Enfolding Theology with Peirce

8/20/2019 Enfolding Theology with Peirce

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If one subscribes, as I do, to a polydoxic, tehomic panentheism, what does that say and not say?

Without discussing that stance, in particular, let's explore some norms for the interface of

theology and metaphysics, in general, first.

Our interpretations of reality's regularities will influence our theopoetics.

As metaphysical realists, we affirm reality's givenness, ataphatically, aspiring to descriptive

accuracy via affirmations. As metaphysical fallibilists, we acnowledge these constructions,

apophatically, negating the ever!cascading, yet ever!collapsing, root metaphors, which interpret

those descriptions, which model but do not explain reality's rules or regularities.

As fallibilists, we recogni"e that our epistemic states, variously interpreting a given reality as

determinable or indeterminable, converge on reality's ontic states, which may be variously

determined or indetermined, but we do so in an inescapably anthropometric way. #his presents a

challenge as we hope to avoid anthropomorphic pro$ections of our epistemic states onto reality's

ontic states.I would argue that, whether in science, philosophy, metaphysics or theology, in

every great school or tradition, there have been saving remnants offering prophetic criticisms,

urging an ongoing dialectic of ataphasis and apophasis, whether, for example, %& opper via

falsification or alternating con$ecture and criticism( )& *odel via incompleteness theorems( +&

cotus via the formal distinction( -& eirce via a modal ontology that prescinds from necessity

to probability( & emergentisms, which modestly avoid supervenience( /& 0awing, who has

lately gathered the godelian implications for physics( 1& apophatic cohorts of every great

religious tradition and so on.

If human epistemology remains ineluctably anthropometric and human axiology remains properly anthropocentric 2although more suitably attenuated, nowadays, by a hierachy of

intrinsic values, which extends moral considerability throughout reality's pan!, physio!, bio!,

phyto!, "oo! and anthropo!semiotic spheres&, then our participatory imaginations,

understandably, will remain challenged by the constant intrusion of an anthropomorphic

imaginary.

#his challenge, then, presents in our tendencies to rush to closure, to prove too much, to say

way more than we can possibly now, to tell untellable stories. aradoxically, the taming or

domestication of this regnant anthropomorphism will re3uire the unleashing and uncaging of its

anthroposemiotic imaginaries that they may wander free and wonder much in the pansemiotic

wilds.

4oncretely, then, what might a more thoroughly pansemiotic imaginary loo lie?

In my experience, it will loo %& less hierarchical and more egalitarian( )& less reliant on the

privileged and institutional and more attendant to the marginal and noninstitutional( +& less

pervasively de5constructive and more ubi3uitously reconstructive( -& less preoccupied with

evidential theodicies and more satisfied by logical defenses( & more focused on belonging and

desiring, orthocommunally and orthopathically, while less focused on behaving and believing,

orthopraxically and orthodoxically( /& less focused on philosophical theology, metaphysically,

while more focused on theologies of nature, liturgically( 1& granting hermeneutical primacy to


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the pneumatocentric and agapic, polydoxically, recogni"ing the plurality of sophiological

tra$ectories even given a singular soteriological account of human authenticity and conversions(

and so on.

#here's a tension between the goals of deemphasi"ing theodicies and emphasi"ing defenses,

while, at the same time, focusing less on philosophical theology and more on theologies of

nature. After all, philosophical theologies articulate logical defenses, while theologies of nature

celebrate evidential resonances, which precisely reinforce the plausibility of those defenses. I

will try to explicate and resolve this tension more concretely, below.

In taing account of godel!lie constraints on physical theories, 0awing suggested that, when

confronted with a choice between consistency and completeness, the good money is on

consistency. imilarly, the more sage atheological critics have retreated in recent years, many

indeed surrendering, conceding that logical defenses of *od, properly nuanced, will inevitably

succeed( they have drawn bac from their ramparts, where they've attaced the conceptual

consistency, logically, whether of classic, open, process or other interpretations, and now lob the

weaer philosophic ordnance of evidential implausibility. It is in this latter sense, then, that I

suggest we accept our theo!logic victory, whether we're flying the battle flag of Augustine,

lantinga or *riffin, aware that neither the noncognitivists nor ignostics nor atheologians have

ever demonstrated any unreasonableness of faith, logically. hilosophical theology has, as ever

and always, done its $ob of 2re&establishing the life of faith as a forced, vital and live option that

can be eminently reasonable, logically, and supremely actionable, existentially.

It in the above sense, then, that I suggest that philosophical theology, beginning from reason,

has done its $ob. In a real sense, its tas is done( its wor is finished. When I recommendemphasi"ing defenses, then, that's only in the sense of engaging the noncognitivists, ignostics

and atheologians on that ground, logically, while not being drawn into epistemic battle,

evidentially. #here's an old pedagogical saying !!! we don't teach pigs to fly because, for

starters, they cannot fly and, besides, it annoys the pig. o, when I suggest we focus more on

theologies of nature but less on theodicies, there's no contradiction, because I'm all for

evidential reverie, liturgically, $ust not evidential repartee, metaphysically. #he reason is that

plausibility and implausibility are way too wealy probabilistic, trafficing in a dyadic cycling

of only abductive hypothesi"ing and deductive clarifying unable to avail themselves of any

robustly inductive testing, which is necessary to complete the epistemically virtuous cycling of

triadic inferences. 6ore succinctly, any final ad$udication of competing logical conceptions and

interpretations regarding primal and5or ultimate realities, even of their initial, boundary and

limit conditions, can not, in principle, be delivered in terms metaphysical necessity, i.e. in terms

of explanatory ade3uacy regarding reality's rules, axioms and regularities. Instead, science,

probabilistically, models such rules but does not explain them.

#his is not only true for any cosmogony that extends, interpretively, for our cosmological

descriptions. It applies across our emergentist heuristic. It's the case for any 3uantum

interpretation that extends from the descriptions of 3uantum mechanics. o, too, regarding the

biopoietic origins of life, those descriptions remain open to a5biogenic interpretations. Our

neuroscientific descriptions extend, interpretively, to a plurality of philosophies of mind.


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7escriptions of symbolic human consciouness extend, interpretively, to any number of

anthroposemiotic accounts.

Whether 3uantum, cosmic, biopoietic, "oopoietic 2sentient& or anthropopoietic 2sapient& origins,our emergentist heuristic, eschewing invocations of supervenience, which remain 3uestion

begging for strong, trivial for wea, emergences, provides only conceptual placeholders,

epistemic boomars, where explanatory ade3uacy eludes us. #hese boomars remain on the

blan pages of our probabilistic, scientific, descriptive modeling narratives. #hey won't be filled

in by plausibilistic, metaphysical, interpretive explanatory metanarratives. #his is to recogni"e

that epistemic states of in5determinable realities might be ontologically suggestive of various

putative ontic states of in5determined realities, but they should not, a priori, be considered

decisive.

6ore concretely, coming full circle bac to out theopoetics and theologies of nature, what I am

suggesting is that we engage them widely and wildly with an aim to celebrate the metaphorical

imagery of our descriptive sciences and interpretive metaphysics, fired by our pneumatological

imaginations, all to enhance our devotions, liturgies and psalmody, but letting such cascading

metaphors collapse prior to any temptation to employ them logocentrically in any evidential

theology or apologetic. In a peircean normativity, aesthetics precedes ethics which precedes

logic. #he highest and best use of our theopoetic adventures is thus an affective attunement to

oneself, to others, to *od, to the cosmos, via the cult!ivation of an evaluative dis!position and

not, rather, the articulation of descriptive or interpretive pro!positions, which cannot aspire to

robustly probabilistic argumentation.

hilosophical theology has done, already, what it can to mae the life of faith logicallyconsistent, externally congruent, internally coherent, existentially actionable and a host of other

virtuous epistemic criteria. uch reason taes us only so far, where forced, vital and live options

becon a leap of faith. uitably chasti"ed by the epistemic inade3uacies of plausibilities and

implausibilities, evidentially, we'd do very well not to overinvest, theopoetically, in one %&

3uantum interpretation or another 28ohm vs 4openhagen vs ...&( )& cosmogony or the next

2cyclical, oscillating, singularity, un5bounded, in5finite, ...&( +& biopoietic or another 2abiogenesis

or vitalism or ...&( -& philosophy of mind or another 2physicalist or csc as primitive or ...&( &

anthropopoietic or another 2anthropic principle or irreducible complexity or ...&. A robust

panentheism needn't place *od along reality's seams, evidentially, when it has already affirmed

that 5he's been dyed into its fabric, theo!logically.

I am sympathetic to anti!theodicies but wonder, sometimes, if they are but the obverse side of an

evidential coin that has no evidential purchase, anyway, whether heads or tails, in the same way

that nominalism and essentialism moreso represent the same wrong 3uestion than they do any

coherent answers. If our logical defenses have already secured for us an opening for faith, our

evidential theodicies only concede more epistemic force and normative significance to

atheological implausibilities than they actually warrant. 9et us celebrate our metanarrative

consistencies without lamenting their ineluctable incompleteness, for that, pragmatically, is

where the good money has always been wager, the best life has always been lived.

#his is to suggest, also, that our anxiety to overcome every form of insidious !ism cannot finally

determine our choice of 3uantum interpretation, our cosmogony, our biopoietics, our philosophy


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of mind or our anthropic principles. Which aspects of reality are eventually found

in5determinable, in5determined, probabilistic or necessary, brute or 3uestion begging, will

always mae for richer psalmody, greater affective attunement, more consoling evaluative

dispositions, devotionally and liturgically. #he phenomenological taxonomy of our epistemicstates, though, does not gift us an infallible metaphysical map of reality's ontic states, not for

proximate realities, not for primal realities and especially not for ultimate realities. If theodicy

problems, present, it's not because we have the wrong answers, evidentially, but only because

we've ased the wrong 3uestions, logically, which includes the use of incoherent, inconsistent,

incompatible god!conceptions, proving too much, telling untellable stories, saying way more

than we can possibly now, rushing to metaphysical closure.

6ost concretely, now, those who've most consistently grappled with the putative divine

attributes are the cyber!interlocutors of #ripp :uller's ;0omebrewed 4hristianity,; whose

emphases have been, logically, on conceptual clarity and consistency< 8racen, 4obb, 4aputo,

=eller, Oord, 4layton, >ong and their il, whose appeals have been, evidentially, in a word,

muted, apophatically tempered, but whose celebrations have engaged every cascading metaphor

ceremoniously, ataphatically enriched, even as those analogies inevitably collapse into the

luminous darness of faith.

I intuit a vague panentheistic reality, where a creatio ex profundis brings

coeternal kenotic and tehomic elds into relationship, each eld a dynamic,

open, relational reality of ever-emergent novelties, which participate in an

eternal fugue of peircean 1ns, 2ns and 3ns, each with its own inviolable

logic of indeterminables andor indetermined realities!

"here these tehomic and kenotic elds overlap a creatio ex nihilo presents

as a cosmic reality, wherein we participate!

In my view, the tehomic logic accounts for emergent teloi, which include the

teleomatic, ententional regularities #pansemiotic$, the teleonomic purposive

realities #biosemiotic sentience$ and teleodynamic purposeful realities

#sapience$! %ehomic emergence, then, would account for free #enough$ willand anthroposemiotic value-reali&ations!

%he triadic #trinitarian$ kenotic eld #erotic, philic, agapic$ with that divine

logic you described, variously constrained #exactly how ' to what degree

remaining a mystery$ by the tehomic logic, co-participates in the cosmic

eld, eternali&ing every trace of emergent truth, beauty, goodness and unity

in a way that, eschatologically, will be utterly e(cacious, while ineluctably

unobtrustive, cosmically! )roleptically, we witness these kenotic in*uences

in various degrees!


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+uering can be transformed, agapically, good soteriologically harvested,

but is otherwise part of a tehomic logic! "hat the kenotic eld, od, can doto eliminate or alleviate it, without violating tehomic or agapic logics, od

does do, invariably! %./% this is so is a vague creedal stance0 ." ' ".

otherwise properly invites both metaphysical and theological skepticism!

)atterns that we encounter in both tehomic and kenotic elds, as well as the

cosmic eld, where they interpenetrate, reveal both, high and low,

freuencies and amplitudes, of interactivity such that 1$ low freuency, low

amplitude a-pathetic indierence and 2$ high fruency, high amplitude

pathetic interference yield, instead, to 3$ low freuency, high amplitudeinterventions and, more the predominant pattern, 4$ high freuency, low

amplitude in*uence! %his pattern predominates in nature, such as

throughout evolution, in human relationships, such as in codependency, and

in divine interactivity, such as in kenotic dynamics, the agapic +pirit,

coaxing, luring, inviting, seducing but never coercing the emergence and

eternali&ation of truth, beauty, goodness, unity and freedom!

"ell, that5s hard to set forth in a 6eader5s 7igest condensed version, but I

hope you intuit the resonances! 8y stance is, more succinctly, a polydoxic,

tehomic, pan-semio-entheism, which a(rms both a creatio ex profundis, the

kenotic initiative, and ex nihilo, the cosmic emergent!

#he interventions, above, are sym!pathetic, the influences, em!pathetic. eality, generally

eschews a!pathetic indifference or co!dependent, pathetic interference. Influence and

intervention present on a continuum of the axis of co!creativity. Indifference and interference

present on the axis of codependency. What@s coaxed forward is human authenticity 29onergan@s

conversions&.

egarding regularities and invocation of eirce<

uccessful references, metaphysically, remain !!! not only necessary, but !!! sufficient for

human value!reali"ations even as we aspire to and strive for ever more successful descriptions,

whether in science, philosophy or theology.

We thus describe, in moments of poetic ataphasis, that which has been, provisionally,

ontologically ;suggested; by our various axiological reali"ations. #hen, in moments of

apophatic negation, we thus prescind from these specific descriptions bac to our vague


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references, nowing in this moment of unnowing, saying in this moment of unsaying, that

nothing has been, finally, ontologically ;decided.;

#his was philosophically intuited in cotus' formal distinction and in eirce's thirdness, whereour modal ontology prescinds from the possible, actual and ;necessay; to the possible, actual

and ;probable.;

What's going on here is a holding of tension or a certain ontological agnosticism regarding

reality's regularities, between stochasticity and nomicity, between patterns and paradox, order

and chaos, symmetry and asymmetry, chance and necessity, random and systematic, whereby

our epistemic in5determinacies aren't a priori interpreted, ontologically, as necessarily due to

either indetermined or determined realities 2or various degrees or blends thereof&.

#his is to recogni"e that an in5determinate epistemic state might suggest an in5determined ontic

state but not in a decisive metaphysical fashion, thus a plurality of interpretations is invited, poetically. A reality that remains utterly incomprehensible, apophatically, nevertheless presents

as eminently and infinitely and richly intelligible, ataphatically.Our ataphatic descriptions

serve, then, as conceptual and axiological placeholders, as fecund heuristic devices, maring

those epistemic states that confront us at given ontological $unctures, where explanatory

ade3uacy eludes us.

:or example, whether 3uantum origins, cosmic origins, biogenic origins, sentient origins

2consciouness& or sapient origins 2symbolic language&, our descriptive modeling attempts and

phenomenological taxonomies must not be mistaen for explanations. uantum mechanics

invites a plurality of interpretations. 4osmological data invite a plurality of cosmogonies.

A5biogenesis posits a plurality of interpretations of how the robustly biosemiotic emerged from

the merely physiosemiotic. Beuroscience invites a number of philosophies of mind. If the

origins of sentience remain problematic, the so!called hard problem, how much more

problematic are the origins of sapience and anthroposemiotic symbolic language?

#hus the epistemic humility of cotus' formal distinction and eirce's modal phenomenology

instructs us in science and, if there, how much more in metaphysics and, if there, how much

more in theology?;

below is redacted correspondence of my friend across the big pond, 9ambrusco

Whatever ascal really intended,we best draw a distinction between speculative and practical reason.

I would interpret both ascal's Wager and Wm. Cames' 'forced option' as forms of practical reason.

Cames also described this 'option' as 'vital.' We might say, then, that this option hasmomentous existential significance.


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Cames also described it as a 'live' option. :or me, this is where speculative reason comesin. ascal's Wager, in my view, could not reasonably argue against one's use of speculative reason per se. :or an option to be 'live,' then, it must at least be e3uiprobable

vis a vis competing interpretations.

#here are indeed competing metaphysical interpretations that refer to ultimate reality.Whatever other epistemic virtues they might en$oy, they don't en$oy falsifiability, aren'tempirical or robustly probable but merely plausible. In that sense, interpretations of ultimate reality can compete, leaving us with several 'live' options.

At this point, we 'leave' our spculative reason behind, but only because we havedutifully exhausted its resources. Which forced, vital and live option do we choose?

We turn to practical reason and an existential dis$unction, to live A I: this or that. o,

our practical decision, our wager, moreso has 'performative' but less so informativesignificance.

#his e3uiprobability or e3uiplausibility principle suggests !!! when we encounter acoiled ob$ect on the floor of a dimly lit cave, unsure whether it's a snae or a rope !!!that we $ump over it, for that's the safer course. We've nothing to lose by leaping over itif it's a rope, much to gain if it's a snaeD

If there's an illuminating epistemic fire burning in that cave, we are obliged to use thelight of reason to delimit, probabilistically, which options are truly live.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

We do not now whether the concept 'nothing' successfully refers to reality, whether temporally or atemporally?

Also, implicitly presupposed in the 3uestion 'why not rather nothing?' is the principle of sufficient reason EF. We do not now whether it successfully refers because wecannot a priori now whether reality as a whole begs an explanation. 2:allacy of 4omposition may or may not apply, who nows?&

Our ability to navigate reality successfully evolved in a milieu of sufficient probabilities. #hose probabilities remain metaphysically vague. #hey have epistemicsignificance as regularities, but that, alone, doesn't tell us whether they also haveontological significance as 'regulators.' If they are regulators, thin laws 2nomicity, it'scalled&, we still don't a priori now whether they're emergent, local and ephemeralversus primitive, universal and eternal.

ut more simply, in a modal ontology of possibilities, actualities and probabilities, wedo not now whether those putative probabilities, which are often called 'necessities,'successfully refer to reality either.


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Without %& the , )& eternal laws, +& modal necessity or -& reality as a whole beggingan explanation, the concept !!!'nothing' !!! maes no reference?

#o mae this an atheistic argument rather than what I suppose is $ust a metaphysicalagnosticism, one would have to move from the logical, rational sphere where this matter cannot be ad$udicated to the evidential and press weaer claims, perhaps suggesting theimplausibility of those implicit metaphysical presuppositions that mae the 3uestion

prima facie reasonable. In other words, challenge the + B's that ground the <nomicity, necessity G nothing.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

#he defenses argued against the logical problem, for the most part, succeed because theclaims are too strong.

6ost fall bac, then, to weaer claims by advancing evidential arguments suggestingvarious degrees of implausibility. :rom a common sense perspective, implausibilitysucceeds to a degree in persuasion. hilosophically, that type of rhetoric is lessinteresting to me because it's $ust not robustly probabilistic.

#heodicies that respond to evidential arguments can become even more problematic.:or starters, they often seem to me to triviali"e the enormity of human suffering,immensity of human pain and horror of both personal and natural evil. Also, they sound

blasphemous to me in their arrogant presumption to comprehend the divine will.

till, those !!! who argue that the remedy, a theological septicism, maes *od way tooinscrutable !!! are wrong. If *od is, in part, utterly incomprehensible, it doesn't followthat he's not, at the same time, intelligible enough for humans to discern 0is nature,generally and vaguely. Whether one confronts the evidential problem of evil or itscorollary problem of good, explaining either *od's nonintervention or interactivity, one

best simply affirm, for example, #0A#, while miracles can happen or good can comefrom evil, following both inscrutable divine and natural logics, the when, where, 0OWand why or why not warrants a certain agnosticism regarding specifics.

All that aside, having said nothing new !!! some may find of interest< Others and my

own reading of *enesis taes its references to the deep, the abyss or the tehom asimplying !!! not a creatio ex nihilo, not as classically conceived, anyway, but !!! acreatio ex profundis.

As such, our cosmic experiences putatively derive from a co!eternal interactivity between a tehomic realm 2chaos, formless void, etc& and agapic realm 2truth, beauty,goodness, unity, freedom H love&, both constrained by their eternal logics, *od notomnipotent in the classical sense 2thin 0artshorne, Whitehead, *riffin& but ;powerfulenough; to coax 0er eschatological 2fullness& realities forth, eternali"ing every trace of human goodness, every beginning of a smile, all wholesome trivialities.


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#here's more nuance than would be charitable to share in a single post, but anyinterested might investigate a #0O6I4 panentheism, wherein *od neither maesrocs so big 0e cannot pic them up nor human wills whose freedom *odde can tae

away.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

#he 3uestion relies on indispensable methodological stipulations to various epistemicand metaphysical presuppositions.

8eyond the principles of identity, excluded middle, noncontradiction and sufficientreason ...

In addition to a modal ontology of possibilities, actualities and probabilities ...

6oving past nomicity, necessity and common sense notions of causation ...

We can still as which root metaphor one presupposes for one's metaphysic?

If one stics with a static notion lie substance orEiFbeingE5iF, then, the only way I could ever mae sense of the 3uestion was to rephraseit EiFwhy is there not rather something else?E5iF.

I haven't EiFa prioriE5iF and cursorily dismissed the concept's meaningfulness on literalgrounds precisely because I suspect some #homist will come along and nuance it insome essentialistic, substance ontology that I don't want to have to inhabit in order todefend my own arguments. I'd rather hop around on the surface of common sense thanhead down some ontological rabbit hole. I don't have an ideological dog in that hunt, sodon't feel strongly about 'nothing' one way or the other.


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I have often wondered what EiFnothingE5iFmight refer to in a 3uestion lie EiFwhy is there not rather no!thing, which is to reallyas, why is there not rather no process or no becomingE5iF?

At stae are notions of causation, including not only efficient but minimalistconceptions of formal and final. What gets set aside is material causation. I'm willing toleave that open, not imagining that EiFnothingE5iF cannot successfully refer $ust becausemy methodological stipulations suggest that's the case. Our methodological stipulationsto certain metaphysical presuppositions may be ontologically suggestive but we're

proving too much to claim they're necessarily decisive?!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

0eading down the rabbit hole, then ...

%& A lot of metaphysics turns on one's chosen EbFroot metaphor,E5bF e.g. being vs becoming, substance vs process.

)& ven after opting for a root metaphor!!! let's stay with being !!! we must determinewhether another is speaing a& EbF univocallyE5bF, b& EbFe3uivocallyE5bF or c&EbFanalogicallyE5bF of being as one moves from a descriptive physics to a normativemetaphysics.

+& #he former employs a modal ontology of possibility, actuality and probability, whichhas an implicit grammar. Boncontradiction EB4F and excluded middle E6Fvariously hold or fold in these categories. :or a& EbFpossibilitiesE5bF, only 6 holds.:or b& EbFactualitiesE5bF, 6 and B4 hold. :or c& EbFprobabilitiesE5bF, only B4holds.

-& till, the grammar of that modal ontology, alone, does not drive us, algorithmically,to ontological conclusions, whether from physical or metaphysical premises. We mustfirst define our root metaphor, in this case being, revealing our univocal, e3uivocal or

analogical predications.

What often happens, then, is that our ontological conclusions are not flowing from our modal logic or metaphysical premises, alone, but can be found already buried in our definitions, for example, of being and nonbeing.

9et's see what happens to our modal ontology and its grammar when we tiner with our definitions.


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:rom a vague phenomenological perspective, which bracets metaphysics<

%& mere possibilities can be conceived in terms of the clearly a&EbFinstantiatedE5bF2actual&, b& EbFnoninstantiatedE5bF 2pure& or c& EbFvirtualE5bF 2neither, but 'as if' actual&.

)& mere probabilities 2uniformities, tendencies, regularities& can be conceived in termsof a& EbFnomicityE5bF 2deterministic&, b& EbFstochasticityE5bF 2indeterministic& or c&EbFpropensityE5bF 2neither, but virtual, cf. opper, eirce, cotus&.

& Any given belief that a given concept may or may not successfully refer to reality is atrope contained in a philosophical fortune cooie. #hat cooie and its tailored message

have already been baed to order. #hey will thus match those tastes that would best gowith the metaphysical selections that one has already made off the above!listed 4hinese6enu of epistemic and ontic entrees.

#o mae these distinctions more concrete, let's loo at an example of how we canreimagine and redefine concepts and what practical implications might flow therefrom.9et's avoid the e3uivocal and analogical predications that lead, via their implictmetaphysical presuppositions, to concepts lie absolute nonbeing, both because they'remore controversial and, to me, less interesting. Also, let's remain agnostic regarding thenature of the possibilities 2non5instantiated& and probabilities 2nomicity5stochasticity& in

play and tiner only with a definition or interpretation.

Instead of imagining the origin of our space!time!mass!energy plenum in terms of aspatial singularity, let's employ, instead, a EiFtemporalE5iF point. 8ecause the taing of the s3uare root of negative one produces a complex number, metaphysically mapping asa higher dimension, it will physically manifest as asymmetric temporality 2the

proverbial arrow of time&. o far, so good.

#his avoids many of the problems with spatial singularities, such as classical theory andrelativity breaing down as we approach #HJ. It allows for 3uantum effects on a cosmicscale, due to an infinestimally small cosmos. Interesting solution.

8ut what type of 3uantum effect or event?

articles arise in vacuums by borrowing surrounding energy. #o conserve energy, such aspontaneous particle and anti!particle annihilate each other within a 3uantum time limit,remaining virtual, while net energy remains the same. 0ere, EiFno!thingE5iF might refer


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to an absence of spatiotemporal observables, epistemology modeling ontology. It clearlydoesn't refer to the presupposed energetic milieu.

Bow, in classical theory, blac holes allow no thermal energy escape. What if blac holes could evaporate by allowing the emission of 3uantum radiation?

If, when a spontaneous particle pair arises, should one escape the blac hole, while theother gets trapped, they will both become EbFrealE5bF, the former carrying mass!energyaway, spatio!temporally, and asymmetrically 2arrow of time&, the latter shrining the

blac hole.

4onceptually, then, by using the s3uare root of negative one, we can model a cosmicorigin that's conceivably consistent with both classical and 3uantum theory. It re3uiressome nonuniformity, however small 2which I lie to conceive as chaos&.

6etaphysically, while there would be no problematic #HJ and our conceptuali"ations of efficient causation would need tweaing, the # at singularity would be symmetric,which, of course, seems absurd.

What could this mean regarding our conventional understandings of the relationships between initial, limit, boundary and final conditions?

We see the 'Arrow of #ime' operating for thermodynamic, cosmological andepistemological realities. What would be the relationship between the uantum Arrowof time, which seems to have arrowheads on both ends, and our other experiences of reality, which have an ontologically penetrating arrowhead on one end and anepistemologically stabili"ing fletching of feathers on the other?

It seems that the Arrow, informationally, comes from increasing correlations, whichmodel e3uilibrations of entangled states. tates collide, energy disperses, ob$ectse3uilibrate. #ime's arrow, then, while reversible in theory, for all practical purposes,remains asymmetric because there are way too many mixed states, exhibiting anadvance toward e3uilibrium, and far too few pure states, which are 'ordered' and notravaged by entropy.

A finite, unbounded universe could exhibit an eternal flux between pattern and paradox,the random and systematic, symmetry and asymmetry, order and chaos, contingency andnecessity. 8ut not between being and nothing, unless a putative nonspatial, atemporality


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would refer to EbFnothingE5bF. 8ut that would still be only in the sense of being,energetically, EbFEiFsomething elseE5iFE5bF.

:inally, new 3uestions beg if one posits the singularity this way. Why was the initialstate far from e3uilibrium? 7oes the concept EiFintialE5iF successfully refer?

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

In my view ...

Why is there not rather nothing? or Why is there not rather something else? or It's not0OW things are but #0A# things are which is the mystical? or It's neither how thingsare nor that things are but that #0 #0IB* are which is the mystical?

Which of these 3uestions mae sense, in whose metaphysic?

A given metaphysic, as an interpretive stance, provides a normative heuristic, whichcould variously foster or hinder human value!reali"ations but doesn't add newinformation to our systems. It can demonstrate the reasonableness of our 3uestionsregarding many realities but, properly received, leaves those regarding first and lastthings begging.

I precisely wondered, when the 0iggs boson news broe, whether it spoe to my3uestions regarding the putative asymmetries near any singularity, however it'sconceived.

While metaphysical speculations regarding putative ultimate realities remain especially problematic, those regarding penultimate realities remain indispensable heuristicdevices.

Abductive!transductive inference, meaning analogical inference to the best explanation,coupled with deductive clarifying, paves the way to the next best round of inductivetesting. In abduction or retroduction, we can loo at various effects as might be proper

to no nown causes and reason analogically how the unnown cause is lie or not liethose that are nown.

#his is what happens when fols argue whether this universe as a whole begsexplanations not provided by its parts. We do face *odelian!lie constraints in formallyformulating a #heory of verything E#OF.

8ut the practical upshot of incompleteness is not that we necessarily could not taste andsee the truth of our axioms, only that we could not prove them in a closed, formalsymbol system. I have never gone through the rincipia with ussell G Whitehead, andone would need to go at least halfway, in order to satisfy myself regarding the axioms

that ground )K)H-. We cannot EiFa prioriE5iF say whether the axioms of some future #O


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will be interesting, controversial or seemingly trivial. We will evaluate it, pragmatically, based on the values which we'll be able to cash out or not.

#he anthropic principle, as it stands, rests on a conceptual confusion between chanceand coincidence. Lnless and until we learn a lot more about the initial conditions of theuniverse, we don't now what should be reasonably ;expected; regarding our existence.

o, we shouldn't rush to closure regarding either metaphysics or epistemic probes. Weshould cave neither to mysterianism nor naive realism. We should aspire to proceedfallibly but inexorably.

If we dispatch metaphysics, we'll abandon highly theoretic sciences, too. We aspire beyond descriptive accuracy to explanatory ade3uacy, the latter evaluated by pragmaticmetrics. I say let a thousand 3uantum interpretations bloom for our 3uantum mechanics,

then cash out their values, or pluc their friits, if any, . in advances in 3uantumcomputing, energy production or who nows what.

9et 6 birth 3uantum interpretations, neuroscience birth philosophies of mind andcosmology birth cosmogonies. Lntil we negotiate those interpretations, how could we

presume to ad$udicate primal much less ultimate realities?

We always hope the merely plausibilist can become robustly probable for any givenreality. I don't have a 3uarrel with competing plausible interpretations of any reality,whether proximate, primal or ultimate. 6y concern is with how much normativeimpetus 2especially for others' behavior& some aspire to exert vis a vis our consensusregarding rules of evidence and burdens of proof.

What does another want to demand of me based on their interpretation of reality, basedon what epistemic warrants or normative $ustifications?

#hat's a political reality. #han the founders for nonestablishment and free exercise and pity those who don't en$oy sameD

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

6y $uxtaposition of those various taes on the mystical, posed as an interrogatory, onlymeans I'm agnostic regarding same, over against either a god of the gaps mysterianismor a scientistic, logical positivism.

Once again, I'm metaphysically agnostic regarding that, over against either ussell or those who invoe the principle.


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A problem arises in any invocation of a strong anthropic principle. 2#he wea version istrivial.& #he problem results, in part, from a need to clarify the conceptual confusion

between coincidence and chance. 4oincidence is something that pertains to the present

or past. 4hance has meaning only when information is lacing. o, we distinguish thetwo in temporal terms. If we are considering an event a priori, chance is in play. If weconsider it a posteriori, we have coincidence 2something which, however, over thecourse of a lifetime !!! even of a multiverse !!! might otherwise be considered liely&.o, the concept of probability has no validity vis a vis a coincidence and statisticalscience thus pertains to chance and not coincidence. robability deals with theepistemically!unavailable, is an empirical notion sub$ect to empirical methods and isassigned to arguments with premises and conclusions 2and not rather to events, states or types of same&. I suppose that if we new enough about the universe's initial conditionswe could imaginatively 2conceivably& wal ourselves bac to #HJ and invoe chance,

but we don't thus have such an informed grasp of what should or should not be expected

of this reality.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

=nowledge typically advances by formulating interpretive heuristics using abductivehypothesi"ing and deductive clarifying. #his precedes any inductive testing.We must evaluate these interpretations using a host of criteria for epistemic virtue.

:or starters, we can loo at the concepts they employ, concepts that will have beennegotiated in various communities of earnest in3uiry. #hose concepts which have thus

been negotiated and out of which a great deal of pragmatic value has been cashed out,are EiFtheoreticE5iF. #hose that remain still in negotiation are EiFheuristicE5iF. #hose thatare nonnegotiable, lie first principles, to which we must at least methodologicallystipulate, are EiFsemioticE5iF. #hose not negotiated are EiFdogmaticE5iF.

Our interpretations are normative, not descriptive, are explanatory attempts notempirical measurements. If they are heavily laden with theoretic concepts, they lielyen$oy a greater degree of explanatory ade3uacy ... with heuristic concepts, less ...with dogmatic concepts, even less.

o, while 3uantum mechanics, neuroscience and cosmology are descriptive, 3uantuminterpretations, philosophy of mind and cosmogony are interpretive. At the frontiers of those disciplines, good heuristic devices can pave the way to the next best scientifictests.

8eyond these penultimate realities, interpretations abound regarding reality's first andlast things, ultimate realities. uch interpretations are much more heavily laden withheuristic concepts 2e.g. metaphysics& and dogmatic concepts 2e.g. religions&. It's not to

be expected that such interpretive stances would en$oy the same degree of explanatoryade3uacy as scientific theories or meta!theories !!! not due to a lac of epistemic virtue,

but !!! due to the nature of the realities under consideration.


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Overlapping magisteria.

6ysterianism is a philosophic stance, mostly used in philosophy of mind. It'sdescriptive not pe$orative. While re$ecting scientism, I also re$ect any EiFa prioriE5iFepistemic surrenders or rushes to closure that declare some type of, in principle,ontological occulting. I thin it was 4hesterton who suggested that we don't nowenough about reality to say that it's unnowable.

As with other traditions, 8uddhism's not monolithic but has different schools.

8elow is a position statement I constructed with a 8uddhist practitioner from an

extensive dialogue. he said that I properly interpreted her outloo. o, :WIW<

6any have been threatened by some buddhist!lie conceptions of self and with other no!self teachings. What they seem to most fear is self!annihilation or self!dissolution or loss of self or loss of the individual or loss of personal identity or loss of self!significance.

Aurobindo and certain 8uddhists do not deny what they refer to as the ;empirical self,;which is very much consistent with the conventional distinctions we draw betweenindividuals. As empirical selves, for example, we are still called forth in solidarity withand compassion for one another. We still recogni"e moral obligations and practicalresponsibilities toward one another. We can still even affirm a continuity of identity of each individual, both temporally and eternally.

#he no self conception is thus moreso an ad$ectival description and not an ontologicaldenial of the self. What we experience as individual empirical selves might beconsidered ;fractures; of the 7ivine elf. #hese fractures have no static essence per se,metaphysically, but do present, empirically, as perduring individuals, who remainrecogni"able as a dynamic process, which is related to and confluent with other ever!

changing processes, movements and energies. #his conception of a person thus presentsmoreso as an active moving target, which is in constant change and flux.

#his divine fractured self perdures eternally. We can affirm an eternal Immutable elf aswell as individual streams of consciousness or armic bundles, which, even in theafterlife, we would recogni"e as each other, as the individuals we new, so to spea, onthis side 2even notwithstanding reincarnations and so on&.

#he divine fractured ;;elf expressed in our individual ;s;elves are individual peepholes on reality, seen by individual streams of consciousness, experienced as

distinct armic bundles, complementing and supplementing the singular, all seeing elf


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as discrete psychic perspectives, enriching the Immutable One's experience of elf precisely via this fracture into mutable souls. uch wholeness and fracture both perdureeternally in dialogue, the mutable and Immutable mutually enriching each experience.

#his particular conception by Aurobindo would not be wholly inconsistent with a4hristian panentheism. #he Oneness of the Immutable elf could correspond to whatwe experience as a univocity of being 2cotus& and divine energies 2astern Orthodox,hesychasm&. #he love with which we all 9ove is, itself, the love of the divine,immutable self, Who is One.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

8ecause humans, for the most part, are similarly situated, we tend to share evaluativedispositions and normative propositions toward many descriptive realities. We can thuscouple any given shared prescriptive premise to a given descriptive premise, thenreason our way to a normative conclusion. #he move from the given to the normative,descriptive to the prescriptive, is to an ought, in large measure, is not especially

problematical, for all EiFpracticalE5iF purposes. #he same is true for 0ume's problem of induction, because we are situated in and evolved in relationship to a spatiotemporalsphere of regularities, which needn't hold absolutely or universally, only provisionallyand locally.

ractical upshots of the 0umean criti3ue would certainly include epistemic humility.8ut we are proving too much and rushing to closure if, theoretically, we EiFa prioriE5iFconclude for or against telos, nomicity or sufficient reason, on one hand, or

purposelessness, stochasticity or brute existence, on the other. #heoretically, we thushave competing tautologies that differentiate axiomatically. #hey can't be ad$udicated interms of logical validity, so we all fall bac to weaer evidential arguments, whichcannot be ad$udicated in a robustly probabilistic way, only advanced by plausibilisticappeals.

One can agree that ascal's Wager operates in a system where the axioms refer to telic

ultimate realities but would be meaningless in a nontelic system. 0owever, doesn'tascal's Wager refer, meta!systemically, to one's choice between one axiomatic systemand another? 4ouldn't ascal be acnowledging an ontological undecidability, hence adeontological vagueness, which merely ass one to stipulate to telos for argument's sae

before deciding on essentially pragmatic grounds? #his is to say that the 0umeancriti3ue could apply moreso to one's theory of nowledge but needn't presuppose one'stheory of truth, that it's epistemically impactful but not ontologically decisive.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

We can stipulate to a theory of truth, speculatively, for argument's sae, or normatively,

for all moral and practical purposes.


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When we suggest one cannot reason from an is to an ought, we recogni"e that our

descriptive, evaluative and normative probes of reality are EiFmethodologicallyautonomousE5iF, each asing distinctly different 3uestions. We are not, however,suggesting that they are not otherwise EiFaxiologically integral,E5iF each necessary butnone, alone, sufficient, for every human value!reali"ation.

We are not saying that one cannot couple descriptive 2pre&suppositions, evaluativedispositions and normative propositions in one's premises and then reason one's way to

prescriptive conclusions. :ols might reasonably disagree, however, regarding theultimate grounds of our descriptions 2truth or #ruth&, evaluations 2beauty or 8eauty& andnorms 2goodness or *oodness&.

#hose ultimate grounds operate axiomatically, so, we encounter godelian!lieconstraints, unable to prove those axioms within the very systems they axiomati"e. Weare confronted with a choice between consistency and completeness. #he good money'sordinarily opting for incompleteness.

#his doesn't mean that we cannot formulate a system that is both complete andconsistent, however. It only means we cannot prove that we have.

0ume's criti3ue, then, has an epistemic force similar to godelian constraints. 0e cannotEiFa prioriE5iF maintain that one cannot reason from an is to an ought, only that onecannot now whether one has necessarily done so.

ascal's Wager invoes such ontological, hence deontological, uncertainty. It invitesone, existentially, to live as if our existential orientations to truth, beauty and goodnessare grounded in putative transcendent imperatives of #ruth, 8eauty and *oodness. Onemay live with the epistemic uncertainty and ontological vagueness implicit in both0ume's criti3ue and godelian incompleteness but still opt, existentially and practically,

and not unreasonably, to live as if our shared evaluative dispositions and normative propositions are indeed grounded more deeply than our evolutionary inheritance. Or not.

As for ascal's specific gains and losses vis a vis what's at stae, that invites criti3ue.8ut the structure of the Wager survives, in my view, based on generic e3uiprobability

principles, which guide practical reason.

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In a thermodynamic environment, far from e3uilibrium, dissipative structures arise,morphodynamically, with novel boundary conditions formed. :rom the interaction of morphodynamic structures, novel dissipative structures and boundary conditions arise,

which can interact !!! not $ust thermodynamically and morphodynamically, but !!!teleodynamically.

#he teleodynamic refers to downward causations. #eleodynamic realities interactsemiotically with novel boundary conditions provided by signs and, for humans, alone,symbols.

#his is the narrative called emergence. It's a descriptive heuristic, not robustlyexplanatory.

eople distinguish between wea and strong emergence, but the former distinction

remains trivial, the latter, 3uestion begging.

One taeaway is that semiotic science employs a minimalist telos, but doesn't suggestwhether or not its downward causations would violate physical causal closure.

#he emergence of consciousness, in my view, could well have been entirely physical,so, too, with life.

Without nowing the initial thermodynamic conditions, it's not possible to place odds.mergence isn't inconsistent withtelos or #elos.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

#he notion of divine simplicity was introduced as a strategy to preserve utter transcendence.

Of course, affirmative predicates of *od are analogical, not univocally predicated between *od and creatures. Any literal predications must be expressed as negations.

At best, though, the classical theist approach remains a 3uestion begging tautologygrounded in an essentialistic substance ontology employing EiFbeingE5iF as its root

metaphor.

ince the environs that we inhabit presents moreso as a dynamical, processive andrelational reality, it would mae more sense to employ affirmative analogues from someother ontology using some other root metaphor. uestions would still beg but theapproach would be more coherent, internally, and congruent, externally.

#he classical approach addresses infinite regress and sufficient reason but introducescausal dis$unctions. 0ow could a 8eing related to beings, only analogically, causeanything?

#he answer relies on an atemporal conception of cause, which may or may not refer.


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ven if one can situate divine simplicity, coherently, within an ontology, and I'llstipulate it can be done, in my view, it doesn't mae *od more intelligible because that

type of metaphysic isn't an ade3uate heuristic for reality as most experience it.

I only use the a"or to decide between systems that have already achieved explanatoryade3uacy. Arguably, aside from interpreting it in terms of not unnecessarily multiplyingontologies, metaphysically, epistemically, it can refer to going with that inference thatone has abductively formulated with the greatest facility 2facile or simple as in ;ease;not vs complex&.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Bot all interpretive explanatory accounts, however, provide the same degree of modeling power?

#heoretic interpretations differentiate from metaphysical heuristics !!! not by strictdemarcation criteria, not in ind, but !!! in degrees.

Whether a given interpretation is more closely related to the robustly, probabilistic probes of descriptive sciences or the wealy plausibilistic hermeneutics of normative philosophies can be determined, analytically, by its discourse.

cientific and metaphysical interpretations might share such epistemic virtues as logicalconsistency, internal coherence, abductive facility and interpretive consonance, butscientific theories, further, will discourse primarily with a terminology that employsconcepts that have been negotiated in a community of in3uiry that !!! not onlyempirically measures and inductively tests, but !!! pragmatically cashes out themodeling power of those concepts.

#his enhanced modeling power thus further differentiates theoretic from metaphysicalinterpretations in terms of conceptual warrant, interdisciplinary consilience,hypothetical fecundity, pragmatic utility, existential actionability, evidentialmeasurability, phenomenal predictability, popperian falsifiability and other normative

criteria of good scientific research programs.

Bot all scientific theories can demonstrate all of these criteria, but they can bedistinguished from metaphysical heuristics using most of these criteria. #he theory of evolution is clearly a scientific interpretation while both intelligent design and

philosophical naturalism are metaphysical interpretations, so to spea, meta!theoretic.

#he whole notion of irreducible or specified complexity lacs probabilistic significancefrom the get!go.


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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

#he theory of evolution involves several core hypotheses in relationship to a host of

auxilliary hypotheses in an expansive web of coherence. Its predictions are legion andimpactful across the entire spectrum of pure and applied sciences, including modernmedicine and agriculture. It doesn't rise and fall on anomalies or with every unexplained

phenomenon.

#he theory's not inconsistent with either creation accounts, classical theisms and panentheisms or with philosophical naturalism and materialist monism.

#his isn't terribly controversial in most circles. When it does get litigated by the few, $udicially, the courts manage to sort through the distinctions I've set forth and mae theright call.

#he problem results, in part, from a need to clarify the conceptual confusion betweencoincidence and chance.

4oincidence is something that pertains to the present or past. 4hance has meaning onlywhen information is lacing.

o, we distinguish the two in temporal terms. If we are considering an event a priori,chance is in play. If we consider it a posteriori, we have coincidence 2something which,however, over the course of a lifetime !!! even of a multiverse !!! might otherwise beconsidered liely&.

o, the concept of probability has no validity vis a vis a coincidence and statisticalscience thus pertains to chance and not coincidence. robability deals with theepistemically!unavailable, is an empirical notion sub$ect to empirical methods and isassigned to arguments with premises and conclusions 2and not rather to events, states or types of same&.

I suppose that if we new enough about the emergence of life or of consciousness, muchless the universe's initial conditions, then we could imaginatively 2conceivably& wal ourselves bac to life's beginnings, the dawn of consciousness or even #HJ and thereby

invoe chance, but we don't thus have such an informed grasp of what should or shouldnot be expected of these realities.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

#hat's why we distinguish between descriptive sciences, which employ aEiFmethodologicalE5iF naturalism, and interpretive metaphysics, not all which employ aEiFphilosophicalE5iF naturalism.

As long as no one confuses what belongs in science boos and what belongs in philosophy boos, there's no rub for me.


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hilosophically, the emergentist paradigm, in my view, serves as the paragon of interpretive heuristics vis a vis complexity. It precisely has room for formal and finalcausations, especially from the perspective of semiotic science. It taes note of

EiFdownwardE5iF causation in nature, but doesn't EiFa prioriE5iF suggest whether it wouldnecessarily violate physical causal closure or not.

I embrace an emergentist stance, myself, but remain metaphysically agnostic regardingthe origins of the universe, life and consciousness. I find that the affirmation of teleodynamics maes reality much more intelligible as a heuristic device even though,obviously, it doesn't gift us with a great deal of explanatory ade3uacy.

Allowing a design inference into descriptive or theoretic sciences is not the proper antidote to EiFscientismE5iF. Instead, scientism and I7 theory both need to be chased bac across the 3uadrangle to the philosophy department.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

7ynamical whole!part constraints.

4hec out the thining of Alicia Cuarrero.

ssentially, new constraints emerge, in far from e3uilibrium environments, as wetraverse thermodynamic, homeodynamic, morphodynamic and teleodynamic layers of complexity. #hese dynamical constraints, boundary conditions, exert various downwardcausations.

#hese are analogous to Aristotelian versions, what can be considered only a minimalisttelos.

#he emergentist paradigm can be variously interpreted, whether from an eliminativist,epiphenomenalist, nonreductive physicalist or even dualist stance. #he emergentist

heuristic essentially refers to EiFsomething more 2or else& coming from nothing butE5iF, but doesn't necessarily re3uire one set of primitives vs another. :or example, some addconsciousness along side space, time, mass and energy as a primitive.

6y sneaing suspicion is that consciousness is emergent not primitive, that anonreductive physicalism fits reality best. 8ut, I remain agnostic and none of thismatters to me, for all EiFpracticalE5iF purposes.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!uestions beg.


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xplanatory ade3uacy eludes.

ome laws may be eternal, necessary. Others emergent, ephemeral.

ome regularities may result from nomicity, others from stochasticity. We bracet them,metaphysically, as propensities. #his is to recogni"e that regularities may have onticsignificance in addition to epistemic.

We can't EiFa prioriE5iF say, and no one has EiFa posterioriE5iF demonstrated, whether or not reality's initial, boundary or limit conditions derive from clear necessities or mereregularities, or even vague probabilities.

Any, who wave these 3uestions away as nonsensical or who claim they re3uire one typeof answer or anther, are proving too much.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

It's claims are modest because that's all that's epistemically warranted. As a heuristicdevice, it provides conceptual placeholders and frames up our 3uestions, but doesn't

pretend to explanatory ade3uacy.

Of course, beyond the formal causes, the tacit dimensions and boundary constraints, aminimalist telos, a more robust telos emerges with human consciousness.

8y acnowledging the intelligibility of these causations, we better $ustify invoing themanalogically for heavier metaphysical lifting in this or that philosophy.

6etaphysics provide interpretive heuristics, which may or may not be true, withoutadding new information to our systems. #heir sheer multiplicity reveals their still!in!negotiation status. #hey gift us, when well formulated, with good 3uestions. Botanswers.

9ife's higher goods, which are intrinsically rewarding, are EiFgivensE5iF and in no need of

an apologetic or $ustification to be reali"ed. A good heuristic, though, can be tested pragmatically. 4ertain amplifications of epistemic riss can augment human value!reali"ations.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

ciences describe. 4ultures evaluate. hilosophies norm. 6etaphysics G religionsinterpret, as do those fast G frugal heuristics gifted by evolution, which we refer to ascommon sense.

We interpret reality, existentially, in a robustly participatory manner 2beyond any merecognitive map!maing&.


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#he normative mediates between the descriptive and interpretive to reali"e theevaluative.

Our methods differ in the 3uestions they as, which maes them autonomous.

What's that? 7escribe it.

What's that to us? valuate it.

What's the best way to ac3uire or avoid that? Borm it, morally G practically.

*iven any relevant epistemic indeterminacy and ontological vagueness, how shall weinterpret this reality 2including proximate, penultimate or ultimate realities&?xistentially, we will EiFlive as ifE5iF ... thus and such is the case.

Bo, my pragmatic criteria apply only to a theory of nowledge, not a theory of truth. Inother words, it does not e3uate truth with utility. It suggests, rather, that a useful belief has a greater chance of also being true, hence is wealy truth!indicative.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Our discourse implicitly relies on various metaphysical presuppositions, which functionas indispensable methodological stipulations. While it would be silly to deny that such

presuppositions are ontologically suggestive, at the same time, we haven't been able todemonstrate that they're ontologically decisive.

o, scientifically, we bracet the nature of regularities, using probabilities for allEiFpracticalE5iF purposes. 6etaphysically, many different 2reasonable& interpretationscompete, in varying degrees of plausibility.

Any who suggest that epistemology, in many instances, successfully models ontology,in varying degrees 2as it seems you are suggesting?&, are certainly not beingunreasonable.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Actually, it seems you have begun to grasp what I mean, when you suggest EiFIf wenow the numbers we can wor out the probabilityE5iF.

We don't now the numbers, so can't calculate the odds, that any given dissipativestructure might arise far from thermodynamic e3uilibrium.

cientific theories remain rather domain specific and cannot 2yet& be facilely cobbledtogether into a #heory of verything. #hey suffer explanatory gaps. cientific theoriesdon't rise and fall based solely on explanatory gaps. Instead, they gain theoretic


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resilience from maing innumerable unfalsified predictions and gifting us withcountless practical applications, unlie, for example, the 7esign Inference.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!While scientific theories do go beyond mere descriptions to introduce a modicum of explanatory ade3uacy, hence introduce interpretive heuristics, metaphysicalinterpretations employ root metaphors. #he theory of evolution bracets metaphysics,which maes it consistent with substance, process, relational, dualist, monist, idealist,neutral, materialist and all manner of other interpretive metaphysics. 7escriptive andtheoretic sciences employ a methodological not a metaphysical naturalism.

#he theory of evolution employs no root metaphor and neither presupposes nor excludes, implicitly or explicitly, any specific ontology.

#here's no $ustification, then, for characteri"ing the theory of evolution as predominantly metaphysical, wealy scientific. #here's even less $ustification for characteri"ing I7 theory as remotely scientific rather than robustly metaphysical.

#his issue maes for a great foil regarding methodological demarcation criteria,generally, but, specifically, isn't terribly interesting to me.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

#he abuse of something, in this case a scientific theory, is no argument against its proper use.

nlightenment fundamentalisms, for example, as have presented in the forms of radicalempiricism, logical positivism, theological ignosticism and scientism, are no moredefensible, philosophically, than religious fundamentalisms, as have presented viafideism, metaphysical rationalism, arational gnosticism and dogmatism.

#he culture wars are being waged between ideologues who employ bad epistemologies,immersed in category errors, who confuse methodological stipulations with

metaphysical commitments and conflate descriptive models and interpretive metaphors.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

I wholeheartedly resonate with your common sense and intuition regarding humanconsciousness and intentionality. As the symbolic species, humans interpret reality in a3ualitatively different way, semiotically, from other animals.

Interestingly, even in birds, we see hard!wired forms of abduction, what we experienceas EiFinference to the best explanationE5iF. 0umans employ abduction, however, both


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instinctually and inferentially, in both hard! and soft!wiring, both algorithmically andnonalgorithmically.

At issue, for us as a species, is how much of our interpretation of reality taes placealgorithmically, 3uasi!algorithmically or nonalgorithmically. #here's liely a normalrange of percentages for each. At issue for each of us, as individual persons, is how tooptimi"e this mix, harnessing both our conscious and unconscious, inferential andinstinctual, faculties. #here are age!old practices, disciplines and asceticisms in all of our *reat #raditions, which are ordered to such an optimal awareness, mindfulness andwaefulness.

#he only taeaway from :# for me was the recognition of $ust how great a role our unconscious can play in problem!solving, nowing it's also being formed and reformed

by robustly intentional stances and pervasively conscious processes but in varying

degrees from one person to the next. It's one thing to recogni"e this degree of humanalgorithmic and 3uasi!algorithmic interpretation 2and most people liely grosslyunderestimate it&, however, 3uite another to deny a meaningful role for trulynonalgorithmic, robustly conscious intentionality. As you observe, that's ludicrous.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!:or starters, most of the biologists I now, including the author of the most widely usedtext in cell biology, do not even employ the descriptor neo!darwinian, considering it ananachronism, but spea of modern synthesEiFesE5iF in biology, acnowledging thediversity of mutually critical approaches. Which brings up my second point !!! that your understanding of what scientific theories entail is idiosyncratic, apparently confusedwith metaphysical interpretations.

recisely because scientific theories are vague interpretive heuristics, they don'tambition the degree of explanatory power you seem to re3uire of them. #hey, instead,enhance our modeling power of reality, EiFrelyingE5iF on certain rules withoutEiFexplainingE5iF them. o, again, your overemphases on explanatory gaps to discreditthe modern biological syntheses don't strie at the theories' modeling power resiliency.:urthermore, your confirmation bias is betrayed by your inventory of problematics,which wholesale ignores the web of coherence provided by the EbFuncountableE5bFexamples of practical applications of our modern biological syntheses.

:inally, scientific theories, as interpretive heuristic devices, especially those that are broadly interdisciplinary, aren't tossed aside due to explanatory gaps or experimentalanomalies. Isolated, auxilliary hypotheses that get disconfirmed get replaced. #heyaren't fatal to the syntheses, as you continue to insist.

6ost of all, though, theories don't get tossed aside until there are better ones to taetheir place. What EiFscientificE5iF theory do you have in mind?

It may turn out that our methodological naturalism may ultimately fail us precisely because reality's implicately ordered by initial, boundary or limit conditions that, in

principle 2ontologically&, elude our physical measurement systems, or due to technical


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methodological constraints 2epistemologically&, or entropic erasures. What would maeno sense at all would be to EiFa prioriE5iF concede such epistemic defeat, to shut downin3uiry. o, $ust because we persist in a line of in3uiry, methodologically, that stipulates

to naturalist presuppositions, doesn't mean anyone's thereby EiFa prioriE5iF committed tonaturalist metaphysics. cience bracets metaphysical stances.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!9ambrusco wrote on 7ec M, )J% ! N


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6y only interest in this thread concerns demarcation criteria vis a vis science andmetaphysics.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

#his math is EiFdeeplyE5iF flawed. election is not random. uite the contrary, it involvesdeterministic processes. ven nonliving morphodynamics involve deterministic

processes. #hus, there's an EbForthogradeE5bF 2against entropy& EiFratchetE5iF dynamic,dramatically increasing various probabilities.

#hat particular study by Axe wasn't published in a mainstream peer reviewed $ournal,liely because it wouldn't have survived. 8esides, contrary to this example, ancestral

reconstructions have indeed been used to change en"yme5binding specificity.

As far as life's origins, establishing odds against any specific life!form isn't informativeor interesting. We need to now the odds, rather, against any life!form. #he odds that aspecific protein won't liely win the lottery pale in comparison to the odds thatEiFsomeE5iF protein might.

Infinity inschminity.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Bot sure exactly how materialists might self!describe re< your other descriptions, butsince there are several materialist versions of philosophy of mind, it seems therewouldn't be a single philosophy of intention either.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

ngaging in interpretation, beyond description, is a necessary condition in setting fortha theory or metaphysic, but not a sufficient condition to mae an interpretationmetaphysical. I already set forth the criteria that distinguish scientific theories frommetaphysical interpretations. #hose criteria have convinced courts of competent

$urisdiction ever since EiFcopesE5iF. And those boundaries are well established inacademia and commercial enterprises. I may be setting the probative bar too low but Idon't aspire to convince everyone else.

Bo, I refer to the criterion that scientific theories are inade3uate if they suffer explanatory gaps. #hey recogni"e explanatory gapsD #his is especially the case for overarching theories, which have various auxilliary hypotheses coming and going incompetition across a broad interdisciplinary spectrum. 8esides, these overemphases ongaps are also fallacious arguments from ignorance.


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>ou're trafficing in either!or and all or nothing conceptions for realities that present in

degrees.

And you're dealing with an idiosyncratic conception of theories. #heories are variouslyformal due to the nature of the realities they interpret. #heories can present syntacticalinterpretations, lie axiomatic propositions. #hey can also employ semanticalinterpretations, lie classes of models. #hey also include pragmatic interpretationsregarding how EiFthey can be EbFusedE5bFE5iF.

Indeed, the 3uintessential example for how theoretic interpretation wors can be seen precisely in the topic under consideration !!! EbFpopulation geneticsE5bF<http


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interpretive cosmogony. uantum theory does become 3uantum interpretation. #heoriesin neuroscience G cognitive science do become philosophies of mind.

#hose who would annihilate metaphysics should tae heed that, in the same instance,they'll be doing away with our highly speculative sciences, too. cientific theory andmetaphysics belong to the same interpretive continuum. Overlapping magisteria slice in

both epistemic directions.

Any interpretive paradigms that rely only on abductive hypothesi"ing and deductiveclarifying without the benefit of inductive testing compete plausibilistically2evidentially& and logically 2consistency G validity& but not in a robustly probabilisticway. #hat goes for materialism, too.

As for 7awins, yes, he attacs caricatures. At the same time, no too few worship same.

o, there's some hygienic value there. 0e's no 4amus or Biet"sche, though.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

I'm treating this normatively. o, there EiFshouldE5iF be an uneveness as each particular interpretive approach to each particular problem in any given domain will vary in itsdegrees of being scientific and5or metaphysical. And it's a dynamical situation, too, asmethodological advances change the hori"ons of the un5nowable.

I gather, though, that the uneveness you refer to suggests that, notwithstanding thenorms I discussed above, sociologically, attitudes don't reflect those norms?

Obviously, that varies from one sociodemographic cohort to the next? I thin a clear ma$ority of scientists are philosophical naturalists, but a very substantial minority areonly methodological naturalists. While fewer people participate in organi"ed religion, aclear superma$ority, worldwide, participate in spiritual practices and are open to morethan physical descriptions of reality? I doubt seriously many nonscientists give muchthought at all to philosophy of science? 8est I can tell, a great many scientists seem

philosophically illiterate? I have no real grasp of such sociologic metrics, so used a lotof 3uestion mars ???!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

In my view, we now enough from both science and our own phenomenal experience todo anthropology without becoming overwrought about competing metaphysicalinterpretations. 6etaphysically, physicalist conceptions of consciousness or even of thesoul threaten neither human freedom nor human value!reali"ations. imilarly,

physicalist conceptions of cosmogony don't obviate theological approaches.

#his is to suggest that methodological naturalism, even when coupled with a physicalistmetaphysic, anthropologically and5or cosmologically, remains a solid philosophical stepremoved from eliminativist and reductionist accounts.

Bow, as far as norming anyone's approach to ultimate realities, in a pluralistic world,

free exercise and nonestablishment wors well here in the LA. If those who tae a


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more enchanted stance toward reality seem to be having a rough go of things in the public maretplace of ideas, I suggest they focus more on getting their own rampantlyfundamentalistic houses in order and less on 7awins, 7ennett, 0itchens and 0arris,

who engage facile caricatures. In other words, 3uit emulating those caricaturesD #heworld, per my stance, remains pervasively enchanted, $ust not for all the reasons manyseem to imagine.

dit to add url's<#hose interested might chec out %& metanexus.net)& counterbalance.org+& ctns.org!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!I agree that religions, going beyond metaphysics, can augment both human freedom and

human value!reali"ations, if that nuance or conception is worth anything to you.

8ut I would maintain that the anthropology we can derive from science, phenomenalexperience, common sense and common sensibilities, including philosophy but

braceting metaphysics, is both necessary and sufficient to establish human freedomand human value!reali"ations.

#his is to recogni"e that people can live both a good and a moral life without religion.

If we have an impasse, that's fine. I $ust wanted to more precisely locate it as well as toclarify both what I was saying and not saying.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!I'll leave you with this teaser. While I thin any anthropology worth its while wouldhave to affirm our radical human finitude, my theological anthropology doesn't do EiFthe:allE5iF.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#hat's right. :aith, properly approached, taes one EiFbeyondE5iF but not EiFwithoutE5iFreason.

eligions generally address both EiFcreedalE5iF and EiFmoralE5iF realities, the former characteri"ing reality's first and last things or EiFultimate realitiesE5iF, the latter pertaining to this, that and the other thing or EiFproximateE5iF realities. While creedalrealities tend to rely on alleged special revelations, moral realities are transparent tohuman reason.

4reedal beliefs aspire much more to successful references to !!! much less to successfuldescriptions of !!! ultimate reality and generally entail an existential dis$unction or aEiFliving as ifE5iF ultimate reality is friendly, as if all may, can, will and shall be well.uch an evaluative disposition toward ultimate realities, which can also inform one'saffective attunement to others, the cosmos, even oneself, is transmitted by and

celebrated within interpretive communities.


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In such communities, right belonging 2orthocommunal& and right desiring2orthopathic& tend to en$oy a formative primacy over right behaving 2orthopraxic&, much

less right believing 2orthodoxic&. A EiFpolydoxicE5iF perspective, gifted by moderninterreligious dialogue and comparative theology, interprets the diverse creedal stancesof the *reat #raditions, as well as indigenous religions, as complementary references to!!! not conflicting descriptions of !!! ultimate realities.

When it comes to human references to ultimate realities, we inescapably fall bac onlogical consistency and evidential plausibility and our interpretations compete, someclearly better than others. ven among the best e3uiplausible interpretations we willfind agnostic, theistic, nontheistic and atheistic accounts, none which deservestigmati"ing.

When it comes to proximate realities, both practical and moral, normatively, our interpretations incorporate evidential probability. obustly probabilistic reasoningguides us morally and practically. It helps us discern the best disciplines, asceticismsand practices to foster our intellectual, affective, moral and social growth anddevelopment, in other words, to reali"e our human authenticity. One doesn't need to beon any particular creedal path to reali"e such values.

o, when we tal about the rules of evidence in the context of failing or succeeding, wealways in3uire further< failing to do what? 8urdens of proof are normative rules whichas< EiFWhat do you want to do with that evidence?E5iF.

eligious beliefs regarding creedal realities thus en$oy free exercise but are curtailed bynonestablishment. Interpreted as evaluative dispositions toward ultimate realities, theycan be celebrated as both private and communal EiFreverieE5iF. #hose regarding moraland practical realities, however, re3uire higher burdens of proof 2because they aspire tocoerce others' behaviors, whether prescriptively or proscriptively&, which is whyessentially religious moral claims do fail, evidentially, should not serve as a publicEiFrefereeE5iF 2of others' behaviors& and cannot $ustify coercive strategies.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

8iosemiotics describe how living things interpret signs. When synthesi"ed with an

emergentist stance, it would recogni"e EiFdownward causations,E5iF which can becharacteri"ed as analogous to Aristotelian formal and final causations, but it doesn'tEiFexplainE5iF them metaphysically. :or example, they may or may not violate physicalcausal closure. 8iosemiotics combined with emergentism remains metaphysicallyagnostic and is not robustly explanatory. It serves as a vague heuristic device and

provides some conceptual placeholders, precisely where 3uestions continue to beg.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


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8eyond biosemiotics, which includes phyto!, "oo! and anthropo! semiotics, someEiFcomplexityE5iF thought speculates about a putatative EiFphysiosemioticsE5iF, whichimplicates a EbFpansemioticE5bF perspective.

A pansemiotic stance would be consistent with a EiFteleonomicE5iF account2EiFpurposiveE5iF integration or adaptation not EiFpurposefulE5iF intention& of at least someof the universe's regularities.

While science, as a methodological naturalism, would remain metaphysically EiFEbFaE5bFgnosticE5iF regarding the putative nomicity of regularities, that's 3uite differentfrom the metaphysical EiFEbFiE5bFgnosticismE5iF urged by the EiFscientisticE5iF cohort. Inthe first instance, science leaves the 3uestion to be framed by philosophy. In the latter,scientism says the 3uestion's not even meaningful or is a pseudo!3uestion.

We'll continue to probe the origins of the 3uantum, of the universe, of life and of consciousness, scientifically. 4omplexity approaches will continue to frame theseexplanatory gaps, philosophically, and the 3uestions they raise are legitimate.

If I've interpreted you correctly, at least in part, you are protesting metaphysicalignosticism regarding these 3uestions. I would agree, wholeheartedly, that such a stanceis philosophically indefensible.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Is your stance epistemological, ontological or both? Are there specific philosophies of mind you EIFa prioriE5iF re$ect? or not? or even accept?

I as in the interest of seeing how your stance toward the mind might interface withyour metaphysical framing of life's origins?!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

It's not sentimentalism to recogni"e the difference between fully determinedmechanisms and partially determined organisms. 6echanistic accounts of organisms arenecessary, because organisms are, in part, determinate, but they are insufficient

precisely because organisms are, in part, indeterminate. Arguably, this could mirror the

fabric of the cosmos. ervasive indeterminacy, in principle, would prevent completereducibility. #hat's one reason we refer to methodological naturalism and notmethodological EiFphysicalismE5iF. ome scientists don't get this distinction, which canmae for bad science.

#hose who draw inspiration from obert osen's wor may also find the followingauthors stimulating< Cames 4offman, Coyus 4rynoid, #errence 7eacon,Cesper 0offmeyer, Alicia Cuarrero, 7onald 6iulecy and van #hompson.

ee 4rynoid's EiF#he cientific 6isconception of 9ifeE5iF

http


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interpretation that ignores complexity theory and mereological relationships would be bad science.

o, these specific demarcation criteria 2number of conceptual placeholders& dodistinguish between biopoietic and I7 accounts. #here are other criteria we've alsodiscussed that further distinguish between a scientific and metaphysical interpretation.8ut, even if one stipulated for argument's sae that the design inference is sufficientlyscientific, it employs a woefully inade3uate analysis of relevant im5probabilities, whichmaes it, at best, bad science.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!I share your criti3ue of scientism.

I affirm the need for an EiFexpandedE5iF evolutionary synthesis, generally, supplemented

by holistic and emergentist perspectives, also, specifically, framed by a semioticinterpretation. 2I say expanded and supplemented but never conceived itmechanistically, myself.&

#his synthesis would remain agnostic regarding both the universe's primitives 2space,time, mass, energy plus ???& and the nature of its regularities 2nomicity vs stochasticity&.

#his is to suggest, perhaps, that, ontologically, I re$ect no serious metaphysic, EiFin principleE5iF. pistemologically, I tae a fallibilist stance, where I recogni"e the realityof any given epistemic uncertainty, EiFprovisionallyE5iF, but don't suggest it willnecessarily remain, EiFin principleE5iF.

4oncretely, for example, I wouldn't EiFa prioriE5iF rule out panpsychism or evenconsciousness as a primitive. 6y sneaing suspicions, however, are that consciousnessis an emergent reality, consistent with a nonreductive physicalist stance. ince I don'thave to choose, I don't.

I appreciate that a mechanistic account is not sufficient to describe human moralrealities.

A semiotic emergentist evolutionary synthesis, in my view, is sufficient, whatever the

natures of our universe's primitives and regularities. Our phenomenal experience,common sense, common sensibilities and good old fashioned EiFreductio adabsurdumE5iF reveal what we need to now about our free will and how to be moral.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Cust to clarify, do you accept the distinction between the neo!darwinian synthesis EiFper seE5iF and its EiFmaterialist conceptionE5iF?

In other words, it's one thing to suggest that the evolutionary synthesis is clearly wrong but 3uite another to recogni"e that it's merely inade3uate to this or that tas? And,further, that methodological naturalism, itself, doesn't re3uire a mechanistic paradigm?


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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!9ambrusco wrote on 7ec %/, )J% ! %%


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beyond the teleonomic to the teleodynamic as the mind goes beyond mere programmatic, computational algorithms.

8oth merely ententional and clearly intentional phenomena, as well as teleomatic,teleonomic and teleodynamic realities, are wholly consistent with a teleology conceivedas EiFprimalE5iF telos. #hey're also consistent with an EiFemergentE5iF telos, whichever root metaphor one employs for one's metaphysic.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

I $ust read that :eser blog response to 4oyne that you referenced above. 8asically, hewas saying the same thing I was trying to say 2with my dense prose, neologisms andabstract categories&

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Enfolding Theology with Peirce