Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or Ending Capitalism?

Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or

Ending Capitalism?

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Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or

Ending Capitalism?

Samir Amin

Trans lated by Victo ri a Bawtree

Pambazuka Press At) imprint o f Fahamu

~ roJ BOOKlk~~ CODESRIA International Publish ing House

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Copyright © Samir Amin 2011 The right of Samir Amin to be identi(jed as the author of this work

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Contents

Translator's note

Introduction

The financial col lapse of li beral globalisation

2 Th e contrast between the Europ ean and the Chi nese historical developments

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40

3 Historical capitalism - accumulation by di spossession 51

4 Revolutionary advances and catastrophic retreats 78

S Peasant agricu lture and modern family ag ricu lture 101

6 Human itarianism or the internationalism of the peoples" 129

7 Being Marxist , bei ng com munist , being international ist 146

Index 195

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Translator's note

I feel it might be helpful 10 clarify so me o f the wo rds and phrases in this boo k which, beca use they refer to specifi cally French phenomena, canno t be trans lated w itho ul dis torting the meaning . For example ' bobo' , a term w id ely used in French newspapers and journals in recent years, s ignifies ' bohe mian bo urgeo is' ,md it refers, in the word s o f the author o f this book, to those of the upper middle classes who lean to the left as long as their privileges are maintained. Of course ' champag ne socia lists' gives the idea but it somehow Limits the term to those who gel together fo r expensive eating and dr inking, while proclaiming themselves to be of the left. 80bo is a rathe r deeper co ncepl and refers to more general politi cal and social behiwio ur.

Then there is the phrase ' actu ally exis ting socialism' (and, by ex tensio n, tho ug h less often, ' act ually existing capita li sm' or even 'actually existing globalisa tio n' ). It came to be used several decades ago by independent thinkers on the left w ho, while ad vocating socialism, felt the nL>ed to distance themselves from the 'socialist' socie ties in Eas tern Euro pe, set up und er the dorninati on of the Soviet Union. In the minds of people like Ernes t Mandel and RudoU Bahro these socie ties were in many ways a tra vesty of soc ialism.

Samir A min oft en uses the Frel1 ch wo rd ',thivi" , referring to the way in w hich princi ples or po li cies gradually lose their impetus and end up in positio ns quite contrary to their o riginal purpose. So metimes this is a deliberate de cision on the pa ri of a group or party bu t in any case the process is usually s low (and often unrecogni sed ), hence the word 'derive', w hich seems to me to be best trans lated as'drift ' .

The autho r uses the word ' n'111"I'S l'I1 tatioll ' not to refer to a theatrical performan ce or in the sense o f an agent, bu t as Marx used it to describe the way in w hich a system presents itself to the members of its society in such a way that is con venient for those w ho dominate society but s till co nvincing e no ug h to obtain the co nsent of the dominated (if only tacit) if the system is to work. See parti cularly the sectio n hea ded 'The Liberal Virus' in Chapter 7.

Then there arc word s whi ch have different connotatio ns in

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

Eng lish an d French. O ne of th em is 'pnplllaif!", w hich cannot normally be transl,1 ted by ' pop ul <lf' in English, w hic h generally means pleasing 10 Ihe people al l<lfge, while in Frenc h il usually refers 10 the populace, the wor king and / o r the under classes. This is Ihe sense in whic h we use ' the popu lar classes' for lack o f a beller adjective.

Another such word is 'vulgar ', which in Eng lish invariably means gross, lastek>ss, loutish. 'VII/gaire' in French more o ften means ordinary, w idespread or banal This is the sense in which Samir A rnin uses it when he refers 10 conventional economjcs, which, fo r so many years of llis lile he has been at pains to try and demolish.

Vidmia Bmlltf!'1'

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Copyrighted material

I Introduction

Capitalism, a parenthesis in history

The principl e of endl ess accumwal ion that defines capita lism is sy nony mous w ith ex po nentia l growth and the latter, like cancer, lea ds to death. Jo hn Stuart Mill, w ho recogni sed this, imagined that a stationary stale o f affairs would put an end to this irr<1 lionaJ process. John Mayn;nd Keynes shared this op timism of reason . Bu illci lher was equ ipped 10 understand how the necessary overcoming of capitalism could prevail. By contras t, Marx, by giving proper imporlance to the new class s truggle, couJd imagine the reversal of the po wer of the (<1pilali51 class, concentrated nOW<ldays in th e hands of the ruling olig archy.

Accumulation, whic h is synonymous with pauperisation, provid es the objecti ve framework of the stru ggles agains t ca pitalism. Bu t <lcc umul:ltio l' expresses itself mainly thro ug h the growing contrast between the afflu ence o f the societies in the centre o f the world syste m, who benefit from the imperialist rent, 1 and the misery of the societies at the d ominated peripheries. This conflict becomes, therefore, the central axis o f the a lternative between sociali sm and barbarism.

Hi stori cally, actuaJly exis ting capitalism (see Translato r 's no te) is associated with successive forms of accumulatio n by di spossession, no t only at the begi nning (primitive accumulatio n) but also a t each stage of the unfo lding of the capitalis t system. Once pro perly cons tituted, thi s Atlantic cap italism soug ht to conquer the world and has remad e it on the basis of permanent dispossess ion of Ihe conquered regions, which throug h this process became the do minated peripheries of the system .

This victoriou s globalisa tion has turned ou t 10 be unable 10

impose itself in a durable manne r. Just about half a century afte r it s triumph (which appeared to inaugurate the end of hislory), this model was questioned by the revolution of the Russian scmiperip hery and the (victori ous) liberation s trugg les in Asia and Afri ca which constitute the hi story of the 20th century - the first

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ENDING THE CRI SIS OF CAPITALI SM OR ENDING CAPITALISM?

wave of s trugg les in fa vou r of the e mancipation o f the wor kers and the peoples.

Accumulation by dispossessio n continues before our eyes in the late modern ca pitalism of the co ntempora ry ol igopolies. In the centres, monopoly rents - whose beneficiaries are the ol igopolistic p lutocmcies - are syno nymous wi th the dispossession of the entire producti ve bilSis o f society. Ln tJle peripheries, this pauperising dispossession manif~ts itself in the ex propriation of the peasant ry and the plundering of the natural resou rces o f the regions i.n questio n. Both these practices co nstitute the essential pillars of the expansion strategies o f the o Ligo polies' late capitalism.

In this context, I situate the new ag rarian question at the heart of the challenge for the 21st century. The dispossession of the peasantry (in Asia, Africa and Latin Americ<1) is the major contemporary form of the tendency towards pa uperisation (in the sense w hich Marx ascribed to this law), linked to accumulation. Its implementation carumt be dissociilted from the str<ltegies of imperialist rentseeking and rent-capturing by the oligopolies, with or without agrofucJs. I deduce from this that the deve lopment of the struggles in the peasant societies of the South (almost lmlf of humankind) and the responses to these struggles will largely determine the c<lpilcity or otherwise of the workers arld the peoples to progress on the road to constructing an authentic civi.lis.,lion, libcmtcd (rom the domination of c<lpitaJ. I do not S(.>C any name for this other than socialism.

The plundering of the So uth's IMtura] resources, w hi ch is dem<1nded by the pursuit of the mod el o f w<1steful consumption to the exclusive benefit o f the North's affluent societ ies, destroys any prospect of development worthy o f th is name fo r their peop les <lnd therefore constitutes th e other (<lce of pilupe risatiol1 on a world wide sc ale. In this sp irit, the energy crisis is neither the product of the growing scarcity of cer tain resources necessary for production (oil, obvio usly) nor the o utco me o f the d estructive effects of the energy-devo uring forms o f productio n and consumption that are currently in pl <1ce. This desc ription, while not wrong in itself, fail s to go beyond banal and immediate evidence. The energy crisis is the p roduct of the will o f oligopolies arld a coUective imperialism to secure <l mono poly of access to the planet's natural resources, whether these be scarce or nol, in such a way as to app ro priate the imperi alist rent. 11 would make no

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INTRODUCTION

difference if the utilisatio n of these resources rema ins the same as it is now (wasteful and energy-d evouring) or if it were subject to environmentally fr iend ly measures and new correc ti ves. I d educe from this that the pursuit o f the expansionis t strategy of the late cap italism of o ligopo li es w ill inevitably clash with the growing resistan ce of the nations of the South .

The current cris is is therefore neither a financial cris is nor the sum of multiple systemi c crises, but the cris is of the imperialis t cap italism of oligopolies w hose exclusive an d supreme power risks being ques tio ned once more by the struggles of the entire popular classes (see Translator's note) and the nations in the do minated peripheries, even if they a ppear to be emerg ing markets. This cri sis is also si multaneo usly a cr isis of US hegemony. The fo llowing pheno mena are in ex tricably li nked to o ne ano th er: the capitalism of o ligopo lies, the po litical power o f o ligarc hies, barbaro us g lobalisatio n, financ ialisation, US hegemony, the mi litarisation of the way g lobal isation is operated in the service o f o ligopolies, the d ecline of democ racy, the plundering of the p lanet's reso urces and the abandoning of develo pment for the South.

The real cha llenge is therefore as follows: wi ll these struggles man age to converge in o rder to pave the lo ng w ay - or ways -towards the tnmsitio n to world 50ciill ism? Or wi ll these s truggles remain separate from one another, or will they even clash with each o ther ilnd therefore become ineffective, leaving the initiati ve wi th the cap ital of the oligopo lies?

From one long crisis to another

The financ iill meltdown in Septe mbe r 2<X.l8 probably took by surprise the con vention al economists who ad vocated hilp py globa lisalion and tltrew into d isarrilY some of the filbri cil tors of liberal discou rse, w ho hild been triwn p hant since the filII o f the Berlin Wall . If, however, this event did not surprise me - I expected it (withou t of course predicting its dilte, like so me astroJogi st) - it is sim ply becil use for me this event is part of the unfolding of the lo ng crisis of an ilgeing capi tal ism, begun in the 1970s.

It is good to return to the firs t lo ng crisis of cap italism w hich fashioned the 20th century, ilS the parillle is between the s tilges o f the unfo lding of bo th crises are 50 s triking .

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ENDING TH E CRI SIS OF CAPITALI SM OR ENDING CAPITALI SM?

The industrial cilpitalism tha t WilS triumphilnt in the 19th century entered il crisis from 1873 onwards. ProfH riltes dropped, for the reilsons highlig hted by Milrx. Cilpitill TCilcted with il do ubl e move : concentriltion and glo balised ex pansion . The new monopolies confiscated in ilddition to their profits a rent levied on the massive ildded villue generilted by the exp loitiltion o f lilbour. They reinforced the co loniill conquests of the plmlCt. These structural transformations a llowed a new surge in profits. These tmnsformiltions led to the belle epoque - fro m 1890 to 1914 - which is the period o f glo balised domination by financial mo nopoly ca pital. The dominant disco urses of the time praised colonisatio n (its civi lising mission) and d escribed globalisation ilS synonymous with peilce, and the workers' sociill democracy rall ied to the cau se.

However, the belle cpoque, announced as the end of his tory by the ideo logues of this period , ended in the Firs t World Wa r, ilS only Lenin hild predicted. And the period which followed and las ted until the ilftermath of the Second World War was the period of wars and re vo lutions. In 1920, after the Russian Revo lution (the weak link in the sys tem) had bL>en iso lated fo llow ing the d efeat o f the hopes o f revoluti on in cen tral Eu ro pe, the capitill of the finiln cia.lised monopo lies restored, ilgains t all the odds, the system o f the belle 6poque; a res toration, denounced by Keynes at the time, which was at the origin of the financial collapse o f 1929 and the Greilt Depression to w hich it led and which lilsted until the beginning of the Second World War.

The lo ng 20th century - 1873-1990 - is therefore the century o f both the deployment o f the fir s t systemi c and profound cris is of ilgei ng ca pitilLism (to the po int w here Lenin th oug ht tllilt thi s cap italism of monopolies constituted the supreme phase o f capitalism) and that of the first triumphmll wave of anti-capit alist revol utions (Russia, China) and o f the anti-imper ialis t movements of Asia and Africa.

The second sys temic crisis of capi taJism begiln in 1971, wi th the abandoning o f the go ld convertibility o f the dollar, almost exact ly a century after the co mmenceme nt of the first crisis. Profit rates, inves tment levels and growth Tilles all co llapsed (iUld never ilgilin reverted to the levels of the perio d 1945-75). Cap itill responded to the challenge, as in the previous crisis, with a do uble movement

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INTRODUCTION

of concentration and g lobalisation. In tllis way, cap ital es tablished s tructures that d efined the second belle e po'!ue (1990-2008) of financialised g lobalisatio n, allowing oligopo listic groups to levy their monopoly rent. The same discourse accompanied this process: the market guarantees prosperity, democracy and peace; it is the end of his tory. The sa me rallying occurred, this time by Europcan socialists to thc ncw liberalism. Howcvcr, this new bellc epo,!ue was from the outset accompanied by war, the waf o f the North versus the South, started i.n 1990. Ju st as the firs t financial ised globalisalion had led to 1929, so the second p rodu ced 2008. Today wc have rcnched this crucial mo ment whi ch announces the probability of a new wave o f Wilrs and revolutio ns. The chances of this are even g reater s ince the ruling powers do not enviS<lge anything other than the res toratio n of the system as it was before thc fin ancial mcltdown.

The analogy between the unfo lding of these long, systemic crises of ageing capi talism is striking. There are, nonetheless, differences whose political significance is important.

A systemic rather than just a financial crisis

Be hind the financial crisis, there exists a systemi c cri sis o f the capitalism of oligopolies.

Contemporary capitalism is firs t and foremost a capitalism o f o ligopo lies in thc full sense of the term (w hi ch so far cnp italism has only been in part). What I me an by this is that the oligopolies a10ne command the production of the economic system in its entirety. They are financial ised in the sense that they alone ha ve acccss to capitnl markets. This financinli satio n grants the mo netary and financial market - their market, on which they co mpete wi th each o th er - the status of d o minilllt market, whi ch in turn fashions nnd commands the labour and commodity exchange markets.

This g lobalised financiali S<l lion expresses itself by a transformation of the ruling bourgeois class, which has become a rentcapturing p lutocracy. The oligarcJls are not only Russian, as is too o ft en prcsumcd but rather, and mu ch more so, US, European and Japanese. The decline of democracy is the inevitable product of this concentratio n of power to the exclusive benefit of the oligopolies.

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The new form of capitalist g lobali sati on whic h corresponds to this transfo rmation - by contras t w ith the one whi ch characterises the fir st belle epoque - is also im por tant to specify. I have ex pre&>ed it in a phri\se: the passage from plural imperialisms (that o f the imperialist powers in permanent confli ct wi th each other) to the collecti ve imperialism of the Triad (the Uni ted States, Europe and Japan).

The monopolies that emerged in response to the fir st cris is of the rates of profit const itu ted themselves on bases that have reinforced the violence of co mpe tition between the major imperialist powers of the time, and led to the armed conflict begun in 1914, which continued through the peace of Versailles and then the Second Wo rld War unti l 1945 . That is wha t Giovanni A rrighi Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein and J described in the 1970s as the ' war of thirty years', a notion that has bccn taken up by ot hers since then.

By con trast, the seco nd wave of o Ligopolistic concen tration, begu n in the 1970s, constituted itself o n totally other bases, w ithin the framework of a system which J ha ve descr ibed as the collective imperialism o f the Triad. In this new imperialis t globalisalion, the do minati on of the centres is no longer exercised by the mono pol y of industri al production (as had been the case hitherto ) but by o ther means (the control of technologies, financial markets, access to the planet's natura l resou rces, informa tion and communi cations, weapons of mass destructi on). This system, which I have descri bed as ' apartheid o n a g lobal scale' implies a permanent war agains t the states and the peoples of the recalcitrant periphe ries, a war already beg un in the 1990s by the deployment of military con trol over the world by the United States and its subordinated NATO allies.

According to my analysis, the financiaJisation of tllis system is inextricably linked to its clearly oligo polistic aspect . There is a fundamentally organic relation between them. This point of view is not prevalent, nei ther in the expansive literature of conventional economists nor in the majo ri ty o f crit ical writings o n the cur rent cris is.

It is the enti re system whic h hen ceforth is in difficulty. The facts are clear: the 2008 financial co Uapse is already producing not a recession but a veritable, profound depression. But beyond

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INTRODUCTION

th is, other dimensions of the crisis o f this system had surf,ICed in public consciousness even before the financial meltdown. We know the sort of labels - energy cr isis, food cris is, environmental cris is, climate change - a nd nume rous analyses o f these aspects o f the contemporary challenges are produced on a d aily bas is, some o f wh.ich are of the highes t quality.

I remain nonetheless cri tical abo ut this mode o f treating the system ic cris is o f capitalism beca use it excessively iso lates the different dimensions of the challenge. I wou ld, therefore, redefine the d iverse crises as facets o f the sa me chal lenge -that of the system o f contemporary capitalist g lobalisation (whet her liberal o r not), fou nded upon the principle that the imperialis t rent operates on a g lobal scale, to the benefit of the plu tocracy of the ol igopolies o f the imperialist Triad .

T he real bailie is foug ht o n this decisive ground between the o ligo polies - who seek to produce and rep roduce the cond itions that allow them to approp riate the im periali st rent - and all their victims - the workers of all the countri es in the Nort h and the So uth, the peop les o f the d ominated peripheries co ndemned to g ive up any perspect ive of develop ment worthy o f the name.

Ending the crisis of capitalism or ending capitalism?

T his formula - retained in the title of this book - was first suggested by An dre Gunder Frank and myseU in 1974.

The analysis which we d eveloped about the new great cris is that we tho ught had beg un led us to the major conclusion that capital wou ld respond to the cha llenge with a new wave o f co ncentration o n the basis of whi ch it wou ld proceed to massive dislocations. Later developments largely confirmed this . The title o f ou r intervent ion at a co nference o rganised by II A IIlI/ifi'S to in Ro me in 1974 (' Let u s not wai t for 1984', referring to the work by George O rwell) in vited the radi cal left at that time to renounce an}' strategy of coming to the aid of capital by looking for exi ts from the cris is in o rder to SL'Ck strateg ies a imed at an exit from capitalism .

I have pursued this line of ana lysis with a stubbornness I do not regret. I have suggested a concept ual isation of new forms of domina tion on the part of the imperialis t cent res whi ch is ground ed in

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new modes o f control that replaced the old monopoly over exclusively industrial productio n; the rise of the cou ntries referred to as emerging markets has confirmed this co nceptualisation . I have described the new glo balisation which is being built as an ' apartheid at the g lobal level', caUing for the militarised managemen t of the planet and in this way perpetuating in new conditi ons the polarisation that canno t be dissoc iated from the expansion o f aclually ex isting capitnlism.

The second wave of emancipation by the people

There is no alternat ive to a socialis t perspective. The contempornry world is governed by o ligarchies: the finan cial o ligarchies in the United States, Europe nnd Jnpnn who do minnte not on ly economic life bu t also politics and daily [jfe; Ru ssian ol igarchies in their image, which the Russian s tate tries to control; s tatocracies in Chinn; nutocrncies (so metimes hidden behind the appearance o f an elecloral democracy of low intensity ) inscribed into this worldwide syste m elsewhere across the globe.

The management of con temporary globalisation by these oligarchies is in crisis.

The o ligarchies o f the North seek to remain in power once the cris is is over. They do not feel threa tened. By con trast, the frag ility of the power held by the autocracies o f the Sou th is d early visible. The model of globalisation that is currentl y in place is therefore vulnerable. Will it be questioned by the revolt in the South, as was the case in the previous cen tury? P robably, but that wouJd be cause for sadness. For humanity will only commit itself on the rond to socialism - the only humane alternati ve to chaos - o nce the powers o f the o ligarchi es, the ir allies and their servants have been defea ted bo th in th e coun tries of the North and those in the So uth . Long li ve the internationalism of the peop le in the fil ce o f the cosmo politanism of the olign.fchies.

Is the reins tntemen t of the capitali sm o f financiali sed and g lobalised o ligopolies possible? Cnp italism is liberal by nature, if by liberalism we mean no llhe pretty label w hi ch Ihi s notion inspires but the plnin and lo tal exefcise o f the do mination of cnpilal nol only over work and the econo my but over all nspects of soci al life. There can be no market economy (a vulgn! - see Translator' s

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INTRODUCTION

note - expressio n fo r capitalism) witho ut a market society. Capital s tubbornly pu rsues this unique objecti ve: mo ney; accumuJati on for its o wn sake. Marx, and after him other criti cal thinkers such as Keynes, understood this perfectly, but not o ur conventional econorrus ts, those on the left i.ncl ud ed.

This mod el o f total a.nd ex cl usive domin ation by ca pi tal had been imposed ruthlessly by the ruling classes throug hout the prev io us long crisis up to 1945. O nly the triple victory of democracy, socialism and the national liberatio n of the peo ple allowed a replace ment fro m 1945 to 1980 of thi s permanent model of the capitalis t ideal with the conflictua l coexistence of three social, regulated models: the welfare s tate o f Western social democracy, the actually ex isting socialism i.n the Eas t and the popular nationalisms in the South. The demise and collapse of these three models made the return of the ex clusive domination by capital possible, this time described as the neolibe ral phase o f capitalism.

I have lin ked this new liberal.ism to a series of new characteristi cs w hich appears to me to merit the description of senile ca pitalism. My book with the epony mo us titl e, publi shed in 2001, is probably one of the very few writings at the time whi ch, far from viewing g lo bali sed and financia lised neo liberalism as the end o f history, analysed the system of ageing capitalism as uns table, co ndenmed to eventual collapse, precisely in terms of its financialisatio n (its 'Achilles' heel', as I wrote then).

Conventio nal econo mis ts have re mained persistently deaf to any questioning of their own d ogma, so m uch so that they were unable to foresee the financial collapse of 2008. Those w hom the media have po rtrayed as critical hardly deserve this descriptio n. Even Joseph Stig Htz remai ns co nvin ced that the sys tem as it s tands - globalised and financia lised liberali sm - ca n be fi xed by means of so me corrections. A martya Sen preaches mo rality witho ut da ring to think of actually existing capitalism as it necessarily is.

The socia l disasters, whi ch the d eployment of liberal ism - ' the permanent utopia o f ca pital', a s I wrote - would cause, have insp ired quite a bit of nos talg ia in relation to the recent or dis tant past. But such nostalgia canno t respond to the present challenge. For it is the p rod uct of an impoverished criti caL th eoreti ca l thinking which has gradu ally stopped itself from unders tanding the

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internal contmdictions and the limits of the post-194S systems, whose erosio ns, di versions and coll<lpses <lppeared to be unforeseen c<lt<lclysms.

However - in the void created by these regressions of critical, theoreti cal thinking - <I consciousness <lbout the new dimensions of the systemic cr isis of civilisation m<lnaged to chart a path . I am referring here to the ecological movement. Bu t the grccns, who have purpo rted to dis tinguish themselves radi cally from both the blues (the conservatives and the liberals) and the reds (the sociali sts) are locked into an impasse s in ce they have f<lil ed to link the eco logical dimension to the challenge of a mdical critique o f capitalism.

Every thing was therefore reildy to ensu re the triumph - in fac t ephemeral bu t experienced as definiti ve - of the altern <lti ve described as ' libeml democracy' . This is a miserable kind o f thinking - a ver itable non-thinking - which ig no res Marx 's d ecis ive argumen t about bourgeois democmcy's failure to acknowledge that those w ho decide are not those who are <lffected by these decisions. Those who decid e and benefit from the frccdom reinforced by the control over property are nowadays the plutocrats of the cap italism of o ligopolies, and sti'lles Me their debto rs. Perforce, the wo rkers <lnd the peop le affected Me littl e more than their vict ims. Tlus sort of liberal no nsense might at so me po int have been credib le, at least fo r a short while, as a result of the diversions of the posl-1945 systems. The poverty of the prevailing dogm<ls could no longer ex pl<l in the ori gi ns of the crisis so th<lt liberal democracy might therefore loo k like th e best of aU possible systems.

Today, the powers Ihat be, those who foresaw nothing, are busy restoring the same system. Their possible success, like th<lt of the co nservati ves in the 1920s - which Keynes had denounced wi thout mu ch of an echo at the time - will only exacerbate the scope o f the co ntradictions which are the root cause of the 2008 fin<lncial coli <Ipse.

No less serious is the fact thai economists o n the so-called left have long since embraced the essential tenets of vulgar (see Translator 's Note) econo nucs and accep ted the erroneous idea th<lt markets are r<ltio na l. The same econo mi sts h<l ve focused their efforts on defilung the co nditi ons for Ihis market rat ionality,

10

INTRODUCTION

thereby ilbilndoning Marx, who hild discovered the irmti onaJity o f mill'kets from the point of view of the workers and the peoples, a perspecti ve deemed obso lete. Accordi ng to this left-wing perspective capitalism is fl ex ible and adjusts itself to the requirements of prog ress (technologiCil I and even sociill) if it is co nstrained in thi s way. These lefti st economists weTe not p repared to understand that the crisis which has erupted was inevitabl e. They are even less prepill'ed to confront the d lilllenges that the peo ples face as a result. Like the other v ulgilf economists, they w ill seek to repair the damage witho ut understanding t ll"t it is necessary to pursue ano ther route to be successful - that of overcoming the funda mental logics o f cilpitalism. lnsteild o f loo king for ex its from ca pitillism in cris is, they think they can s imply exit the crisis o f cap it"lism.

US hegemony in crisi s

The G20 summit in London in A pril 2009 in no w"y marked the beginning of a reco nstru ction of the world . And it is perha ps no coin cidence ami dst the flurry around the G20 that it WilS followed by a summit meeting of NATO, the rig ht hand of contemporary imperialism, and by the rei nforcement of NATO's military in vo lvement in Afg hanis tan. The permanent war of the North against the South must continue.

We al ready knew that the governments of the Tri "d - the United St" tes, Eu rope <lJld J"pan - would pursue the sole goal o f restoring the system as it existed before September 2008, and o ne must no t take seriously the interventions at the G20 summit in Lond on by President Obam" and Co rdon Brown, on the o ne hand, and those of Sill'kozy "nd Merkel, o n the other. Both weTe aimed at amusing the spectators. The purpo rted diffe rences, identified by the med ia but without any genuine substance, respond to the exclusive needs of the leaders in question to make the best of themselves in the face of naive public opinion. ' Re-crea te capitalism', 'mo ralise financial o perations' : these and s imilar g rand declarations were made in o rde r to esc hew the real questions. That is w hy restoring the system, w hich is not impossible, w ill not solve any pro bl em but will in fact exacerb" te the gravity of the crisis. The Stig litz Commissio n convened by the United Nations is

11 ngntea IT na


part of thi s s tra tegy to trick the pu bHc. Obviously, one could not expect otherw ise from the OligMChs who control the real power and their polit ical debtors. The point of view I have d eveloped, which puts the emphasis on the inextricable links between the dornination of the o li gopoli es and the necessary financialisation o f man"ging the world eco nomy, is confirmed by the results o f the G20 summit.

More interesting is the fael that the in vi ted leaders of the emerging markets chose to remain silent. A sing le inte lligent sentence w"s s"id throughout thi s d"y of great spect"c1e - by the Chinese President Hu jintao, who observed in passing, without insis ting and with a (moc king?) s mile, that it would be necessary to envisage the creat ion o f a g lo bal financial sys tem that is not based on the US d oll ar. So me com mentators immed iate ly linked thi s - correctly - to Keynes's proposals in 1945.

This remark is a rude reminder that the crisis of the capitalist system of oligopo li es is inex tricab ly linked to the cris is o f US hegemo ny, whi ch is on the ropes. But who w ill rep lace it? Certainly not Europe, which docs not ex ist apart from or o utside Atlanti cism and w hi ch has no ambition to be ind epe ndent, as the NATO sununit meeting o nce more confirmed. China? This threat, w hich the med ia undoubtedly repea t ad l1"use" m (a new yellow peril ) in o rder to justify the Atl ant ic alignment, has no found ation in reality. The Chinese leadership knows that the country does not have suc h mea ns and they do 110 t have the wil l. China's strategy is confined to promo ting a new globalis" tio ll wit hout hegemony - something which neither the United States nor Europe deem acceptable.

The like lihood of a possible evol uti on in this direc tion depends once more o n the co untries of the South . And it is no coi ncide nce tha t UNCfAD (the United Natio ns Conference on Trade and Develop me nt) is the on ly ins titutio n wi th in the UN u mbrella which has taken ini tiat ives th"t a re fundamen tally different from those of the Stigl itz Co mmissio n. It is no coi ncidence that UNCTA D's Secretary -Gene.ral Supachai Panilchpakdi from Thailand, hitherto considered to be a perfect liberal, has dared to propose in a report entitled 'The global economic crisis' o f March 2009 reaJis ti c ideas th " t are part of a second wave of a Southern awaken ing.

12 ngntea IT na

INTRODUCTION

For its pmt, China hils begu n to build - in a g mdual and co ntro Ued manner - a lterna tive regional financial systems free from the US do ll ar. Such initi at ives complete on the econo mic levc lthe promotion of po litical a lli ance w ithin the Shanghai Coo peration OrgiUliziltion (Seo). which is a major obstacle to NATO's belligerence.

The NATO summit meeting, con vened in the same month as the G20 summit, agreed o n Washington's decision not to s tart a g radual military downsizi ng but on the con trary to reinforce the scope of its militilry involvement, il lways und er the misgU ided p retext of the 'war on terro r' . Pre sident Obama dep loyed his talent to save Clinton's and Bush's programme of im posing glo bal mi litary control, w hi ch is the only way of prolonging the days o f US hegemo ny now under threat. Obama scored poi nts and obtained a total unco nd itio nal s urrender fro m Sarkozy's France - the end of Gaullism - which has now rejoined NATO's military command, something that WilS d iffic ult during Bush's reign w hen Washington spoke w ithou t in telligence bu l nol w ithou t arrogance. Mo reover, Obama acted like Bush by ignoring Europe's independence and g iv ing lessons about how Turkey shou ld be allowed to enter the European Union.

Second wave of victorious struggles for the emancipation of workers and peoples

A re new advances in the st ruggles for the emancipation of the wor kers <lnd peoples possible?

The pol iii cal manageme nt of tile wo rl dwide dominat ion by the cilpital of oligopolies is necessmi ly marked by ex treme vio lence . f or in o rder to maintain their s tatus as affluent societies, the countries of the imperi<llist Triad are henceforth ob liged to reserve access to the planet' s natu ral resources for the ir ow n excl us ive benefit. This new requirement is at the ori gin of the militarisation of g lobalisa tion, whi ch 1 have elsewhere described as the 'empire of ch<los' (t he title of <l book o f mine published in 1992), <lll express ion which others have since taken up .

In line with the Washington projec t of military control over the planet and the wag ing of pre-eru pti ve wars under the pretext of the W<lr on terror, NATO has portmyed itself as the represent<llive

13


of the international co nununity and has thereby margi naHsed the UN -the only ins titution enti t led to speak under thi s name.

O f course, these real goals canno t be openly acknowledged. ]n order to mask them, the powers in question have chosen to instrumentalise the discourse o n democracy and have arrogated to themselves the rig ht to intervene so as to impose ' respect fo r human right s'.

A tthe same time, the absolute power o f the new o ligarc hi c plutocracies has hollowed ou t the substance of the prilctice o f bou rgeois democ Tilcy. iJl former times, poli tical negotiatio n between the different social parties of the hegemonic bloc was necessary for the reproduction of the power of cap ital. By con trast, the new po liti cal management of the society of oligopo listic capitalism, established by means of a syste matic depoliticisation, has g iven rise to a new political culture o f 'consensus' (mod elled on the example of the United States) wh ich substitutes the consumer and the po litical spectator for the active citizen - who is a conditi on for an "ulhenti c democracy. This ' liberal virus' (the title of ano ther book o f mine, pub lished in 200S) abolishes the opening onto possible alternative choices and replaces it with a co nsensus th"t is centred solely on respect for a procedural, electoral democracy.

The demi se and co llapse of the three social models mentioned above is at the origin of this dra ma . The page of the fir st wave o f s truggles for emancipatio n hilS now bL>en turned, that of the second wave has not yet been opened. In the twilig ht which separates them one can di scern iJle ' monsters', as Gramsci wrote.

In the North, these developments have caused the loss of any real sense o f democratic practice . This reg ression is masked by the p retensio ns of the so-called pos t-modern discou rse, accord ing to which natio ns and classes have <'l lready left the scene and ceded po litical space to the individual, w ho is now the active subject o f socialtransfOTmation.

In the South, other illu sions dominate the political realm. The illu sion of a capitalist, national and autonomou s development that is part of g lobalisation is po werful among the dominant and the middles classes in emergent markets, fu elled by the immediate success of the last few decades. Nostalgic (para-ethni c or parareligio us) illusio ns about the past are co mmon in the cou ntries excluded from this process.

14 ngntea IT na

INTRODUCTION

W hat is wo rse, these develo pments ha ve strengthened the general embrace of the ideology o f consumption and the idea that progress is measured by the quantita ti ve growlh of consumption . Marx showed that it is the mode of production whi ch d etermines the mode of consumption and not vice versa, as is claimed by vulgar economics. What is lost sight o f in al l this is the perspective o f a humanist and superior rationality, the basis for the social ist project . The g iganli c potential which Ihe applicati on of science and technology offers to the who le of humanity and w hich would enable the real flourishing of individua ls and socie ti es in the North and the South is wasted by the requirements of its subordination to the logics of the unlimited pursuit of the accumulat ion of capital. What is even worse, the continuou s progress of the social productivity of labour is linked to a brea thtaking use of the mechanisms of pauperis., lion (visible at a g lobal sca le, for instance in the wholesale attack on peasant societies), as Marx had already understood.

Embracing the ideological alie natio n whi ch is cau sed by capitalism does not on ly ad versely affect the affluent societies of the imperiali st centres. The peoples o f the peripheries, who arc for the most part dep ri ved of access 10 acceplable levels o f consumption and blind ed by aspira tions to consume like the o pu lent No rth, are losing conscio usness of the fact that the logic of hi stori cal cap italism makes the ex tensio n o f this model to the entire globe impossible.

We can therefore wlders tand the reasons w hy the 2008 financial collapse was the exclusive resu lt of a sharpening of the internal conl radictio ns pecu liar to the accumu latio n o f capital. As a resuit, only the intervention of fo rces that embod y a posilive alterna tive can offer a way of imagining an exit from the chaos. (Ll thi s spirit, I have contrasted the revo lutionary way w ith promo ting decadence to overcome the llistorically o bsolete sys tem). And in the current s late of affairs, soc ial pro test movements, despite their vis ible g row th, re main as a who le unable to question the social order linked to the capitalism of o ligopolies in the absence o f a coherent political project Ihal can mat ch up to the chall enges.

From this point o f view, the current situation is markedly d ifferent from that wru ch prevailed in the 1930s, when the forces of socialism clashed w ith fascist parties, produ cing Nazism, the New Deal and the Popular Fronts.

1 5


The deepening of the cris is wi ll not be avoid ed , even if rei ns tating the system o f domina tio n by the capital o f the oligopolies were to be eventually successful. which is not impossible. In this s ituation, the possible radica lisation of the strugg les is no t an improbable hy po thesis, even if the obstacles remain formidab le.

In the cou ntries of the Triad, such a radi ca li sation woul d imply that the agenda would be to expropriate the ol igopolies, a possibility that seems to be ex cluded for the foreseeable future. In consequence, the hypot hesis tha t - despite the turmoil ca used by the crisis - the stability of the societies of the Triad will not be questioned cannot be discarded. T here is a serious risk o f a rc-run o f the 20th century wave o f emancipatory struggles, that is to say, a qu esti oning of the system exclusively by some of its peripheries.

A second s tage o f ' the So uth's awakening' ('/'rvt'i/ rill Slid' -

the title of yet another book of mine published in 2007, w hich o ffers a reading of the Bandung period as the fir st stage of this awakening) is now on the agenda. In the best possible scenario, the ad vances produced in these conditions could force imperi alism to retreat, to reno unce its demented and criminal project o f military control of the world . A nd if this were the case, then the democ ratic movement in the countries at the centre of the system co uld make a positi ve co ntributio n to the success of this neu tralisation strategy. Moreover, the d ec line of the imperi alist rent which benefits the societies at the centre, itself caused by the reorganisation of in ternationa l equil ibria to the advantage of the So uth (especia ll y Chin a), cou ld help the awakening of a socialis t consciousness. However, on the o ther hand, the societies o f the So uth could still be confronted by the same challe nges as in the past, producing the sam e limits on thei r progress.

A new internationa lism of the wo rkers and the peoples is necessary and possible.

His torical capita lism is all things to everyone, except that it is no t durable. It is but a short pa renthesis in histo ry. The fundamen tal questioning of capitalism - whi ch o tlr conte mporary thinkers in their overwhelming majority deem neither possible nor desirable - is no netheless the in(."Scapable condition for the emancipation of the dominated workers and the peop les (those o f the peri pheries, that is 80 per cent of mankind). And the two dimensio ns o f this chaJlenge are inex tri cably linked with one

16 ngntea IT na

INTRODUCTION

another. There wi ll be no exit from capitalism so le ly by way of the s truggle of the peo ple of the North, or solely by the s truggle of the dominated people of the South . There will only be an exit from capita lism if and when these two dimensions of the challenge co mbine with o ne other. It is far from certain that lrus will occur, in w hi ch case capitalism w ill be overcome by the destru ction o f civilisation (beyond the malaise in civilisation, to usc Freud's terminology) and perhaps of life on the planet. The scenario o f a fe-run o f the 20th century faUs short o f the require ment for a co mmitment by mankind to the long route of the transitio n towards world wide socialism. The liberal catastro phe requires a renewal of the radi cal critique of capitalism. The challenge requires the permanent construction / reconstru ction of the internati onalism of the workers and the peo p les in the face of the cosmopolitanism o f oligarchi c capital.

Co nstructing this internationalism can o nly be envisaged by successful, new, revolutio nary ad vances (like those begun in Latin America and Nepal ) which offer the perspec ti ve o f an o vercoming of capitalism.

ln the co untri es of the So uth, the battle of the states a nd the nations fo r a nego tiated globalisation w ithou t hege monies - the contempo rary form of delinking - supported by the orga nisati on of the demands o f the po pu lar classes can circumscribe and limit the powers of the o ligo polies of the imperialis t Triad . The democrati c forces in the countries of tIle North must suppo rt t lus battle. Real eng"gemenl w ith the challenge is eschewed by the proposed democratic discourse. Thi s has been accepted as it stands, together with the humanitarian interve ntions in its name, by a majority of the left , just like the miserabl e practi ce of giving aid .

In the countries o f the North, the oligopolies are already clear ly forms of the common good w hose management calUlOt be left to sectiona l pri vate interes ts alo ne (t he cris is has hig hlig hted the catastrophic results o f such an appro ach). An authentic left must d are to envisio n nationali sation as the first inescapable stage of the socialisation of the o ligopo lies by dee pening d emocratic practice . The current crisis makes it possible to conceive a commo n front of social and po litical forces, bring ing together all the \'ictims of the exclusive power o f the ruling oli garchies.

The first wave o f struggles for socialism, that o f the 20th

17


centu ry, showed the limits of European social democracies, of the communisms o f the Third International and of the popular nationalism o f the Bandung era, which brought the demi se and collapse of their socialist ambitio ns. The second Wil ve, thM o f the 21s t cen tu ry, must draw lessons from this. In particular, one lesson is to associate the socia lisation of economic management and the deepening of the d emocratisat ion of society. There will be no sociillism witho ut democracy, but equally no democratic advance ou ts ide a soc ialist perspective.

These strategic goals in vite us to think about the constru ction o f convergences in diversity (referring here to the formula used by the World Forum o f A lterniltives) o f forms of o rganisiltion illld the st ruggles of the d ominated and exp loited classes. It is not my intention to condemn from the o utset the convergences of these forms, w hich in their own way would retr ieve the traditions o f social d emocracy, co mmunism and popular nationa lism, or would d iverge from them.

According to this perspective, it seems to me to be necessary to think the renewal of a creat ive Marxism. Marx has never been so useful and necessary in order to unders tand and trilnsform the wor ld, todilY even more so than yesterday. Being Marxis t in this spi rit is 10 begin w ith Marx and Ilotto s to p wit h him, o r Lenin or Mao, as co nceived and practised by the his torical Marx ists o f the prev io us century. It is to render unto Marx thilt which is o wed to him: the intelUgence to have begun a modern cri tical thinking, a cri tique of ca pitalist reality and a crit iclue of its politi ca l, id eological and cultural representatio ns (sec Translator 's no te). A creat ive Marxism must pursue the gOill of e nriching this critical thinking par excellence. It mu st not fear to integra te a ll th e input o f refl ection, in all areas, includ ing those which have wrongly been considered to be foreign by the dogmas of hi storical Marxisms o f the pas t.

The structure of this book

This boo k is composed of the arguments sust<lining the theses th<lt have bL>cn briefly presented in this introduction.

C hapter 1 opens wi th a reminder, not of the unfolding financi al cris is (excellent presentations of which can be found elsewhere),

18 ngntea IT na

INTRODUCTION

but of the or igin of the C<lu ses thilt m<lde them f<ltal (foreseeilble ilnd correclly pred icted by il few). I h<l ve s ituated these causes in the development of the c<lpitalis l1l of general ised oligopolies and collective imperialism, a nd not in the expansio n of credit, w hi ch is a consequence <lnd nol il C<luse.

There fo llow two ch<lpters dedicated to a re<lding of capitalism over a long period . Chapter 2 discusses the diversity o f the respo nses to the grow ing contr<ld ictions of the old systems w hich here ilnd Ihere opened up the w ay to it (co mparing Europe, the Mediterrane<ln and the Middle East wi th the Chinese wo rld). Then, in Chapter 3, there is a presentation of his torical (Atlantic) c<lpitalism, which was to become the defin itive fo rm of this response, bilsed on its princip<ll characteri stic: accumu lat ion throug h dispossession. The contrast between the centres and the peripheries generated by this permanent form of accumulation in historical capitalism governs, in its turn, the domin'lIlt contrad iction Ih<l t acco mpilnies capi talism ilS it d evelops <lnd, bilsed on thi s, the struggles in w hi ch its v ictims <Ire engaged. The fig ht o f the peo ples o f the periphery is accorded it s full place: it shaped the fir st W<lve of strugg les (in the 20th century) and will pro bably, for the S<lme re ilsons, sh<lpe the second W<lve, yet to corne (in the 21st century).

It is more than ever necessary, al the dawn of a possible opening to this second wave of strugg les, to recall, however briefl y, the ild vilnces ilnd retre<lts ex pe rienced by the stru gg les fo r emilncipatio n by the workers and peoples in the 20th century. I do thi s in Chapter 4.

It is not by ch<lnce that I have placed the new agr<l rian question, which is the su bject of C hap ter 5, <I t Ihe heart of the chalJenge for the 21st century. I had no difficul ty in making this choice among other possibilities. My thesis is that the development o f the s truggles in this field, the respo nses that wi ll be given th roug h them in the future by the peilS<l nt societies of the Sou th (almost half of humani ty) will largely condition the c<lp<lcity (or not) o f the workers and peoples to make progress on the route to socialism.

This is the ch<l llenge th<l t confronts the constructio n! reco ns tru ction of the interniltionalism of the workers and peoples in the f<lce of the cosmopolit<l nism of o ligarchic ca pital. Ln Chapter 6 I try to show ho w and why the humanist discourse that is proposed

19


and accepted by most of the left , such as it is, is not up to meeting thi s challenge.

The las t chapter, Chapter 7, concerns Marx and Marx ism, co mmunism and internationalism. Never befo re has Ma rx been SO

useful ilnd necessary to und erstilnding and changing the world situiltion as he is today.

Note 1, '~Ionopoly ren t' was definl'<i by ;\Iarx a~ thc difJcrence between the price of p roduction und murkcl price where miUkcl price is ~cl no t by the <tl'emgc profilthnt results from cquillisalion of the rute of profits over limc; inslcild the price is set by il few mrtcls o r corporiltions . In Ute current imperialist epoch, a small number of oligopolies sets the world prices in various sectors of production (e.g. oil, medicines, biotechnology, agricultural inputs), and thus monopoly rent is often referred to as imperialist renl or rent of oligopolies. Where finance capital exercises the s..'lme control over p rices, the term fina ncialised monopoly rent is some times IISOO .

References Amin, Samir (1992) Tlir Eml'ire 0IC/laOS, New York, NY, 11 lonthl}' Review

Press Amin, Samir (2002) Beyond Senile Capitalism, Paris, Presses Univcrsitaires de

Fruncc (PUF) Amin, Samir (2005) The Libt"lIlJ Virus: Permillll'lIt Will' lind till' AmeJTt"lIni:atim'l of

the WoJ/d, New York, NY, Monthly Review Prl'Ss Amin, Samir (2007) J:Eveil .III Srld, Paris, Ie Temps des Cerises

20 ngntea IT na

The financial collapse of liberal globalisation

The financial collapse of Septem ber 2008 was foreseeable and predi cted by those rare ana lysIs who had no l succumbed to the disco urse of con vent ional econo mi cs, liberal and others (of the ' left') . T his collapse certainly initiated a new period of d epression and chaos. And the shape of the system that will e merge is difficu lt to define precisely wit h any degree of plausibility. Everything is possible, for beller o r for wo rse. It is an open question . T hroug h their successes o r failures, politica l and social strugg les will shape the fu ture, w hich is mo re un certain than ever.

However, the financial coll <lpse is not only the beginning of the transformations to come. It is also the end of the evolutio n o f the system and of its changes. It is the end, not only o f some 20 years o f the financia l ex plosion, w hich is blinding ly obvious tod ay, but, beyo nd th at, the end of the lo ng cri sis that began in 1968-1971 .

I insist on this last point precisely because it is absent in the analyses of the ' financial crisis' (at leas t of those that I know) and even of the 'systemic crisis' that is associated with it - i.n the better cases.

After the Second World War, g lo baliscd capitalism experienced a period of marked grow th whi ch las ted for a quarter of a ce ntu ry, fro m 1945 to 1970.

The reasons fo r this growth are obvio us. The power relalio nships were mo re favo urable to the working classes (the victory o f democracy o ver fascism ); to socialism (the victo ry of the Red A rmy over the Nazis); a.nd to the peo plesof Asia and Afri ca (w ho set o ut to reco nquer their ind epe ndence). This created the conditio ns for the 'g lorio us' decades (the catching-u p of Eu rope a.nd Japan vis-a-vis the United States, the o nly benefi ciary of the war ) a.nd for those years of the 'd evelo pment' of the South .

2 1


At the same time, this growth faci litated the ad justmen t o f capita.! to Ihe requi rements o f the workers and of peop les. Growth, which was strong, o ffered capital opportuniti es for the inves tment it required to feed itself. The ' moderate' rate of retu rns (in relative histo ri cal terms) on ca pi tal was compensated by solid and continu ed growth in the volume of profits. This modera te rate represented one side of the reality of this period, the o thers being the g rowth in real wages (g row ing parallel with average social productivity) and the acceptance by the imperial powers o f co ncessio ns to the countries of the periphery th,,1 had regained their independence.

The viability of the system was suppo rted, on the international political leveL by milit"ry bipo larity (U nited States / Soviet Union) and pe"cefu l coex is tence (a l Ihe time people even spoke o f the co nvergence o f the eastern " nd western systems, which Jan Tinbergen pred icted would increase).

The system was legitimised by a series of powerful ideological d iscou rses th"t com plemented eflc h other: the socia l-d emocratic / Key nesi"n discourse in the West; that of actually existing socialism (see Translator 's note) in the East; ,md that of development in the South. They all shared the same vision o f 'peace and social p rogress'. At the he" rl o f the system in Ihe developed countries, it was felt that the management of ca pit al shou ld be ent rusted to capitalist tec hnocrats rat her than to the for mal ow ners o f cap ital (the shareholders). John Kenneth Galbraith expressed this o ptimistic visio n of a cap italism th"t had fi nal ly become socially respo nsib le, whose leaders werc more interested in innovation and in extend ing their enterprises than in the rate of their remuneration (w hi ch was, even so, a comfortab le one) '1I1 d in the useless d istribution of profits to shareholders (Key nes pred icted their euthanasia). This syste m has g iven what it has given, but it g radually ran o ut o f steam for reasons that I have analysed e lsewhere, so I shall not repeat them here.

This capi tal ist system entered illto crisis from 1%8 (a politi cal cris is and erosion of the legit imacy o f its discourse) and 1971 (the abandoning of the convertibility of the dol lar to gold).

The presen t cris is is no thing more than one sl"ge (whi ch is certainly new) in tllis lo ng, drawn-oul cris is dati.ng back to the

22 ngntea IT na

I THE FIN ANCIAL COLLAPSE OF LIBERAL GLOBALISATION

1970s. [t has been marked by a weakening in the rates of grow th and of in vestmen t, w hich 1"1ve never recovered - and I insist on Ihe 'llmer' - Ihe levels thallhey a ttained in the posl-1945 period. Triumphant liberalism from Ihe 1990s o nwards has changed no lhing in that respect.

Only a few of us, in the 1970s, spoke o f the s tructural cri sis (w hich is described as systemic t hese days). How was do minanl capital going 10 meet the challenge?

At thaI time Andre Gunder Frank and I had imagined that the logic of cap ita l wou ld o pt for a '1984' (it was in 1974), based on a massive delocalisalion of ord in ary industrial production activit ies towards Ihe cou ntries of the periphery and the recentralisation o f activiti es in the centres around the monopolies that gu aranteed them th e co nt rol of the delocalised production and enabled them 10 levy rent o n it. I will not dwell here on the develop ments that 1 pro posed concern ing these ne w 'mo nopolies' o f the imperialis t centres (control of tec hnologies, access to natural resources, glo bal finance). Delocal isation above all made it possible, we said at the lime, to break the relationshi p betwccn wages and prod ucti vity and to reduce real wages (or their g rowth), w hich were at the centre of the w ho le system.

I do not believe that what has happened sin ce has in va lidated our precocio us theses whi ch were scornfull y dismissed as ranis by o ur ' left- wing' economists (not to speak o f the libe rals). With the exception of the Italian j\ la lllfl'Sto, they were hardly given serious atten tio n in Europe or in the United States, so far as I know, alas excep t perhaps by Margare t Thatcher and Ronald Reagan and a few senior o fficial s in count ries of the South (I was in vi ted to co rne and speak about ou r theses in China!) . Because i.n fact, from 1980, Thatcher and Reagan decided to do w hat we had feared they wo uld do.

Th is s trategy of cap ital was set in motion in 1981 (at the G7 meeting at Candm) and it accele rated during the 1990s after the coll apse of the Soviet Union. It look on the name of ' neoliberalism' ; pri vatisation and liberalisfltion aimed at opening up new fro ntiers for the expansio n of capital; the glo balised o pening that would enable delocalisa tio n; the imposition of s tru ctural adjus tment prog rammes 0 11 the countr:ies o f the Sou th; and the Ii beralisation o f the rates o f interest and currency exchange.

23


It is important to unders tand the tran sfo rmatio ns of the capital system itself that cond itioned the success of this operation and even im posed it. There were two transformations at the or igin o f this so-called ' neo liberal ' o ptio n: the emergence o f a generalised cap italism of oligopolies (I insist on the ad jective 'generalised' as ol igopolies are no novelty in the hi story of capitalism) and the emergence of the co llec ti ve imperialism of the Triad (the Uni ted States, Eu rope and Japan ). I will return to these later, but I emphasise their decisive role, because most of the analyses of the 'systemic crisis' do not. I believe, moreover, that if yo u neg lect to spell out all the developments from 191.XJ as they impact o n these transformations, you inevitably view the vertiginous ex pansion of cred it that led to the 2008 crisis as th e result o f a ' d eviati on', as being without any cause. Or else the ca use origin ated in a ' theoret ical blunder ' (nco liberaLism). But tltis deviation was a IH.><:essary and perfect ly logical consequence from the vie wpoint of the management of the world by the oligo pol ies. The essential relatio nship between oligopoly rent and financialisalion w ill be dealt with in subsequ ent pages.

Understanding how all the dimensions of what is today called the 'systemic cr isis' revolve around these two decisive transformations is the only way o f situating them (the energy cri sis, the food crisis and others) in a framework that assigns them their true place. O nly thus is it possible to identify, beyond the general nature of these challenges (the op tion in favour o f hi gh-level energy consumption w hi ch has such disastrous consequences, fo r example), the issues and the different co unterstrategies that arc possible and effective for the workers and for the peoples. If all this is not unde rstood, the ri sk is that people w il\ be sati sfied wi th p ious wishes or, worse s till, ad just to minor changes in the s.ame system (under so-called 'ecologicaJ ' management). Capital will then continue to keep the initiative.

The neo Libe ral o ption (1990-2008) has not extrica ted ca pitalism from its long crisis (w hi ch started in 1971). It imprisoned capitalism still further, as can be seen from the weakness in grow th and in inves tments to expand and deepen the productive ~ys tems .

Weakness o f g rowth ? How then to ex plain the accelerating g rowt h in the e merging countri es? It is important to realise that this is not ' the exception that pro ves the rule' but an essential

24 ngntea IT na

I THE FINAN CIAL COLLAPSE OF LIBERAL GLOBALISATION

part of the rule, as this acceleration is linked to the so ug ht-after delocalisations . That thi s emergence can create problems in the lo nger term is beyond dispute. But that constitutes another series o f questions, problems and concerns.

The real object ive of the liberal op tion has not been to reinstall growth - even if the liberal di sco urse claims that it is. The real object ive was to proceed to a redistribution of income in fa vour o f capital, and of the income appropriated by capital in fa vouT of the rent of oligopolies. These two objectives have been fulfiJled to a far grea ter ex tent than the ' left' co uld have imagined. The success o f this op tio n has ind eed weakened g rowth; it has no t happened ' in spite' o f it.

A nd, in tUTn, Ilus success - and the weakening of growth that it requires - has imposed all the d e viations o f finance capital .

O n the basis o f this analysis it SL'Cmed to me ev ident that the IH,"01iberal op tio n would not be viable. I said in 2002 that I had ' no crystal ball ' but predicted that the coll ap se wo uld occur within 10 years.

T he financial coll <l pse o f September 2008 thus initiated a worsening o f the systemic crisis o f cilpitalism. To und erstand the nature o f this crisis ilnd w hat is at stake, and o n that basis to imagine the possible forms o f the different alterna ti ve systems that will g radually emerge from the rL>sponses that wi ll be made by the dominant powers, the states and the governing classes, as well as the workers ilnd the dominated peo ples, it is necessary to move beyond analysing the unwi nding of the financiaJ cris is, in its narrowest sense. Bu l il is not eno ugh, eilhe r, to juxtapose this l<lst analysis and that of o ther crises, in parti cu lar: (1) the cris is of accu mu latio n in the real, producti ve eco nomy; (2) the energy crisis, concerning (a) the d windling of fossil fuel reso urces, (b) the co nsequences o f Ihe g rowth caused by the mo del using this energy (possible effects on the climate included ), and (c) the co nsequences of subs titution policies (agrofuels); and (3) the cris is of peasant societies subjected to accelerated destruction and the food cri sis thai is linked to it. It is necessary to in clude all Ihe dimensio ns of this major systemic crisis in an integrated analysis.

So I shall return to the major transformations that ha\'e d eveloped over the last d ecades. Altho ug h they s tarted to evolve a lo ng

25


time ago, I believe that the qua ntitative change ha s beco me a qualitative lea p forward .

The first of these transformalions concerns the degree o f the centralisation of capital in its dominant sectors. This is immeasurably greater than it was on ly som e 40 years ago. True, monopolies and oligopolies were no t new in the history of capi talism, from the mercantilist era until the emergence of trusts and cartels at the end of the 19th cen tury (analysed by Hilferding, Hobson and Lenin). But today we should caLi it a generalised ca pitalism of o ligopolies that now dominates all the fie lds of economic li fe.

I d educe two major conseq uences from this observatio n. First, that this transfo rmation has gi ven a new face to imper ialism. In the past this term was always used in the plural, which was apparent from the permanent confli cts between the imperialis t powers. Now we sho uld refer to the collective imperialism of the Triad in the sing ular.

The second major, qualitative tran sformation concerns the natur<11 resources of the planet. These are no longer so abundant for unlimited access to their ex ploit ation to be considered possible. They have become relati vely much rarer (if not in the process of being ex hausted ) and for this reason their access cannot be open to all.

The list of 'w hat is new' in the organis.,tion of modern societies is much g reater than the fields considered here. Many books emphasise, for example, the scientific and technological revolution o f o ur time (informatio n technology, space, nuclear energy, deep-sea exploitation, the productio n of new materials, e tc). This is all very important and beyond dispute. Nevertheless, I refu se to approach thi s dimension of reality throug h the ' tec hnologi st' discourses that dominate the subject, considering these innovations as the main dri ver of his tory and therefore calling o n society to ' adjust' to the constraints that they impose. O n the contrary, in the analyses that I am proposing, techno logies are themselves shaped by the dominant social relationships. In the field of international relatio ns, th e possibility of ' new powers' emerging cannol be excluded . In the fi eld o f soc ial relationships the lis t o f ' new deve lopmen ts' could indeed appear to be unlimited , for example. w ith the labour market and the organisation of producti ve systems, or the erosion of o ld forms of po lit:icaJ expression in favour of new

26 ngntea IT na


affirmatio ns - or renewed or reinforced - of gender, ethn ic, religious and cultural identities. However, I think it is necessary to link the analysis of these realities to the logic of the reproduct ion o f the system, characterised by those o f the major transfo rmiltions that I have speh o ut.

The crisis is systemic in thil t the continuiltion of the model deployed by capi tillism over the last decades hils become impossible. The page will necessarily be turned in a ' transition' perio d (of crisis), for a shorter or longer Ii me, o rderly o r chao tic . 'A no t her world is possible' proclaimed the 'alternati ve world movement' at Porto Alegre, Brazil. I say, ' Another world is in the process o f emerging', which could be s tilJ more barbaric than the present, but which could also be better, to varyi ng degrees.

The dominant social forces will try, in the conflicts that arc destined to become mo re acu te, to maintain their privileged positions. But they will not be ab le to do so unl ess they break wi th many of the princ iples and practices that until now have been associated with their do millation, parti cularly renouncing democril cy, interniltionallaw and respe ct fo r the rights o f the peoples o f the South. U they succeed in doi ng so, tomorrow's world will be based on wha t I ha ve called 'apartheid at the world level'. Will it be a new phase of cap italism or a system that is qualitatively new and different? It is wo rth while discussing this question.

The workers and the peop les who will be the victims of this barbaric evolution cou ld put to flig ht the reactionary social and po litical forces (which arc not ' liberal' as they like to describe themselves) thilt me at work. They are cilpilble of taking the full measure of the issues of this systemi c cris is, of freeing themselves from the illusive responses that seem to prevai l at the present mo ment, to invent appropr iate forms o f organisation and act ion and to transce nd the frag mentation o f their s truggles and overcome the co ntradictions thilt result from it. Will they have then ' in vented ' or ' reinvented' the sociali sm of the 21st century? O r wi ll they ha ve only advanced ill that direction, along the long route of the secu lilr trilnsition o f cap itillism to socialism? I think it is more likely to be the liltter.

Global isa tion - a phenomenon that is inherent to capi talis m as it deepens during the successive phases of it s expansion - means

27


that the world of tomorrow wiU not be better unless the peop les of the So uth (who represent 80 per cent of humanity), strugg le to make themselves fell. If tllis doc s not happen the world cannot be belter. There are no g rounds for believing that, in a movement of humanist generosity, the workers of the North - themse lves as much victims of the ex isting sys tem - could shape a belter world system fo r the peoples of the Sou th.

The domination of the o ligopolies is the basis o f a financialisation in d isarray.

The phenomenon of contemporary capitalism described as financialisation consis ts of the ex pansion of investments o n the monetary and financia l markets. Tltis exponential ex pansion, unprecedented in history, started a quarter of a century ago and has increased the volume of operations conducted annually on these markets to mo re than $2,(J(X),0J0 billion, as o pposed to abo ut $50,(0) billio n fo r the world' s COP (g ross domesti c product) and $15,(0) billio n for international tr"de.

Tllis financialisation has been made possible bot h by the generalisation of the flex ibl e exc hange system (the rates o f which are determined eac h day by what is caUed ' the market') and by the parallel deregulation o f the rates of interes t (also abandoned to supply and demand). In these conditions, operations on the mo neta ry and financial markets no longer constitute the counterpart of trad e in goods and services, bu t are now stimulated almost exclusively by the concern of economic agents to protect themse lves from fluctuations in the rates of exchange and interest.

C learly, the astronomical ex pansion of these operat ions to cover themse lves from risk in no way corresponds to the inunediate expectations of those who are mobiliSing the mea ns. Elementary common sense dictates that the more the means arc multiplied for red ucing the risks fo r a certai n operation, the greater the collective risk becomes. But the co nventional economis ts are not equipped to understand Ihis. They need 10 believe in the absurd dogma o f the self-regulation of the markets, without wltich the entire co ns tructio n of the so-called ' marke t econo my' would collapse. The market economy, whic h I ha ve d escribed elsew here as the theory of an imaginary syslem that has no relationship to real ca pitalism, is the corners tone of the ideo logy (in the vulgar - sec Translator's

28 ngntea IT na

I THE FI NANCIAL COLLAPSE OF LIBERAL GLOBALISATION

note - and negati ve sense of the te rm ) of capital ism, its way o f giving it an appearan ce of legiti m acy.

It is therefore not surpris ing Ihat co nventional econo mists, in spite of thei r arrog ance, ha ve been incapabl e of foreseeing what, fo r others, was evident. And when the collapse actu ally happened, they co uld find no other excuse o ther than it was pu rely 'accidental', mistakes in calculati o ns concerning 'sub-primes' and o thers. For them it could only be caused by mino r accidents, witho ut dramatic consequences, w hich could be quickly corrected.

The expansio n o f the monetary and financi al markets, whi ch inevitably led to catas trophe, was extremely well analysed, even before the collapse o f September 2008, by criti cal polit ical eco nomis ts, particularly by Fran~o is Morin, Frederic Lo rdon, Elmar A ltvater, Peter Gowan, me and some others (al as, all too few). There is nothing here to add to these analyses o f how these events develo ped .

But it is necessary to go furthe r, fo r limiting the finan cial cris is to a financial analysis implies that the o nly causes were those direct ly responsible for it. In other words, it was the d og ma o f the liberalisation of the moneta ry and financial markets and thei r ' d ereg ulation' that was at the origin of the disaster. But that is o nly tru e at a fir s t, immed iate, reading of the reali ty. Beyond that the ques tio n concerns the identificat ion of the social interests that are behind this adherence to dogm as concerning the dereg ulatio n o f these markets.

Here "g" in, the b"nks and o ther financi al institutio ns (insu rance co mpanies, pension and hedge funds) seem to ha ve been the main beneficiaries of this ex pans ion, which makes it possible fo r the official discourses to make them exclusively respo nsible for the d isaster. But, in fact, financialisatio n benefited the oligopolies as a who le, 40 per cent of their p rofit s deriving fro m their financial o perations alo ne. And these o ligo po lies co nt ro l both the dominan t secto rs of the real produ cti ve economy and the fin<1n cial institutions.

Why, therefore, ha ve the oligopolies deliberately chosen the financi<1liS<1tio n path for the sys tem as <1 whole? The reason is quite s imply that it enabl es them to take for themselves <1 growing proportion of all the profits fro m the real economy. The ap parent ly insignificant rates o f gain on e"ch financial operation produ ces,

29


taking into <1ccoun t the giganti c scale o f these operati ons, considerable profits. These are the result of a redistribution of the mass o f surplus value generated in the real economy and they constitute the rents of the mono polies . It is e <1sy to unders tand, therefore, th <1 t the hi gh rate of yields of fi ll<1ncial inves tments (aro und 15 per cent) has, as a corollary, mediocre rates of yiel ds for in vestments in the productive economy (aro und 5 per cent). This levy on the g lobal mass of profi ts ope r<1ted by the fin<111 cial rent of the oligopolies makes it impossib le not to <1ssoc i<1te the ca use (the oligopolistic character of conte mporary cap itali sm) with its conscquence (financialisatio n, that is, a preference for financial inves tment compared w ith investment in the real economy).

The monetary and financial market thus has a dominant position in the market system. It is the market w here the o ligopol ies (and not only the b<1nks) d educt their monopoly rent on the one h<111d and, on the other, compete among themselves for the sharing o f thi s ren!. Conventi onal econo mists ignore this hierarchy in the markets, replacing it with an abs tract discou rsc on the 'economy o f generalised markets' .

The expansion of the monetary and financ ial market thus inhibit s investment in the rea l economy, limiting growth. In turn, this weakening in the general growt h of the economy affects jobs, wi th its well-know n consequences (unemployment, <1 growing precariousness and the stagll<1tion - if 110t reduction - of re<11 wages, w hich are disconnected from progress in productivity). The monetary and financial markets in turn do minate the world o f wo rk. A ll these mec hanisms together fo rce the submission o f the eco nomy as a whole (the 'markets') to the dominant monetary and fin" nci,,1 market, producing "n e ver-in creasing inequ"lity in income dis tribution (that no one denies). The market for productive inves tment (and hence for work) suffers both fro m the red uction of its apparent d irect profitability (the price of the levy for o ligopoly rent) and also from re du ced fin" l dem"nd (we"kened by the inequality in sharing the in co me).

The domin<1tion of the financialised o ligopolies boxes up the economy in <1 cris is of cilpi ta! accu muliltio n, which is both <1 cris is in demand (, under-consumption ' ) "nd "crisis in profitability.

30 ngntea IT na

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We should now be 'lble to und e rst'lnd why the do min'lnt powers (governments o f th e Tri'ld ), them selves at the services of the o ligo po lies, have no other project than to re-establi sh this s., me financialised system, for the o li go po lies need to ex pand financially in ord er to maintain their do min'ltion over the eco no my and society. Questioning the d ominati on of the monetary and fi n'lncial market o ver market s as a who le is to ques tion the monopo ly rent o f the oligopolies.

Can the po licies being fo Uowed fo r this pur pose be effecti ve? I believe that it is no t impossible to restore the sys tem as it was before the crisis of the autumn o f 2008. But two conditions need to be m e l.

The first is that the state 'lnd the centTilI banks have to inject into the system the huge quantities of finance that erase all of the rollen debts and res tore credibility and profitabilit y to the re-establishment of financial ex pansio n. The sums requi red are indeed astronorrucal, as so me (m yself included ) foresaw sever'll years before the debacle o f the autumn of 2008, against the opinion o f con ventional eco nomis ts and the ' lMF expert s' (International Moneta ry Fund), who d id not join us in o ur estimations until three mo nths after the disaster. But now it is possible to believe thai the powers that be w ill bring thi s inje ct ion up to the level req uired .

As for the second, the co nsequences of this injectio n ha ve to be accepted by society, fo r the worke rs in ge neral. and the pco pk'S of the South in particular, are necessarily the vi ctims. These poli cies are not aimed at fe-launching the real economy throug h re-Iaunching wage demand (as Keynesianism p ro posed in former times) but, o n the co ntrary, maintaining the levy composed of the rent of the oligo polies, and this, necesS<l rily, would be to the detriment o f the rea l wages of the wo rkers. Those in power callously envisage the aggravatio n of the cri sis of the real econo my, unemployment, p recariousness and the deteriora tio n of pensions insured by the pension funds. The workers are already reacting and will p robably react more in the corning months and years. But their struggles remain fragmented and with no p rospects beca use of the way Ihey are at present being waged; these protests are ' co ntrollable' by the power of the o ligopolies and the st<ltes <It their service.

There is <I big d ifference between the po lit ical and social conjuncture of o ur epoch and th at of the 1930s. At that li me, two

31


camps of social forces confronted each other: the left, which called for socia li sm, composed of communists (the Soviet Union gave the impression of success at that time) and of authentic social democrats, and the right, whi ch cou ld get support from powerful fascist movements. This is w hy, i.n response fo the 1930 cris is, in so me places there were develop ments like the New Deal and popular front s, whi.le in ot hers Nazism. T he current politi cal conjuncture is radica lly different. The failure of Sovietism and the raUy ing of sociali sts to soc ialliberaHsm has drastically weakened the politi cal vision of workers, who are deprived of prospects and the ca pac ity to ex press an authentic alternative sociaJism.

The current cris is o f ol igopoly capitali sm was not the result of a rise in social struggles forcing the retreat of the oligopolies' ambitions. It is the exclusive result of the internal contradicti ons peculiar to its accumulation system. In my o pinio n, the distinction is absolutely central betwL>en the cris is o f a system produced l>y the explosion of its interna l contradi ctio ns and that of a society t hat suffers t he assau lt of progressi \'e soci al forces aiming at transforming the system. On this difference will depend the different possil>le o utcomes. In a s ituati on of the first ty pe, chaos l>ecomes a major probabiUty and it is on.ly in a s ituation of the seco nd type that a progressive outcome is possil>le. The main pol iti ca l questio n today is thus to know whether the social victims o f the exis ting sys tem willl>ecome capal>le of constituting an independent, radi cal, consis tent and positive al ternati ve.

If not, the restoration of the financialised rent oligopolies to power is not impossible. But, in this case, the system will only wi thdraw to get a beller run-in and a new financial debacle, s till more serio us. willl>e inevitable, because the ' adjustments' envisaged for managing the financial markets are far from sufficient as lo ng as the power of the oligopolies is not questioned .

It remains to be seen how the states and the peoples of the Sou th are goi ng to respond to the challenge. Here we should ana lyse this cha.llenge w hi ch has been ex acerbated by g lobalised financialisa tion.

It is absolutely in d ispensable to take into account fhe question of natural resources and the North-South conflict . No effective s trategy in response to the challenge can ignore these issues.

32 ngntea IT na


T here are key questi ons concerning bo th the use that an economi c <lnd soci<ll system makes of the n<ltural resources of the planet and the phiJoso pltical conception of the relationships between human beings (a nd within society) o n the one ha nd, and between humans and nature on the o ther. The respo nse to these questions th<lt a society h<ls given in the past descri bes the mtionrui ty that governs its econo mic and social management.

His tori cally, capitalism has mainly ig nored these considerations. It es tab lished a s tri ctly economic rati onality w ith a shortterm vision ('Ihe deprecia tion of the future') and W<lS b<lsed on the principle that natural resources arc generally put at the free disposal o f society and, w hat is mo re, in unlimited quantities. The o nly exception is when certain reso urces are privately approp riated, as the l<lnd or mining resources, but subordin<lting their utilisation to the exclusive requirements of the profitability for capital, whic h ex ploits the potential. The rationali ty of this system is therefo re narrow and beco mes sociaJly irrationa l as soon <IS these resources beco me se<U"ce, even ex hau sted, or when their usage, in the forms imposed by the economic profitability o f capitalism, produces dangero us long-term co nsequences (destruction of biodivers ity, climate change) .

I propose here not to d iscuss these fund<lment<ll <ls pects of the question of society and nature' s relationship, still less to intervene in the philosophi cal debates abo ut the development of the different w"ys of thin king abou t the probl em. My propos,,] is much more modest <lnd concerns only access to the use of the p1<1net's reso urces and their d istribution, in theory and in practice, whether it is equal and open to a ll peo ples or, on the contrary, reserved for Ihe exclusive benefi t of some .

From thai viewpoint, our modern world system has now undergone a qualitative transformation of d ecisive significance. So me majo r natural resources have become considerab ly rarer - in relati ve terms - Ihan they were even 50 years ago, and the ir drying-up constitutes <I threa l th<lt is perh <lps real (this ca.n certainly be debated). There is now an awareness that their access cannot be open to all any longer. Th is, independent o f how they are used, endangers the future of the planel, according to some (a.lthough not everyone). The countries of the North (<l nd I deliberately use this vague term not to specify either the states

33


or the peoples) in tend to hilve excl usive access to these reso urces for their own use, whether these resources would be used as at present - that is, based on waste and endangering a future that is not fM off - o r whether they would be subject to co nsid erable corrective reg ulati ons, as certain greens propose.

Theegoism of th e cou ntries of the North was brutally ex pressed by former US president GL'Orge W. Bush when he declared: T he American way of life is not nego tiabl e' (a phrase that his successors, w hoever they may be, w ill not discuss) . Milny in Europe ilnd Japilll fee l the sa me way, even if they refrain from declaring it. Tllis egoism simply means that access to these scarce natural reso urces will largely be denied to the countries of the South (SO per cent of humanity), whether the latter intend to use these resources in a s imilar way to that of the North, w hich is wasteful and dangerous, or whether they envisage more economical forms.

H goes without saying that this prospect is unacceptable to the coun tries of the So uth, in theory and in practice. Besid es, the markets are not necessarily able to Illeet the requirements thai g uaran tee the exclusive access of the I ich countries to these resources. Certain countries of the Sou th can mobilise large sums in ord er to milke themselves recognised on these markets for access to reso urces. Atthe las t resort, the only gUMantee for the cou ntries of the North lies in their military superiority.

The militaris.ltion o f g lobalisatio n is the expression of this egoisti c illtitude. It is not the result of a pilssing aberra tion of the Wilshington adminis tra tion . The plan for the military control o f the planet by the US ilrmed forces was established by fo rmer president Bill Clinton, pursued by Bush and wi ll be continued by current President Barack Obamil. Of course, to illtain these o bjectives Wilshington always intends to use this 'ad va ntage' for its own benefit, in particular to compensate for its own financial d eficiencies and maintain its leadership, if not hegemo nic position, within the Cilmp of the No rth. The suoordinilte allies of the Triild ille very much aligned along the Washing ton p lan to militaIiiy control the planet. Neither the Atlantic ism of the Euro peans nor the submission of Tokyo to the views o f Washing to n co ncerning Asia and the Pacific seem likely to disintegTilte, ill least for the moment. Of cou rse the 'missio ns' - preventive W ilIS, the fight again st ' terrorism' - in which the US armed forces and their subordinate allies

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of NATO (N orth Atlanti c Treaty O rganisa tion) are engaged will always be presented in di sco urses abou t a ' defence of democracy' (if not its exportatio n), of the 'defence of the rights o f peoples to self-determination' (at least for some, but not fo r others). But these pac kages only deceive those w ho wan t to be deceived. For the peoples of the South they are just remi nd ed of the permanence of the old colonial traditi on of the 'civilis ing mission'. The real exclusive o bjective of the North's military programme is the con trol of the wor ld 's reso urces. This was plain when Washing to n recently decided to complete its system of military 'Regional Commands' and bases by creating an 'African Command'. The Uni ted States, and behind it Europe, thus aims at controlling oil (in the Gulf of Guinea, Sudan), uIanium (Niger, Sudan), rare metals (Congo, southern A fri ca), and nothing mo re.

The North / South confli ct has become the cen tre o f the major contradictions of contemporary capitalist / imperialist globalisation. And it is in this sense that the conflict cannot be separated fro m the o ne that opposes the domination of oligopolistic capi talism against the progressive and socialist ambitions that could put forward alternatives, here and there, in the So uth and in the North. 'A nother, better world' is not possibl e if the interes ts of the peoples w ho constitu te 80 pe r cen t of human ity are regarded with almost total con tem pt in the dominant op inion o f the rich cou ntries. Humanitarianism is not an acceptable subs titute to international so lidarity in struggle.

The co untries in the centre o f the world capitalist sys tem have always benefited from w hat I have described as 'i mperialist rent' and the capital accumu latio n in these centres has always involved ' acc umulation throu g h dispossession' of the peo ples of the periphery. Today's claim to reserve access to the world's ma in resources for the rich alo ne constitutes it s new, contemporary form.

Wha t then are the condi ti ons for a positive response to the challenge? It is not enough to say that the interventions o f s tates can modify the rules of the game and attenuate the aberrations. It is also necessary to define the logic and the social impact. Of cou rse, one mig ht imagine a return to the fo rmul a o f publi ci private partnerships or a mixed economy, as during the 30 'g lorious years'

35


in Europe an d the Bandung era in Asia and Africa w hen s tate cap italism was largely dominant and there were serious socia l po licies. Bu t this kind of intervention by the state is no longer on the agenda. And are the prog ressive social forces st rong enough to impose such a transfo rmatio n? In my humble opinion, they are not.

The real alternati ve involves overturning the excl usive power o f the oligopolies, w hi ch is inconceiyable without fina lly natio nalising them for a management tha t is in line wi th a progressive democratic socia lisation. The end of ca pitalism? I don' t think so. I think, on the other hand, that new patterns in social power relatio nships can force capital to make adjus tments in response to the claims of the popular classes (see Translator 's note) and peoples, this o n the condi tio n that the social s truggles - sti ll fr'lgmented and o n the w hole defensive - succeed in dra wing up a coherent po litical alternative. If so, the beginn ing of the long transition from capital ism to sociali sm beco mes possible. Progress in tha t d irection is obviously uneq ua l from one country to anot her and from o ne phase of implementatio n to another.

There are many dimensions of a possible, desirab le a lternative and they conce rn all aspects o f eco no mic, social and po litical life. In the countries of the Nort h the challenge means that the general op inio n must not be allowed to limit itself to the defence o f their pri vi leges vis-a.-vis the peo ples o f the South. The necessary internati onalism mu st take the form of an ti-imperialism, not humanitari anism.

In the countries of the So uth, the crisis pro vides an o pportunity to renew a national, pop ular and democratically self-managed develop ment, subordinating its rei<1 tionships wi th the North to its own needs, in other words, delinking. This involves n<1 tional control over the monetary and financial markets; recovering the usage of natural resources; overtu rning globalised management do rninated by the oligo polies (the Wo rld Tr <1d e O rganisation -WTO) and the military contro l of the pl anet by the United States and its associates; and freeing themsel ves from both the illusions o f a national, au tonomous capitalism and a backward-looking syste m w ith its own enduring my ths.

The agrarian <]u estion is more tha.n ever at the core of the op tions to be taken in the countries of the Thi rd World . A devel-

36 ngntea IT na


oprnent wo rthy of the name cannot be based on growth - even s trong growth - thnt excl usively benefits a minority, even if il is 20 per cent of the pop ulation, leaving most of the population abnndoned to stag nation, if not pauperisa tio n. This model o f development, associated wi th exclusion, is the o nly one that capitalism can offer the countri es of the perip hery in its global system. Polit ical democracy (w hich is evidently the exception in these conditions), when it is associated wi th social regressio n, remains frilgi le indeed . But a niltional and popu lilr illternative that ilssocintes the democ ratisation of socie ty w ith social progress, that is, with a perspec ti ve of development that integrates - and docs not exclude - the popular classes, requires a politi cal strategy o f rural development based on the gu arantee of ilccess to lilnd for all peasants.

Moreover, the policies reco mmended by the dominant powers - accelerating the priviltisatio n o f ilgr icultural land, treated ilS a commodi ty - are provo king the massive rural exodus that we are witnessing tod ay. Modern industrial develo pment cannot absorb this over-abundant labour force, which is piling up in urban s lums. There is a direcllink between suppressing the g UilranlL:.e of ilccess to land for the peasants and accentuating migriltory pressures.

Does reg io nill integration thilt promotes the emergence of new centres of development constitute a form of resis tance and an alterniltive? There is no simple reply to this ques tio n. The dominant ol igopolies Me not hostile to regional integriltions that ilfe in line with the logic of cn pitalis t / im perialist globalisn lio n. The European Union (EU) and the regional co mmon markets of Latin America, Asia and Afr ica are examples of fo rms of regio nalisation that become obstacles to the eme rgence of progressive ilnd socialist alternatives. Can another form of regionali sntion be conceived that is capablc of suppo rting the option of nati onal and popular development and opening the way towards the lo ng, sec ular transition to soci alism for the peoples and nations of the planet? WIllie thi s 'luestioll is not relevilllt fo r the g inn ts like Chinn and India, it canno t be di smissed from debates concerning Latin America, the Arab world, Africa, South Eas t Asia ilnd even Europe. As far as this last region is concerned, is it no t possible to envisage the destru ction of the EU in stitutions, the purpose of whi ch was to co nfine the peoples of this contin ent in so-call ed liberal (i.e.

37


reactionary) cap italism and an A tlantic 'llig nment? This could be the preconditio n for its eventual reconstru ction (i f it were to be considered useful ) with a socialis t perspect ive. For the countries o f the So uth as a whole, is it possible to env isage a new politi cal Bandung th'lt wou ld reinforce the cap'lcity of the countries of the three con tinents to co mpel the co llective imperialism of the Triad to back down? What would the conditions be?

There wou ld need to be progress in both the North and Sou lh in the internationalism of workers and peop les, who are the sole g uarantee for the reco nstruction o f a better, multipo lar and democrat ic wo rld and the only alterna ti ve to the barbarism of an ageing capitalism. If capitalism has got 10 the point Ihat it considers half of humanity a ' superfluous popu lation', mig ht it not be that cap italism itself has now beco me a mode o f social organisation that is superfluous?

There is no feasib le 'liternative thai does not ha ve a socialis t perspective.

Quite apart fro m necessary agreements on the s trategy o f s tages, based on the construction of the con vergi ng o f struggles, respecting diversity and the progress thai these s trugg les can contribu te to the long route to world socialism, it is essential to reflect and debate o n th e socia li st / co mmuni st objecti ve: imagi ning emancipation from market and ot her alienations, imagining the democratisation of social life in a ll ils dimensions and imagining modes of managi ng production, from the local to the world level, that correspond to the needs of a genuine democracy assoc iated with social prog ress.

Evidently, if the ca pitalist / imperialis t world system as it actually exis ts is based on the g rowing exclusion of the peoples w ho constitute the majority of hum,l nity, and if the manner of using natural resources resulting from the logic o f capitalist profitability is both wasleful and dangerous, the socialis t / communis t alternati ve canno t ig no re the challenges posed by these realities. There has to be another 'style of consump tion and living' than that whic h apparently g ives happiness to the peoples o f the rich cou ntries and which exists in the imagination o f ils victims. The ex pression of a ' so lar soc ialism ', proposed by Elmar Altvater, mu st be taken seri ously. Socialism cannot be capitalism, corrected by equal access to its benefit s at the national and world levels. It

38 ngntea IT na

I T HE FI NAN CIAL COLLAPSE OF LIBERAL GLOBALISATION

must be qualitati vely superi or or it will not happen.

References Altvater, Elmar (2008) 'The plagues of capitalism: energy crisis, climate

collapse, hunger and financial ins tabilities', p..'lpcr presented at Ule f orum Mond ial d es Alternatives (rMA), Caracas, Venezuela

Amin, Samir ct al (forlhcoming) De J(l (.-i,,1' fi"(lllcie,-,' h J(l (~isc systhlliquc, book in preparatio n with contribu tions from l\'lorin, f ran<;ois; Gowan, Pcl~r; and Aitvatcr, Elmar

Amin, Samir and Gunder Frank, Andre (1985) N'att" 'hlo"~ pas 1984, Paris, l\ laspero

Gowan, Peler 'Causing the Credit Crunch: the rise and oonscquellC('s of the ne\\" \ Vall Street system'

Lordon, l~ rederic (2008) lusqll'U qlll!nd? Pour en jiuir m>e,; lcs crises fiumlcins, Paris, Raisons d 'agir

~.,.j orin, fnll1 <;ois (2006) 'La crise fimncierc globali;;;::e ct les nou\"dks o rientalions du systemc', paper presented'" the forum l\ \ondi,,] d es Altern"tiv(.'s (FMA), CaraCils, Venezud"

39 ,.,

The contrast between the European and the Chinese historical developments

The general and the particular in the trajectories of humanity's evolution

The concrete, the immediate, is always particula.r - this is vir tually a truism. To s lop there would make it impossible to unders l;md the his tory of humani ty. T his sccms- at the phenomenal level - as if it were composed of a successio n o f particular trajectories and

evolutions, w ithout any COlll1c cl ions wi th each o ther, exce pt by chance. Each o f these successions can only be explained by particu lar causalities and sequences of events. This method reinforces the tendency toward s ' culturalisms', tha i is, the idea thai each peop le is identified by the spec ifics of its culture, whic h arc mostly ' trans histo ri c', in the sell se tha i th ey persis t in spite o f change.

Marx is, for me, the key thinker on research in to the generaJ, as his research goes beyond Ihe particu lar. Of course, the gener<ll C<lnno t be <lnnou nced a priori through reflection <lnd ide<llised reasoning abou t the essence of phenomen<l (<lS Hegel mld Augus te Com te wou ld do) . Jt must be infe rred from analysis of con crete f<lc ts . In such cond itions il is clear Ihat Ihere is no <lbsolute g uaran tee tiM! the IHoposed induction will be definitive, o r even accur<lte. But suc h research is oblig<lto ry; it C<lnnot be avoided .

Whe n you analyse the particular you w ill discover how the general makes ilself felt Ihrough forms of the particular. That is how I read Marx.

With this in mind, I ha ve proposed a reading of his to ri cal materialism based on the general succession of three importan t s tages in the evol ution of human socie ties: the community s tage,

4 0

2 EUROPEAN AND CHIN ESE HISTORICAL DEVELOPM ENTS

the tributary stage and Ihe capitalist stage (poten tially overlaken by comm unism). And I have tried, within thi s framewo rk, to see in the d iversity of the societies at the tributary stage (as in the previous community s tage), the particular forms o f ex pression o f the general regu irements that define eac h of these s tages (see my book (Ami n 1981) Class 1111(1 NI/firm ). The proposition goes agai ns t the tradition o f a banal o pposition between the European path (that of the famous five s tages - primit ive communism, slavery, feudali sm, capi tal ism and socialism, w hi ch was not an invention of Stalin but the domina.nt view in Europe before <lnd <liter Marx ) and the Asian path (or, mUler, dead end ). The hydraulic thesis, as proposed by Wittfogel, at that time seemed to me overly infantile <lnd m is taken, based on Eurocen tric prejudices. My proposition <llso goes against <lnother tr<ldition, produced by vulgar Marxism, that o f the uni versality o f the fi ve stages.

With this also in mind, I pro posed looki ng at the contradictions wi thin the large family of the tributary societies as express ions o f a general requ ire ment to go beyond the basic principles o f the organi sation of a tributary social system by the invention of those that define c.lpitalis t mod ernity (and, beyo nd, the possibility of sociali sm / communism ). Capital ism was no t destined to be Europe' s excl usive in vention. It was also in the process o f develop ing in the tributary countries of the East, particular ly in China, as we shall see later. In my early criligue of Eurocentrism, I broug ht up this very guestion, which had been ejected from the domin<lnt debate by the d iscou rse o n the 'E uropean exception'.

However, once capitalism was constituted in its hi sto ric form, that is, s tarting from Europe, its world wide ex pansion th rough conguest and the submi ssion of other societies to the reguirements of its polarising re production put an end to the possibility o f anot her path for the capitalis t d evelop ment of humanity (the Chinese path, for example). Th is expansio n des troyed the impact and impor lance of the variations of local cap italism and in volved them a ll in the dichotomy of the contr<ls t between the dominant capitalist / imperialist cent res with the dominated capitalist peripheries, w hich defines the polarisation peculiar to his tori ca l cap italism (European in origin).

I am therefore now proposing <l reading of the two paths (that o f the Mediterranean / Euro pe an d that of the Chinese wo rld).

41


This is not thilt of the opposition fi ve stilges/ Asiilll deild-end, but is based on anot her analytica.! principle that contras ts the full -blo wn forms of the tributary mod e in the Chinese world wi th the peripheral forms of this SillTIe mode in the Mediterraneiln / Europeilll region. The full -blown form in ChilM WilS visib ly strong and stable from its beginnings, while the peripheral forms have al ways been fragile, resulting in the failure o f successive attempts in Europe by the imperial centre to levy tribute, in contras t to its success in the Clunese empire.

Opposition between the European and Chinese

deve lopment paths: the peasant question

The Mediterrmtcan / European pat h and the Chinese path di verged right from the beg inning . The stability of the fu ll-blown tributary mod e involved 'l solid in tegmtio n of the peasmlt world into the overall construction o f the system and thu s it guamnteed access to land. This choice has been a principle in China from the beginning. There were sometimes serio us infringements in its implementation, altho ug h they were always overcome . In contmst, ill the Mediterranean / Europe region access to land was mdi ca lly abolished when the principle of pri vate ow nerslup of land was ado pted. It bec'lme a fundament'll and absolute right with the instilliation of cilpitalist modernity in its Europeml form.

Histo ri cal cap itali sm, which was th e result, then proceeded with the massive expu lsion of the rural population and, for many o f the m, their exclusion from the building of the new society. This involved lilrge-scale emigmtion, which WilS milde possible by the conquest o f the Americas, wit ho ut which its success wo uld ha ve been impossib le. His torical capitali sm became a military and conquering imper ialis t capitalism, involv ing unprecedented violence.

The path followed by ca pitalis t develop ment in China (before it submitted to the conquer ing imperialism of the second half o f the 19th century) was quite different. It confi rmed, instead o f aboLishillg, the ilccess to lilnd by the peilsa.l1try ilS a who le and opted for the intens ification of agricultural production and the scattering of industrial manufa cturing in the rural regions. This gave China a d istinct advantage over Europe in all fi elds o f pro-

4 2 ngntea IT na


duclion. [t was lost only [il ler, after the Induslrial Revoluti on had successfull y proceeded to shape modern Eu rope.

Modern China before Eu rope

European thinkers were aware of the sllperiori ty of China, w hi ch became the 'mod el' par excellence, as Et iemb[e and ot hers recognised . It was a mod el o f adm inistrati ve rationality: China very early on in ven ted the pub lic service, independent of the aristocracy and the religious clergy, recruiting a s tate burea ucracy, wit h com petiti ve ent rance examinations. Hund reds of years had to pass before Europe discovered this form o f adm inis trative moderni ty (only in the 19th century), which w as g raduill1y imitated by the rest of the world . China was a model of rati onality in the way it im p[emented ad vanced techno logies fo r ah'Ticu ltural and artis.-lnal / manufacturing productio n. This admi ratio n for the C hinese model only d isappeared when the Eu ropeiUls succeeded, throug h their military su periori ty (and by that alone), in breaking the Chinese mod el.

C hina was therefo re engaged o n the path of inventing capitalism illong lines that wou ld ha ve been very d ifferent from those of the conquer ing globalised imperialis t ca pitalism.

Why did the modern Chinese path, the beginnings of w hich p redated that of Euro pe by at le ast 500 years, not take off? And w hy did the Eu ropeiln pa th, which st<lTted la ter, take definite shape in a short space of time and then beco me able to impose itself at the world level? My effo rt in trying to exp lain this is based on an emphasis o f the ad vantages o f the European tributary societies o n the perip hery (the feudil] path) ilS opposed to the inertia imposed by the solid ity of the cen tral form of the Ch inese tributary mode. This is a more g(! n(!ral ex pr(!ssio n o f w hat I have described as unequal develo pme nt: the perip heral forms, because they were less solid and more ada ptable, milde it easier to overtake the con tradictio ns of the old sys tem, w hile the centralised forms, whi ch were more so lid, slowed the movement d ow n.

Premodern regionalisations and the

4 3

ENDING TH E CRISIS OF CAPITALI SM OR ENDING CAPITALI SM?

centralisation of tributary surplus

Nowa da ys the term g lobalisa lio n is u sed in vario us ways, o ft en vag ue a nd ambi g uo us . Mo n.'Over, the phe no meno n in itse lf is co nsid ered as a g iven and un avoid able, an ex p ression o f the evolu ti o n o f reali ty th a t is cla imed to be ine lu ctabl e. Pheno mena s imilar to mo dern g loba li sa tion - w hi ch fo r the fir s t time in his to ry co ncerns the e ntire wor ld - a rc to be fo und in more an cient times. However, these o nly concerned the large reg ions o f the Old Worl d, the so-caJl ed pre-Colo mbi a n Ameri c.1S lJeing isolated and u n known lJy the fo rmer (and the fo rme r u nknow n to the la lle r). I w ill call these g lobalisa ti o ns region a lisatio ns.

I describe .111 these phe nomena w ith o ne common criterion, that of organi sing co mman d over the su rplus o f current prod uctio n at the level o f the whole reg io n (o r of its wo rld ) lJy a central au tho rity and the extent of centrali sation over that su rplus used by that au th ority. This in turn regulated the sharing o f access to the surplus that it commanded .

The regio nalisatio ns (or g lo ba Lisa lion) co ncerned co uld be inclined toward s ho mogene ity or polarisation, according to whet her the red istri butio n o f the surp lus was subjected to laws and customs th <l t aimed expressly at one or other of these objectives, or they co uld be produced by d eploy ing their ow n log ic.

The cent ralisation of tributary surplus

In a U the p remod ern systems (the old regionaJisations) this su rp lus appears as a tribu te, and in the mod ern (cilp italis t) system as profit fo r ca pital or, more precisely, the rent o f domin <lnt o ligo polisti c capital The spec ific di ffe re nce between these two forms o f smplus is qu al itati ve and deci sive. Levying trib utary surp lus is transparent; it is the free wor k o f the subjugated peasant s on the land of the no bles and a proportion of the harvest creamed o ff by the latter or by the state. T hese are quite natural. no n-mo netary for ms and even w hen they assu me a monetary fo rm it is generally marginal or except ional. T he levying of p rofit or rent by dominant capital is, in contras t, o paque as it results fro m the way the netwo rk of t rad e in monetised good s operates: wages of workers, p urchases and sales of the means of p rod uction and the results o f

44 ngntea IT na


economic activities. Taxa tion of tribu tary surplus is thu s insepamble from the

exercise o f political power in the region (large or small) w here it o perates. In co ntras t, th at o f cap italist surplus appears to be dissociated from the exercise of politi cal power, apparently being the p rod uct of the mec hanisms that control the markets (of labour, prod ucts and capital itself). The (premodern) tri butary systems were not a pplied o ver vast terri tories and large numbers of peop le. The level of developmen t of the productive forces typica l o f these ancient times was still lim ited and the surp lu s consisted essent ially of w hat was produced by the peasant co mmunities. The tributary soc ieties could be split up, sometimes to the ex treme, wi th eac h vilJage or seigneu ry (domain of a feu dal lord ) consti tuti ng an elementary society.

The fragmentat ion o f tributary societies d id not exclude them from part ic ipating in broad er trade networks, commercial o r otherwise, or in systems of power ex tending over g reater areas. Elementary tributary systems were nol necessarily autarch ic, even if most of their productio n had to ensure their own reproduction witho ut o uts ide su pport.

The emergence of tributary empires has always required a political power capab le of impos ing it self on the scattered tributary societies. Among those in this category were the Roman, Caliphal and Ottoman empires in the Euro pe / Mediterranean / Mid dle East region, the Chinese empire and the imperial states that India experienced on var ious occasions during its history. This emergence of tributary empi res in turn fac ilit ated the ex pansion o f commercial and monetary relationships within them and in their external relations.

The tributary emp ires did not necessarily pursue the political aim o f the ho mogeni s., tion of co nditions in the regio n controlled by ce ntral power. But the la ws and their usages governing these syste ms, dominated by the po litical au thorities to w hich the funct ioning of the economy remained subord in ated, did 110t in themselves create a grow ing polarisation bet ween the subregions constitut ing the empi re .

Hi story has largely proven the fragi lity of tributary empires w hose apogee was short - a few centuries - followed by long periods o f dis integration, usual ly described as decadence. The

4 5 ,.,


reason for th is fragili ty is that the centralisatio n of the su rplus was not based on the internal requirement necessary for the reproduction o f elementary tri butary societies. They were very vulnerable to attack from outside and revolls from within by the dominated classes or provinces, suc h as they were. Evoluti ons in the different fie ld s of ecology, demography, military armamen ts ,1nd the trad e in goods over lo ng d istances pro ved to be s trong enoug h to turn this vulnerabi lity into a catastrophe.

The only exception - a vi tal one - was that of the Chinese empi re.

The Chinese itinerary: a long, calm river?

The preceding refl ectio ns concentrated o n the Middle East / Medi terranean / Europe region. This region was the scene o f the formation of the firs t (tributary) civilisations - Egyp t and Mesopotamia - and, later, of its G reek market / sla very periphery. Then, as from the Hellenisti c period , it saw successive attempts to constru ct tr ibutary e mpires (Homan, Byzantine, Cali phaJ, O ttoman). These were l1ever ren lly able 10 become slnb le al1d they experienced long and chaotic d eclines. Perhaps for this reaso n conditions were more favourable to the early e mergence o f capitalism in its historical form, as a p relud e to the conquest of the wor ld by Europe.

The itinerary of China was ex tremely different. Almost from the start it became a tributary e mpire that was exceptionally stable, in spite of moments when it threatened to fall apart. Nevertheless these threats were al ways finally overcome.

Phonetic writi ng , conceptual writing

There are various reasons for the success of the construction of tribu tary centrali sation th.rougho ut the Chinese world . Chinese authors, who are no t very well kno wn o utside their country (such as Wen Tieju n), have proposed diffe rent hypotheses, depending on the geography and ecology of their region. They emphasise the early inve ntion of intensive agricu lt ure, associil ted with il populiltion density that graduall y bec<lme considembly greater than th<lt of the Mediterranean / European wo rld . It is no l our purpose here 10 open li p a debale on these diffi cult ques tions, w hic h have

4 6 ngntea IT na

2 EUROPEAN A ND CHIN ESE HISTORICAL DEVELOPM ENTS

been barely stud ied up until now bec<1 use of the do minance o f Eurocen tri sm. Personally, I wou ld insist o n the very long-term effects o f the Ch inese adopt ion of conceptu<11 writing.

Phonetic writing (alphabetica l or syllabic), invented in the Middle E<1st, g radu <1 lly became the basis o f all the lang uages o f the Mediterranean / Eu ropean region and the Indian subcon tinen t. It is only understandable by those who know the meaning o f the words as they are pronounced in the spoken lang uage, and it requires translatio n for others. The ex pansion o f this way o f writing rein forced the di fferences between the languages and consequently the forms of iden tity thai were based upon them. This co nsti tuted all obs tacl e to the expansion o f regional political powers and therefore to tribu tary cen tralisation. Then, w ith ca pita lis t mod ernity it created the mythology of a nation /stale that was linguisti cally homogenous. This persists - and is even reinfo rced - in co ntemporary Europe and is thus an obstacle to its po liti cal un ifica tion. The o bstacle can only (partial ly) be overcome by adopting a co mmo n language, foreign for many, w hether it is the languages of the empires i.nhe ri ted by modern states (Eng lish, French <1nd Portug uese in Africa, English in India and up to a point Spanish and Portug uese for the A meri.ndians of La tin A merica), or Ihe ' busi.ness Engl ish' Ihal has become the lang uage o f contemporary Europe.

The Ch inese inve nted ano ther way o f w riting wh ich was co ncep tual and not phonetic. The same character described an object (like a door) o r an idea (such as fri endship) and can be re" d wi th a different p ronunciation, for example, ' d oor ' or 'bab', ' fri endship' o r 'smtaka' by readers who are respectively Engl ish or Arab. This form of writing wa s an important factor in promoting the ex pansion of the im peria] power of Ihe Chinese world 'l Ithe continental level. It was a world whose popu lat ion was comparable to that o f all the A mericas from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego in Argentina and of Europe from Po rtugal to Vlad ivosto k. The conceptual way o f Chinese writing enabled the readi ng of one tex t in all Ihe d ifferent lang uages of the subcontinent. And it is only recently that, thro ug h generalised ed ucation, the Mandarin lang uage of Beijing has star ted to beco me the (phonetic) language o f the w ho le Chinese worl d.

4 7


China was five centuries ahead of Europe

The image of Ihe Chinese Irajectory as be ing Ihe course of a ' long, calm river ' is certainly so mew hat forced.

A ncient Chin<l, until the int ro du ction of Buddhism in the firs t centuries of the Chris tian era, was m<lde up of multiple tribut<lry form<ltio ns, organised in principalities and kingdoms Ihal were often in conflict. There was, neverthe less, a tendency towards unifying them into one s ingle empire, which had its early express ion in the writings of Confuciu s 500 hundred ye<lrs before Jesus Christ, in the Warring States period.

The Chinese world then adopled a religion of indi vidual sal vatio n, Budd hism - althoug h it W<lS mixed w ith Taoism - fo Uowillg the eX<lmple of Chris ti<ln Europe. The two societies - feudal, Christian Europe <lnd imperial, Buddhist China - had s triking s imilarities. Bul there were also important differences: China was <I urlified political e mpire which rose to remark<lble heig hts under the Tang dy nasty, while feudal Europe never achieved this . The tendency to reco ns titute the rig hl of access to land each time that it seriously d eteriorated in China contra sted wi th the long-lasting fragmentation of European feudal p roper ty.

China freed itself from religion, in this C<lse Buddhism, from the So ng period and defin.itively with Ihe Ming. 11 therefore entered into modernity so me fi ve centuri es befo re the EumpeaJl renaiss<lnce. The alHlJogy between the C hinese renaissance <lnd the later European one is impressive. T he Chinese ' returned to their roots' of Confu cianism in a frcc, rationa l and non-relig io us reinterpretation, like that of <l Europe<lJl renaissance w hi ch invented a CrecoRoman <lllcestor to break with wJlat the Enlightenment d escribed <lS the religious o bscurantism of the Midd le Ages.

All the cond itions were then met to enab le the modern Chinese world to <lccornp lish re markable progress in all field s: the organisation of the st<lte, scientifi c knowled ge, agricultural <lnd manufacturing production tec hniques and rational thinking. China invented secularism [,00 yea rs before it develo ped in Europe. Modern China put forwilrd the id ea that it was man w ho made hi story, a 110 tion which l<1t€f became <I central theme of the Enlightcnment. The imp<lct of this progress was rcinforced by the periodi c correct ion of da.ngerous drifts (see Tra.ns lator's note) towards the private appropriation of land .

48 ngntea IT na

2 EUROPEAN A ND CHINESE HISTORICAL DEVELOPM ENTS

The stability o f Ihe econo mi c and polHical organisation o f China constituted a model for the d evelopment of produ ctive forces bascd on the continu ed intensification of agricultural production, which was in striking contrast with the model o f historical European cilpitalism bilsed on the private appropriatio n of ag rarian land, the expulsion of the rural populatio n, massive emig ration and the conqu est of the world associated with it . This model of European capitalis m was that o f accumulatio n by dispossession, not only primiti ve but permanent (the other aspect of the polari sation inherent in capitali st g lobalisatio n). China was launched on a path that co uld have led to a capitalism of a different kind, closed up o n itseH rather than conqu ering . The prodigious ex pansion of co mmercial relations associil ted w ith the le vying of tribute and not se parated from it shows that this possibility did exisl. But this assoc iation made the evolutio nary process relati vely s low compa red with that of a Europe in transition towards fuU-blow n cilpitalism.

For this reaso n China kept its advantage - in terms of the average producti vity of social labo ur - over Europe until the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century.

As I said before, the Enlig htenment i.n Europe recog nised this advance of China, whi ch it saw ilS a mod el. Howe ver, nei ther the Europe of the Enlightenment of the mercantilist transitio n period, nor, later on, the Euro pe o f the full-blown capita lism of the 19th centu ry managed to overcome th e fTilgmentatio n o f the kingdoms o f th e ancien regime, then of the mod ern nation s tales, to crea te a unified power capable of co nt rolling the centralisation o f the surplus tribute, then capitalis t surplus, as China had d one .

Fo r their part, Chinese observers d early SilW the advantage o f their his toric development. A Chinese t«w eller, visiting Europe in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, compared the s late o f the co ntinent to that of the Warring States, 500 years before Jesus Chris!.

The decline o f China, ca used by a combinatio n of the ex haustio n o f the model of U1e intensification / co mmercialisation of ag ricultural and rural production, together with European m ilitary aggressio n, was relatively sho rt. It did not cause the break-up o f thi s continental state, althoug h the threa t was apparent during the decline. Some o f the essential characteristi cs of the Chinese

49

ENDING THE CRI SIS OF CAPITALI SM OR ENDING CAPITALI SM?

Revo lution and of the path it too k afler its victory in the successive Maois t and pos t-Maois t moments should be seen in this perspective of an exceptionally long duratio n.

50 ngntea IT na

Historical capitalism accumulation by dispossession

Dominant bourgeois thoug ht h<ls replaced the hi storical reali ty of capitalism with an imagin ary constru ction based on the prin ci ple - claimed to be e ternal - o f tile ralional and egoistical behaviour o f the individ ual. ' Rat ional' socie ty - p roduced by the competition requ ired by tllis princip le - is thus seen as hil vi ng arrived il l the end o f history. Co nventional econo mics, which is the fundamental base o f this thinking, therefore suostilulcs the general ised market for the reality o f capitalism (and the capitalist market),

Marx ist thoug ht hilS been built up based 0 11 quite ano ther vis ion, that of the permanent transfo rmation of the fundamental s tru ctures o f societies, w hich is al ways historical.

In this framewo rk - Ihal of hi s lorical malerialism - capilalism is histori cal, has had a beginning and w ill have an end. Accepting thi s principle, the nature of this historical capital is m shoul d be the object of continu al reflect ion, w h.ich is not always the case in the ranks of the ' histor ical Marx isms' (that is, Marx ism as interp reted by those who claim it). Certainly one can accept the very general idea that ca pitalism constitu tes a necessary s tage, preparing co ndit ions for socialism - a more advanced stage of human civil isatio n. Bul th is idea is too general and insufficient prec isely because it reduces 'c api taJ ism - necessary stage' to actually existing (see Translator's note) historical ca pitalism.

I shall sum up my reflect ions o n this ques tio n in the following points to be developed over subsequent pages:

• Accumu la tion th rough d ispossession is a permanent fea ture in the histo ry o f capitalism . Historical cap italism is, therefore, imperialist by nature al all stages of its development, in the sense that it po larises owing to the inherent effect o f the laws th at govern it.

51


• From this it follows that tllis capitali sm cannot become the unavoi dable st"ge for the peo ples of the peripheries of the historic" l capitalist system. Therefore, this stage is not necessary to create, here as e lsewhere (in the centres of the system ), the conditions for overtaking it by socialism. Development and und erdevelopment a re the two insepar"ble sides of the historical capitalis t coin . This historical capitalism is itself inseparable from the European conquest of the world. It is inseparable from the Eurocentric ideology which is, by definition, a no n-uniVers.l1 form of civilisation .

• Ot her forms of res ponse to the need for accelerated accumulation (compared with the rhy thms of the accumulation of the ancien t epoc hs of civilisation ) - a necessary premise for the soci"lism of Ihe future - wo uld haw been possible. This can be discussed. But Ihese forms, perhaps more visible in an embryonic way elsew here Ih.m in the Europe of the trans itio n to capitaJism (in C hini\, among othe rs), have nol been im plemented because they h" ve been cru she d by the Europe,Ul conquest. Thus there is no alternative for human civilisation o lher Ihan 10 eng age in a construction of socialism, this in lurn being based on the strategic concepts that mus t command the objective results produced by Ihe g lob"lised and polarising expa nsion o f western ca pitalism ! imperialis m.

Accumulation by dispossession: a permanent historical feature of actually existing capitalism

The vulg ar (sec Translato r 's no le) ideology of conventional economics and the cu ltura l and social thinking thai goes wi th it c\,u m that "ccumulation is financed by the virtuo us savings of the rich (the wea lthy owners), like n a tions . History hardly confirms thi s in ventio n of Anglo-A meri can puritans . It is, on the co ntrary, an accumulation largely financed by the dispossession o f so me (the majo ri ty) for the p rofit of others <the minority). Marx rigorou sly analysed these processes, w hi ch he described as primitive accumulation, with the dispossession of the English peasants (the enclosures), that of the Irish peasants (for the benefit of the conquering English ]"ndlords) and that of A merican colonisation being e loquent examples. Ln reality, this primiti ve accumulation

52 ngntea IT na

3 HI STORICAL CAPITALI SM - A CC UMULATI ON BY DISPOSSESSION

has not excl usive ly taken place in bygone and ou tda ted capi ta1-ism. It con linues today.

It is possible to measure the impo rtance of this 'accumulation through dispossession', an expression [ prefer to that of p rimitive accumu lation. The measure that I am proposing here is based o n the conse<]uences of this d ispossession, and can be expressed in demograp hic terms and in terms of the apparent value of the socia l results that accompany it.

The popu lation of the world tripled between 1500 (450-550 mill ion in habitants) and 1900 (1,600 million), reaching three and a <]uarler times the 1500 population during the 20th century (at over 6,(X)() millio n). But the proportion o f Eu ropeans (those of Europe and of their con<]uered territories in America, Sou th Afri ca, Australia and New Zealand ) increased from 18 per cen t (at most) in 1500 to 37 per cent in 1900, befo re falli ng grad ually during the 20th century. The fir st four centuries (1500 to 1900) correspond to the European co n<]ues t of the wor ld, and the 20th cen tury - w hich con tinues through to the 21s t century - to the awakening of the So uth and the renaissance of the con<]uered peop les.

The Eu ropean con<] uest o f the world constituted the colossal dispossession of the Amerindiarls of the A mericas, who los t their land and n,l tural resources to the colonis ts. The Amerindians were almost totally exterminated (through a genocide in North America) or reduced, by the effeels of th is dispossession and the ir over-explo it il tion by the Spanish and Portu guese con<]uerors, to o ne-tenth of their for mer popu liltion . The slave tmde that followed represented a plunder of a large part of Africa, selling back the progress of the continent by ha lf a millennium. Such phenomena are vis ib le in So uth Afri ca, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Algeria, and still more in AustraJi il and New Zeilland . This ilccumulation by dispossession characterises the state of Israel, which is a colon isat ion s ti ll in progress. No less vis ible are the co nse<]lwnces o f colorlial exploi tation a mong the peas<ln try subjec ted by British India, or in the Du tch Indies, the Philippines or Afri ca, as evinced by famines (I he famous famine o f Bengal, those o f contemporary Afri ca). The method was inaugurated by the Eng lish in Ireland, the pop ulatio n of w hich - for merly the same as thil t of Eng land - today o nly represents one-ten th of that of the English, ca used largely by the organised famine denounced by Marx.

53


Dispossessio n not o llly affected the peilsilnt pop ulations, which were the grei1 t mi1jority of peoples in the pi1s t. It i1lso des troyed the ci1pacity for industrii11 prodllCtion (i1r lisan and manufacturing) of regions that fo r a lo ng time had bL>en more prosperous thilll Europe itself: C hini1, India and others (indispu tilble proof of wh.ich is described by Amjya Kumar Bagchi (2005) in his lates t work, Peri/OilS Passage).

It is important here to unders tand that this destruction was not produced by the lilws o f the market, with European industry - claiming to be more effecti ve - having taken the place o f non-compclitive production. The ideological discourse docs not discuss the politi ca l and military vio lence utilised to achieve this destruction. It WilS not the canons of English industry, but the Cilnnons of the gunboa t period, which won ou t in spite of the superiority - not inferior ity - of the Cllinese and h1dii1n industries. Industria lisation, whi ch was pro hibited by the colonial administTilti on, did the rest and 'developed the underdevelo pment' o f Asia and Africa during the 19th and 20t h centuries. The co lonial atrocities and the ext reme exp loitation of workers were the natural means and results o f acc umulation through dispossession.

From 1500 to 1800, the material production of the European centres progressed at a rate thilt wa s hi1rd ly g reater than that o f it s d emographic growth (but this was strong in relati ve terms for that era). These rhythms accelerated during the 19th centu ry, with the deepening - and not the ilfte nuiltion - o f the exploitation of peop les overseils, w hi ch is why I speak of the pennil nent accumuliltion by dispossession and not primitive (i.e. fir st, preceding) accumulation. Th is does not exclude the fael that the contrib ution of i1ccunntliltion financed by tec hnological progress during the 19th and 20th centuries - the successive industri al revoluti ons - then took o n an importance that it never had during the three mercantilis t centuries that preceded it. Finally, therefore, from 1500 to 1900 the ilpparent production of the new cen tres o f the cap italis t / imperialist world syste m (western and central Europe, the United States and, a late arri val, Japan) increased by seven to seven and a half times, in contrast with that of the peripheries, which barely doubled. The sap wi dened as had never been possible in the his tory of illl humanity. During the course of the 20th century, it widened still further, bringing apparent per capita

54 " co


incomes in the centres to a level I S 1020 times grea ler than thai o f the peripheries as a who le.

The accumulatio n by d ispossession o f centuries of mercantiJism had largely financed the lu xuries and s tandard of li vi ng of the governing classes of the period (the Ancien Regime), wi thou t benefiting the popu la r classes (see Translator's no te) w hose standard o f li vi ng o ften worsened as they were themselves victims of the accumulation by dispossessio n of large swathes of the peasantry. But, <lbow all, it Il<ld financed an extr<lordinary reinforcemen t o f the powers o f the modern st<lte, o f its ad ministration and its military power. This can be seen in the wars of the French Revolution and of the empire, which marke d the juncture between the preceding merc<ln tilis t epoch <lnd the su bsequent industrialisation period. This <lccumul<llio n is therefore <I t the origin of the two major transfor mations that had taken place by the 19th century: the fir st Industrial Re volution and the easy colo nial cOllques t.

The popu l<lf classes did not benefit from the coloni<ll prosperity at fir st, not in fact unlillate in the 19th century. This was obvio us in the tragic scenes of the destitution of workers in Eng land, as described by Engels. But they had an escape route, the massive emigrat ion that <lccelef<lted in th e 19th and 20th centuries, to the po int th"t the population of Europea n origin became g rea ter than that of the regio ns to which they emigrated. Is it possible to imagine two or three billio n Asians and Africans having that <ld vantage tod<lY?

The 19th century represented the "pogee of Ihis system o f capitalist / imperialist g lo balisalio n. In fact , from this po int on the ex pansion of ca pitalism and westernis.'ltion, in the brutal sense o f the term, m"de it impossible to d istinguish between the economic dimension of the conquest and its cultural dimension, Eurocentri sm.

The va rious fo rms o f ex ternal <lnd internal colon ialisms which I refer to here (for more details, see Amin (2010), p. 108 o nw ards) constituted the framework of accumulatio n by dispossession and gave substance to imperialist rent, the effects of which proved decisive in shaping the rich societies of the con temporary imperialis t centre.

55


Capitalism: a parenthesis in history

The development o f his torical capitalism was based on the private app ropriatio n of agrarian la_nd, the subordina tio n of agri cultu ral production to the requirements of the market and, on this basis, the continuing and accelerating expu lsion of the peasant pop ulatio n for the benefit o f a s mall number of capitalist farmers, w ho were no longer peasants a nd w ho ended up fo rming an insignificant percentage of the population (from 5 to 10 per cent). They were, however, capable of producing enough to feed (well) all the ir countries' popu lation, alld even export much o f the su rplus p rod uction. This I'a th, started by England in the 18th century (with the enclosures) and g radually ex tended to the res t of Europe in the 19th century, constituted the essence of the historical path of capit<l list development.

It seemed very effective . But whether it is e ffecti ve or not, can it be imi tated today in the peripheries of the system?

This capitalist path was o nly possible because the Europeans had at their disposal the great safety valve of immigration to the A mericas, whi ch we ment ioned ell rlier. But this solu tion s imply does not exist for the peop les of the periphery today. Moreover, mod ern in dustrialisat io n cannot absorb more than a smaU minority of the rural popul<ltions concerned because, compared wi th the industries of the 19th century, it now integrates techno logical progress - the condition of its efficiency - whic h economises the labour that it e mploys. The capital ist path ca nnot produ ce anything e lse than a 'slum planeI' (w hich is vis ible in the contemporary capitalist Tltird World), producing and reproducing indefinitely chea p labour. Thi s is the reason w hy this path is politically unfeasi ble. In Europe, No rth America and Japan, the capita list path - in volving emigration outlets and the profit s from imperialism - certainl y created, ra ther belated ly, the conditions for a soc ial compromise be tween cap ital and labou r (pa rticu larly apparent in the period following the Second World War, with the welfare sta te, although this had already existed in less explicit fo rms since the end of the 19th century) . The co nditions of 11 compromise uascd o n this model do not exist fo r the peripheries of today. The capi talist pat h in Ch ina and Vie tnam, for examp le, cannot create a uroad popular alliance, in tegrating the worker class and the peasantry.

56 ngntea IT na


It can only fin d its social basis in the new middle classes th at have become the exclusive beneficia ries of this development. The social-democratic way is now therefore excluded . The inev itable alternati ve is one o f a peasant develop ment model, to whi ch we shal l return in Chapter 5.

The C'Ju estio n of natural resources constitutes a second decis ive issue in the confli ct o f civilisat ion that opposes ca pitalism to soc ialism in the future. The ex plo itation of the no n-renewable reso urces of the So uth for the exclusive profit o f the wasteful co nsumption o f the No rth is also a form o f acc umulation by di spossession. The exchange of these resources against renewable goods and services jeopa rd ises the future o f the peoples of the South, w ho are being sacrificed o n the altar of the super-p rofits of the imperi alist o ligo polies.

The d estructi ve dimension of capitalism, at least for the peop les of the peripheries, makes it impossible to bel ieve that this syste m can be sustainable and imitated by those w ho see m to be backward. Its place in the history o f humanity is that of a parenthesis, o ne w hich creates the conditions for overtaking it. If this does not ha ppen capitalism can only lead to barbarism and the end of all human civilisation .

The co urse of ac tu ally existing ca pita lism has been composed o f a long period of maturation lasting severa.! centuries and leading to a shorl apogee (the 19th ce ntury), followed by a probable long decline beginning in the 20th centu ry, which cou ld initiate a lo ng transiti on to g lobaJised socialism.

Ca pitalism was not the result of a brutal, almost magical appari tion, chosen by the London / Amsterdam / Paris triangle and established in the short period of the Reformation / Renaissance of the 16th century. Three cen turies earlier, it had ex perienced its first for mulation in the Italian cities. The first formu las were brilliant but limited in space and thus crushed by the surrounding feudal European wo rld. This is why, ha ving been set back by successive defeats, these firs t experiences coll apsed. It is also possible to d iscuss various anlccedents to these in the co mmercial towns along the silk route of China and India to the Arab and Persian Islamic Middle East (see my conunents o n the Chinese pa th described in Chapler 2). Later, in 1491.. with the conquest of the Ameri cas by the Spanish and the Portuguesc, beg-rul the creation of the mercantile/

57


slavery ! capi taJist system. But the monarchies of Madrid and Lisbon, for various reasons w hi ch I shall no t go into here, were unable to give a definiti ve form to mercantil ism whi ch, instead, the Eng lish, Dutch and French were to invent. This third wave of sociaJ, economic, politicaJ and cultural transfo rmations, which was to produce the tra nsition to ca pitalism in its hi stori ca l form that we know (the Ancien Regime) would have been unthinkable wi thout the two preced ing waves . Why shou ld it no t be the same for socialism, a lo ng process, lasting centuries, for the inventi on o f a more ad va nced stage of human civili sation?

The apogee of the system did no t last long. Hardly one century separated the Industrial and Frenc h Revolutions from 1917. This was the century when these two revolutions were accomplished , taking over Europe and its North A merican offspring - as well as the challenges to them, from tile Commune of Paris in 1871 to the 1917 revolution - and achieving the co nquest of the wo rld, wh ich seemed resigned to its fate.

Cou ld this historica l cap itali sm con ti.nue to develop, allowing the peripheries of the system to overcome their backwardness to beco me developed cap italist soc ie ties like those in the dominant cen tres? If this were possib le, if the laws of the system allowed it, then the catching-up by and through capitalism would have had an objective una voidable strength, a necessary precondition to an ultimate soc ialism. But thi s vis ion, obv ious and do minant as it seemed, was s imply fal se . Historical ca pitalism is - and continues to be - polarising by nature, renderi ng cat ching-up impossible.

His tori cal capitalism must be overtaken and this cannot be done unless the soc ie ties in the pe ripheri es (the great majority of humanity) se t to work ou t systematic strategies of d elinking from the g lo bal system and reconstru cting them selves on an autonomous basis, thus creating the cond itions for an alternati ve g loba.lisation, engaged on the long road to world soci a.lism. I will not take up this analysis here, as it can be read in my Obso/!'sct'Ilt Capitalism (A min 2003, Annex IV ). Pursuing the capitalis t path to development thus represents, for the peoples of the per iphery, a tragic impasse. This is because the d eveloped c<lpitalism of so me - th e dominant minori ty centres (20 per cent of the world po pulatio n) - requires the und erdevelopment of the othe rs (SO per cent

58 .gntea IT na

3 HI STORICAL CAPITALIS M - A CCUMU LATION BY DISPOSSESSION

of the wo rld's pop ul ation ). The impasse can thu s be seen in all dimensio ns of socia l, economic and po litical life. A nd it ma nifes ts it self most s trikingly in the agrarian ques tion .

The 20th century: the first wave of socialist revolutions and the awakening of the South Thus the apogee o f the system las ted o nly a short while, hardly a century in facl. The 20th centu ry ex peri enced the first wave o f the g rea t revolutions conducted in the name of social ism (H ussia, China, Vietnam, Cuba) and the radicalisation of the liberation s trugg les of Asia, Afri ca and Latin Ame ri ca (t he perip heries of the imperialist / ca pitalist system) whose am bitions were ex pressed in the Bandung project (1955-80) .

This coincidence was not by chance. The g lobalisation of capitalism / imper ialism had imposed the g reatest tragedy in human history on the peoples of the peripheries concerned, showing up the destruct ive character of capital <lCClOllu]ation. The law of pauperiS<ltion formuJated by Marx at the level of the system was still more violent than the fa ther of socialis t thought had imag ined . This page o f his tory has been turned over for good. The prop lesof the periphery will no longer accept the destiny that capitaJism reserves fo r them. This change of fundamentaJ altitudes is irreversible. It means that capitalism has entered into its decline. This docs not exclude various illu sions: those of reforms capable of giving capitalism a human face (whkh it has ne\'er ]1ild for the majority of peoples); those of a possible c.ltching-up in the system, which is cherished by the govern.ing classes in the emerg ing countries, exhil'Hated by mo mentary success; and those of nos talgic retreat (para-relig ious or para-ethni c) into which many of the ex cluded peoples have SlOTh ilt the moment. These illusions continue ilS we are still in the troug h of the wave. The wave of the revolutions of the 20th century is spent and that of the new radicalism of Ihe 21st century has not yet affirmed itself. And in an inte rregnum, ' a g reat variety of morbid symptoms ilppear ', as Gramsci wrote. The awakening of the pL'Op les of the periphery has made itself fdt since the 20th century, not only because of their demographic catch-up, but also by their exp ress desire to reconstruct their states and their society, delinked from the imperi alism of the four p receding centuries.

59


I therefo re proposed looking a t the 20th centu ry as one of the fir st wave of strugg les fo r the emancipation o f the workers and o f peoples (A min 2008, Chapter 1), of which I ment ion here only the main theses.

Bandung and the first globalisat ion of the struggles (1955-80)

The governments and peoples of Asia and Afri ca proclaimed at Bandung, in 1955, their desire to reconstruct the world system on a basis of recognising the rig hts o f nations that had up until then been d o mina ted. Tllis ' right to develop ment' was the foundation o f g lobalisatio n at th at time, implemented in a multipolar negotiated framework imposed on an im perialism that was forced to adjust to these new requirements.

The induslriali s.-, tion prog ress that s tarted during the Bandung era wa s no t the result o f imperia list logic but was imposed by the victories o f the peo ples of the South. Undoubted ly, this progress cherished the ill usion of ' catching -up' , which seem(."!! on the way to becoming a reality, w hile imperialism, forced to ildjust to the demands of the development o f the peripheries, recomposed it self around new forms of dominat ion. The old co ntras t of imperialis t countries/ dom inated countries, w hich was sy nonymo us wi lh the contrast of the industrialised countri es/ non-industrialised co untri es, gra duall y gave w ay to a new contrast based on the centralisat ion of the ad vantages associated with the five new mono polies of the imperialist centres (contro l over new techno log ies, natural resources, the g lobal finan cial system, communicatio ns and weapons o f mass des truction).

The long decline of cap italism and the long transition to

worl d socialism

Is the long decline of cap italism the same as the lo ng positive transit ion to soci alism? If it is 10 be so, it is necessary thai the 21st century prolo ngs the 20th century and radi cilJises the objectives o f social transformation . This is comp letely possible, but the conditio ns must be spe lt o ut, ot herwise the long d ecline of capitalism wi ll turn into the con tinual degrada tion of human civilisation. I shall refer here to w hat I wrote OJ1 this subject more than 25 years

60 ngntea IT na

3 HISTORICAL CAPITALI SM - A CC UMULATI ON BY DISPOSSESSION

ago, in ' Revo lution or d ecadence?', a chapter in my book Cla)i)i and Nation (Amjn 1981).

The d ecline was not a continuous, linear process. There were moments of reviva l, o f the counteroffensive o f cap ital, like the coun teroffensive of the governing classes o f the A ncien Regime on the eve o f the French Revolut:ion.

The present time is of that kind . The 20th century was a first chap ter in the long apprenticeship of the people in going beyond cap italism and in venti ng new socia list forms of living, to bo rrow the ex pressio n of Do meni co Losu rdo. Like him, [ d o not analyse it s develo pment in terms of a failure (of socia[jsm, of national independence), as reactiona ry propaganda - which has th e w ind in its sails today - tri es to make o ui. O n the contmry, it is the \'ery successes and not the fa ilures of this first wave o f socialis t and natio nal popular ex periences which arc at the origin of the problems o f the co ntemporary wo rld. I have analysed the projects of thi s first wave in terms of three families of social and po liti cal ad vances: the welfa re s tate in the imperiali st West (the hi sto rical compromise between cap ital and labo ur of the period), the actually existing socia l isms (Soviet and Mao ist) a nd the national 1'01'war systems of the Bandung era . The analysis is made in terms of their comp le mentarity and confli ctua lity at the wo rl d leve l (a different perspecti ve from that of the cold war and the bipolarity proposed today by the defenders of the capita list end o f his tory sc hool. as [ stress the multipo lar character o f g lobalisat ion in the 20th century). The social contrad ictions of e,1ch of these systems and the tentati ve nature of these fir st ad van ces exp lain their loss of impetus and fina lly their defeat, and not their failure (Amin 2003, pp. 7- 21 ).

It is thus this inertia that crealed fa vou rab le conditi ons for the current cap ita[js t counteroffensive, the new peri lo us passage o f the libe rations o f the 20th century to those of the 21 st century. It is therefore important to now tackle the nature o f this troug h moment that separates the two centuries and to identi fy th e new challenges that confront the peo p les of the wor ld .

6 1


The counteroffensive of capital ism in decline

The contrast of cent res and pe ripJ1Cr ies is no lo ngcc similar to that of indus trialised co un tries and no n-indus triali sed countries. The polarisation of centres/ pe ripheri es, whic h gave the ex pansio n of world capitalism its imperialis t character, continues and even increascs thro ug h the ' fi ve new mono po lies' that th e imperialis t centres enjoy. In these condi tions, the pursuit of accelerated development by the emerging pe riphe ries, implemented with unquestioned success (in China, particular ly, but also in o ther coun tries of the Sout h) has not ccadicated i mpccialist dominat io n. It has led to a new contrast between the centres and the peripheries, not to its overtaking.

Imperialism is no longer written in the plural- as in the earlier phases of its devel opment - it is a collective imperialism of the Triad (the United States, Europe, Japan ). In this sense, the co mmon interes ts shared by the o li gopoli es based in the Triad are greater than the conflicts o f (mercanti le) interests that might cause them to o ppose eac h other. This collecti ve character of imperialism is exp ressed through the U\iUlagement of a world system by the common ins truments o f the Triad : at the econo mi c level, by the Wo rld Trade Organisation (the co lonial minis try of the Triad), the International Monetary Fund (the colonial collective monetary agency), the World Bank (the propaganda mini stry ), the Organisatio n for Econo mi c Cooperation and Developmen t (O Ee D) and the European Union (constituted to prevent Europe from ex tri cat ing itself from libcr" lism ); and at the politi cal level, by the C7 / C8, the armed focces o f the Uni ted Sta tes and their subordinate ins trument, NATO (North Atl antic Treaty Organisatio n) (with the marginalisa tion / domes tication of the United Nations completing the picture). The US Ilegemoni c p roject, im plemented thro ug h a prog ramme of the military con tro l of the p liUlet (in vol ving, amo ng other things, the abrog ation of intern,l tional law and the law that Washington has conferred upon itself to conduct the p reven tive wars of its choice), is arti culated th rough collective imperialism and makes it possible for the A merican lead er to o\'ercompensate for its econo mic defi ciencies.

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What st rategy to construct convergence in diversity?

The peoples o f the three continents (Asia, Africa and Latin Ameri ca) are co nfronted today wit h the ex pansion of the imperialist system caJled g lobaJised neoliberalism, w hich is nothing less than the constructi on of aparthe id at the world level. T he new imperial order will be challcnged, but by whom ? A nd w hat will result from this challenge?

Here L shall outline the main proposals that L ha ve de\'eloped elsew here (From Capitalism to Cim1i:atioll (2010), p. 127 onward s).

There is no dou bt that the image of the dominant re<llity makes it difficult to im<lgine an immediate challenge to Ih.is o rd er. The governing classes of the countrie s of the So uth, defeated as they are, have la rgely accep ted playing their ro le of subordinate co mprador classes w hi le the peoples, confu sed and caught up in the d aily s trugg le for su rvival, o ften seem 10 accep t their lot o r even, worse s till, to harbour new illusions that their own governing classes hold out before them.

The governillg classes of certa.ill countries of the South have obviously chosen a strategy tha t ls neither Ihal o f passive submiss ion to the dominant forces in the world sys tem nor of declared o pposition to them : a s tra tegy of aclive interventions upon w hich they base their hopes to accelerate the develop ment of their country. China - owing to the soHdity of its nationaJ cons truction g iven to it by it s revolution and Maoism, its option to conserve control of its cur tCncy and ca pital movements and its refus.1.1 to qu estion the collec tive ownership of the lcllld (the miliJl revolu tionary co nquest of the peasants) - is better equ ipped than Ihe others to make this choice ilnd to achieve incontestably brilliant results .

Can this ex pericnce co ntinue? A nd w hat arc its limits? After analysing the contrad ictions inherent in this option I have co ncl ud ed thil t the idea of a ,wliona! capi taJism c<lpabl e of imposing it self on equal terms with the main powers of th e world system is based largely o n illu sions. The o bjective condil i()!ls inherited fro m history do no t make it possible to imple ment a sociaJ compromise between cilpi tal, labour and the peilsantry that wouJd guarantee the stability o f the sys tem. Ln time the social compromise has to d rift (see Translato r 's note) to the rig ht (and the n be confronted by

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the grow ing social movements of the popular classes), o r evolve towards the left by building market socialism as a stage alo ng the lo ng transiti on to socialism. The problems of Vietnam are s imilar. The apparently analogous choices made by the governing classes of the other so-called emerging countries are still more fragile . Nei ther Brazil nor In dia -because they ha ve not had a radi cal revo lu tion like China - arc capab le of posing strong resistance to the do ubl e pressures of imperia lism and the reactionary local classes.

A nd yet the societi es of the South - at least so me of them - are today equipped w ith the mea ns to enable them to co mplete ly rid themse lves of the monopolies of the imperialis t centres. These societies are c<lpable of develo ping by themselves without f<lliing into dependency. They have the potential of a techno log ical mastery that would enab le th em to use technology for themselves. They can constrain the North, recover the use o f their natural reso urces and force the North to <ldjus t to a consumption p<lltem that is less scandalous. They c<ln extr icate themselves from financiaJ g lobalisation. Already they Me questioning the monopoly on weapons of mass d estruction that the United States lVants to reserve for itself. They C.1I1 develop South- South trad e (in goods, services, capit<ll. techno logies). something which was unthinkable in 1955 w hen none of these countries possessed industries and the mastery of tec hnology. More than ever before, the possibility o f delinking is on the <lgenda.

Will these societies do it? And who will und ertake it, the ex isting governing bourgeois classes? I very much do ubt it. Will it be the po pular classes in power? In all probabiuty, the fir st wi ll be national / po pular transitional regimes.

The inseparable capitalism/socialism and North/South conflicts

The North / South (centres/ peripheries) conflict is a m<ljor issue in the who le history of capi tali st develo pment. It is the reason why the strugg le of the peop les of the South for their liberati on - w hi ch in general is proving victorious - is based o n a ques tio ning of capitalism. This is inevit<lble. The capit<llism / sociaJism conflicts and those of the North / South a re inseparable . Socialism is inconceivable wi thout the uni versa lism that in volves the equal-

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ity of peoples. Here again I refer the reader to the proposal s that I develo ped in From Clipitlilism to Civili:.u tiolZ.

Capitalism is a wo rld system and not just the juxtaposing o f national capiti1lis t sys tems, and so political and social struggles, if they are to be effecti ve, mu st be conducted simultaneously in the national arena (w hich remains decis ive because the conflicts, al liilIlces and social and political compromises arc to be wor ked out there) and at the world level. Thi s viewpoi nt, which is o bvious to me, see ms to have been that of Marx and the historical Marx isms (,Wor kers of the world, unite!') and, in its enriched Maois t vers ion, ' Proletarians of a Li countries, oppressed peop les, unitc!'

It is impossible to foresee the trajecto ry that will be tr.lced by the unequal ad va nces of the struggles in the South and in the North . My feeling is that at this mo ment the Sou th is going through a cri sis, bu t that it is a crisis of growth, in the sense that the pursuit of the liberation o bjecl ives o f its peoples is irreversible. The peop les of the North would do well to take their measure, or better still adopt the same perspec tive and associa te it with the constructi on of socialism. There was a moment of solidarity o f this kind at the time of Balldung: you ng Europeans proclaimed their soHdarity wi th the Third Wor ld. It was doubt lessly nai ve, but how much beller than their current turning in on themse lves.

Without going back to the analyses of actually ex is ting world capitalism that I have deve loped elsew here, I wi ll jus t recall the ir conclusions. In my op in ion, humanity cannot engage seriously in the constructio n o f a socialist alternati ve to capitalism unless things change in the developed West. That does not mean at all that the peoples of the periphery have to wait for this change and, un lil it happens, co ntent themse lves with ildapting 10 the possibilities offered by capi talist globalisation. On the contrary, it is more probable that, to the extent that things begin to change in the peripheries, the western societies, forced into it, could be led, in their turn, to evolve as required for the progress of humanity as a whole. If this does not ha ppen, the wo rst is most probab le : barbarism and the suicide of human civilisation. O f course, I en vis.,ge the desirable and possib le changes in bo th the centres and in the peripheries of the g lo bal system in the framework of w hat I ha ve ca lled ' the long transition'.

In the peripheries o f g lobalised cap italism - by definition

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the storm zones in the imperialist system - a form of revolution certainly remains on the agenda. But its aim is by nature ambiguous and vague - natio nal liberation from imperialism (and the maintenance of much of, o r even all o f, the essence of the social relatio nship s that und erpin capitali st mod ernity) - or will it be more than that? Whether it was the radical revolutions of China, Vietnam and Cuba or those which were not radical elsewhere in Asia, Afr ica and Latin America, the challenge remained to catch up and / or do someth ing else. This chaJlenge was in turn linked to another task generall y conside red of eq ual priori ty: to defend the Soviet Union, which was being encircled. The Soviet Union and later China found themselve s confronted by the strategies o f syste matic isolation used by dominant ca pitalism ilnd the western powers. One ca n therefo re understand why, revo lution not being o n the immediate agenda elsewhere, priority was generaJly g iven to saving the post-revolutiollilry s tates.

The Soviet Union and Chin'l ex pe rienced the vicissitudes o f the g rea t revolutions and also had to confro nt the co nsequences o f the unequal expansion of world cap it ali sm. Both these faclors g raduillly sac rifi ced the o riginal communist objectives to the immediate requirements o f an eco nomi c c'ltching-up. This Sllift, 'lbandoning the 'lim of socia l ownership by whic h the commun ism of Marx defined itself, ins tead substituted state management. This was accompa nied by the d ecline o f popular d emocra cy, which W'lS cru shed by il brut'll (and sometimes bl oody) d ict'ltorship of the post-revolutionary power, "cceler"ting "n evo lution towards the restoratio n o f capitalism. 1.11 both experie nces, prio rity was given to the defence o f the post-revo lutionilry s t"te and intenlil l mea ns were used (or tllis purpose, as well "s extern,,] strategies giving priori ty to such " defence. The co mmun ist parties were thus in vited to fall in line with this opt ion, no t o nly with respect to the global s trategic directio n but also in their tacti cal day-to-day "djustments. This inevitably caused a rapid weakening of cr iti c" l thinking alllong the revo lutionaries, whose abstract discourse on the 'revolu tio n' (always ' imminent') was far removed from an analysis o f t he real contrad ictions of society, something supported by maintaining almost military fo rms o f o rga.nisation against a U odds.

Those of the avant garde w ho refused to align themsel ves, and

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sometimes dared to fil ce the reality of post-revolutionary societies, nevertheless did not renounce th e o riginal Lenini st hypothesis (the ' imminent revolutio n'), without taking into ilccount thilt this WilS clearly refuted by the facts. Thus there was Trotsky ism ilnd the pil rti es of the Fourth Intemilliona!. Then there we re il good number of organisiltions of ilctl\' ist revolutionaries, inspired by Maoism or by C uevarism. Examples o f this arc numerous, from the Phi lippines to lndiil (the Naxalites), from the Arab wor ld (w ith the nati onalist / communist A rabs - the Qawmiy in - and those em ulating them in South Yemen) to Latin A merica (Guevarism).

The grea t nati onililiberation movements in Asia and in Afri ca, in open conflict wi th the imperialist order, Cil me up against, as d id those who conducted revolution in the name of socialism, the co nflicting needs of catc hing -up (national constructio n) and the transfo rmation of soc ia l relationships in fa vour of the po pular classes. O n tlus latter concern, the post-revolu tionary regimes (or s imply reconquered post-independence regi mes) were certai nly less radical than the communis t powers, which is w hy I wo uld describe these reg imes, in Asiil and Africa, as national/popu lar. They were also somelimes inspired by forms of orgilnisation (sing le party, nOll-democratic dictatorship, state management o f the eco nomy) that had been develo ped during the experiences o f actually ex is ting socialism. They usually diluted their effi ciency by their vague ideo logical choices and the compromise with the past that they accep ted.

It was under these co nditions that these regimes, like the cri tical avant-garde (historical communism in the countries concerned) were, in turn, invited to support the Soviet Union (and, more rarely, Chin a) and benefit fro m its support. The co nstitutio n of this commo n front agains t the imperi alist aggression o f the United States and its European ilnd Japanese partners was certainly benefi ci al for the peoples of Asia and Afri ca . It opened up a ma rg in of autonomy, bo th fo r the initiati ves of the governing classes of the co untries concerned and for the act ions of their popular classes. This is proved by what happened fo llowing the Soviet collapse.

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The plutocratic oligarchies and the end of bourgeois civilisation

The logic of accumulation is that of the g rowing concentration and centra lisatio n of capital Contempora ry ca pitali sm is a cap italism dominated by a p lutocratic o ligarchy that is unprecedented in history, to whi ch I have alread y drawn attention (Amin 2010, C hapter 4 and Amin 2008, p. 47 o nwilfds).

The whee ler-dealers, the new dominant class in the peripheries

The centre / periphery contrast is not new; it accompanied the g lobalised ca pitalis t ex pansio n from the beginning, 500 years ago. Thus the local governing classes in the countries of peripheral cap italism, whether Ihey were ind ependent cou ntries or even colonies, ha ve always been subo rdinated governing cl asses, but nevertheless allied by the profil.s they obtained by being inserted into globali sed capitalism.

These classes, most of them coming from those Ihat previo usly dominated their societies before submitting to capitalism / imperialism, are very di verse. Their change, because of this integration / submission, is also considerab le: fo rmer po liti cal mentors beco ming large laJld owners, o ld aristoc racies becoming leaders o f tile mod ernised state, and so o n. The reconques t of independence often in volved replacing these old subordinated classes (colJaborators) with new governing classes - bureaucracies, s tate bou rgeoisies, e tc. They had g rea ter legitimacy in the eyes of their peoples (at the beginning ) because of their associati on with the national liberatio n movements.

But here again, in the peripheries dominated by the o ld imperialism (t he forms preceding 1950) o r by the new imperi a li sm (that o f the Bandung era until about 1980), the local governing classes benefited from a relative, visible stabi lity. Successive generations of aristocrats and the new bourgeois for a long time, and then the new generation co ming from the political forces thai d irected nalionalli bcration, shared value systems, moral and natio nal. T he men (and more rarely the women) who represented the governing classes, enjoyed var ious degrees o f legitimacy.

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The upheavals brought about by the cap italism of the oligopolies in the new collec tive imperialist centre (the United States, Europe, Japan) have co mpletely eradicated the po wer o f all thet;e o ld governing classes o f the peripher ies, replacing them w ith a new class that I call wheeler-dealers. This term has in fact spo ntaneously circulated in many countries of the Sout h. A wheeler-dealer is a businessperson, not a creati ve entrepreneur. Businesspeople ob tain th eir wealth from their relationship s wi th ex is ting power and the fore ign masters of the system, w het her it is representatives of the imperialist cou ntries (the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), in parti cular) or the oligopol ies. Businesspeop le operate as very well-paid intermediaries, who benefit from a veritable po litical rent, from whic h they drilw the wealth that they accumul ate. Th e wheeler-dealers do not belong to any system of moral or national val ues w hatsoever. They arc a caricature o f their alter egos in the d ominant centres, for they know no thi.ng el se but ' success', money and the covetousness that li es be hind their alleged pra ise for the indi vidual. There, again, mafia-like and criminal beha viour is never very far away.

It is true that phenomena of this kind are not completely new. The very nature of imperi al ist do mination and the subordination of the local governing classes to it used to encou rage the emergence o f this kind of person in power. But, whal is surely new is that this kind o f person now dominates the w hole scene of politics and wealth. The wheeler-d ealers are the friends, the only friends o f the dominant plutocracy at the wo rld level. Their vu lnerability lies in the facl thai they have no legitimacy whatsoever in the eyes o f their pL"O ples, neither the leg itimacy conferred by tradition no r that g iven by participation in national liberation.

Senile cap ita lism and the end of bourgeois civilisation

The chara cters of the new dominant classes descri bed here are 11 0 1 coincidental; they correspond stricl ly to the requirements o f contemporary capi talism and its functio ning.

Bourgeois civilisation - like all civilisat ion - is not only red uced to the logic of the reproduction of the economi c system. It integ rates ideo logy and morality : praise for individ ual initia ti ve, of coursc, but also ho nesty and respect fo r the law, if not solidarity

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wi th people, at least at the natio nal leve l. Tlus ensured a certain s tability in social reproduction as a w hole and it pervaded the world o f the political representati ves at it s service.

This system of va lues is in the process o f d isappearing, making way for a system wh.ic h has no values. There are many clear signs of thi s transformation: criminal US presidents, buffoons at the head o f European s tates, ins:ignificant autocrats in a number o f countries in the South - who are not enlig htened despots but just despo ts - ambitious obscurilnti sts (the TaLiban, the Christian and other sects, the pro-sl" very Buddhists). They are "II "dmirers of the American model, wi thout any reservations. Lack of culture and vulgarity M e characteristics of a grow ing majority of this wor ld of those who dominate.

A dra matic evol ution of this kind proclaims the end of a civilisation. It reproduces w hat we llClve already Sl-'Cn in the decadent epochs of history. A new world is being born. But not the (better) one wllich many of the naive social movements are calling for. They do, of course, see the ex tent of the destruction, bu t they do not unders tand the reasons. A world that is much worse than that o f the bo urgeois civ ilisation is being imposed.

For all these reasons, I conside r that the conte mporary capi talism of the oligopolies mu st be now described as seni le - w hatever it s apparent immediate success - because it is a success that is s inking into a new barbarism. (I refer here to the concluding chapter, ' Revo lution or decadence, thoug hts on the transition from o ne mode of production to another ', of my book Class ([/1(/ Nllti01T (Amin 1981) written almost 30 years ago.)

The fragility of capitalist globalisation

Ca pitalism can be defined as the reversal of the relati onship o f dominance between the politi cal bod y and the economic one. This reversal g{)('s along with the new market alienation and the o bscuring of social production, with the levying o f the surplus that accompanies it (as Marx described),

This in vention has produced positi ve effects, which in my view arc ind isputable and, the refore, irreversib le. These are, among ot hers, the liberation of Ihe spirit of econo mi c enterprise and overwhelnung accelera tio n, thro ug h the rapid development

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of productive (orces; the combination of condi tions enabling the emergence o f the social sciences (including economics), the formulations of w hich have been fr<.-'Cd from morality and replaced by the .search fo r o bjed ive causalities; and the emergence o f modernity, formu lated in terms of the emancipati on of the human species, capab le of making its own history and, with that, bringing toget her the conditions for modern democracy.

Capital ism is the fir st system that cou ld become genuinely g lobal . This was because of the power that it enabled to develop, far beyond that of the most advOl nced societies o f the past. Thus the conqu est of the en tire planet became its object ive. This power, which IVOIS al ready vis ible in the centuries of the mercantilis t transition (1500-1800), appeared to be without limits from the Industrial Revo lution onwards. Contrary to the nai ve vision o f economists, ca pit alist g lobOllisOltion invo lved the political (and mi litary) in terventio n of the new imperi al powers. It was through these unequal po liti cal relations hips that markets were opened up a.nd co nquered, w hile the eco nomic s tru ctures of the periphery, now dominated, adapted to the req uirements of this form o f ex pansion. The new polar isation, to an ex tent unprecedented in the history of mankind , was established by politica l mea ns and not in any way by the vidorious competition of the industries o f the dominant centres. As a conseq uence, the countries of the periphe ry could reconquer their political independence witho ut it putting an automatic end to their domina ted statu s.

Polarisatio n is inheren t in Ilisto rical cap italism. Cap italism and imperial ism arc inseparable. Im perialis t by nature, the world ex pansion o f thi s historical sys tem has shown that it was neither acceptable nor accepted by the majority of humanity - its victims - and that therefore it is considerab ly mo re fragi.le than beli eved by the economis ts, among other s. The develo pment of the cris is u nder way will certainly show this.

The s tatus of a dominated country has never been accepted by the peoples concerned, apart fro m the new comp rador cla sses that benefit from capi talist / imperialis t g lobalisation . During the 20th ce ntury, this refusal turned into revolut ions conduded under the flag of socialism or nati onal liberation s truggles, both vido riou s, which forced the imperiali st powers to adjus t to these unprecedented changes.

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The coun teroffensive of capitali sm / imperialism, whic h has been at work for some 30 years, has been made possible by the exhaustion of the alternati ve forms produced by the historic socia l isms and nationalisms of the 20th century. Th is cou nteroffensive w raps itself up in the flag of g lobalisatio n. But, in fac t, it ca nnot ,1 ttain its a.ims withou t undertaking a new permanent war o f reconquest. The project o f contemporary g lobalisation is inseparable from the permanent military engagement of the do minant powers, the new Triild of collec tive imperialism.

Extri cation from ca pitalist globalisiltion (whilt I Cill! delinking) is a fi rst conditio n for extrication from peripheral ca pitalist stat us (i n vu lgar terms, gett ing o ut o f ullderd evelo pment o r of poverty) . Extriciltion from cilpitalist / impe riillist g lobalisation ilnd ex tri ciltio n fro m capi talism cmmot be dissociated. This equation creates problems and it is therefore cru cial to kno w how it has or has not been taken into account.

The dominilnt thin king, whic h is essentially Eurocentric, is impervious to the rtrguments developed here. Fo r these thinkers, there is no alternati ve to the western model. It has to be - and can be - imitated by o thers. That capitalism / imperialism has rendered impossible tllis development by imitil tion is beyo nd their ca paci ty to understand .

Marxist thought is not Eurocentric by nature. Marx inaugurated the only way of modern thinking that was capab le o f ridding itself of the prejudices and the s traitjacket of Eurocentrism. Bu t the schools o f historical Marx ism were vict ims o f its limitations. The drift from Marx took the form of the alig nment of the European wo rker and sociillist movement with a linear vision of history, which was nol that of MilTX Ilimself. In this perspective, the socialist revolution cou ld only occur when countries had become full y capitalis t, as in the developed industrial wo rld . Everyw here else the obligiltory passage of a capitalis t d evelopment th rough il bo urgeois revolu tion was declared tlI1<lvoidilble. His torical Marxism to a large extent ignored the co nsequ ences o f the inherent polarisat ion of historical g lobaliscd capitalism and hence the reill nature of the chililenge.

Po larisation delayed the necessary ripening of the socialist co nsciousness in the centre, whose peop les received benefits from the dominant position of their nations. In the peripheries it prevented

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3 HI STORICAL CAPITALIS M - A CCUMU LATI ON BY DISPOSSESSION

the constru ction of new niltional cilpitaJisms like those of the dominilnt centres, and hen ce it closed off the way to the bourgeois revolution. This creilted a double challenge fo r the alternati ve o f populilr revolution, tl1<It of accelerating the develo pment of productive forces and s imultaneous ly building social reliltionships thilt breilk w ith cilpitalism. There are therefore perspectives ilnd s trategies for the transition from wo rld capitalism to wor ld socialism that a re different from those imagined by historical socialisms ilnd Marxisms, and these hilve created new and unforeseen conditions for constructing th e internationalism of the peoples.

Is lucidity possible in the transformative activities of soc ieties?

The modernity of the Enlightenment, by declaring 'man' the iluthor of his history, inilugurilted a new chilpter of history in volving the possibility o f lu cidity.

Lu cidi ty and alienation arc the two o pposite poles of the s.,me dialectical contrildiction. Lucidity is defined by the knowledge o f need, and the power, based 011 tllis knowledge, to act free ly and trilnsform reality. lucidity involves the emergence of a social science that makes it possible to know these objecti ve necessities. In contrast, alienation is defined by the submission of human beings to forces seen ilS being ex terio r - s upernatural - even if they are i.n fact the result of the human thinking and action that shape social reality.

Lu cidity, which was absent from all premodern societies, European and others, thus unders tands that the passing from one stage of social evo lution to another was not conceived and implemented by a social force that develops on its own (w hich o ne might describe as revolutionary). Rather, it develops by itself, through chilotic evo lutions and is, therefore, ilssociated with what o ne could describe as mo ments of d ecadence (from the old regime in decline). The passing from Ihe s lave society of the Roman Empire to the feudali sm of the Middle Ages is a good example of thi s mode of Iransform iltiol1 in whic h lu cidi ty is lacking. Lack o f lu cidi ty is not the sa me as 1,1Ck o f intelligence. Our ancesto rs were no less intelligent than us; they were simply less equipped to control the necessary transformation, even when this control was

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only re lati ve. Actors use tactics of intelligen t actions. But they d o not know w here their choices will lead the m; they do not pose the question of the results they will rcaJly be producing.

With modernity and the eme rgence of lucidity, the ways o f transforming society underwent a Copernican revolution. The sages of the Enlightenmen t formulated, for the fi rst time, a ho listic and coherent project of transformation. Tlus was to establish capitalism on the rubble of the Ancien Regime, a new society based on reason, itself a condition of emancipation. The project, which described w hat essentially became the bourgeois ideo logy, was in turn based on the separation of the reg ulations proposed for manag ing economi c life (to be ordered on the princip le of the new private ow nership, the freedom of en terpri se and to draw up co ntracts) and that o f the model for managi ng politica l life (ordered by what was g radually to beco me democracy - respect for the diversity of opinio ns, removing the sacred from power and the formulation of human and ci li zens' rig hts) . The two sides of the project were legitimate in terms of reason.

The lu cid project of capitalis t mod ernity to be constructed defined itself as establishing a transhistoric a nd definitive reason - the end of history, follow in g non-reasonable prehistory. A ug uste Co mte, in his time, had a definitive visio n w hi ch encapsulated the essent ial ideology of bourgeois modenuty. But the victims o f the new sys tem of triumphant capitalism - the working classes - saw their p roject of transfornung rea Lity in a completely different perspective, that of overtaking capitalism and building soci aJism. By so d oing they showed the relati ve character of bourgeois lu cidity. From the idealisti c fo rmulations of utopian social isms up to the one ini tiated by Marx - histo ri cal materiali sm - there is clear ly vis ible progress in recognising the need to found the transformation project on the overtaking of capitalism and the building o f socialism.

Assoc iating the democratis<1tio n of society in all the dimensions of its economic and politi ca l management- and associating therefore this with social and human progress - definiti vely rejects the dissociation in the bourgeois formula of the En lightenment and unmasks the mi'ITket alienation that is peculiar to this fo rmulation, in so doing g iving the reason / e mancipatio n associatio n a new meaning, representing the advances in the communism project

74


ini tiil led by Marx. That this pe rspective, which in turn consigned cilp italism to prehistory, had sometimes imagi ned the co mmunis t future as the authentic end o f his tory is another s tory.

The fact remains that lu cidity, however rela tive it may be, made it possib le to in vent the revolu tio nary Pillh as il Wily of transforming society, replacing the decadence of the Ancien Regime and the crystallisation o f the new throug h controlled chaos.

The revolutio nary path was indeed the one that ca pitalism imposed, first i.n its early revolut ions in the Netherlands and in Eng land, then pMtly throug h the ind ependence war of the Eng lish co lon.ies of North America and finally, and above all, in the French Revolution. In its turn, the revolutiona ry path was imposed as a lu cid way of tra nsformation, as it pro posed 10

o pen the way to socialist /conununist cons truction. The revol utio n in questio n has often been seen as the great moment that makes it possible, o nce and for <l ll, to g ive a rational! e mancipatory response to the co ntrildictions of a reality that hilS ou trun its course (the Ancien Regime for the bourgeois revoluti onaries, capitalism for the worker and socialist mo vement s). O ne co uld compare the scope of these imagi nary visions and re place, for the concept of the revolution (in the s i.ngular>. that of revolutionary advances (in the plural) whi ch ta ke on different forms accord ing to the conjunctures, but arc always dri ven by an expressio n o f objectives and meilns that aspi re to lucidity.

At the present time we are being in vited urgen tly to ilbandon w hat is described as the ' illu sion of lUcid ity' . No do ubt the reason is that the firs t wave of im p lementi ng project s for socialist construction wore out its capacities to successfull y t ransform the societies concerned . Luc idity, w hich is always relati ve (so metimes the head iness of early success tends to make peo ple forget this), is even bro ug ht into ques tion as a very princ iple. However, U1C reaso ns for the co llapse of the firs t w ave of socialist projects should - w ith the benefit of h.indsight - be very clear: histor ical Marxism, which inspired these projects, had und erestimated - w hi ch is the least one can s.'y - the polarising character o f historical g lobal ised capitalism. The second wave - to be created in the fu ture - must draw the necessary lesso ns. The history of the fOTlll<l lion of capital ism itself sho ws how it w as a s uccession o f waves that made it possible for the final victo ry to e merge: the Medi terranean wave

75


of the Italian towns, whic h abor ted, preceded by three cen turies the wave of Allantic mercantili sm w hic h prepared the success o f the definiti ve form of European cap it alism / imperialism and ensured ils conquest of the world.

To renounce the princip le of the wil l for lu cidity means not open ing up new avenues for the future, but closing them by a return to the obscurantism of the premodern epoc hs. This obscurantism is at the forefront o f th e scene at the present moment, in the trough between the collapse o f the fir st wave of socialist ad va nces and the emergence of the second wave, w hich is necessary and possible. This obscurantism takes on different forms, hard and soft. The hard versions t.l ke the form of a return to the apocaly ptic hope. whose ex treme and carica tu red expression is found in the d iscou rses of the sects, but its ravages are no less vis ible when it comes disg uised behind the masks of so-called religio us o r ethnic fundamentalis ms.

It is not a C<1se of returning 10 the spirituality denied by the g ross m<1 terialism of the consumeri sm of cap italist modernity but, in a more commonp lace sense, it is the ex pression of people's powerlessness confronted by the challenges o f ageing capitalism. The soft version contents itself wi th renouncing the id ea of a co herent globaJ project whi ch necessarily poses the qu estion of power. replacing it with the wonderful belief that indi viduals can change the world jus t by the miracle of their own behavio ur. From the socal led autonomis t movements to the philosop llies - a 1'1 Negri - of the 'bobos' (see Translato r 's note) of our time, this soft mode o f obsCluantis l renunciation of lu cidity, by thus obliterating the reality of ex isting power (oligopolies, military interventions, e tc), is now fashionable because its discourse is trumpeted by the media.

There is always a need fo r lucidity, even if it is, as always, relati ve. Abandoning it is like withdraw ing into obscurantism and it can only lead to the horror of an uncontrolled transition towa rds another world which is still more barbaric than that of our senile g lobalised c.l pilali sm.

Lu cidity invo lves supporli.ng uni versal ism, whi ch is different from actual ly existing g lobalis.-l.tion. The religious universalisms of ancient times (C hri stianity, Islam, Buddllism and others) which accompanied the fo rmalion of tributary empires should be considered as quite distinct from the necessary universalism, both

76 ngntea IT na

3 HI STORICAL CAPITALIS M - A CCUMU LATION BY DISPOSSESSION

modern (' man makes rus own his tory') and sociil List ('the progress o f humilnity m ust be based o n cooperation and solidarity, ilnd not on compel ition').

The renunciation of lu cidity opens the way to the possibility o f returning to the model of transforma tion thro ug h chilos and decadence. Senile cilp italism can, in this way, inaugurate a new em o f immense massacres, with the means available today. Nearly a century ago Rosa Lu xembu rg described the a lternative: 'socialism o r barbilfism'. TodilY one could say: 'capi talism o r civilisiltion?' Dec,ld ence and cri minal chaos o r lu cidity ,1 nd the renaissance o f the socialist project?

References Amin, Samir ( 1981) Class and Natioll, New York, NYU Press Amin, Samir (2003) Obsobcwt Capitalism: COlltempOlU1Y Politics and Global

Disorder, London, Zed Books Amin, Sami r (2008) TIi" World H',. Wis!. 117 5.'<': R<'l,oIuli rm ary Objrd i1'<'s in the

TI,wnty·Fi, ,~t C"" I",y, ]l.lonthly Rel'iew Press Amin, Samir (2010) FrQm C"pil"/i~,,, tv Cipi/i:;;;tiQn: Re(vnstr"dins tI", SOt'i"li~t

Perspectil'f, New Delhi, Tulika Books Arrighi, Giovanni (2007) Adam Smith ill BeiJillg: LilleaS"s vJ tile 21st C~lIlury,

London, Verso Bagch.i, Amira Kumar (2005) Pnilvus P",;sasr, Ala/lki/ld and flU' Globrl/

Ascendalley 'fC/lpilal, Oxford, Oxford University Press Losurd o, Domerlico (2007) F"" I'Histai>t', Paris, Editions Delgil

77

Revolutionary advances and catastrophic retreats

This chapter deals wit h the conjunction of imperialist external aggression and local re <lctionary forces, as well as the theore tical errors and insufficien t practice by revo lut ionary fo rces. It poses the ques tio n: w hat democracy ca n serve the people?

There is no lack of eXil rnples of advances that have been fo llowed by dramatic re lTents. They fill the history o f the 19th .md 20th centuries. They consti tute the his tory of Ihe three great revolutions of the modern wo rld (the French, Russian, C hi nese) and of a few o thers (Haiti, Mexico) . Retreats of the same kind may be emerging (Cuba, Vie tnam). Less spectacu lar, but nevertheless real, advance marked the his tory o f the peo ples of Asia and Africa du ri ng the Bandu ng e ra (1955--S0) . Bu t everywhe re they have been fo ll owed by re treats th at hilVe go ne as far as re-establi shing the co mprador power subo rd inated to imperia ljst dicta torship . I describe these re treats as the ' d rama of the great revo lut ions'.

The socialist advances of the 20th ce ntury: Sovietism and Maoism

The Marx ism o f the Second Inter national, whic h was worker-o rien ted an d Eu rocentr ic, shared wi th the dominan t ideo logy o f the period a linear vision of hi story, according: to which all societies mu st pass throug h a cap ita list stage of devclopment (thus sowing the seed s of the idea that colonisation was hi sto ricall y positive) before being able to asp ire to socialism. T he idea was utterly fore ign to them that the 'develo pment' of some (the dominan t centres) and the ' under-develo pmen t' of others (the dominated peri pheries) we re inseparab le, Ij ke two sides o f the same coin, both inherently produced by the world expans io n of capi talism.

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4 REVOLUTIONARY AOVANCES ANO CATASTROPHIC RETREATS

At fir st, Lenin s tood some dis tance fro m the dominant theory o f the Second lnternational and successfull y condu cted the revolution in the 'weak link' (Russia), but always with the con vict ion that this would be fo llowed by a wave of social ist revolutions in Europe. Tlus hope was not fu lfilled and Lenin then gave more importan ce to the transformation of rebellions into revolutions in the East. Bu t it was Icftto the Chinese Co nununist Par ty and Mao to systematise this new perspective.

The I{ussian Revolutio n was conducted by a party thai was well rooted in the working class and the radica l in tell igentsia . Its alliance with the peasantry (w hich the Soc ialis t Revolutio nary Party represented ) - in military uniforms - Cil me abo ut naturally. The radical agrarian reform that resulted finally sati sfied the old dream of the I~uss i an peasants - to become owners. But Ihis historical compro mise carried within it the seeds of its limitations: the ' markef , as a lways, created a g rowing d ifferentiation within the peasan try (the phenomenon known as kulaki sation ).

Rig ht from the start (o r at leas t as from the 1930s) the Chinese revolut ion d evelo ped along different lines, guaranteeing a solid alliance w ith the poor and middle peilsilllts.Furihermore, the national dimension - the war of resistance against the Japanese - Ollso enabled the front directed by the communis ts to rec ruit a considerable number o f people from the bo urgeois classes who were dis.l ppointed by the weaknesses and betrilyals o f the Kuo minlang . The Chinese revo lution thus produced a new situatio n, different from th Ol I o f post-revolutio nary Ru ssia . The rad ical peasant revolutio n go t rid of the very idea of pri vate ow nership o f Olgrarian land and replilced it by the g uarantee for illl peasants to have equal access to agrariiln Jand . Up until now, this decis ive adva ntilge, w hi ch is not shared by any other country other th an Viclnam, constitutes the major o bstacle to a de vastating ex pansion o f agrarian cilpitillism. The question is now very freq uently debated in China. The reil der is referred to the cha pter on C hina in my book Beyulld US HegwlO1/y (A min 2(06), and my arti cle 'C hina, market socialism and US hegemony' (Amin 2005). But on the other hand, the ril llying of many Ililtionalist oourgeois to communi st parties obviously exercised an ideological influ ence thai encou raged the deviOltions of those described by MOIO OlS partisans o f the capitalis t way ('capitalist roaders').

79


The post-revo lutionary regime in China not o nly had a number of subs tantia] political, cultural, material and economic achievements to its credit (industriruisation of the country, rad icalisation o f its modern politi cal culture, etc). Maoist China resolved the ' peasant problem' that had been at the heart of the drama of the empi re's decline for two decis ive centuries (1750-1950). For more on tlus subject, SL'C my boo k The. Fllture. of Maoism (Amin 1983). Moreo ver, Maoist China achieved these res ults avoiding the most dramatic devia tions of the Sov ie t Union: coUectivisation was not imposed by murd erous vio lence as was the case w ith Stalinism; opposition witlun the Chinese party did not end up ill a reign o f terro r (Deng was put aside, then he returned ).

The objective was pursued te naciously of an unprecedented relative e<] uality in the distribution of income between the peasan ts and the workers as well as bet ween these classes and the governi ng circles - although o f course with ups and dow ns. This was forma lised by options of developmen t s trategy that contrasted with those of the Soviet Union (these choices were formulated in the 'ten great balances' at the beginning of the 1960s). lt was these successes wh ich later facilitated the successes of the development of pos t-Maois t Cluna from 1980. There was ,,]so a contrast w ith ]ndia, which had not car ried out a revolution; thi s is significant for understanding no t only the different courses taken during the period 1950-80, but also the prospects for their probable (and / or possible) different futures. These successes explain why postMaois t China, while now situating its develop ments w ithin the new capitalist g lobalisalion (through the po licy o f 'opening'), has not undergone d estructi ve shocks such as those that fo llowed the collapse of the USSR.

However, the success of Maoism did not 'defini tively' (i.e. irreversibly) decide the <]uest ion o f the longer-term perspect ive fo r socialism. This was, fir st, because the d evelo pment s trategies o f the 1950-80 period had ex hau sted its potentia l and the 'opening' (al thoug h controlled) became necessary (see Till! Flltlll'/' of A II/(Iis /ll, Part ll, Chapter 2), which later involved the risk of reinforcing the tendencies to evolve towards cap italism. But it was also because the sys tem of Maoist China combined contrad ictory tendencies on the reinforcement of socia]ist o ptions o r their weakening. Mao, conscious of Ihis contradiction, tried to bend things in fa vour o f

80 ngntea IT na


socialism throug h the Cultural Revo lution (from 1966 to 1974) and ' Fire o n headquarters' (a reference to headquarters o f the Central Committee of the Party, w hich rep resented the bourgeois aspiratio ns of the po liti ca l class to positions of power). Mao thought that if he succeeded in this co rrec tion of the COUTse of the revo lution, he could get the suppo rt of the you th (which, among ot hers, largely i.nspired the European upr isings o f 1968 - sec the Godard film, 1..11 Cllil1oisl') . The outcome of these events showed whal .m error of judgement tlus w as. O nce the page of the Cultural Revo lution was turned, the partis,ills o f the capitalist p"th became confiden t enough to move o n to the offensi ve.

The conflict between the socialist path, which is long and difficu lt, and the cap italist option, w hich is bei.ng imp lemented, is certainly no t ' definitively resolved '. As elsew here in the world, thi s combat, wlti ch o pposes the pursu it of cap italis t ex pansion to the social ist perspec tive, constilu tes the real confli ct o f the civil isation of our time. But in tllis comb" t, the Cllinese people have so me g rea t adv"ntages, w hich are the inheritance of the revoluti on and o f Mao ism. These ad vantages functio n in vari ous fields of social li fe: they are forcefully shown, fo r examp le, in the defence by the peasant ry of the s tate ownership of agrarian land and the g uarantee th at everyone has "ccess to it. M"oism contributed decisively in taking the exact measure of the issues and the challenge posed by the ex pansion of glo balised cap italism / impe rialism. Mao ism m"kes it possible, in analysi ng this ch"l lenge, to foc us on the co ntmst between the centres and pe ripheries that is inherent in the expansion of actually existing (sec Tmnslator 's note) capitalism, imperialist and polaris ing by nature, and to draw all the lessons involved for the s trugg le for sociali sm, both in the do minant centres and in the do min"ted peri pheries.

These conclusions were summed up in the beautifu l, very Chinese formula: ' the states want ind ependence, the nations, liberation and the peoples, revolutio n' . The s tates - that is, the governing classes (in a1l countri es, when they "re not lackeys and transmission belts for foreig n inte rests) - arc engaged in broadening the space that enables them to manoeuvre in the (ca pitalist) wor ld system. They are also concerned to raise the positio n o f the ' passive' "ctors (ob liged to subm.it to unilateral adjustment to the requ irements o f dominant imperialism ) to becoming 'acti ve'

81


actors (who participate in shaping the world order). The nati ons - tha t is, the historical blocs of cl asses that are potentially prog ress ive - desire liberation, that is, ' development' and ' modernisatio n' . The pL>oples - that is, the dominated and ex ploited popular classes (see Translato r's note) - a spire to socia.lism. This formula makes it possib le to understand the real world in all its complexity and, on this bas is, to formulate strateg ies of effeel ive aelion. It has the perspeelive of a long - a very long - trans ition o f capi lillism to world socia.lism and th us breaks w ith the concept of the ' shor t trans ition' of the Third International.

Flood tide and ebb fl ow of the Bandung project (1955-80)

The second half o f the 20th century sa w unprecedented transformiltio ns in all the societ ies of the world . Bu t it WilS in Asiil ilnd Afri ca, as they came out of the co lonial night, that these transformations were the deepest, fo rced as these societies we re to question the differen t degrees of capi laJ is t logic. The page of 1492 was turned over, and the globalisilt io n of the futu re was not the o ne that had been inaugurated fi ve hundred years previously, dominil ted by wes tern imperiaJism.

Nevertheless, after the flood tid e of the Bandung era came the ebb flow. 1 have put fo rward some anaJyscs o f the progress acco mplished and the reasons fo r later re treat, particu lar ly o f the most radi cill ex periences in the two continents, in my recent book L'Evdl rlu Sud (A min 2008), whi ch I reco mmend to the re.lder.

I would suggest four rece nt cases fo r debilte: Afg hilni sliln, Iraq, Sudan and So uth Yemen. T hese are litt le and badly unders tood beyo nd the reil ders of Arabi c and Farsi. He .. ders could comp lete the ou tl ines g iven here with som e supplementary writings .. bout Afg hanistan and Irilq.

T hese fo ur socie ties are co mparatively less ho mogenou s than o thers fro m the religious or e thni c viewpoint. Bu t that happens frequ ently in his tory, homogenis .. tion oft en being a result o f mod ern isatio n. T his docs nol s ig nify - far fro m it - that there is a ' natural animosity' between the different ele ments of a co untry, whether it is a qu estion o f Shiite s o r Sunnis, Arabs o r Kurds ( in

Imq), of peo ple speaking Farsi or Turki sh (in Afg hanistan ), o f

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4 REVOLUTIONARY AOVANCES AN O CATASTROPHI C RETREATS

Muslims or no n-Muslims (in Sudan) or of subjects of a feud al frag mentation (in South Ye men).

Nevertheless, tltis heterogeneity has, it seems, benefited the revolut ionary response, because it acco unts fo r the relative wea kness of 10caJ powers, bo th the o ld ' independent' powe rs ilnd those subo rdinated, thro ug h moderni sation, to the p rotectio n of the imperial powers. It is the weakn ess o f this power that it changes - in mo ments of crisis - into a break-up according to the lines that define t ltis heterogeneity, w hile the revolutionary forces are able to take ad vantage of the genera l aspiratio n for unity of the people fig hting against the exis ting powers.

These fo ur countries are impo rtant from the viewpo int of the g lobaJ interests of imperiali sm, w ru ch has difficulty in renouncing cont rol over them: Afghanis tan, once the frontier s tate with the Soviet Union and now with the central Asia that the imperialists are trying to build up aga inst Ru ssia; Iraq, whose sub-soil hoa rds so me o f the best oi l reserves in the world; So uth Yemen, w hich comm,Uld s the ent ran ce to the Hed Sea (the oil rou te); Sudan, control of w ltich involves the co ntro l of Egy pt (for the British o f yesterday), rich in o il and uranium (today).

In these four countri es, the mino rity ' mod ern' society, co nfro nled by an apparently ' traditional' mass, has thus been particu larly attracted by radi cal solutions, thro ug h a project o f ' modernisatio n from above, supported fro m below', that had a socialist perspective .

Remarkable success of communist parties

among the modernised minority

In Afghanistan, a monarc hy w hich coul d be called fe udal governed (barely) a collect ion o f regions with vague borders, which we re ru led over by their local maste rs. Its long attempt to resis t the aggression of Britain, concerned to cut off the route o f the Russians to the Ind ian Ocean and then o f the Soviets in Tu rkista n, did not al low the country to acquire the ho mogeneity and strength to meet the challenge of social transformation. It is hardly surprising tha t the social and in tellectual elites, w ho understood th is failure, were naturally convinced , aJmost unmtimously, th <l t the (Soviet) socialist model was able to respond to this challenge.

8 3


In Iril'l, the 'Sunni' monarchy imported by the Bri tish couJd not milintain itself except by renouncing its real in dependence. The lrilqi co mmunist party was therefore ab le to win the hearts o f the masses among the Kurds and the Shiite Arabs, winning minds ilmong all the educated class, particularly amo ng the s tudents, of cou rse, but "lso in large sectors of the new urban midd le classes (professio nals, army officers, etc). On the order o f a monarchy that served the British, the communists opposed the H!illity of the millennia! wuty o f Mesopotam ia - the land between the Tigris ilnd the Euphrates - in spite o f it s diversity.

In South Yemen, the British had reinforced a subordinated pseudo-feudal frilg mentation, creil ting everything it nL>eded. It divided the appilfent local powers into a multitude of mtlshiakll!l!i (the domains of the sheikhs o r those that claimed to be such), o f sultanates and emirates (reduced to a small town and three viJlages), reserving the port o f Ad en to direct co lonial adminis tration. The communist movement (unified under the name of the sociali st party) had no diffi culty in rallying all sectors of mod ern society (dockers, s tudents, the urban middle classes) und er the banner of ' abolishing the structures created by the British: unity, liberation, socialism' .

In Suda n, th e com muni st party succeeded in win ning over all the sectors o f modern socicly in the country: the workers' unions (starling wit h the rail w ay workers) w hich, althoug h clearly a minority in the society, neverth eless represe nted an impo rtant force, no t so mu ch for itself but for the ro le it played for the peopl e as a w hol e by its d efence of the social rig ht s o f workers and the democratic righ ts o f the po p ular classes in their ow n organisation s; the peasants in the regions moderni sed by irriga tion, which had been incorporated into ca pitalism in a more direct way; the women's organi sations s trugg ling aga inst patriarchal o ppression; the edu cated yo uths and students; the pro fessio ns organised in uni ons by the party; and even a good numbe r o f officers in the army.

The communist parties of these four co untries succeeded in making remarkable revolutionary advances: in Afghanis tan and Yemen they conquered state pow er, in lraq and Sudan they were 110t far fro m do ing so

The communist party of A fg hanistan (in fact two part ies in

84 ngntea IT na


one: Parcham - the Flag; KhaJq - the People) did not come to power through a military ('our d'ftllt fabri cated by Moscow (on the model of the CIA COlipS d'etat ), as unfortunately is widely believed in the West. It took over the declining power of the monarchy; the few co mmunist officers w ho 'invaded' the palace did not set up a d ictatorship, but opened the way for power to be exercised by the party. Moscow did not have mu ch to do with it a t the beginning; it had been quite hap py with the monarchy's neutralis t position in internatio nal politics. But o ne part o f the co mmunist party, confronted by the (military) aggression of the United States, whi ch was foreseeab le and inevitable (and indisputably this was a correct judgement), felt that Soviet s upport was necessary. The o ther part felt that tlus support would not s trengthen the cil pacity of the country to successfull y resis t imperialism, but, on the co ntfil ry, risked complicating the task.

A fghanis tan ex perienced the best moment of its contemporary history during the epoch of the so-called commurlist republic. It was il regime of modernising e nlightened despotism, open ing up education to both boys and g irls and hostil e to obscurant ism, fo r which it had decis ive support within society. The agraria n reform that it undertook was mai nly a colJection of measures ilimed ilt reducing the tyrannical powers o f the tribal chi efs. The supportat least tac it - of tile peasant majorities g uaranteed the probable success o f thi s evolutio n, whi ch stil rted we ll. The p ro paganda trilnsmitted by both the western media and political Is lam presented this experience as one o f ' co mmunist and atheist totalitarianism', which was rejected by the Afghan people. In reality the reg ime, like thai of Ataturk in his time, was far from unpo pular.

The fact th at its promoters, in their two major sections (KhaJq and Pilrcham), described themse lves as co mmunists WilS not ilt ilJl surprising. The model of the progress accomplished by the neig hbouring peoples o f Soviet Centr<l l Asia (in spite of a ll that could be silid on thi s subject and the autocriltic practi ces of the system ), when co mp;u ed w ith the permanen t socia l disas ters of the British imperial management o f neig hbo uring cou ntries such as India and Pakistan, had the effect - as in many ot her countries o f the region - of encouragi.ng patriots to understand the obstacle thilt imperi ali sm co nstituted for aU effo rts at mod erni sation . The in vitation that cert ain members of the party add ressed to the Soviets

85


to he lp them get rid of the others certainl y weig hed nega tive ly i.n that it impeded the national -popular-mod ernist projec t.

In South Yemen, the party (o(ficially 'socialis t') consisted of five communist groups of different orig ins w ho realised that they had to merge (while keeping their own identities). The British had decided to hand over a fal se independ ence to some of their colonies (Aden and the Trucial States) and had developed a plan g uaranteeing the ' pacific' transfer of power to feudal bodies (emirates and others) whose powers had been reinforced during the colonial period.

London's plan functioned wit hout a hitch for the Gulf coast, prod ucing the United Arab Emirates. The Socialist Party of South Yemen refused to play the game and succeed ed in mobilising all the most active e lements of society around its wa tchwords: real independence, abolition of the systems of po litical opp ression claiming to be traditional and social justice. Its radicalism paid off: the forces that it mobilised entered Ad en and then all the tow ns that functioned as the administrati ve centres of the country. They even short-circu ited a rival curre nt supported by Nasser and the regi me of North Yemen. The advances that followed arc equally incontestable, in particular the liberatio n of women, the rolling back of obscurantislll and the opening up of the way to a modern and democrat ic interpretation of religion and a secular state. Its popularity was no less undisputed .

In Iraq, too, the fall of the monarchy in 1958 was not the result of a rnilitary (0111' d'/;tat. The intervention of a group o f o ffi cers (including communis ts, but also progressive nationalists) only crowned the struggles of imposing masses o f people, in w hich the communist party played a d ec is ive role (in cooperatio n with other Arab and Kurd organisations, whic h were progressive to different degrees). The Ba'ath party and the Muslim Brotherhood were remarkably absent in these s trugg les. Abdel Karim Kassem, who presided over the reg ime, was therefore supported by a poli ti cal allian ce that broug ht together the conunun.is t party, the progressive Kurds and the nationalis ts (independent of the Ba'ath party). The rivalry between the laller and the co mmunis t party was constant and li vely, so mu ch SO that at a certa in mo ment, suppor ted by so me officers who were communi sts or sy mpathisers, the co mmunjs t party thought it could tilt th e balance in its favour. Its fa ilure to do so was due to a combination of interventions from

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the local reactionary (orces (supported from outside), N asserites and al lied Ba' alhists.

In Sudan, the strength of the communis t party in modern civil society (workers, peasants fro m the Gezira, s tudents, women, professionals and the army) was the reason w hy the dictatorship o f General Aboud (suppo rted by the Brit ish ) was overturned, not by a military co unter-cou p, but by an eno rmous mass movement (the o fficers, in their turn, having refused to repress it). A lo ng s trugg le fo llowed, in w hich the traditional parties devoted to the colonia l power (A nsar and AshiC]qa) were mobilised, supported almost uncond itionally by the Muslim Brotherhood and the diplomats of N asser ' s Egypt and Libya'S Ga ddafi. This reactionary, obscu rantist and nati onalis t bloc (co nsidered uncritically as antiimperi alist) was suppo rted by western op inion agai nst the most democratic forces of the country!

The victories o f this reactio na ry bloc were always limited and ffilgi le, and the communist party each time succeeded in getting back on its fee t and making its op ponents withd raw. The commun ist party did not try to instigate a mi li tary co up (whi ch wo uld have been fala l for it), as has been claimed. Genera l Nimeiry was put in power by a military co up su pported by a react ionary alli ance: the Egyptian and Libyan d iplo mats, the Muslim Brotherhood, the United States and Great Br itain. But not all the army officers were partisans of the cou p. It was they (communis t officers and sym pathisers, progressive na tionalis ts) who, wi thou t d ifficulty, isolated (and arrested) Nimeiry. After this success there was the possibility of a retu rn to democrat ic civilian power, the place o f the communis t par ty having been reinforced. But a third reactionary military counter-coup (wi th, thi s time, the d irect intervention of foreign powers, as well as Gaddafi ) des troyed this democratic perspective. And ever s ince ...

There were various causes for the fa ilu re of these fou r revol utionary advances. Some, of course, were specific to each case, but o thers were more or less common to a ll .

The first cause was the deliberate intention of the United States, Great Bri ta in and their subaltern Eu ropean all ies to d estroy these advances wi th the most ex tre me violence, including military intervention, imp lemented (in Afg hanistan and later in Iraq ) o r seriously threatened.

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As part of their str<ltegy, the imperiali sts mobilised all poss ible and imagin<lble obscur<lntist forces, fin<lncing and giving them military equipment. In thi s they were helped by the Muslim Brotherhood . But it has to be said that they also benefited from the benevo lent neutrality (and sometimes the co mplicity) of the nalion<lJist popu lis t regimes of Egy pt and Libya.

The second cause stemmed from the very real difficulties in integ rat ing certain parts of the' middle classes' into the d emocratic bloc that supported the revo lutionary advances. All efforts were made, very syste mati cally, by - alllong ot hers - the Mu slim Brotherhood, supported by brutal actions of the po wer in place (prohibiting org.misations, mass arrests and torture), to block the communist party's access to the popu lar masses.

As for the third cause, it was a result of the weaknesses in the theory of the vario us parties and of their analysis of a s impl istic Marxism. The Russian Revolutio n had a s trong echo in the Eas t and the communist part ies ranged th emselves wi th no hesitation in the M<l rxism-Leninism c<lmp, to whic h they remained verbally faithful until the collapse of 1990. Tllis took them by surprise as they had never rea lly posed qu estions about the nature of the syste m and its problems. Pe rest roika appeared to them to be a welcome new st<lge of development in triumphant soci<llism. They were ignorant o f the profound cris is o f Soviet society w hich was at the root of the p roblem. They considered the unfortunate choices of Corbachev as simple mistakes, jf not betrayal .

Convin ced of th e Marxi st-le nini st n<lture o f the Sovie t Communist Party, these co mmunist parties always ralu ed verbally to the positions defended by Soviet d iplomacy, w hich was itself very attenti ve to d evelopments in the s trategic countries. I say 'verba lly' bec<luse, in fact, these pil1"ties - or m<lny of their cad res and leaders- in spite o f everything, actually fo llowed their ow n judgement and s idestepped the insistent interventio ns o f Moscow. This was the case, for example, when Moscow insisted th<lt the parties should di ssolve a nd join with the nati onalist pa rties in power (Nasserites and Ba'athists), w hich were described as being eng aged in the ' non-capitalis t way' .

The combination of all these e lements, as well as o thers, exp lain s the setbacks. In Afg hanistan, the Soviet in tervention -' useless' is the ki ndest way of describing it - was ca pitalised on by

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the impe ria I powers, thus rallyi ng the moderate natio nalists of the Middle East. Withou t this intervention, it is possibl e that the progressive Afg han forces mig ht have been able to hold in check the forces of Pakistan, the Taliban and all the obscurantists d escribed in the western med ia as 'freedom fig hters' .

In South Yemen, the communist power in effect committed sui cide in 1991 by accepting unity with North Yemen. How to ex plain this incredible decision? Of course, Yemen constitutes o ne nation and there w as a real desire among its people to get rid o f the sep"r"lio n cre" ted by the Brilish colonis"lio n of it s southern coast. But the re lationship between North " nd South Yemen was not similar to that o f West and East Germany, rather exactly the reverse. The (' backward' ) society and the po liti cal power of the North held no att ractio n for the South, even "fter the revolutio n had chased away the imam and replaced him with a po pulism that was inspired by the confused discourse o f Gaddafi (w hose power, in fac t, does not ha ve many prog ressive achievements to its credi t). This is p roved by the fact that, just aft er ' uni ty' lwd been proclaimed , the peo ple of the So uth revolted in rejec tio n o f it, considering themselves betrayed by the leaders of the party. Savage military repression was necessary to impose unity. T llis is o nly a part ial ex pl anation: some of the pMty leaders (but no t " II), desperate after the collapse o f the Soviet Unio n, wanted to rally to the camp of those they tho ug ht would ultimately be victo rio us. So me of them were afraid (corre ctly so) o f a ferocio us econo mic block"de by the West, perhap s a military intervention o n so me pretex t or other.

In Iraq, the power relations co uld not be reversed exce pt by the bloody dictatorships of Abdels.llem Are£, and then of the Ba'ath, with the unconditio nal suppor t of the Muslim Brotherhood, of the autocratic, pro-imperialis t regimes o f the Gulf and even of N asserite Egy pt. Was not Nasser the ' father ' of Ku wait's independence, fabricated by the Britis h in 1%1 and then supported by Egypt? The way was then o pen to the regime of Saddmn Hussein.

In Sudan, the defeat of the attempts to s to p the counter-revolution of Nimeiry opened the Wily to a regime that combined the dictatorship of the military with that o f the Is lamists. But in spite o f the brutali ty of this type of power, the modern sectors of the society constituted a resis tance front (but henceforUl more passive

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than active), ig nored by the West's 'fri ends o f democracy'. The interminable war in the Sou lh, the breaking up of the country (provi nces in the eas t, Darfu r in the west) arc the price that the Sudanese people pay for this undoing: of its revolutionary advan ces. The inte rventio n, ' humanitarian' amo ng others, of the western powers does not redeem them from their close [lssoci[llion with the assassination o f Sudan ese democracy - nolto speak o f th e direct economic in terests that motiv[lt e these interventio ns (particularly in o il and uranium).

Conclusions should focus on 'democracy'

Democratisation is a process tha t canno t be reduced to a stalic and definiti ve formu la as in the contempo rary 'representati ve democracy' that is generally proposed (multi-party, elections, human rig hts) . Democracy is abo ut all aspects of social life and not excl usively the management of the politi cal life of a coun try. It concerns all the rel[ltionships between individu[lls, wi thin the famil y, in the wo rkpl ace, as well as the relat ionships betwL'Cn these and the economic, adm inistrative and po lit ical dec isio n makers. These relationship s are at the sa me time individual and collective (the class relations are mainly the result o f the unequal power relations in co ntempo rary societ ies). Democracy means associating rather than dissociating po litical democracy and social p rogress. It al so in volves Ihe recogni tion and the definition o f the rig his of the indi vidual, formuJ<1led in terms of leg[ll rig hts, and the instituti onal guaran!L'C of their being genuinely respected . Indi vidual freedo m and the liberatio n of human beings from all forms of oppression are inseparable from the exercise of power by the peop le. A society is no t <1dvanced if it does not integr<1te the rig hts of the individual w ith those of the wo rkers' and peoples' col lective organisations.

The dominant ideo logy associates ' democracy' with 'freedo m of the markets' (l h<11 is, ca pitalism) and claims Ih<11 Ihey M e

inseparable: there is no democracy without markets, therefore democratic socialism is inconce ivable. It is o nly an ideo logical formu lation - in Ih e vul gar (see Translator' s note) and negative sense of the term - whi ch is tautoJogic<1I, inferring tlMt the concep t of democracy is reduced to that of the trunc<1ted US mod el.

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History does not bear ou t this viewpoi nt. Advances in democracy h,we al ready comes about as a result of popular s truggles and have always been in conflict, to different degrccs, with the fundamental log ic o f cap italism. In fact, the his tory of actually ex isting capi talism as a world system shows that even that truncated form o f democracy has been the exception rather th an the rule. b1 the very centres of cap italism, the progress o f representative democracy has always been the res ult of popu lar st ruggles, resis ted as long as possible by the holders of power (the owners). At the wor ld level of the capitalist system - the real un it of operations for capitalism - the associatio n of (truncated) democracy with ca pitalism even more visibly has no rea l gro unds. In the peripheries that are integrated into ac tu al world capi talism, democracy has never - o r hardly ever - been on the agenda of the possible, o r even desirable, for the funct ioning of cap italist accumulation.

In these conditions, I wou ld go as far as saying that the d emocrati c advances in the cen tres, wh ile they have indeed been the result of the s truggles by the pop ular classes, have at least been g reatly facil itated by the advantages their societies ha ve in the world system. Marx ex pected positive effects from universal suffrage: the possib ility of a peaceful transit ion to socialism. His tory has not confirmed his hopes, as universal suffrage has fu nctioned in societies that have become gangrenous through nationalist / im perialist ideology and the real advantages associated with it (see Canfora 2006).

The po pular movements and the peop les struggling for socialism and liberation from the imperial ist yoke were at the orig in o f genuinely d emocratic breakthroug hs, in iti ating a thL>ory and a p ractice that associa ted democracy wit h social progress. This evolution - beyo nd cap italism, its id eology and its limited p racti ce o f representat ive and procedural d emocracy - began very earl y, from the French Revolution. It was ex pressed in a more mature and radi cal way in the later revo lutions, in the Paris Co mmune, the Ru ssian Revolution, the Chi nese revo lution and a few others (those of Mexico, Cuba and Vietnam).

The Russian Revolut ion proceeded to make the great reforms that condi tioned a possible socialist and de mocratic evo lution: agrarian reform, expropriflt ioll of the capitalists. The state deviations came later. Bu t it was wi tho ut do ubt the Chinese revol ution

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that posed the principl es of a popu lar democracy (w hich has nothing to do with the 'po pular democracies' of Eastern Europe), making real social and democratic ad vances that define a s tage in the long tr.lIlsition to d emocratic socialism.

The abolition of the private property of liUld and the g uarantee of equal access to it fo r everyone constit ute a major advance. The implementation o f communes, o f the collecti ye management o f agricultural prod uction, of small, associated industries ,md o f pub li c services (sc hools, clinics, etc) could serve as an effective institutional fr.unework for a gr.l duaJ democrati sati on of the management o f aJlthese aspects of social life.

The limits, inconsis tencies and retreats fro m po pular democra cy in China have many causes, which have been wel l analysed by Lin Chun (2006). They include the objecti ve contradicti ons that o ppose the three necessary thrusts toward s a transit ion project over a lo ng period (natio nal independence, the develo pment o f the productive forces, progress towards the values of equality and socia lism), bu t also - and no less important - the absence o f formal legal guaran tees for the indi vidual and the imprecise institutionalisatio n of powers. The Maois ts' 'mass line' that invited the popular classes to pu t forward their ow n demands, gave them the mea ns of doing it, and did not raise the party as a self-proclaimed avant-garde, which ' taught' the people the truth o f which it had the mono poly, witho ut having to ' learn' from the people: all this s tems from the fundamental logic of a democratic projec t. This p rincip le is the very op posite of the thesis that theory comes from o uts ide the mo vement. The ' mass Line ' is not, however, a substitute for the institutionalis.'ltion of rig hts and of organ isatio ns.

The ca pitalism of the o ligopolies is the enemy of democracy. The market decides everything, the parlia ment (where it exists), nothing: People thus risk being attracted to the illusions o f identity (para-ethnic and / or para-religio us), which are in thei r very essence anti-democratic, and so they are imprisoned in an impasse.

Ln the countries that we ha ve mentioned here, the communist parties, far from having been anti-democratic by nature ('totalitarian' as western propaganda always repeats), have on the contrary constituted the most democratic fo rces in their societies, despite the limitations of their practi ces (so-called democratic centralism, etc).

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Sudan is a tragic example of the con tradi ction between the practice of representati ve, mulliparty, electoral democracy on the one hand and, o n the other, the urgent need for an authentic d emocra cy that serves sociaJ progress. Several times in the con temporary hi story of Sudan (before the setting up of the military / Is lamic dictato rship) - a country th"t w"s committed to free electio ns - the revo lution in progress (supported by the people) was challenged by a (co rrectly) elected parliament, which was dornin"ted by the traditio n,,1 parties, who were enemies o f both democracy (w hen necess<lfY) "nd of soc ial progress (alw"ys).

So, w hat is the alternati ve? The enlightened despotism of the party, as in Afg hanis tan? Some wi ll say thai il is an oxymoron: despotism is always anti-de moc ratic, the EnHg htemnent was "lw"ys democ r"ti c. This is " dog m"tic simplifi c"tion which does not stand the test o f the necessary, continuing in vention o f new forms (includi ng institutional o nes) Ihat go well beyond the western fo rmula o f representative, e lectoral democracy.

So is a s ing le party the altern"ti ve? Or " front of different forces thai are genuinely autonomou s (not co nveyor belts) but concerned to participate in a real convergence in the strategy fo r a long transiti on? The parties of the four countries co nsidered here never settled this qu estio n, either in the bure"ucrati c sense thai is commonplace clscw hC'Te (w hich is to their cred it ) or in the sense of a consistent for mulation of the alternative. This wea kness s tems from their summary interpretation of Marxism.

Actors of the new advances

A re these useful refl ecti ons for the actors of the new advances (especiaJly in Latin America)?

I think so. Because while in Latin AmC'Tica electoral democracy has, in favou rable circumstances, made unde niab le victo ries possible as wel l as the formation of goverrunents decid ed to engage in a progressive social transfor mation, the past his tory J have discussed here shows Ihatlhese very quickly end up in an impasse.

The analyses and the strategies for pursuing strugg les that I propose here go beyond those that were formu lated in the Bandung era, fro m 1955 onwards. At that time, the regimes emerged fTOm the national JibC'Talion strugg les of Asia and Afri ca.

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They were legitimate and popular because of thi s and were generally of a ' populist' nature, which was recognised in the praclices o f the s tate (often confused with it s charismatic hero) and the party (manufactured at the top in certain ca~, never very d emocratic in its practice, even when it was the heir of the popular mobilisations associa ted with the liberatio n s trugg les) in thei r relations wi th ' the people' (a vag ue substitute for the aJliance o f the identified po pular classes).

The ideology on which the legitimacy of power was based d id not make reference to Ma rxism. It was cobbled together, assoc iating a past largely reinvented and presented as essentially ' progressive' (because o f the so-call ed democratic ways in wh ich power was exercised in the o ld communities and because of relig io us interpretations of the same kind ) w ith founding natio nalis t myths. This amalgamation was done with a prag matism that was hardly concerned about the requirements of tec hnological and admini strative moderni sation . The self-proclaimed socialism of the 8andung regimes was vague in the extreme and diffi cult to d istinguish from the populis t s tatism that redistributes and g uarantees soc ial justice . Should o ne not point o ut the ex is tence of many of these character istics in the recent advances of Latin A merica, w hich has not had the opportunity of knowing the Bandung experience and so risks reproducing its limitations?

I have develo ped quite another vis ion of the question of socialism and am careful nol to reduce the ' construction of socialism' to achieving e\'en the w ho le of a current, maximally possible prog ramme. I describe such a programme as ' natio nal, popular and democrat ic' , one which opens the way (but not more) to the lo ng, secular transiti on to sociali sm. I il void the simple phrilse o f ' sociali sm of the 21st century' and favour, instead, ' progress alo ng the long route o f the transition to socialism' .

From Nepal to India: a contagion?

At the very moment when impe riaH st globalisation seemed to be triwnphing, a small country in the heart of Asia s tarted a genuine revolutionary process.

A liberation army that supp orted the ge nerali sed revolt o f the peasantry reached the gates of the ca pital where, in turn,

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4 REVOLUTIONARY AOVANCES ANO CATASTROPHI C RETREATS

the popu lation rose to chase away th e royal governm ent and welcomed as a li berator the Co mmuni st Party o f Nepa l (Maois!), which had proved the effectiveness o f its revol utionary s trategy. 11 is th e most radica l, victorious, revolutionary advance of o ur epoch and thus the most promising. For comparison, it wou ld be as if the FA RC of Co lombia m anaged to mobilise all the peas,mtry of the country (actuaJly impossible to imagine) and link their victory to a po pular urban upris in g, chasing U ribe from Bogo ta (equ ally illlPossible to imagine), thus enabling FARC to d irect the new revo lut io nary government!

Tllis victory in Nepal has created the condit ions for a first success, that of a national, populm and democrat ic revo lution, described by the party itself as anti -feuda l and anti-imperi al ist. In fac t, the generalised urban revolt, w hich involved bot h popu lar and middle classes, forced all the po litical part ies to proclaim themselves, in their turn, as 'revolutionary republicans' . They had never thought of doing so a few weeks before the victory o f the Maoists, having opted for pe.1cefu l stru gg le and the reformis t path, and in vested their hopes in ciections. The other communist pmty, the Unifi ed Marxist-~ninis t Communis ts (U MLC), had joined the Cil mp of the reformists, denouncing the ' ildven turism' o f the Miloists.

The Communis t Party of N ep aJ (Maois t) had del iberately decided to make a compromise agreement with the ot her parties (the Nepal Cong ress, the UMLC and o thers) in the belief that they had acC[uired il minimum of legitimacy by ra llying to the revolutio n, w hic h cou ld not therefore be easily contes ted afterwards. The co mpromise agreement did no t solve fut ure problems - on the contrary, it showed how enormous they were.

The firs t chillienge WilS Ihe ilgrar iiln C[ues lio n. The peasil nl uprising was the result of the correct analysis o f the agrari an C[uestio n made by the Maoists and the s trategic conclusions, eC[ ually correct, that they had drawn: the g re'l t majority of the peasan ts, those w ho had no lruld (often Dalits in certilin reg ions of the coun try), or were over-ex plo ited tenan t / sharecroppers or ow ners o f tiny plots, were able to organise themselves into a united front and moved on to Milled strugg le, the occupation of Ia.nd (including giving access to Dalits, which was denied them by the caste system in Indi a) and reducing the rents paid to landow ners, etc.

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The upris i.ng had, for these reaso ns, gradually spread throughou t the country and the po pular anny, o rganised by the Maoists, inflicted defeats o n the state army. But it is also true that when the revolt in the ca pital opened its gates to the (Maoist) Communis t Party, the popular army had no t yet managed fo overcome IIlat o f the state, w hich was strong ly supported and equipped by the government in Delhi and the im peri alis t powers.

The line defended by the Maoists is one of a radical revolutionary ag rarian reform, guaranteeing access to land (and the necessary means fo r li ving on it) to all the poor peasantry (the g reat majority), witho ut, however, touching the property o f the rich peasants.

The second challenge was the qu estion of de mocracy: was jt to be bo urgeois or popular democnlcy?

In Nepalese soc iety there arc the defenders of the conventio nal fo rmula of democracy, which is reduced to multipartyism, electio ns, the for mal separatio n of powers (among o thers, the independence of the judiciary) and the p rocla mation of human and fundamental po liti cal rig hts . The Maoists saw that the fundamental r ights on which this democrilcy was based put respect for private property at th e top of the hierarchy of so-called human ri g hts. Instead, the Maois ts defended the prio ri ty of social rig hts without w hich no social prog ress was possible: the rig ht to Ide, to food, to lod ging, to work, to e ducation and to health. Private property is not sacred; it is Iirnited by the requirements of implementing soci al rig hts. Ll other words, so me in Nepal defend ed the concept of democracy dissociate d from questions o f social prog ress (the bourgeo is and d ominant co ncept of ' d emocracy'), while o thers supported democ fil cy associated with social prog ress.

The debate - in Nepal - was not confused . The Maois ts said that they did not o bjecl to private property, be it peasant, artisanal o r even capitalis t, nationa l o r foreign. They were not, however, against na tionalisa tion jf the nationa l interes t demanded it (prohibiting foreign banks from imposing the integra tion of the country into g lobalised financial markets). They only challenged the fe udill land ow nership, whose benef iciaries had been the clients o f successive kings, w ho were authorised to dispossess the peasan t communities. Nor did they challenge personal rig hts and the independence o f a judiciary responsible for guafilntccing them.

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They i'ldded to tllis prog ramme an inviti'ltion to the Constituent Assembly to formul ,1 te not only the main principles of social right s, but also the institutional fo rms necessmy to imp lement them. Popular democracy, as they defined it, was to be invented g mdually, thro ugh the actions bo th of the popular cli'lsses organising themselves and by the state.

Evidently, there is no guaranlee that protects the future from the risk of things getting o ut of control. This co uld be the power of the s tate beco ming i'lutocratic. Or it could, just i'lS likely, be i'ln opportunist alignment about Wh,1t is immed iate ly ' possibl e', in w hich the Maoists might rally to the moderate line of their rivals. Bu t w hy condemn the Nepalese in adva nce when all these questions are the object of serious debates w ithin the party and w hen the plurality of o pinions is accepted?

These analyses and s trategies for pursuing the s trugg les go beyo nd those that were formulated in the Bandung era. The Mi'loists of Ne pal have deve loped a completely diffe rent vision o f sociali sm. They do not redu ce the construction of socialism to the carry ing o ut of their current max imum programme (radical agrarian refor m, a peop le's army, popu lar democra cy) . They describe it as a ' national, popular, democrati c' programme, o pening the way (but not more than thatl to the long, secu lar transition to socialism. They do not usc the expression 'sociaJi sm o f the 21st century'.

The ..,uestion of the econo mi c ind epend ence o f the country is also a serious challenge. Nepal is classed by the United Nations as o ne of the ' least developed countries' . The modern adminis tration of the state and of social services and infrastructure works depend, for this reason, on fo reign aid. The present government is aware, it seems, of the need to li berate itself from this extreme depend ency. But it realises that t his can only be done g radually. Food sovereignty in Nepal does not constitute a major problem, even tho ugh self-sufficiency in thi s fi eld means food rations th"t are often d eplorab le. The organis.., tion of mo re efficient and less costly marketing networks for the producer peasants and urban consumers is, however, i'I proble m beca use the in terests of the intermediaries are "t stake. To organise sma ll-scale production that is half artis.,nal and half industrial and w hich is capable o f

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reducing depend ency o n impo rts requires considerab le time and effort to produ ce app ropriate results.

The Mao ist disco urse is abou t a model of inclusive d evelopment, o ne wh ich benefit s the popu lar classes d irectly and at each s tage of its imple men tation, as opposed to the Indian model of growth that is associated wi th soci al ex clusivity, whic h benefit s only 20 per cent of the popu lation and condemns the ot her 00 per cent to stagnatio n, if not to pauperisation. It shows an option based o n principles Wllic h one can only suppor t. However, how it is to be translated in to an effec tive prog ramme for imp lementation remains to be formulated .

Revolut ionary Nepal comes up against the ferocio us hosti lity of its main neig hbour, Indi a, whose governing classes fear its contagious effec ts. The ende mic revol t of the Indian Nax alites cou ld, by gelling inspiration from the lessons of the victories in Nepal, seriously affect the stabi l ity of the mod es of exploitation and oppression in the Indiiln subcontinen t.

The hostil ity o f India sho uld no! be underestimated . It is o ne o f the reasons for the military coo peration between IJ1dia and the United Stntes . T he lndinn government is mo bi lis ing considerable poli tica l means and it also finances, among o thers, the co nstitu ti on in Nepal o f an' alternati ve' Hindu po licy, a long the li nes of th e Indian BW and similar to the po litical Is lam o f Pakistnn and elsew here, as well as the politiC<l1 Buddhism o f the Dalni Lama and o th ers. These reac tionary projects are receiving suppo rt from the United St,l tes and other western powers, particularly Great Bri tain . A Nepalese pol itica l Hinduism cou ld crystnll ise if the o bject ives - eve n modest - o f the new Ne pal take too long to milteri al ise. External in tervention could al so mobili se the reactio nary Nepalese and even foment secessionis t mo vements. The enemy has vari ous s trings to its bo w, including the use of ex te rnal nid, wh ich is always conditionn l even if no t adm itted as such, and the demilgog ic discou rses a bout ' human rig hts' and democracy, nu rtured by th e non-gove rnmental o rgan isat ion networks.

The ndvances in Nepal cou ld be a forerunner o f what mig ht develop on the Indian subcontine nt. The ou tcome of the - v iolent - politi cal and social strugg les w hich will certainly take p lace in India du ri ng the 21st century will determine the shap ing of futu re

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4 REVOLUTIONARY AOVANCES ANO CATASTROPHI C RETREATS

g looalisation. No do ubt the governing classes of the country will try to <1d vallce successfully wilhill the sys tem o f c<1p italist gloo<1 lisation . A large majority of western observers share tltis illu sion, as they are incapable of realis ing the gro wing ex tent of the social con tradictions that these effo rts will en tail. It is thus possible thilt Indi<1 wiU beco me Ihe arenil for the 'gTeill revolutio n' of the 21s t century, mther like Chill <1 was in the last century, and that the o bjective realities will force India, in turn, to initiilte the necessary ilnd possible passilge beyond capi talism. In these circumslilnces the cont<1gion of the Nepalese mod el would h<1ve positive imp licat ions at the g lobal level.

References It is d ifficult to prov ide refere nces as they are almost all in the Arabic language, or I' arsi fo r Afghanistan (and perhaps in RU.5sian ). As far a s the Arab world is concerned I should li ke to ri te two important co llections :

The collectio n of studies on the commwlist parti ~:s, over I,BOO pages, put together by Fay.;al Darra}, for the Arab Cenlre of Social is t Studies (Damascus). These s tudies arc scru pulously honest concerning Ihe facts and d ocuments cited (the interpretation is, as al\\'ays, a questi on o f debilte).

The collection of s tudies on the Egyp tian commlUlis t party (some 15 volumes of memoirs, documents and analyses), put together and published in Cairo by the Arab and African Research CenlTe.

~ Iore accessible to English-speaking readers are the following:

Amin, Samir (1 983) The Flltllle of llIaoism, Part II, Chapter 2, New York, Mon Ully Review Press

Amin, Samir (2005) 'China, market socialism and US hegemony' , Re!';e"W

(Bing hamton ), vol. XXVIII, no . 3, pp. 259--79 Amin, Samir (2006) Br.volld US Hrgemorty, London, Zed Books Amin, Samir (2008) l.'Et'dl .III Srld, panorama de I";P"'I"" de Bandllng (1955-

1980), Paris, I.e Temps des Cerises, p articularly for the ad vances in NaS6Cr 's Egypt, ~ Ial i and some o thers

Amin, Samir (2009) 'Nepal, a promising JC\'olubonary ad vance' , Alon/My Ra';(,,!', New York, February

Amin, Samir (2010) From Capitalism to Ci/,iilzation, Delhi, Tulika Books, in particular for thc dcvelopmcn ts of lhc drama of tllC grcat rcvolutions and thc contribution of !-.!aoism (pp. 29-.-36)

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Canlora, Luciano (2006) La Demacmfie, I,istairc d'une idea/agie, Paris, Seuil Lin, Chun (2006) 'flu: 'liansfarmatiall afCilinese Socialism, Durham, NC, Duke

Unin.:'rsily Press

100 oc ngntea IT ~nal

Peasant agriculture and modern family agriculture

This chapter tackles capi tali st agriculture and agri culture practi sed where capitalism pred omina tes. It loo ks parti cularly al the land tenure reform that is necessary in Asia and Africa .

The North: family agriculture integrated into dominant capitalism

Modern family agriculture, dominant in Western Europe and in the United Stales, has clearly s hown its superiority co mpared with ot her form s of agricultural production.

Annual production per worker (Ihe eq ui valent of 1,(0) to 2,000 tonncs of ccreal) has no equal and it has enabled a minimum proportion of the active popu lation (abou t 5 per cen t) to supply the whole cou ntry abundant ly and even produce expo rtabl e su rp luses. Modern famil y agri cu lture has also shown an excep tion<ll c<lp<lcity fo r <lbsorbing innov<ltions and mu ch fl exibility in ad<lpting to d em<l nd.

Thi s <lgriculture does not share that specific characteristi c o f c<lp it<l lism: it s main mode of labour organisation. In the factory, the number of wo rkers enalJ les an advanced divis ion of labour, which is at the origin of the leap in produc tivi ty. In the agricultural family business, labour supply is reduced to one or two in d ividuals (the farming couple), sometimes helped by one, two or three <lssociatcs or permanentlabollrers, lJut also, in ce rtain cases, a larger number of seasonal workers (particu larly for the harvesting of fruit and vegetables). Generally speaking, there is not a definitively fixed division of l<lbour, the t<lsks being polyvalent <lnd variable. In this sensc, family agri culture is not capitalist. However, this modern family agriculture constitu tes a.n inseparalJle part of the capitali st economy, into w hi ch it is totally integ rated.

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In this family agric ultura1 business, its sell-consumpti on no longer co unts. It depends entirely for its econo mic legitimacy on it s production for the market. Thus the logic that commands the produelion opt ions is no longer the S<1.me as that of the agri cultural peasants of yes terday (anaJysed by Chayanov) or of today in Third World countri es.

The efficiency of the agricultural family business is the consequence of its modern equipment. These businesses possess 90 per cent of the tractors and othe r agricultural equipment in use in the wo rld. These machines are bought (often a ll credit) by the farmers and arc therefore their property. In the logic of capitalism, the farmer is both a worker and a capitalis t and thei r income should correspond to the sum of the wages for their work and the profit from thei r ownership of the capi tal being used. But it is not so. The net income of farmers is comparable to the average wage ea rned in industry in the same co untry. State in tervention and regulatory policies in Europe and the United States, where thi s form of agriculture do minates, have as their declared objecti ve ensuring (through subsidies) the equality of ' peasant' and worker incomes. The profits from the capital used by farmers are therefore co lleeled by seg ments of industrial and financial capital further up the food chain .

In the family agr icultu re of Europe and the United States, the land rent compo nent, w hi ch in conventional economics is meant to constitute remuneration for the productivity of the land, does not figure in the remuneration of th e farmer l owner, or the owner (w hen they arc not the farmer ). The French model of Illlestlll's ie du propriall i,.e (pulling the ow ner to sleep ) is very tell ing: in law the rig hts o f the farmer are given priority over those of the owner. In the United States, w here respect for property always has absolute p rior ity, the same result is obtained by forcing, de facto, almost all family businesses to own the land that they farm. The rent from ownership thus disappears from the remuneration calculation o f the farmers.

The efficiency o f this family agricu lture is also due to the fael that it farms (as owner or not) enoug h good land: neither too small, nor poi ntlessly large. The surface farmed corresponds, for each stage of the dewlopment of mechani sed equipment, to what a farmer alone (or a small family unit) can work. It has gradually

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5 PEASANT AND MODERN FAMILY AGR ICU LTURE

ex tend ed, as Marcel Mazoyer (Mazoyer and Roudard 1997) has demonstr,l ted ex tremely well (by the fac ts) and illus trated (as an efficiency requirement).

Con trol o ver agricultural production is also exercised down the food chain by modern commerce (particulilrly the supe rmarkets).

In actual fact , therefore, the agricultural family unit, effi cient as it is (and it is), is only a sub-contractor, caug ht in the pincers between, upstream, agro-business (which imposes selected seeds today, CMOs to mo rrow), industry (which supplies the eq uipment and che mical products) ,Uld finan ce (wh ich provides the necessary credits), and, dow nstream, the co mmercialisatio n of the supermarkets. The status of the fa rmer is more like that o f the artisan (individual producer) who llsed to work in the ' putting out' system (the weaver do minated by the merchant who supplied h im with the thread and so ld the material produced).

It is true that this is not the o nly form o f agriculture in the modern capitalist world . There are also large agribusiness enterprises, sometimes big owners who employ many waged labourers (when these estates arc not leased o ut to tenant family farmers). This was generally the case w ith land in the colonies and still is the case in South Africa (this form of latifwldia having been abolished by Zimbabwe's agrari,Ul reform). TIlere are various forms in Latin A merica, sometimes not very modernised and sometimes very modernised (that is, mec hanised), as in the Southern Cone. But family agriculture remains dominant in Europe and Ihe United Stales.

Actua lly ex isting (see Tra nslator 's note) socialism experimented with various forms of industrial agric ultural production . The 'M arxism ' underly ing this o ptio n was that o f Karl Kauts ky who, at the end o f the 19th century, had predicted no t the mode rnisation of the agricultural family business (its eq uipment and its spec ial isation) but its d isappearance altogether in favour o f large productio n units, like facto ries, believed to benefi t from the advan tages o f a tllOro ug hgoing internal divis ion of labour. Thi s predictio n did not materialise in Europe and the United Slates. But the myth was belie ved in the Soviet Union, in Eas tern Europe (wit h some nUilnces), in C hina, in Vietnam (in the modalities specific to tha i co untry) a nd, at one time, in Cuba. Ind ependent ly o f the o ther rea sons that led to the failure of these experiments (bureaucratic managemen t, bad macroeconomic

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p lanning, reduction of responsibilities due to lack of democ racy, etc), e rrors of judgement were m ad e about the advantages of the division of labour and specialisation, w hich were extrapo latedwithout justification - from certai n forms of industry and applied to o ther fields of produ ction and social activity.

If the reasons for this fOlilure <Ire now recognised, this cannot be said for the forms o f cap italist agriculture in Lat in America and southern Africa menti oned above. And yet, their failure is also obvious, d espite the profitability and the competitiveness of these mod ernised forms of IOlt ifundia. For this profitability is obtained throug h horrific ecological wastage (irreversible des truction o f productive potential and of a rable land), as well as social ex plo itatio n (miserable wages).

The South: peasant cultivators in peripheral capitalism

Peasan t culti va tors in the So uth constitute almost half of humanity - three billion human beings. The types of agriculture they pmctice vary: those who have 'be nefited ' from the G reen Revol utio n (fe rtili sers, pes ti cides and selected seeds), although not very mechanised, have seen the ir p rod uctio n rise to be tween 10,COOkg and 50,OOOkS per labourer, while for those whose practices are the same as before this revolutio n, prod uction is only around 10 quintals per labo urer. The ratio be tween the average production of a farmer in the North and thOlt of peasant agriculture, w hi ch was 10 to 1 before 1940, is now 100 to 1. In ot her words, the rale of prog ress in ag ricultural productivity has IOl rgcly ou ts tripped that of other Ol cti vi ties, bring ing abou t a fivefo ld lowering o f the real price.

Peasant agriculture in the countries o f the South is a lso well and truly integrated into local and world capitalism. However, closer s tudy immediately reveal s both the convergences in and differences between the two types of ' family' eco nomy.

There are huge differences, w hi ch are visible and undeniable: the impo rtan ce of subs istence food in the peasant economies, the only means of survival for those rural popu lations; the low efficiency of this agriculture, not eq uipped w ith tractors or o ther materials and oft en divided into tiny plot s; the po verty of the

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rural wo rld (three-quarters of the victims of wld er-nouris lunen t are rura !); the growing incapacity of these sys tems to ensure food supplies for their towns; the sheer immensity of the problems because the peasant economy affects nearly half of humanity.

I n spi te of these differences, pe asant agricu Iture is already integrated into the dorninant g lobal capi talist system. To the ex tent o f its contribution to the market, peasant agriculture depends on bought inputs (at least of chemical products and selected seeds) and is the victim of the o HgopoLies that control the marketing o f these products. For the regions that have ' benefited' from the Green Revo lution (half of the peasantry of the South), the drain o n the value o f products by d ominant capi tal is very great, both upstream and downstream. Bu t, relatively speaking, the drain is also heavy for the other half of the peasantry of the So uth, g iven the weakness o f its production.

Modernisation of agriculture by capitalism

Is the mod erni sation of the agricu lture of the Sou th by capitalism possible and desir.,ble?

Lei us usc the hy pot hesis of a strategy for the development o f agriculture that tries to rep roduce syste matically in the Sou th the course of modern family agriculture in the North. One cou ld easily imilgine thilt if some 50 million more modern (ilnns were g iven access to the large areas of land which would be necessary (taking it from the peasant economy and of course choosing the best soils) and if they had access to the capital markets, enabling them to equip thelnselves, they could produce the essential o f what the creditworthy urban consumers still currently o btain from peasant agriculture. Bu t w hat wou ld happen to the billions of no n-competi tive peasant producers? They wouJd be inexorably elimi nated in a short period of time, a few decades. What wou ld happen to these billions o f human beings, most o f them already the poorest o f the poor, but who feed themse lves, for better and for worse (and for a third of them, it is for worse)? Within 50 years, no industrial d evelo pment, more o r less competitive, even in a far -fetched hypothesis o f a continual yearly growt h of 7 per cent for three-quarters of humanity, cou ld absorb even a thi rd o f thi s labour reserve. Ca pitalism, by its nature, calUlOt resolve the

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pe<1 sant ques tion: the only prospects it can offer are a planet full of slums and biUions of ' too many' human beings.

We ha ve therefore reac hed the point w hen, to open up a new field for the ex pansion of ca pital (t he modernisation of ag ricultural production), it is necessary to des troy - in human termsen tire societies. Fifty million new effi cient producers (200 million human bei ngs wi th th eir families) o n the o ne hand, three billion excl uded people o n the o ther. The creative aspect o f the o peration wou ld be only a drop of water in the ocean o f destruction it requires. I thu s concl ude that capitalism has entered into its phase of declining senility: the log ic of the system is no longer able to ensure the simple survival of huma nity. Capitalism is beco ming barbaric and leads directly to genoc ide. It is more th'1I1 ever necessary to replace it w ith ano ther d evelopment logic which is more rational.

So, whafs to be do ne? It is necessary to accept the need to maintain peas.--lIlt agri

culture for the foreseeable future in the 21 s t century. Not out o f romantic nostalgia for the past, but simply because the solution to the problem is to overtake the logic that drives ca pitalism and to participate in the long, secu lar transition to world socia1-ism. It is therefo re necessary to work o ut po licies to regu late the relatio nships between the ' market' and peasant agri culture. At the national and regional levels, these regulatio ns, spec ific and adapted to local conditions, mu st protect natio nal production, thus ensuring the indispensable food sovereignty o f nations - in o ther words, the regulations must dcLink the internaJ pri ces from those of the so-called world market. A gradual increase in the productivity of peasant agricu lture, which will doubtless be s low but continuous, wou ld make it possibl e to control the exodus o f rural populations to the tow ns. A t the level o f what is called the world market, the desirable regulations can probably be appl ied thro ug h interregional agreements thilt meet the requirements o f a development that integrates people rather than excludes them.

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There is no alternative to food sovereignty

Allhe world level, food consumpli on is assured, Ihrough competilion for 85 per cenl of ii, by loc<ll productio n. Nevertheless this production corresponds 10 very different levels of satis faction o f food need s: exceUent for North America and western and central Europe, acceptable in China, mediocre for the rest o f Asia and L<ll in Americ<l, disas trous for Afri ca. O ne can abo see <l strong correlation between food quality and Ihe leve ls of industrialisatio n o f the variou s regions: countries and reg ions that are more industrialised a.rc ab le to feed their populations well from their own agri cultural produce.

T he United Stales and Europe ha ve well understood the impor tan ce of food sovereignty ,md have su ccessfully imp lemented itlhrough systematic economjc po licies. But, apparently, what is good fo r them is nol so for others! The World B<lnk, Ihe OECD and the European Union try to impose an alternative, which is 'food security' . According to them , the Third World countries do not need food sovereignly and sho uld rely on international trade to cover the deficit - however large - in their food requ irements . This may see m easy for those countries w hich are large exporters of na tura] resources (oil, uranium, e tc). For the o thers, the advice of the weste rn powers is to specialise, as mu ch as possible, in the productio n o f agricu ltural commodities fo r export (colto n, tropica l drinks and oi ls, agrofuels in the future). The d efenders of food security (for others, no t for themselves) do not consid er the fact tha t this specialisation, w hich has been practised since colonisatio n, has not made il possible to improve the miserable food rations of the peop les concerned (especiall y the peasan ts) . Nor is the corre lation mentioned in the previou s paragraph taken into account.

Thus the advice g iven to peasants w ho have not yel entered into the industrial e ra (as in Africa ) is not to engage in ' insane' industri alisation projects . These are the very terms utilised by Sylvie Brunei (see Altenllltivt's Slid 2008), who goes as far as attributing the failure o f ag ri cuHural development in Afri ca to their governments taking this 'insane' option! It is precise ly those countries tha t ha ve taken this o ption (Korea, Taiwan, C hina ) that have become 'emerging countries' as well as able to feed their

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pOpuli'l lion beller (or less bi'ldly). And it is precisely those w ho have not done so (A fri ca) that ".re sunk in chronic malnutrition and famine. This would not appear to embarrass the defenders o f the so-called principle o f ' food security' (more acc urately, ' food insecurity'). There is lillie d oubt th i'l t, undernei'l th this obstinacy over A frica co mmHting itself to paths that the successes of Asia have inspired, there lies more than a touch o f contempt (if not ra cism) towards the peoples concerned. It is regrettable that such nonsense is to be fo und in mi'lny western circles and organisi'lti ons wi th good intentions (NGOs and even research centres) .

Bruno Parmentier (2007) has clearly demonstrated the total failure of the ' food sec urity' option. Governments who thought they could cover the needs of thei r poor urbiUl populi'lti ons throug h their exports (oil among others) have fou nd themselves trapped by the food deficit that i.s growing at an alarming rate as a result o f these policies. Fo r the other countries - particularly the Afri can ones - the situi'ltion is even more di si'ls trous.

On to p of this, the econo mic crisis ini tiated by the financ ial collapse of 2008 is further aggravating the s ituati on - and will continu e to do so.

I! is sadly amusing to note how, <I t the very moment when the cris is und erway illu strates the fa.ilure of the so-call ed food security policies, the partners of the OEC D (such as the EU inst itutio ns) cling to them.

I! is not thi'lt the governments o f the Trii'ld (United States, Europe, Japan) do no t understand the problem. This wou ld be to deny them the intelligence that they certainly possess. So can one dismiss the hy pothesis that food insecurity is a conscio usly ado pted objective? Hi'lS the food weapon not a lrei'ldy been employed ? There is, therefore, an extra reason for insis ting that, w itho ut food sovereignty, no po litical sovereig nty is possible.

But while there is no <l lternative to food sovereig nty, its efficient implemen tation does in fact require commitment to the cons tructio n of a diversified econo my and hence industrial isation.

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land tenure reform vital for peasant societies

The main issue in the debate on the future of peasant agricultures is the rules governing the access to land.

The necessary reforms of the land tenure sys tems in Africa and Asia mu st be made from the perspecti ve of a develo pment that benefits the whole society, in particular the working and popular classes (sec Translator 's note), including, of course, the peasants. [t mu st be orien ted towards reducing ine£[uali ties and radically eliminating poverty. This development paradig m combines a mixed macro-economy (associating private enterprise and public plalllling) based on the double democ ratisation of the management o f the market and of the s tate and its interven tions, and the optio n to d evelop an agricu lture based on peasant family cultivation .

Implementing this sci of fundamental principles - the special ways and means of each country and phase of d evelopment will have to be worked o ut - constitutes in itself the construction of the alternati ve in its national dimensions. This mu st, of course, be acco mpanied by evolutions that call suppo rt it, at both regional and world levels, throug h the construction o f an alternative g lobalisation, negotiated and no longer imposed uni laterally by dominant transnational capital, the co ll ective imperialism of the Triad and the hege mony of the United States.

The regu lations governing access to the use of agricu ltural land mu st be conceived through a perspective that integr"tes and does not excl ude, which enables culti va tors as a whole to have access to the land, a prio r condition for the reproduction of a peasant society. Thi s fundamental righ t is certain ly not enough. [t also has to be accompanied by policies tha' assis t peasant family units to produce in conditions that help maintain the grow th of national production (guaranteeing, in tu TIl, the food sovereignty of the coun try) and a parallel improvement in the real income of all the peasants invol ved. A collection of ma croeconomic proposals and appropriate policies for managing them has to be implemented, a.nd negot iations concerning the organisation o f international trade must be subordinated to them.

Access to la.nd mu st be regul ated by the statu s of its ownership. The terminology utilised in this fi eld is often imprecise, because

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o f a lack o f conceptualisatio n. In Eng lish the wo rds ' land tenu re' and ' land system' a.re often used interchange<l bly.

First of all it is necessary to d istinguish two families of land tenu re sys tems: those that are based on the priv<lte ow nershi p o f lim d and those that are no t.

Land tenu re systems based on pri vate ownershi p of land

In this case the owner disposes ai, to use the terms of Ro man law, the USliS (rig ht to develop ), t he j i"r/(.' l ll s (ownership of the prod ucts of this exploitation) and the abuslIs (the rig ht to transfe r o wnership ). This rig ht is absol u te in that the o w ner can cu lti vate their I<lnd themselves, they can ren t it out or they can even keep it ou t of cultiv<l tio n. Ownership can be given o r sold; it is pa.r t o f a collec tion of assets deri ving fTOm the rig hts o f inheritance.

Th is rig ht is no doubt o fte n less abso lu te than it ap pears. In all cases, usage is subordina ted to laws governing p ublic order (p rohi biling land 's illegal use for growing drug-p rod ucing crops, for example) and increasing nu mbers of reg ulations co ncerned wi th p reserving the e nviro nmen t. In some countries that have carried out ag rarian reform there is a fixed ceili ng to the size of the property of an indi vid u<ll o r a fmn ily. The Tig hts o f ten<ln t farmers (length and g uarantee of lease, the amo unt of land rent ) limit the rig hts o f the ow ners in different deg rees, to the extent o f giving the teniUl t farmer the gre ater benefit of protection by the state and its agricu ltural pol icies ( <IS is the case for Frml ce). The freedom to choose cro ps is not alw ays the rule. In Egy p t, the s tate agricu lt ural services have alw ays imposed the size o f the plots o f I<lnd al located to different cro ps as a fu nction o f thei r irr igation req uiremen ts.

This land tenure system is m od ern in the sense that it is the result of the cons ti tu tion of actu ally existing capitali sm, starting from Western Eu rope (firs t in Eng land) and then moving to the colonies of Eu ropea.n ex traction in America. The modern land tenure system was sel u p thro ug h the d estruction o f the ' cus to mary' syste ms o f regu lating access to the land in Europe itself. The statu tes o f feud<lIEurope were fo unded o n the superimposing of rig hts on the s<lme I<lnd : those of the peas;m t concerned and o ther members of the vil lage community (serfs o r freed men), those o f

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the feudal lord and those of the king. The assault o n these rig hts took the form of the enclosures in England, imitated in various ways i.n all European countries during the 19th centu ry. Marx very soo n denounced this radi cal transfo rmation that excl uded most o f the peasan ts from access to the use of land - and who were destined to become emigrant proletarians in the town or remain where they were as agricultural labourers (or sharecroppers) - and he classified these measures as primitive accumulation, dispossessi ng the producers of the land and the use of the mea ns of production.

Using the terms of Roman law to d esc ribe the statute of modern bourgeois ow nership implies that it dates fro m time immemorial, that is, that it dates back to the ownership of the land in the Ro man Emp ire and, more precisely, to s lave- labour land ownership . In actual fact because these parti cular forms of ow nership disappeared in fe udal Europe, it is im possible to talk of the co ntinuity of a western concep t of owners hip (itself associated wi th individualism and the values that it represents).

The rheto ric o f the cap italis t discourse - the liberal ideo logy - has no t on ly produced this myth of western conti nuity. It has produced another myth that is s till more dangerous: that of an abso lu te and superior rationa lity of the management o f an eco nomy based on the pri vate and exclusive ownership of the means o f productio n, whic h include a.gricultural land. Conventional economics does in fact claim that the market, that is, the alienability of the ownership of ca pital and land, ensures the optimal (the most effi cient) usage of these faclors of production. According to this logic, therefore, land must be turned into a commodity like the ot hers, w hich ca n be alienated ilt the price of the market to gua rantee that the best use is made of it for the owner co ncerned and for the whole society. Tlus isonly a mi serable piece of tauto logy, lmt it is what the whole discourse of the bourgeois economy is based a ll . This same rhetoric thinks it can legitimise the principle of ow nership of land by the filct that it il lo ne g ives the culti vator who invests to im prove the yield s per hectare and the producti vity of their wor k (and of those that they employ, if this is the case) the guarilntee that they wiU not suddenly be dispossessed of the fruit of their lilbours and their savings.

Tlus is not true at all, for other forms of reg ulations on the

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rig ht of land use can produce the same results. Fi.nally. th is dorrunant discourse extends the conclusions that it believes to draw from the construction of western modernity. to propose them as the on ly rul es necessary fo r the progress of all other peoples. Giving over the land everywhere to pri va te ownersh.ip in the current sense o f the term, such as that practised in the centres o f capitalism, is to apply to the w ho le world the policy of the enclosu res - in other words, dispossessing the peasants. This is no t a new process: it was ini tiated and continued dur i.ng the cen turies p receding the world ex pansion of capitalism, parti cularly in the colonial sys tems. Today, the World Trade Organisation actually proposes to accelerate this process, altho ugh the ensuing d estruction that th is capi tal ist op tion invo lves is in creasing ly foreseeable and calculab le. For this reaSO ll, the resistan ce of the peasants and the peoples in volved can make it possible to build a real alternative that is genuinely human-oriented .

Land tenure systems not based on private ownership of land

This definition, being nega ti ve, cannot apply to a homogenous group. For in all human soc ieties, access to land is regulated. But this is done either through cllstomary communities, mod ern local authorities or the s tate o r. more precisely and more often, by a collec ti on of institutions and pract ices that involve indi vid uals, loca l authorities and the slale.

The cus tomary management (ex pressed in terms o f customary law or so-called custo mary law) has almost always excluded p rivate ownership (in the modern sense) and alw ays g uaranteed access to the land to aU the families (rather than indi vidual s) concerned - that is, those who constitute a dis tinct village community and identify themselves as such. But it hardly gave equal access to the land . First, it usually excluded foreigners (very often what remained of the co nq uered peop Ie) and s laves (of various status); it also unequally d istributed land according to membership o f clans, lineage and castes, or status (c hiefs, freedmen, etc). So it is inappropriate to indiscriminately praise these customary rig hts as - alas - is done by numero us ideo logues of anti-imperialist nationalism. Progress wi ll certainly require them to be questio ned.

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Custo mary management has almost never been carried out by independent villages, which were in fact nearly always integ rated into some sort of s tate, s tabl e or shifting, so lid or precarious, but seldom absen!. The usage rights of communiti es and o f the families thilt composed the m hilYe illwilYs been limited by those of the state th<lt received tribute (which is the reason why I described the vast array of premodern production modes as tr ibu tary).

These comp lex kinds o f custo mary management, which d iffer from one country and epoch to another, now only ex ist ilt best i.n extremely degr<lded forms, h<l ving been attacked by the dominating logic of g lobaliscd cap italism for at least two centuries (in Asia a nd Afri ca) and sometimes five centuries (in Latin A merica). The example of Indiil is probably the most striking in tlus regard . Before the British colonisation, access to land was administered by the village commUiuties or, more exactly, their governing cas tes, excluding the ' inferior ' castes - the Dalits - who were treated as il kind of collective s lave class, s i.milar to the helots of Sparta. These commu nities, in turn, wefe controlled and ex p loited by the imperial Mogul state and it s vassals (rajas and other kings), who lev ied the taxes. The British raised the s tiltus of the zamindars (w hose responsibility it was to actually co ll ect the taxes) to becoming 'owners', so that they constituted a kind o f allied, large land-owning class, regard less o f tradition . On the ot her hand, they milintained the traditio n when it suited them, for eXilmple ex cluding the Dil lits from access to land! independent Lndia did not challenge this he<lvy COI01Uru inheritance, w hi ch is the c<luse o f the unbelievable destitution of most o f the peasantry and thus o f its urbiln population (see ' Ind ia, a g reilt power?' in Amin 2006) .

The so lut ion to these problems and the building up of il viable peasan t economy of the majority th us requires agrari '1l1 reform, in the strict sense of the term. The European colonisation in South East Asia ilnd thilt o f the United States in the Phi lippines hilve hild s imilar consequ ences. The regimes of the 'enligh tened ' despots of the East (the O ttoman Empire, the Egypt of Mohamed A li, the Shahs of Iran) also mostl y supported priva te ow nership in the modern sense o f the term for the benefit of a new cl ass (incorrectly described ilS ' feudal ' by th e main currents of historicill Mil rxism ), recru ited from the senior agents of their power systems.

As a result, the pri vate owners hip o f land is now app licab le to

11 3


most agricu ltu ral land - particularly the most fe rtile o nes - in all Asia, except for China, Viet nam and the former Soviet rep ublics o f Central Asia. There remain only the vestiges of para-customary systems, particu larly in the poores t areas and those less attractive to prevailing capitali st agricul ture. This s tru cture is highly d ifferentiated, jux taposing large landowners (rural capi talists in my termino logy), rich peasants, middle peasants and poor peasants wi thout land. There is no peasant organisation or movement that transcends these acu te class confl icts.

In Arab Africa (but not in Egypt), in Sout h Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya the co lonial authorities granted their co lon isers ' modern' private property, gene rally o f a latifundia type. This inheritance has certainly been e li.minated in Algeria, bu t there the peasan try had practica lly di sappeared and been proletarianised o r reduced to vagrancy by the extension of the co lonial properties, while in Morocco and Tunisia the local bourgeoisie took over (w hich also par tiall y happened in Kenya). In Zi mbabwe the revolution und er way has challenged the co lonial heritage on behalf partly of new owners, w ho arc more urban than rural, and partly o n behalf o f the 'communities of poor peasa nts' . So uth Afri ca, for the time being has not taken part in tllis movemen t. The stri ps of degenerated para-customary sys tems whi ch remain in the ' poor ' regions of Morocco and Berber Algeria, as in the Bantustans o f So uth Afr ica, are suffering from the threat of private appropriation, encouraged by e lemen ts inside and ou tside the communi ties concerned .

In all these s ituations, the peasant struggles (and so metimes the organisations that support them ) shou ld be identified more p rec isely: do they constit ute movements and represen t claims by ri ch peasants w ho are in confli ct w ith some s tate policies (and the influence of the dominant world system on them)? O r arc they movements of poor and landless peasants? Co uld they both form an alliance agains t the dominant (so-ca lled neoliberall system, and on wha t conditions and to wha t exten t? Can the claims -whet her they arc exp ressed or not - of the poor, landless peasants be fo rgotten?

In tro pi cal Africa, the apparent persis tence of these cus tomary systems are certainly more visible. Beca use here the co lonisation model too k off in a different direction known as the e("(Jnomil' de

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traitl' . Tllis concept, which has no Eng lish translation, means that the management of nccess to Innd was left to the so-called custo mary nuthorities, who were nevertheless controlled by the co loninl s tate (either throug h genuine traditiollill chi efs or fal se ones fabricated by the ildministril tion. ). T he objec tive of tllis con tro l was to force the peasa nts to produce, beyond their own subsis tence, a quota o f specific ex po rt products (groundnuts, colton, coHee, Cil CilO). The maintenilnce of il land tenure system thilt did not recognise pri vate property was convenient for the colonisers as land rent did not have to be tOlke n into account in caJculnting the price of the products. This rcsuJted in the degradation of soils, destroyed by expilnd ing crops, sometimes definitively (as, fo r example the desertification of Senegal where g roundnu ts hOld been cultivOlted ). Here, once again, capitalism demonstmtes tllnt the short-term ratio nality inherent in it s dominan t logic is largely respo nsib le fo r ecologicill d isas ters. The juxtaposition o f subsis tence food crop s and ex port crops also made it possible to pily peasan ts for their wor k nt levels close to zero. For these rensons, to tnlk nbout the ' cus tomary land tenure system' is grossly mislending: it is a new regime thnt conserves on ly the appea rance o f tradi tion, o ften its leas l interes ting aspects.

ChinOl nnd Vi etnnlll provid e a unique example of n system for mnnaging nccess to the Innd which is neither based on p rivate ownership, nor o n cus to m, but o n a ne w revolutiolln ry rig ht, unknown elsewhere, which is thilt of all the peilsants (d escribed as the inhabitants o f a village) having equal access to land (Olnd I stress the equal). T lus is the most beautifu l acq uisition of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions.

In Cluna, and stiU more in Vietnam, w hi ch hnd il deeper colonisation ex perience, the old land tenure systems (those I hOlve described as tributary) were already fairl y erod ed by do minant cilpitalism. The old governing classes of the imperial power syste m had taken over ownersl1ip of ilgricultural land almost as pri va te property, and the new classes of rich peas,lnts were created in the ensuing ca pitalist development. Mao Zedong was the fir st to descri be an agrar iiln revolut ionary strategy based on the mobiJisOltion of most of the poor peasants, who were without land or other assets. The victory of thi s revolutio n mOld e it possible to abolish the private ownersllip o f land r ight from the

11 5


begituung - replacing it w ith ownership by the state - as well as the organisation of new forms of e(jual access to land for all peasan ts. True, this procedure has pflssed throug h several successive s tages, including the Sov iet-inspired model based on production cooperatives. The limits of their achievements led both coun tries to return to the ide" of family peasant units. Are they viable? Can they produce a continual imp rovemen t in production wi thout freeing up too much rural labour? On what conditions? What kinds of support are required from the state? What fonns of politica l management « 111 meetthj s challenge?

Ideally, the model invo lves the double alfirmation of the rig hts o f the s tate (the only ow ner) and of the usufructuaries (the peasant famil y). The state guarantees the equal di vis ion of the village lands among all the families and it prohibi ts all other usage o ther than family culti vation, for example the renting o f land. It g uarantees that the result of investments made by the usufructuaries are g iven back to them immediate ly throug h their ri ght of ow nership of all the produce of their land, w hich is marketed free ly, althoug h the s tate guarantees purchase at a minimum price. In the lo nger term the children who remain o n the land can inherit from the usufructuaries (those who definiti vely leave lose thei r righ t to the land , w hich reverts to land available for future redis tribution). This is the casc, of coursc, for fertile land, but also for small, even dwarf-sized plots, so that the system is only viable if there is vert ical investment (the Green Revolution but wi th minim'll mecllilnis'l tio n), whi ch proves as effective in incre'lsing prod uction through rural acti vities as horizontal in vestment (extension o f the holdings, supported by intensified mechanisation).

Has this ideal mod el ever been imple mented? The pe riod of Deng Xi'loping in China, for eX'l mple, was surely dose to it . Nevertheless, even if it has created a g reater degree of e(juaJity wi thin a village, it has never been ab le to avoid the ine(jualities between one communi ty and another, which are created by the differences in the (juality of the soils, the po pulation density, p roximity to urban markets. No o ther system of redistr ibutio n (even during the Soviet-e ra s tructures o f cooperati ves and state marketing monopo lies) has managed to resolve tlus challenge.

What is certainly more serio us is th'ltthe system itself is subject to internal and external pressures that undermine its aims and

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5 PEASANT AND MODERN FAMILY AGRICULTURE

social impact. Access to cred it and fa vourable conditions for the supp ly of inputs are the object of lJargaining and interventions o f all kinds, legal and illegal: equal access to the land is not the same as equal access to the lJest conditions for productio n. The increasing popu lari ty of the ma rket ideology promotes this erosion: the system tolerates tenan t farming (if not re-Iegit imising it) and the hiring of wage lalJour. The discourse of the rig ht - enCOlIfaged from the glolJal Nort h - repeats that it is necessa ry to give the peasan ts 'ownership' of the land and open up Ihe market in agricu lturaJ land. It is very clear thaI those supporting litis are the rich peasants (if not agro-lJusinc ss), who want to increase their ho ld ings.

The management o f this syslem of access to land for the peasan ts has been ensu red until no w by Ihe state and the party together.1t may welllJe that tltis is on account of the vi Uage cou ncil s that have lJeen genuinely re-e1ected and lJecause there is no other way to mobilise the op inion of the majority and reduce the intrigues o f the minorities of pro fiteers who wo uld eventual ly benefit from a more marked ly capi talist development. The dictatorship o f the party has shown that this issue has been la rgely solved through careerism and opportu nism, if not corrup tion. The soc ial s trugg les under way in the Chjnese and Vietnamese countryside make their voices heard in these countries just as they do elsewhere in the world. But they remain very much o n the defensive, that is attached 10 defending the heritage of the revolution: the equal right of everyone to land. Defence is necessary lJecause this heritage is mo re threatened than it wo uld appear, in spite o f repeated affirmations by the two governmen ts that the ownership of land by the sta te will never be abolished for the benefit o f private ownership . But now this defence requ ires the recogni tion that the peasan ts, w ho are those concern ed, have the right to organise to carry out this defence.

Not only one formula for peasant alternatives

Agrarian reform should be understood as the redistribution o f p rivate ow nershil' when it is considered to be unequally distribu ted . It is a la nd tenure system tha t is based on the princip le o f ownership . Thi s reform becomes necessary bo th to satisfy the

11 7


demand (perfectly legiti mate) from poo r and landless peasants and to reduce the political and so cial power of the large landowners. But where it has been imp le mented, in Asia and Africa after the liberation from o ld forms o f imperialis t and colonial do mination, it has been carried ou t by hegemonic, non-revolutio nary social blocs that were not governed by the dominated and poo r majority classes. The exceptions were in China and Vietnam where there had not been an agrarian reform in the stricl sense o f the term but, as I have silid, private ownership of land was supp ressed, the principle of sta te ownership was affirmed ,1 nd eq ual access to the use of land by all peasan ts was put into operation . Elsewhere, reill refor ms only dispossessed the large landowners to the profit, finall y, of the middle and even ri ch (long-term) peasan ts, ig noring the interests of the poor and landless. Thilt was the case in Egypt and in o ther Arab co untries. The refo rm underway in Zimbabwe risks end ing up in the same way. In other s ituations, reform is always on the ilgenda of wha t should be done: in India, in Sou th East Asia, in South Africa and in Kenya.

The progress generated by agrarian reform, even where the reform is an immediilte illld essentiill requirement, is nevertheless ambig uous in its more long-term implications. For it reinforces attachment to ' small property', w hich becomes an obstacle to the questioning of a land tenure system based on pri vate ownership.

Russia's his tory illus triltes th is drama. The d evelo pments that followed the abo lition of serfd o m in 1861 were accelerated by the revolution of 15()S because Sto ly pin' s policies had already produced a ' claim for ownership' . This was (finally ) fulfill ed in the rildi ca l agrariilIl refo rm ilfter the 1917 re volut ion. And, as we know, the new smalJ owners did not enthusias tically renou nce their rights for the benefit of the unfortunate cooperatives, whi ch were dreamt up in the 1930s. Another path to develo pment, based o n the peasant fami ly eco nomy of the generalised slllil ll owners, would have been possib le, but it was not attempted.

And what abou t the regions (other than China and Vietnam) where, in fact, the land tenure sys tem had not (yet ) ix>cn based on private prope rty? This was of course the case with tropical Afri ca.

Here we find the o ld debate. Towards the end of the 19th century Marx, in his correspondence with the Russian Narodniks (Vera Zasulich, among others), dared to say that tile absence o f

liB ngntea IT na


p rivate ownership could constitu te an ad vantage fo r the sociaJis t revolution . It wou ld enable a leap forward towards a regime for managing access to land other than the one governed by pri vate ow nership. But he d id not specify w hat forms this new regi me shou ld take, the adjec tive ' collective', correct as it was, being insuffi cient Twenty years later, Lenin believed this possibility no longer existed, havi ng been eliminated by the penetra tion o f cap italism and the sp irit o f private ownership that accompanied it. Was this a correct assessment? I cannot say, as I do not know enough abo ut Russia. However, Len in was hardly "b le to g ive decisive impo rtance to this ques tion, having accepted the viewpoin t ex pressed by Kau tsky (1899) in Oil tlu' Agmriall Q W$ ticlII.

Kautsky made generalisati ons abou t the extent of the mode l i.n modern European capitalism and believed that the peasantry was desti ned to disappear because o f the cap italist expansion itself. In other words, capitalism would be able to reso lve the agrarian question . While t[us was true (for 80 per cent ) of the ot her capi talist count ries (the Tri ad: 20 per ce nt of the world popu lation), it is not tile case fo r the rest o f the world (SO per cent of its pop ul at ion). H is tory has shown that not only has cap italism no t solved this question for the SO per cent of the world popu lation, bu t that, as it pursues cap itali st expansion, it cannot reso lve it (other than by genoc ide - w hat a marvellous solu tion! ). It was necessary to await Mao Zedong and the communist parties of China and Viet nam for an 'ldequa te response to thi s challenge.

The questio n came up aga in in the 1960s, w hen Africa attained it s independence. The natio n'll liberat ion movements of the co ntinent, the states and the sta te part ies which it had produced, received, to different degrees, the support of the peasan t majorities of their peop les. Their natural tendency to po puli sm was to imagi ne a specific (Afri can) path to socialism. This co uld be described as very moderately radical in its relationships both with donunant cap italism and wi th th e local classes associated w ith its expans ion. Nevertheless it posed the question of reconstruction o f peasan t society in a hu manist and universalis t sp irit This spirit was often very crit ica l o f trad it ions that the fo re ign masters had in fact been trying to mobilise fOJ their own profit.

A ll the African countries - or almost all - adopted the same p rinci ple, formulated as the pre-emi nent ownershi p right of the

11 9


s ta te over a ll the land. I <1m not among those w ho cons ide r this decl<lr,l tion to have been <I mistake, nor th<lt it was moli vated by extreme statistim.

To g rasp th e ex tent of the challenge it is necessary to s tudy the w<ly in which the cu rrent system contro ls the pe<ls<lntry <lnd how it is integr<lted into the wor ld c<lp ita lis t syste m. This control is en sured by a co mplex system that calls upo n custom, private (capitalis t) ow nership and the s ta te - a)[ at the sa me time. C us to m ( <IS we lwve just see n) has degener<lted and onl y serves as decora tion in the d iscourses of dictators appealing to what is know n as a uthenticity, the fig leaf to cover t he ir appeti te fo r pillage and be trayal to imper ialism . T he tendency fo r private <lppropriation to ex pand has no t met wi th <lny serious obstacle, apart from so me resis tance by the victi ms. Ln certain regions, which arc more suitable fo r profit able cu ltivation (irrigated a reas, marke t gardens), land is bought, sold and rented wi thou t any for mal ow nershi p titles.

The pre-eminent sta te ownershi p (of land ), w hic h I defend as a principle, itself promotes pri vate appropriation . The state can thus g ive away the land necessary fo r installing a to urist a rea, a local or fo reign <lgro-business ente rprise or <I s ta te far m. The title deeds required for access to the areas to be developed are the object of a d istribu tio n process tha t is rarely transparent. In all cases, the peasant families tha t o ccupied the areas and a re forced to clear o ff are the victims of practices that amoun t to an abuse o f power. But to abolish the pre-eminent state ownership of land in order to transfer it to the occ upie rs is not in fact feasible (all the village te rritories would have to be reg iste red) and if it were attemp ted it wou ld elw ble the rura] and urban notab les to make o ff with the best bits of land .

The rig ht response to the challenges of pulling in place a land tenure system tha t is not based o n private ow nership (at leas t nol dominated by it) sho uld be to reform th e s tate <lnd ac live ly invol ve it in setting up a management system for access to land that is modernised, effic ient (econo mically) and democratic (to avoid, or at least to reduce, inequalities) . A bove all, the solution is not to return to custom, w llic h is anyway impossible and w hi ch would only serve to increase inequaliti es and open up the way to unbr id led cap ita lism.

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However, it cilnnot be said th at African stiltes llilve never tried to tilke the path recommend ed he re.

In Mali, just after independence in September 1% 1, the Sudanese Union s tarted on what was very inaccurately called ' co Uectivisiltion' . In fil cl, the coopemtives that were es lilblished were not production cooperiltives; production remained the exclusive responsibility of the fa mily farmers. The cooperatives constituted a form of modernised collective power, replacing the so-called custom which the colonial power used to support. The party tlhlt took over this new modern power was also clea rly aware of the challenge and aimed to eliminate the customary forms of power - which were judged to be reactionary, if not feudal. It is true thil t this new peilS<l.nt power, formally d emocmtic (the leilders were elec ted ), was o nly as democratic as the state and the party. However, it did exercise modern responsibilities, seeing thai access to land was carried o ut without discrimination. It managed the credits, Ihe distribution of the inputs (which were partially supplied by st[lte tmding) and the m<lfketing of produce (also partially deli vered for s tate commerce). Nepotism and extortio n were certai nly 110t eliminated in these procedures, but the only response to these abuses w as the gr[ldual d emocm tis[l tion o f the s tOlte, not its withdr[lwaJ, which W[lS lOIter imposed by liberOlIism (through an extremely violent military dicta torship), for the benefit of the traders (the diol/llls).

O ther ex periences, like those in Ihe liberated [lfeas of CuineaBissau (insp ired by the theo ries adv[l nced by AmilcM C[lbral) and in Bu rkina Faso during the Sankara era, have also o penly confronted these challenges and sometimes produced unquestionabl e ad vances. There Me now efforts to ob literale them from peop le' s minds. In Senegal, the establishment of elected rural authorit ies constitutes a response that I unhesitating ly defend in p rinci ple. Democracy is a practice whose apprenticeship never end s, no less in Europe than in Africa.

What the dominant d isco urse at the moment means by reform o f the land tenure system is the ex act opposite of what is required for the building of an au then tic alternative based on a prosperous peasant economy. W hat tlus discourse, conveyed by the propilgand[l instruments of collective imperiali sm - the World B[lnk, many development institutions, but also a number of NCOs that

12 1


are ri chly endowed - means by land reform is Ihe acceleration of the priva tisa tio ll of land, and nothing more. The a im is d ear: to create the co nditions that would enable some modern islands o f ag ribus iness (foreign and local) to take over the land they require to ex pand. Bu t the suppl ementary produce Ih<1t these island s cou ld supply (for expor t or for local effective demand ) could never meet the needs for bu ilding a prosperous society fo r all, which wou ld involve the developmen t o f the peas<1nl family economy as a who le .

Defining the role of the state in land reform

I do nol ex clude comp lex and mixed formulas for managing the <1ccess to use o f land, w hich can be s pecific for e<1ch cou ntry. Private ownership of land can be accepted - at least w here il is es tablished and considered legitim ate. Land dis tribution can - or mus t - be rev iewed where this is necess<1ry, by ag rari an refo rms (for sub-Saharan Africa, South A frica, Zi mb<1b we and Keny a). I do no t even necessa rily ex clude the openi.ng up of op po rtwutiesund er conlrol- for selling up <lgribusi.ness. Bullhe essenli<ll questio n lies elsewhere: how to mode rnise peasant family production and to de mocratise its integr<1 tion into the national econo my and g lobalisa tion.

I have no ready-made solutio ns to propose in these fields. I shall just menti on some of the great problems tha t this reform ra ises.

The guestion o f democracy is indispu tably the issue that needs to be tackled in responding to th is ch<1llenge. Lt is <1 com pl ex <1nd difficult issue th<1t C,innot be reduced to the insipid discourse o f good governance and electoralmultiparty ism. It has, of coursc, a genuine cultural aspect: d emocracy wants to abol ish the custo ms that are hos til e to it (prejudices <1bo ut sociaJ hierarchies and, above all, the treatment o f women). Democracy in cludes juridic<11 and institutional aspects: the construction of systems of administrative, commercial and personal rig hts that Me consistent wi th the <1inTS of social construction <1nd the se lling up of <1deguate ins titutions (elec ted , for the most part). But <1bove all, the progress ion of de mocracy will d epend o n the social po wer of its defenders . The orga nis <1tion of pe<1s<1nt movements is, in this sense, <1bso lute ly irreplace<1b le. It is o nly to the ex tent thallhe peasa ntry

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can exp ress itself that the advances towards what is call ed ' participatory democracy' (in contras t to reducing it 10 Ihe problem o f ' representati ve democracy') can have a clear path.

The relationship be tween men and women is no less important in the challenge of democracy. Those who speak of family cultivatio n (peasa nt) evidently refer to Ihe famil y, whic h up until now and almost everyw here has struciures tha t impose the submission o f women and the over-exp loi ta tion of their labour. The democratic transformation will not take place if the re are no organised movements of the women concerned.

Attent ion should be given to the ques tion of migrations . C usto mary rig hts generally ex clude fore igners (that is, all those who d o not be long to the clans, lineages and famili es of which the original village co mmunity is constituted ) from a rig ht to the land, or there are conditions a ttached to their access. The migrations caused by colonial and pos t-colon ial development have sometimes taken on dimensions that upset the ethni c ' homogeneity' of Ihe regions concerned . The emig rants who come from outside the country (like the Burkinabe in Cote d'lvoire), or w ho a lthough forma lly cit izens o f the same country are o f an 'e thnic' origin that is foreign to the regions where they settle (like the HilU Si'! in the Plateilu s late of N igeriil), have had Iheir rights to the land they have cult ivated questi oned by narrow-minded and chauvin istic political movements, w ho also benefi t from fore ig n support. O ne of the most unilvoidab le condi tions for real d emocratic advance is to d ismiss ideo logical and po liti cal communitilrianisms and firml y denoun ce the para-cultural discourse that underlies them.

A ll these analyses and pro pos."ds, w hich come from past d evelopmen ts, only concern the statu s of ow nership and the rules o f ilccess 10 lilnd. These questions indeed relille to il miljor issue in the debates about the future of agricu ltu ral and food production o f peasant societies and of the ind ividuals who cons titute them, but they do not cover illl dimensions o f the challenge. Access to land cannot be a potential transformer of the society if the peasants who benefit aTe unable to get access to the indispensab le means of productio n on fa vourable te rms (cred it, seed s, inputs, access to the marke ts) . National poli cies, Like the inte rniltionalnegotiiltions that aim to define the framework in which the p rices and in comes Me determined, MC anothcr dimensio n of thc pcas..,nt qucstion,

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I refer the reilder to the wr iti ngs of Jilcques Berthelot on these questions. He is the best ilnd most crit ical analys t of the projects to integrate agricultura1 and food pro ductio n into world markets.

I shilll just mention two of the conclusions and most important proposills thilt we hil ve reached.

First: it is no t possible to accept that agricu ltural and food production, as well as land, should be treated as ordinary 'goods' and thus allow them to be integ rated into the project of g lobalised liberalisiltion promoted by the do minant powers and trilnsnationillised capitill.

The Wor ld Trade Organisatio n agenda must just be rejected, pure and simple . O pinion in Asia and Africa must be convinced of this, and pilTticulariy of the need for food sovereignty, beginning with the peilsant organisations but ill so al l the other social and polit ical forces that defend the interests o f the popular classes and of the nation. All those who have not reno unced a project for deve lop ment that is worthy o f the name mu st reil lise that the negotiiltions underwilY in the framework of the WTO ilgenda w ill only be cat astro phi c for the peoples of Asia and Africa. Capitalism has reilched the stage where the pursuit o f profit requires 'enclosure' policies ilt the world level, like the enclosures th "t took p]"ce in Engl<md in the fir st s tage of its (modern) d evelopment. Now, howevCT, the destruction of the peas., nt reserves o f cheap labour at the world level wi ll result in no th ing less than the genoc ide o f half o f hum"nity.

Second : it is impossibl e to ilccept the behilviour of the milin imperiali st powers (the United States and Europe) thai arc associated with the assa ults agains t the peoples of the So uth within the WTO. These powers, which try to unilaterally impose liberal isation proposals on the cou ntries of the South, have freed themse lves from the same restri ctions by ways that can only be described as systematic trickery.

The Farm Bill of the United Stales and the ilgricllltural po licies of the European Union violilte the very principles thilt the WTO in tends to im pose o n o ther s tales. The ' partnership' projects proposed l>y the EU, follow ing the Cotono u Conven tion o f 2008, are nothing less than criminal to use the strong, but appropriate, expression of Jacques Berthelot.

These imperialist po wers can and must be accused in the very

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cou rts of the WTO set up for this purpose. A g roup of coun tries from the Sou th can do this - and they must.

The alternati ve consis ts of national policies to construct ! recons truct nationil l funds fo r the stabilisation and suppo rt for production, completed by the estilblishmen t of common interna tional funds for basic products, en<lb ling <In effective <llternative reorganisat ion o f the internatio nal markets of agricultural products. Jean-Pierre Boris (2005) hils elilborated such proposills in detil il.

The peasants of Asia an d Afr ica o rganised themselves d uring the stage prior to the liberation struggles of theiT peop les. They fo und their place in the strong histo rical blocs that made it possible to win victory over the imperialism of the time. These blocs were sometimes revolu tio nMY (China iln d Vietnam ) and then had their main rural bases in the majori ty classes of middle peasan ts and poor, landless peasants. Elsewhere, they were led by the national bo urgeoisie or secto rs amo ng the rich and middle peasan ts w ho aspired to become pMt of it, th us isolating the large landowners in some places and the custo mary chiefs who were in the pay of the colo nisers.

That page of his tory having been tu rned , the chil ilenge o f the new col lective imper ialism of the Triad will only be removed if hi storical blocs <Ire constit uted in Asia and A fr ica. Bu t these canno t be remakes of the preceding blocs. The challenge faced by the so-called alternati ve wo rld move men t and its const itut ive componen ts of soc ial forum s is to id en tify, in the new conditi ons, the nature of these blocs, the ir s trategies and immediate and long-term object ives. This is a far more serio us challenge than is realised by many o f the movements committed to the s trugg les.

A complex and multidimensional challenge

Is the capitalist modernisatio n pa th as effect ive as the conventional economists claim?

Le t us imagine tha t, Ihrough capi tali st modernisation, we can double production (from an index of 100 to o ne o f 200), but Iha l this is obtained by the expulsion o f 80 per cenl of the surplus rural popula tio n (the index of the number of ilctive cultivators faHing from 100 to 20). The apparen t gain, measured by the growth of

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p roduction per il cti ve prod ucer is considerilbl e: it is multipl ied by ten. But, if it is seen in terms o f the ru ra l po pulation as a who le, it is o nly multiplied by two. The refore it is necessilry to distribute freely a ll this growth in product io n in order simply to keep alive the peasilnts who have been eliminated and CilJU10t find alternati ve work in the towns. It WilS in these terms that Marx wrote ilbo ut UlC pauperis'll ion associated wilh the accumulation o f ca pitill.

The challenge, w hich is to base development on renewing peasant societi es, has many dimensio ns. I will just call attention here to the pre-conditions for constru ct ing the necessary and possible pol iti cal alliances that will enable prog ress to be made towards so lutions (i n the interests of the worker peasants, of co urse) to all the p robl ems th at are posed. The pre-cond itions would include access to the land and to the mean s to develop it properly, reaso nable wages (o r peasant work, imp rovement of wages parallel to the p rodu ctivi ty of this work, and app ropriate regulatio n o f the markets at the national, regional and world levels.

New peasant o rganisations ex is t in Asia and Afri ca and are visibly in itiating and active in the s trugg les underway. Often, when po litical sys tems make it impossible fo r peasants to constitute formal orga nis.l tions, the social struggles in the rural wo rld take the form of movements with no apparent di rection. These actions and prog rammes, w here they ex ist, should be analysed mo re carefull y. What peasant social forces do they represent and w hose interests are they defending? The ma jo rity mass of the peas.l nts? Or the minorities w ho aspire 10 par ticipate in the ex pansion of do minant g lobalised capitalism ? We sho uld mistrust q uick answers to these questions, w hi ch are co mplex and difficult. We shou ld be careful not to condemn a number of organisations and movements o n the pretex t Ihat they arc not mobilising the peas.l nl majorities on radica l programmes. This wo uld be to ig nore the need to formulil te broad alliances and s trategies by stages. But we should also be carefu l not to support the di scourse of the ' naive al ternati ve world people', who o ften scllhe lone in the forums and fuel the illusion that the wo rld is o n the rig ht path only because o f the ex istence o f the social movements . This is a d isco urse that belongs more to the many NGOs - with good intentio ns perhaps -than to the peasant and worker organisations.

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I myse lf am not so naive as to think thilt all the interes ts that these alliances represent can natura lly con verge. In all peilsan t societies there are the rich and the poor (who arc o ften landless) . The cond itions of access to land result from different histori ca l experiences which, in so me cases, ha ve rooted aspirations to ownership in peoples' mjnd s, whi le in others they ha ve ins tilled the desire to protect th e access to land of the greatest number. T he relationships of the peasantries to state power are a lso the result o f different political paths, parti cula rly ilS concerns the natio nal liberation move ments of Asia ilnd Africil: po puli sms, peasant democracies, s tate anti-peasant autocrac ies show the dive rs ity of pL>oples' heritages. The ways in w hi ch in ternatio nal marke ts are run favour so me ilnd penalise others . These dive rgences of interes t are so metimes echoed in Illany of the peils ilnt movements and often in the divergences of the pol it ical strateg ies adopted .

Bib liography

The anillyse8 ilnd proposills pul fom'ilrd in lliis study do not only concern Asiil ilnd Afr im. The ilgrarian questions in Latin America and the Caribbean have Uleir o\\'n particularities and specifics . Thus, in Ule Soutilern Cone of the continent (southern Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile), modernised lutifimdismo, w hich is mechanist":! a.nd benefits from cheap labour, is a form of exploi ta tion well adapted to the K'<juiremenls of the libera.l globalised capitalist system. It is more competitive even than the agriculture of the Uni ted States and Europe.

Al/mJllti!'t:s Sud (2008) 'Etnt d es r&>istancL'S dans Ie Sud, facc ilia crise nlimentaire', \ '01. 15, no . 4

Amin, Samir (00) (2005) Lf's IrrUI'S I'aysmmes d om.jim'sju,'t' IIIrx .lJfts du Xxe sii>dl', Pnris, Les Indes Savantcs. Includes references to peasant struggles in China, India, PhilippinL'S, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Ethiopia, West Africa, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Amin, Samir (2006) Beyond US Hegemony, London, Zed Books Amin, Sami r (2()()';) 'India, a great power?', in Be.Vmrd US Hesem ony, London,

Zed Books Ber thelot, Jacques (2006) 'L'agriculture, talon d' Achille de l'O:-'1C', ht tp://

\\' \\'1 v.solidarite.nssoJ r Bertildot, Jacques (2006) 'Quels avenirs pour les societ('S paysannes de

I ' Afrique de ['Ouest? ', hllp:/Iwww.solid arile.nsso.fr Boris, Jean-Pierre (2<Xl5) Commerrr' ;,rh,llilublr: k romun noi, de mutiffes

I'fflrrrhl's, Paris, Pluriel

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Chap UlO\', Alexander (1924 [1 966]) On tlu: TheOl-y of Non -Capita/ist E~on"mi~ Systrm$ (English ed ition)

Kautsky, Karl (1 899 [1987]) On the Agrarian Qlj e~ti"n, London, Zwan Pu blica tions

/I [akie, Archie (2003) The Agm, ian Qursti()l1, Acre"" to umd anll Pea",,,,t Responses in Sub-Sa/lUm" Aftic", Gen eva, UNR[SD

/l lamdani, /l ialunood (1 996) Citi::en /lnd Sljbjed: Cont~mr01ary Aftica and the Lesucy of Late Colonialism, Princeton, NJ, Princeton Un iversity Press

1l'1azoyer, I\ larcel and Roudard, Lauren ce ( 19cn) His!oi l"l' des agdcultljl"es du mom/e, Paris, Seuil

/1 10)'0, Sam (in preparation) Llmd ill Ihe P,,/iliOi/ EmnolUlj "f AftiC/ln Devdopmenl

Panncntier, Bruno (2007) NOUlTil" 1'/lUmanit,;, Paris, La Decouvcct, Shi\ii, Iss., (2008) interview by Marc \ Vuyts in Del1dOl'l1wnl and C/lIl11gf,

Ins titute for Sociitl Stud ies, \'01. 39, no. 3


Humanitarianism or the internationalism of the peoples?

The revolu tionary sociali st tradition ha s always proclaimed it se lf to be internationalist, at least in its intentions, its visions o f humanity and its SOCiillis t futu re.

Tllis tradi tion \\filS started by Ihe French Revol ution w ltich in its rad ical mo ments abolished s lavery, something that the 50-

called A merican Revolution never even thoug ht of doing. The s la ves (of Santo Do mingo) foug ht to win their frL-"Cdom (it was not g iven to the m): they lVeTe citi zens.

The new tradition cou ld declare itself for the Enlig htenment and fo r humanism, even if the COJ1Ccpt of the lalter was stiU in fael limited to the cosmopo litanism of the enlig htened classes.

T he socialist movement, utop jan and Marx ist, drew an imaginary picture of fu ture wor ld sociali sm and thus identified the need s of the struggle to give it greater cons istency. W hen the International Wor kers Associatio n was founded Marx made fun of the proposal by certain peop le w ho ad voca ted the form ula ' all the world are brothers' (Marx sajd he was not the 'brother ' of all men!). He accepted instead the watchword ' workers of the world unite!' and he went so far as to say ' the prole t.niat has no cou ntry', a phrase tha t has s ince been wro ng ly interpreted by many peop le.

In practice, t he worker and socialist movement of the capitalist / im per i<l li st centres has no l aJways been cons is tent o n this issue . It drift ed (see Trans lator's note) towards social imperialism which h<ld <l linear and d ete rminis t read ing of history: fir st capitalism (in whi ch Ihe peri phe ri es, believed to be ' backward' on the road Ihal mu sllead Ihem to ii, must 'calch up') and then on 10 socialism. This drift was largely a result of whal I have

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analysed as 'imperiali st rent '. O n the contrary, considering the contrast between the centres and the peripheries, there should have been a call to ret urn the nat ions of the dominated peripheries to their place in the fig ht against ca pitalism, wh ich is inseparable from imperialism. Moreover, this drift to social imperialism accompanied rallying to the (imperiali st) country, to the point o f accepting the chauvinisti c calls for an inter-imperialist war. Is this no longer the case for Europe? (It is not for the United States and Japan. ) Has it been superseded by the new cosmopol itanism of the European Union? It is by no m ea ns evident.

The historical Marxism of the Third International - Marx ismLeninism - wanted to break with this trend and it formu lated a famous distinction - also badly understood - between 'bourgeois cosmopolitanism' and ' proletarian internationalism'. This distinction is, however, based on an extremely important objective reality: the gradual formation of the plutocratic oligarchy of collective imperialism. Thus tltis fonnulation was in so me ways before its time: cosmopolitmtis m, und erstood as the solidarity of national fragments of the g lobaliscd oligarchy, conscious of the need for their collective management of the world system, is now more visible than it could have been before (or even after) the Second World War.

The abandonment of Marxism (of historical Marxism and, before it, of Marx himsclf), after the waning of the firs t wave o f s truggles fo r the emancipation of workers and of peoples in the 20th century, end ed not in an increased consc iousness of the need of the do minated and exp loited for internatio nalism, but a retrea t to positions of charity and humanitariani sm. The central plank o f this change was humani ta rianism and d evelo pment assistance, which helped to efface the real chall enge: how to di sengage from cap italism and, for the peripheri es, how to start this off, by ge lting rid of dependence, aid, humanitarian charity, by d elinking from the im perialist world system.

The first essential question: what kind of development?

It is no! difficult to ag ree that a discussion on aid makes no sense without the co untry benefiting: from the aid having: a clear vision and development strategy.

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6 HUMANITARIANISM OR TH E INTE RNATIONALI SM OF TH E PEOPLES)

Fro m the 1981 meeting of the G7 at Canclln, the western powers proclai med through the voice of Ronald Reagan, supported by his European colleagues, thai the powers of the G7 countries knew betler than the co untries of the So uth themselves what was best for the South to d o. The Washington consensus and the policies o f stru ctural adjus tment pu t this positio n (return to colonialism) into pract ice thro ug h po licies that have, effectively, been implemented ever since. ln spite o f the current deep cris is w hi ch should certairlly challenge the global vision of libe ral globalisation, this challenge is not in fact happening.

'Development' cannot be reduced to its apparently majo r econo rnic dimension - the growth of GNP and the ex pansion of markets (both exports and internal markets) - even when it takes into consider,ltion its 'social' dimensions (degrees o f inequality in the d istribu tion of income, access to pub li c services like education and health). ' Development' is an overall process that in vo lves the definition of political obtecli ves and how they are articu lated: democratisation of society and emancipatio n of ind ividuals, affirmation o f tile power and auto nomy of the nation in the world system.

This observation is all the more important because there is general agreement on the fai lu re of d evelopment, as a lso on the failure of aid, because the cou ntries co ncerned see thai their dependency only in creases rather than diminishing as time goes by.

The d ebate on aid is confined in a s traitjacket, whose design was defined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effecliveness (2005), d raw n up by the DECD to be endo rsed by (OT, rather, imposed o n) the reci pient countries. Rig ht fro m the start, the procedure was illeg itimate. If, as is claimed, there are two part ners in aid w hic h are in prin ciple equa1 - th e do nor coun try and Ihe recipien t cou ntry - the design o f the system sho uld have been negotiated by both part ies. This was absolutely not the case. The init iat ive was unilateral: it was the DECD alone that was respo nsible fo r the drawing up o f the PMis DeciMation. Ju st like the United Nat ions Millennium Declaration, whi ch was drafted by the US State Department, to be read oul by the Secretary-General of the Uni ted Nations at the General Assembly, the Paris Dec larat ion did nol conunit the inlern<ltional community. Also, the non-western cou ntries that are not on the lis t of potential recipients of aid, particu larly those w hich arc themselves dono rs, refused, very

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legi timiltely, to associa te them selves wi th the' donor club' proposed by the deciMation. If the international co mmunity WilS to commit itse lf seriously, a commission that had this responsibility should have been constituted in the United Na tions, ilssociating illl the 'pMtners' from the shut o n the basis of true equality. The p rocedure adopted WilS part of tJle political strategy of the cou ntries of the Triad (United States, Europe, Japan) to do wngrade the Uni ted Nations and substitute il by the G7 and its instruments, claiming to be the international community, which is of course iln imposture.

The field of responsibilities o f the rich countries is defined according to the omnipresent principl es o f liberal g loba lis.ltion. So metimes trus is ex plicitly stated: promoting liberalis.ltion, the opening of nlMkets, becoming attractive to fo reign private inves tment . Sometimes it is indirect : respecting the regulations o f the WTO. From this viewpoint, the Paris DeciMation is a step back compMed w ith the pmcti ces of the firs t d evelopment decade (1 960-1970) when the principl e of the countries of the Soulh being free to choose their econo mic and social poli cies was more recognised.

The unequal power relationship between dono rs and recipient s was further reinforced by insistence on the harmonisation of donor poli cies, which reduced the margins of manoeu vre that the countries of the Sou th bene fi ted from during the d evelopment decades. lnsteild of ' partnership', th is re lationship sho uld be described as 'reinforcement of control over the assisted cou ntries by the co llectivity of the Tri ad states' . ' PMtnership' is not progress but rilther a regression compared w ith what used to happen during the Bilndung e ra (1 955- 1980). U the word ' partnership' was put fonvilTd, it W<lS precisely beciluse that was no t what WilS wanted. As George Orwell said, diplo macy prefers to talk about peace while it prepares for war. ft is more effective.

Furthermo re, the Paris Declaratio n hilS reinforced the meiU1S of political control by the Triad by add ing to the genera l economic conditionalities (subject to the req uirement s o f liberal g lobaLisation - now in such dis.Hray!) a number of po liti cal cond itionalities: respect for human rig hts, electoral iUld multiparty democfilcy, good governan ce. The fact tlMt the democrati sat io n of societies is il long, diffi cult process, resulting from social struggles and policies,

132 mea IT na


is ignored . It absolu te ly cannot be replaced by the sermons o f the heralds o f good ca uses - na tional , le t a lone fore ign - and sti ll less by diplomatic pressures . Bes ides, in this field, rea lity - that is, the application of doub le standards - really hits o ne in the face.

The d eclaratio n tries to atten uate the gravity of the consequences o f the strategies it promotes (structural adjustment, g lobalised liberalisa lion) by a new discourse, that of poverty and p lans to redu ce it, to which a id must g ive priority.

The feeble rhetoric of the new humanitarian discourse

The do minant discourse no w aims at redu cing: poverty (e liminating it for those w ho think radically ), w ith the su ppo rt of civi l socie ty and replacing by good governance what was considered to be bad governance.

The very term 'poverty' s te ms fro m a language w hich is as old as the hills, that of charity (of re li gious o r so me other o rig in). This language belongs to the pas t, not to the present - still less to the future . It predates the language developed by modern social thoug: ht, which tries to be scientific by discovering the mechanisms thai generate a phenomeno n that is observable an d observed .

Nor is ' social justice' a scien lifi c concept. It is vag ue, imprecise by nature, and the means fo r achieving it go no further than listing measures thai are not inleg rated (and are in capable o f being integrated) into a coherent strategy. The contrast w ith the language of revo lutionary France and o f Marx, w ho ca lled for equality and e mphas ised its co ntradictory complementarity wilh libe rty (itself associated with property) shows how o ur thinking has reg ressed with thi s d iscourse on socia l justice. The nonsense of the North American juri st Jolm Rawls, the sermons of A m<lTtya Sen (a No bel prizewinner ) and the ' practical' pro posals of Joseph Stig litz (the rebel o f the World Bank) cannot save this miserable l1 on-tninking.

The expression ' civil society', so frequently u sed these days, comes 10 us fro m Ihe U nited States. This concept is linked 10 a s trategy constru cted o n the basis of ' communities', pri vate ente rp rises that are believed to be closer to the pub lic (consumers rather than citi zens) tl nd therefo re more effective. It defines the

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common goods (edu cation, health) but wha t it does in fact is to open up spaces for the expansion of c,'pi tal. II contrasts w ith the European conception of public So.:! rvices and a civil society that is und ers tood as all the po pular orgallis.1.tions (see Translator 's note) defending ri ghts.

Civil society, in prac tice, rarely includes organisations that are rooted in the tradit ion of popular struggle (such as trade unions, peasant organisations, and worker and sometimes peas.1.nt political parties). The fashionable discourse prefers the non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This option is part and pMcel o f another aspect of the dominant ideology that Sl-'CS in the state the natural ad versary of freedom. In the conditions o f the real world thi s ideology is used to legitimise the ' jungle of business', as is illu strated by the o ngo ing financial crisis. Ll the real conditi ons of the Third World, the pet NGOs arc o ft en called - ironically and rig htly - GONGs (governme ntal NGOs), o r MONGs (NGOs operating like the Mafia) or TONGs (NCOs transmitting donor policies), etc.

Civil society is therefore the collection of neighbourhood assemblies, of communities (the concep t cannot be separated from the co mmunitarian ideo logy), of local interests (school, hospital, green spaces) w hich are themselves inseparable from id eologies that are split up, separated from one another (gender understood in its narrow sense, respect fo r nature, which is also made into an o bject that is sep<1fable from the o thers) . Even if the defence of the demands of these assemblies that constitute the so-called civil society is often legitimate, the absence - whet her deliberate or not - of any integratio n into a vis ion of the whole society implies suppor t for the dogma of consensus. In other word s, to the ex tent that these demand s succeed, it will be seen that ' the more it changes, the more it is the same thing'!

It is true that in these NGOs sectors of soc iety ex press thei r defence of interests or of parti cular causes that are frequ ently legi timate (democracy and hUlnan r ights, the rights of women, respect fo r the en vironment, etc), but so metimes they arc ambiguous. Often they aim to make up for the shortcomings of the s tale (in education and heal th, for example). They are i.nterclass organisations by nature, able to mobilise the middle classes, bulthey are much less successful with the popular classes. In these conditions,

134 oc ngntea IT nal


th is civil society does not offer an adequate framework for overall alternati ve projec ts, by definition consistent and polit ica l, to tak e form. Ci vil society is thus im prisoned into an an Ii-political, anlis ta te s ituation, sometimes a way of legitimis ing no n-act ion; the discourse o n the multitud e (in the sense used in Negri and Hardt (2000» serves this funct ion . It is also the objec t of manipulati ons and has served , among ot her things, as a battering ram against socia list or nati onal populist regimes. The deficiencies of these regi mes are thus denounced not by the left but by the rig ht, wi th the intention 'Illite simp ly of supporting the return to cap italism . The underlying ideology, which is that o f Americrul liberalism, is an invitation to abandon the positive inheritance of left-wing po liti cal culture (the Enlig htenmen t, emancipation and eC]uality, alternative socialism) to the domination of capi tal over labo ur.

T he term 'governance' was in ven ted as a subs ti tut e fo r ' power ' . T he o pposing character istics o f the two - good versus bad governance - hark back to Man..ichaeism and moral ism, in place of an analysis, as scien tif ic ilS possible, of reality. Once again, thi s mode co mes to us fro m the ot her side o f the Atlant ic, where rel igio us sermo ns have o ften dominated po litical disco urses.

T he noti on of good governance assumes that the deciders are fair, objective, impartia l and, obVio usly, honest. For orienta l readers, the list of adjectives produced by the abundant literature o f the American propaganda services is an immediate reminder o f the grievances o f ancien t times, presented by the loyal su bjects to the despot, who was asked to be fair (no t even enlig htened! ). The proposals fo r es tablishing good governance institutions are no better: an interminable list of cr iter ia, products of a bureaucratic imagin<1tion sufferin g from verbal d iarrhoea.

The visible underlying ideology is just concerned with erasing the real C]ucstion: what social interests docs the ex isting power, whatever it is, represent <1nd defend? How can this power be transformed so tl1<1 t it g r<1dually becomes the instrumen t of the m<1prities, particu larly the victi ms of tIle system such as it is? The recipe o f decto ral multiparty ism has show n it s limits in this respect.

All together, civil society, good governance, soc ia l jus tice and the war o n poverty constitute a perfectly fun ctional ideology; w hat is essential - the real power of the ca pitalist oligarchy - is eliminated from debate.

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Humanitarian interventions, development aid, geo-economy, geopolitics and geostrategy

The choice of recipients and forms of interventio n as we ll as of the aid' s immediate, apparent objectives cannot be sepM"ted from the re,,1 geo politi cal objec ti ves underlying them.

Sub-Sah"ran A frica is very we ll integrated into the g lo bal syste m and is iJ1 no way ' marg inalised ' as, unfo rtu n"tely, peop le often say without th inking: fo rei g n tr"de o ut o f the reg ion represents 45 per cent of its GNp, as against 30 per cent for Asia and Lat in A meri ca, and 15 per cent for each of the three regions that constitute the Tr iad . Africa is therefore qU iUltitati vely 'more' and not ' less' 'integrated, bu t it is so i.n a d iffe rent way.

The geo-t.>conomy of tile region is bilSt.>d on two kinds o f production which determine its struclures and the definitio n of its place in the g lobal system: tropical ag ricultural products fo r export such as coffee, cocoa, collon, g round nuts, fruit , palm oil; and hydrocarbons and mined materials, such as copper, go ld, rare metals, diamonds.

The former category represents the means of survival - apart fro m peasants' subsistence crops - whi ch finan ce the grafting o f the state o nto the local economy and, throug h publi c expenditure, the reproduction o f the middle classes. The term ' banana repub li c' correspond s, apart from its negative impli cations, to the place that the do minant powers g ive to the goo-econo my of the region. These agricu ltural products are o f interes t more to the local governi ng cl asses than they arc to the do minant econo mics.

O n the other hand, what interests the latter above all are the natural reso urces of the co ntinen t. Today these are the hydrocarbons and the rare m.inerals. Tomorrow, Ihey w ill be the reserves for deve lop ing agrofuels, the sun (when the transport of electricity from solar energy becomes possible, w hich wi ll be w ithin decades), wa ter (w hen its ex port, d irec! o r i ndi recl, is feasible).

N iger is a tex tbook example of a ll this . Tlus co unl ry receives ,1 id that covers 50 per cent o f its budget. This aid is ' indispensab le' fo r its survival altho ugh it is pe rfectly ineHective: the cou ntry remains close to the bottom of the lis t of the poorest countries in the world. Bu t N iger is the third lrugest ex porter of uranium in the world . Situ ated between Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, it could be tem pted, th rough nationalism, to recover control over this wea lth. Areva,

136 ngntea IT na

6 HUMANITARIANISM OR THE INTER NATIONALISM OF THE PEOPLES)

the French firm thi'lt exp loits the uranium mine, knows thi s very well. It is no t difficult to believe thi'lt aid to Niger has no other objec ti ve than to mainti'lin the cou ntry i'lS i'I client state.

The race for rural terri tory to be converted to the ex pansion of i'lgrofllels is we ll under wi'ly in Latin Ameri ci'l. Africi'l, too, offers enormous possibilities in this fi eld . Madagascar led the way and has already concL>ded large areas in the western part o f the country. The im plementa tion of the Co ngolese Rural Code (2008), inspired by Belgian ilid ilnd the Food and Agricu lture O rganisiltion, w il l no doubt enab le agribu siness to take over agricu ltural land on a huge scale in order to ' valorise' it, just as the Mining Code formerly facilitated the pi ll age of the mineral reso urces of this former Belgian colony. The peilsiUlts, who have been rend ered useless, are the victims: their in creasing destitution wi ll perhaps attract humanitarian aid in the future, as well as aid programmes ' to reduce poverty' ! I o nce learnt that an o ld co lonial dream for the Sahel in th e 1970s WilS to expe l illl the popu liltions (t he ' useless' Sahelians) in order to ins tall extensive Texa n-type ranches of livestock for expo rt.

We are now in a new phase of his tory in w hi ch co nflicts abou t i'lccess to the ni'l tuml resources of the planet are beco ming more acute. The Triad means to reserve exclusive access to this ' useful' Africa (that of the reserves o f natural resources) for itse lf and to prohibit access to the emerging cou ntries whose needs in this fi eld are gre'l t and will no doubt increase. The gllMan tee of exclusive access is obtained through political control and redU Cing African countries to client s tates.

Foreign aid thus perfo rms impo rtant functions in maintaining coun lries i'lS clien t s lates.

In a certain way, therefore, it cou ld be said that the objective of aid is to corrupt the governing classes. Apart from the financial mis'lpp ropr iations (which are well known but the impression is g iven tllilt the donors are in no W'ly responsible), tllis political funct ion is served by aid which, as it is now the major source for financing budgets, has become indi spensab le. It is therefore imporl'lnt that this aid is not reserved exclusively for the classes in power in the government: it must also go to the oppositi ons that may succeed them. This is where the role of the so-called civil society and certain NGOs comes in .

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A id , if it is to be really po liti cally effecti ve, must il lso con tribute to main taining the integratio n of the peasants in the g loba l sys tem, which feeds the o ther source of in come for the state. A id, therefore, also has to promote the moder niSiltion of cro ps for ex port.

In add it ion, it mu st facilitate access to common services (ed ucat ion, health, housing ) by the middle classcs and by some of the popular clilSseS (mainly in the urbiln ilfeas). The pol itic.l l funct ioning of the client state depends on this to a considerable ex tent.

In the Bandung er.l and du ring the development decades Asia and Afri ca, on the who le, init iated countergeopo lit ical policies, d rawn up by the cou ntries o f the South, whi ch ilimed at counteracti.ng the geopol iti cal policies of the Triild. The conditions of the period - military bipol arity, glo bal overal l growt h and increasing demand faci litating the expo rts of the South - favoured this cou nteroffensive, forcing the Triad to make co ncessions, minor or major, accordi ng to the circumstan ces. 1.n particular, rni litmy bipolarity prevented the Uni ted States and its associa tes in the Triad from reinforcing the power of their geopo litics by a goostra tegy bilsed o n the threilt of permilnent military interventi on.

These days, the geopolitics of the Triild, at the service of its goo-economy, are reinforced by its geostrategic arm. It is now understandable why the United Nations has to be marginalised and substituted, cynically. by the militilry ilrm of the Triad 's geopo liti cs, NATO. It is also understandable w hy the discourse about the ex ternal security of the co untries of the Triad has become so insis tent. All this rhetoric about the war on terrorism and the rogue states, which is intended to legi timise the strategy of the Triad. thu s takes on dimensions that have become all too familiar.

The shape of an alternative international solidarity

A sudden rup ture in ongo i.ng aid - bad as aid is - is not desirnb le. In fnel, it would be a declarat ion o f war ,limed nt destabili sing the ex is ting power o rde r and perhnps even at destroy i.ng the s til te. T his is the strntegy that sanctio ns have implemented, nnd con tinue to imp lement, the econo mi c blockades of Cu ba and Zimbabwe being good examples.

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The choice is not between aid , such as it is, o r no aid. The battle must be to trans form radically the concep t of the funct ions o f aid, for whi ch the So uth Centre has developed the arguments (Tando n, 2008). Solidari ty, and not humanitarianism, is a major intellectua l battle w hich sho uld not recognise any red line that ca nno t be crossed.

T lus is one of the battles to be had among those that propose the construction o f another, better, world, 'lIlo ther g lobali5<ltion, an authenti caUy polycen tric world system that respects the free and d ifferent - cho ice of states, nations and peoples of the pl anet. Let us leave to the World Bank and the arrogant technocrats of the North the mo nopo ly of producing valid recipes to be imposed on everyone.

The mo ral arg ument that the North owes a debt to the Sout h, legitimising the principle o f aid - as long as it becomes solidarity - is no t w ithout value. But more con vincing - because they ca n mobil ise po Htical mea.ns 10 support them - are the arg uments about the orga ni5<l tion of solida ri ty between peoples confronted by the challenges o f the future, in particular the co nsequences o f climate change . The UN Framework Con ventio n on Climate Change (UN FCCC) constitutes <111 acceptab le point o f d eparture for conceiving of finance from. the rich cou ntries (w hi ch are p rimarily respo nsible for the deteriora tion o f the wo rld environment) for prog rammes benefiting the peoples o f the planet, espec ially Ihe most vulnerabl e. Bu t, precisely because th is initiative sta rted off wit hin the United Na tions, the western d iplomats have been busy - it is the least tha t can be said - in hindering its develo pment (o ne mig ht call it s<1 botage).

The d raw ing up of a g lob'll view of a.id cannot be delegated to the DECO, the Worl d Bank or the European Unio n. This is the responsibility of the Uluted N at ions and of that body alone. It is true th'lt th is institution is, by definition, limited by the mo nopoly o f states, assu med to be representi ng their peop le . (But the same is true for the organi5<l tions of the Triad .) It is good that a proposal has been made for a stro nger, mo re direct presence of the peop le, alongside thei r states, and it is wo rth d iscussing how this co uld be o rga.rused . But their presence must aim at rein forc ing the Uni ted Nat ions. This cannot be done by substit uting NCO participation (which wo uld be carefully sclected ) in the conferences conceived

139


and adrninis tered by the No rth (and inevitably manipulated by the dip lomats of the North).

I would also give importance to the initiative taken by the UN Economic a nd Soc ia l Council in 2005 to create a Development Cooperation Forum (DC Fl. This would lead to the creation o f authentic partnerships based on the conception of a polycentri c world. As can be imagined, the in itiat ive was not well received by the diplomats o f the Triad.

But it is necessary togo further and dare to cross the red line. It is not a questi on of refo rming the Wor ld Bank, the WTO, the IMF. It is not enough to limit o neself to denouncing the dramat ic consequences of their poli cies, those o f yes terday and those of today. What needs to be done is to propose alternati ve institutions, to define their tasks in a positi ve way and to shape the institutional arrangement s.

The debate on alternative aid based on solidarity sho uld immed iately get rid of certain chapters in the OECD Developmen t Assistan ce Committee' s officia l development assistan ce compilations which in reality arc not abo ut aid from the North to the South, but rather the reverse . Heading this lis t are the concession'll loans, given at rates that me claimed to be inferior to those of the market. These Me the means by w hich aggressive commercial policies imp lemented by the states of the Triad help the main beneficiaries, whi ch are in fact the exporters of the North (rather like the practice of dumping). Debt reduction, presented almost as a charitable act (as is clear from the diplomatic jargon in w hich the decis ion was couched ) certainly docs not merit being included as aid.

The legitimate response to this ques tion, and not only fro m the moral viewpoint, sho uld lead to an audi t of all the debts in question - private and public, on the s ide of the lender and on that o f the borrower. The debts recognised as immoral (among o thers, because of their associatio n with cor rupt operations on one side or the other), illegitimate (poorly disguised political support, as for the Sou th A fri can apartheid regime), usuri ous (ra tes fi xed unilaterally by the so-called markets, by the integral reimbursement of their capital - and well beyond it): all these debts must be il1mulled and the victims, the debtor countries, recompensed for ha ving overpaid . A commi ssion of the United N"tions shouJd be created to dmw up an intern"tional law wort hy of the name

140 ngntea IT na


w hic h, in thi s field, has hardly been started. N'lturally, the diplomacies of the Td<ld do not wanl to hear o f <lny such proposals.

The option for <In alternative aid is insep<lmble from the formuI<lt ioll of all alternative development. I cannot go into this in 'lily detail here. Howeve r, it is perhaps useful to recall so me impo rtant p rincip les <lbout develop ment in order to g ive gre<l ler meaning 10 proposals about alternati ve aid.

These important principles sho uld include at least the following:

1. The problems of the ruml world <lnd o f <lgricu lture must be placed at the centre of a stra tegy for anot her kind of d evelopment, based o n keeping large numbers of the rural popu lation in place (even if there will inevit'lbl y be a dec line in the num bers, the process shou ld not be accelerated ).

As eq ual access as possible to land and the means for d eveloping it properly must be the orientatioll of this conception of peasant 'lgri cuhure. Its major fea tures sho uld include priority for food sovereignty; industri <llisation, witho ut which the <lChievement of these objectives is impossible; and a radical questioning of Ihe g loba lised liberalisati on of production and Lntern'ltional Irade in agricultural <l nd food prod ucts (see also Chapter 5) .

The o ption <ldvoC<lted by the domin<lnl system, which W<lS nol questioned by Ihe Paris Declaration, is in complete oppositi on to the princi ples pu t fo rward here. Tllis declaf'ltion is based 0 11 financial profit<lbi lity, short-term produclivism (rapidly increasing production atlhe price of accelerating the ex pu lsion of surplus peas.1.nls), all of which corresponds very well to the interests of the ag ribusiness transl1ationals and those of <I new class of peas 'lnls included as assoc iates, but it is not ill the intercsts of the popu l<IT classes and the nation.

2. De velopment requires the bu ilding of divers ified producti ve sys tems, s tarting with those alrea dy on the w ay to i ndus tria lis<ltion.

The vital industrial perspective does not definitively rule o ut calling on international capital. Complex and d iverse fo rms of partnership, state / loca l private (w he re it exists )/ foreign cap it<ll, <lTe completely accept<lb le - indeed, 110 doubt inevitable. But this development must have a perspective

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that rejects LibeTil lism, which is in essence abo ut creating atlractive co ndilio ns for the transnationals as advocated by the WTO and the so-called aid agencies. Real partners hip in strategic decis ion-making and control over the re-exported profits must accompany indus trial.isation strategies.

3. Di versifi ca tion (in cl uding of industrialisation), whi ch is fundamental , certainly requires building infras tructures where they do not exis t in countries receiving aid that has beco me indispensable fo r thei.r survival .

This includes social infrastru cture: there is no development without good educatio n, from boltom to top, and witho ut a pop ulatio n in good health. Such objectives for aid (finan ci al and tec hni cal ) could und eniably be positive and become solid aril)'. The erad ication of endemic diseases such as Aids is an obvious example.

4. In turn, di vers ificatio n and industrial isation require building up form s of adequate regio nal cooperation. Countries that are continen ts may well do without them. But those wHh an aveTilge population (around 50 million) can only start the process, knowing that they w ill soon reach thresholds that they cannot cross excep t th rou gh regio nal cooperation.

It will be necessary to reinvent these forms of regional coo peration so that they arc consistent with the development objectives outlined here. The reg ional common markets, wluch domina te the instituti ons in place (where they ex ist and function) are not consistent with such objectives as they havc been conceived as building blocks for liberal globalisatio n (see Amin and Tchuigoua 2(05).

5. T he alte rnative developmen t sketched here requires control over foreign econo mic rela tio nships, including abandoning the free trade sys tem, which is claimed to be regulated by the markets, and instead, rep lacing it with national and regional syste ms of con trolled trade. Beyond th e impossible reform of the lnternational Monetary Fund, solutions to the challenge should en visage the setling up of regional monetary funds, linked to a new system of wo rld mo netary regulation, which the present cr isis makes more than ever necessary. The reform (or mini-reform) o f the IMF does not meet these need s.

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6 HUMANITARIANISM OR THE INTERNATIONALISM OF TH E PEOPLES)

More generaiJy, control o ver fo reign relations, w hi ch d oes not mean autarchy, shouJd d efine the outline of what I have described as 'delinking', essential if a negotiated g lobalisat ion is to emerge.

Such develop ment also requires, obvio usly, nationa..l control over natural reso urces.

This alternative develop ment is based on the principle of g iving priority to internal markets (natio nal and regional) and, in tlus framework, to the markets that meet the ex pansio n of the de m,md from the popu lar classes and not from the world markel. lt is w hat I call ' autocentric development'.

6. The principle of the internationa l solidarity of pL>oples, w hich I d efend , legitimises support for stru ggles for the democ ratisation o f society, associ ated w ith social progress and efforts to undertake reflec tion that is rad ical and criti cal.

With this in mind, publi c aid, which is certai nly desirab le in itself, must support the reconstruction of the state and its capacity to ful fi.1 its functi ons (pub lic services in the fi elds of education, health, water and electricity supply, publi c transport, soc ia l housing and social security), challenges whi ch can be met neither by the privilte sector, w hi ch reserves for itself o nly the p rofit able pa rts of these activities, nor by associations, even the well-intentioned .

7. There will always remain a case for interventio n in the name of wuvers.,] hunliln solidarity, w hich is perfectly legitilll<lte.

Help for the victims of na turaJ ca..l ilmities and fo r the refugees that unfortu nately w ars produce in large quantities, cannot W<li t. It would be cr iminal to refuse he lp o n the pretext th <l t nothing had been done to prevent the deterioration of situations that were at the origin of these catastrophes (part icularly warfare). Help first, then afterwards we' ll see. Nevertheless the d<l nger ex ists of an U1l<1cceptable politi c<l l ex ploitation o f ' humanitariatusm'. There is no l<lck o f exa mpl es, one of the most recent and most terrible being Haiti, w here the aid provided in response to the January 2010 earthquake has g iven th e US army an o pportunity to reoccupy the country. On the o ther hand, necessary immed ia te help d oes not exclude opening up an investigation into the causes of the catastro phe. An independent critical

14 3


reftec tion on these problems is necessary and there sho uld be a co mmitment to the social strugg le necessary to rectify d eteri orating situations that goes beyond the immediate humanitarian interventio n.

8. North- South coopera tion is no t exclusive. There was SouthSouth coo peration during the Bandung era and it was effective in the cond itions of that time. Support for the liberation movements in the Portug uese colo nies, Zimbabwe and South A fr ica, which was g iven by the Non-Alig ned Movement (the OA U of tha t period), China, the Soviet Union and Cuba, was important and somet imes d ecisive. Then, apart from Swed en and some o ther Scandinavian countries, there was no development cooperation from the cou ntries of the Triad, which were subord inated to the d iplomatic priorities of NATO (including Portugal) and support fo r apartheid.

Today Ihere are ample opportunities for renewing this South-South coopera tion. The So uth now has <lccess to means that enable it to break the mo nopolies upon wltich the supremacy o f the Triad was based. Certilin co untries of the South are now capable not only of assimilating the technologies that the Nort h wants to protect for its own use (precisely beca use it has now become vulnerabl e), but also o f developing: them s till further o n thei r own. If they wish to put them il t the service of il different development mod el, more app ropri <lte for Ihe needs of the countries of the South, this could open an import<lnt new field for South- South cooper<ltion. The countries o f the South could also give priority ilCcess 10 the natural resources thai they can con trol to reinforce thei r own industri alis.ation and that of their p<lftners in So uth-South cooperat ion.

Certain cou ntries of the South have access to financial surplu ses which, lns teil d of being placed in the financial <lnd monetary markets controlled by the Tri<ld, now f<l cing collapse, could break the monopoly of the North in tltis field and the blackmail o f aid that goes with it.

The South can do without the No rth but the reverse is not true. But to <lchieve thi s, it is necessary that the peop les and the lead ers of the South f I"L'C themselves fro m their way

144 " co

6 HUMANITARIANISM OR THE INTERNATIONALISM OF TH E PEOPLES)

o f thinking tha t in teriori ses de pendency and that they cease to believe that aid constitutes the conditi on fo r the development o f their societies.

Bibliography In the order in which lhe), appear: Amin, Samir ( I <J73) .r\r~o-Colonii!lism in West Aftiw, London, Penguin Books

(includes referenccs to Niger) Tandon, Yash (2008) Ending Aid Depo·",l~ n<'f, Oxford and Geneva, Pambazuka

Press and South Centre Amin, Samir (2()();) 'The Idillel1l1ium IA:vclopmenl Goals', MontMy R~'t'i<:t",

I'o\. 57, no. 10 O rwell , George (1949 12008]) [I.'inc/een Eighty FOlll", London, Penguin Books Amin, Samir (2003) 'Africa in Ule world ', ill Lauer, I-Iden (ed.) History rmd

PhiiO${)I'/ry ~fS("i~ n cr, Ibadall, Hope Publica tions B,xl.nik, Al1l1i1 Oul)' 2(08) 'Niger's mine war', Le Mondr Diplomufit,u~, (English

edition) Am in, Samir and Tch uigoua, Bernard Founou (2005) ' Les rCgionalis.-.tions,

quelles regionalisations?' http://www.forumtiersmonde.net. Partially reproduced in Amin S. et aI., Afriqu,·, fxdusim' prQsrw",,,,;,· 0" Rena;SSlmCl'?, Maisonnellve el Larose, p. 129 onwards

Ndiilye, Abdourahmane (2008) 'Avellir des agricultures et des SOCi.1tL'S paysannes en Afrique de l'Ouest, Vne lecture critique des lravau x du Club du Sahel', October, http:// tiny.cc/ kbOlw, ilccCS$(:d 24 June 20 10

Ber thelot, Jacq ues 'o/>.rc ct Sud', http://wlI.w.solidilritc ... sso.fr Ber thelot, Jacq ues 'La question agriook', htlp: llw\\'lI".solid ilri tc.assoJr BerUlelot, J<lcques (2008), 'DemeJer Ie " rai du f<lux dans 1<1 flambce des prL"

agrimles mo ndiaux', 6 October, hllp:llwww.cadlm.org / Demeler-le-vrai du-faux-dans-Ia, accessed 24 June 20 10

Berthelot, Jacq ues 'Cinq OOl1l1es raisons pour ne pas sig ner!' APE-AO' Boris, Jean-Pierre (2005) C olllme'ce iw:qllitaNt": Lc roma" noi, des lIIutieres

"remiines, Paris, Pluriel Am in, Sami r (2009) 'Aid for Ikvdopm.ent?' i." Abbas, Hakim" and

Niyiragira, Yves (cds) Aid to Afri<'(J; Rrd,·,·"",r..,,· Cvlr", i".'r) Oxford , Pambazuka Press

Negri, Antonio and Hard t, />. lichael (2000) Empi re, Harvard , Han'ard Unh'ersity Press

Negri, Antonio and Hard t, />. lichael (2004) ."'lulh tud~': Gupne d dh'lOcrati~' ~

l'uge de l'Em/,ire, Puris, La O("':ouvcr tc

145 ,.,

Being Marxist, being communist, being internationalist

] am" Marx ist.And by that [mean that Marx is my point of d eparture. I am con vinced that the cri ticism thai Marx put on the agend a of thoug ht and action - the critici.sm o f capitalism, the criti cism of its main representation (the politi cal econo my of cap ita l ), the criticism of politics and its discou rses - a ll these constitute a central and essential theme for the struggles to achieve eman ci pation for the workers and for the pL"O ples.

I am no t a neo-Marxi st. To be olle is to confuse Milrx and historical Marxism, whic h is 1101 my case. The neo-Marxists wall t to break with histor ical Marxism and Ihey think by doing so it is Il L><:essary ' to go beyon d Marx' . In fact they are o nly againsllhose I describe as ' paleo-M <lfxists', thai is those w ho un conditionally support historical Marxism, particularly Marxism-Lenini sm, in its various vers ions.

To be Marxis t, as I und erstand it, is to be neither 'Marxian' (those w ho find such and such a theory of Marx to be interesting, isola ted from the work as a w ho le) nor 'Marxo logue'. It necessarily means being a comm unist - becausc Marx does not dissociate theory from praci ice. It is no t possible to follow the traces of Marx wi thout eng aging in the s truggle fo r the e mancipatio n of the workers and o f peoples. To be communist means also being an international ist. Tllis is not only a requi rement of human reasoning. It is impossible to change the world while forgetting about the immense majori ty of peo ples w ho fo rm part of it, those of the perip heries. Now the onus is o n these peoples to t" ke responsibility for their future. It is no t the pco ples of the r ich imperialis t centres w ho alone can change the world (for the betled). They wish to subs titute charity, a id and humanitariani sm for internationalism,

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7 BEING MARXIST, BEI NG CO MMUNIST, BEI NG INTERNATIONALI ST

in the sense o f solid ilIity in s trugg le. This only contributes to the consolid" tion of the world such ilS it is or, worse s till, invo lves constructing aparUwid on a world scale.

In the follo wing tex t I try to fll<1ke more expli cit the conclusions ilt w hi ch I hilve now ilrrived con cerning the crit icism of cilpitalism and thil t o f the strugg les in whi ch its vic tims Me engaged . They a re no t ' definiti ve conclusions' - a term that is a lien to my way of thinking (which he re, I be lieve, joins that o f Marx). A good number of the central theses tha t I present ha ve the ir histo ri es in the development of my work. From one formula tion to the next, I ha ve obviously benefited from new readings - and re-readings - but I have also tried to take into account the evo lut ions o f capitalism and the stru gg les tha t have been tilking place in the mea ntime. To make the tex t easie r I hil ve not made refe rences to the develo pment of the concepts and proposaJs as they evo lved .

Political and social confl icts and their representation

J insist o n revers ing the rela tionship of politi cs and eco no mi cs, by w hich I define capitali sm.

This reversal - econo mi cs becoming dominilnt and substituting for po liti cs - indicates a qualitati ve change in history. The soci<l l system of capi talism is not just a system of classes, like those tha t preced ed it, only based o n a mOTe ad van ced level of development o f prod u cti ve fo rces. The bourgeoisie does 110 t have a conflictu il l re latio nship with the prole tariat like the a ristocracy's rela tionship with the peasants . The relati onship is not only o ne of explo itati on (w hich it is in both cases), it is a qualitati vely new one . 1 a lso s tress the qUillita ti ve transfo rmatio n of the domin ant ideology (l prefer the te rm ' representa tion' - see be low), w hich was met<lp hysicaJ in the tllleit'lls n;gilllt's and econo mis tic in capitalism.

Isabe lle Garo' s convi ncing boo k A1arx, UIll' Critiqlll' !It' la Philosuph;I' co rlfirmed me in my reilding of Marx, but this re"d ing is not domin ant in historical Marxisms.

T he capitalist sta te is not o nly il class stilte, li ke the state o f the Ancien Regime. II is a lso a state tha t is qU illitati vely new. Po litics is not the pu rsuit of the exercise of power for the benefit of the domimmt class, as it used to be. It is qualit a ti vely d iffe rent politics.

147


It is in this sense that my emphasis on the rupture that the invention of mod erni ty represents is justified.

The relationship beflwen the poli tical conflicts (the state) and the class s trugg le (in the sphe re of economic and social management) is pecu li ar to cap italism, different from the way it was before capitalism.

A t the heart of this transform<ttion lies the novelty introduced by modernity: the declaration that human beings, individually and collecti vely, make their own history and want to do so in the way they choose, rather than as used to be do ne by God, an cestors and customs. Th is transformation makes democra cy necessary and possible . In itself th is is a new dimension of social life, which has only dis tant relationships wi th Athenian democmcy o r with all the forms of consultatio n and organised debatcs about the dec isions to be taken in the o ld societies. Neither the L<;lamic simnl, nor the Afri can palavers round a tree, nor the Indian village councils are comparabl e w ith modern democracy which, for the fir st time, authori sed itse lf to invent and not o n.ly to interpret (religio n or cus toms).

Moderni ty and democracy initiate the liberatio n of the ind ividuaJ and beyond, po tentially, of society. But they only initiate it, because they remain fettered by the requirements o f capit alist rep roduction. However, this beg inn ing is not without importance, far from it. Democracy enab les social stru gg les (class struggles) to make themselves felt, to flouri sh and perhaps to make possible a decisive transformation, the concept o f socialism - beyond capitalism - and the freedo m to strugg le with this pe rspective .

At the same time, mod ernity and democracy transform the s tate and pol itics, where the conflicts take place both around powcr and aro und the linking of its exercise to social interests, which are themselves in conflict o n their own grounds. The complexity of po litical stru ggle thus becomes a major reality. It produces a differentiation and a mu ltip li ca tion of representati ons o f reality and issues by the actors, who arc themselves subject to permanent differentiatio n and multiplicatio n of representations.

Marx, as Garo has powerfu lly d emonstrated , was very carefu l about th e co mplex interferences of perceptions, of systems o f

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7 BEING MARXIST. BEING CO MMUNIST. BEI NG INTERNATIONALIST

general or parti cular ideas (id eologies) in a specifi c field of sociill and / or political stru gg le (or both at the same time).

When treat ing this subjec t he used a vocab ulary w hi ch has a broad range o f terms. Garo cites 16 of them: appea rance, representati on, p resen tati on, abstraction, ex pressio n, signification, id eology, fi ctio n, refl ection, analogy, vision, fetishism, illu sion, method, intellectual production, imagination (Garo 2000, p. 268).

Marx, critic of social thought, and the centrality of 'representation'

Marx was not a philoso pher, an economist, a sociolog ist, a historian. He WilS not even a scholar w ho possessed aU these fi elds of knowledge. He was more than that: the critic of philosophy, of polit ical economy, of sociology, of representations o f history. He was the crit ic of social thought tllilt based its fo rmulations o n the different segments of knowledge brought logether from these fields.

A ll th ese specialised field s of knowledge (eco nomics, social history, politi cal hi story) or genera lised fields (phi losophy) share in commo n represcntiltio ns o f real ity o r what they claim it to be. Thus they are intellectual productions.

Philosop hy itself, and all the p hilosophies, are rep resentatio ns. Whether it is Greek philosop hy or that of the Enlig htenment an d of cl assical Europe, or o f modern plliloso phcrs (after Marx ), they are all inte ll ectual productions an d therefore canno t be unders tood outside the social reality (the hi storical economi c and sociill formation, to w hi ch I shaH retu rn later) wit hin w hi ch they were formulated .

II is the same fo r the re ligio ns that have taken the pl ace o f philosophy (and still do). They a re representatio ns tllilt have found their place as representations o f t he universe, of society and of the human bei ng in the social format io ns in which they we re co nstituted. They have even been, I believe, till' major and fundamental representa tio ns th at conform to the need s of the reproduction of social formations that I have descri bed as ' tributary', preced ing cap italis t modernity. But they have also proved their fl ex ibility. that is their capacity to reinte rpret themselves to sur vive the transformiltiOllS of social formations. 1n that respect they share wit h many representations (if no t all of them) the capacity to

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evolve by themselves. These evo lutio ns are ordered both by their own internal logic and by th " t governing the social form"tion as a who le. Thi s coming together is fruitful, or no t, possible or not, ad vantageous "nd positive or negative, d epending on the case (I sh<ll1 return to tllis question l<l ter, which I ha ve described as , u nd er -determi n" Ii on').

The 5.1me applies to philosop hies or systems of tho ug ht in o ther, non-European societies. Confu cianism is a represent<l tion. It hils even been <l powerful and flex ible rep resentatio n - powerful bec" use fl ex ibl e. After its fiTst, origin<l l formul" tio n it was reco nciled wi th Buddhism, under the Tangs, especiaJly, then it was reformul<lted, during the Song and Mi ng d ynasties, before the western intrusion into China's his tory, in <l spirit that was firmly initi"ting modernity, wit h the abolition of the (Buddhist) state religion and the in vention o f the first secular ism.

A t this time, Chinese philosop hy d eve loped befo re the Enligh tenment (w hich, i.n f<l ct, it inspired mu ch mo re than is genemlly believed). Confuci<111ism even fo und a new role in the effort of modern nationalist China to reconcile it with cap italism - unfortunate, in my o pinion - the fa ilu re of which o pened up the W<ly to the penetration of Marxism /M aoism and co rrununism into Chinese thinking and action. Heconcili"tion, with" view to its restoration in our post-Maoist epoch? It is a serious and im por t<lnt questio n. This Co nfuc ianism (or pseudo-Co nfu cianism, wh<l tever it is) is s tiIJ the do rnin<ln t id eology in T<liwan <lnd p<lrtially in Japan (i n a versio n defo rmed by bei ng g mfted o nto Shintoism ) and in Korea.

What I have said here abo ut philoso phy as (general) representation is also valid fo r the segmen ted represen t<ltions, pa rticuJar ly political economy "nd political ideologies (liberalism and o thers).

Ma rx w<l nted no t o nly to criticise representatio ns. He also w<111ted to criti cise fir st, reali ty, then its re presentatio n and finally its practices, stnrting with the choices of action th " t the "ctors of his tory made based on their representations. These three dimensions o f the critique a re inseparable for Marx.

The aim of the criticism of reality is primord ial. By that Marx mea nt th" t " correct represen ta tio n o f re"lity is possible. The discovery - gradual - o f the reality of what societies have really

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been and are, yesterday and today, constitutes Ilis first permanen t concern, 111 o ther word s, Marx thoughtth<1t represent <1 tion cou ld become scientific, th at is, making it possible to discover the actual real ity. He proposed a formulil tio n (his own ' intellectual prod uction'), based on the abst ract co ncept of his tori cal social fo rmation. This formu lation is, in my humbl e opinion, gre<1t ly superio r -whatever its limitations - to all tile other ' theories' of society and history thil t hil ve been proposed up until now.

To ilc hieve it, Marx made two cho ices. O ne was for materialism: lllilt is, the exis tence of il reality o utsid e (and before) its representation, which may be correct (perhaps partially) or no t at all (i llusionary).

The other w as for dialectics: the reality itself is inseparable fro m its movement, ordered by the contrad icti on - A <1nd B in co nfli ct - and it s resolutio n by the invent ion of C, which is neither the triumph of A over B or vice versa, nor a ne w mixture of the two. This materialist dialec tic (a term I prefer to 'di alectic materia lism') qualita ti vely goes beyond forma l logic . I refer here to w hat I have wr itten on the subjec t in From C(lpifalism to Ci1liii:::ll fion (2010).

The result of Marx implementing th is method (th e wor k o f Marx) should be given the serious considera tion it merits. In historica l MMxism it is all too often considered as the final resu lt: there was nothing to be added, no thing to be corrected. I disagree: my point of view is that to be Marxist is to start from Marx, not s top wi th him.

Ma rx was not conte nt jus t with crit icis ing reality <1nd its represcnta tions. He o bserved that human be ings, indi vidually an d col lec ti vely, we re permane ntly e ngaged in acting, tran sforming an d wanting to transform re ality. They did so on the basis and by means of the represen tations th<1t they had of this rea lity. Even the ' conser vatives', who cl ai med not to want change, acted, e ven if only to try to hinde r the change . Marx SilW this as a pe rmanen t task an d chose his cam p, no t on ly, for co mple tely respect<1 bl e moral and human reasons, that of the oppressed and exploi ted (who wo uld dare to say that they do not ex is t!); also he chose the camp of those who aim to change the world by he lping the m to d eliver w hat his movemen t am bitio usly aimed at: the abo lition of o p pression and exp lo ita tion, as we U as o f classes, and the replacement o f cap ita lis m by com m unism, wh ich was

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necessary (in th e sense that the movemen t went in that direction ) and therefore possible.

This choice, whi ch I wholeheartedly agree with, does, however, pose three series of questi ons th at have to be faced.

Firs t: emancipation, envisaged as the co mmunis t future, defines it self as the freedom from alienation, whi ch is at the orig in of the d is tance separating re presentations o f the world from its reality. Fo r my part, J ha ve proposed a classification listing these alienations in distinct, supe rimposed ca tegories and I o pted for a mod est solution: communis m allows a socicly to gcl rid o f the eco nomis t / market alienation, which is itself the condition that enables the reproduction of the capitali st sys tem, but perhaps not also the alienations that I ha ve described as anthropological I refer the reader to these developments Wllich I proposed in Ullt'qlwl D!'vdopm1'lIt (1 976 ).

Second : as capi talism d evelops it produces its 'gravedigger ' (t he proletariat) and the ti me becomes ripe for the possibility of it being overtaken by communism. But is this inescapable? I wo uld be careful in draw ing this conclusion, s ince in fael Marx does not d o so. The collapse, or even seU-destruction, of a society is also considered possible. In order to und erstand and th us define the necessary hypotheses for either the success or the fai lu re o f the transfor matio n on the speelrum of the possible / necessa ry, I suggest the concept of und er-determination. In transiti on periods like ours, there is a host of multip le determinations impacting on the system, pushing it in a direction that can be revolutionary or chaoti c (revolutio n o r decadence, as I have put it).

Third: what should be made of the rep resentation of society that Marx's own co nstruelion has produ ced (an intelleelual production like the others, that he himself critic ised )? Should not Marxism be subjeeled to critical Marx ism ? Marx never avoided this questi on. The re presentatio n that he proposed is not a closed and definitive theory (Marxism) but an ensemble of o pen questions, with no closure being possible. I do not believe that the attempt made by Karl Mannheim (1 952) in Ideology ami Utopia helps us to progress on th is qu est ion because he is making a -remarkable - criticism of hi storical Marxism, not of Marx.

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Marx: critic of capitalist reality and its bourgeois representation

Marx never separated his ti re less reseilfch into the actual reality o f capitalism - bo th its bas is in the ca pitalist economy as well as the way in w hi ch it functioned po litically, in which were entang led class s truggles (in the plural as they were not limited to the central bo urgeois ie / proletariat strugg le) - and poli tical co nflicts . Marx gradually d iscovered this real ity, that of the his torical social forma tio n of capitalism, through d issecting the representations that it gave itself.

I wo uld add that the reaJity that Marx wanted to understand (to make the struggle more effective for the positive overt hrow o f capitalism ) is both the economic la ws that generate its reproduction (I would prefer to say requi rements rather than laws, w hich imp ly a d eterminism that is foreign to Marx's thinking) and the way in which its politica l form is dep loyed . These two faces of reality arc inseparable.

I also share the view point of Garo, who saw no contradiction between the concrete historical analyses of Frenc h politics between 1848 and 1871, and the theses of CaFital, as has been wrongly suggested by Ray mond Aron, w ho is not well equipped to understand the spirit of Ma rx' s research in the way he artificially divides Marx into 'economi st', ' sociologist' and 'poLiti c,,1 ac tor' .

Marx thus produced a critique of political economy, the essential suutille of C«rital, w hich was a critique of the economic d isco urse of cap itali sm. And it is in thi s sense that Ctlpital sho uld ue read, no t as good economi c science, as opposed to bad (or imperfect) economic science o f ot hers (classical o r popular). Rather Capital was the discovery of the ex istence of this rep resental io n used by the uourgeois political economy, in its origins and in its (active) functions in reproduci ng its system.

But it was also a study o f capitalism's limits, its internal contradict io ns Ihal it can not overcome, and of its character that is, final ly, no t scientific uu t ideological. The term ' ideology' should ue u nderstood here in one of the senses that Marx gave it: not sim ply as a system of ideas, a visio n, a 'Welt ansc hauung' (cons truction o f the world), uut in its pejorative sense o f false co nsciousness, illu-

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sion, a ma sking of the alienations that condition the formulations. The to-ing and fro -ing from the co ncrete to the abstract, from

apparent phenomena to the hidden essence, constitute the living body of materialist dialectics in operation . Wo rk, value, goods thus become forms of discovered abstrac tion which makes it possible to define capital as the social relationsh.ip, the surplus labo ur and the exploitation that originate in the mode o f productio n (and not in the circu lation a nd distributio n of income). The shift from the abs tract (the cap itali st mode of production) to the concrete (sociOlI formatio n) thu s integrates the forms produced by the genesis of his torical capital ism (ow nership of land, rent ), those forms produced by the requirem ents o f its polit ical management (the state, political economies, the management of credi t and currency) and those prod uced by the enro lment o f eOlch of these social form ations of historical capitalism into the g lobalised capitalist system (fo reign trade).

The result of th.is effort is remarkable but a lso unequalled. All the bou rgeOiS eco nomi c science subsequ ent to Ma.rx, even the most sophis ticated of modern times, even the most criti cal (like that o f Keynes) make, in my humbl e o pinio n, a poor showing comp<1Ted with the monumental Capital .

ThOlt does not mea n that the result is final - it cannot be. This is not only becausc Marx did not have the lime to complete it, but because the very idea o f its completio n was alien to Marx's mind and method.

Marx was, after ali, somew hat limited by his times. He did not take a miraculous medicine that vacc inated him agains t the errors and especially all the illusions and visions of his times. He d id not claim to be infallible, even iJ his i.nterpretation by hi storical Marxism sometimes im plies it.

I myself ha ve dared to proposc conti nuing this crit ique o f the political econo my by restoring the whole ex tent of the challenge constituted by the world cap ital is t system. Thus I propose ex tending the theory of value at the most abstract level o f its formulation (in the mode of cap italist production, itself an abstractio n) towards formulating the ' law o f g lobalised value' . This has been the cen tral object o f my research for half a century. I now realise, w ith the advantage of h.ind sig hl, thOlI in order to do it I benefi ted from being outs ide the centre (d eveloped capitalism )

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in the peripheries (the very resuJt of g lobilli sed cilpitalis rn ), w ith il viewpoint th il t I thu s hope wa s free from Eu rocentrism. I also could not do it o ther than nowadays, after Marx, in o ur epoch o f the ca pitalism of the oligopolies. And in doing it] benefited from the lead of Lenin in this fi eld.

The co ncl usio n th at Marx Cilllle to, an d to w hi ch I subscribe, is that the bo urgeois politi cal econo my, w hich had become vulgar (see Translato r 's note) by necessity (as it co ntinues to be), is an ideo logy in the strictest sense o f the word : a functional rep resentation, as Ca ro says, that is di rectly of use to 'ownership', by legilimising its claimed necessity. Tllis impli es, rig ht fro m the beginning, that bourgeois politi cal economy analyses only the immediate realiti es throug h w hic h econo mic Life expresses itself. The ca pitalist takes pro fits in p roportion to the ca pital that he put s to work, therefore the capit a l is producti ve. When I recalled, in my book From Carita/ism to Ciuilizatio/l (2010), the pro ductivity of social labo ur, erased by tod ay's left -wing econo mists (even those who claim to be Marxists!), I was just pointing out that the representatio n of the eco nomy that they propose remains a vulgar rep resentatio n.

It is not surpri sing that a - positiv ist - Marxian po liticill economy has replaced Marx's criti <] ue of the po liti cal economy. That this trend has mainly been produced by Ang lo-Ameri can academics, befo re being ado pte d by others, is unders tand able given the attachment to empi ricism thil t characterises thei r cmture. The fa lse <]ues tio n of the transfo rm ati on o f value into price is an example.

The transformation implies a rate o f p rofit ex pressed in the syste m of production prices thil t is different from the rale of p rofit ex pressed in the syste m of va lu es. Marxians see an 'error ' here that abolishes the validity o f the law of valu e. However, according to Marx's thinking, there is no contradictio n and still less an error: the rate of apparent profit (expressed in the p ricing system) must be different from its rea l rate, itself d irect ly associated to the ra te o f surplus value that measures the exploitati on o f work. Science al ways in vo lves going beyond appearances, as Marx said many times. Fo r o ur econo mis ts, w ho are bogged d own in emp iri cism, knowledge is red uced to w hat is immed ia tely apparent. I insist on this po int, Wl1i ch is never unders tood by o ur Marxians who ha ve,

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alas, es tablished a school of tho ug ht on the European continent. I ha ve also proposed reading the Marx o f his toricru Marxism o f

the 20th century (the Marxism of Soviet planning) and the Keynes o f the so cial democracy of the welfare state as two representations (both of them defo rmed ) of reali ty: that of the Soviet society and that of the post-war western societies. And however mu ch Keynes was an authentic genius, his economics remains commonplace. O f course it was of a uanality that was different from that of the liberrus. But rus concep t of a preference for liquidity and the marginal efficiency o f ca pital stems di rectly fro m his read ing of the appearances by which the reproductio n of capital manilests itself.

The sophistication of modern economics, origi nating from North Ameri can universities, d oes not succeed in hiding the bana lity of the met hod that reveals the fundamental em piricism o n which it is uased . It is a method that proposes to co llect together the ' facts' (that is, the blcts as they are presented in the immed iate picture), then search the correla tions among them to es tablish the ' laws' .

The way this vulgar economics functions is, to me, blindingly ouvious to the point of being ilb le to compare this function to the discourses of the sorcerers of ancient times (pure economics or the witchcraft of the co ntemporary world ). Listening to the speeches made at Davos in 2009, with the economists practising all kinds o f contortions as they talked about the cris is being 'unex pected ', ' unexp lained', ' inexp li cable' , I fe lt vindicated in my views.

The rep resentation of the econo mic discourse (from the political economy in the times of Marx to the pure economics of our days) is certainly an active discourse that shapes the reproduction of the system. It is not a useless bi t of decor. Not o nly do business lead ers believe in its scien tific reality, but genera l opinio n believes it just as mu ch. Both expect governments to be i.nspired uy the 'scientific' knowled ge that this representiltion produces for finding the so lution to the proulems - these days, the financial cris is, unemployment and so o n.

Economic po licy thus constitutes the active resuit of tltis representation .1 ilm not silyi ng thilt this economic po licy is necessmily and always ineffecti ve . The knowled ge on which it is based can, to a certain degree, be reliaul e. Proof is given from time to time by the eHecti veness of this or tlli"lt economic policy. But I wo uld

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put a dampe r on Illis reputatio n (or effi cacy. The New Deal, (or exam ple, only attenuated the exte nt of the crisis; it was the Second World War that ended it. It is now known that Hitler 's econo mic policy, whi ch was so praised, was not really effect ive. One could multi p ly the examples. Capitalism remains, in (act, a syste m that is not p roperly controlled by those who are its act ive agents (the businessmen) nor by those who, in po utics, try to impose some o rder on it.

Marx also made a critic]u e of po litics, of th e state and democ racy, o f po litical co nflicts and of class s truggle. His o bjective was not to write an academic manual of po litical science, like the welJknown philosopher Raymond Awn. He developed a method (or the critic]u e of pouti cs w hi ch wa s the same as fo r his critiqu e o f capitalism.

Just as he had chosen Eng land (the beacon country for the development of the capitalist economy in his time) to make a critique of political economy, he selected France fo r hi s critiqu e o f po litics. For it was France that had invented the state and the modern politi cs of capitalism. The Eng lish revolution of 1640, then the far from glorio us revolution of 1688 and the non-revoluti on cal led the America n War of Independ ence, were certai nly ilUlOvatory, but they went only half way. It was tile French Revolution that invented modern po litics and, w ith it, the modern state. It was a great revol ution and a genu ine o ne, because it envisaged the longterm objective needs of its times, as later the Russian and Chinese revolutions WC'Te to do. The drama of the g reat revo lutions ex pl ains also their later retreal.s and the un ti ring pursuit of political confli cts entang led with the class conflicts thai constitute mod ern po liti cs.

The parti cul ar attention that Marx gave to France was thus deliberate. It was on the basis of his reading o f the political co nflict s and social s truggles in France that Marx was able to make his crit ique of the state and of politics and discover (or approach, to be modest, as Marx was) the reali ty o f the s tate and modern po liti cs. The subjects chosen by Marx, the revolution o f 1848, the Eig hlL>enth Brumai re of Lo uis N apoleon (his clmp d'etat of 1851), the Paris Co nunune weTe no t selected by chan ce, as Raymo nd Aron would h,we it. They are no less fundamenta lth<111 Capital in unders tanding both the reality o f the capitalist social formation in

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its integraHty (that is, as an eco no mi c, political, and social entity) and the nature of the rep resentati ons that the actors in his tory made of them.

Marx therefore set to disentang ling the muddle of the d iscourses (representations) of the actors in this historical period and in the class struggles. He forgo t none of these representations a.nd gave them their full force in exp laining the choices of action and the results that were producL>d. He gave their r ightful place to the heirs of Jacobinism and ' the Mou ntain ', to the BlIl/III"isll't', to the heralds o f the business bourgeoisie (G ujzot and others), to the political adventurers (Louis Napo leon Bonaparte), to the spokesmen of the workers who were organising, to the peasa ntry who were apparently silent, and even to insignificant personalities (such as Lamartine). Later, with the creation of the International Working Men's Association, then tile Paris Commune, ' the ascent to attack the sky', he crossed swords w ith the anarcho-commu nist representations of Bakunin, the hesitant ideas of Proudhon, the state theories of Lassale, the narrow-mindedness o f English trade unionism.

The theo ry of the state outl i.ned by Marx and Engels and later by Lenin, and those of d emoc racy and mod ern pol iti cs, are the result of this cri tiq ue. Or, more exact ly, Marx, Engels and Lenin set down the bases of this theory Wll ic h, like that of capit"l, cannot be completed, either theoretically or in practice. For these analyses must "lways be up for question, retho ug ht and reformula ted. And the st"te and poH tics pursue their evolution and change wi th the permanent transformation of the ca pitalist reality.

The contras t between this analysis of the new reality made by Marx and the prodigious analysis made by Machiave ll i o f the ancient poli tical re"lity should imp ress the attenti ve re"der. M"chiavell i speaks abou t the re" lity of "nother lime, another kind o f power.

The critique o f politics and o f the s tate proposed by Marx is both fu nd amental for the whole history of capital ism, including its l"test developmen ts, and lim ited by its pe riod . This cri tique sho uld have been pursued, as Lenin did, but he only started it. This has no t been the case for histori cal Marxism which became bogged down, repeating w l1<lt Marx had said in his time.

I tri ed to continu e this criti que in Tilt' Llbaul Vinls (2004).

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The liberal Virus

W hat I tried to do in my recent wo rk wi th this title (it had an impo rtant subtitle: PI'rmrl/1I' I1t IVaI" alld t}w A ml'l"icalli:;utiOll of tl1I'

1.I,'odd) wa s to update the d ominant di scourse (the representatio n) o f our g lobali sed neoliberaUsm, which is now in open crisis.

The critique of this disco urse is bascd on a representation (mine) of the reality of capitalism today. It continues to be capitalism and therefore the essence o f what Marx said abou t it remains perfectly valid: wo rk and exploit a tion, conunercial alienation and expansion, the fetishism of money, false representations of the (al ienated ) ind ividual and of competitio n, the sta te at the service of capital, the alienated represe nta tio ns o f po liti ca l actors (illus ions of democracy), the entang lement of social strugg les and po liti cal conflict s. [do not hesita te however in ' com pleting' these representa tio ns and their cr itique as Marx pro posed them for his time, stressing what is new in co ntemporary ca pitalism.

TIll' Libnal lIirus therefo re combines two discou rses, two representations: that of the new pure economics (the modern form of vulg ar eco no mics) and that o f the model Ameri can democra cy. These are two discou rses that a.re very usefu l in serving, and giving the .. ppearance of leg itim .. cy to, the domin <1 tion o f the o ligopolies in the centres tJlat have become the collect ive imperialism of the Tr iad (United States, Euro pe, Ja pan) and .. t wor ld level (through the militarisa tion of g lobal isatio n .. nd the ' co mpr<1dorisation' of the go ve rning classes of the peripheries) . These discourses arc less scienti fic than ever, purely ideological, but nevertheless aclive. They a rc the expressio n of the decline o f bourgeoi s thought, the end of the Enl ightenment.

The Libe ral virus expresses itself tluou gh the separil tion o f the management o f the economy alld the po liti cal management o f soc iety; the reduclio n o f economic ratio nali ty to the myth of generalised markets that tend to produce a general equilib rium (even optim .. J because they respond to the p references of individuals); the dissociation of po li tical management, reduced to electoral representati ve and multiparty democracy, fro m qu est io ns of social prog ress; the lirnit .. tion of human rights w hi ch canno t cross the limi ts of the supreme valu e of pr iv<1 te property; the descri ption o f g lobal is.1tion as positi vely g lobal.

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These ideas are developed fur ther in 1'111' Libf'ral Vims . [ shall just emphasise thai libera1 ph ilosophy evades the essence o f historical capita1ism in general, and of the actually existing (sec Translator 's note) capitalism of today, in particular.

Capitalism has become a capitalism of o li gopo lies that dominate the whole productive and financial system. The domin<lnt class at the world level, which corresponds to this concentrat ion o f ca pital (unprecedented compared wi th previous stages of capitalism's history ), is composed of a veritab le plutocracy which, fo r thi s reason, h<ls beco me the enemy of all hummli ty. Oliga rchy is not restricted to Russia, as we arc led to believe. It is no less real in the United States, Europe and Japan.

Tllis system is finallciaJised in the sense thilt the monetary <lnd financial market (itself globaJised ) has beco me the domin<lnt market that, in turn, structures all the other markets that govern labour, access to natural resources and production o utlets.

The liber.11 discourse thu s makes it impossible to unders tand why the p resent cris is began with the collapse of the monetary and financial market, the AchiJles heel of the system. It was perfectly predictable (but not by the conve ntional economists) because it is a systemi c crisis of ageing capitalism which is o bsolete and senile . In addition, this d iscourse eliminates Ihe centre-peri phery co ntradiction, whi ch is inherent in the (imperiali st) polaris ing expansion of g lo balised his torical capitalism. These days this e rasure is particu larly the exp ression of the new monopolies based on the domination of the cen tres (control o f technology, access to natural reso urces, global financia lisation, communica tions and informatio n, weapons of mass dest ruction ), which now substitute for the ancient privil ege of the exclusive industrialisation of the centres.

The centre-periphery conflict is exacerbilled by the new co nditions created by natural reso urces becoming relati vely rare, which gives the conflict over their contro l at world level a decis ive dimension in the geo po litics/ geostrategics of the cen tres.

The libeml virus comes from a political cu ltu re o f consensus, which is based on eliminating the reality o f social classes and nations, proclaiming the individual as the subject o f history.

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In my books Obsoll'sal1 1 Cal'it ll iism (2003) and Sl'l'd fl'S of Cupitalism (1 998), I emphasised the tran sform,l ti ons in the economi c dimensions o f mod ern capitalism. In Till' L,balll Vim :>, I stressed the po litica l dime nsions . But the two critiques cannot be separated . In other words. the capitalism of the oli go po lies. the dee pening g lobalisatio n, fin anci ali sati on. the crisis of th e mode l of econo mi c management (co lla pse of the fina ncial mar kets, the ongoing de pression), th e systemi c cris is (o f energy, o f food / ag ric ulture, climate change. de stru ction of the peasa ntry, the gro wi ng scarci ty of natural reso urces), the decline in the cred ibility o f democracy, the rise in nostalg ic illusions, the illusio ns of th e indi vidu al (the king that he is not), the 'single party o f the oligopol ies' , the co llective imperial ism of th e Triad, the relati ve an d abso lute paupe risatio n at the wo rld lew l, the militari satio n of g lo balisati on, the race to cont rol the natural reso urces o f the planet, apartheid at the world le vel: all these together constitute the po rtrait of reality that th e eco nomist / liberal representatio n leaves out of its co nside rations. Th e other d iscou rses, th e representations that the movemen ts in struggle ha ve o f realit y. arc on the whole frag mented - that is. they gene rally concern o nly o ne of the dimensions o f the to tal re a lity, w hose e lements are spe lt out above .

The Americanisalio n of this renewed functio nal represent ation must be emphasised. The cont ra1jt I wanted to make between the European po liti cal culture(s) and that of the Uni ted States is. i.n my hu mble opinion, essent ial for understand ing the fatal dangers that the Americanis., ti on of Euro pe entails. It doses the door on a g radual transfo rmation along the road to soc ialism and o pens the W <ly to a continu ally g rowing chaos w hi ch co ul d become even worse, leading to the self-des tru ctio n o f civilisatio n.

The debate on democ racy in America is certainly not new. I ha ve take n a position against the reactionary comments of de TocquevilJe and the spi.nelessness of Ray mond Aron, both of them techno logists, fo r w hom the ind ustrial society replaces the capitalist society. I even expressed an op inion which is not th at of Marx, who admired the North American capitalism ' free o f feudal vestiges' . My thesis is that the more capi tal ism is pure, the stronger the correla tio n w ill be between the needs for the reprodu ct ion of the power of capital (today that of the oligopolies) and the expressions

16 1 ,.,


of the poLiti cal representati on fhat suits it. Co nsensus closes the door to a soci alist co nscio usness.

Europe - s tarting with France - thus invented o ne modern political (and state) form, while the United States has quite another.

The g rea t revolutions carried ou t in the name of soci alism, those of Russia and China, included in their programme the in vention of a new state and a new po litics, that of the transitio n to socialism. They were well on the way after their victories but later go t s tu ck. even retreating . The first effo rt to construct a politics for the future has thu s <lborted. The task of achieving it therefore remains ahead of us.

The o ther dimensio n o f the functioning of the state and the po licies of capitali sm is that which J have described as the ' awakelung o f the South' (the title of the book L'[:twiT dll Slid I produced o n the subject in 2(08) . A result o f the victories of national libera tio n in Asia a nd Africa after the Second World War and o f the Bandung era, it broug ht about tIle modernisation of the new s tale (or th e renewal o f the o ld, premodern, pre-colo nial s tate) and a flo uris lung po litical life that had been unkn ow n in those societies, and which was obvio usly assoc iated with the development programmes initia ted 10 leave be lund the lught of domi nation by the o ld, colo nia l and semi-colonial imperia lism. I ha ve tried here, inspired largely by lessons drawn from my readings o f Marx, o f historical Marxis ts and others, to disentangle the new muddle of the social strugg les, the power confli cts and their ideo logical representatio ns.

Wha t is new here about the state, po litics and democracy as regard s the firs l advances of MilTX i.n these fi elds? There are the old and the permanent elements that are particular to ca pitalism, but there arc also new ones.

The state remains a class state: in the final analysis it is al ways the servant of property, of capital. Bourgeo is democracy reinforces thi s chara cter, defined as it is by its representative form whether parliamentary (in the European tradition whi ch is in the process of being eroded) or pres id ential (the clever invent ion o f the Founding Fathers, aware of its power to destroy the potential danger o f democ racy). Uni versal suffrage, w hich ca me late and upon which Marx based some ho pe, did notlhreaten the power o f

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cap ital (as I observed in my 2001 articl e 'Marx et la democratie' ), as it was associated with the emergence of social imperiali sm, to w hich I shall return.

Neither did muliiparty ism, w hich also developed later, largely in response to the formation of workers' parties, serio usly challenge the power of capital. Nor did the recognition of many and expanded rights, even incl uding so me social rights, but all o f them forbidden from crossing the red line of the right to property. These democratic advances were not made from a perspective o f the transition to socialism but, on the co ntrary, reinfo rced bourgeois democracy in what was most essential, its association wi th the power of the bou rgeoisie. Nevertheless they shaped a political life that saw the muJtiplication of conflicts over the exercise of power. These confli cts ha ve always been dispersed and fragmented, producing and mo bilis ing endless disco urses (o f representatio n), wh ich a re themselves fragmented. The entanglement o f these conflicts wi th class s truggles in th is way weakened the revolutionary potenti al of the latler and blocked the way to a socialist transition.

Today, with the s trengthening of the power of the ol igopolies in the economic fie ld, the state is mo re than eve r the s tate of the cap ital o f these oligopolies. One mu st not therefore be surprised at the way it is managing political democracy towards less democracy and more co nsensus, as in the United States.

Nevertheless thi s state of ca pital can also be a social s tate. The social-democrati c historica l co lllpromise o f cap ita l and labour during the post- Second World Wilr period is an excellent examp le. But, as I observed above, this compromise, which was im posed by the defeat o f fascism and the legitimacy gained from thi s by the wo rking-class parties, was possible only thanks to imperialist rent.

There is so mething new in the peripheries of the sys tem because he re the fun ctional s tale for dominan t imperialis t c"pit,,] is the comprador s tate. There is no shortage of models from previo us cpochs: U1C Otto man sultan, the Egyptian khedi ve, thc shah of I r"n, the emperor of China, the lll tiftll1dista states of L" tin Ameri ca. This kind of s tale hils its loc'll soc ial base in the classes that benefi t from imperialist expansion: old feu dalists converted into agrari'ln semi-capitalism and the intermediary bourgeoisie (the compra-

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dores in the strict sense of the term). These models can hard ly accommoda te bourgeois democ racy. New forms o f the comprado r s tate have been in vented in mo re recent times in independent Africa (descri bed as neocolonial) and they too are in capable o f respecting the minimal requireme nts of bourgeois democracy.

For those very reasons, the comprador s tate has never been abl e to acq uire the s tability of the states o f cap ital in the imperialis t centres. It has been completely overturned by revolutions under the bi\.lUler of socialism i\.lld Marxism (thil t became Marx ism-Leni nism) in Russia, China, Vietnam and Cuba. Or it has been seriollsly transformed, in var ious degrees, by nationalist, popular (see Translilto r 's note) blocs fo r nil lionalliberatio n.

In the per iphery the entang lement o f conflicts around power and class strugg les has been no less complex than in the contemporary centres. The subordination o f radical class strugg les to ot her objectives, said o r claimed to be d erived from the needs of developmen t, is al so vis ible. Bu t tlus e ntanglement takes on a different form from th at of the centres. For here, the conflicts to acqui re power - to make it possible to gaiJl access to the ownership of capital - have Imd to be presented in other lVilyS. Pmticular representations llilve given expressio n to these confli cts, g ivi ng credibility and leg itimacy to thei r di scourses. I have tried to d isentang le the threads o f some of these entanglement s for the countries of Asia and Africa during the Bandu ng era in L'£"l!i~ 11 rill Slid.

To sum up, w hat I think is worth remembering fro m these co ntributions, which I believe absolutely to be Marxist and not nooMarx ist, is the emphils is o n the world d imension of ilctuilily ex is ting historical cil pitalism / imperialism. This dimension may even hilve been underestimilted by Marx himself. In any Cilse it was abolished by the historicill Marxism of the Second lnternil tional and the social-i mperialists that built it. It was hal f reinstated by the Tili rd in teTll<1tional, to be sidelined subsequently by the cons trilints o f the need for coex istence ildvocated by the Soviet Union (not by the imperial ist powers). These ideas were taken much furt her by Maoism.

Hi stori cal Marxism (or all these Marxisms, to differen t degrees) alwilys tends to reduce the world system to a juxtaposition o f cap italis t formations (or formatio ns on their way to becoming

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cap italis l), w hether or not they were wleq ually developed and thus eventua Uy overpowered, I have taken a sys tematic opposition to thi s viewpoint and soug hl to unders tand the world system in a different way, as consisting of centres and peripheries that are inseparable from eac h other.

In this perspecti ve, the concep ts o f the globa lised law of va lue and its coro llary, the imper ialis t rent, enrich the d ecisive and determining advances by Marx. They do 110t negate them - o n the contrary.

This is because what MMX ha d derived from hi s constru ction (capitalist reality) is, at the level of the wo rld system, s triking ly confirmed by the facls. The centn.>-periphery polarisation is s imp ly another way of describing il gigan tic pauperi sation, relati ve and absolute, o n an e\'en greater sca le than Marx had enVisaged in his epoch.

The accelerated growth of proletarianisation at o ne end (in the peripheries)' associated wi th its appMent decrease in the centres (I say apparent beca use wha t I c, .. lIthe genera l proletarianisation takes on ot her for ms) also confirms the views of Marx.

Ta king into account the g lobalisation of capital, as must be done, enriches the range of representati ons that guid e the aclio n o f the social forces that are in strugg le. These specific d isco urses are important, and sometimes d ecis ive because the co ntrast between centres and peripheries entails the in volvement of classes and nations (and peoples). In the centres trus entanglement is inseparable from the im periali st rent and its effects on the who le society (and not o nly on the vo lume of capital's profit s). In the periphe ries it g ives the o bjective o f national independence new scope.

To g ive the imperiali st reality of ca pital ism all the importance it should ha ve means introducing geopoliticall geostrateg ic co nflict s into the analysis o f the req uirements of the reprod uction o f econo mic and po liti cal reality and translating them into acti ve representations, as it also requires d ividing capi talis t ex pansion into s ig nifi cant phases.

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The geopolitics of capitalism/imperialism in crisis

The main theme that I have put forward o n this subject is that imperiali sm, whi ch was once referred to in the plural, has now beco me the collect ive imperialism of the Triad . T his qualitati ve transformation co rrespo nd s ex actly to the deg ree of capital co ncentration mentioned earlier.

Ne\'ertheless, its politi cal management remains mostly natio nal (even within the European Union, and all the more so in the Triad countries as a whole), hence there is a possible co ntradicti on between the econo mic managem ent of th e g lobalised , financiaJ jsed system by collec tive impe r:ia lism and its po litical management by the states of the Triad .

Howe ver, I stress that it was possible to reconcile g lobalised economic management and natio nal po Jjtical management d uring the whole period of neohberal ascent (1980-2008). This reconci liation red uced the extent of possible intra-Atlantic conflict s betwL>en Europe and the United States and intra-European conflicts wi thin the European Union. Beyond thi s, it attenuated the North-South conflicts in th at the e merging cou ntries of the So uth aligned themselves with tIle requirements o f globalisat ion and even, by accelerating their g rowth, o btained some short-term profits from it, while other countries of the South were forced to submit passi\'ely to these requi re ments.

Tllis page of his tory has now been turned with the onset o f the g looalisatio n crisis, starting with its financial crisis.

New qu estions thus arise: will the development of the cris is lead to a weakening of At lanticism, to its re \'ision, o r to its breakup? O r, perhaps, to its reinforcem ent? The European Union and, within it, the e uro zo ne: are they des tined to explode? to stagnate? o r to be streng thened? Is the conflict between imperialism and the mai n emergi ng co untries - in pmt icular Chin a, but also Ru ssia, and perhaps others - likely to beco me more acute? O r will everyo ne acco mmodate themselves to viab le compromises in the cris is? Will the o ther countri es of the Third World escape their lethargy, or sink d eeper into it?

The replies to these ques tions, which arc necessarily diverse, will d epend both on ongoing strugg les and those to come: social

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s trugg les (local dominated classes ag ainst d ominating classes) in all the ir political d imensio ns, in lernationaJ conflicl s be tween the leading blocs in command positions o f the states and nations , There are no evident prog noses and d ifferent ones a re possible. This does not exclu de but indeed requ ires the concre te analysis of all these contradictions and the confli cts that they create.

The division of capitalist expansion into significant phases

There <Ire different ways of making thi s division, depend ing on the main criteria that m.'Cd to be stressed.

T he 'econo micis t' tradition is technologist in the sense that it identifies the divisions in terms of the main technological revol utions o f modern history. This has so me validity. But it is necessary to put this approach into perspeclive and above all not to take a tec hnological stan ce: that tec hno logy d ecides every th ing (that it w ill be, at last resort, the motor of hi story) ,lnd tha t t he res t will adju st to it s requirements. Kondratieff cycles can be reconciled to a technological and eco nomicist inte rpretati on (successive phases of expansion and s tagna ti on, inflationary and deflationary phases, e tc). I w ill no t repeat the criticisms 1 have made of such interpret<1tions . The cycles of hegemonies (the United Pro vinces, G reat Bri tain, United Sta tes) arc dear to Wallerstein, to A rrighi and, to some ex tent, to Gunder Frank. I refer here to my criticisms o f thi s su ccession of s tages, which seem to me to be forced.

Gra msci proposed long po litical cycles, defined by the composition of the hegemonic all iances that shaped the economic and social conditions of capitali s t reproduclion. As an example he pu t forward , as far as france was conce rned, the two phases 1789- 1870 then 1870-1930, w hich he saw as successive p hases of the stabili satio n of bourgeo is hegemony, in co nflicl w ith the s tiU strong vestiges of the hegemonies of the Ancien Regime. The fir st phase was a competiti ve capi taJ ism; the second, Ih<1t o f the mo nopo lies (here Gram sci takes up the writings o f Lenin). The hegemonic a ll iances t hat characterise each of these phases a rc specifi c: during the fir st the bourgeo isie made concessions to the fo rces of the A ncien Hegime (the aristocracy, the church) and kept down the peas.:1.lltry w ho came ou t of the revolution, in order to

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iso late the new working class; tn the second, it made hi storical compromises with the waged classes.

I don' t hide my conviction that the method that Gramsci proposes is sounder than the others. in the sense that he stressed the essential forces that shape the transfor mation: the class stru gg le.

I have tried to use thi s method to characterise the specific po lit ical cultures of the main imperialist natio ns, emphasising the or iginal compromise, sometimes a serious one, between the bourgeoisie and the po liti cal forces of the !ll1dl'1ls ligilll l~l' . I have also tried to implement this mel hod in my ana lyses concerning the centre-periphery conflict, characterising the centres by their capacity to implement the capit<l. llIabou r historical compromise in lale mature cap italism (the welfare s tate) and hen ce 'social imperi alism'. And I ha ve shown the incapacity of the bourgeoisie in the peripheries, becau se of their co mpradori sati on, to construe! a stable cilp italism.

As we know, Lenin believed that Ihere had been a rupture (at the end of the 19th century) between rising, competiti ve capitalism and the capitalism / imperi<l.li sm of the monopolies, w hich had entered into the age of its d estructive senil ity, thus pulling the socialist revolution on the agenda. I subsc ribe to Ilus thesis but would put it into perspecti ve.

The division I would make in the modern period of cap italism is bilsed on the idea that the 20th century saw the first great philse(l call it 'wave') of the progress of struggles by the workers and peoples.

The century, in lurn, di vides into successive mo men ts. From 18CXJ to 1914 there was a fi rst belle 6poque (liberal finan

cialised g lobalisation based on the several imperialisms) which led to the inter-imperialist war and the Russian Revo lution. This belle epoq ue was itself the respo nse to the great systemi c crisis which had preceded it, from 1873 to the end o f the century.

To leilve behind this firs t fililure of generalised liberillism, the donunant powers from 1920 se t 10 res toring the belle epoqu e, which led to the greil t crisis ilJ'ld the Second World War. The period is also thilt of the 30 Years War between the Uluted States and Germany fo r succession to the hegemo ny of Great Britilin.

The w ar end ed in victory for democracy over fascism, vic tory of the Red Army, o f the worker pilrties a.nd of the anti -co loniill movements. There were new condit io ns, with the working classes

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7 BEING MARXIST. BEING CO MMUNI ST. BEING INTERNATIONALI ST

and the colonial peop les ha ving gained a respectability that they had never had befo re. This mad e possible, between 1945 and 1980, the establishment of the we lfare state in the countries of the imperialist Triad (socia l imperialism), the second g reat revolution (in China) and the victory of the national liberation stru ggles i.n Africa and Asia (the B,lIldung era).

These post-war models were worn ou t by 1980, after the new systemic crisis whi ch bega n as of 1%8-1971 , and this made it possible to dream o f a return to generalised liberal ism (associated thi s time with the co llective imperialism of the Triad ). So then we entered into a second belle cpoque, introducing a possible and desirab le second wave of s trugg les for the ema ncipatio n o f humanity.

Thus it is that history repeats itself, C]uite obViously to me, and I ha ve analysed it in these terms from the end of the 1980s.

The page is now turned o f this second belle epoq ue (1 980-2008), w hich was based on the collective imperialism of the Triad, the erosio n thell coll apse of the Soviet U nio ll, the passage to postMaoism in Chin a, the co llapse of the national popular models o f Bandung nnd the social-l ibera l d rift (see Translator ' s note) o f social democracy. This does not mean tllat the o ligarc hies are not trying to res tore it.

The liberal ideo logues saw financialised globalisat ion as the ' end of his tory' . Pe rsona lly I tho ught from the beginning that it was unstable and unviab le, as I said earlier. The event surprised the libera ls, but not myself and some others - very few, alas, at that lime.

The deve lopment of struggles fro m 1995 o nwards shows the social and po litical d imension of th is ins tability: the financial collapse o f October 2008 ,md its incapacity to overcome the internal contradi ctions o f its mode of econo mi c management. I shall co me back to the importnnce that shou ld be given to these two modes o f sys tem colla pse, that is, thro ugh internal con trad ictions or through the victo rio us strugg les o f the vic ti ms (see the conclusion to Class alld ,lVatioll 1980) . Fro m 2008 we have been confronted wi th C]uestions about the fu ture that can be resolved only by the develop ment and radicalisil tion o f the current stru gg les.

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The social struggles and political conflicts of today

Today, just as in the past, the strugg les to transform society an d politi cal co nfli ct are most certainly not unconnected. A ll social demands, however modest, become the object of politi cal conflict and none of them can co ntinue indefinit ely without hav ing a social impact.

Nevertheless, it is useful to d istingui sh between these two aspects of real ity, even if they arc two s ides of tile same coin. We cou ld s lart with the di versity of aspirations that motivate mobi lisations an d social struggles and perhaps di vid e these aspirati ons into fi ve grou ps: for political democracy and respect for indi vi dual rig hts and freedom; for soci a l justice; for respect for di verse groups and communities; for be tter ecological management; for obtaining a better positi on in the wo rld syste m.

C learly the protagoni sts of movements tha t stan d for these aspiratio ns arc rarely the same. For example, the concern that o ne' s country should o btain a hig her position in the wor ld hierarchy, d efined in ter ms of wealth, power and autono my of action, is primarily a co ncern of the gove rning classes, of those in power, rat her than of the pcople as a w hole even though it would have their backing . T he aspi rat ion for respect - in the fullest meaning of the word, that is fo r reall y equal treatment - can mobilise women round their posilio n as women, or a cultural, ling uistic o r religious g roup that is d iscri minated against. T hese movements can be trans-class.

O n the other hand, the aspiration fo r more social justi ce, defi ned variously, depend ing on the different movemen ts - fo r greater mater ial well-being, for legislat ion that is more appropriate and effi cacio us, or for a sys tem o f social relations and production that is rad ically differen t - aJl these almost necessarily invol ve the class struggle. It can be the demand of the peasantry or o f one of its sectors for an agrarian reform, a redistribution of property, a legislatio n that f.l.Vo urs, fo r exa mple, tenants o r better prices. It can be fo r muon rights, employ ment legisla tion, o r even the need fo r s tale po liti cs that makes its intervention on behalf o f workers more effective - to the point of nalionali s., tioll, co-management and wo rker management. But it can also be the

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7 BEING MARXIST. BEING CO MMUNIST. BEI NG INTERNATIONALIST

demand s of professional or entrepreneurial groups claiming a reduction in taxes. It can be demands concerning the peop le as a who le, like the movements in lavour o f the right to education, hea lth or lodging and, IIIlItat is IIllltmldis, 10 appropriate enviro nmenial management. The democrati c aspiration can be limited and precise, particu larly when it is inspiring a movement fig hting against a non-democrati c power. But it can also be inclusive and thus seen as the lever that makes it possibl e to bring together all the social demands an d claims.

A chart of the actua l dis tributi on of th ese movements wo uld certainly show how tremendously unequal they are on the ground. Bu t the chari wo uld, as we know, be per petually cha nging because where there is a problem there is almost always a poten tial movement to fin d a solution to it.

One needs to be really naive a nd ex traordinarily o ptimisti c to think that these forces act ing in very different fields could g ive the necessary coherence to a movement Ihat would help societies move towards g rea ter justice and democ racy. Chaos is part o f nature, just as order is. It wo uld req uire the same nai vety to neglect the reactions of the ex isting powers towa rds these movements. The geography o f the d istribution of these powers and the s tmtegies they develo p to meet the chall enges that f,1ce them, at both the local and the international levcis, fo llow d ifferent forms o f logic from those o n which the~ aspi rations are based.

That is to say that Ihere is a possibility of deviations among social movements, of theiT being instrumentalised and manipulated. These arc aJso realities that cou ld lead them into powerlessness, or to subscribe to a perspective o ther than their own.

It wou ld perhap s be usefu l, in the jung le of struggles and conflict s that make those in power o ppose the soci al movements, o r that make the powers op pose eac h other or even make the social movements themselves oppose e ach other, to create an inventory o f the major issues dominaling the contemporary scene.

There is no doubt that priority should be g iven to a careful analysis of the stmtegies of the o li garchy in the co untries o f the Triad, the eco nomi c interests al stake and the gL>opo lit ics and geos trategy of s tates that are systemati cally 011 the defensive. Bu t an inventory shou ld also be mad e of the strategies of the dominated powers in UlC exis ting world system, both in the co untri es o f the

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former sociali st East and those of the Sout h. O ne could then draw u p a chart of the conflicts w here the powers op pose each other. These strategies o f the dominated powers arc used to destroy certain movements or to subordinate them to object ives that are not their own.

One o f the most effective ways of d oing this is to promote, support and encourage mOVemeJl ts ot her than those listed above and to push them into directions that are conven ient for the powers in conflict. Ethnici ty and cornmunitari ani sm on a nati onal or religious bas is, a mong o thers, Me hig hly app ropria te fo r Ihis pu rpose because their demands (sha llow as they arc) take the place o f democratic and social aspirations - to the benefit of local powers and / or dominant powers at the world level. Pretences abou t being ' left wing' are also useful for this purpose.

To work out aU these complex issues it is necessMY to unders ta nd the challenge that con temporary imperialism poses. On that basis, we migh l hope 10 take the debate further as well as to conceplualise the requiremen ts o f an effective and consistent alternati ve.

The language of the discourses

To make a cri tique o f the var ious representations, it is necessary to unders tand the voc abulary, that used by Marx as well as that used by the liberals.

We know the curren t terms used in Ihe tradition of worker and socialist s trugg les, associated wi th diHerent concep ts it is true, but o ft en at least insp ired by the writings o f Marx - on the s tate, po lit ics, classes and class st ruggles, social change, reform and revolutio n, power and id(.>()]ogy.

These terms h<l ve di silppea.red from the lang uage, even that o f many of the mo vements that are in volved in s truggle. Other terms have take n their place: civil society, governance, social parinNs, communi ties, alternation (i.e. a change in government bu t no change in policy), consensus, poverty. These substitutio ns are not innocuous. They entail adhering 10 the fundamental requ irements o f cap italist reproduc tion.

I would therefo re p ropose re-reilding Marx and at the S<1.me time I refer to my cri ticism of those who Wil.nt to replace him.

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Proletariat

With Marx the term ' prolclarian ' has a precise scientific meaning : peop le who ilJe forced to sell the ir labour (the only thing they ow n) to capital. Wo rkers do not use the means of production, w hic h is done by capital, using labour, subordinati ng and exploiting it.

In this se nse the continual expansio n of capital is sy nony mo us wi th tha t of the process of proletariani satio n. The end of the prole tariat, that is, the end o f 1,1bour subordinated to capital, is jus t nonsense,

Never theless, prolela ri ani sation has never bee n unifo rm, al ways multi fo rm at all s tages in th e capi ta list ex pansion. The formal submission of artisans in the first period of capitalism (the pull ing ou l process), Ihal of modern fa rmers, Ihose of peasanlries in the peripheries o f the sys tem, Ihat today o f the free workers (w ho be lieve themselves free) w hose numbers ha ve multiplied because of new forms of capi tali st organisation, t hose o f the inform al wor kers: these show the diversity of forms of the general prolclarianisa tio n. Moreover thLs di vers ity is, at least partiall y, the result of po licies im plemente d by capital ilJ\d the sta. te a.t its se rvice to break the front of labo ur, These policies also al lowed the development of representations s pecific to each of these situations, thus making it more complex to pass from the conscio usness of se lf to the consciou sness for self o f the general prole tariat. The theo ry / pr,lctice of the struggles (always 'spontaneously' sectoral) - and not that of the Ulcory introdu ced fro m outside, or so-called ' creat ive spo ntaneity' - is the cent ra l plank of the class s trugg le and of its indis pensable politi cisatio n, for its ow n success, bo th immediate and more long term.

' Farewell to the proletariat', comes from a simplification by historical Marxism, red ucing thi s cl ass to a fragment. This is the Eurocentric, econo mi cist and worker-idealism (workeri st) viewpoint o f large-scale iJldu slry of the 19th century and then of the Fordis t factory o f the 20th . Thi s was the objective foundation o f the wo rker-o ri ented viewpoint, jts o rganisatio n be ing facili tated by its concentra tion iJl the workpla ce and, o n this basis, of the co nstitution of worke r parties and unions ,

T he politi cal offensive of capi tal, w hic h developed in the seco nd be lle epoq ue and w hich still continues, a ims at fragment ing

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the labo ur fron t into new and supplemen tary fro nts. The con tras t between the conditions of Ihe workers that I h<l ve described as 'st<lbilised' <lnd the conditions of those who <Ire not, which I h<lve highlig hted (and I have tried to measure the extent of ex pansion of this group), is a po Hcy, not the natural and unavoidable consequence o f the objective evolu lioJl of tec hno logies. Thi s poli cy is now associ"ted with the financialisation o f the system. It objective is to create a creditor front, constituted o f pensioners benefiting from privatised pension funds (and thus fee ling solidarity wilh c<lpit<llism) <lnd, behind them, the ' st<lbili sed' workers. This front is to oppose th"t of the ' marg in" lised' (c"suru I"bourers, the unemployed, info rmal workers and so -called free wor kers).

A ll these frag ments of the general proletariat constitute what I have described as the ' sod<l l basis' (as opposed to the ' electoral b"sis' ) of soci" lism. The convergence of their s trugg les involves recognising the d iversity, no t o nl y of their fragmented disco urses but also - to a certain ex tent - thei r immediilte interests. A n examp le of this s ituation is the conflict between the in terests of the urb"n prolelari"t (in their c"p"city as consu mers of food products) and the proletariani.sed peasantry (producers of these products) . In constructing co nvergence th is rea Hty carUlot be transformed without recognising such di versity. As for the frag mentary discourses, they contribute to the vo latility of the electoml bases o f the pilrties and movements that claim to be of the left .

At the g lobal level, as has been said, the proletariaJlisation under way is sy nony mous with p<lUperis.l tioll, <IS Marx unders tood .

Class a nd struggle

The divers ity o f the forms of the gener"l prolelMi"nls"tio n m"ke it necessary to analyse the classes and strategies o f the struggles.

Shou ld one then replace the expression 'expansio n of the gener<1l prolet<ITiat' (which I support) wi th the 'popu l<lr cI<1sses', as dis tinct fTOm the ' midd le classes' ?

Bourgeois soc ial th(.>o ries, whi ch are always confined with in s tri ctly em pirical methods, are in fa vour of this shift. The World B<lnk knows only the immedi<lte form of the reality - the income pyrilffiid . The cI<lssification proposed for the socio-profession<1l

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7 BEING MARXIST. BEING CO MMUNI ST. BEING INTERNATIONA LI ST

categor ies of the French INSEE (National ins titute fo r Statistics and Econo mic Studies) is less rudimentMY. It makes it possible to correlate th e divers ity of representatio ns with that of the electoral o ptions. But it still remains empiri cal in spir it.

It is not evident th at, in the long period of the ex pansion o f historical ca pitalism, the proportion of the middle classes has constantly increased (the fashionable belief) or decreased (as suggested by a definitio n of proletarian is<ltion whi ch is no t that o f MMX). The re are several phases of expansion (after the Second World War) and cont rac tio n (in mo ments of great crises, such as o urs) . But, in all cases, the transformations in the composition o f these middle classes have <l lways been subordinated to the transformations in the position of the various co mponents of that class in the p rodu ction system. To s implify: at one time the small in dependent producers were, i.n reality, only a pparently independent; now the cad res, mostly sala ried, the liberal professions and, here and there, p<1Tti cularl y in the pe ripheries, new small prod ucers, are integrated and subord inated to the process of the reprod uctio n o f capital .

The growth o f the new middle cla&<.;es at the centre o f the syste m is associa ted with imper ialist rent. A ndre Gunder Frank and I enVisaged, from 1974, the possibi lity of a new di visio n o f labo ur between the centres and the peripheries. This wo uld be based on the concent ratio n of productio n at the centre linked to the mono poli es tltroug h w ltich its dominatio n is ex pressed at world level (research and techn ology, armaments, communi catio ns, commanding fi nancial sys tems) and the emig ration to the periphe ries of the co mmon industrial produ ctio n, subord inated and dom inated thro ug h these means. Today this has become reality, co nfirming our early intuitions. im perialis t Tent, ap propriated thro ug h these mono po lies and reinforced by the s iphoning off o f the natural resources of the planet throug h their mo nopoly o f access fo them, th us transfor ms the s tructures o f the classes and the representations associated with them.

The s tru ct ure of the middl e classes of the peripheri es has also undergone permanent change. But here there a re some particul;uities that are due to the evolution o f g lobal ca pitalism.

The integration of th e peasantries o f the peripheral regions into the g lobal system has produced it wide variety of transformation,

17 5


such as the new classes benefiting from imperialis t ex pansion (the Illtifill/dis/ll of Latin America, As:ia and the Arab world, the new ' rich' peasan ts, the o ld cllieftaincies now con verted ) as well as the victims (landless peasants and peasants with minuscu le plots) . New or renewed urbanisatio n has also seen the emergence of new classes: the compradors profiting from the system, the popular classes that are victims o f it, and various middle strata.

Faced by the diversity of situations, amplified by the d isco urses and representations, is it possib le to imag ine the emergence o f a front of the popular classes (whi ch are the general proletariat with it s di verse constituent parts )?

In the centres, o ne might think that imperia list rent, wh ich aligned social democracy with soc ial imperialism almost from the beginning of the setting up of the modern left, wou ld make it impossible for a credible soc ialist perspective to emerge. The shift towards the ideology of Amer ican-sty le consensus reinforces this possible disastrous evolution, which would impose apartheid at the world level. While the danger of this possibility should not be underestimated, there is one reason why it is not inevitable. The o ligarchic centralisation o f capital and its mo de of managi ng the cris is of senile capitali sm is commi tting itself to a general evo lutio n toward s the des truct ion of the who le future of humanity and perhaps life o n the planet. An awareness o f this perspecti ve is growing . Will it enable the co nstitution of an alternative antioligarchy bloc? Would the emergence of such a bloc be facilitated by the degradation of the li\Iing conditions of the popu lar classes and large sections o f the midd le classes that this crisis will almost certainly produce? Here we see the imparlance o f representations. Will these succeed in giv ing cred.ibili ty to fascis t-leanin g responses (' it's the fault of the immigrants', o f ' international terrorism' )? Or will they fail to do so?

In the peripheries, the emergence of alternative national blocs (anti-imperialist), popu lar (anti-fe udal, anti-comprador) and democratic, are coming up against visib le difficulties. The nostalgic drifts- manipulated by imperialism and the local IlL'O-compradors - are far from losing their strength. There, too, battles on ideological fron ts, the dissection of discourse, are most necesg..·uy.

Beyond the analysis of the realities concerning bo th the pop ular and middl e classes, can a concept of 'people' help us to

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develop s trategies for the construction of a soc ialist convergence? I would say that it is important to do politi cs (i ll the good sense

o f the term). The people in ques tion is not defined in advance; this can o nly be done in its relation to both the immediate and more distinct o bjectives of the strategy to fig ht for the opening up o f the socia list path, A n anti-oligarchy peop le in the North ? An an ti-imperialis t peop le in the South? This reali ty has previously ex is ted, in moments o f radicalisa tion of the s truggle for national liberation and socialism. In Vietnam it became the ac tive subject o f hi story. This was ind eed the case o f a peop le who came together, but excl uded the feudal and comp rador classes.

The poli t ica l classes

A concrete analysis of the conditio ns for strugg ling fo r the alternative with a socialist perspective should give special attentio n to the social g ro ups that are particu larly active. These are w hat are (ina pp ropria tely) called the ' political classes'.

Here we get into a jung le o f e ntang lements which can o nly be disentangled one by one. I have tried to do it only for a few cou ntries in the Bandung era.

The temptation has always bee n very great to replace the anaJysis o f representations and the real choices of action by a general discourse on the petty bourgeois ie. It tends to be fo rgotten that this term does not usually constilu te a very defin ite class, defined by objective cri teria of stat us in Ihe production system. The term was introduced by popu lar revolu tionary talk of the 19th century and by Marx to identify more an attitude th an a class. Its U5<lge was always pejorative, if not sarcastic. The ' petty bourgeois' is an individual who is not bourgeois (they do not ha ve access to capital, even at a modest level), but they believe themselves to be so.

The petty bourgeois way o f thinking, wid espread since then, is not reserved to one or several pm ti cu lar middle classes. O ne can see this in the conclu sions to the representations that bombard them. Thus there is frequent ab use in sticking the label o n anyo ne w ho does no t agree (wit h you, or with the party that cla ims to be hardened and revolutionary. These abu ses are w hy this term IS

losing groun d and has become suspect.

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The language of capitali st reproduct ion

The fashion from .1CroSS the A !Ian tic has rep laced these co ncepts shaped by social strugg les, w hich Mar xism tried to systematise, with a new languag:e of civil society, good governance, fig ht against poverty, social justi ce.

I suggested in Cha pter 6 a radica l crit ique of this ' newspeak' w hic h expresses an ideo logy that has a very defini te function that aims at restri cting: thinking to w hat is requ ired by cap italis t reproduction.

Towards a second wave of victorious anti-capitalist struggles?

I shall just reca pitulate the most recent d evelopme nts that I have put forward on these ques tions, e mphasising the most essentia l o f what I feel to be new ones.

The transition from worl d cap italism to world socialism cannot be envisaged other than in the for m of successive waves o f ad va nces (fo llowed by possible retreats, alas!) in the s truggles for hu man emancipation, just as cap it"li sm itself h"s been the prod uct, not of a European miracle sh"ped in " br ief period in the A msterdam / Lo ndo n / Paris triangle, but of a successio n of waves that took place in different geographical reg ions fro m the Ancient World and from China to the Europe of the Italian ci ties, not forgetting the Muslim Orient.

His to ri cal ca pitalism, w hi ch was the product o f the las t European wave, imposed itself, thus destroying the possible shap ing of ot her forms of capitalism based on hi storical cultures other th an that o f Atlantic Europe, in parlicul <1T o n th at o f Confucian China.

Bourgeois thoug ht, w hich is by nature linear and Eurocentri c, d id not have the necessary intellectual lool s to think beyond capitalism. Its only thinkable future for humanity was oriented to the ca tching up of the under-deve lo ped countr ies that were backward. It co ul d not imagine fl future except as an imitation o f the ca pit alist model such as it exis ted in the developed centres. From Rostow to the emerging cou ntries this bourgeois thesis remains unchanged. My critici sm of this thesis was in "dvance of the times, written even before Roslow's book (pub lished in 1960).

17 8


Historical Marxisms which are, in spite of everything, imp regnil ted by the sam e reductionist and linear vision of history, only partially understood the size of the challenge, whatever the nuances ,

[therefore regard the 20t h century as that o f a fi rst wave. Great ild vances ha ve been made in the centres, in the form o f socialdemocm tic management (not to be confused with socia l liberalism), together with a broadening of the d emocratisatio n of society (particula rly the emergence o f women o nto the scene) . Reactiona ry attempts to halt these ad vances (fascisms) were finally put to flig ht. Hevolutions in the nam e of socialism, fir st in the Hu ssian semi-periphery, then in the Chinese periphery (and in some other places) beyond doubt constituh..>ci the most radical adv'lIlces of the centu ry. The global isatio n o f the stru ggle fo r regain ing independence by the peo ples of Asia and A frica fo rced imperialism to ad just to a new multipolar system in the post-war period .

These ad vances veritably transfo rmed the societies of the North and the So uth, of the West and the East at unp recedented ril tes and no tnecessMily for the wo rse, as liberal propagand il has it. But they were shot thro ug h with cont rad ictions and reilched limits that prepared the way fo r later retreats from their firs t victories. I will not return to desc rib ing these ebbs and flows but just outline w hat seems to me to be their main ori gin il nd what the second wave o f strugg les sho uld therefore put at the centre o f their concerns.

First of all is the fascination with the state, not only of Leninism but also of sociil l d emoc racy iUld the nil tional populisms o f Bandung. The practice o f democracy (when it existed) remained limited by the concept o f progress from above, a fatal handicap fo r the sociali satio n of economic management.

Then there is also the und eres timati on - whi ch is the least o ne can say - o f the ex tent of the challenge created by the depth of the centre-periphery split. There are of co urse nuances o n this issue too. From Baku, in 1920, Lenin fo resaw that the revolutionary an ti-cilp italis t movement was Inoving eilstwards. But above all, the decis ive co ntribution o f Mao ism finds its place here. Mao's agenda was to conceive the revo lutio n as natio na l (anti-imperialisl), popular and democ rati c (anti-feudal. anti-co mprador), opening the way to a very long, possible transitio n to socialism.

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So, w hat are the conditions (or tJle e mergence of a second wave, ' the sodalisms o f the 21st century?

At the heart of the challenge lies the question o f d emocracy and o f the reconstructi on o f the world system.

The question of democracy

I start from the crit ique that Marx add ressed to the bou rgeois system as a w hole.

Marx' s instrument for analysi.ng it is hi s theo ry of representatio n. Human beings no t o nJy li ve in a system (a histor ical social form atio n) but also in the way it is rep resen ted (by their ideology ), whic h itself is o rdered by the objecti ve fo rmatio n in w hich they li ve. It was religious (l call it ' metaphysical') in the ancient systems and economic (J call it ' econo mi cist') under ca pitalism. 1 will not repeat all that J ha ve already written about the contrast between the two. ' Representatio n' disting uishes human sociclies fro m animal societies: it governs the actio n strategies of the subjects of his tory, classes and natio ns.

In cnpi til lism, religion, Inw n.nd money cons titute the three faces of the alienated representa tio n of the ca pitalist reality, as Gaw points ou t. As I ha ve written, these three are inseparable: ' mo ney theism' substitutes (or acco mp anies) mo notheism.

But law, too, whi ch becomes the foundation of the new state, perhaps democratic, is itself actively in volved in the economic alienation. It transforms itself, fro m having been at the service of power (in the IllJdt:'lls Ifginlt:'s), to that of p roperty. The democratic conquests have re,lched the limit that they CiUlnot cross without getting o ut of capitalism. The bourgeois democracy is itself an alienated democracy. It forbids the crossing o f the red line of sacrosanct p roperty ownershi p. Law and money are thus inseparable. A nd this association accompanies the separation between the politica l management of socicly by electo ral and multiparty representative democracy (w here it exists) and the management of the econo my which is abandoned to reason, il ttributed to the market. In politics ci tizens are equal before the law. In social reali ty, dominant and dominated, explo iters and exploited, arc no lo nger equal in their capacity to make use of their rig hts. Social progress is ex teriorised, it is not a constitutive part of the founda tion of law and democracy.

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7 BEING MARXIST, BEI NG COMMUNI ST , BEI NG INTERNATIONALI ST

The strugg le for bourgeois de mocracy is perfectly justified in s itualions where it does not exis l. One can understand the legitimacy of its claim to implement fundamental cig hts (of freedom o f opinio n, organisation, s truggle, e tc). Progress in this d emocratic fie ld fa vours the develop ment of struggles and a correct representation of the challenges. But this strugg le in no way reso lves the problem. The real challenge demands the in vention o f a law and a democ racy that associates the freedo m of indi viduals wi th social progress. Tltis cannot be d one w ithout dethronjng money, that is, extrica ting ourselves from capitalism.

Rather than discuss democracy (which always impli es bo urgeois democracy) o ne must disc uss democratisation (co nsidered as an endl ess process), sy nonym of the emancipa tion of individuals and peoples.

The second wave will not constitute progress compared with the first wave, if it d oes no t make real progress in this directio n.

To make progress in democratisation is impossible wi thou t bringing together what I call the ' social base' (soc ial cons titu ency) as opposed to the 'electoral base' (electoral constituency) in s trugg les that are co nvergent in divers ity.

The social base ex ists objectively ilnd brings together the immense m<ljority of people both in the Nort h and in the South because their ad versary is always this same oligarchy that governs co ntemporary capitalism. Yet it is difficult to pass from an ex is tence in itself to an existence for itself, defining the new subjects o f tmnsfor m<ltio n. It in volves the fo n mJ<lt ion, gro ping, slow and diffi cult, of effecti ve strategies. There is no alternat ive foc the s truggles co ndu cted in this spirit wit h this objective.

The electoral b<lse of the ex is ting left gro upings (w here they ex is t) is, by n<lture, vol<lti le bec<luse it fun ctions within the limits o f bourgeois democracy. The Leninis t altercat ion - ' the parliamentarian cretinism' - is as vigorous as ever, confirmed eac h day by electoral di sappointmen ts.

A fir st question: is the prospect of emancipati on as proposed above possible (critical uto pia) o r is it uto pian in the co mmon use of the term - a d ream withou t any real possibili ty o f fulfilment?

[s e mancipation then rea lly possible? The question often posed here is that of overcoming alienations. I mean by alienation the

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behaviour of human beings that ilttributes to fo rces outs ide themselves the obli gation to ac t as tlleY do. The most obvious case is the economis tic alienat ion produced by the domination of capital (beyond the market) which imposes its needs like a force o f nature ou ts ide the society, while the economy in ques tion ollly exists throug h the social relationships that define its framework. My reading of Marx's Capital: C,itilflll' of tIJI' Political Economy is based o n the central position of a lienation.

But what are the o ther forms of alienation? Such as those tllat define religio us beliefs? In genera l, is alienation not a condition that defines a human being? It is clear that if the reply to this question is that alienation is inherent in the human being, then the possibiliti es of freedom through the democratic management of the economy and of power are, by d efinition, limited. But what arc those limits?

I therefore pro pose to disting uish the forms o f alienation that I describe as social and which can therefore be situated in time and space, parti cular to a concrete society at a concrete mo ment o f its history, like the economis1ic ali enation that is peculiar to capitalism, or the religious alieniltions as they are experienced by the soc ieti es concerned, from those that would be anthropo logical (or, in my voca bulary, supra-hi storica l). And on that basis I would be sat isfied with d efining the emancipatio n offered by the co mmunist perspective as liberatio n from the social alienations alone. O ne can then give a more precise defini tion of the instit utional forms o f the management of the economy and of politics that facilitate prog ress in that direction.

The critical uto pia comes w ithin this framework and its limitatio ns. I und ers tand, by cri ti cal utopia, a vi sion o f the future that is, in the end, mu ch more reali sti c than its adversa ries imagine. Even modest ad vance in that directio n wou ld produce a strong mobilisatio n of forces prepared to go s till further. To renounce the cri tical utopia, when all is said and d one, is to accept the barbarous dr ift of capitali sm. I refu se this call for socalled realism, w hich is, in fact , submission to a reality that is itself on ly ephemeral.

Emancipation, a synony m for democratisation wi thou t limits: mu st it therefore e liminate the te rms of al ienation (reli gion, law and democracy, money) as they figure in the ideolog ies of anar-

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dust iln d conununist iltheism? Or work o ut WilyS to control them: r<ldie<l l secul Mism, sociru democracy, the socialis<l ti on of economic management? I would opt for th is second, modest interpret ation for the long term of the communism of the futu re .

The peoples in ques tion, do they wa.nt the de mocr<ltis<lt ion as proposed above? Do they even want the limited d emocracy that is o ffered to them ? This is where the representiltions come in, those prod uced by the system in w llich they live, the limits of actio n that they believe to be possib le. In o ther words, it is <I questi on o f having a ' lucid conscio usness' (or of their illusions to that effect), movi ng from the conscio usness of oneself to the conscio usness fo r oneself of the dominated classes.

Rig ht now, the demand for democracy is not obvious. People Me victims both o f the ideo log ical ruienations specifi c to capitalism and of the immed iate challenges of living (o r even of surviving). They are not necess<uily coLlvi.nced tllilt any thing o lher than a daily adju stment and manoeuvre is possible.

In the centres the damages o f alienation are visible. Do the you ng (and others!) want anything else than more o f the same, to possess w hat they do n' t have iUld w hat o thers do ha ve? The f<lc t th<ltt hey also want less ineq uality, more solid <uity, does not fundament ally change the facts o f this form of depoliticisation .

In the perip heries, li ving - o ften the same thing as surviving - und erstandab ly gives priority 10 eil ting, bu t ru so to having schools for children so th <l t they have a ch<lnce to rise in the system, such as it is . This second form of depoliticisation is no less vis ible than the preceding o ne.

W hilt, therefore, would be an e ffec live way of dealing w ith this cha.llenge?

The theory / pract ice d i<llectic c<ln not be ig no red. Correct theo ry proceeds from an analy sis of the rea li ty; the rightness of the proposa ls that stem fro m it is then tes led by ilction . The theo retic<l l elabor<ltio n is never a spo ntmleolls result o f the move ment, despite what cert<lin peo ple say. It needs ' theoreti cians' (a term th<lt is too academic and therefore pretentious), who are of the ' ilvant-garde' (a te rm thil l irr itil tes because il remi nds people o f the way it W<lS used by those w ho proclaimed the mselves as s uch), and ' clites' (a term that is refu sed beca use it is the one that

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the ideology of the sys tem used to designate those w ho are its servants ). The Hussian word ' inte lligentsia' is no doubt the most approp riate.

Theory and practice are inseparable. There will be no movemen t towards democratic and sodal progress wi thou t fo rmulating a programme that constructs con vergence in diversity. Its definitio n ca nnot be avoid ed. I sum it up in one phrase: 'socia lising economic manage ment'.

In the centres, the o pera tio n c,l nno t be ini tiated wi thout firs t exprop riat ing the o ligarchy. It is not only in Russia that the o liga rchy dom inates the system, as I ha ve s.lid, it do minates jus t as much in the Uni ted States, in Euro pe and in Japan. Nationalisation (perhaps throug h the s tate) constitutes a first, essential measure. It is a long ro ute, built up along the way, that has to be invented.

In the perip heries the national, popu lar and democrat ic prog ramme contai ns its internal con trad ictions. Not only becilu se its sodal base is composed o f social sectors w hose interests do not always con verge. But also and as mu ch because the hi stor ical task here is double and conflictua l. It is necessary to catch up in the sense of deve loping productive forces (and there is il great temptation to t,lke the formulas for doing so from cap italism), as this is necessary to leave poverty behind. And it is also necess., ry to do so mething else, to initiate social relationships based o n so lidarity instead of competition. The J{USS;iln and Chinese revolutions did this very vigorously in their ear ly, victorio us phases but then they g radually regressed and got bogged dow n in just catching up . It is a d ecisive lesson to draw from the fi rs t wave: to avoid getting mired in tlus co ntradiction must be a cen tral aim of the concerns o f the second wave.

It goes witho ut saying that the successive phases o f the long nationa l, popu lar and democ ratic transition are based on co nflictua l comp romises that op pose aspirations to social ism against forces that have a capi talist orienta tion. I refer again here to the experience of Mao ism and the powerful analysis made o f it by Lin Chun. O n the positive s ide there was the invention of the ' mass line' , What even tual ly dest royed it was the lack of insti tutions guara nteeing right s (i nclu di ng of the individual) and justice. We could also refer to the proposals and experiences of wo rker

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7 BEING MARXIST, BEING CO MMUNI ST, BEI NG INTERNATIONALIST

self-management, of participatory democracy and others. They should be read and re-read wi th a critical mind.

Recourse to the instrument of an enlightened despotism is nevertheless sometimes inevitable. Forcing: recalcitrant fathers to send their dau g hters to school : is tllis ,111 antidemocratic procedure or the only way to o pen the path to democratisation?

I analysed, in Chapter 4, some of these advances during our era (i n Afghanistan and so-called communist Yemen).

The new economics cannot be red uced to the socia lisation o f its management. It mu st integrate the society I nature relationship and redefi ne the development of the productive forces, taking into account this relationship. The destructive dimension of ilCCUmul"tion is now very much gren ter than its co nstructive dimension. Pursued in the forms that cap italism g ives it means destroying the ind ividual, nature and whole peop les. Socialism is not 'cnpitali sm wi thou t capitalists' . The 'solar sociali sm' of Altvater is relevant here and is con vinci ng iJ1 my opinion .

The question of globalisation

I shall be brief here because I have written much on the subjec t. I shall just retrace the essential of the co nclusions.

Liberal g lobaJisation wants to build another world whi ch is in the process of emerging, based on an apartheid at the world level, s tiU more barbaric than what we ha ve ex perienced since the en d of the Second World War. The policies being implemen ted by the powers, who are in desperate s traits, in response to the financi"l crisis are exclusively aimed at restori ng the liberal wo rld order. As in 1920, it is an effort to return to the belle epoque. And it is certain that there will be the same threat of new coUapses of the system, still more serious.

This pu rsuit, against all odds, by the oligarchy of the imperialist Triad to con tin ue their do minati on over the world syste m involves the recourse to perma.ne nt, ilrmed violence through the military control of the planet. As long as this project is not comp letely defeated, all ad vances anyw here will be ex tremely vulnerabl e. Constructing convergence in the di versity of struggles must give iI central place in its s trategies to the objective of rou ting: the

185


mili t<1Ti sil tion of the wo rld. I hilve been insis ting on thi s po in t s ince 1990, even before the emergence of the Social Forums.

A Bandung 2, the Bandung of the peop les (but also with the 1H.><:essary and possible perspective of the Ba ndung of the states) would be an excellent Wily of terminil ting bo th the militilry in terventions o f the collec ti ve imperialism of the Triad and the implementation of a resto red liberal globaJ isat ion.

From Marx to historical Marxism

As we know, Marx used to say he was not a Milrxist as soon as he saw the dangers of the his torical Ma.rxis ms of the par ties that claimed his thinking.

It is not the p lace to develop a critique of historical Marxism here, even a rapid one. L should just like to mention the five fi elds o f questions th at, I bel ieve, canno t be avoided w hen one declares o neself Marxist . Not in the sense o f adhering to the his tori cal Marx isms of the past, but in the spirit o f starting fro m Marx.

The question of the articul<llion of inst.1.nces (bilSe and supers tru cture, economics, po litics, ideology and culture), to usc ou r well-known j<1Tgon, has given rise to a d rift to whi ch I feel it is necessary to respond.

Marx seems to me to have established very well tha t the base (the organisation of productio n and work) was always determinant in the las t ins tance . It was SO at the dawn of the development o f the productive forces in the communitarian systems (communal formations governed by the ideology o f family or kinship), relatio nships that managed the b irth o f social classes; it was also the case in the long period of the tributary systems of pre mod ern classes; and, o f co urse, under cap itilJism.

Bu t Marx took the precau tion of art iculating the politi cal and ideological superst ructure o n th.i s base in a way that was specific to capitalism - different from previolls systems. In our jargon (tilat I shilre wi th others), the economic bilse does not beco me dominant, or direct ly dominant, except under capitalism. In the p rev io us systems, it was the pol itical po wer that co nstit uted the directly d ominant au tho rity. 1 ha ve summed up this reversal in this sentence: in capi talism weaJth is the source of power, in

186 ngntea IT na


the previous sys tems it w as the co ntrary. The d ominant po liti cal power needed an ideology that suited its reproduction - the state religion; that o f capital was econo micism - commodity alienation .

But in a ll cases it is neceSSi1ry to ma ke ex plicit how these articulations function. Mar x d id no t propose a generaJ theory (inevitably transhis toric), because his method forbad e him to do so. He therefore co ntented himse lf with analysing concrclely how these arti cu latio ns wo rked in va rious places and times. Whether these analyses were later confirmed o r invalidated does not concern me.

In contrast, histo ri cal Marx ism s proposed tltis general theory, decla ring th at the different ins tances were al ways and necessarily constituted in the same way. T ltis general theory w as taken to an ex treme by Althusser wi th his concept o f 'over-d etermination'.

My criticism o f this shift of his tori cal Marxism towards a kind o f his to rical d eterminism led me to propose ins tead a concept of under-d etermination. I mean that the different instances are o rdered, not exclusively by the re Cl uirements of a global consistency but eCluaJly by internal log ics of their own. The case o f relig io us log ics cou ld, I tho ught, g ive us some striking examp les in this fi eld. Mo re im portant is w hat [ deri ved from my concept o f under-determinati on: that the co nflict of the instances can e nd up in a positi ve revolutionary change, but it can also lead the socicly into an impasse, if not regression. Revo lution and chaos are both different and possible outcomes from these confli cts. Therefore importance must be given, in ana lysing these represent"tions, to these Clu eslions of internal logics specifi c to the different fragme nts o f the social reality.

Over-determin"tio n proved to be an encouragement of a simplifying drift w hich was perhaps dominant in popu larised Marx ism.

Th is consisted o f the false theory of the ideology as a refl ection, that is, it d irec tly ex pressed the requ irements of the rep rod uction o f the economic base. Marx used the term reflectio n here and there but, it seems to me, in order to characterise these ex treme cases when the ideology becomes purely functional. This is what, in my o pinio n, tr<1nsmitted the liberal vi ru s. But it is far fro m being the ru le th"t governs the rel"li onship between the inst"nces.

Perha ps the authorities o f historical Marxism were aware that

187


th is simplification did not always help to prog ress in ilnalysing reality and they reso rted to a rather vague phrase 't he autonomy of the instances' . ls this an escape when confronted by a real difficulty? Whal is the exact meaning and content of this autono my? Is it o nly passing resis tan ce, submitting to the requirements of the base and ending by withering away? This is probably the meaning that it has been g iven . I suggest going mu ch further.

The modern state, which is capitalist, wou ld not ex ist if it were not s trong ly linked to the req uirements of capitalist domination and reproduct ion. This was said by Marx and I agree.

But from there to conclude thai the state, because it has never been o ther than a class state and cannot be otherwise and therefore it should disappear in the cla ssless society, seems to me to be a problem. Marx and Engels sometimes imp lied this quick conclusion, sometimes something else: that the proletariilt could not take over the bourgeois stil te to pu t it at thei r own service, so it was necessary to destroy it. And replace it by another s tate, ' the admini stration of things and no lo nger the government o f men', as the utopiilll socialists defined it, and Milrx took up the fornndil. I hil ve reached a so mewhat different proposaJ: of the s tate as o rganiser and soci aliser of the management of advanced and complex sys tems o f producti on . And with this in mind I place culture (communist culture, much more than illl ideology ) in the command position, culture so defined becoming the new dominant instance.

But the s im pl ifying drift was grea tly to obscure an analysis o f the requirements of the stilte in a trilnsition period . A nd while o ne admits that it will be a long transition (a secu lar one) the question acquires a central importance. It does no t only concern the national, popular, democrati c state of the lo ng transition based o n the revolutio nary advances in the peripheries o f the system. It concerns every state in their no shorter transition in the developed centres. It requires the articulation between the needs for the socialisat ion of economic management and those for the prog ress in the democratisatio n o f society. It requires the <lfticu lation between the po licies of (national) states and the implementation of a multipol ar g lobalisati on . I think thattltis last dimension of actually existing cap italism, the

188 ngntea IT na

7 BEI NG MARXIST, BEI NG CO MMUNI ST, BEI NG INTERNATIONALI ST

im periaHst an d po lari sing g lobalisation that und erlies its ex pansion, has been - and it is the least one cou ld say - underestimated by histo ri cal Marxisms bot h as to its reality and in the consequences that it brought about.

I won' t come back to tllis question, quite simply becau se it is arowld this that all my refi ectioJlS and pro posals (or al most all) have revolved for the past fifty years.

Marx did not produce a general theory of society. It was not even a genera l theory of hi story - he w as careful to avoid this.

Docs this mean that refl ect ion, not ' beyond' Marx (w hich would im ply a fundamenta l revis ion of Marx's propositions), but 'o uts ide' Marx, in the fi eld of i'lnlhro pology, are forbidden?

I think it wo uld be po intless to say so. For my pi'lrtl have di'lrcd (w itho ut having any qualificat ion for

arrogating to myself the rig ht to d o so) to propose some thoug hts concerning the pyramid o f alienations that do in fac t s tand out in Marx's views in thi s field .

I think that a refl ection of the same ki nd on the question o f power wo uld no t be w itho ut interest, a mong o ther things in o rder to be able to unders tand its representi'l t io ns better, bo th the scienti fic and the d isto rtions, Mili tants know the prob lem th roug h their pract ice. They know how to d isting uish the log ic of organisatio n fro m the logic o f strugg les. Ant hropolog is ts, ph ilosop hers and, in p<lTticu lar, psychoanalys ts have posed the q ues tion of i'I

human being's requi rement for democ racy and also for expressing power. I d o not believe that Marxism req uires one to ignore these issues.

Marx be lieved he hi'ld detected the asp iration to co mmunism in the real movement of society, Thi s is the reason w hy he mistrusted it s mutation into a project of a po lit ical, utopian or so-called realist orga nis.l tion. Marx left the clOlSS in its ensemble - the general proletar iat - to invent its rou te to communism.

I ralJied to this th esis which a ssumes, in its way, an optimis ti c vision o f human reason. Other thinkers o utside Marx (and no t s ta rt ing fro m Ma rx) d o not share this vis ion . Freud is an examp le. In sp ite of the real grei'ltness of this thinker, his theses do 110t convi nce me beca use, by read ing them and discovering the representa tion of Ihe world thai he proposes (as Marx did for all

189


the thinkers), one cannot, in my humble opinio n, avoid finding the representations of the Viennese bourgeois in crisis.

I also tried to read Keynes in the same way, which was that o f Ma rx. Key nes is not jus t an economist. He is an econo mist, o f course, and even a great one . But he was great because he was not only an eco nomist, he was a thinker. Gill es Dostru er and Bernard Maris in Capitali.'''I1lt' t'f Pulsion df' Mort understood tltis and their boo k was recently presented in this spirit.

Keynes's vision of the fu ture of humanity was o ptimistic. He saw that the level of developme nt of the producti ve forces that had been acqu ired enabled humanity 10 emancipate it self from the economic question (in his beauliful speeches 10 our greal g rand children). A society that was freed fro m the chains of ob ligatory work was therefore possible: a society that passed its time culti vating human relat ionships, a society that was Iruly emanci pated and cu lti vated. This objeelive, in its way, is no ne ot her than that o f Marx's communism. [t is the reason w hy capitalism is a system that is now obsolescent, w hose time is now over. The thinking of Keynes constitutes, I believe, o ne of the examples that prove the rig htness o f Ma rx's visio n: humanity aspires to communism. Not only its popular classes (w hom Keynes d istrus ted ), but even its grea tes t thinkers. Keynes was certai nly not the fir st o ne to ha ve conceived th is radiant future. Before him, the utopians had done so.

However the equally necessa.ry reading of Keynes the economis t is, in my view, disappointing. Of course Keynes was far above the con ventional vulgar economists of his day (and their descendants, the pure eco nomis ts of today). And his proposals constitute an approach to reality in fini tely more powerful than those of our mi serable liberals . But the concepts that he advoca ted to g rasp the economic reality in a different way (the preference fo r liquidity in parti cula r) a re no t fr<.>e from the empirical and direel observation of the phenomena_ Marx goes mu ch fu rther: the preference for liquid ity that Keynes rightly associated w ith the worship of mo ney expressed the commodi ty alienation, w hich is fundamental for the reproduelion of the system.

Keynes thu s too k no notice of the tendency to pauperisation that is necessarily produced by the logic o f accumulatio n. The effeel of this tendency was no t in fael very vis ibl e in the England

190 " co


of hi s ti me. Nevertheless it was very much present in the British empi re, as the Sou th A fri can communist party wrote allhe lime . But Keynes was no t concerned about it.

As a thinker, a utopian communist, Key nes was certainly a very sensitive person. But he remained a prisoner of the prejud ices of his class. Hi s scorn for the populM classes, incapab le, according to him, of fighting for this rad iant future to whi ch he and his Bloomsbury fr iends aspired, betrayed the edu cation that he had received . Ra ther like the 'bobos' (see Translato r 's note) o f Paris today, he thoug ht that the task o f changing the world was the exclusive do main o f the clites.

There is no d oubt that the observatio ns o f Keynes about the British workers of his period (and our own) are quite pe rceptive. But to lUlderstand this, it is necessMY to leave behind the view point of the pop uJar classes in the ri ch centres alo ne, to sec the reali ty of the globalised capital ist I'>),s tem. Im perialist rent exp lains thi s ki nd of behaviour in Britain. Looking at the wor ld system as a whole thus meiUlS d epa rting from Marx and posing the questioning o f capi talism in o ther terms. It means giving all due imporlance to the strugg les for eman cipation of the peoples in the peripheri es, of w hi ch Keynes had no idea.

Can social movements measure up to the challenge?

Here, too, I shall be brief and jus1 refer to my conclusions. The progressive social movements, because they are s till very

fragmen ted a nd in defensive positio ns, arc in danger of being dragged down, even retrea ting, to the benefit of the reactionary move ments based on para-religious, para-ethnic, para-popuJis t and ot her illusions. There is no lack of eX<lmples of po liti cal relig io ns, of new sects, of ct hnocracies.

In these co nditions, it is im po rtant to di sting uish the possible coU<lpses of the system ca used by the sharpening of its own internal cont r<ldictions on the one hand, from the retreats of the system u nd cr thc b lows of lucid pop ular and dcmocrat ic ad vances 0 11 the o ther hand . Because of thi s I ha ve suggested describing certain transiti ons in the past (for example from the Roman Empire to European feud alism) as the path to d ec<l dence as opposed to the

191


revolutioniUY p'lth which is char<1cte rised by the transitions to historica l capit'lli sm and sod'l lism: ' revolution or decadence' (my vers ion) ' socialism or barbarism ' (Rosa Luxemburg's), or again, ' lucid transitio n or chaos' (my recent ex pression in response to the ongoing crisis) - these Me aU sy nonymous. Up until now the wor ld is more engaged on the road to chaos because the movements in struggle have not measured up to the challenge.

For this reason, enor mous import'lnce must be given to the ideological battle. I should mention here the critiques that I have made of the pos t-modern discourse of Neg ri in particular. There arc idi oc ies li ke 'cognitive cap it alism', or U1C ' dea th o f Marx' , the fetre'l t to the bo urgeois ideology of the frL>edom of the individual, which has already become ' the s ubjec t of Ilisto ry' (as Habermas puts it), tec hnologism (the essence of the chaJlenges and transformations under way being attributed to the technolog ical revo lution), the elimination of the essential reality o f contemporary cap italism (the domination of the oligarchy), if not naive fo rmulas (horizo ntal communica tion repJadng vertical hierarchies ). All these delay the develo pment of a lu cid awareness of the real ch'llienges, in the sho rt 'l11d the long term, of the casualisation of labour and the increased subordination of the peoples of the So uth to work and wars.

References It "(IS not my intention to retrace the p lmscs of the form"tion of concepts and cond w;ions that ru-e pn::sent<:.-d hen:. I shall just briefly indic(ltc the texts of mine Lh (l t could help the reader to discover th<:.u del-e1opment, p resen ted ch ronologically.

A",-"IIl"la/iOll all a "'-'mid 5eal,- (2 \'ols) (l 972) New Yo rk, 1\ [onthly Review Press

Th~ Law of Value alld Histodc'al.I\Iateriulism (1978) New York, l\lonUlly Rev iew Press. A nel\' edition is in preparatio n.

Class alld J\"at;oll, Histori,·all.v and ill tlw CU1'1mt Crisis (1980) Nell' York, l\ [onlhly Rcview Press • Comml.Ulal fo rm<ltions, Chaptcr 2 • Tribut<lry formations, Chapter 3 • Revolution or decadence, Conclus ion

EUfocf .lIri611l (2010) 2nd edition, Ox(ord and New York, Pambaw.ka Prcss and l'I lonUlly Review Press

192 ngntea IT na


5pedres ,if Capitalism, a Critique ofCUlwn t lu tellntuall'aslli,ms (1998) New York, ~ Ionthly Rel' iew Press • Unily and changes in the ideology of political economy, Ch apler 2 • O l'crdctcrmin<ltion <lnd underdctcrminillion in history, Ch"ptcr 3 • The wi thering "IV<l}' of the I"", of I'<llue, Ch<lptt:r 5 • Pure economics, lh e contt:mpor<lry world 's wilchcraft, Ch<lplcr 8

Obs"lesc~nt Capitalism (2003) London, Zed Books • The politiC'll economy of Ihe 20th century, Ch<lpter l • Historiml IIbrxism <lnd historic,,1 Keynesi<lnism, Ch"pter 2 • Socialis<ltion through the market or socialisa tion through

democmtis<ltion, Chapter 2 • FinmlCi illisation, a temporary phCJlOmenon?, Ch<lpter 3 • The collectivc imperi <llism of lhe Tri<ld , Ch<lpter 4

Th" Liberal Virus, P<'I"IIIIIlwllt War Imd the AmericIIni::;ation offllf' Wol'id (2004) Ncw York, ,\ IOJllhly Revic\\' Prc&" • Pauperisation and glob<l l polaris."ltion, Chapler 3 • The ideology of modernity, Chapter 4

B~y(lIId US Heg~mony? Assessing tlu' Prosp!'ds for II IIlu/tiro/1ll INorld (2006) London, Z,xl Books • The d rama of gn::at revolutions, A ppendix I • The w.:.oight of im perialism, Appendix I

Th~ World W<' Wish to Se~: RmJOlutionar.'I Objl'di1't's in the 21st Celltury (2008) New York, I\ lonthly Review Press

Fro m Capitalism to Civili::;atiml (2010) Delhi , Tulib Books • The con tribution o f r,.·laoism , pp. 33--36 • f<ormilliog ics or materialist di<llectics, pp. 52- 57 • Productivity o f sociilliabour, pp. 57-67 • From Ille law of ,';:due to globaliscd value, pp. 67-69 (see " Iso new

edi tion of Til" Law of Fa/ue wltl Histo,.i.-al M"[eri"/i,,,,, "bo\·c) • ~ !arkcl cconomics or capililli~m of the oligopolies? Ch apter 4 • The 'multirude', cri tique of Ute concept, Anne" 2, p. 147 onwards • On the cultural fronl, full sp<..>ed backwards, Anne" 2, p. 151 onwards . 1\0 ;\Uthenticdemocracy without social progress, Anne" 3, p . 157

onwards L'Elld/ dll Sud (200g) Paris, Le Temps d es Ceris.:.'S

Other references A]t\'<lter, Elmar (2009) 'Encrgy crisis, clim<ltc ch<lnge coli<lpsc, hunger <lnd

financial instabilities: the plaguC6 o f C<lpit.1Jism' , 12 February, IVww.oidido.org / article.php3?id_article=730, accC6soo 29 June 2UJO

Amin, Samir (1 976) Uuequa/ Df7l1'i"lnnrnl, New York, ~ Ionthly Rel'iew Press Amin, Samir (2001) '~Iarx ella d emocratic', La P<'IIsee, no. 328 Am in, S<lmir (200!) 'Cinquantc <l1\S <lprcs B<lndoung', Re~hen,hes

international"" 1'01. 73, no. "-All in, Samir (2005) 'Empire cl multi tud e', La Pensh', no . 343 Amin, Samir and Frank, And re Gunder (1981) Ld's Not Wail for 1984, New

19 3


York, ~ lonthly Review Press Dos t."\l er, Gilles an d ~ laris, Bernard (2009) Capi ta/islllc et Plj/sion de A1art,

Paris, Albin Michel Etiemble, Rene (1988) L 'E1,rop" <.'iliumSf', P<1 ris, Gallim<lrd Gam, Is.lbdle (2()x) i'lmx, U'lf Crifique' dc' fa Phif(l~ophie, Paris, Sewl ~.,.jannhcim, Karl (1952 [1985]) ldeo/a8.'1 <1",1 Uto/na, l> lariner


Index

accumulatio n, by diSp066C6sion 1-3,

15.. 52-5 Afghanistan, cOmffiwusm 82- 'Xl, .93

Africa agrari,m reform !!..& 11 9-20

development aid 136--7 disposseSSion 53

food security 107- 8 land tenure 114-1 5

African Command 35 agr,uian reform 117- 25

agriculture

capitalist modernisatio n 105-6,

125-7 fam ily agriculture 101-4

pcas.1nt <lg ricullurc 104-5 aid, d evelopment aid 130-45

aJicniltion Z1. m J 80-3 altcm atil'c world movement 2Z.. ill A 1Lva tcr, Elm (lf 22. alL 185

Amerindians, dispossession 53

Ancien Regim e 55... 58. 74.-:Q.. m 167-8

apartheid al world [C\·cl !ilL 2Z..!il. HZ.. l..hl..1& ill

Aron, Raymond mill Arrighi, Giovanni Ii

13agchi, Ami)'a Kumar 5;1

Bandung per iod lQ..!§., 6Q..Ji5. 82-3,

21.. .u&lB6. belle cpoquc

firs t (1890-19]4) <1.. 168-9

s(.'COnd (l9<JO-200S) 5 169

Berthelot, j<tatues ill bobos (bohemian bourg(:ois) Z6,..ill

Bori~, Jcnn-Picrrc 125. borngcois ci,"ilisalion, end o f 69---70

bourgeois democracy l.4.. 162-4, 180-1

Brazi l M Brown, Gordon 11

Brwlcl, Sylvic 1.Ol Burkina l' a5O ill Bus h, Georgc \ V. 11..:H.

Cabral, Amikar ill capitalism

agricultural modernisation 105-6, 125-7

decline 60--2 ending 7-8, 16-17 glob..-.lis.'ltion 7Ch.'l his torical developmen t 40-50,

51-77, lZB. history of crisis 3-7,21-38 neoliberal phase 9- 10, 1.59-62

phases 167-9 pobrisaLion Q2. 71-3

post-war growth 21-2 reality 153--8 senile 69-70 77

socialism lnlllsition 2...8.. 27-8, ~60-- 1 , 64- 7, 178--80

centre-periphery oonflict 64- 7, 1QQ..lZ2

SC~ a/so North-South confl ict China

Confucianism l5!l global strategy 12- 13 historical developmen t 40-50 land tenure 11 5-17

rCI'olulion f!f!.. 79-82, 91-2, 1M civil SOciety, concepl 133-5 ciass, and struggle 174-7

climate change ill Clin ton, Bill :Y

Colombia .25 colonialism 4. 53-5

195

ENDING THE CRI SIS OF CAPITALI SM OR ENDING CAPITALI SM?

commulusm me"lling of 146-7 modern societies 83-94 Nep,,1 94-9

revolutiolls 66-7

compmdor st"lc 163--4 CornIe, Auguste 4l1.:M Confucianism 15Q

conscnsus, political lA

Cuba 52.!!f!.. Zll.2.L!ill.. U& ll4.. 1M

customary mmlagement, land tenure 11 2-1 5

debts, development <tid lM1 delinking ~ 5B. Z2.l3Q democracy

bourgeois democracy l4.. 162-4, 100-1

Nepal 96-7 social is t 90-3

democratisa tion 181-5

development, principles 141 -5 del'elopmcnt aid L3IJ-45 Development Coo]Xra tion Forum

(DCF) lM1 DostaJcr, Gilles l.9Q

ecological mm'ement ill

Egypt E. B.S cm<lncip"tion &-11, 74-5, m 181- 2 energy crisis 2- 3, 25. Enlighlellment 48-9,73-4, 2Js. ill Europe

i\merimnisation 161-2

colonialism 53-5 feud<llism IHl- 11 hisloriml development 40-50

Europ<:an Union (EU) J'L!!1.lJJZ

family agriculture JOI-4 fcud"lism, Europe 110--11

196

financi,,1 crisis (2008) 3--7,21- 38, ill fin"ncialis.'l tion 28-32 food crisis 25. food sovereignty 107-8 Fourth In ternational 6Z

France agriculture 102 tvlarx's cri tique of 157-8

Frank, Andre GWlder 6,. Z. bll.Z5. French Re\'olulion ss.. 5a. Z5. 21.

m 157--8 Freud, Sigmund 139-90

G7 /G8 92.. 131- 2 G20summit(2009) 11- 13

Gaddafi, ~Iuammar E. 8'l Galbraith, John KenneUl 22 Gam,Is.1Ixlle liZ.. [48-9, illm

L8ll geo-economy, Africa 136-7 geopolitics, mpi talism crisis 166-7

glohaJisation

capitaJism 70--3 histo rical 44--6 o ligarchies 8-[3,68-70, 185-6

struggle against 27-8 gOI'emance, concept .L35. Gowan, Peter 2'1 Gramsci, Antonio l4..5'1.. 167-8 Gn.>en Revolution .uH..lQ5 Guinc<l-Bissau ill

Haiti ill his torical development, BOCieties

41)..5()

I-Iu Jin t.lo 12 humanitarianism 129-45

imperial is m, Triad (United States,

Europe, Japan) 6-7, 13-14, 26. g m 1M. 185--6

im]Xrialist rent 1- 3, ~ mill

oc ngntea IT ~nal

India ~~ 9S--9, ll3

Industrial Revolution 54-5, 58.

internationalism, meaning of 146-7

Intem<ltion<ll tdonet<lry Fund (I~IF)

3.L!2b 142 ln tcm<ltion<ll \ Vorkers t\ssocintion

ill Irnq, communism 82-90

Kassem, Abdd Karim sn Kautsky, Karl m ll.9.

Keynes, John ~ Ia)'nard L4.lD.~ ,9<>-,

Kondratieff cycles ill

bnd reform

pea;;.-mtry role 117-22

stale Tole 122-5

land tenure 109-17

cllstom<lry management 112- 15

privilte ownership 110-[2

lallguilge, devc[opment o f 46-7

lntifwldin lffi..l.!H...llil Latin America

agriculture 103-4

socinlism 93-4 Lenin, Y.L !l a ll.2..l.ML 119. liberill virus l!l 15'Ni2

Lin Chun 'l2.-lM Lordon, rrederic 29: Losurd o, Domenico fi1 lucidity 73-7

Luxemburg, Rosa ?L ill

l\·f<lchi<lvdli, Niccolo 158. l\1<ldagilsciU 13Z l\lali ill 11'i<lnnheim, K<lTI ill M<loism 79-82, lZ.2..lM

Nepal 94-9

l\ laris, Benmrd ~

m arket economy, coUapsc 2S--9

[NDEX

l\larx, Karl

Capital 153-4

capit.1.1ist re<llity critique 153-3

wei<ll thought critique 149-52

l\lani sm

consumption id<::ology l5. gener<llism 40-1

his toric<ll 72.. 129-30, [64-5, 186-9]

meaning of 146-58

renewal lii terminology 172-3

miltcriillis t dia1<::ctic ill mercantilism ,25.. 57-8, Zl l\lerkel, Angela il

migrants, land rights ill militari;;'1. tion 34-,."i

l\ fill, John Stu<Jrt 1 m onopoly rent b 20n I

l\lorin, fran~is 29: />.I usl im Brotherhood ftZ.. m!.. 89.

Nilsscr, Gumal Abdd .8Z..89. natural resources

access to ~,I113Z

cxploit;,tion 5Z N illism 15.. 32 Negri, Antonio 1'12 neoliberalism 23-5, [59-62

neo-/>. larxism l46. Nepal, ~laoism 94-9 N en" Dcal 15... 32.. ill N iger 136-7

Nimeiry,Gener<l1 BZ..82 Non -Aligned l\lovement 144. non-govemmental org;,nisa tions

(NGOs) 134-5

North, agriculture 101-4

North AtlilntkTreaty Org<lnis.1. lion

(NATO) J! [3 3 <; 62

North- South cotill ict 32-8,64- 7

see also centre-periphery

197 ,.,


Obama, Sarack lL l.3..24 obscurantism ill oligarchies S-13, 6S-70, [email protected]&l

SI'~ al so Triad

oligopolies capi talism crisis 5--7, lZ. 2!i. 32 fin<lncia lis.-. tion 2S-32

O rg<lnisalion for Econom ic

Cooperation and Del'elopmen t (OECD) & l!l'Z..1Q& ill ill

ovcr-detemlination 1BZ

Paris Declaration on Aid Effectil"encss 131-J

Parmentier, BrwlO l.O8.

pauperis.-.tion, by accumulation 1-3 peas. ... nlry

agriculture 1(}f-5 a nd class 175-6 dispossession l-J,52-5 l<lnd tenure 109-17

m obil isation 126- 7

Nepal 95-6 p('Tipheries

revolu tio ns 59-64 sa al~ centn.~peripheJ)' conflict

pelly bourgeois ill polarisation, c,lpi talism & 71-J political c1asscs ill political conflicts 170-2 political econo my, I\ larxian critique

153--7 pop ular fronts ~ 32 prolet<lrianisation ~ill proletariat, tenninology 173--4

Rawls, Joh n m Reag.m, Ronald 23 131

reality capi truis t 153-8 representa tions 150--2

regionalisation 3Z p remod ern 44-6

19B

religions, as representa tions 149--50 representation, I\ larxist th eory

[49-52, 180

revolutions 66-7, Z2, 7S-99, 119. Rostow, \ V. \ \'. ill Russi(l, agmriM rdorm 1IS--19 Russi(ln Revolution Z2.. as.. 2..L.1&l

Sru-kozy, Nico](ls ll.1.3 Second lnl.::mationru 7S-9, .1ful

Sen, Amartya 2. ill Senegal ill Sh anghai Coopemtion Organi:wtion

(SeO) 1.3 sl,lI'c trade 51

social imperialism 129-30, l63. socialism

e;.,; sting 22 first W;lI'C 1& 2L 32.- 59-64, ill revolutions 7S-99, ill second \\'(lve [7S-SO

transition from capi talism b &. 27-K 3f!.. 60--1,64-7, 17S-80

socia]lu stice, concept 133 social mOI'ements 19 [-2

social struggk-s 170-2 societies, histo rical develop ment

4<J-&)

solar socialism 3&l.85 South

agriculture 104- 5 awakening 1fi. 59--64, 162 devclopment aid 130-45

SC~ a/so North-South confl ict southern Africa, agriculture 1Q;1.l.Q,1

South-South COOp('Tation 144-5 South Yemen, communism 82-90 Sovietism 7S-9, 88. Soviet Union Jb 66. state

imperialis t 163--4 land reform role 122- 5

Stiglitz Conunission 11- 12

ngntea IT ~nal

Stiglitz, Joseph 2.l33. Sud<ln, communism 82- 90, .2J

SUp<ldl<l i P<lnitchp<lkd i 12

Thiltchcr, l\l;u-g;u-ct 23

Third Inlcmil lioml lB...!!b.U!1.lM Triad (United Stilte;;, Europe, Japiln)

d cvc1opmcn t <lid 132- 3

geopoli tics 138. im perialism 6- 7, 13--14, 26,..22..

152.. l!22. 185--6 milit.uisation 34-5

tributru,), societies 41--6 Trotskyism 6.1

under-dclermin<ltion rn ~ ill Uni ted Ar<lb Emirates B6. Uni ted Nations, I'dillennium

Ded<lr<ltion 131- 2

United N<ltions Conference on Tr<lde

an d Development (UNCTAD) 12

INDEX

Un ited Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Ch<lnge

(UNFCCC) ill United St<ltcs

ag riculture 1Q2

cilpitalism 16 1-2 hegemony 11- 13, 62

5<',' al~o Triad

universal ism 76- 7

Vietnam 56-7, M. b6,.l1!J.. l.15...llL. ill

Wallerstein, Immanuel .6 Wen Tiejlm %

wheeler-dealers 68-9

World 6<lnk ~ illZ World Tr<ldc Org,misation (WTO)

~~m I 24-5

writing, development of 46- 7

199 ,.,

Global History: a View from the South

Sam ir Amin

978+906387·96·9 2010 Paperback £:14.95

Responding to the need to take a fresh look

at world history, hitherto domin<lted by

Eurocentric ideologues and histori<ln5 in their

attempt to justify the nature and character

of modem capitalism, this book looks at the

ancient world system and how it influenced

the development of the modem world. It also

analyses the origin and nature of modern

globaJisation and the challenges it presents

in achieving socialism. Amin, one of the best-known thinkers of

his generation. examines a theme thllt has been primordial to his contr ibution to political and economic thought: the question of unequal development. Thi s is II refreshing lind crelltive

work thll\ is necessary rellding for llnyone wanting to understand the real process of history.

I always learn important things when I read Samir Amin. This book is no exception. It is full of original interpretat ions and is required

reading for all who are seriously interested in global history.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Yale University

Order your copy from www.pambazukapress.org

Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or Ending Capitalism? With his usual verve and sharpness Samir Amin examines the factors that brought about the 2008 financia 1 collapse and explores the systemic crisis of capitalism after two decades of nealiberal globalisation. He lays bare the rel<ltionship between dominating oligopolies and the globalisation of the world economy. The current crisis, he argues, is a profound crisis of the capitalist system itself, bringing forward an era in which wars, and perhaps revolutions, will once again shake the world.

Amin examines the threat to the plutocracies of the US, Europe and Japan from decisions of recent C20 mC<'tings. He analyses the attempts by these powers to get back to the pre-20OS system, and to impose their

domin;1tion on the peoples of the South through intenSifying milit<lry intervention by using institutions such <IS NATO.

Amin presents origin<ll proposals for the way forw<lrd: an <lltern<ltive str<ltegywhich, by building on the advances made by progressive forces in Latin Americ<I, would allow for a more humane society through both the North and the South working together.

II With hi5 wn5tantly critical eye on the foundation5 of capitali5m, Samir Amin

has modified and reformulated his ideas through a 5core of worh .. [He fore5awj

the world crisis and presents solutions that benefi t the people .. 'It is what I call

privatising the losses ,' he told AI·Ahrllffl, ' the opposite of the present model which

aims at 50cialising the losse5 , while respecting the privatising of the profits.' ''

A /'Ahram weekly

Samir Am in is a rei/OWl/cd radical economist, the director of tile fOfllm du

Tiers Mallde (Third World FOrl/m) ill Dakar, Smegal, alld chair af the World

Farum for Altematives. He is one (if the best-klww/I thinkers ofliis generatioll,

both ill political science alld ill the analysis of global capitalism.

Pambazuka Press

An impfim of Fah~m"

a CODESRIA

~ BOOKsk..~~ International Publishing House

nghteo IT

Documents

Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or Ending Capitalism?