EnActivism BJET Final

8/8/2019 EnActivism BJET Final

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Instructional Design and Technology Grounded in Enactivism: A Paradigm Shift?

Qing Li, Ph.D

Bruce Clark, Ph.DIan Winchester, Ph. D

Paper to be published at the British Journal of Educational Technology

Abstract

Although traditional instructional design and technology (IDT) has largely based on objectivism,

in the past twenty years, constructivism has emerged as a dominant framework for IDT. Both

perspectives, however, present shortcomings. This paper explores enactivism – an emerging new

philosophical world view – as an alternative paradigm. It also investigates the possibilities offered by

this new paradigm to instructional design and technology. The philosophical worldview known as

enactivism is reviewed to illustrate the similarities and differences amongst the 3 philosophical

paradigms, namely objectivism, constructivism, and enactivism. Finally, details of enactivism and its

implications for IDT are explored.

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INTRODUCTION

This paper explores enactivism and the possibilities offered by this paradigm to instructional

design and technology (IDT). Enactivism, rooted in the phenomenological work of Merleau-Ponty and

Bateson’s biological perspectives, is an emerging philosophical worldview and has flourished

particularly in the field of mathematics education. At a fundamental level, it rejects dualism and focuses

on the importance of embodiment and action to cognition.

In the past two decades, constructivism has emerged as a dominant paradigm in educational

research, substantially influencing IDT. A critical assumption of constructivism is that knowledge is not

something out there to be acquired but rather constructed by learners. This shift of assumptions

challenges the traditional objectivist viewpoints, and demands a reconsideration of our foundational

philosophic and epistemological beliefs (Bednar, Cunningham, Duffy, & Perry, 1995; Jonassen, 2001).

Believing that truth is always relative and contextual, constructivist approaches of instruction “promote

the judgments and evaluations that facilitate personal interpretations and refine understanding”

(Hannafin & Hill, 2002, p.71). Constructivist approaches reject many traditional instructional design

practices such as the focus on instructional objectives, and the employment of task and content analysis

(Jonassen, 2001). Rather, it emphasizes the establishment of a learner-centered environment where

students negotiate their learning goals, focusing on authentic learning problems and contexts, with

activities and assessments in alignment with their needs (Hannafin & Hill, 2002).

Even though many scholars in our field embrace constructivism, a number of criticisms have

arisen (Begg, 2000; Fox, 2006). Such criticisms point to various problems of constructivism that may

undermine educational practices. The following presents several main criticisms that deserve our serious

consideration.

1. There is no mechanism to avoid the construction of undesirable outcomes.

2. There is an undue influence in education and in what constitutes knowledge bythe dominant culture, that is the white middle class.

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3. Constructivism is concerned only with cognitive knowledge. It does not explain

unformulated or subconscious knowledge, it does not consider how things might be known

intuitively or instinctively, and it does not consider how emotions are constructed or their role inlearning.

4. There do not seem to be explicit links made between constructivism and the

learning theories that brain-science or neural biology offer.5. While constructivism has numerous forms with respect to an individual and a

social focus, and a relativist or objectivist view of knowledge, no one form of constructivism

seems to consider these differences.(Begg, 2000, p.2)

Davis and his colleagues claim that constructivist theories typically criticize contemporary

teaching practices, yet fall short of providing direct, practical guidance to teachers as to what they might

do more effectively. When these theories are applied in designing learning activities, they lean towards

“the most familiar and accessible (but not necessarily the most significant or appropriate) aspects”

(Davis & Sumara, 2002, p. 420) of the theories.

In the field of IDT, Fox (2006) argues that many research studies (e.g. Dick, 1996;

Hannafin, Hannafin, Land, & Oliver, 1997; Winn, 1997) demonstrate how we still struggle, both

theoretically and practically, with the constructivist viewpoint. One main reason for such

struggle is the lack of philosophical consistency in literature: constructivism includes many

versions ranging from radical constructivism to social constructivism (Davis & Sumara, 2002;

Fox, 2006), often expressing conflicting ideas (Burbules, 2000; Phillips, 2000). Many people

“call themselves constructivists without much awareness of the fundamental differences among

the varieties of constructivism. Nor are they always absolutely clear about the epistemological,

ontological, metaphysical, and moral assumptions, concepts and values that undergird

constructivist beliefs” (McCarty & Schwandt, 2000). They often take aspects from different

versions of constructivism indiscriminately, with little understanding of fundamental distinctions

between these strains, some of which may have contradictory philosophical assumptions. Most

importantly, limited empirical evidence exists at this point to support constructivist theories

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(Driscoll, 1999; Fox, 2006). This lack of empirical support is keenly felt in IDT considering that

this field has such a strong emphasis on empirical research.

While such confusions and criticisms should not diminish the value of constructivism, they do

call for an alternative worldview. The recent emergence of enactivism provides an appealing paradigm.

Enactivism, rooted in biology and phenomenology, has flourished particularly in the field of

mathematics education partly because it provides a more encompassing philosophical stance than other

viewpoints. In fact, Winn (2006) recommends scholars in IDT pay particular attention to enactivism

because it is a “relatively well established and viable framework within which to do research and

development” (p. 57). Yet enactivism has not been well represented in IDT, owing in large part to its

recent emergence. In this paper, therefore, we examine this paradigm and argue that enactivism holds

great promise for IDT. To demonstrate the core philosophical assumptions of enactivism, we first

investigate the enactivist worldview. We then compare the three paradigms: objectivism, constructivism,

and enactivism, to illustrate the similarities and differences. Finally, we explore the implications if we

take enactivism as the basis for IDT.

ENACTIVISM

Before our discussion, it is worth noting the inconsistencies in the literature about whether

enactivism is simply a theory of learning or a philosophy – in other words, a worldview. Some (Begg,

2000; Proulx, 2004; Winn, 2006) consider that enactivism is a new theory of learning while others

believe that it is a “theory of mind”, which, from an enactivist perspective, is the same as epistemology

(Bateson, 1987) – a branch of philosophy. In this paper, we assume that enactivism is not a learning

theory but a worldview from which various theories can be derived.

An Example

Enactivism is a philosophy based on two important premises: cognition and environment are

inseparable, and “systems” enact with each other from which they “learn” (Fenwick, 2000). Consider a

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simple event: Jean is learning how to make a peanut butter and jam sandwich. Understanding this event

is not just about the bread pieces, or the peanut butter and jam, just Jean herself, or putting jam on the

bread, the motion of her hands putting two pieces of bread together, or just the room. It is all of the

above and the physical process of making the sandwich (personal enactment with the physical world)

that shapes her understanding of the event. Most importantly, when Jean enacts the task of making the

sandwich, she draws upon specific experiences from her personal history to enable her to understand her

present world. Jean’s learning to make a peanut butter and jam sandwich is connected with her

experience, mirrors her structure (e.g. cognitive), and is embedded in her action. For example, she may

be told, by her mom, that she needs to learn how to make a peanut butter and jam sandwich for her

lunch. She may have found, based on her previous experience, that toasting the bread pieces before

putting peanut butter and jam on would taste better. Likewise, she may notice that holding the bread in

one hand and the knife in the other would make the job easier.

Assuming Jean is a student in China who is learning English from her teacher through this

activity, she may have to use chopsticks instead of a butter knife to spread peanut butter and jam. Or she

may have to use a butter knife but is not sure how to use it. Peanut butter and jam may be stored in

bowls instead of jars. In this scenario, Jean’s limited personal experience with butter knives affects her

understanding of the event. Further, intertwined cognitive, social, and physical systems all shape how

she enacts.

Or, suppose Jean is an astronaut from NASA. She is making a peanut butter and jam sandwich in

a space shuttle in outer space for the first time. Spreading peanut butter and jam on bread thus becomes a

brand new concept even though she may have rich experience of making them in a North American

context. The simple act of “taking out two pieces of bread and putting them on a table” in our normal

sense is no longer possible. What appears to be trivial action (where we may treat it as “habit” or “tacit

knowledge”) in one setting (i.e. on Earth) turns out to be an event that needs a tremendous amount of

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consciousness in another setting (i.e. outer space). This suggests that we often realize only a small part

of bodily sensation, attend only to the surface of our thoughts, and are aware of only fragments of our

acts. It highlights that body, mind, and this world are inseparable. Learning is more than simply paying

attention to a series of conscious events and changing some intentional decisions. Instead, learning is a

complex matter, enmeshed in a convoluted web of biological-and-social agents, the incarnation of varied

perceptions, of applying, of abstracting, and of acting that involves both conscious and unconscious

understanding and abilities.

Roots

Enactivism is rooted in two important views: the phenomenological work of Merleau-Ponty and

the biological perspectives of Bateson. Consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s view of ontological

embodiment, which is based on the idea that “the world which is given in perception…is the concrete,

intersubjectively constituted life-world of immediate experience” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. xvi),

enactivism argues that

the world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a

project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world

which the subject itself projects.(Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, p. 7)

This concept that “things have no meaning independent of the consciousness of the agent

determining meaning” is called double-embodiment. According to the conceivers of enactivism (Varela,

Thompson, & Rosch, 1991), double-embodiment regards the body not only as a lived structure to

experiences, but also the setting for cognition. Built from traditional Buddhist idea of “mindfulness

meditation” that places the mind in

embodied everyday experience…[Our reflection] can change from an abstract,disembodied activity to an embodied (mindful), open-ended reflection. By embodied we

mean reflection in which body and mind are brought together…[Refection] is not just on

experience, but reflection is a form of experience itself and that reflective form of

experience can be performed with mindfulness/awareness…(Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, p. 27)

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Embodiment, therefore, refers to the “developing process” of our interaction with the real world.

It is not simply our beliefs or behaviors, rather, it is our ways of living and experiencing our world that

“involves our sensory and motor processes, perceptions, and actions” (Johnson, 1989, pp. 362-363).

Developed from the double-embodiment, enactivism adds another significant aspect by addressing a

fundamental concept regarding the role of reflection.

Origins of enactivism can also be traced to biological perspectives involving systems theory and

cognitive theory (Michie, 2004). Renowned researchers in these areas include Bateson, Capra,

Maturana, and Varela (Bateson, 1972; Capra, 1996, 2002; Maturana & Varela, 1987; Varela, Thompson,

& Rosch, 1991). The idea of autopoiesis, a word about auto-production explaining the circular

organization of living systems, heavily influences these researchers’ thoughts. Enactivism describes

living as systems that produce themselves endlessly (Reid, 1995). Living systems, are not simply

observation objects or interacting systems, but rather autonomous, self-contained, self-referencing and

self-constructing closed systems (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p.v).

A central idea of enactivism is co-emergence. Co-emergence focuses on the concept that

the change of both a living system and its surrounding environment depends on the interaction

between this system and the environment. When a system and an environment interact, they are

structurally coupled and they co-emerge. It is important to note that co-emergence only suggests

that the system and the environment interact but does not guarantee greater or lesser adaptation

to each other (Reid, 1995).

Cognition & Enactivism

Enactivism views that cognition is a complex co-evolving process of systems interacting

and affecting each other and their environments (Davis, Sumara, & Luce-Kapler, 2000). Rather

than consider the cognitive system as a processor of information, enactivism regards it as

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producer of meaning (Baerveldt & Verheggen, 1999). All living systems have to be involved in

cognition and cognition is active rather than passive. Cognition, contrary to our common ideas, is

a human, social, and biological phenomenon. For example, the current development in

neuroscience and neuroplasticity has demonstrated the plasticity of our senses and brain. Norman

Diodge, in his top selling book – “The Brain That Changes Itself”, provides convincing

arguments and examples to demonstrate that learning can actually increase the volume and

thickness of our brain. Our brain structure and function, therefore, can change through our

thinking and other activities (Diodge, 2007). Learning causes not just mental but also biological

changes.

A living system such as a plant engages in cognition through, for example, the feedback

system in its leaves with chemical pathways. Through these chemical pathways, the plant learns

from and adapts to its environment (e.g. the amount of sunlight, humidity). At the same time, this

plant also contributes to its larger environment/system (i.e. co-evolves). The way the plant knows

about the environment is through its interaction with the environment it lives in. Hence the

plant’s knowledge of its world depends on the environment it lives in and the actions the plant is

capable of (Reid, 1995). The plant neither determines its world, nor is determined by it, but co-

emerges with the world. It is important to note that there is no dichotomy (i.e. the plant and the

environment) because any system and its context are inseparable (Fenwick, 2000).

Challenging historical epistemological-ontological debate on dualism where knowledge

is considered as either merely forms of representation of reality or as discrete agents built by

learners and residing inside their “inner-self”, this new interpretation of cognition changes our

view about knowledge. Knowledge is a domain of possibilities and emerges from a sequence of

“structured coupling” where the change of one system causes responses in the dynamics of the

other when two systems “coincide” in an ever-evolving world (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch,

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misinform teaching practice (Davis, Sumara, & Luce-Kapler, 2000). A noticeable such shared

assumption is that cognition sits inside the individual’s body isolated from the world and other people.

Reality (the real world) is separated from the mind, even though they have different views about where

it is. Enactivism, on the other hand, rejects dualism that divides self from world, mind from body, or

subject from object. Therefore, both objectivism and constructivism focus on knowledge, whereas

enactivism emphasizes knowing. In this paper, we differentiate action from behavior, although some

people use the two terms interchangeably (e.g. Proulx, 2004). To us, action always involves

consciousness while behavior does not necessary require intention.

Table 1. Comparison of Assumptions Inherent in Objectivism, Constructivism & Enactivism*

Objectivism Constructivism Enactivism

Reality

(real world)• External to the knower

• Structure determined byentities, properties, and

relations;

• Structure can be

modeled

• Determined by the knower

• Dependent upon humanmental activity

• Product of mind

• Symbolic proceduresconstruct reality

• Structure relies onexperience / interpretation

• We and the world aremutually specifying and

co-emerging

• Reality is dependent on

the consciousness of theknower who determines

the meaning (i.e. double-

embodiment)

Mind • Processor of symbols

• Mirror of nature

• Abstract machine for

manipulating symbols

• Builder of symbols

• Perceiver/interpreter of

nature

• Conceptual system for constructing reality

• Placed in embodiedeveryday experience

• Cannot be separated from

nature

• The mind interprets and

affects nature

Cognition • Is interpreted

mechanistically

• Governed by and reflect

external reality

• Independent of human

experience

• Mental is separated from physical

• Action is the only accessto cognition

• Is interpreted

mechanistically

• Cognition is a process of

organizing and

interpretation of one’ssubjective experience

• Mental is separated from

physical

• Is interpreted biologically

• Cognition is a complex

process of enactment of a

world and a mind.

• Mental and physical are

inseparable and co-evolve

Knowledge • External • Embedded inside inner self, • Neither internal nor

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• Is a “thing” that can beacquired

• Cognitive/conscious

knowledge only

• Knowledge is mental

• Do not consider emotion

internal

• Is a “thing”

• Constructed by learner

• Cognitive/consciousknowledge only

• Knowledge is mental and physical but essentially

human

• Do not consider emotion

external, it depends.

• Is not a “thing” but a

domain of possibilities.

• Emerges from our ongoin

interpretations necessary

for successful action in anever-evolving world

• Both cognitive and non-conscious knowledge

• Knowledge is both mental

and physical, and notrestricted to human.

• Knowing is knowledge

• Including emotion

Dualism • Inner vs. outer

• Self vs. world/other

• Subject vs. object

• Mind vs. body

• Knower vs. known

• Action vs. mental

• Inner vs. outer

• Self vs. world/other

• Subject vs. object

• Mind vs. body

• Knower vs. known

• Action vs. mental

• No dualism

• Inseparable

Causal

relationship• Change the environment

causes behavior change

• Same stimulus leads tosame response

• Response is unique for each

individual• Learning and environmen

co-evolve constantly

• No outcome can beexactly predicted or

determined (taking theuniverse as a whole)

*objectivist & constructivist assumptions are adapted from Jonassen (2001).

Enactivism and Objectivism

Objectivism assumes that reality is external to the knower, is structured, and structure can be

modeled. The purpose of learning is to mirror this abstract reality and its structure through thinking.

Cognition is governed by the real world and should reflect external reality. Learning is the process of

mapping objective reality onto learners. Since cognition is independent from human experience, teachers

tell students about the real world and students replicate the content and structure (Skinner, 1968;

Thorndike, 1931).

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Rejecting the idea of absolute reality independent from the knower, enactivism argues the

knower and the world are mutually specifying and co-emerging. Cognition is a complex process of

enactment of a world and our mind. A well known slogan in enactivist literature is “all doing is knowing

and all knowing is doing” (Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 27). Action, therefore, bears significant

meaning in enactivism. This view of knowledge as adequate action implies that knowledge usually

involves behavior. “Cognition is as much a physical as a cerebral activity, [and] it extends through the

body to the environment, and by so doing becomes social” (Winn, 2006, p.57). It is important, however,

to recognize that enactivism is not a “step back” towards objectivism.

According to Proulx (2004), two significant accounts distinguish objectivism from enactivism.

The first aspect is the status of action in each view. A fundamental assumption of objectivism is that our

cognitive processes are subjective within a “black box”, and we can only access them through the

observation of an individual’s external behavior. Consequently, objectivists study overt physical actions

in precise detail, often in an attempt to control and change them. Enactivism focuses on action not

because it is the only access to mental process, but precisely because action and mental process are

inseparable – action, then, IS knowledge (Proulx, 2004).

The second important account for the difference between the objectivist and the enactivist views

is the causal relationships. For objectivism, a change in the environment causes a change in action.

Further, the same stimulus can result in the same response in everyone. For enactivism, however,

outcomes can never be predicted or determined because the systems – learning and the environment –

co-evolve constantly.

Holding an objectivist or an enactivist view would have different implications for classroom

practices and IDT. Objectivism considers teachers as the experts who hold the absolute truth and

knowledge to be transmit to students. Lectures predominate as classroom practice and students simply

replicate and try to master factual knowledge and skills. Enactivism asserts that teachers are not the

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source of knowledge, but they coauthor knowledge with students through the design of a complex

learning world, considering the integration of our biological systems and electronic media. Rather than

focusing on telling, teachers would guide students’ attention towards the intended possible coevolving

patterns.

Enactivism and Constructivism

Constructivism asserts that reality is determined by a knower, hence is a product of mind.

Constructivism, regardless of the version, assumes that reality is formed from the mind of the knower

through his/her construction (Dewey, 1933; Piaget, 1954; Vygotsky, 1978). Like objectivism,

constructivism accepts dualism and interprets cognition in mechanistic ways. In all its varieties,

constructivism considers that cognition always involves conscious construction of something: an object,

a theory, a concept, a proof, a tool, a place, a way, a tradition. It is, therefore, a human phenomenon.

In contrast, enactivism relies on biological interpretation of cognition. It rejects the idea that

knowledge consists of separate objects different from the world. Rather, “all cognition exists in the

interstices of a complex ecology of organism relationality” (Davis & Sumara, 1997). A key idea of

enactivism is that living systems adjust to their exceedingly complex surroundings in an autopoetic

manner. Cognition, hence, is continuous with what other animals and living systems do when they get

onto something that they adjust to in all its complexity, often something useful about the world they find

themselves in. This may or may not be a cause of conscious construction of anything but rather noticing,

slowly, the light that dawns over the whole in the context of their need(s). One can go from a state of

complete lack of understanding, puzzlement or bafflement and mystification through a series of

unconscious stages until suddenly one can do whatever it is, individually or collectively.

Consider young children coming to grip with daily life outside themselves: walking, talking,

bathing, running, falling…it all looks random but the result in the end is very precise indeed. In some

ways this is similar to initiation, but it differs from it in that with initiation something already exists into

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which one is being initiated. For much of enactivist thinking, we are facing a new world into which we

want to or simply do find a way. For example, children often learn the accents in a language of their

school chums rather than those of their parents – something exceedingly important in England. And in

the case of children this is often not consciously constructed, as it might be for an adult, but simply

occurs through their complex interactions with their school environment.

Enactivism also considers the cases in which something already exists. Think, for example, of

Eskimos and how they traditionally learn without conscious teaching on the part of their family.

Children may notice in passing adults building a kayak. Perhaps they fiddle a bit with the same

materials, perhaps they do not. But one day, without any special conscious effort they may know how to

build a kayak and what a kayak is good for. Nobody “taught” them or set them a task. They did not

consciously construct either a theory of kayaks or their building. Nor did they build a kayak before they

found themselves actually needing to do so and as a mater of fact being able to do so too.

Both constructivism and enactivism reject the idea that reality is independent of the knower, but

for different reasons. Constructivism asserts that the knower determines reality because s/he constructs

it. In contrast, enactivism believes that reality is knower-dependent, not because the knower constructs

whatever s/h chooses, but because s/he cannot be separated from the relevant world (Varela, 1999).

An important distinction between enactivism and constructivism is their emphases: on

knowledge or knowing (Begg, 2000). Knowledge, from the constructivist perspective, is a human

construction that needs to fit with the person’s experience. Constructivist views separate self from other,

in that they distinguish between the human being who constructs meaning and what is constructed. This

creates problems because knowledge is considered a constructed phenomenon located in either a

personal or a social space (Davis & Sumara, 2002; Davis, Sumara, & Luce-Kapler, 2000).

Enactivism, in stressing embodied action, finds a middle way between two extreme views about

reality: the objective view considers that reality exists independent of our experience versus the

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subjective perspective in which reality is independent of the surrounding world (Maeers, 1996). This

approach, of course, can not be interpreted in linear ways. Rather, it sees the world and us as mutually

specifying and co-emerging. From this standpoint, enactivism avoids the dualistic problem of inner vs.

outer, self vs. world, subject vs. object, mind vs. body, and knower vs. known (Davis, 1994). Classroom

instruction, therefore, differs from either the “‘adult-run’ or ‘children-run’ instruction” (Rogoff, 1994,

p.210).

Enactivism and constructivism are fundamentally different, even though we may find seemingly

parallel aspects. For example, enactivism and situated cognition may look similar. Both consider that

environment plays a vital and integral role in cognition instead of simply supplemental to or a mere

background to our “consciousness”. A close examination at a foundational level reveals distinctions

between the two views. Situated cognition grounds and focuses on individual development through

his/her interaction in a community of practice. Although the individual and the environment are integral

parts, the primacy of individual mind has never been questioned. Enactivism, on the other hand,

emphasizes understanding the world through different systems entangled in processes of self-

organization and interdependence. Consequently, human subjectivity, our mind, and the environment are

all subsumed within larger systems.

The distinction between enactivism and constructivism leads to different practices in classrooms

and IDT. For constructivism, teachers establish learning environments in which students construct

knowledge with teachers’ facilitation. Such environments involve the negotiation of goals and

objectives between the teacher and the students. Students’ learning focuses on promoting their multiple

interpretations of reality based on personal experience. Instructional strategies concentrate on student-

centered activities because it is the students who control the process of learning. Enactivism, in contrast,

includes co-evolving patterns as opposed to pre-determined goals and objectives. Instead of focusing on

a “single best sequence” of lessons for learning (Jonassen, 2001), teachers in enactivist classrooms build

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a rich learning world with abundant stimulation, but enough limits to guide students toward possible co-

evolving patterns. Further, the physical, biological, and electronic systems are carefully crafted to

merge together, resulting in a rich learning world.

ENACTIVISM AS THE BASIS FOR IDT

IDT is a field that “encompasses the analysis of learning and performance problems and the

design, development, implementation, evaluation and management of instructional and non-instructional

processes and resources intended to improve learning and performance in a variety of settings” (Reiser,

2002). IDT historically grew out of a behaviorist perspective but has experienced a great shift to

constructivism in the last twenty years. Both paradigms provide valuable frameworks for understanding

of learning and consequently IDT. Each, however, presents its own shortcomings, some of which have

been discussed at the beginning of this paper. We argue that both perspectives are incomplete and

therefore fail to address some critical IDT issues.

Enactivism offers a dynamic new vision for examining learning and performance, and enables us

to see this field in a new light. It claims that our mind, body, and the world are inseparable. Learning is

through the learners’ acts and is acted upon by the world and understanding is embedded in doing. If

practitioners in IDT are to accept some of these enactivist assumptions, many of our deepest

presuppositions would need to be reconsidered. For instance:

1. Traditional instructional design assumes learning and learning outcomes can be

predicted. It is therefore possible to perform analysis, choose approaches, implement and

revise, all independent of actual instruction, until predetermined goals are achieved (Winn,

2004). Since enactivism claims that learning and behavior cannot, in general, be

predetermined, we need to question the independence of design from instruction. According

to Winn (2004), a few educational technologists have been considering this issue, thinking

about concurrent design and instruction rather than pre-design instruction. Examples range

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from conceptualization and doing of instruction occurring simultaneously (Schon, 1987), to

establishing learning environments that are adaptive in real time to student actions (Merrill,

1992), to the idea that instructional design should be contextualized if learning is situated in

contexts (McLellan, 1996).

2. Instructional goals would not be pre-determined but rather be constructed, modified

with students during the instruction. This, of course, it not to say that instruction should be

goal-free. Instead, it emphasizes that goals should be framed in such a way that enough

freedom is given for students to learn in their own way and is adaptive to students’

proclivities.

3. IDT would focus on the creation of a collection of stimulating learning conditions,

whose functions are not entirely prescribed. The best ways for students to learn are

determined on the fly and this system is potentially responsive to it (Winn, 2004).

4. A typical constructivist approach concentrates on “task and content analysis…[with]

lesson identifying and prescribing a single, best sequence for learning” (Jonassen, 2001,

p.61). Instead, an enactivist approach would focus on the development of a rich (may be

messy) setting with varied stimulation, as oppose to singular, isolated, neatly organized,

linearly sequenced concepts. Content would be generated by learners rather than pre-given.

5. Since learning is an ongoing enactment of embodied sensibilities rather than a sequence

of conscious decisions, teaching needs to concentrate on directing attention and affecting

interpretations. Strategies such as repetition, well timed questions, highlights, practice,

discussion, and re-symbolization, can help guiding students’ attention, while elaborated

explanations, extended instructions, and de-contextualized formulations should be de-

emphasized. Teachers should focus on the particular while embedding the explicit message

in more generalized, contextual concerns. Instructional approaches should shift from telling

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to listening (Davis, Sumara, & Luce-Kapler, 2000). We should attend to both conscious and

non-conscious cognition which is deeply rooted in physical engagements with the world.

Consequently, hands-on learning holds significant value in learning. Further, same as the

traditional “conscious cognitive learning”, emotion, intuition, instinct and mindfulness all

play important roles in this learning world.

6. The inseparability of mind, body and the world, as supported by the recent development

in neuroscience and other related fields, points to the possibilities of merging of biological

and electronic ‘platforms’, means of co-laboring and co-emerging (Diodge, 2007; Etkin,

Pittenger, Polan, & Kandel, 2005). Although a more drastic idea for many to accept, IDT

may focus on the use of technology to extend our cognitive systems. As Doidge (2007)

explains:

When computers crash and people have mini-nervous breakdowns, there is more than

a little truth in their cry, "I feel like I've lost my mind!" As we use an electronic

medium, our nervous system extends outward, and the medium extends inward. ...

Electronic media are so effective at altering the nervous system because they bothwork in similar ways and are basically compatible and thus easily linked. ... Because

our nervous system is plastic, it can take advantage of this compatibility and mergewith electronic media, making a single, larger system. Indeed, it is the nature of suchsystems to merge whether they are biological or man-made. ...

(p. 311)

What would it look like?

If we believe that enactivism provides a better and more comprehensive world view and

therefore consider adapting this view, what would it look like in classrooms? What are the implications

for instructional designers?

We propose that the focus for educational technologists and teachers should be the creation of a

comprehensive learning world which mirrors the complex system of our world, considering the merging

of our biological nervous systems and the electronic medium. Although we cannot predetermine any

specific goals, the creation of such a world should consider possible coevolving patterns. This learning

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world should have enough constraints so that students’ attentions are guided towards these possible

coevolving patterns. Further, technology is essential to craft this learning world where the electronic

media and our biological systems merge, to guide students towards these possible coevolving patterns.

Within this learning world, learners create their own learning environments with the support of

technologies, and through their co-emergence, learning occurs. Two aspects of this learning world: 1)

the constraints attached to it and 2) the consideration of merging of electronic and biological systems,

set important distinctions between this learning world and a constructivist learning environment. Unlike

typical constructivist approaches, an enactivist learning world would allow learners to immerse in rich

and stimulating learning experiences while the intentionally built-in constraints foster learners’

development towards the set of intended co-evolving patterns. Further, the possible merging of humans

and the electronic systems implies that technology may play an essential role for learning. This will also

reframe issues of authority and knowledge. Learners, therefore, are co-authors of their learning

environments, their learning, and knowledge.

One possible example of such learning worlds is by using educational games integrating Web 2.0

and associated technologies. Previous work has demonstrated that significant learning of students occurs

through investigating, constructing, and interrogating in hypothetical worlds (de Castell & Jenson, 2005;

Gee, 2003; Jenson & de Castell, 2002; Squire, 2006). Many existing games are designed as complex

environments of interrelated parts, mirroring our real world, that engross players and are controlled to

act in certain ways (Gee, 2003, p.42). Researchers (Gee, 2003; Squire, 2006) note that a core

characteristic of games is doing and that

knowing is at its essence a kind of performance, as learners learn by doing, but within

powerful constraints instantiated through software and social systems. The focus is onexperience that enables students to develop situated understandings, to learn through

failure, and to develop identities as expert problem solvers

(Squire, 2006, p. 26)

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Players interact, enact in and with this environment, coevolving with not only the cyber world

but also the real world. Game environments can be designed as a multimodal space that reflects not only

the complexity of the creation of cyber worlds but also the ramification of the design of social

relationships/identities in our modern world. This space, with situated meanings, allows players to solve

problems through embodied experiences (Gee, 2003).

For instance, we can develop a learning world where students can create games to teach others

specific content. In this world, students are co-authors and designers of the learning environments

toward the possible coevolving patterns. This world provides a foundation and resource that the students

act and solve problems. As players, students immerse in a world of action through which they learn from

experiences guided by the very design of the learning world. Various constraints are built-in and

students accept a powerful set of values connected to their identity (virtual or real). Through the use of

Web 2.0, students co-emerge with the world through their actions of building mental models, playing the

game, evaluating the outcomes, and revising their actions.

Nature of IDT Research

Research of IDT, from an enactivist standpoint, would focus on studying

relations/connections amongst different components in the systems rather than on isolated

events/elements. We would pay equal attention to the environmental, physical, and mental

aspects, and take holistic approaches for the examination of them. Because experimental

methods and purely cognitive theorizing/research are all valued, we would adapt qualitative,

quantitative, and correlational methods, depending on the nature of the investigation. Our

analyses that emphasize the current and historical context of actions can directly contribute to

educational practices, and these results can provide guidance to change the learning world to

improve educational practice. IDT research, therefore, would center on careful and frequent

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examination of the interrelationships between actions and context, including behavioral, mental

and other outcomes in the complex systems.

CONCLUSION

Although both Objectivism and constructivism have contributed significantly to IDT, they fall

short in several ways. They see the world dichotomously, and therefore, the physical is separated from

the mental. Enactivism rejects dualism and argues, pervasively, that the mental and physical are

inseparable.

If IDT chooses to adopt an enactivist worldview, we will need to consider a revolutionary shift in

our philosophical paradigms. This is not to abandon all of our objectivist and constructivist assumptions

and presuppositions in favor of the enactivist ones. Rather, we suggest that enactivism holds important

lessons for us about understanding learning and, by inference, designing environments to enhance

learning. These environments should be rich, as the world is rich, as opposed to a singular or linear

sequence of events. They must contain varied stimulations, where students’ attentions are guided toward

particular content, though the exact results will vary from person to person. This environment attends to

and responds to student needs and the sense they are making.

The intention of this paper is to offer another “analytical lens through which to view human

activity – not a replacement of any other lenses” (Jonassen, 2006, p. 44), which can have significant

implications for IDT. It fundamentally questions the assumptions of IDT that learning can be prescribed

and knowledge is a ‘thing’ to be “acquired”, whether outside (objective knowledge) or inside (subjective

knowledge) the knower. Enactivism argues that learning can only be influenced, knowledge is a domain

of possibilities, and ‘where knowledge is’ depends on the situation (Davis, Sumara, & Luce-Kapler,

2000). While we argue that enactivism brings great promises, it, just like any other epistemological

paradigm, should not be considered as the panacea for all the problems in education and training.

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References1

2

Documents

EnActivism BJET Final