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Energy in Japan after Fukushima
Feb. 19th , 2016Japan Update by JASH
Hisanori NeiProfessor
National Graduate Institute for Policy StudiesJapan
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3500.0mtoePrimary Energy Supply by country
China US Russia India Japan Canada Germany Brazil
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Final Energy Consumption & GDP
Industry Business Home Transpot GDP(Real2005)TY GDP(Nominal)
Japan is the 3rd largest Economy and consuming 5th largest volume of energy After Fukushima(2011) , energy consumption has decline 4 consecutive years.Last 3 years , Japanese economy has recovered by the AbenomicsIn 2014, House sector shows most rate of reduction in energy demand
0.002.004.006.008.00
10.0012.0014.00
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EJ Primary Energy Supply by Sources
Oil Coal Natural Gas Nuclear Hydro Renewable
0%20%40%60%80%
100%
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PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY BY SOURCES
Oil Coal Natural Gas Nuclear Hydro Renewable
In 2014, we had no nuclear power supply. It’s the first time since 1965.It result in constant increase of electricity tariff.
0.010.020.030.040.050.060.070.080.090.0
100.0
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
LNG import by country in Japan(source: Trade Statistics)
U.S.A Brunei UAE IndonesiaMalaysia Australia Qatar OmanNygeria Equatorial Guinea Russia OthersTotal
Natural Gas (LNG) has been major alternative power sources.Thanks producers especially Qatar for the generous increase of LNG export to Japan.
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Basic Act on Energy Policy (June 2002)<Objectives>� Securing of Stable Supply (Article2)� Utilization of Market Mechanisms(Article4)� Environmental Compliance(Article3)<Responsibility of Stakeholders>National Government(Article 5), Local Government(Article6), Business(Article 7), Citizens (Article8).Mutual Cooperation(Article9)
<Mandate/Obligation of National Government >/Legislative arrangement, Fiscal or Financial arrangement if needed(Article10)/Report to the Diet(Article 11: White Paper)/Strategic Energy Plan (Article 12: Strategic Energy Plan)/Promotion of International Cooperation (Article13)/Dissemination of Knowledge Regarding Energy (Article 14)
The Strategic Energy PlanThe Strategic Energy Plan (First) Oct. 7th 2003(Background)/TEPCO’s Falsification Scandal---Subsequences to 17 NPS shut down/Kyoto Protocol ratified (June 2002)The Strategic Energy Plan (Second) Mar. 9th 2007(Background)/Oil Price Increase---Demand Shock/Kyoto Protocol Effective (Feb. 2005), First Commitment Period start 2008/New National Energy Strategy (May 2006) ---Nuclear RenaissanceThe Strategic Energy Plan (Third) June. 18th 2010 (Background)/Administration Change from LDP to DP/Oil Price Spike and fluctuate/25% CO2 emission reduction proposal by PM of Japan (Sep 2009. UN)
Major Change around the time of the Accident(The forth Strategic Energy Plan April,2014)�TEPCO’s Fukushima Accident and subsequent to NPS a stop� Concerns over serious damage caused by the TEPCO’S Fukushima Nuclear Accident and the Safety of Nuclear Power Generation� Outflow of National Wealth and increased supply instability due to higher dependency on fossil fuels� Rapid increase in Greenhouse gas emissions in Japan� Exposed defects related to supply systems, including power interchange and emergency supply between eastern and western Japan� Reduced confidence in the government and business operators involved in energy supply� Change in the demand trend-increased introduction of cogeneration and changes in power saving actions� Higher electricity bills due to a change in the power source mix. And the impact of the international regional differences in energy price on the macro economy, industry and household economy (by combination with the shale revolution)
�Shale Revolution� Signs of a change in the global energy supply-demand structure caused by the shale revolution in North America
�Turmoil in MENA region after “Arab-Springs”� Change in the geopolitical structure of resource-supplying regions, including instability in the Middle Eastern and North African regions.
2030(After energy
conservation measures)
2013(Actual result)
Energy demand
Final energy consumption
Heat, gasoline, town gas,
etc.75%
Electric power 25%
361 mi kl 50.3mkl15%(13%)
Electric power28%
Heat, gasoline, town gas,
etc.72%
Economic growth1.7%/year
326 m kl
Primary energy supply
8
2030
Coal25%
Natural gas18%
Petroleum30%
Renewable energy13 to 14%
Nuclear power10 to 11%
489 million kl
LPG 3%
Self-sufficiency rate24.3%
values are approximate
GOJ concluded its energy mix at 2030 (July 2015)
1,065 billion kWh40%.
196.1 billion kWh20%(17%)
Electric power980.8
billion kWh
Power demand Power source composition
(Total generated energy)
1,278 billion kWh
2030 20302013
Economic growth1.7%/year
Electric power966.6
billion kWh
Petroleum 2%
Coal22%
LNG22%
Nuclear power17 to 18%
Renewable energy19 to 20%
Energy conservation17%
Renewable energy22 to 24%
Nuclear powerApprox. 20 to 22%
LNG27%
Coal26%
Petroleum 3%
Hydroelectric8.8 to 9.2%
Solar power7.0%
Wind power 1.7%
Biomass3.7 to 4.6%
Geothermal1.0 to 1.1%
9
Base load ratio: 56%
values are approximate
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1965 1968 1973 1975 1977 1980 1982 1985 1986 1989 1990 1992 1995 1996 1999 2000 2005 2010 2013 2020 2030
Primary Energy Supply
Feb-67 Jul-70 Aug-75 Jun-77 Jun-77 Aug-79 Apr-82 Nov-83 Oct-87Oct-90 Jun-94 Jun-94 Jun-97 Jun-97 Jul-01 Jul-01 Mar-05 Mar-05Mar-05 May-08 May-08 May-08 Aug-09 Aug-09 Aug-09 Jul-15 actual
Historically, between 1960 and 1980, actual energy consumption had been lower than planed energy outlook.From late 80s , it had been difficult to lower energy demand than planned outlook by 2008.
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1970-19901990-20102012-2030
There are several challenges to overcome for achieving the policy target
/The target of Energy Conservation is extremely high./The share of Renewable and Nuclear・・・Political Message/Power Market Reform・・・Uncertain/Coal vs Natural Gas ・・・ Fuel Price/Nuclear
GOJ need to review its Strategic Energy Plan in every 3 years by Law./Last Strategic Energy Plan was published on April 2014./In fact, the amendment of the plan has been done every 3 – 4 years./Next 3 years, there should be some progresses to create more concrete plan .
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65.5%
9.2%
16.4%
8.9%
43.0%（158 million kL）
20.6%（76 million kL）
22.5%（82 million kL）
14.0%（51 million kL）
Real GDP1973→2013
2.5 Times
0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.02.5
5.1 5.25.7 5.7
6.2
7.7
2.5
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Primary energy supply per GDP unit of each country（（（（2011））））
Do we have more rooms to improve energy efficiency?
Current electricity system・Partial liberalization : retail competition for over 50kw customers・Retail players : 10 big GEUs(vertically integrated, regional monopoly), PPS, etc・Situation is…
・Share of non-GEU power producer and supplier : 3.6%・0.6% of the total retail market sales is transacted at JEPX
Negative aspects of regional monopoly were revealed by 3.111.Lack of system to transmit electricity beyond regions.2.Little competition and strong price control3. Limit in digesting the change in energy mix (cf. renewables)
Decision on Electricity System Reform in 2013
・The Cabinet decided to execute the Policy on Electricity System Reform on April 2, 2013
Objectives:/Securing the stable supply/Suppressing electricity rates to the maximum extent possible/Expanding choices for consumers and business opportunities
Process:A bold reform will be steadily carried out step by step focusing on the 3 agendas:/Cross-regional Coordination of Transmission Operators was established on April 2015/Full Retail Competition starts at April 2016 (regulated tariff expired by 2020)/Unbundle the transmission/distribution sector by 2020
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Supply Share by Sources - Gas Production
Oil Natural Gas Coal Nuclear Energy Hydro electric Renew- ables Gas Production
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20.0
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120.0
140.0BCM Natural Gas Import by countries
Pipelin Import LNG import
Supply Share of Natural Gas is varied by countries. Japan maintain the largest volume of Import.After the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Japan increase its NG import from 75Mt to 90Mt/yearIf NPS resume as expected, import volume will decrease to previous level.
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8Yen/tkcal Import Fuel Price Changes in Japan (CIF)
Coal LNG CrudeMkw 2014 New Add Abolish 2024
Hydro 48.14 0.4 0.03 0.04 48.53
Normal 20.82 0.2 0.03 0.04 21.01
Pumped-Strage 27.32 0.2 0 0 27.52
Thermal 159.41 14.71 0.97 5.07 170.02
Coal 40.41 4.77 0.61 1.01 44.78
LNG 74.55 9.48 0.36 1.2 83.19
Oil 44.45 0.46 0 2.86 42.05
Nuclear 44.26 0 0 2.22 42.04
Renewable 5.86 0.09 0 0 5.95
Wind 0.09 0.02 0 0 0.11
Photovoltaic 4.47 0.03 0 0 4.5
Others 1.3 0.04 0 0 1.34
Total 257.67 15.2 1 7.33 266.54
18.7% 18.2%15.7% 16.8%
28.9% 31.2%
17.3% 15.8%17.2% 15.8%2.3% 2.2%
2 0 1 4 2 0 2 4
COMPOSION OF POWER PLANT BY UTILITIES
Hydro Coal LNG Oil Nuclear Renewable
/Fuel Price difference make difficult to increase Natural Gas Power Units/Utilities consider to build new NG Power Unit as well as Coal ones./Under the future liberalized power market, many smaller (less than 112.5Mw) coal power plants are planned to build
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Crude Oil Import by countries
Saudi Iran UAE other ME China Indonesia Rossua Others ME%
Japan is heavily depending on imported crude from ME
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1959196119631965196719691971197319751977197919811983198519871989199119931995199719992001200320052007200920112013
Historical Oil PriceOPEC Arab Enbargo
Iran Revolution
GulfWar
Iraq War
0 20 40 60 80100120140160
Jan-2000Sep-2000
May-2001Jan-2002Sep-2002
May-2003Jan-2004Sep-2004
May-2005Jan-2006Sep-2006
May-2007Jan-2008Sep-2008
May-2009Jan-2010Sep-2010
May-2011Jan-2012Sep-2012
May-2013Jan-2014Sep-2014
Crude Oil Price after 2000
WTIBrent
Dubai
/Before 2000, Crude Oil Price Mainly affected by the events in MENA region/Still Only Saudi Arabia maintains sufficient spare capacity.
0 20 40 60 80 100120140
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1Q 20013Q 20011Q 20023Q 20021Q 20033Q 20031Q 20043Q 20041Q 20053Q 20051Q 20063Q 20061Q 20073Q 20071Q 20083Q 20081Q 20093Q 20091Q 20103Q 20101Q 20113Q 20111Q 20123Q 20121Q 20133Q 20131Q 20143Q 20141Q 20153Q 20151Q 20163Q 2016OPEC Spare Capacity and WTI Price
Spare CapacityWTI Real Price (GDP Deflated)
-80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
-1.5 -1
-0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
1Q 20013Q 20011Q 20023Q 20021Q 20033Q 20031Q 20043Q 20041Q 20053Q 20051Q 20063Q 20061Q 20073Q 20071Q 20083Q 20081Q 20093Q 20091Q 20103Q 20101Q 20113Q 20111Q 20123Q 20121Q 20133Q 20131Q 20143Q 20141Q 2015
Changes in Saudi Arabia crude oil Productioncan affect oil prices
Saudi Production ChangeWTI Price Change
02000400060008000
10000120001400016000
2003 7
2004 7
2005 7
2006 7
2007 7
2008 7
2009 7
2010 7
2011 7
2012 7
2013 7
2014 7
2015
Crude Oil Production
Iraq Saudi Arabia United States Iran
-500
0
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15
th b/d(Libya)th b/d Crude Oil Production
Saudi Arabia United States Sub Total Libya
2003/5～8
Military Civil
TF-RIO
Looting
Local Government Election� Confusion in Jun� BIGC Launch� Resistance� Success of Election
(LOYALTY OPPOSITE)� Balance between stake
holders
High Technical Level
Order of the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional AuthorityDe-Baathification of Iraqi SocietyMay 16, 2003On April 16, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority disestablished the Baath Party of Iraq. This order implements that declaration by eliminating the party’s structures and removing its leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society. By this means, the Coalition Provisional Authority will ensure that representative government in Iraq is not threatened by Baathist elements returning to power and that those in positions of authority in the future are acceptable to the people of Iraq. Full members of the Baath Party holding the ranks of ‘Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member), ‘UdwFar‘ (Branch Member), ‘Udw Shu’bah (Section Member), and ‘Udw Firqah (Group Member) (together, “Senior Party Members”) are hereby removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector. These Senior Party Members shall be evaluated for criminal conduct or threat to the security of the Coalition. Those suspected of criminal conduct shall be investigated and, if deemed a threat to security or a flight risk, detained or placed under house arrest. Individuals holding positions in the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals) shall be interviewed for possible affiliation with the Baath Party, and subject to investigation for criminal conduct and risk to security. Any such persons determined to be full members of the Baath Party shall be removed from their employment. This includes those holding the more junior ranks of ‘Udw (rse information. the same manner upon ppropriate, detained, interned placed under house arrest,Member) and ‘Udw ‘Amil (Active Member), as well as those determined to be Senior Party Members. Displays in government buildings or public spaces of the image or likeness of Saddam Hussein or other readily identifiable members of the former regime or of symbols of the Baath Party or the former regime are hereby prohibited.Rewards shall be made available for information leading to the capture of senior members of the Baath party and individuals complicit in the crimes of the former regime. The Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority or his designees may grant exceptions to the above guidance on a case-by-case basis.By order of:L. Paul Bremer, IIIAdministrator, Coalition Provisional Authority________________________
Purge
Cooperation with Executives
Gulf Monarchies after the “Arab Spring”
Abdulla Aziz ibn Saud①-1953
Faisal ③-1975 Saud ②-1964
Abdul Mohsen-1985
Musa'id-2013
Nasser(Riyadh)-1984 Khalid ④-1982
Abdullah ⑥-2015
Bandar Fahad ⑤ -
(Faisal(Ryadh)
Badr -2013 Mutaib Sultan (CP)-2011
Saud(MFA-2015)
Mishaal(Najran-2008)
Muqrin(CP-2015)
Salman ⑦ 2015- Nayef(CP) -2012
Mutaib(MNG)
Khalid(Makkah) Mishari (Al Bahah)
Faisal(Asir) Mohammed (Jisan)
Faisal(Al Qassim)
Fahad(Al Jouf) Mansour(MM) Fahd(Tabuk) Saud(Ha’il) Abdulla Aziz(DMFA)
Muhammad(DCP) Abdullah Aziz(DMO) Muhammad(CP
Succession of Saudi Arabia
Reform of Nuclear Regulatory Organization/Independence
Separate the functions for nuclear regulation and nuclear promotionEstablish the Nuclear Regulation Authority(NRA) as an independent commission body
Amendments to the Nuclear Regulation Act/New regulation on severe accidents/Regulation based on the state-of-the art information (backfiting)/40-years operational limit for NPPs (exceptional less-than-20 years extension)
New Regulatory Requirement/Strengthening of Design Basis/Severe Accident Measures/Enhanced Measures for Earthquake/Tsunami
Principle of Regulation/Place emphasis of Defense-in-Depth/Eliminate common cause failure/Protective measures for extreme natural hazards
After Fukushima, new regulatory system and severer safety standards are implemented.
Strengthening of Design Basis/Comprehensive consideration of natural hazards including volcano, tornado and forest fire in addition to earthquake and tsunami, etc/Reinforcement of fire protection measures/Enhanced reliability of SSCs important to safety (e.g. Redundancy of piping)/Reinforcement of off-site power supply (connection to different substations through multiple lines)/Protection of systems for Ultimate Heat Sink
Resilience for AC power supply
There are 100s of mobile equipment provided in NPSs
Strengthen Requirement of Counter Measures for Severe Accident (SA)
Prevention of Core Damage (ATWS, Loss of RCF・RDF・RCF・UHF etc.)Prevention of Containment Failure (CV spray, Filtered venting etc.)Prevention of hydrogen explosion at reactor building etc.Cooling at SFPPrevention of fuel damages during shutdown
Emergency Response Center
Resilience for CV cooling
Enhanced Measures for Earthquake/Tsunami
More Stringent Standards on Tsunami
/Define “Design Basis Tsunami” – Exceeds the largest in the historical records
Enlarged Application of Higher Seismic Resistance
/SSCs for Tsunami protective measures such as Tsunami Gate are classified as Class S equivalent to RPV etc.
Tsunami
EarthquakeMore Stringent Criteria for active faults
/Active faults with activities later than the Late Pleistocene be considered for seismic design/Active in the Middle Pleistocene be investigated if needed
More Precise methods to define seismic ground motion
/3D observation of geological structure on the site
Displacement and DeformationClass S buildings should not be constructed on the exposure of active faults
Resilience for Water Injection & Tsunami
Water Proof Door
Mobile Water Injection Pump
Motor driven pump
Hydrogen Passive AutocatalysticRecombiner Heated Igniter
Resilience for H2 Accumulation
Process of Resuming Nuclear Power Plant in Japan Submit Permit Submit Approve Submit Approve Approve Request Approval
NRA
Licensee
Reactor Installation Permission
Assessment of Change in Reactor Installation
Local Government
Safety Agreement with Licensee
Construction Approval
Change of Construction Plan
Tech-Spec Approval
Change of Tech-Spec
Construction Inspection
Operation
41
37.7 40.549.1
15.7 12.6 9.8 13.3
30.331.4
28.3
2223.4
15.1
28.4
23.1 19.9
16.7
35.9 38.1
38.1
38.3
3.4 4.6 1.5
12.1 10.9
13.4
7.3
3.8 2.4 2.613.1 13.7
22.6
11.7
1.8 1.2 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.1 0.9
2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4
POLL FOR NUCLEARYes Probably Yes Yes or NO Probably No No Others
-80
-60
-40
-20
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40
60
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Worldwide Barometer of Views on Nuclear(Source:Gallup Survey)
Favor Unfavor
Nuclear Development after the Fukushima Daiichi NPS AccidentNuclear Development Policy differ across countries.
A. Phase out/Germany・・・Phase out by the end of 2022/Belgium ・・・Phase out by 2025/Switzerland・・・Phase out by 2034 (no operation after designed life)/Taiwan・・・Suspend to operate new capacity
B. Maintain /U.S.A.・・・under severe competition with low cost NG/France・・・New energy law cap nuclear capacity
C. Expansion/Russia・・・Increase to 50GW by 2035/Korea・・・Increase capacity to 29% of installed one by 2035/China・・・Increase capacity to 58GW by 2020/UK・・・Introduce “contract-for-difference”
D. New Comer /UAE, Vietnam , Turkey
Shutdown Period in Major NPS troubles shows little difference between Fukushima and the others
/Fukushima Daiichi(2011) Sendai NPS Unit 1 resuming 25 months after new regulation guideline set ,
36 months after NRA establishment, 36 month
/Kashiwazaki Kariwa(2007)25 month to 45 month more after the earthquake (Unit 6-7, Unit1, Unit5)
*Unit 2-4 never operated since then/Shika Criticality event hiding (2007) 25months after stopping for inspection /Hamaoka & Shika Turbine Missile(2006) 8 month to 20 month after the accident /Onagawa Earthquake(2005) 7 month to 21 month after the scram /Mihama Unit 3 accident (2004) 32 month after the accident/Fukushima Daiichi Falsification (2002) 40 month after stopping for inspection/Monju (FBR) (1995) 178 month after the accident
Tomari
Higashidori
Onagawa
Fukushima-Daiichi
Fukushima-Daini
Tokai-Daini
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Shika
Tsuruga
Mihama Takahama
Ooi
Shimane
Hamaoka Ikata
Genkai
Sendai
There are 43 Units with 42.048 Mkw NPS registered in JapanNPS total Capacity at the Accident 54 units 48.96MkwFukushima-Daiich 6 units 4.696Mkw in decommission process5 first generation NPS with) 2.216Mkw in decommission process 25 NPSs in 15 sites submit TA report to NRA 24.838MkwSendai Unit1, 2 resumed 1.78MkwTakahama Unit3,4 approved and be resumed quite soon 1.74 MkwIkata Unit 3 approved and be resumed soon 0.89 MkwKashiwazaki Kariwa Unit 6, 7 final process of approval 2.712Tomari Unit 3 enter the final process of approval 0.912 MkwShimane Unit 2 enter the final process of approval 0.82 MkwGenkai Unit 3,4 enter the final process soon 2.36 MkwOhma Unit 3, 4 midst of the process and see others 2.36 Mkw
Hamaoka Unit3, 4 midst of the process and under construction 2.237 MkwOnagawa Unit2 midst of the process and under construction 0.825 MkwTokai Daini midst of the process and under construction 1.10 MkwTomari Unit1.2 reviewed after Unit 3 1.158Mkw
Tsuruga Unit 2, Higashi dori Unit1 , Sika Unit 2 fault line issues 3.466Mkw
Takahama Unit1,2 40years review by July 2016 1.652 MkwMihama Unit 3 40years review by Nov. 2016 0.826 Mkw
18 NPSs with 17.209 Mkw not submitted TA to NRA yet/ Fukushima Daini Unit1-4 with 4.4 Mkw difficult to get local government approval/Kashiwazaki Unit 1-5 with 5.5 Mkw submitted after Unit 6,7 approved(Unit 2-4 never operated since 2007)
/Hamaoka Unit 5 with 1.38 Mkw submit soon after fixing sea water contamination/Onagawa Unit 1, 3 with 1.348Mkw submit after Unit 2 approved/Shika Unit 1 with 0.54 Mkw submit after Unit 2 approved /Ikata Unit 1,2 with 1.132 Mkw submit after Unit 3 resumed/Ooi Unit 1.2 with 2.35 Mkw submit and challenge 40 years review after the others/Genkai Unit 2 with 0.559 might submit after Unit3.4 resumed
2 NPS under construction/Ohma NPS with 1.383 submitted TA to NRA /Shimane Unit 3 with 1.373 Mkw (93% completed) submitted after Unit 2 resumed
After years, power supply by NPS in Japan will recover. /NRA develops standard review process.-Sendai Unit1,2・・・133 days, 67 public meetings, 593 discussion meetings-Takahama Unit 3,4・・・105days, 62 PM, 413 DM -For BWR , Kashiwazaki is the model of standard review process/Major Reason of low capacity ratio in Japan since 2000 -Earth quake ground motion exceed design base 4 times(2004,2006,2007,2009)- Falsification issues(2002,2006) , Material troubles (2005,2006, 2007-8)
We need to consider next issue challenged by the industry./NRA’s permission for over 40 Years Operation NPS in 2016・Takahama Unit 1,2 need to get approval by July 2016 ・Mihama Unit 3 by Nov. 2016・There is no fundamental technical issues to get approved. ・Kansai PC should prioritize /EDMG facility by 2018/Longer Post-Outage Period after 2017/New NPS development
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Nuclear Capacity & Electricity Generation
Capacity Approved Case2 Case3 Electricity Case2 Case3 target low target high
Estimation for NPS supply recovery/NPS supply will recover by 2020 exceeding the target of the outlook in 2018/If NRA reject the proposed TA related with fault line assessment, it still exceed the target./If NRA agreed the fault line assessment, It will exceed the lever of before the accident
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050000
100000150000200000250000300000350000400000
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Capacity & Power Generation in Japan
Capacity Electricity
01020304050607080
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Capacity Ratio
Under the New Regulatory System, after 4 years from now , NPs in Japan have capability to produce more electricity than before the Accident.
0100020003000400050006000
050000
100000150000200000250000300000350000
201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024
Capacity & Power Generation in Japan(Faultline Severe Case)
Capacity Electricity
0100020003000400050006000
050000
100000150000200000250000300000350000
201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024
Capacity & Power Generation in Japan(Faultline&40years Severe Case)
Capacity Electricity
