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ISSN: 2036-5438

Empowering Local Democracy In Catalonia: Tools And

Policy Domains To

Implement a Top-Down Solution

by

Lluís Medir Tejado

Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 4, issue 1, 2012


271

Abstract

This article is the result of an ongoing research into a variety of features of Spanish

local government . It aims, in particular, at providing a profile of the tools implemented by

local authorities to improve local democracy in Catalonia. The main hypothesis of the work

is that, even though the Spanish local model is constrained by a shared and unique set of

legal regulations, local institutions in Catalonia have developed their own model of local

participation. And the range of instruments like these is still now increasing. More

specifically, the scope of this research is twofold. On the one hand, different types of

instruments for public deliberation in the Catalan local administration system are identified

and presented, based on the place they take in the policy cycle. On the other hand, we

focus on policy domains and the quality of the decision-making processes. Researching the

stability of the participation tools or whether local democracy prefers more “ad hoc”

processes allows us to analyze the boundaries/limits of local democracy in Catalonia. The

main idea underlying this paper is that, despite the existence of a single legal model

regulating municipalities in Catalonia, local authorities tend to use their legally granted self-

management capacities to design their own instruments which end up presenting

perceivable distinct features, stressing democracy in different policy domains, and in

diverse policy cycles. Therefore, this paper is intended to identify such models and to

provide factors (variables) so that an explanatory model can be built

Key-words

local democracy, participation, public policies, local self-government


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1. Introduction

Democracy is a vast and complex concept. It includes a lot of features that need to

be reduced if we want to make it useful for our purposes. In this paper, local democracy

refers basically to those political processes that incorporate the participation of citizens or

local associations in the local policy-making process. This article is organized as follows:

the first part focuses on the subject with some definitions and key concepts; the second

part explains the institutional and legal framework in which political participation is

embedded at local level, and also points out the theoretical basis of how participation has

been treated by scholars; the third part describes the situation in Catalonia and identifies

the relevant variables to be analyzed. And finally, results are shown and a discussion made.

Our research topic is not related to “non conventional” ways of participation (such

as non authorised public demonstrations, boycotts, violent protests, resistance to public

obligations...), nor to “classical” ways of participation, more related to the question of

creating and promoting democratic representation (through elections, party affiliations,

having meetings with elected and institutions, advocacy...)I. Our article is focused on the

“macro” level (aggregated data), regarding administrative structures and the

institutionalisation of participation processes. We are facing here a sort of “third way” in

that benefits are not exclusively related to create and promote democratic representation,

nor to express political wills far away from an institutionalised political channel.

Following Mendelberg’s position concerning local participatory processes, the theory

of deliberative democracy starts from the state that “egalitarian, reciprocal, reasonable and

open exchanges among citizens about public issues will lead to a number of individual and

collective benefits”. And she highlights “among these (benefits) greater empathy and

tolerance, a better understanding of one’s own views, and those of others, the building of

consensus, a more engaged, active citizenry, and decisions that are more reasoned and

attuned to the larger public good” (Mendelberg, 2002; Shapiro, Delli Carpini, & Shapiro,

2002).

This paper addresses several topics which have particular significance in the changing

world of local government, but one of the most important is related to the growing


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pressures to incorporate participatory and direct forms of democracy within local

governments (Blanco & Gomà, 2002; Bucek & Smith, 2000; Font, McLaverty, 2003;

Subirats, 2001). Much of the time, the aim of these pressures is to revive the limited

electoral participation in elections (especially local elections). In fact, the turnout at local

elections in Catalonia is decreasing fast and deeply, becoming structurally low compared to

the rest of SpainII.

Graph 1. Abstention (%) from local elections in Spain and Catalonia

Source: data from Ministerio del Interior, Spain.

In this increasingly complicated scenario, it would seem logical to initiate strategies to

encourage citizens to return to democratic participation and real involvement in public

affairs.

The main questions that the article aims to treat are closely related to the classic

problems in political science and local government studies: how do local governments

encourage local participation? What are the intentions of it all? Are citizens ready to

participate? Under what terms? In any case, the core question remains: elected politicians

are responsible for making decisions in representative democracies, so why would they


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want to share the power that the law gives them and thus limit themselves? (Font et al.,

2003; Font, 2003)

As Font remarks, the debate is still about the reaction of any local players towards

citizen participation. Those reactions will represent a combination of beliefs and

instrumental motivations (Font, 2003) Politicians (like other local players) will be in favour

or against each citizen participation proposal depending on what they gain from it.

Wherever the process starts, the key players accept it as a legitimate process. The

justifications for participatory experiences come basically from two main arguments: they

are either done to get better policies or to get better polities (Font et al., 2003). In fact,

institutional structures are important because are the vehicle through which the basic

purposes and values a society wishes to pursue through local governments are carried out

(Judge et al., 1995).

In this paper we are focusing on the institutionalisation of participatory processes at

local level. We are going in depth into the creation of better polities, because we do not yet

have data regarding the quality of the participatory processes. The main hypothesis of the

paper is that, even though the Spanish local model is constrained by a shared and unique

set of legal regulations, local institutions in Catalonia have developed their own model of

local participation; but to what extent we are facing a “top-down” directed process but

largely dominated by local strategies?

2. Brief description of a unique legal framework

As a case representing the classical Napoleonic structure of local government, the

Spanish, and also the Catalan local systems, are constrained by a shared and unique set of

legal regulations. Moreover, fragmentation and smallholdings are also relevant features of

the local system. Catalonia numbers up to 947III municipalities – Spain has up to 8,115 –,

four provinces (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona) and a regional government

(Generalitat de Catalunya).

Table 1. Distribution of municipalities in Catalonia by population


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Barcelona Girona Lleida Tarragona TOTAL

Catalunya

Population

size in

inhabitants (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)

Up to 500 16.752 72 25.359 97 28.912 117 17.213 67 88.236 353

501-1.000 23.170 31 29.081 41 35.233 50 24.442 35 111.926 157

1.001-

5.000 213.957 88 133.732 57 107.419 53 128.401 58 583.509 256

5.001-

20.000 777.415 80 199.969 20 88.040 10 165.422 17 1.230.846 127

20.001-

50.000 621.193 21 150.331 5 0 0 103.188 4 874.712 30

50.001-

100.000 752.809 12 81.220 1 0 0 94.407 1 928.436 14

100.001-

500.000 1.064.632 6 0 0 118.035 1 121.076 1 1.303.743 8

More than

500.000 1.582.738 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.582.738 1

Total 5.052.666 311 619.692 221 377.639 231 654.149 183 6.704.146 946

(1): Total number of inhabitants; (2): Number of municipalities

Source: Innovacio democratica, 2007 and MUNICAT.

The legal bases for local participation are scattered through multiple normsIV. In any

case, local governments are considered from a legal point of view as “immediate channels

for citizen participation in public affairs” (art. 1 LBRL).

Basically, local councils in Catalonia could engage three main instruments for public

participation:

• Consultations

• Participatory organisms

• Participatory processes


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Each of these instruments fulfils some of the needs to activate public participation,

and allow citizens to express several points of view. Besides that, there are other

procedures that include public hearings and consultations to stakeholders, but we are not

taking them into account in this paper because they are compulsory following

administrative laws.

Consultations are like referenda, but at local level and related to local issues. They need to

be approved and authorized by the Spanish government (art.71 LBRL). Participatory

Organisms are conceived as stable mechanisms that allow regular participation of citizens

in different topics, and in different stages of the public policy process. Participatory

procedures are non-stable mechanisms (or “ad hoc” processes) that allow public

participation during a delimited and restricted time; like organisms could be associated in

any stage of the public policy process. These two last instruments could be binding or not

and depend only on the political will of the councilV. The city council allows the decisions

made by citizens to be binding at the decision stage. Besides all this regulation, each local

council has the autonomy to decide what kind of instruments it is going to implement, in

which stage of the policy process, in which domain, and can limit the political effects. In

short, we have a widespread regulation and a wide scope of decision for the local

governments in order to promote local democracy.

To try to counteract this potential chaos, some “top-down” solutions have been

proposed in recent years. The most important one is the creation by the Catalan

Government, in January 2004, of an agency called “Direccio General de Participacio

Ciutadana” (DGPC) with the mission of promoting public participation in the design,

implementation and monitoring of government policies (either of the Regional

Government and Local Governments in Catalonia). Its main goals are encouraging,

studying and disseminating the positive values of political and social participation with the

final objective of enriching the quality of democratic life. Its creation was an important

issue for the new leftist government in place (starting from may 2003) after 23 years of

rightist governments.

As an organism of the Regional Government (the Generalitat) the role of this

organism is quite complicated regarding local governments, due to the restriction attached

to the autonomy of local governments. The Generalitat can only offer support regarding


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participation in local policies. The DGPC offers economic aid (through grants, credits, and

public subsidies), formation and an institutional recognition of initiatives being carried out

locally. It cannot impose decisions, or regulate in a homogeneous way for all local

governments, except by parliamentary law being completely respectful of local powers and

the autonomy established by the Constitution.

2.1. Theoretical assumptions and conceptual frameworks

The scientific literature regarding local democracy is divided into two main groups of

approaches or conceptual frameworksVI. Some are more attached to a normative

conception of the need to empower local democracy (Blanco, Lop, 2004; Blanco, 2008;

Font et al., 2003; Pares, 2009; Subirats, 2001;Putnam, 2000). Others are more analytical,

and mostly attached to effects and limits of local participation in both individuals and

institutions (Aars, 2007; Font et al., 2003; Salisbury, 1975; Shapiro et al., 2002; Wolman,

1995; Zafra Victor, 2003; Zittel, 2007a; Zittel, 2007b). In a correlative way, there are critics

and partisans of local participation.

For the believers on the necessity of a renewal of the decision-making process at

local level, Putnam –and its notion of social capital-� is a prompter leader. Concerning

benefits for the community, Putnam has argued that the efficiency of a local government

and the economic development of an area may be strongly influenced by the active

engagement of the local citizenry in community affairs (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti,

1993). Following Putnam’s ideas, the community’s social capital will increase as people

bring deliberation to their civic activities (Putnam, 2000). In general the main arguments in

favour of public participation are that: it leads to an improvement of the decision-making

processes; it represents pluralism in a better way; it helps legitimise public decisions; it

allows more control over elected representatives; it increases accountability and political

culture; and finally builds up a better perception of politics (Chaques & Palau, 2006; Marti

Marmol, 2010).

Contrarily, those who are not so optimistic regarding public participation argue that:

there is a high complexity in terms of implementation of good processes for having only

simply and partial solutions; these processes are economically expensive; public opinion

could be easily manipulated; low rates of participation could affect the process itself, and


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even the classical democratic representative system; polarization in deliberation could

increase social divisions; and users become engaged in single issues and devote little

attention to common public good (Aars, 2007; Marti Marmol, 2010; Zafra Victor, 2003). In

conclusion, and following Zittel’s “Critics of participatory democracy claim that it is solely

driven by normative concerns without opening itself up to empirical inquiry and to

empirical testing of its claims. Proponents are pictured as utopian dreamers obsessed with

the question of how things should be rather than how things can be in real world settings”

(Zittel, 2007b).

In any case, theories of political participation are characterized by a certain

ambivalence regarding popular participation. Theories of democracy do not agree on how

much participation is healthy for democracy. The defining idea of democracy is that the

people govern their own affairs. Participation thereby reflects a population’s self-

government. In this scenario some projects aim to strengthen traditional representative

channels of participation, whereas others promote more direct participatory forms. (Aars,

2007).

In general terms, the analytical approach focuses on the fact that it is not self-evident

that more possibilities for participation automatically result in an improved local

democracy. In fact, more channels of involvement certainly do imply a greater choice of

means by which citizens can express themselves politically. However, if democratic arenas

are being fragmented into a greater diversity of forms one must assume that the individual

has the resources to orient him or herself in a complex landscape (Aars, 2007). In this

sense, “more channels of influence do not necessarily lead to more people becoming

involved in political work, but simply that those who were already active acquire more ways

to make their influence felt” (Aars, 2007).

One of the first and most important analytical approaches was an article that Robert

H. Salisbury published in the American Journal of Political Science in 1975. The article,

named Research on Political Participation, opened the way to the analysis of public

participation as a phenomenon far larger than election: “participation is understood to

involve several quite different types of activity and of activists, and also to vary according

to the institutional setting in which it occurs” (Salisbury, 1975).

Salisbury (1975) distinguishes up to three lines of intellectual usage of political

participation, which are part of the theoretical foundations in our times:


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1) Political participation is regarded as a legitimizing act.

2) Instrumental participation. Here participation is seen as a necessary way of gaining

political power.

3) Participation as a solvent of social conflicts.

After Salisbury’s article, other models to explain the uses of political participation

had been created. However, regarding local politics we are taking as a referent the

distinction made by Zittel (2007a; 2007b), Font (2003) and Salisbury (1975). Following

these scholars, four strategies of empowering local democratization had been identified:

1. Integrative democratization: In this model institutions are a factor that shapes

goals and perceptions of individuals. Democracy must be learnt and this can be

ensured only through relevant institutional frameworks that empower people by

educating them. Here participation is regarded as a “democratic school” for citizens

(Zittel, 2007b).

2. Expansive democratization: This strategy aims to increase the utility of political

participation by expanding rights to participation. Expanding rights to participate

has qualitative rather than quantitative connotations. It cannot increase solely by

increasing the number of opportunities or channels to participate but rather

increases by allowing for certain forms of participation in contrast to others

(implement direct democracy or making binding decisions, more than consultative

and deliberation instruments).(Zittel, 2007b)

3. Efficiency oriented democratization: Here Zittel stresses a conception of

political institutions as incentive systems that patterns the player’s strategic

behaviour. The basis being that political apathy is a result of a negative cost-benefit

effect. So the strategy of efficiency-oriented democratization sees the solution as

lying not in increasing the benefits of participation, but rather in lowering costs

(Zittel, 2007b).

4. Instrumental participation: Participatory processes are implemented to legitimise

or strengthen either local elected or local stakeholders. This model usually attracts

citizens who are most interested in participating, fostering the participation of


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organised groups to the detriment of the capacity of non-organised citizens to

participate (Font, 2003; Salisbury, 1975).

Whereas we want to follow analytical approaches, trying to avoid as much as possible

normative ones, we are focusing on those four strategies mentioned above. These four

strategies of democratization could allow us to define some models of local participation,

having always in mind that they include components or categories without assuring relation

among variables (Judge et al., 1995). In this sense, even if our work has a strong empirical

basis, the model construction in this stage of the work tends to be deductive, more than

inductiveVII , and with limited effects.

Because this is a preliminary exploration, simple models of analysis were chosen to

allow future further study on the material. To classify the data, models were constructed to

classify the data using the categories of commitment envisaged by 611 municipalitiesVIII,

both for organisms and processes. Nevertheless, we must emphasize that models “are

representations or stylized and simplified pictures of reality. They include the most

important components or categories, but they do not posit relationships among variables”

(Judge et al., 1995).

As analyzed in the theoretical assumptions, we are particularly taking two main axes

in order to create models of local participation. In the vertical one we find the degree of

public involvement in the decision-making process, from consultation (low coercion) to

decision (could be binding). In the horizontal axis we can find the stability of institutions

(in the left wing we find processes, in the right wing we find stable organisms). As can be

seen in the figure below, the modelisation of the democratization of policy-making

processes at the local level -according the data we count with-, can be presented as follows:

Figure 1. Models of democratization

Decision

Efficiency oriented

democratization

Expansive

democratization


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Co-decision

Processes

Organisms

Deliberation

Instrumental participation

Integrative

democratization

Consultative

Source: own creation.

Obviously, it would be impossible to fit each of our 611 municipalities clearly in one

or another model. For correctly adapting models and municipalities we need qualitative

analysis and to go in depth into the reality of each municipality. Moreover, not all of 611

had created participatory processes.

3. Identification and characterisation of a heterogeneous reality

In order to have in mind a wide landscape of what we are talking about, it seems

necessary to make some general descriptions concerning the participatory processes in

Catalan municipalities. If we assume that one of the most important topics in local

governments is related to the growing pressures to incorporate participatory and direct

forms of democracy, we must analyze its evolution and present situation.

In absolute numbers we count up to 874 instruments of public participation at local

level from 1978 to 2008. As Table 2 shows, these instruments are distributed following

these patterns: 156 municipalities that had engaged a stable organism of public

participation; and up 206 municipalities had engaged some kind of participation process. In

disaggregated terms (classifying municipalities by having a single instrument, both of them

or without an instrument), 90 municipalities had only created stable organisms, 140

municipalities had only created processes and 66 municipalities had created both types of


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instruments. That means that almost a half of the Catalan municipalities of more than 500

inhabitants have already created some kind of participatory instrument by themselves.

Table 2. Distribution of instruments by municipality

Total 1978-2008 Number of

municipalities

Organisms 549 (62’8%) 156

Processes 325 (37’2%) 206

Total 874 (100%)

Instrument Municipalities % over 611

municipalities

Only Organisms 90 14,80%

Only Processes 140 22,90%

Both instruments 66 10,1%

Total 296 48,4%

Without

instruments 315 51,6%

Source: own treated data from Pi i Sunyer Foundation

Regarding the evolution in time from 1978 to 2008 the increase of these instruments has

really been, in general terms, impressive in absolute numbers. The evolution by year shows

a kind of participation euphoria starting from late 90s.

Graph 2. Evolution in absolute numbers in time from 1978-2008, both instruments added


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0

20

40

60

80

100

120

14019

79

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Both Lineal tendency


As graph 2 shows, the creation of participatory instruments really began in the late

90s. Until that moment, participatory processes were not part of the local political agendas.

In fact, if we take from 1978 to 1997 years, a mean of 1.52 participatory processes were

created each year. However, if we take the mean from 1998 to 2008, the mean increases up

to 25.8 participatory instruments created each year. Another relevant pattern of

institutional behaviour, but not shown in the previous graph, is that the increase is not

distributed in a homogeneous way among instruments. The first instruments that show an

increase are the more stable ones (organisms), while the increase of processes began later,

but seems stronger.

Regarding the degree of public involvement in the decision-making process, first we

have to consider a methodological point. All organisms and processes could include several

own degrees. For example: the first stages of an education plan could consist of

consultation, and afterwards there would be some phases related to the decision itself. It

means that the same process could include first a deliberation stage, and afterwards a co-

decision stageIX. In general terms, the large majority of both instruments are embedded in

the consultation and deliberation stages of the policy-making process, while co-decision

and decision are real laggards. So, in a broad sense, the public involvement in the policy-

making process has a low political impact on decision-making process.


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Table 3. Level of involvement in policy-making process

Organisms Processes Total

Valid 524 313 837 N

Missing 25 12 37

Both instruments

Involvement N % Involvement N %

no 140 16,7 no 662 79 Consultative

yes 697 83,3 Co-decision

yes 175 21

Total 837 100 Total 837 100

no 547 65.3 no 813 97,1 Deliberation

yes 290 34.7 Decision

yes 24 2,9

Total 837 100 Total 837 100


Taking all the instruments together, 83.3% of them are of a consultative nature in

one or another phase; 34.7 % are of a deliberative nature; 21% allow citizens to decide with

elected; and finally, only 2.9% have an exclusive decisional nature.

If we divide the analysis by instrument, we find some significant differences. The

distributions of the percentages mentioned above are somehow influenced by the type of

instrument. The main differences we find are focused on the co-decision involvement.

Processes seem to be used in a different way than organisms. In fact, deliberation and co-

decision are exchanged. Only 10.9% of processes are created for deliberation, while 34.5%

of them are created for co-decision processes. Inversely, 12.7% of organisms are devoted

to co-decision, while 48.9% of them are created to deliberate. So, processes seem to be

more used as instruments for helping elected decisions than organisms, which are more

related to deliberative and consultative issues.

We are focusing now in the distribution of instruments by policy domains. Here we

find that there is not a pattern of similarity in the use of instruments by policy domain. As

table 4 shows, heterogeneity is the dominant factor, and the use of these instruments does

not seem to have any clear pattern of specialization, except urbanism -which is strongly


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related to processes, up of 52.2%-. None of the other policy domains follow any clear

pattern. But, there is still another fact that makes difference. From the total of policy areas

that are affected by those instruments, processes have a mean of 1.65 policy area per

instrument, while organisms have a mean of only 1.04 policy area per instrument. That

means that processes are more all-purpose oriented, whereas organisms are closely focused

on a unique domain.

Table 4. Policy domain* by instrument

Processes % Organisms %

Urbanism and territory 52,2 Education 15,1

Public spaces 21,7 Global 12,6

Strategic planning 13,2 Culture 10,7

Sustainability 11,3 Environment 8,3

Young people 11,3 Aged people 6,2

Others 11 Young people 5,8

Women 6,9 Welfare 5,6

Budget 6,6 Urbanism 5,1

Education 6,3 Health 3,2

Living together 6,3 Women 3

Social cohesion 5 Immigration 2,4

Aged people 3,8 Others 25,8

Childs 3,8 N Proc. Org.

Equality 3,1 Valid 318 531

Immigrants 2,5 Missing 7 18

*the % does not sum up to 100 because each instrument could have more than one policy domain.



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Despite this ambiguous distribution, it is possible to notice that, on one side,

organisms had four policy domains that reached the barrier of 10%: global approach

(12.6%), culture (10.7%), education (15.1%) and others (25.8%). On the other, processes

had six policy domains with more than a 10% of presence: Strategic planning (13.2%),

public spaces (21.7%), Urbanism (52.2%), sustainability (11.3%), young people (11.3%) and

others (11%). Given this fact, we can deduce that both instruments are somehow dedicated

to different topics: processes slightly more devoted towards everything concerning urban

planning and development, while organisms are slightly more committed towards topics

related to fundamentals of living together (education, culture, and global approaches of the

city).

Another important factor, besides policy domains and public involvement, is the

territorial scope of these participation instruments. Our territorial scope is divided into

three possibilities, going from the whole city to the neighbourhood. Here we are focusing

our attention on the dimension of problems that face participatory instrumentsX11. In

other words, it is not the same being demanded to participate to “solve” or discuss

something related to your neighbourhood (whether we should plant cork oaks or only

green grass in the main square), than something related to the whole city (something like,

where and how to place the rubbish incinerator).

Table 5. Territorial scope of policy instruments

Processes N % Organisms N %

no 52 16,3 no 36 7,1

yes 267 83,7 yes 472 92,9 City

Total 319 100

City

Total 508 100

no 313 98,1 no 499 98,2

yes 6 1,9 yes 9 1,8 District

Total 319 100

District

Total 508 100

no 285 89,3 no 493 97 Neighborhood

yes 34 10,7

Neighborhood

yes 15 3


287

Total 319 100 Total 508 100

N Organisms Processes

Valid 508 319

Missing 41 6


The territorial scope of the Catalan participatory processes is mainly focused on a large

territorial scope, the whole city. Possibly to prevent the NIMBY effects. NIMBY could be

defined as: “the protectionist attitudes of oppositional tactics adopted by community

groups facing an unwelcome development in their neighbourhood” (Dear, 1992).

Obviously, it is possible to find NIMBY effects affecting the whole city (big infrastructures

with a general impact), but having more dissipated interests in an extensive participatory

process could avoid disputes and quarrels among close neighbours. However, discussing

and participating in terms of the whole city could discourage individual citizens from

participating in it, whereas big associations and organised stakeholders could have more

incentive to take partXI.

3.1. Relevant variables

Arriving at this point, after a preliminary description of the complex landscape of

participatory instruments created by local governments in Catalonia, we want to analyze

some other relevant variables that may affect the increase of these political phenomena. We

want to test some exogenous variables that may affect the process of institutionalisation we

are analyzing, focusing on those identified in the scientific literature. They are mainly

grouped around three concepts: classical ways of participation; size and population

variables; and political and institutional factors.

First of all we will take some classical participation variables (elections) as potentially

explanatory of the increase of participatory processes. Several scholars pointed to the

dramatical decrease of participation in local elections, and the absence of a local political

clear interpretation of these results in aggregated terms (Botella, 1992; Capo Giol, 1991). In

this respect, other scholars claim that this lack of classical participation needs to be


288

compensated and complemented by other participation channels (Blanco & Mas, 2008).

Even “The introduction of formulas of citizen participation beyond elections should not

only preserve but also foster the capacity of representation of the diverse interests in public

decisions” (Font, 2003). So, the decreasing rates of participation should have an influence

on the rise in participatory instruments.

Another set of relevant variables regarding local politics are still those related to size

and population. The discussion about size, efficiency and democracy is a “perpetual”

ongoing debate (Keating, 1995). Regarding specifically democratic issues, the key point is

“what structures can best secure citizen control over government and proper

accountability” (Keating, 1995). In other words, smaller units will enhance local democracy,

while larger units -being remote from the citizen- discourage active participation and empty

the concept of local democracy of its content (Keating, 1995). In this set of variables we

want to analyze whether the size of the Catalan municipalities has an impact on the

institutionalisation of participatory processes. If Keating’s assumptions are correct, larger

municipalities should have more participatory processes than smaller ones.

The last packages of endogenous variables we want to test are those related to

political factors. First, we are going to analyse whether the political tendency of the mayor

has any relevance. We suppose that municipalities directed by Mayors belonging to left

parties are more prone to establish such mechanisms, while Mayors belonging to right

parties do not. The second variable we are going to analyze is the top-down processes

engaged by the regional government. Basically we are trying to find out whether the

creation of the “Direccio General de Participacio Ciutadana” has been somehow relevant

in the institutionalisation of participatory processes at local level. Some scholars wonder if

it is possible to promote bottom-up involvement by means of top-down strategies. The

danger being always: “Is democratization policy a program for strengthening popular

political participation or for controlling it?”(Aars, 2007)


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4. Results and discussion

To what extent is abstention a main variable for understanding the increase of

participatory instruments? The analysis of correlations illustrates that there is not a

correlation between the percentage of abstention in electoral processes and the creation of

participatory instruments in absolute numbers. In fact, none of the variables gives a

significant or moderate correlation (except organisms and processes among them).

However, the fact that we count with a small N -only eight elections- could introduce some

bias, and maybe we will have to wait for some more.

These results allow us to tentatively assert that normative pressures coming from

stakeholders have been probably more effective in the creation of participatory processes

than the real fact of abstention. As graph 3 shows, abstention as a percentage remains

almost constant, while the percentage of creation of participatory instrument by legislature

increases during the sixth local election period. So changes in the creation of participatory

instruments are not related to electoral abstention in aggregated terms. If abstention does

not change in a spectacular way, it may mean that the real change is based on the

perceptions of it. Scholars and politicians may analyze now abstention as a problem, while

20 years ago they did not, and it was not necessary to do anything about it.

Graph 3. % of abstention and % of creation of participatory instruments by legislature

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Abstention catalonia % organisms % processes



290

As mentioned above, the number of inhabitants could appear as a variable affecting

participatory processes. Following Keating’s assumptions, probably smaller units do not

need to empower local democracy. By contrast, large units will need more participatory

instruments to involve citizens in politics and democracy.

We have used the same division as is envisaged in the Basic Law on Local

Government, but we have incorporated additional sub-divisions into the lower ranges to

avoid the accumulation of cases in one type. As mentioned above, the Catalan municipal

map is full of smallholdings and really fragmented. This accumulation of town councils in

the lower bands made it preferable to introduce an additional division to ensure a more

detailed approach. The municipalities were therefore divided as follows: 500-1000, 1001-

5000, 5001-10000, 1001-20000, 20001-50000 and more than 50000.

As table 6 clearly shows, population matters. There are main differences among

instruments and due to the size of the municipality. Taking all 611 local governments

together, the % of those that engage participatory processes vary by size and instruments.

In general terms, larger populations tend to use more stable organisms than processes,

while small municipalities tend to use more processes than stable organisms.

Table 6. % of use of instruments within population

Processes Organisms

Localities by population % of localities having at

least one

% of localities

having at least one

500-1000 30,7 9,2

1001-5000 35,5 17,9

5001-10000 42 45,9

10001-20000 56 52,9

20001-50000 55,2 78,1

over 50000 84,2 100



291

One of the most significant data is that 100% of local governments of over 50,000

inhabitants have at least one stable organism of participation, and it is also relevant that a

78.1% of those between 20,001 and 50,000 do so. In general, the percentage increases with

population bands. Regarding small municipalities, it is important to note that they prefer

processes rather than organisms. So, there’s a kind of specialisation of instruments

according to population. Indeed the public involvement tends to increase the more the

number of inhabitants diminishes. Big cities tend to use stable organisms with low public

involvement, while small cities use more processes with “stronger” local involvement.

Regarding political and institutional variables, in Catalonia there are up to five main

political parties. Two of them could be classified as “right” parties (CiU and PP), and three

of them could be classified as “left” parties (PSC, ERC and ICV). For the issue of

participation we are not taking into account the other “cleavage” that affects the political

parties in Catalonia, which is “Catalan nationalism” and “non Catalan nationalism”. We

believe that any relevant relation will be focused on the “right-left” axis.

There is no relevant relation between political party and the engagement of

participatory processes. The only parties that seem to have special characteristics are those

placed in the extreme of the “right-left” axis: ICV (green and post-communist party) is very

engaged in participatory projects while the Partido Popular is very reluctant to engage in

participatory processes. However, they have a very small N in comparison to the other

three parties. This fact could introduce some bias in interpretation.

In general terms we cannot identify clear patterns of behaviour, but it’s possible to

deduce that the PSC (the party which governed Barcelona City Hall and the Regional

Government in 2008) had the “equilibrium” among the two extreme cases (PP and ICV)

while the other two parties (CiU and ERC) were more sceptical about participation. It is

also relevant that processes are better accepted than organisms, in terms of a higher

percentage of implementation, all parties considered.

Table 7. % of municipalities by political party having at least 1 instrument

Political party of

the Mayor

Processes

%

Organisms

%

Mean

of %

ICV 85,7 50 67,9


292

PSC 45,3 42,7 44

CiU 37,4 24,9 31,1

Others 35,6 23,9 29,7

ERC 37,8 16,2 27

PP 0 25 12,5


The last political variable we want to take into account is the creation of the

“Direcció General de Participació Ciutadana” (DGPC). We must remember here that it

was created in January 2004, only a few months after the victory of a coalition of three left

parties (PSC-ERC-ICV) for regional government, after 23 years of government by the

same party, CiU. This change represented a political shift in several topics, and one of them

was the idea of promoting large and extensive participatory processes. This General

Direction is conducted by ICV, one of the most engaged political parties in these issues

(and as well their local Mayors, as shown above).

By analyzing the role played by this governmental agency, we want to take into

account whether the evolution of the institutionalisation of local participatory instruments

is somehow conducted by a “top-down” policy. In order to understand the impact of this

governmental agency, we are focusing on the year of creation of the first participatory

instrument engaged by each municipality. So, as graphic 4 shows, the distribution of

“newcomers” to participatory engagement has clearly risen since 2003. Before 2003,

participatory mechanisms were not in the local government’s agenda. This figure allows us

to consider that there is a relationship between the creation of the agency and the political

will to promote local democracy at local level. Moreover, if we take the mean (both

processes and organisms) of “newcomers” from 1979 to 2003 and the mean from 2004 to

2008, the numbers speak for themselves. In the last 5 years, almost 43 new municipalities

–each year- engaged for the first time a process or an organism empowering local

democracy.

Table 8. Number of newcomers per period and instrument

1978-2003 2004-2008


293

Processes Organisms Processes Organisms

New

comers 23 57 157 57

Mean 1,0 2,38 31,4 11,4

Total

mean 3,3 42,8

Source: own treated data from Pi I Sunyer Foundation

Graph 4. Absolute numbers of first participatory instruments created by year

Source: own treated data from Pi I Sunyer Foundation

These data speak for themselves but the final proof of the impact of the Catalan

government’s top-down policy is the correlation analysis. As table 9 shows, there is a

significant, and very strong, correlation among the presence or absence of the DGPC and

the creation of new instruments. It is necessary to note that the statistical correlation is

strongly positive: 0.849 for organisms and 0.‘923 for processes. That means that there’s a

very strongly positive linear dependence between the presence of the DGPC and the

arrival of newcomers.

Table 9. Correlations between year of creation of first participatory instrument and

presence of DGPC.


294

4.1 Discussion

The main objective of the paper was to study how participation in local Catalan

Governments is being institutionalised. To what extent institutional processes conducted

and created by local governments show common patterns of behaviour. We decided to

take a picture of the state of the process up to 2008, following the models and variables

identified by the literature. Summarizing briefly, the main findings of our introductory

research allow us to identify some patterns of local institutional behaviour regarding the

democratic empowering process carried out in Catalonia.

Is it possible to fit our data within the theoretical models mentioned above?

Obviously the response is going to be partial and incomplete, because we are analyzing

aggregated data. Rigorous “micro analysis” could partially confirm, or even deny, some of

our conclusions. Recognition of municipal autonomy extends to what is known as the

Year of creation

Processes

Year of creation

Organisms Presence DGPC

Pearson

Correlation

1 ,826** ,923**

Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000

Year of creation

Processes

N 30 30 30

Pearson

Correlation

,826** 1 ,849**

Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000

Year of creation

Organisms

N 30 30 30

Pearson

Correlation

,923** ,849** 1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 Presence DGPC

N 30 30 30

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


295

principle of self organisation, which reinforces the freedom of municipalities by letting

them set up their own organisational structure. This opens the door to a plurality of forms

that is difficult to embed in any of the models previously distinguished. Nevertheless,

following the two main axes we have identified (see figure 1), we can tentatively assume

that the model of democratization that is being implemented by local governments is

somewhere in between the “integrative democratization” and the “instrumental

participation model”.

After the statistic analysis of data, it is now clear that the participatory tools created

are more stable than precise interventions, and require little public involvement. In total we

count 62.8% of organisms, of which only 2.9% and 12.7% are embedded in decision or co-

decision stages of the policy-making processes. Moreover processes (representing 37.2%)

are embedded largely in a consultative stage (83.3%). Even so, processes are more used in

the co-decision stage than organisms, allowing more qualitative participation of citizens. In

other words, very few organisms are involved in the decision stage. The figure of processes

involved in the co-decision stage is only slightly higher.

Despite the larger number of existing organisms, processes are expanding faster. The

use of “ad hoc” instruments seems to be more accepted in recent years, and further

analysis is needed in order to determine if its adscription to the co-decision level of public

involvement is also increasing.

Regarding policy domains, we cannot conclude any solid pattern of use in general

terms. We can deduce that processes are more all-purpose oriented, whereas organisms are

focused on a unique domain. Besides, organisms and processes are dedicated to slightly

different topics: processes are slightly devoted to urban planning and development, while

organisms are more related to fostering social groups and creating social capital. Moreover,

both kinds of instruments focalize participation on the whole city, avoiding small units

(and also small interests) like districts or neighbourhoods.

We were also willing to interpret some other political variables that could affect the

institutionalisation of participatory processes. Firstly, abstention. According to some

scholars, the decrease of “classical” participation will create the necessity of promoting

other participatory channels. Our findings tend to contradict this vision. Abstention in

local elections does not seem to be related to new participatory instruments. We are more

inclined to consider that what has really changed is the perception of abstention in


296

politicians and governments. Scholars and politicians see now abstention as a problem,

whereas 20 years ago it was not. Trying to justify the political need to empower democracy,

abstention is used more as a normative argument, than a real causal argument.

Population matters. The bigger the city, the more stable and more consultative are

the instruments implemented. A large majority of big cities have more organisms than

processes, and more related to consultative and deliberative stages. Contrarily, small cities

use fewer organisms but more processes, and are slightly related to co-decision stages.

Finally we found out that politics (in terms of party affiliation) does not really matter.

Local factors, more than the general political mood, could explain the institutionalisation of

participatory processes. Related to party affiliation, we find the establishment of one

particular top-down process to empower local democracy as a relevant explanation. In fact,

the apparition of the “Direcció General de Participació Ciutadana” has been important in

terms of the enlargement of number of municipalities involved in creating participatory

instruments. We can affirm that the DGPC has been determinant in the increase of

municipalities offering new channels of participation. The question remaining is what kind

of participation has been encouraged by it?

Local autonomy prevents very intrusive top-down policies. The DGPC only has

promoting capacities; and within this framework, the DGPC has promoted the creation of

more processes than organisms -less expensive and with smaller bureaucratic needs, than

stable organisms-. The DGPC has legal and political barriers to impose a vision and a

direction over local governments. The final decision over contents and effects of

participatory policies created by municipalities belong only to its political wishes. To find

out the reasons why the institutionalized model created until now lies somewhere in

between the “integrative democratization” and the “instrumental participation model”, we

need to explore further both the top down processes engaged and the adaptation of those

policies to the reality of each local government.

In any case it seems that the question of why elected politicians want to share the

power, and thus limit themselves, needs to be reformulated. It’s true that local elections are

increasingly creating participatory processes; but what is the sense of all that if low impact

on the policy-making process is the norm?


297

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I As the classic distinction among “conventional” and “non conventional” political activities recognizes (Vallès, 2006). II Local elections all take place at the same time throughout Spain. It is true that participation in local elections is decreasing in aggregated terms, but it’s nuanced by the size of the municipality (in small municipalities we find high rates of participation whereas abstaining prevails in large cities). III Note the difference with the total number of municipalities in Table 1. This is because the last municipality, which raises the sum to 947, was created in May 2010 IV The Spanish Constitution (arts. 9.2, 6, 23, 29, 87.3 and 92), the Autonomous Statute of Catalonia (arts. 29 and 122), the Spanish law of basis of local government (known as LBRL arts. 1, 18, 24, 69, 70bis, 71, 72). Moreover, Barcelona has its own regulations, and the government of the province of Barcelona encourages the creation of participatory processes V And, of course, it only affects local competencies. VI By conceptual framework we mean “ways of looking at or conceiving of an object of study. They provide a language and a frame of reference through which reality can be examined and lead theorists to ask questions that might not otherwise occur”(Judge, Stoker, & Wolman, 1995) VII “Empirical theory can also be deductive, starting from a premise or set of premises and deducing conclusions about causal relationships and behaviour from these premises. The premises may or may not be empirically valid, but utilizing them produces plausible results about and an understanding of (that is, explains) reality” (Judge et al., 1995). VIII The universe of our study covers municipalities with more than 500 inhabitants. That means 611 Catalan municipalities. IX This is because data shown in most of the tables changes in comparison to the total number of instruments. X Again here we can find processes or organisms that have several territorial scopes. XI The costs of information are higher for individuals than organized associations, which in fact is Font’s main argument: “the predominant participation model has fostered the participation of organised groups to the detriment of the capacity of non-organised citizens” (Font, 2003).

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