Engineering Ethics May 2011 Coleman (1)

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e

Coleman

o am

• Did BE electrical at Auckland University. Now

o most y me ca eng neer ng .

•

five years.

• Currently product development Engineer, for

, .



Some of my own ethical experiences

1. Cable undersized –devon ort naval base. 1985

Had designed a cable that wastoo small. Failed to meet

regu a ons.Cause: I was not experienced

enou h with inade uatesupervision.

2. Mobility Scooter failures1989

Scooter gearboxes failing.Cause: Company out of it’s

-,rode my engineeringconcerns.

y o cs ma er or

Because the public trust us, and we can hurt them if we are not careful.

•There are many ‘grey areas’ in engineering...that can come from..

• or ng outs e your s an exper ence area..

•Trying to meet tough deadlines

• Commercial pressures

•Conflicts of interest

Engineering is a commercial job, it’s a money making job, no-one will hire

you just to make pretty designs, they hire you to make money for them.

, ..



• Your biggest career asset is your reputation

,others can.

• Integrity is why people trust you. Your

emp oyer can on y rus you you ave

integrity.

• Integrity is doing the right thing, even if it mayurt you persona y, or urt your career.

Man recent disasters were ethical failures

Cave creek minin disaster, BP oil s ill, Hun arian toxic

sludge disaster, Toyota sticking accelerator pedal,

,

Being slack is an ethical failure:

-

My biggest lesson “Murphy was an optimist”



Look at IPENZ code

t ca u e nes;o e cs.

Consulting Engineers in NZ need to be registered members of

.

ro ec on o e an a eguar ng eop e: em ers s a recogn se e nee oprotect life and to safeguard people.

Professionalism, Integrity and Competence: Members shall undertake theirengineering activities with professionalism and integrity and shall work within theirlevels of competence.

Commitment to Communit Well-bein : Members shall reco nise the res onsibilit ofthe profession to actively contribute to the well-being of society.

Sustainable Management and Care for the Environment: Members shall recognise'

endeavour to minimise adverse environmental impacts of their engineering activities.Sustaining Engineering Knowledge: Members shall seek to contribute to the

' ,expertise for the benefit of society.

The En ineer

juggling actThe customer

requirementsCare of Theenvironment

NZ

procedures

regulations

and lawsInternational

regulations

Your ethics and training and skill are your platform.



Eth cs n theChoose your future company well.

Before you take a job, make sure you

agree w t t e r et cs an mora s.

Working for someone is like getting

marr e , a r y easy o ge n o, messyto get out of.

Choose your industry carefully, ………do you really want to make cigarettes?

If you work for a foreign company, they may ask you to copy a patented design.What would you do?

How much do you want to impact the environment…No engineering activity is

totall environmentall friendl we ust want to minimise the im act on theenvironment whenever we can.

ENGGEN 115, Engineering Ethics Lecture, N. Coleman 2010

Coleman’s first Law- The mess you will be in, is related exponentially to the time youtake to come clean. Look at To ota and BP for recent exam les.

IMPACT OF DELAY IN COMING CLEAN

25000

15000 I L L

B E I N

10000

A P Y O U

5000 C R

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

TIME TO CONFESS

MISTAKE

WRINGHANDS , TRYTO REPAIR

IN SECRET



group u ng

o William LeMessurier was the structural

engineer in charge of the design.

o Site constraint--historic St. Peter’s

Church obstructed part of the site

o Innovative design solution used“air rights” above the church,

Church.

59 stories high, 7TH tallest building inWorld in 1977


Citi rou buildin

nnovat ve rst oor co umns es gn ,

nine stories high, columns situated in middle of each side of building.

Buildin frame desi ned as series of

welded steel sections.




To employ theinnovative column

layout,LeMessurierdeveloped aseries of diagonalbraces to transferthe upper flooroa s to t e ourcolumns.

Bad news 1:Engineering studentJoel Weistein pointed

out Le Messurier did not

wind loads, which hitthe building at a 45degree angle. Thisoversight revealed that

resulted in a 40%

increase loads overdirect wind, and a 160%increase in the load at

.



Bad news 2:While discussing

another job, LeMessurier found out that

were changed to bolted,instead of the welded joints in the design. Acost saving measure

engineer at LeMessurier’s office.Reduced the strength ofthe frame even more.

Panic stations:Le Messurier went tohis beach house, and

reviewed the design

quarter winds.Concluded that a ‘oncein 16 year’ wind couldtopple the building.

concealing these calcs.

and committing suicide,but felt that wasunethical.



Action plan:Le Messurier told

Citigroup president andlawyers of the danger.

Told them the buildingneeded urgent repairs.(Building was alreadyoccupied.)

Steel strips 50mm thickwere to be welded overevery bolted joint.

Avoiding panic:Repair work done atnight. Office workers did

not know what was.

walls cut open at nightand then repaired afterwelding.Red cross, fire service,

standby.

Media told only buildingwas being ‘upgraded’.



Close call:Half way through

repairs, hurricane Ellaheaded towards New

.

toppled the building.Hours away from amajor evacuation,hurricane Ella changed

.

Work was completed,and not made publicuntil 18 years later, in1995. Now one of

in world.

•Le Messurier did not supervise thecontract closely enough, should

have known about bolted joints.•Nobody is infallible, always getcritical work double checked.

Keeping the repairs secret wasrisky, he was lucky to avoid

.Good•He did the right thing when he

’, .•He took ownership of the fault andtook on the repair work

success u y.



When Computer Engineers Go Bad….

The Char es…

-

data communications manufacturer to win a $115-million

contract to revam the Social Securit Administration's

computer system in 1981 and 1982.

The 1985 indictment alleged conspiracy to defraud, bribery,

,

1981 contract to computerize Social Security field offices.

rosecu ors accuse ara yne o a ng a compu er

demonstration during the bidding process by showing

' .



The Char es…The government alleged that a conspiracy began in

, ,returned in December, 1985. Paradyne was suspended

.

'Empty Box'

e comp a n a ege a w en ara ynecouldn't develop the computer's brain in time for the

',its own. The SEC also contended that the equipment

' .

Paradyne vehemently denied the charges, insisting that" " ….

intended to show how the final product would work, the

e case o t e computer mposter

• The tender stated that there was to be a pre-award demonstration of the product, and

s ecificall rohibited the demonstration of a rotot e.

• Paradyne demonstrated to SSA a different computer, a modified Digital Equipment

Corporation PDP 11/23 computer placed in a cabinet that was labeled P8400.• Many of the DEC labels on the equipment that was demonstrated to SSA had

Paradyne labels pasted over them.

• Subsequent investigation by SSA indicated that the product supplied by Paradyne

was not an off-the-shelf system. In Paradyne’s response to the RFP, they had

propose se ng e r mo e w e opera ng sys em.

• The bid was written as if this system already existed. However, at the time that the

bid was prepared, the 8400 system did not exist, and had not been developed,prototyped, or manufactured!



e way we g ourse ves nto o es

• Problems occurred immediately upon award of the contract when the

Paradyne computers failed the acceptance testing.

….• The SSA subsequently relaxed the requirements so that the Paradyne

com uters would ass acce tance testin .

• After delivery, many SSA field offices reported frequent malfunctions,

sometimes multiple times per day, requiring manual rebooting of the

system.

• Subsequent investigation by SSA indicated that the product supplied by

ara yne was not an o -t e-s e system.

processor, as was the P8400 they proposed, it was irrelevant if the machine

demonstrated was the DEC or the actual P8400. What the! ???

ng neers e ng suc e a ong…

• Engineers mocked up the pretend computer and Engineers wrote the software .

• In preparing their bid, Paradyne wrote in the present tense as if the computer they

proposed currently existed, when it wasn’t even a prototype.

• Paradyne claimed that the use of the present tense in their bid was acceptable since.

• But the customer (the SSA) was also at fault• Once the Paradyne machine failed the initial acceptance test, should the

requirements have been relaxed to help the machine qualify?

• If the requirements were going to be modified, shouldn’t the bidding process have

been reo ened to the other bidders and others who mi ht now be able to bid?

• In the End, the entire Paradyne computer system was replaced after only a few

years in use, it never worked properly, for a cost of over USD $115 M to the US

Govt.



The FORD Pinto

• "You don't want to talk

a out t e nto, sa aFord official. "Leave thatone in the cemeter ."

• When eo le talk abouthow bad American smallcars created an

Japanese to come in andclean house in the 1970sand '80s, they are referringto vehicles like this.

or ss on a emen

• “ ,proud heritage, passionately committedto providing outstanding products andservices that im rove eo le’s lives.”



• In Ma of 1968, the Ford

Motor Company, based upon

vice-president Lee Iacocca,

decided to introduce a

it domestically. The

automobile was designed and

schedule. During the firstfew years sales of the Pinto

were excellent but there was

trouble on the horizon.

Time f ram e 23 mont hs to r o l l -ou t (not 45 as

norma l )

PRODUCT OBJ ECTIVES:

1. TRUE SUB COMPACT :

Size & Weight

2. LOW COST OF OWNERSHIPn a pr c e, ue c onsum p on, e a y

Serv iceab i l i t y

.

Appearanc e, Com for t , Features,

,

Lee Iacocca was fond of sa in ,

"Safety doesn't sell."



as an on gurat on

• -

• Easiest and cheapest design

ompany u ure

• Of 40 tests, 37 resulted in rupturedas tanks. Was Iacocca told?

• "Hell no," replied an engineer whoworked on the Pinto. "That ersonwould have been fired.

• Safet wasn't a o ular sub ectaround Ford. Whenever a problemwas raised that meant a delay onthe Pinto, Lee would chomp on hiscigar, look out the window and say'get back to work.'"



e momen um o sas er

• More crash tests showed that a one-pound,

one- o ar p ece o p ast c wou stop t euncture of the as tank.

• The idea was thrown out as extra cost and

extra weight.

, .

• Where were the ethical Engineers?

p n o urn ng

People started to die in rear end

collisions, often burnt to death.



What life was worth in 1971:

e or os - ene na ys s• Component 1971 Costs

• Future Productivity Losses

Direct $132,000

n rec ,Medical Costs

• Hos ital 700

• Other $ 425

Pro ert Dama e 1 500 Insurance Administration $ 4,700Legal and Court $3,000Em lo er Losses 1 000Victim's Pain and Suffering $10,000Funeral $900Assets (Lost Consumption) $5,000Miscellaneous $200

Total Per Fatality $200,725

or cos - ene ana ys s



corpora on prosecu e• n anuary , , t e or otor ompany went on tr a

on charges of reckless homicide in the 1978 death of threeIndiana teena ers who burned to death after their 1973 FortPinto was hit from behind by a van.

• Indiana state prosecutors alleged that Ford knew Pintogaso ne tan s were prone to catc re ur ng rear-encollisions -but failed to warn the public or fix the problem outof concern for rofits.

• The trial marked the first time that an American corporationwas prosecuted on criminal charges—in this case, recklessom c e.

• Ford was acquitted in March; the case was too complex.

• ate n , or reca e a - nto mo e s .million cars) The Pinto was discontinued in fall 1980.

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER

1. Space shuttle challenger 1986. O-rings failed on booster rocket. Entire

crew killed. Engineers recommended no launch but were over-ruled by

management. What went wrong?



SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER

1. O-rings in solid rocket boosters were discovered to be failing as early

. ,

investigating the o-rings, decided they were unsafe, and wrote to

management urging no more launches with this design.

The solid rocket boosters (SRB),relied on a seal made with two o-

rin s. If both o-rin s failed hot

rocket fuel would burn through theside of the SRB.

Morton Thiokol, Inc

Wasatch Division

Interoffice Memo

31 July 1985

2870:FY86:073 TO: R. K. Lund Vice President, Engineering

CC: B. C. Brinton, A. J. McDonald, L. H. Sayer, J. R. Kapp

FROM: R. M. BoisjolyApplied Mechanics - Ext. 3525

-

This letter is written to insure that management is fully aware of the seriousness of the current O-ring erosion problem in

the SRM joints from an engineering standpoint.

The mistakenly accepted position on the joint problem was to fly without fear of failure and to run a series of design

evaluations which would ultimately lead to a solution or at least a significant reduction of the erosion problem. This

position is now drastically changed as a result of the SRM 16A nozzle joint erosion which eroded a secondary O-ring with

the rimar O-rin never sealin .

If the same scenario should occur in a field joint (and it could), then it is a jump ball as to the success or failure of the jointbecause the secondary O-ring cannot respond to the clevis opening rate and may not be capable of pressurization. The result

would be a catastrophe of the highest order - loss of human life.

It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take immediate action to dedicate a team to solve the problem with the

field joint having the number one priority, then we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad

facilities.

R. M. Boisjoly



SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER1. Roger Boisjoly’s urgings were ignored by management at Morton

o o , an t e next a enger aunc was sc e u e or anuary

28th 1986.

,had a conference call with Nasa, who wereconcerned about the safety of the launch in the

su zero empera ures. oger o s o y was nthe conference call meeting. Off line hestrongly urged postponing the launch. ..After

much discussion, Jerald Mason, (generalmanager at Thiokol), turned to Lund (Thiokol

chief en ineer , and said, "Take off ourengineering hat and put on your managementhat," a phrase that has become famous in

ethics discussions. Lund reversed his previous

decision and recommended that the launch.

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER1. Due to the freezing temperatures, the first O-ring was frozen stiff, it

a e qu c y. e secon -r ng a so a e a er a eo . p ume o

gas was seen escaping from the Solid Fuel Booster.

The space shuttle disintegrated

,were lost.

In the ensuing enquiry, Roger

Boisjoly testified about his

.Morton Thiacol, and left soon

after. He is now held up as an

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Engineering Ethics May 2011 Coleman (1)