EN - European Commission · It exports the "acquis communautaire" worldwide thus participating to the implementation of the EU policy promoting nuclear safety, ... All possible sources

1

EN

ANNEX 1

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2019 for

Nuclear Safety Cooperation

Action Document for Promotion of nuclear safety culture

ANNUAL PROGRAMME 2019

This document constitutes the annual work programme in the sense of Article 110(2) of the

Financial Regulation and action programme/measure in the sense of Articles 2 and 3 of

Regulation N° 236/2014.

1. Title/basic act/

CRIS number

Action document for nuclear safety cooperation

CRIS number: INSC/2019/041-951, 042-202 & 042-203

financed under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation

2. Zone benefiting

from the

action/location

Middle East/Gulf, European Neighbourhood East, South East Asia

The action shall be carried out at the following locations: Tehran (Iran),

Yerevan (Armenia) and South East Asia

3. Programming

document Commission implementing decision of 6.11.2017 on the Instrument for

Nuclear Safety Cooperation Multiannual Indicative Programme (2018-

2020) – C(2017)7254 final

4. SDGs Main SDG: 16 (strong institutions)

5. Sector of

intervention/

thematic area

Nuclear safety DEV. Assistance: YES

6. Amounts

concerned Total estimated cost: EUR 8.400.000

Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 8.400.000

7. Aid

modality(ies)

and

implementation

modality(ies)

Project Modality

Direct management through:

- Procurement

2

8 a) DAC code(s) 23510

b) Main Delivery

Channel

10000 – Public Sector Institutions

9. Markers

(from CRIS DAC

form)

General policy objective Not

targeted

Significant

objective

Principal

objective

Participation development/good

governance ☐ ☐ X

Aid to environment ☐ X ☐

Gender equality and Women’s and

Girl’s Empowerment

☐ X ☐

Trade Development X ☐ ☐

Reproductive, Maternal, New born

and child health X ☐ ☐

RIO Convention markers Not

targeted

Significant

objective

Principal

objective

Biological diversity X ☐ ☐

Combat desertification X ☐ ☐

Climate change mitigation X ☐ ☐

Climate change adaptation X ☐ ☐

10. Global Public

Goods and

Challenges (GPGC)

thematic flagships

N/A

SUMMARY In accordance with the Multi Annual Indicative Programme 2018-2020

1, the overall objective

of the Action is the promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture and implementation of the

highest nuclear safety and radiation protection standards, and continuous improvement of

nuclear safety.

1 CONTEXT ANALYSIS

1.1 Context Description

The promotion of radiation protection and nuclear safety is a key priority for the EU since the

early days of the European Economic Community and EURATOM. The Instrument for

Nuclear Safety Cooperation2 is the only specific tool of the European Union addressing

nuclear safety issues in partner countries, complementing other external financing

instruments.

The international recognition of the added value of the Instrument was acknowledged in 2017

during the 7th

IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety review meeting, where "the

1 C(2017) 7254 of 06.11.2017

2 OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 109

3

implementation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation Program for assisting non-

EU countries" was officially recognised world-wide as “good practice”. The evaluation under

the completed Mid Term Review (MTR) on the external financing instruments of the EU

recognises the positive contribution of the Instrument, noticing its capability to respond

swiftly to new needs. The MTR acknowledged INSC's unique value added due to the

institutional framework that allows the Commission to act at a global level; the instrument is

supporting complementarities, coordination and synergies and is effective in leveraging

financial resources for nuclear safety.

1.2 Policy Framework (Global, EU)

The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) participates to the objective of safety,

which is anchored in the EU's development and aid effectiveness commitments, and the 2030

Agenda. It also contributes to President Juncker's priority 9 (EU as a stronger global actor),

responding to fast evolving challenges, although in a much specialised policy area. It is also

aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals 16 (Strong Institutions) and to a lesser extent

5 (Gender equality).

It exports the "acquis communautaire" worldwide thus participating to the implementation of

the EU policy promoting nuclear safety, transparency and public information worldwide3.

The action in Iran is the EU contribution to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

The action in Armenia is part of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement

signed by the country and the EU in November 2017.

The Action in South East Asia is part of the ASEAN strategy for regional cooperation on

radiological and nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) and the

corresponding Action Plan for its implementation by ASEANTOM, which is supported by the

EU.

1.3 Public Policy Analysis of the partner country/region

The objectives of the actions proposed to promote nuclear safety in the partner countries

contribute to President Junker's priority 9 (EU as a stronger global actor) as well as to the

Sustainable Development Goals 3 (Good Health and Well-Being) SDG 5 quoted in 1.2 and 16

(Strong Institutions).

On 14 July 2015, the international community and Iran reached an agreement on the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), the full implementation of which will ensure the

exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Annex III of this deal provides a

detailed description of the future cooperation on civil nuclear matters which largely is covered

by activities funded by the EU under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation. Due to

the previous sanction regime, the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority lacks international

exchange and networking ability that would strengthen its position in particular by capacity

3 The EU provisions for radiation protection and nuclear safety have been substantially enhanced in recent years,

notably through Directive 2013/59/Euratom (Basic Safety Standards Directive) and Directive 2014/87/Euratom

(Nuclear Safety Directive).

4

building and peer review. The present Action will continue the on-going programme, which

started in AAP2016, in line with the provisions of Annex III of the JCPoA.

In Armenia, the “National programme on public exposure control and dose reduction due to

naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORMs4), including radon gas and their progeny”

was reviewed in the frame of a recent INSC project (A3.01/10&12), taking into account

international recommendations and best practice. The work also included the review of

national radon reference levels and the revision of the national policy, strategy and action plan

to manage long term risks caused by radon exposure in existing dwellings, buildings with

public access, as well as new buildings and workplaces. All possible sources of radon ingress

were analysed, including soil, building materials and water. The development of appropriate

radiation monitoring methodologies and procedures was started, as well.

One of the main conclusions of this project was the identification of the need to establish,

maintain and develop state-of-the-art environmental radiation monitoring capabilities in

Armenia, as the most important condition for the proper implementation of the National

Radon Programme (NRP).

Within ASEAN, a broad consensus emerged following the Fukushima accident that a regional

approach to radiological and nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) in

South East Asia would be beneficial as a complement to national capacities and capabilities.

Nuclear power plants are already in operation or under construction in the ASEAN

neighbourhood (i.e., Chinese NPP are in operation within a few tens and a few hundreds of

km of the Vietnam border and others are under construction; Taiwanese NPP are in operation

within about 200 km of the Philippines; Bangladeshi NPP are under construction within a few

hundred km of the Myanmar border; the possible installation of NPP on artificial islands

constructed by China in the South China Sea in the vicinity of ASEAN territory in or near the

Spratly and Paracel Islands). Nuclear powered vessels also operate in the region and

occasionally make use of berthing facilities in ASEAN.

1.4 Stakeholder analysis

Component A: Support to the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority

The main stakeholder in this component is the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority, INRA,

which is part of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran AEOI.

Component B: Support to the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority

The Beneficiary is the Government of the Republic of Armenia, represented by the Armenian

Nuclear Regulatory Authority, ANRA. The End-users are ANRA and NRSC, which is the

technical support organisation of ANRA.

Component C: Support to Emergency Preparedness in the Association of South East

Asian Nations, ASEAN

The main stakeholder in this project is ASEANTOM, a network of regulatory authorities for

radiation and nuclear safety in ASEAN comprising: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,

4 NORM = Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material

5

Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand,

Singapore and Vietnam.

1.5 Problem analysis/priority areas for support

Iran

The 2015 agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action provides in its Annex III the

detailed description of the future cooperation on civil nuclear matters. The present Action will

continue the on-going activities funded by the EU under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety

Cooperation to contribute to the implementation of the JCPoA.

Armenia

In Armenia, an indoor radon survey was carried out between 2010 and 20125. The results of

the survey have shown that local radon concentrations in Armenia require further attention in

the related national regulation and further development of the monitoring capabilities to

obtain a solid experimental base for adequate protective and corrective actions. The need for

improving radon measurement and monitoring capabilities was identified as the next step to

effectively deal with the related public health protection issues. The establishment of an

appropriate national radon laboratory (NRL) is an important step in this process.

The need to establish, maintain and develop state-of-the-art environmental radiation

monitoring capabilities in Armenia is the most important condition for the proper

implementation of the National Radon Programme (NRP).

ASEAN

Within ASEAN, a broad consensus emerged following the Fukushima accident that a regional

approach to radiological and nuclear EP&R in South East Asia would be beneficial as a

complement to national capacities and capabilities. The benefits include: enabling more rapid

and informed response from the exchange, in real time, of information from national radiation

monitoring/early warning networks; reduced costs from sharing expertise, methods, training,

equipment and facilities at a regional level, thereby avoiding needless duplication; and

ensuring the more consistent application of protective measures in neighbouring countries that

would enhance trust and confidence among those potentially affected. With support from the

EU (via its INSC programme) and the IAEA (via its Technical Cooperation (TC)

programme), ASEANTOM has developed a strategy for regional cooperation on radiological

and nuclear EP&R and an Action Plan for its implementation6. The strategy aims at bringing

EP&R arrangements in ASEAN broadly in accord with best international practice within the

next five to ten years. The action plan is being implemented by ASEANTOM with support,

inter alia, from the EU’s INSC and IAEA’s TC programmes.

The EU has considerable experience in the development of early warning radiation

monitoring networks and in the exchange of monitoring data between them. Networks have

5 Status of radon related activities in Member States participating in Technical Cooperation projects in Europe,

TECDOC-1810, IAEA, Vienna, Austria, 2017 6 ASEAN strategy for regional cooperation on radiological and nuclear EP&R and an action plan for its

implementation, December 2017 that has been distributed to the Member States through CIRCABC

6

been installed in most EU Member States and the data are exchanged and shared via the

EURDEP (EUropean Radiological Data Exchange Platform) platform and used by decision

support systems to provide important inputs to the effective and timely management of any

radiological or nuclear emergency. This European experience will be shared with

ASEANTOM in this action.

2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Risks Risk

level

(H/M/L)

Mitigating measures

Termination of the nuclear deal

with Iran

M Leading role of the EU in supporting the

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Lack of political and administrative

support in the beneficiary countries

L

Close monitoring of project

implementation and establishment of

efficient communication channels at

appropriate level by the Commission.

No relevant international peer

review mission in the relevant time

frame

M Reporting requirements at contracting

level will include the obligation to report

the relevant information for the indicators.

If no review mission is available, they will

be reviewed by independent experts, e.g.

from JRC

Complexity of implementation due

to the involvement of ten ASEAN

Member States (MS)

M Effective administrative and organisational

arrangements in place within

ASEANTOM before project start

One or other ASEAN MS chooses

not to participate actively, or

withdraws

L Establish regional network without one or

other ASEAN Member State

Failure to agree on location of

regional centre/s for exchanging

and integrating monitoring data

from national networks

L Location/s for regional centre/s to be

agreed within ASEANTOM, ideally

before project start

Assumptions

- Independent missions, such as INIR and IRRS are best suited for many of the

performance indicators concerning good governance. It is assumed that the relevant

information will be included in those reviews.

- Independent expert support, e.g. by JRC will be available to further define

measurable indicators during implementation

7

3 LESSONS LEARNT AND COMPLEMENTARITY

3.1 Lessons learnt

Extensive and broad experience has been gained in successfully implementing similar

activities in other third countries, both in the framework of the TACIS7 Nuclear Safety

Programme and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC). This experience will

be used in optimising the design and implementation of this action.

Communication and support from the beneficiary and end-users will still be a key element for

successful implementation.

3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

A close working relationship will be maintained between the Commission services and the

EEAS and also with the EU Delegations in the beneficiary countries, in order to help ensure a

coherent approach, taking the latest relevant developments into account.


The Commission will coordinate its activities with the other international donors through the

Joint Commission established under the JCPoA and the IAEA Technical Cooperation

Department.

The proposed project is linked and complementary to the INSC projects in Iran supporting the

Iranian Regulatory Authority (IRN3.01/16 Lot 1, IRN3.01/17 and IRN3.01/18). Concerning

Iran, the Commission will coordinate its activities through the EEAS Iran Task Force with the

other international donors and the Joint Commission established under the JCPOA, as well as

with the IAEA Technical Cooperation Department.

The detailed implementation will be based (i) on the results of the feasibility study which was

performed in the cooperation project IRN3.01/16, and (ii) on the results of the analysis of

equipment needed for typical laboratory functions of the NSC as (to be) performed in the

cooperation project IRN3.01/18.


The on-going EU assistance projects in Armenia under the INSC are as follows:

A3.01/16A: Enhancing the capabilities of the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority

and its technical support organization in reviewing documents demonstrating the

long-term safety of Unit 2 of Metsamor NPP. This project provides support –

including on-site assistance – to the ANRA and NRSC during the licensing of safety

improvements decided after the stress-tests, as well as during the licensing of the

service time extension of ANPP Unit 2.

A3.01/15A: Supply of an Early Warning Radiation Monitoring System (EWRMS) and

computer hardware equipment for the implementation of JRODOS software in

Armenia. Currently this project is in the implementation phase.

7 Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

8

A3.01/15B: Enhancing the capabilities of the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority

in preparedness for and response to a nuclear or radiological emergency. This project

aims to install the JRODOS decision support system in the emergency response centre

of ANRA. Currently this project is in the implementation phase.

In addition to the above regulatory assistance and technical support projects INSC currently

provides technical assistance to the Nuclear Operator of Armenia in the following project:

A1.01/16B: Support to the Nuclear Operator of Armenia. This project provides on-site

assistance to the ANPP during the implementation of the safety improvement

measures resulting from the ANPP Unit 2 stress-tests.

Component C: Support to Emergency Preparedness in ASEAN

This project complements the previous INSC project “REG3.01/16: ‘Enhancing emergency

preparedness and response (EP&R) in ASEAN for radiological and nuclear emergencies

through regional cooperation: Technical support for decision making (project start: Nov.

2017, duration: 3 years), building the necessary technical capacity for data processing.

Coordination in this area will be maintained with the IAEA, in particular with its Technical

Cooperation Department. The Commission, together with IAEA, supported ASEANTOM in

the development of a strategy for enhancing, and more closely integrating, radiological and

nuclear EP&R within ASEAN and an Action Plan for implementing the strategy was also

developed. This action is one of a number of inter-linked activities within the Action Plan.

Other activities have been, or are in the process of being implemented with coordinated

support from the EU’s INSC and the IAEA.

4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

4.1 Overall objective, specific objective(s), expected outputs and indicative activities

The overall objective of all components, in accordance with the INSC Multi Annual

Indicative programme 2018-2020, is to achieve effective nuclear safety culture and

implementation of the highest nuclear safety and radiation protection standards.


The objective of this Component is the supply of equipment (according to the technical

specifications) needed for typical laboratory functions of the Nuclear Safety Centre in line

with recommendations provided by the experts in project IRN3.01/16.

The objectives of this task are, in line with the results of the NSC feasibility study (performed

in AAP2016) and with the detailed analysis of equipment needed for typical laboratory

functions of the Nuclear Safety Centre (performed in AAP2018, component A, task 6), to

supply the measuring, data acquisition, processing, storage and visualisation equipment

necessary to establish laboratory functions and data processing systems supporting expert

activities in the Emergency Response, Radiation Protection or Radiation Monitoring Centres

9

of Iran. The work consists of supplying the listed equipment, according to the associated

technical specifications for procurement.


In June 2018 the Government of Armenia adopted decree No621-A, allocating 500 m

2 office

space to the ANRA for accommodating the National Radon Laboratory. The office space is

located in a 3-storeyed building earlier utilized as a computer centre. The present condition of

the building is such that it requires a complete re-design and structural renovation before it

can be used for the intended purposes. Only after these works are carried out the NRL can be

installed in the building. It is planned that the NRL – within its premises – will also host the

Emergency Response Centre of ANRA and the JRODOS decision support system base station

configuration.

The objectives of this Component are the following:

(a) To improve environmental radiation monitoring capabilities of Armenia by contributing to

the establishment of the national environmental radiation monitoring infrastructure;

(b) To strengthen the capabilities of ANRA and NRSC in conducting environmental radiation

monitoring activities according to the state-of-the-art international practice;

(c) To enhance the knowledge and expertise of the staff of ANRA and NRSC in this area by

transferring relevant measurement techniques / methodologies and by providing advanced

professional training;

The project implementation will enable ANRA and NRSC to carry out their environmental

radiation monitoring activities according to the best European practice and recognized

international standards.

It is also expected that ANRA and NRSC will improve their capabilities and skills in the area

of environmental radiation monitoring by receiving advanced professional training and tuition

to acquire high level competence in relevant measurement techniques and methodologies.

In order to take into account the various phases of establishing a fully-functional NRL and to

reach the above stated objectives, the proposed Component is composed of two distinct parts:

Part 1 is to be covered by a supply contract and comprises procurement of equipment

(special laboratory furniture, appliances, computers and various measuring equipment,

as appropriate);

Part 2 is to be covered by a service contract and it includes tasks dealing with the

following activities:

Reviewing the proposed design of the new laboratory and equipment technical

specifications prepared by the Partner country, in order to ensure full-

compliance with international standards and EU best practice. This review will

also ensure that the equipment to be purchased can fit in the new laboratory

and will be technically compatible with all the required measurement

functions;

Adaptation of appropriate laboratory measurement methodologies, techniques

and quality assurance procedures;

10

Provision of training to Armenian specialists, including long-term fellowships

in accredited EU organizations (laboratories) having appropriate experience in

the related laboratory measurement practice.

Note that Part 1 or 2 does not provide financing for any construction works or renovation

activities. These will be fully covered and implemented by the Partner country. In this respect,

the action will only include the thorough review and assessment of the conceptual and

detailed design plans prepared by the Partner country for the implementation of the new

laboratory. The work also includes the review and assessment of the equipment technical

specifications.

Component C: Support to Emergency Preparedness in the ASEAN

The objective of this Component is to establish a regional early warning radiation monitoring

system capable of providing a high level of assurance that any significant increase in the level

or levels of radiation or radioactive material in ASEAN would be detected promptly. This

would enable ASEAN Member States to take timely, informed and effective measures to

protect their populations and the wider environment in the event of any future radiological or

nuclear emergency that may affect ASEAN.

This will be achieved by: enhancing (or in a few cases establishing) early warning radiation

monitoring networks in each ASEAN Member State in a cost effective manner (i.e., optimised

within a wider regional/ASEAN, as opposed to a narrower national, context); and establishing

a regional centre with which the monitoring data from national networks would be exchanged,

integrated and made available, inter alia, for use in systems used to support decision making

in an emergency.

The Component will comprise two main tasks: firstly, enhancing, where necessary, existing

early warning radiation monitoring networks in some ASEAN Member States, and

establishing networks in others where none currently exists, within an integrated ASEAN-

wide concept; and, secondly: the establishment of a regional centre with which monitoring

data from national networks will be exchanged and used to inform and support decision

makers in responding to and managing any future emergency that may affect ASEAN. A

decision on the location of this regional centre is expected to be taken shortly, in the frame of

the ongoing project REG3.01/16i.

Task 1: Enhancement or establishment of national early warning radiation monitoring

networks in ASEAN Member States

National early warning monitoring networks would be enhanced or established as follows

within an integrated concept for early warning within ASEAN as a whole:

early warning networks, capable of future expansion, would be established in

Cambodia and in Laos, comprising: a national monitoring and management centre

with real time communications with monitoring stations; and a few gamma dose rate

monitoring stations sited at major centres of population and/or at strategic locations in

the respective countries

11

an early warning network, capable of future expansion, would be established (in

accordance with national plans) in Myanmar, comprising: a national monitoring and

management centre with real time communications with monitoring stations; about ten

gamma dose rate monitoring stations located along the Myanmar border with

Bangladesh and along its northern coastline south of Bangladesh (i.e., priority 1

locations in the provisional national plan for an early warning radiation monitoring

system); and a coastal water monitoring station located south of the Bangladesh border

The early warning network in Vietnam would be enhanced (in accordance with

national plans) through the establishment of a regional network in the north of

Vietnam. This network would comprise: a regional monitoring and management

centre with real time communications with the monitoring stations and the National

Operation Centre; about forty gamma dose rate monitoring stations to be installed

along the Vietnamese border with China and along the Vietnamese coastline, with the

density decreasing from east to west and north to south as the distance from Chinese

NPP increases; and a coastal water monitoring station just south of the Chinese border

the early warning networks in Malaysia and Thailand would be enhanced as follows:

replacement of about twenty to thirty gamma dose rate monitors that will soon reach

the end of their design/operational lifetime; and enhancing the reliability of real time

communications between monitoring stations and the respective national monitoring

and management centres

the early warning network in the Philippines would be enhanced (in accordance with

national plans) as follows: enhancing the national monitoring and management centre

to accommodate additional monitoring stations; further increasing the spatial density

of currently installed or foreseen gamma dose rate monitoring stations and replacing a

few monitors that will soon reach the end of their design/operational lifetime (about

ten new monitors in total)

subject to further analysis and confirmation of the threat, a coastal monitoring station

would be located on the west coast of Northern Philippines and a limited network of

gamma dose rate monitoring stations would be installed in the vicinity of the Spratly

Islands to provide early warning of any accidental release of radioactive material from

nuclear reactors that may be installed on artificial islands constructed by China in the

South China Sea.

The design of each national early warning network would enable further (lower priority)

monitoring stations to be added subsequently to the networks, as need dictated or budgetary

resources allowed.

Overall, within ASEAN, three national early warning monitoring networks would be

established and four would be enhanced; about ninety new gamma dose rate monitors would

be installed along with a few coastal water monitoring stations.

Guidance would also be provided on particular aspects of operating and maintaining national

radiation monitoring networks (e.g., quality assurance, quality control, maintenance,

calibration of detectors, etc.) with a view to enhancing the reliability and ensuring the

coherence and quality of measurements made in different ASEAN Member States.

Task 2: ASEAN Radiation Data Exchange Platform (ASEAN-RDEP)

12

An ASEAN Radiation Data Exchange Platform (ASEAN-RDEP) will be developed and

installed at a regional monitoring and management centre in one or other ASEAN Member

State; a back-up or redundant platform will also be installed in a second Member State to

ensure high operational reliability. The ASEAN-RDEP will be based on (i.e., will be a

customised version of) the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP),

developed and used extensively in the EU and beyond to exchange radiation monitoring data

with national monitoring centres. Radiation monitoring data will be exchanged between the

ASEAN-RDEP and national early warning networks in each ASEAN Member State. The

ASEAN-wide monitoring data will be input to decision support systems installed at national

and/or regional levels in ASEAN (with support from a previous INSC cooperation project –

REG3.01/16) and will inform and support decision making on the management of any

radiological or nuclear emergency that may, in future, affect ASEAN.

The data exchanged with and assembled by ASEAN-RDEP will be strictly confidential to

ASEAN Member States. These data may, in due course, be exchanged with neighbouring

countries through bilateral arrangements and/or more widely (i.e., with IAEA’s International

Radiation Monitoring Information System (IRMIS). But, any exchange of data beyond

ASEAN would be subject to prior approval by, and formal agreement with, ASEAN.

4.2 Intervention Logic

The needs assessment has been carried out during expert missions, discussion with the

concerned stakeholders, and coordination with the main partners and in particular the

International Atomic Energy Agency, with whom this programme is strongly coordinated,

and/or arises from previous projects in the countries through a well-recorded experience and

exchange between the project teams and beneficiary institutions. Those assessments were

extensively reviewed by the JRC technical experts. The overall approach through the action is

to strengthen the role and capabilities of the Nuclear Regulatory Authorities in order to reach

the overall objective of promoting nuclear safety as well as to develop Emergency

Preparedness and Response capabilities in the region of interest to integrate the concerned

regions into the International system of information exchange. In each country, the envisaged

upgrades, modernisations, studies/assessments and regulatory advancements are developed

and will be implemented jointly with the local counterparts, in a pre-defined schedule and

well-planned contributions. This will allow a further joint update on the needs and gaps, as

well as intensive exchange and learning both at a technical level and at the level of safety

culture through addressing the priority issues. The actions will be implemented by EU experts

and consortia that will transfer know-how to the beneficiary countries.

4.3 Mainstreaming

Strengthening nuclear safety in partner countries includes capacity building that is achieved in

particular by means of specific training. In all these activities, the European Commission

promotes the participation of women as part of the gender equality.

4. 4 Contribution to SDGs

This intervention is relevant for the 2030 Agenda. It contributes primarily to the progressive

achievement of SDG 16 on the promotion of strong institutions. Actions will mainly support

the achievement of SDG 16 by strengthening the authorities in charge of the nuclear safety

(regulatory authorities and their technical support organisations). (SDG 5 is quoted in 1.2 and

SDG 3 is quoted in 1.3)

13

5 IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the

partner country for components C.

It is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with Iran for component A.

It is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with Armenia for component B.

5.2 Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities

described in section 4 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements

implemented, is 76 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing

Decision for components C and from the date of the entry into force of the financing

agreement for component A and B.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission’s responsible

authorising officer by amending this Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

5.3 Implementation modalities

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing

financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and

compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures8.

5.3.1 Procurement (direct management)

Subject in generic terms, if possible Type (works, supplies,

services)

Indicative

trimester of

launch of the

procedure

Component A – Support to the Iranian

Nuclear Regulatory Authority

Supplies, services Q3 2020

Component B – Support to the Armenian


Supplies, services Q4 2020

Component C – Support to Emergency

Preparedness in the ASEAN

Supplies Q3 2019

5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in

procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as

established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

8 www.sanctionsmap.eu Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes.

The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy

between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.

http://www.sanctionsmap.eu/

14

The Commission’s authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility on

the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the

countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would

make the realization of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

5.5 Indicative budget

EU

contribution

(EUR)

Indicative third party

contribution, in

currency identified

(EUR)

Component A – Support to the Iranian Nuclear

Regulatory Authority

5 000 000 0

Component B – Support to the Armenian


1 200 000 0

Component C – Support to Emergency

Preparedness in the ASEAN

2 200 000 0

Evaluation – Audit Will be

covered by

another

measure

constituting a

financing

decision

Communication and visibility Will be

covered by

another

measure

constituting a

financing

decision

Total 8 400 000

5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

Component A: The implementation of the project will be done through one service and one

supply contract.

Component B: The implementation of this project will be done through a service and a supply

contract.

Component C: The implementation of this project will be done through a supply contract.

5.7 Performance and Results monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be

a continuous process and part of the implementing partners’ responsibilities. To this aim, the

15

implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring

system for the action and issue regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final

reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of the implementation of the action,

difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its

results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as

reference the logframe matrix (for project modality). SDGs indicators and, if applicable, any

jointly agreed indicators as for instance per Joint Programming document should be taken into

account.

The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and

employed, and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial,

will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own

staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for

independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the

Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.8 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, an ex-post evaluation will not be carried out for this

action or its components. In case an evaluation is not foreseen, the Commission may, during

implementation, decide to undertake such an evaluation for duly justified reasons, either on its

own decision or on the initiative of the partner.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders.

The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and

recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner

country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary,

including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing

decision.

Evaluation services may be contracted under a framework contract for component A and B.

5.9 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation

of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent

audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing

decision.

It is foreseen that audit services may be contracted under a framework contract for component

A and B.

16

5.10 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by

the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a

specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of

implementation.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be

implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or

entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the

financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Requirements for European Union External Action (or any

succeeding document) shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the

Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

The financing of the communication and visibility activities shall be covered by another

measure constituting a financing decision.

Summaries of completed INSC projects can be consulted in a database managed by the JRC9.

9 https://nuclear.jrc.ec.europa.eu/tipins

17

APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX

Results chain Indicators Sources of data Assumptions

Overall

objective:

Impact

Application of the highest nuclear

safety and radiation protection

standards

The level of alignment of the Partner's standards

with the EU and/or IAEA requirements

Project reporting, monitoring and

auditing.

IAEA review mission output

(INIR/IRRS)

Specific

objective(s):

Outcome(s)

(Iran)

Align the capabilities of INRA and

the Nuclear Safety Centre (NSC) to

EU best practice

The level of alignment of INRA and NSC

capabilities to EU best practice

IAEA missions to Iran and project

output

There might be relevant

IAEA missions which

can be used for

independent verification.

JCPOA is still

recognized and

implemented by all

parties

Outputs

(Iran) Procurement of equipment needed

for typical laboratory functions of

the Nuclear Safety Centre

Availability and performance of equipment Equipment supplied and operational

Specific

objectives:

Outcome(s)

(Armenia)

Strengthening ANRA and NRSC

capabilities in conducting

environmental radiation monitoring

activities

Quantity and quality of radon monitoring data

characterizing the level of radon exposure risk in

the various regions of Armenia

Project deliverables Full support from the

partner organisations

Specific

objectives:

Outcome(s)

(Armenia)

Establishing the basic radon

monitoring infrastructure with

appropriate equipment and

measurement protocols

Ability to perform radon monitoring

measurements according to the EU best practice

and recognised international standards

Project deliverables Full support from the

partner organisations

Outputs

(Armenia)

Part 1 / A1 – Furniture, computers

and equipment to outfit the new

radon laboratory

Quality and appropriateness of delivered

commodities

Commodities delivered in the frame

of the supply contract

18


Part 2 / B1 – Assistance to design

and equip the new laboratory

Quality of detailed design of the new laboratory

and quality of equipment technical specifications

Detailed design and equipment

technical specifications reviewed

by the EU experts and approved by

the ANRA

Part 2 / B2 – Assistance to adapt

measurement methods and QA

procedures

Number of adopted measurement methods and

QA procedures

Documented measurement

protocols and related QA

procedures

Part 2 / B3 – Provision of training

to Armenian specialists

B3.1 Number of training sessions delivered

B3.2 Number of trainees trained

Training materials

Training certificates

Results chain Indicators Sources and means of verification Assumptions

Specific

objective(s)

(ASEAN)

Establish a regional early warning

radiation monitoring system

(EWRMS) in ASEAN

Regional system is established in ASEAN and

monitoring data are exchanged between regional

centre and national monitoring networks


auditing

Outputs

(ASEAN)

National early warning radiation

monitoring network is established

in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and

enhanced in Vietnam and the

Philippines

Enhanced or established national networks are

operational


auditing

Hardware/software installed and

operating

Monitoring data being exchanged

Regional ASEAN-RDEP is

established and monitoring data are

exchanged with national networks

in all ASEAN Member States

ASEAN-RDEP is installed in two regional centres

in ASEAN and operational

19


Monitoring data from ASEAN-

RDEP are communicated with

decision support systems (DSS)

installed in ASEAN (at national

and/or regional levels)

Monitoring data are communicated to DSS in

ASEAN

i REG3.01/16: INSC /2017/385-343 ‘Enhancing emergency preparedness and response (EP&R) in ASEAN for radiological and nuclear emergencies through

regional cooperation: Technical support for decision making (project start: Nov. 2017, duration: 3 years)

Documents

EN - European Commission · It exports the "acquis communautaire" worldwide thus participating to the implementation of the EU policy promoting nuclear safety, ... All possible sources