Enabling Unity of Effort in Homeland Response Operations

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STRATEGIC

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External Research Associates Program

ENABLING UNITY OF EFFORTIN HOMELAND RESPONSE OPERATIONS

H Steven BlumKerry McIntyre

April 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-530-5


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FOREWORD

Any signi cant homeland response event requiresAmericans to work together. This has proven to be acomplex challenge. Our response capabilities, whilesubstantial, are spread across thousands of stakehold -ers: federal, state, and local government agencies andorganizations, nongovernmental organizations, andprivate industry. No single actor has all the necessarytools to respond completely to a major crisis. Despiteconsiderable national effort and resources devoted toplanning, training, integrating, and improving ourhomeland response capabilities, effectiveness in work -ing togetherunity of effortstill seems to elude us.Achieving unity of effort is dif cult even in simplesituations. It becomes increasingly complicated whenit involves dozens or even hundreds of participants

in a federal system such as ours, where responsibilityand capability are distributed across many levels andfunctions. Finding ways to synergize a broad range ofresponsible participants is the central challenge to ef -fective homeland response operations.

In this monograph, H Steven Blum and Kerry Mc -Intyre argue that the problem of achieving unity of ef -fort in homeland response is not one of poor planningor inadequate resources, but rather more fundamental.It involves the way in which thousands of participantsfrom dissimilar professional cultures think about theirroles and responsibilities for homeland response. Toaddress this problem, Blum and McIntyre propose abroadly construed national doctrine, developed in adynamic and responsive doctrine-producing system.

They cite the example of joint military doctrine, whichattained its contemporary robust state and authorita -tive impact only through changes implemented as a re -


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sult of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The joint doctrine-producing system that arose from Goldwater-Nichols

remedied many shortcomings, such as enforcing con -gruity between individual service and joint doctrine,identifying and addressing capability gaps, and incor -porating the requirements of eld commanders. Theauthors contend that a dynamic national homelandresponse doctrine, developed in a truly inclusive na-tional system, would have a similar effect in syner-gizing national capabilities. They propose a doctrinalsystem that develops and implements operationalconcepts, plans, and training programs. The conceptsare thoroughly tested in realistic exercises and actualoperations. The plans, operations, and training pro -grams are then systematically analyzed to inform andupdate evolving doctrinal concepts, which ultimatelyin uence the organization, training, and equipping of

response elements.Blum and McIntyre contend that such a nationaldoctrine requires a new management concept, fash -ioned on the model of the militarys Joint InteragencyTask Force (JIATF). They argue that this concept hasbroad potential not just in support of military opera -tions, but any time disparate response organizationsmust work together. They suggest a JIATF-like inter -agency coordination and action group which couldoperate across and between jurisdictional divides tounify not just the federal interagency response, butstate and perhaps local interagency efforts as well. Indeveloping this idea, they outline some of the criticalfunctions this element should perform.

Finally, the authors address the problem of en -

suring that our militarys available dual capableforcesactive and reserveare contributing to unityof effort in homeland response. They discuss the na -scent potential of dual-status command, the arti cial

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impediment posed by the division of forces into sepa -rate legal statuses under Title 10 and Title 32, and the

possibility of a civil support force generation modelto improve predictability in providing available capa -bilities for homeland response.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

H STEVEN BLUM served over 42 years in uniform,capping a career as the rst National Guardsman toserve as a Deputy Combatant Commander. As DeputyCommander, U.S. Northern Command, he fundamen -tally reshaped how Americans and the U.S. militarythink about, prepare for, and conduct operations forhomeland defense, homeland security, and defensesupport of civil authority. In two terms as Chief, Na -tional Guard Bureau, he transformed the NationalGuard from a Cold War strategic reserve into a 21stcentury operational force capable of joint and expedi -tionary warfare and exible response to a broad rangeof civil and humanitarian contingencies. He was re -sponsible for deploying over 50,000 National Guards -

men in response to Hurricane Katrina, the largestmilitary response to a natural disaster in U.S. history.Lieutenant General (Ret.) Blum has commanded aSpecial Forces Detachment, an Infantry Battalion, andtwo brigades. As Commanding General, 29th Infan -try Division, he deployed over 6,500 citizen-soldiersfrom 21 states to Bosnia-Herzegovina. He simultane -ously served as Commanding General-MultinationalDivision (North) in Operation JOINT FORGE, leadinga Russian airborne brigade, a Turkish Army brigade,and a Multinational Nordic-Polish brigade. GeneralBlum currently serves as Executive-in-Residence atthe Johns Hopkins University School of Education,Division of Public Safety and Leadership. He is alsoManaging Director and Practice Lead for Sitrick &

Company, a broadly known crisis communicationsorganization. General Blum is a frequent consultantfor private and government organizations on plan -ning, training, and disaster response.


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KERRY MCINTYRE currently serves as a Strategic

Planner in support of the Maryland Army NationalGuard. He served nearly 24 years in uniform, includingmore than 21 years of fulltime service in the MarylandArmy National Guard. His military career includesassignments in personnel, operations, and staff man -agement at battalion, brigade, and state (Joint ForceHeadquarters) level. As the Executive Of cer, 58thTroop Command, he supervised daily planning andpreparations for the states ground Joint Task Forcefor civil support. His career includes a variety of rolesin civil support operations and exercises. LieutenantColonel (Ret.) McIntyre is a graduate of the AmericanUniversity School of International Service and the U.S.Army War College.


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SUMMARY

Balancing authorities and responsibilities withinour federal system has been a matter of continuousdebate since the earliest days of the republic. Its con -tinued relevance is exempli ed in our current nationalconversation over how to most effectively organizeand operate for homeland security and defense. Cri -ses and catastrophic events in our homeland requireAmericans from different organizations, jurisdictions,and functions to work together. Yet despite consider -able national effort and resources devoted to devel -oping and improving our collective response capa -bilities, effectiveness in working togetherunity ofeffortstill seems to elude us.

Achieving unity of effort is the central challengeto effective homeland response operations. No single

organization, function, or stakeholder has all the nec -essary tools to respond completely to the wide rangeof crises that routinely occur, or could occur, in ourhomeland. Combining the assets, capabilities, exper -tise, and resources of multiple participants has provento be exceedingly complex and dif cult. Our home -land response capabilities are considerable, but theyare dispersed across a patchwork of jurisdictions andfunctions. The challenge in homeland response opera -tions is neither inadequate resources nor lack of capa -bilities, but rather in being able to bring them to bearat the right time and place, and in the right combina -tion. Disasters in our homeland have enormous con -sequences. Regardless of cause or extent, they alwayshold the potential for signi cant loss of life, human

suffering, economic dislocation, and erosion of publiccon dence in government. Given all that is at stake,we must do better. There are certainly a number of


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ways to improve our results; this monograph propos -es three speci c ways to do so.

First, enhancing our capacity for unity of effortrequires more than simply devoting more resourcesand rhetoric to the problem. The challenge is morefundamental; it requires us to change the way wethink about homeland response in order to establishthe intellectual pre-conditions for uni ed effort. Cre -ating this cultural shift requires a national homelandresponse doctrine, formulated in a dynamic and re-sponsive doctrinal system. Doctrine performs a vitalunifying function in complex operations. It delineatesbest practices, establishes standards, and clari es ter -minology, responsibilities, and procedures. It createscommon understandings, bridging organizationaland jurisdictional divides.

A nascent federal homeland response doctrine cur-

rently exists, codi ed in the National Response Frame -work (NRF), National Incident Management System(NIMS), and Incident Command System (ICS). Yet, adoctrinal system is larger than the doctrine itself. Itoperates in a dynamic cycle, providing a process toidentify capability gaps, develop new operating con -cepts, and validate them against rigorous standards.An effective doctrinal system also incorporates allrelevant stakeholders in the full cycle of concept de -velopment, validation, and integration into plans andprocedures. Current homeland response doctrine isa federal, not national doctrine. A unifying nationaldoctrine, engendered in a dynamic and responsivesystem, would provide the basis for developing a na -tional culture of communication and cooperation in

homeland response operations.A second way to enhance our capacity for unity of

effort is to ensure that national doctrine can be broad -

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ly implemented. A truly national homeland responsedoctrine system will function in an interagency, in -

tergovernmental, multi-jurisdictional environment.Implementing it requires a new management struc -ture that can also operate in the spaces between agen -cies and governments. The example of the militarys Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) points the waytoward this new structure. A permanent interagencycoordination and action group, which integrates in -puts, resources, and capabilities of all stakeholders,can synergize and coordinate the efforts of all. Sucha structure clearly has an application at federal, state,and perhaps even local level, as each has a complexinteragency framework to manage in order to fullyintegrate response capabilities. To be effective, thisstructure cannot be subordinate to any single agencyor function; it must be responsive to all stakeholders

and accountable to an elected leader with authorityover the interagency effort.A third way to enhance unity of effort is to remove

barriers to employment of military capabilities forhomeland response operations. There are clear legalrestrictions on the roles and uses of our military athome, which exist for sound reasons. Yet much of ourmilitary can be characterized as dual capable, de -scribing forces with inherent capabilities useful bothfor war ghting and for civil support tasks. It makeslittle difference to the injured, hungry, and dispos -sessed that the soldier who rescued them is a NationalGuardsman, a Title 10 reservist, or an active duty ser -vice member. Their reasonable expectation is that theforces raised and sustained with their tax dollars will

provide for their safety when needed. For this rea -son, we should be removing impediments to utilizingour military forcesparticularly our reserve compo -


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nentsfor homeland response operations when theyare not engaged in other federal missions. This is not a

matter of apportioning different forces to the NationalGuard. Rather, it is one of determining when and howany relevant military capabilities should be placedunder a governors authority for civil support roles.The recent development of the concept of dual statuscommand is a step forward in this regard. Develop -ment of a predictable civil support force generationmodel, similar to the one employed by the services forfederal missions overseas, will further enhance unityof effort by facilitating planning among the states fortemporary use of dual status military capabilities.

Achieving unity of effort in homeland response is acomplex challenge, among the greatest of our age. It isthe single most important factor in our ability to planfor and respond effectively to disasters at home. We

devote enormous resources to public safety and secu -rity at many levels. Our citizens surely have a right toexpect that these resources will be well used by theirleaders, elected and appointed. This means that wemust nd better ways to work together. It requiresleaders and organizations at all levels to combine theirefforts, resources, and capabilities to achieve completeand responsive solutions. It requires us to developnew ways of thinking about and managing homelandresponse capabilities, before disaster strikes.


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ENABLING UNITY OF EFFORTIN HOMELAND RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Who is likely to make suitable provisions for the pub -lic defense, as that body to which the guardianship ofthe public safety is con ded . . . which, by the exten -sion of its authority throughout the States, can aloneestablish uniformity and concert in the plans and mea -sures by which the common safety is to be secured?

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper No. 23

Questions about achieving unity of effort in ourpublic policy, and the balance of authority and respon -sibility between various levels of government, are asold as the republic. They have enormous contempo -rary relevance, particularly in the national debate over

how we organize and act to secure the safety of ourcitizens and interests at home. We believe that achiev -ing unity of effort is the central challenge to effectivehomeland response operations. Despite all the effortand considerable resources devoted to improving ourcapabilities, effectiveness in working togetherunityof effortstill seems to elude us. In many disastersituations, including the largest and most dangerous,the ability to eld a seamless, uni ed, robust responsefrom our enormously capable mix of local, state, andfederal government and private sector entities is stillout of reach. This monograph examines how we mightchange our current organization and doctrine todayto achieve a more effective response. For simplicity,the term homeland response is used to encompass

all facets of planning, preparing, and resourcing for;directly responding to; and mitigating and recover -ing from, the broad spectrum of catastrophic events


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in the American homeland, ranging from natural toman-made disasters, industrial accidents, pandemic

disease, terrorist attacks, and similar events.

Why Unity of Effort?

Any signi cant homeland response event re -quires Americans to work together. Doing so canbe a complex challenge. Our nation has enormousresources and vast capacity available to it, but theseare spread across a patchwork of jurisdictions, agen -cies, and authorities. No single organization, function,or stakeholder has all the necessary tools to respondcompletely to a major crisis, let alone many smallerones. Combining the assets, capabilities, expertise,organizations, and resources of multiple participantsis extremely dif cult. This should be unsurprising;

achieving unity of effort is dif cult even for structur -ally similar, well-resourced entities operating underuni ed commandsuch as our military. It becomesincreasingly complicated when it involves dozensor even hundreds of participants in a federal systemsuch as ours, where responsibility and capability aredistributed across many levels and functions. At eachlevel of government, homeland response must com -bine planners and responders with diverse organiza -tional cultures operating under separate authoritiesand differing, even divergent, operational require -ments and objectives.

In normal times, the distribution and balancingof power in our federal system are a considerablestrength, a crucial element in the vitality and respon -

siveness of our democracy. However, the multitudeof threats we face in our homeland are not con nedto the capabilities of a single function, nor within the


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bounds of geography or jurisdiction; both prepared -ness and response are complicated by the seams

in our system. In his seminal work On War , Carl VonClausewitz wrote that in war even the simplest thingsare dif cult, and that dif culties accumulate . . . pro -ducing a kind of friction. This friction is an impedi -ment that makes the apparently easy so dif cult. 1 Just as in warfare, a kind of Clausewitzian friction isquite obviously at work in every homeland responsesituation, in every crisis which demands collectiveaction. The diffusion of authorities and capabilitiesacross multiple agencies, organizations, and levels ofgovernment, coupled with the sheer size and complex -ity of the nation, creates an unavoidable friction thatmakes the simplest operations dif cult and achievingunity of effort a daunting challenge.

Solving any problem must begin with de ning it.

Our homeland response problem is not one of insuf -cient resources. We spend billions, possibly more thanany other nation, on homeland response. It is not oneof individual assets. We have highly developed medi -cal, police, re, transportation, logistics, communica -tions, military, and other emergency response capabil -ities. The problem at its heart is not lacking resourcesand capabilities, but in being unable to bring them tobear at the right time and place, and in the right com -bination, to achieve effective results. It is the inabilityto integrate a vast array of systems and elements intoa seamless, coordinated response. Combining whateach stakeholder brings to the table requires coopera -tion, communication, collaboration, and coordination.These are the most important factors in homeland re-

sponsethey are the key to achieving unity of effort.Without them, effective response is impossible.


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Some recent and well-known major disasters illus -trate the problem. Nuclear disasters elicit particularly

grave concern because of their potential for large-scale human suffering and extremely long-term con -sequences. On April 26, 1986, the Chernobyl nuclearreactor in the former Soviet Republic of Ukraine expe -rienced a disastrous explosion resulting from a combi -nation of poor design and human error. While not anAmerican catastrophe, Chernobyl affected people inmany nations. It demonstrated clearly that problemswith unity of effort are not unique to our system; thepotential exists anytime multiple organizations and jurisdictions have to work together. It also shows thebroad (even international) consequences of ineffectivedisaster response.

Soviet authorities tried to prevent news of it fromreaching the rest of the world even as they struggled

to respond to the crisis. The rst noti cation camefrom radiation detectors at a Swedish nuclear facilitymore than 600 miles from the Chernobyl plant. 2 Firstresponders desperately undertook suicidal efforts tocontrol the re, using inadequate equipment and tech -niques. The resulting cloud of radioactive materialspread over much of Europe. Soviet attempts to hidethe nature and extent of the problem overshadowedand hampered their internal response and precludedtimely assistance from potential international part-ners, even as it put populations across their countryand the region at risk. Ad hoc response and poorlycoordinated efforts exacerbated the consequences ofwhat is commonly acknowledged to be the worst di -saster in the history of the nuclear industry. 3 Despite

the bravery of those at the scene, both planning andresponse were ineffective; and the consequences ofthe disaster will continue to challenge the Ukrainiangovernment and many others for decades to come.


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On September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist cells of theal Qaeda network hijacked four commercial airlin -

ers. They ew two of them into the twin towers of theWorld Trade Center in New York. A third plane wasused to attack the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia,and the fourth crashed outside of Shanksville, Penn -sylvania. Using comparatively low technology, a de -termined enemy was able to strike a substantial blowwithin the U.S. homeland. Nearly 3,000 people werekilled, the largest single loss of life to foreign attack onAmerican soil in the nations history. 4 In the immedi -ate crisis, authorities struggled to obtain an accuratepicture of the situation, share information betweenagencies, and determine how to coordinate govern -ment efforts to respond to the attacks. 5 In the days andweeks that followed, senior leaders had extreme dif -culty coordinating the vast resources and capabilities

of the nation to mitigate and recover from the attacks,anticipate and prevent additional attacks, and de -velop an appropriate response. 6 Air Force planes ewcombat patrols over the nations cities and NationalGuardsmen patrolled the airports. Congress hastilydebated and passed the USA PATRIOT Act. State andlocal governments desperately tried to evaluate theirvulnerabilities and to protect the public and privateassets in their jurisdictions. Substantial reorganiza -tions in the federal government were quickly initi -ated. A new cabinet-level Department of HomelandSecurity was created by combining 22 federal agen -cies. The Department of Defense (DoD) established anew combatant command (U.S. Northern Command)to manage homeland defense, and created a new po -

sition with the title of Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Homeland Defense and Americas Security Af -fairs (ASD-HDASA). These changes were generally


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necessary and prudent, but unity of effort cannot beattained by simply redrawing a line and block chart.

Unfortunately, some of these organizational changeshad the unintended consequence of making unity ofeffort more dif cult. Despite all the restructuring ofagencies and refocusing of resources, many still ques -tion whether the nation is truly safer or better pre -pared for the next terrorist strike. 7

Four years later, on August 29, 2005, HurricaneKatrina struck the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Mis -sissippi. The initial effects of the storm, coupled withlevee failures in New Orleans, caused widespreaddevastation and ooding. Over the ensuing weeks,poor information sharing, lack of coordination, andpolitically-motivated bickering delayed a uni ed re -sponse, and thereby exacerbated the suffering of theaffected population. 8 After Hurricane Katrina, another

congressional inquiry detailed the causes and resultsof the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history. 9 Despite massive national efforts over the preceding 4years to reorganize, refocus, and better prepare, thecongressional inquiry noted a lack of initiative, coop -erative effort, effective communication, and situation-al awareness. Once again, unity of effort eluded us.

More recently, a large man-made disaster struckthe same region. On April 20, 2010, a British Petro -leum (BP) deep-water oil-drilling platform in the Gulfof Mexico known as Deepwater Horizon suffered acatastrophic explosion, sinking the rig. Eleven crewmembers lost their lives, and the damaged well spilledcrude oil into the Gulf of Mexico as BP, its partners,the scienti c and technical communities, and govern -

ment leaders at all levels struggled to nd ways to capthe well and contain the massive spill. The involve -ment of a major foreign-owned multinational corpora -


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tion further complicated the situation. Over the next 3months, the well discharged an estimated ve million

barrels of oil into the gulf, constituting the largest acci -dental oil spill in history and resulting in widespreadecological and economic distress that is being felt tothis day. 10 While analyses are still being written, onemight easily conclude that failure to achieve unity ofeffort reduced the effectiveness of the response, miti-gation, and recovery efforts.

These major catastrophes differ in many of theirparticulars. Some mishaps that were preventable oc -curred; some that were unavoidable were made worseby human error, mechanical failures, procedural laps -es, and poor information sharing. This monographwill not discuss in-depth postmortems on any of thesedisasters, as such. Rather, it provides recent and well-known examples of a common problem in disaster

planning and response. Each crisis was characterizedby multiple failures among the participants to worktogether effectively. Leaders charged with planningand managing the response failed to achieve unity ofeffort. They were less effective than they needed to be,and the loss of life, human suffering, and other long-term negative consequences were accordingly madeconsiderably worse.

Disasters in our homeland have enormous conse -quences. Regardless of their cause, size, and scope,they always hold the potential for signi cant loss oflife, human suffering, economic dislocation, and ero -sion of public con dence in our government and ourleaders. Given what is at stake, we must do better. The

ndings of many investigatory committees and blue

ribbon commissions underscore a broad consensusthat there are substantial impediments to unity of ef -fort and effective response. Such ndings inform the


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ongoing national conversation on this topic, as wellthey should. This monograph proposes three recom -

mendations for improving our capacity for uni ed ef -fort in homeland response operations. Certainly thereare other ways to enhance and synergize our responsecapabilities, but we believe these proposals merit care -ful consideration.

First, to be consistently effective, we must createa culture of collaboration and cooperation. We mustestablish the intellectual pre-conditions for uni ed ef -fort by changing the way we think about homelandresponse. Creating an operating culture that fostersunity of effort requires a national homeland responsedoctrine, formulated in a dynamic and responsive doc-trinal system . Our military forces and our national re-

ghting entity have such systems. The militarys jointdoctrine development system grew out of the legis -

lative mandate of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,11

whilenational re doctrine has developed under the Na -tional Fire Administration, established in response toshortcomings identi ed in the 1973 report of the Na -tional Commission on Fire Prevention and Control. 12 However, the comprehensive doctrinal systems theyhave developed are not replicated to the same degreeacross the wider homeland response community.

More important, there is no single national doctri -nal system that covers all functions and stakeholders.To be clear, there is published federal doctrine embod -ied in the National Response Framework (NRF), theNational Incident Management System (NIMS), andthe Incident Command System (ICS). Publication ofthese documents was a substantial step forward. But

what is missing is far more important. Doctrine is dy -namic; it is evolutionary. To be effective, it must devel -op within a common system, through a standardized


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process incorporating the inputs of all stakeholders asa timely response to the lessons of realistic training

and operational experience. We propose that such acomprehensive doctrinal system is not only possiblefor homeland response, but in fact essential. It is theliving structure and process through which a cultureof cooperation and collaboration can be fostered.

Second, to implement a common national doctrinewhich operates across the many divides in our sys-tem, we need a new management construct, one thatoperates in the spaces between jurisdictions and func -tions to integrate and synergize the contributions ofall. Again, our military has pointed a way forward.Several uni ed commands operate Joint InteragencyCoordinating Groups (JIACGs) and Joint InteragencyTask Forces (JIATFs). 13 The doctrinal basis for their or -ganization and functions is slender but growing, and

their operational effectiveness is well established. Theresults of JIATF-South over the preceding 2 decades,for example, provide clear evidence of the value of theconcept. 14 We propose establishing a similar conceptand rigorously testing it across the range of home -land response operations. The concept should not bea military one, but instead a more broadly construeddoctrinal model which will evolve over time and en-compass all elements involved in homeland responseoperations.

Third, we should remove the barriers to unity ofeffort within our military civil support capabilities.This requires that we put in place the authorities anddoctrine necessary to provide our governors (and thePresident) with the ability to effectively employ DoD

assets for homeland response. Most of our militaryboth active and reservecontains capabilities withstrong utility for civil support. Placing them off limits


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for homeland response is simply counterproductive.Our reserve components (RC) are particularly well

positioned to bear principal responsibility for defensesupport of civil authority (DSCA); they are forwarddeployed across the nation. However, impedimentsto their training, resourcing, readiness, and availabil -ity for this mission remain. Military capabilities thatmight be useful to a governor should not be withheldin time of need, regardless of the command to whichthey are assigned. This requires that we build the au -thorities and processes necessary to access useful forc-es and capabilities, when and where they are needed.It may entail further modi cation of Title 32 of the U.S.code to permit swift and seamless movement of capa-bilities into a status accessible to a governor, and willcertainly require improved procedural mechanisms. 15 Recent steps to clarify and simplify dual status com-

mand structures are a logical step in this direction.16

We believe that many military capabilities could, un -der the right circumstances, be available to a governorand serve under a quali ed dual status commander.Additionally, procedures for identifying and prepar -ing capabilities in advance of catastrophe must bedeveloped. DSCA is a complex mission set. Availableforces should be designated and trained in advanceif their capabilities are to be fully ready when called.States must be able to plan for homeland contingencyoperations with con dence, knowing which militarycapabilities are ready and available, and empoweredto act decisively to employ them when needed. 17

Why National Doctrine?

We must focus rst on doctrine to enable unity ofeffort in homeland response. One might observe thatwe already have federal doctrine published by the


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Department of Homeland Security, that the serviceshave joint doctrine for civil support and homeland

response, and that many elements across the variousEmergency Support Functions (ESFs) 18 have a pub -lished doctrine. However, it is not the doctrine wepossess, but rather the doctrine we lack which is at is -sue. The open questions about our homeland responsecapabilities, including those questions that have yet tobe asked, must be answered with doctrinal solutions.For this to occur, we need a robust national homelandresponse doctrine which is more than a federal doc-trine, larger than the doctrine of individual responsefunctions or joint military civil response doctrine. Itmust subsume, decon ict, and integrate the separatedoctrines of its members; it must do so responsivelyon a continuing basis. It must draw on the input andexpertise of all participants, particularly the agencies

and departments of the states and localities, and othernonfederal stakeholders. What currently exists is goodbut not unifying doctrine; and it is a federal doctrineonly. A unifying national doctrine will incorporate allthe capabilities of the nation within a single system.

The experience of our military makes a strong casefor a national homeland response doctrine system.Despite organizationally similar cultures, unity ofcommand, and strong service doctrine, our militarysperformance in operations such as the Iranian hostagerescue in 1980 and the Grenada intervention in 1983 un -derscore how dif cult it is for complex organizationsto work together effectively. In contrast, the impres -sive combat performances in Panama, Kuwait, Iraq,and Afghanistan in recent decades, and in many op -

erations short of war in various locations, underscorethe value of joint doctrine in creating uni ed effortacross the services. Yet it took a statutory pushthe


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Goldwater-Nichols Actto create the joint doctrinedevelopment system and the body of doctrine our

military now employs. Prior to that legislation, therewas no standard process for initiating, coordinating,approving, or revising joint doctrine. There was norequirement for congruity between joint and servicedoctrine, or for incorporating the requirements of theforce commanders who had to employ the doctrine.There was no way to identify and address conceptualvoids, and no mechanism for validating the ef cacyof emerging concepts. 19 Our military forcesand thenationpaid dearly for the lack of a robust joint doc -trine over the decades from the end of World War IIthrough 1985. 20 Yet the militarys joint doctrine systemis now in place, has matured over the past 25 years,and continues to evolve. The bene ts for the militaryservices are demonstrated by their unrivaled perfor -

mance across a broad range of operational challenges.Considering the thousands of disparate stakeholdersinvolved in homeland response, it will certainly bemore dif cult to bring this kind of rigor to a nationaldoctrinal system. For this very reason, such a systemis all the more important.

Doctrine performs a vital unifying function incomplex operations. It delineates what is taught,believed, and advocated as what is right (i.e., whatworks best). It provides textbook solutions for howthings should be done to achieve speci c results. Itstandardizes terminology, training, relationships,responsibilities, and processes. 21 Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, the individual services had well-developeddoctrinal concepts. Each had institutional structures

for identifying unmet requirements and for updat -ing and improving their doctrine. For example, theArmys doctrinal revolution following the Vietnam


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War was an institutional response to perceived newstrategic challenges. It helped lay the foundation for

the successes of our land forces over the ensuing 3decades. 22 Yet individual service doctrine, by de ni -tion, must be subordinate to joint doctrine. To achievecommon understanding between the services, jointdoctrine coordinates and integrates service doctri -nal concepts. It operates across service boundariesto unify their approaches to common challenges andbind together the ways in which they are addressed. Joint doctrine provides the cultural basis for effectivecommunication by standardizing terms and formats.It enhances coordination by generating and updatingcommon tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Itpromotes collaboration and cooperation by providingcommon ways of thinking about and solving prob -lems. Doctrine clari es relationships: who leads and

who follows, who supports and who is supported. Joint doctrine promotes a common perspective fromwhich to plan, train, and conduct military operations. . . it guides employment of forces in coordinated andintegrated action toward a common objective. 23 Jointdoctrine creates the basis for our military to coopera -tively produce capabilities far greater than any singleservice can eld. In short, despite the commonly ac -knowledged importance across the services of unityof command, it is joint doctrine that has given themunity of effort.

Joint military doctrine operates in a dynamic cycle.It provides a process through which capability gapsare identi ed. Corresponding operating concepts aredeveloped, elded, and incorporated into operational

plans and then validated against rigorous standardsin realistic training and the crucible of real-world ex -perience. The results are analyzed and used to in u -


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ence the ongoing development of doctrine. Successfulresults support training, organizing, and equipping

standards. Failures are equally important, drivingchanges to improve doctrinal concepts and standardsand hopefully future results. But whether success orfailure, the development of future capabilities, of jointoperating concepts, and of standards for equipping,training, and organizing response elements are dy -namically affected by the rigorously tested results oftodays doctrinal concepts.

A recent DoD advisory panel on enhancing de -fense support of civil authority found that there iscurrently no comprehensive national integrated plan -ning system to respond to either natural or manmadedisasters. Further, planning among federal agenciesand other levels of government is fragmented andnonstandard, and there is no formal process by which

state plans can inform federal planning and vice ver -sa. 24 The panel report asserted that:

the emergency response community has long under -stood that the foundation for any effective response toa . . . catastrophic incident consists of effective plan -ning and information sharing before the emergencyand a coordinated preparation and response activity

prior to, during, and after the incident.25

To correct the shortcomings in planning and coordi -nation processes, they recommended that:

the President direct the establishment of an integratedplanning system that promotes coordinated planningamong local, state, and federal government entities

and the private sector . . . international organizationsand friendly and allied governments. 26


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The panel cited a 2003 Homeland Security PresidentialDirective (HSPD-8) as an appropriate model. Much of

what HSPD-8 sought to establish looks a lot like a na -tional homeland response doctrine system. It directedthe creation of:

A national doctrine and planning guidance,instruction, and process to ensure consistentplanning across the federal government;

A mechanism for concept development; A process . . . for plan re nement which re ects

developments in risk, capabilities, and policies,and incorporates lessons learned from exercisesand actual incidents;

A process that links regional, state, local, andtribal plans; planning cycles; and processes,and allows these plans to inform the develop-ment of federal plans;

A process for fostering vertical and horizontalintegration of federal, state, local, and tribalplans, and for using assessments of state, local,and tribal capabilities to inform the develop -ment of federal plans; and,

A guide for all-hazards planning, with compre -hensive, practical guidance and instruction onfundamental planning principles that can beused at federal, state, local, and tribal levels toassist the planning process. 27

The objective of HSPD-8 was to create a systemin which thinking about homeland response amongfederal, state, and local governments comes togetherto create a uni ed, and unifying, national way of op -

eratingthat is, a national doctrine. There is federaldoctrine, and there are federal exercises and training;states and localities also plan and train. However,


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there is no national point of convergence in our home -land response thinking. There is no single place where

differing concepts are understood, de-con icted, andsynthesized to create integrated response capabilities.There is no uni ed system to identify capability gapsand requirements, develop concepts, solicit input,and ensure buy in from all stakeholders. There is nosystematic process to validate national doctrinal con-cepts in full-scale, realistic exercises, and real-worldexperience, or to integrate them into national plan -ning. The effect of a robust joint operating doctrine onour military has been profound. It would be equallyprofound for our homeland response capabilities. Itwould provide a locus in which common understand-ings are formed, where common operating conceptsand principles are analyzed, validated, updated, andauthoritatively disseminated.

A National Homeland Response Doctrine System.

A system that dynamically develops a nationalhomeland response doctrine for all participants is thecritical rst step to enabling unity of effort. But whatshould this system look like? In general, it should op -erate like the model depicted in Figure 1. It should cer -tainly include all of the elements in HSPD-8 outlinedabove. The DoD advisory panel found that the currentadministration had not reaf rmed, amended, or su -perseded HSPD-8, and so they recommended a pres -idential directive establishing an integrated nationalplanning system. Yet, a system founded on executiveorder seems inconsistent with creating the basis for

unity of effort. The aw in such a system, of course,is that it is a creature of the federal executive branchalone. It will extend only as far as the reach of the ex -


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ecutive branch and last as long as a President directs.Presidential orders also lack speci c and long-term

funding, hampering their implementation beyond theexecutive branch.

Figure 1. Theoretical Model of theNational Homeland Response Doctrinal Cycle.

A truly national system must be based on morethan executive at, and must endure beyond the nextelection cycle. It is important to start somewhere, anda presidential directive may be a useful starting point.Certainly, it could enable a doctrinal system to beestablished more quickly. But in the end, just as thearmed forces needed the legislative spur of the Gold -water-Nichols Act to develop a true joint doctrinesystem, so a national homeland response doctrinal

system will require a legislative impetus to be endur -ing, to be properly resourced and fully re ective of thebroad mix of interests at stake. Just as important, this


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system must be larger than the federal government. Inour democratic system, responsibility and authority

are balanced. Our homeland response is graduated,beginning at the local level and progressively draw -ing upon the higher-level resources and capabilitiesneeded to address the challenge. In this system, undermost circumstances the federal government can lead,facilitate, incorporate, integrate . . . but not dictate.Consequently, it must includeas equal partnersthe states, localities, and others. A congressionalmandate would provide the kind of broad nationalrepresentation that is needed. The executive branchcould undertake both kinds of actions, initially issu -ing a presidential directive to the various executivebranch departments even as legislation is developedto create a more lasting system. However, a nationaldoctrine system will be enduring only if it is broadly

construed, has a basis in federal law, and is adequatelyresourced. Most important, it must include more thanfederal government entities and equities.

Properly established, a national homeland re -sponse doctrinal system will incorporate a seniorbody of elected and appointed federal, state, and localof cials who will validate requirements and emergingstrategic operating concepts. Including representationfrom states, localities, and other players that must bea part of a national system will ensure their buy-inand cooperation. Operating below this senior levelshould be a set of institutional bodies which identifycapability gaps and requirements, develop draft doc -trinal concepts, present them for validation, and, oncevalidated, fully develop and implement them as inter-

agency and/or intergovernmental components of thenational doctrine. This subordinate structure shouldalso include regular representation and input from


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all members of the homeland response community.National doctrine should begin with and build upon

the NRF, NIMS, and ICS, which are well accepted andbroadly understood; it would develop and evolveconcepts as needed. Doctrinal concepts created in thissystem would be incorporated into planning at eachlevel in part because the stakeholders help to developthem. The system could further ensure this by includ -ing procedures for linking local, state, and federalplans, planning cycles and processes, and for integrat -ing plans of other stakeholders into federal planning.This will require more than a new processit will re -quire a doctrinally-based awareness that the federalgovernment must (in most cases) lead by supporting.It will require federal response plans that support andintegrate those of the states and other participants inthe process.

A national doctrine system must go beyond con -cept development and integration of plans. Doctrinalconcepts, plans, and capabilities must be rigorouslytested with realistic training and exercises, conductedunder consistent standards relying on objective datacollection, and combined with painstaking analysis ofactual, real world operations. Validation of doctrineshould include a national homeland response trainingcenter system, with its main training aid being anactual mock-up of a small city. 28 This unfortunate citywould be routinely threatened by natural disasters,assaulted by imaginative domestic and foreign ter -rorists, subject to industrial accidents, and bathed inpandemic diseases. It would host a diverse array ofparticipants drawn from the federal interagency, state

and local governments, and other relevant partners. Afull-scale national training center would be a provingground for developing doctrinal concepts that can be


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replicated, trained, improved, adapted, and appliedin jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations across the

nation. It should link multiple elements and smallerregional centers in virtual space to provide tailoredand multiechelon training across agencies, jurisdic -tions, and responsibilities. Senior leaders of federal,state, and local government would interact with newsmedia, industry, and private organizations while di -recting and managing actual responders operating inrealistic conditions. The system should be robustlyinstrumented and staffed to gather data for analysis,dissemination, and doctrinal development. The re -sult would be better response elements, led by bettertrained and more capable leadersin particular thosesenior leaders responsible for achieving uni ed effortacross jurisdictions and response functions. Doctrinalconcepts would be validated, improved, or rejected.

Results would be passed into a feedback loop whichwould provide the basis for improvements in train -ing, organization, equipment, and in the evolution ofhomeland response doctrine and capabilities.

The integrated planning system envisioned inHSPD-8 is important, and if fully implemented couldcertainly improve unity of effort. But, we should notfocus solely on plans, which can and should change.Plans and planning are vitally important, but a nation -al doctrine is larger than the plans it produces. Consis -tent unity of effort will grow out of a culture of coop -eration and collaboration, which can be fostered by anational doctrine system. Plans specify ways of doingthings, but doctrine begins with ways of thinking andunderstandingthese should precede and drive plan -

ning. A national homeland response doctrine systemwould integrate all stakeholders in the evolutionaryprocess of how we think about and understand chal -


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lenges to safety and security at home, and collabora -tively develop responses to them. It takes a great deal

of time and effort to create an operational culture thatfosters unity of effort. The example of our militarysorganizational evolution from the National DefenseReorganization Act of 1947, to the Goldwater-NicholsAct of 1986, to the present day, is instructive in thisrespect. Developing a culture of collaboration andcooperation for homeland response will not occurovernight, but rather as the long-term result of patientdevelopment and continuous improvement.

A New Management Construct.

A second way to achieve unity of effort is to im-prove our management capabilities. With the adventof a dynamic national homeland response doctrinal

system, we will need to develop a new managementstructure that will operate in the spaces between agen -cies and organizations. The NRF and ICS identify uni -

ed command as a key principle for effective incidentmanagement, but it is a temporary, incident-speci ccreation rather than a permanent one. Unity of com -mand can be temporarily achieved in any incident,but cannot be permanently maintained, nor would wewant it to be, in a system based on graduated responseand shared responsibility. What we want to do, bothwithin the scope of a single incident and as an ongoingfactor in planning and preparation, is to establish andsustain uni ed effort. Day to day, our departmentsand agencies do not work together, yet in a crisis, theymust. A national doctrine will provide the basis for

effectively working together by establishing the intel -lectual pre-conditions for cooperation, collaboration,communication, and coordination. However, given


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the breadth and scope of what is to be implemented, anew management construct must also be created, one

that works to bridge the divides within the homelandresponse community before, during, and after inci -dents. It must foster uni ed effort across the doctrinedevelopment cycle, throughout planning and plan in -tegration, and in training, organizing, and equippingresponse capabilities. The national homeland responsedoctrine system will function in an interagency, in -tergovernmental, multijurisdictional environment.Implementing it requires a permanent managementstructure that will similarly operate in the gaps be -tween agencies and governments. Here too, the expe -rience of our military provides an example that pointsin the direction homeland response must go: the JointInteragency Task Force, or JIATF.

Joint military doctrine for civil support has recog -

nized the need for interagency planning and coordi -nation for a number of years. This doctrine describedan Interagency Planning Cell (IPC) that is activatedupon receipt of the . . . warning or alert order, or at thedirection of the combatant commander in responseto a domestic disaster. This ad hoc entity was tailoredto the crisis and set up to rapidly advise the sup -ported combatant commander about the resources ofother agencies in the relief effort. The concept wasdeveloped to facilitate coherent and ef cient plan -ning and coordination effort through the participationof interagency subject matter experts, [and to lightenthe] burden of coordination at the JTF level. 29 In thisway, the IPC functioned similarly to the interagencyCatastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG) called

for under the Federal Emergency Management Agen -cy (FEMA) doctrine. A CDRG convenes . . . whenneeded at the headquarters of the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS). Comprised of representa -


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tives from various federal agencies, the CDRG is setup to provide guidance and policy direction on coor -

dination and operational issues.30

Such interagencycoordination entities are important, but both the IPCand CDRGand similar ad hoc organizationsaretemporary.

More recently, joint military doctrine has promul -gated the concept of a standing JIACG. The JIACGis a permanent planning and coordination element.Described as an element of a [geographic combatantcommanders] staff, the JIACG is an interagencystaff group that establishes and enhances regular,timely, and collaborative working relationships be -tween other governmental agencies representativesand military operational planners. The JIACG isestablished at the discretion of the combatant com -mander to complement the interagency coordina -

tion that occurs at the national level through the DoDand the NSC [National Security Council] and HSC[Homeland Security Council] systems. Its membersparticipate in contingency, crisis action, and securitycooperation planning, [and] provide a conduit back totheir parent organizations. 31 This helps synchronize joint operationsof the combatant commandwiththe efforts of other government agencies. As a morepermanent element, the JIACG is an improvementover the IPC and CDRG. Yet it is still optional and,more importantly, an adjunct to military planning andoperations. It incorporates other federal agencies andeven nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) andinter-governmental organizations (IGOs), but thesefunction under military direction, to support military

needs.A more germane example is provided by JIATF-

South. Established more than 2 decades ago to coor -


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dinate military and interagency efforts to combat theinternational narcotics trade, JIATF-South has built a

strong reputation for success. Although establishedunder authority of the National Defense Authoriza -tion Act of 1989 and still nominally a military entity, JIATF-South is much more a multiservice, multiagen -cy national task force. A key element in this entity isthe integration of participating agencies in commandand leadership posts. It is led by a Coast Guard ad -miral, with a deputy director from the Customs andBorder Patrol (CPB). It integrates senior leaders fromvarious federal agencies into its leadership structureat lower levels as well: the senior intelligence and op -erations directors are military of cers, but their depu -ties come from the Drug Enforcement Administration(DEA) and the CPB. In routine operations, it is notuncommon to see a CBP agent serving as command

duty of cer, an Air Force captain as the intelligencewatch of cer, a Coast Guard operations specialist asthe intelligence watch assistant, and a Navy lieuten -ant as the tactical action of cer. 32 JIATF-South in -corporates multiple agencies into its intelligence op -erations, effectively sharing information drawn fromthe resources of its members. It also includes inter -national liaisons. The joint service, multiagency, andinternational structure enables it to quickly developand share fused operational information, task assetsunder the control of the combatant commander, andcoordinate the efforts of other assets under the controlof participating agencies and international partners.While there is little formal military doctrine aboutwhat a JIATF is and should doand virtually none

among other participating agenciesthe record of JIATF-South demonstrates that the concept works. As joint doctrine evolves, it will only strengthen and ex -pand the potential of the JIATF.


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There have been recent calls to establish JIATF-like entities for homeland response operations. For

example, a recent advisory panel recommended for-mation of a JIATF for incidents involving chemical,biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explo -sive (CBRNE) weapons, to facilitate pre-incidentplanning and coordination and rapidly translatenational-level decisionmaking for a CBRNE incidentinto operational and tactical actions. 33 Such ideas sug -gest an emerging consensus that the JIATF constructhas utility in homeland response operations. Yet thisand similar ideas, and the structure of even highlysuccessful JIATFs like JIATF-South, are too narrowlyconstrued at present. This interagency coordinatingstructure cannot, for example, be an adjunct of U.S.Northern Command (NORTHCOM). NORTHCOMhas a role to play, with important lead responsibilities

for homeland defense and support responsibilities forother homeland security and civil support operations.However, the structure that is needed cannot be sub -ordinate to any particular federal agency or depart -mentit must belong to and support them all. It mustbegin as a broadly held doctrinal concept, and be -come more robust through expansion of its potential.A standing JIATF-like interagency coordination andaction groupan ICAG perhapsshould be estab -lished at the national level to integrate the planning,resourcing, and management of homeland responseoperations. It should re ect a common doctrinal un -derstanding for a multi-participant entity operatingin the spaces between agencies. As such, it cannot bea military structure, although it will certainly contain

military elements. By the same token, it cannot be acreature of any other single agency or departmenthead. The ICAG could rely on a lead agency for sup -


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port, but because it serves to integrate the interagencyspace, it must draw on the capabilities and strengths

of all relevant participants.This model clearly has a similar application forthe states. Each has a vigorous interagency commu -nity that is relevant to its own disaster planning andresponse efforts. If a federal ICAG would work to en -hance unity of effort across the federal interagency, sotoo would a set of state-level ICAGs, accredited to eachgovernor, perform the same useful function. One neednot be overly prescriptive about the ICAG structurethe senior leader it serves should be free to tailor andemploy it as suits the needs of his agencies and con -stituencies. As it evolves, the doctrinal concept mightinclude narrow functional versions (e.g., an ICAGfor national CBRNE response), as well as geographi -cally based and broadly responsive onesmuch as

we have geographic and functional commands withinour military to address different types of problemsand responsibilities. In any case, some functions andcharacteristics should be common to all. These wouldinclude:

Accreditation to a senior executive with author -ity over the interagency construct being coordi -nated, and accountable to the citizens served bythe participating agencies and organizations;

An integrated leadership structure that fostersfull involvement by all participating agencies;

Authority to task some assets useful to its rou -tine work; and to coordinate for swift accessto other assets that ought to be available whenneeded;

Interagency analysis, fusion, and dissemina -tion of relevant intelligence and operationalinformation;

26


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Fair sharing of responsibilities for resourcing,staf ng, and support; and even-handed treat -

ment of the metrics of success for all partici-pants;

Ongoing coordination, communication, andcollaboration between agencies served by theICAG, as well as with the ICAGs of other statesand the federal government.

Additional capabilities could be built into theICAG concept. Over time, it would mature within thenational homeland response doctrine; as governmentsat each level discover what works best, this informa -tion will be fed back into the doctrinal cycle to improveit. But regardless of how the ICAG is structured ineach speci c instance, it will operate with overarchingresponsibility, day in and day out, to be the integrat -

ing structure for all interagency participants, ensuringunity of effort in planning and operations.

Unity of Effort across the Military.

A third way to increase unity of effort is to im-prove our ability to employ all relevant military forcesand functions in the full range of homeland responseoperations. Although its primary responsibility is de -fense against foreign threats, our military has taken ona wide range of other tasks in recent history, includingnation-building, 34 stability operations, 35 and civil sup-port. 36 Regarding the latter, the 2008 Commission onthe National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) nal reportincluded a number of signi cant ndingsamong

them, that DoD fails to put adequate effort (planning,programming, and budgeting) into civil support capa -bilities, and historically has not made civil support apriority. 37


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It is somewhat ironic that our military would placeless emphasis on support for civil authority at home,

even as they have very successfully executed peace-keeping and stability operations abroad. In recent de -cades, both unilaterally and within multinational co -alitions, our forces have routinely been the only entitycapable of providing security and stability, preservinglife and property, delivering medical care, and assist -ing in the restoration of civil institutions. Yet asidefrom National Guard operations, DoD has been re -luctant to engage in civil support operations at home,and perhaps understandably so. There is substantialprimary capability in our nation, at many levels, fordisaster planning and response; state and local leadersare quite rightly held to account for their performancein this area. Yet the CNGR report recommends thatCongress mandate civil support as a primary mission

for DoD, equal in priority to its combat responsibili -ties. 38 The reason for this is plain: our military possesses

a variety of capabilities with great value in respond -ing to disasters and mitigating their effects; Americansexpect that the military resources they paid for willbe available when needed to protect them. It makeslittle difference to the injured, hungry, and dispos -sessed that the cause of their misery is a hurricane, apandemic, an industrial disaster, or a terrorist strike.Their reasonable expectation is that the governmentwill provide for public safety in their hour of need.For this reason, we should be removing impedimentsto unity of effort in utilizing our military forces, andour reserve components in particular, for homeland

response operations when they are not engaged infederal missions overseas.


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There are clear legal restrictions on the roles anduses of our military at home, which exist for sound

reasons that need not be debated here.39

It is suf cientto note that our forefathers wisely saw the problemsinherent to employing military forces in roles normal -ly con ned to civil authority. However, the principalchallenge in employing our military for homelandresponse is not a constitutional issue, but rather oneof lesser law. The role of the federal government inraising, supporting, and employing military forces forboth overseas missions and in various roles at homeis clearly established, as is its ability to federalize Na -tional Guard units when needed. What is not wellsettledbut must beis the ability of our governorsto swiftly and seamlessly employ all the capabilitiesthat might be made available to them when needed.This includes employment of military capabilities; it

is critical to a governors ability to formulate completeand well-coordinated homeland response plans withcon dence. The status of most forces under Title 10currently precludes placing them under state author -ity. This includes all DoD reserve components otherthan the National Guard and the active componentsof all services.

Most of our military capabilities are organized andresourced for federal service, as it ought to be. Yetsome (the National Guard) are available for local andstate missions. From a governors standpoint, nothingcould be easier or more ef cient than having all theavailable military forces in his state operate under hiscontrol when not needed for federal missions. Thereare sound reasons why this is not so, and our pres-

ent systemdespite the Title 10/Title 32 dividehasserved reasonably well over time in providing readyforces for federal missions. Certainly, no one could


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claim that National Guard forces have been less readyor available for service overseas since September 2001

than their Title 10 counterparts because they weretasked with state missions. In fact, quite the oppositeis true. The example of the governor of Louisiana do -ing without thousands of that states National Guardsoldiers who were deployed to Iraq during HurricaneKatrina simply underscores the point that when thenation is at war, our military forces are at the federalgovernments direction. What has become increasing -ly clear since 9/11 is that state and local jurisdictionshave a vital role to play in the full range of homelandresponse operations, including preventing and re -sponding to terrorism. Given this reality, how mightwe reorganize to broaden the base of military capabili -ties available to them?

The CNGR made several recommendations to

improve military support for homeland response. Itrecognized the value of new capabilities (such as Na -tional Guard homeland response elements), as well asother military units which are dual-capable forces. 40 Not all military forces have a value in civil supportoperations. Some have more obvious uses than others,but many are, in fact, dual-capable. This includes notonly National Guard, but Title 10 active and reserveforces as well. These elements have routinely servedin peacekeeping and stability operations overseas andoccasionally in support of civil authority at home, per-forming tasks which are not the ones for which theywere originally organized, trained, and equipped.Simply put, our military can do more than just ghtour nations wars. From the birth of the republic to the

present day, our National Guardand on occasion,our Title 10 forceshave proven the value of dual-capable military forces.


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Achieving unity of effort for homeland responseamong our military services is neither a matter of

determining which forces ought to be in the Nation -al Guard and which should not, nor one of simplycombining National Guard and Reserve structures(an argument which begs the point). Rather, it is oneof determining when and how to best place militaryforces under a governors authority to make themreadily available for civil support roles. Toward thisend, we should be removing impediments to train -ing, planning for, and employing military units un -der the direction of a governor. A pre-quali ed dualstatus commander would have authority to direct andcoordinate the efforts of all military forces acting insupport of the governor (or the governors) of affectedstates and territories. These of cers are senior militaryleaders trained and selected in advance for their ex-

pertise and local knowledge. This positions them wellto plan for the utilization of available military assets intheir regions. Dual status command has been success -fully employed in recent years for pre-planned jointand multiagency civil support events such as the 2004G8 Summit, nominating conventions, and border con -trol operations. 41 It makes sense for the military lead -ers with the most local knowledge and experience tolead defense support of civil authority in their areas ofresponsibility. Dual status command works. It shouldbe the rule, not the exception; and better methodsmust be developed for placing useful military capa -bilities under dual status command, when requestedand if available, for homeland response. This meansdeveloping better advance planning and implemen -

tation procedures for dual status command, such ashas been proposed by the Council of Governors. 42 Thisshould include the full range of no notice homelandresponse disaster events.


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We must also make all relevant military capabilitiesavailable for homeland response in a way that facili -

tates effective planning. The services have developedprocedures for identi cation and rotation of forcesto support overseas deployments, such as the ArmyForce Generation (ARFORGEN) model. This system isa rotational readiness model which provides stra -tegic exibility to meet security requirements for acontinuous presence of deployed forces. 43 Such a sys -tem could be adapted to identify capabilities availablefor civil support operations in a similar waya civilsupport force generation cycleto ensure that thosewho plan for civil support by DoD assets have a pre -dictable way to obtain needed capabilities to supportthose plans and contingencies. This would facilitateearly identi cation and training of units and capabili -tiesactive and reservefor civil support task pro -

ciency as they rotate into the pool of available ele -ments; and it could be nuanced to complement andsupport the demands of federal missions overseas.With a predictable system for force generation, gover -nors and dual status commanders would be in a bet -ter position to plan for, request, and employ availablemilitary capabilities when they are needed.

Unity of Effort.

The greatest challenge in homeland response op -erations is creating unity of effort. Many essentialcapabilities are spread across multiple jurisdictions,agencies, and organizations. This patchwork of au -thority, responsibility, and capability re ects our vi -

brant democratic system, yet it is these same dividesthat makes unity of effort so dif cult. Most of the time,we want these seams in our system. We prefer to deal


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with governments close to home, accessible and re -sponsive to most of our routine needs. In times of cri -

sis, we do not want federal authority to replace stateand local authority. But we do want our governmentsto work together, to use assets and capabilities that arealready available in coordinated and thoughtful waysto ensure the public safety. When necessary, we wantfederal assets to complement and completenot com -pete withour local and state efforts in a seamless,uni ed response.

This requires a new approach. It requires us tofoster a culture of communication, coordination, col-laboration, and cooperation among the many entitiesthat have a role in homeland response operations. Tobe able to act with unity and decision, we must be ableto plan, train, resource, and prepare for uni ed effort.This begins with how we think about homeland re -

sponse, and each participants role in it. A truly unify -ing national doctrine that stresses these tenets, devel -oped and dynamically updated in an inclusive system,will break down barriers to effectiveness and removeimpediments to unity of effort in times of crisis. Toimplement a national doctrine across the divides inour system, we need new management concepts thatwork between and among all participants, such as theproposed interagency coordination and action group.This element will integrate and synthesize the effortsof all stakeholders, working in the spaces between tostitch together the jurisdictional patchwork into a us -able blanket of protection. We must remove all barri -ers that currently exist to full utilization of relevantmilitary capabilities for homeland response. This can

be accomplished by making forces available to ourgovernors when and where they are needed, return -ing them to the nation when the crisis is past; and by


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providing reliable processes to plan for their readinessand availability before disaster strikes.

Achieving unity of effort in homeland response isa complex challenge, among the greatest of our age.It is the single most important factor in our ability toplan for and respond effectively to disasters in ourhomeland. We devote enormous resources to publicsafety and security at many levels. Our citizens surelyhave a right to expect that these resources will be wellused by their leaders, elected and appointed. Thismeans that we must nd better ways to work togeth -er. It requires leaders and organizations at all levelsto combine their efforts, resources, and capabilities toachieve responsive and complete solutions. John Jayobserved in the Federalist Papers No. 3 that among themany objects to which a wise and free people nd itnecessary to direct their attention, that of providing

for their safety seems to be the rst.44

There cannotbe any higher priority for government than ensuringthe safety of its citizens. This is a serious issue, deserv -ing a serious approach. National security begins withhomeland security, and homeland security dependsfundamentally on our ability to work together, tobring our enormous capacity to bear at the right time,the right place, and in the right measure. Americanshave long and proud traditions both of celebratingour differences, and of joining together in adversity toachieve common purposes. We should not allow anyof the routinely divisive factors prevent us from work -ing together effectively in times of crisis.


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ENDNOTES

1. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War , Michael Howard and PeterParet, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,pp. 119-121.

2. Chernobyl Haunts Engineer Who Alerted the World,CNN World News Interactive, April 26, 1996, available fromwww.cnn.com/WORLD/9604/26/chernobyl/230pm/index2.html .

3. Chernobyls Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts, The Chernobyl Forum: 2003-2005, Vienna,

Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency Division of Pub -lications, p. 10, available from www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/ Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf .

4. U.S. Congress, Report of the National Commission on Ter -rorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Re- port, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of ce, p. 311,available from www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf .

5. The 9/11 Commission Report details multiple examples ofchaos and confusion during the morning of the attacks, at everylevel from the federal interagency down to the local level, such asthe interaction between the New York Port Authority and the ten -ants in the World Trade Center. It cites problems with informationsharing and attaining situational awareness, for example, betweenthe North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); and in attempt -ing to put ghter aircraft into the air ( ibid., pp. 26-27) to respond

to attacking aircraft. Another example was the failure of the PortAuthority to develop re evacuation protocols, to convey thoseto Trade Center tenants, and to ensure that the tenants had beenadequately oriented ( ibid., pp. 280-281). Recent releases of audiotapes from the morning of the attack bear out the reports nd -ings, particularly confusion and lack of co-ordination betweenmilitary and civil authorities in the aftermath of the attacks. SeeKaren McVeigh, Newly Released 9/11 Audio Recordings Re -veal Chaos and Confusion, guardian.co.uk, London, United King -

dom (UK), September 8, 2011, available from www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2011/sep/08/september-11-audio-recordings-public .

6. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 325-328.


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7. Ten years after 9/11, stories appear routinely in the me -dia about potential terrorist threats. As the anniversary of theterrorist strikes approached, there was increased concern of an -other attack by al Qaeda. For example, the Chicago Sun-Times re-ported that The U.S. government has long known that terroristssee the 10th anniversary of 9/11 and other uniquely Americandates as opportunities to strike. Of cials have also been con -cerned that some may see this anniversary as an opportunity toavenge Osama bin Ladens death. Eileen Sullivan and Lolita C.Baldor, Threat Puts New York, DC on alert as 9/11 Anniver -sary Nears, Chicago Sun-Times, September 10, 2011, from www.suntimes.com/news/nation/7568755-418/terror-threat-puts-ny-dc-on-alert-as-911-anniversary-nears.html . Numerous opinion columnsalso speculate that the nation may not be safer. For example, acommentator recently wrote that those who follow the terror -ist threat most closely dont think bin Ladens death will havereduced it much, if at all. Christopher Dickey, The Next Ter -ror Threat, The Daily Beast, May 6, 2011, available from www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/05/06/al-qaeda-terror-threat-to-new-york-city-and-us-trains-remains-high.html .

8. U.S. Congress, Report by the Select Bipartisan Commit -tee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to HurricaneKatrina, A Failure of Initiative, Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Of ce, pp. 359-362.

9. Ibid., p. 7.

10. Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is theLargest of Its Kind, Scientists Say, www.NYTimes.com, August 2,2010, available from www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html .

11. David A. Sawyer, The Joint Doctrine Development Sys -tem, Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, pp. 36-37. The Gold -water-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of1986 caused a far-reaching reorganization of the national defenseestablishment, viewed by many as the most signi cant since theNational Security Act of 1947. Among its major provisions, it sig -ni cantly strengthened the authority of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff relative to the separate service chiefs. The act desig -nated the Chairman as the principal military advisor to the presi -


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dent, National Security Council and secretary of defense. It alsoestablished the position of vice-chairman, made the Joint Staff thechairmans staff, and streamlined the operational chain of com-mand from the president through the Secretary of Defense to theuni ed commanders. Regarding joint doctrine, the act vested stat -utory responsibility in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Stafffor developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armedforces (Title 10 U.S. Code Subtitle A Part I Chapter 5 153). Textavailable from www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html .

12. Lennard G. Kruger, United States Fire Administration: AnOverview, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Oc -tober 10, 2008, available from opencrs.com/document/RS20071/2011-04-20/ .

13. Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations , Wash-ington, DC: Department of Defense, July 8, 2008, p. IV-12. A JointInteragency Coordination Group (JIACG) is a staff group com -posed of U.S. Government civilian and military experts. It es -tablishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationshipsbetween civilian and military operational planners. The JIACG isaccredited [to the] combatant commander and tailored to meet[his] requirements. It enhances the combatant commandersability to collaborate at the operational level with other federalagencies. Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) were developedduring the Clinton Administration in an effort to correct perceivedweaknesses in the command and control of the nations counter-narcotics efforts. As a result, four JIATFs were established (JIATF-North, -South, -East and -West) to better integrate the efforts ofthe federal interagency in narcotics interdiction. Along with mili -tary personnel, the JIATFs include staff from the U.S. Customsand Border Patrol (CBP), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Defense IntelligenceAgency (DIA), and Department of State.

14. JIATF-South is located in Key West, Florida, and oper -ates under the authority of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTH -COM). Its mission is to conduct interagency and internationalDetection & Monitoring operations, and to facilitate the inter -diction of illicit [narcotics] traf cking and other Narco-terroristthreats in support of national and partner nation security, avail -able from www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/ .


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15. Title 32 of the U.S. Code lays out the legal basis for the Na -tional Guard. National Guard units are unique among the UnitedStates military in their dual status as both state and federal forces.While they are principally supported by federal funds, they re -main under the command of the governor of the state until fed -eralized (i.e., placed into federal service under Title 10 of the U.S.Code). Since National Guard forces are under the command ofthe governor while in Title 32 status, they are easily made avail -able for tasks as directed by the governor (including training andreadiness preparations for state missions). National Guardsmenmay also be placed in State Active Duty status, in which thestate pays their operating costs and utilizes them as needed tosupport other civil authorities. The National Guard provides civ -il support in thousands of missions each year. For example, in2005the year of Hurricane Katrinathe Army National Guardresponded to over 23,000 incid

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Enabling Unity of Effort in Homeland Response Operations