Employing Immersion Theory as a Public Affairs ... · a Public Affairs Instructional Tool in Frontier Conflict Regions ... smart phones, set DVRs to record ... immersion theory may

Journal of Public Affairs Education 661

Employing Immersion Theory as a Public Affairs Instructional Tool

in Frontier Conflict Regions

Christopher K. Hummel United States Air Force Veteran

Houston, Texas

Maritza Freeland, MSgtUnited States Air Force

Joint Base Andrews, Maryland

Eric Craft, TSgtUnited States Air ForceAviano Air Base, Italy

Paul McKellips, Officer in ChargeCivilian Expeditionary Workforce Washington, DC

AbstrAct

Frontier conflict regions push the boundaries of how to educate foreign civilian and military public affairs specialists. In most cases, United States military personnel and Department of Defense civilians are implanted in these regions as instructors. With no formal guidance or education on how to be educators themselves, these teacher-recruits must design, plan, and execute training strategy on their own. Public affairs mentoring in a war zone can be enhanced through the process of creative immersion. Classroom theory and instruction is not efficient when training members of a foreign military that have been tasked with traditional public affairs officer assignments yet lack any familiarity with computers, cameras, software, writing skills, or Internet access. Immersion is the process of putting public affairs tools in the hands of untrained and often

JPAE 18(4), 661–681

662 Journal of Public Affairs Education

uneducated people and developing process knowledge as opposed to theoretical knowledge. Immersion is an emerging educational tool that is particularly practical in a third-world country at war, also called a frontier conflict region. This case study proposes a new standard for delivering public affairs learning in emerging and frontier conflict regions as created by an American training team positioned near Gardez, Afghanistan, and their endeavor to establish a lasting public affairs program in the eastern region of Operation Enduring Freedom.

immersion theory

The teaching of public affairs is no more exclusive to the traditional classroom than traditional teaching style and structure is exclusive to absolute learning.

Immersion is rampant in modern society, and the focus is on performance competence as opposed to comprehensive knowledge.

A newly invented video game controller is put in the hands of a child (immersion) with no formal teaching or instruction manuals, and within minutes the child navigates (experiential knowledge) through complex scenarios with eyes affixed to the screen, not the buttons and functions on the controller.

There are numerous modern examples of adults asking children to set up smart phones, set DVRs to record programs, and otherwise navigate through the digital morass. Is it because the children took the time to read the operating manuals, or is it because immersion theory using the experiential classroom moves learners to performance competency faster than comprehensive knowledge?

The student who lacks the comprehensive knowledge framework of the traditional classroom (operating manual) may still have a competitive advantage in terms of experiential knowledge and speed to achieving performance competence.

Immersion removes the emphasis on mastery and replaces it with performance competence. In a frontier conflict region such as the war in Afghanistan or in other domestic classroom settings where time, money, and space are in short supply, immersion theory may be a new quill in the educator’s quiver.

Immersion theory had a renaissance in the late 1950s through the work of Stephen Smale and contributions from the Leningrad school. Immersion was used as a new tool in geometrical thinking, especially in the area of theoretic topology (Spring, 2005).

In both theoretical waves, immersion was arguably ahead of its time. For immersion to be an effective learning framework, suitable technology must be in place in order to establish experiential development.

In the mid-1990s, the introduction of virtual reality (VR) platforms, head-mounted displays (HMD), and data gloves (DG) paved the way for immersion to finally compete with interactivity (Biocca, 1992). Without suitable technology, educators had to rely on interactivity with their students in order to transform abstract concepts from the lectern into applied principles at the desk.

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Virtual reality offers a three-dimensional landscape whereby the participant experiences an expansion of physical and sensory powers (Ryan, 1994). While VR does not replace reality, it certainly challenges the concept of reality and enables the participant to rediscover, redefine, and explore reality. VR allows the mind to learn, train, and apply new powers and skills (Ryan, 1994).

Immersion is a key component of virtual reality. Immersion depends on the vividness of the three-dimensional landscape, and its success factors are closely related to the devices being used (HMDs and DGs) that lead to realism in represent- ation. The VR participant does not need to know why the head-mounted display or the data gloves work, but rather how to use them in a virtual reality setting. Once the HMD and the DGs are put into play, their use becomes second nature because the participant is immersed within the scenario (Rheingold, 1992).

Immersion works when the user blocks out the physical world (Biocca, 1992) and cannot be fully experienced if the user remains aware of the physical generator of the data. The “virtual reality effect” requires the denial of the role of signs (bits, pixels, and binary codes) in the overall experience. In other words, the medium must become transparent for the represented world to become real (Lanier & Biocca, 1992).

The “real world” in present-day Afghanistan is filled with war, violence, corruption and poverty. Two major languages (Pashto and Dari Persian) are complicated by 39 variant tribal languages. Modern technology is already decades old and is limited in use to the capital city of Kabul.

The NATO–Afghanistan training mission tasked English-speaking Mobile Public Affairs Advisory Teams (MPAATs) to teach, train, and empower professional public affairs specialists throughout the ranks of the Afghan National Army, police, and border patrol. Many of these soldier-students had not graduated from high school, possessed no skills with modern technology platforms, and knew nothing about a culture that was free from war.

There was a language barrier. There was a technology barrier. But most important, there was a reality barrier.

By placing the modern tools of public affairs technology (cameras, laptops, radio recorders, and video cameras) into their hands and over their eyes like HMDs and DGs, MPAAT-2 used immersion theory to create an enhanced virtual reality effect for rapid learning and empowerment. Through the eye of a camera lens, Afghan public affairs students could “see” a new 3-D landscape emerge.

bAckground

Afghanistan, despite its vast amount of natural resources and mineral deposits, is hardly a frontier market in the pure sense of the economic term. But as a frontier conflict region, Afghanistan is perhaps the crown jewel of the Caspian region. It is a Stone Age frontier with conflict that has seldom stopped.

Since Soviet tanks started to roll in on Christmas Eve 1979, Afghanistan has experienced 32 years of uninterrupted turmoil (CIA, 2011). Long euphemized as



the “graveyard of empires,” Afghanistan has provided battlefields for Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, the Soviets, the Taliban, and most recently NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries.

Absent armed conflict, Afghanistan has neither made great strides toward modernity nor emerged as a legitimate player on the world stage of international commerce. As of June 7, 2010, the war in Afghanistan became the longest in American history (Nagorski, 2011). Although the main goal of the October 2001 invasion was to oust the Taliban and eliminate al-Qaeda, nation building quickly became NATO’s main objective. A lethal combination of geopolitical instability and relentless government corruption has kept Afghanistan suppressed as simply a frontier conflict region.

Few would argue against the ultimate impact that both political stability and civilian security would have on transforming Afghanistan into a frontier market. International precedent is that in order for economic expansion to occur, stability and security must be in place.

NATO has “invested” billions of dollars and more than a decade worth of blood, sweat, and tears in Afghanistan’s stability and security. But the only economic expansion to emerge thus far for this Stone Age nation is a military-styled personnel complex, loosely called the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

At no other time in Afghanistan’s expansive history has more money, time, and human resources been invested with so little return. Though democratically elected, the Hamid Karzai government has been accused of widespread corruption. NATO funds pour through the front door as bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement trickles out the back door. In February 2011, Afghan and world media reported rampant corruption between Kabul Bank and government officials, including Karzai’s brother, alleging more than $500 million in misappropriations. Three months later, Karzai’s brother was absolved of any wrongdoing by a panel appointed by the president (Nordland, 2011).

October 2012 marks 11years of armed conflict in southwest Asia, which has effectively denied safe havens and improved Afghan security by pushing both al-Qaeda and the Islamic jihadists who assemble under the name of the Taliban (which means “students”) out of Afghanistan and into neighboring Pakistan, it’s fair to assert that corruption is now the greatest internal enemy facing Afghanistan. The enemy within Afghanistan resembles organized crime syndicates more than it does terrorists or political insurgents.

A robust and independent media could serve as the political and economic watchdog of the Afghan government and ANSF. That is, of course, if an economic system were in place by which an engaged populace would pay for and support the role of a free and vibrant press in holding the country’s leaders accountable. Illiteracy is rampant. Only 28% of the population 15 years of age and older can read and write, which makes selling newspapers a major challenge. Only 29% of the total population lives in urban areas, which makes television and modern digital

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connections a difficult undertaking. With more than 36% of the population living below the poverty line, Afghans hunger for food and basic necessities rather than government accountability and truth (CIA, 2011).

The free press in Afghanistan is basically what the name implies: free. Without an economic system to support news coverage and the distribution of news, the population is left with few sources of information—namely, government media such as Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA). As in any frontier or emerging region, government-sponsored media is hardly objective. The wolf is almost always willing to guard the henhouse.

probLem

If properly trained, a robust corps of public affairs officers within the various ranks of ANSF could serve a useful, twofold purpose. First, Afghan public affairs officers would be able to establish the communications link between security forces and the general population. Second, public affairs officers would be able to provide prepackaged stories and guidance to an emerging free press, thereby giving the public access to information that security forces in a frontier conflict region might not typically grant.

The problem is, however, self-evident. Public affairs officers can’t simply serve as the mouthpiece of the propaganda machine for commanders and government officials.

But the challenge is even more daunting: to train uneducated soldiers and police officers to be public affairs officers; to teach them how to use modern media tools and communications equipment; and to then empower them to uncover and report the truth, no matter where the truth may take them.

mission

NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A) launched a new initiative in late 2010 and put boots on the ground in early 2011 in an effort to establish a corps of countrywide public affairs officers and change the old paradigm. A new emphasis was placed on training and mentoring public affairs officers within all corridors of Afghan National Security Forces. The theory was straightforward. If NATO mentors could step out of their current civilian and military public affairs roles in America—where they perform their duties in a transparent and open society and step onto forward operating bases in a war zone to train and mentor Afghan security personnel, then, perhaps, an internal “watchdog” could be established while a communications link to the public was being built.

In its most basic form, “public affairs” was defined as the development, creation, production, and distribution of the flow of truthful information to the media as the bridge between the organizations (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and ANSF) and the people.

NTM-A recruited single-subject public affairs experts from the United States Air Force and deployed 17 individual augmentees into Afghanistan as photographers, broadcasters, and journalists. The Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, under the umbrella of the Department of Defense, provided some



civilians with public affairs experience to serve as officers-in-charge (OIC) of mentoring teams. The country was divided into five sections, and five Mobile Public Affairs Advisory Teams (MPAATs) were created. Each MPAAT consisted of three to four USAF specialists under the guidance of a civilian OIC.

provisions

Each of the five MPAATs arrived in Afghanistan in late December 2010 and early January 2011. For the mission to succeed, three fundamental hurdles had to be overcome. All three issues related to provisions—or in this case, the lack thereof.

First, there was no equipment. Aside from the cameras, video recorders, digital audio recorders, laptops, and software that individual team members may have brought with them for the deployment, NTM-A provided no other equipment, either for team use or for the Afghans to train on. At no time during the mission did the Afghan government, military, or NATO provide any equipment to the Afghan public affairs students.

Second, there was no curriculum. Nationally standardized and approved public affairs course curriculum did not exist.

Third, there were no established classrooms and no enrolled students. If an MPAAT wanted to fulfill the mission and train Afghan public affairs officers, each team needed to recruit students from the Afghan National Army, police, and border patrol and then find a classroom environment to teach mostly uneducated men how to perform the duties of a public affairs officer without the benefit of equipment, curriculum, or a meeting place.

mobiLe pubLic AFFAirs Advisory teAm-two (mpAAt-2)The United States Air Force members of MPAAT-2 arrived at Forward Operating

Base (FOB) Lightning on January 7, 2011. None of the Air Force team members were trained as instructors or had formally served as public affairs specialists, yet they were highly trained as specialists in their own areas of expertise.

Technical Sergeant Maritza Freeland (40) is trained as a photographer and served as the noncommissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC). It was Freeland’s first deployment to a war zone. Staff Sergeant Eric Craft (35) is trained as a video- grapher and served as the broadcaster and editor. It was Craft’s second deployment to Afghanistan after two tours in Iraq. Staff Sergeant Christopher Hummel (27) is trained as a photographer and journalist and served as the photography, journalism, and photo editing mentor. It was Hummel’s first deployment to a war zone.

During the first month of mentoring, as the Air Force team waited for the arrival of the civilian OIC, MPAAT-2 provided basic and advanced photography training to six Afghan army and police students—who may have been more interested in learning how to use a camera than in becoming public affairs officers. Between Freeland and Hummel, the team had three high-end professional Nikon SLR cameras for the students to use.

The mentoring and training was professional yet lacking. At the end of a class, the cameras went home with the Americans and the Afghans went back to work. None of the Afghans owned or had access to a camera, let alone a high-end SLR.

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The informal training also lacked context. There was no way to convey how mastery of a camera could lead to a fully functional and professional public affairs officer.

On February 7, 2011, Paul McKellips arrived at FOB Thunder as the civilian OIC. McKellips (52) was a non-federal government, Schedule A civilian appointee. McKellips had performed similar public affairs training for General David Petraeus in Iraq during “the surge” in 2006–07. McKellips is a media professional who has written, directed, and produced three motion pictures, is an Emmy-nominated TV producer, and has covered the Pentagon and State Department as a national television correspondent. He also has covered the Middle East for Voice of America and served as a public affairs specialist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Once the MPAAT-2 team was fully assembled and the mission was reviewed and analyzed, a new strategy for mentoring public affairs officers in a frontier conflict region began to emerge.

Very few of the Afghan students who took the initial photography training had more than a high school education from a remote village school. Some spoke Pashto and some spoke Dari Persian, but none of them had assignments or orders to become full-fledged public affairs officers. The photography training took place in a variety of locations on a busy military base. The probability of success was minimal at best.

Photo 1.Staff Sgt. Eric Craft reviews a student’s photograph during the introduction to photography portion of immersion training.



But the Air Force team did notice one very distinct learning trait that every Afghan trainee exhibited: even though there was a massive language and cultural barrier, each Afghan was able to learn the concepts by modeling actions and behavior. When the instructor got down on the ground to frame a platoon of soldiers marching by for a photograph, it wasn’t long before the Afghan counterparts were all on the ground as well.

It wasn’t difficult to conclude that classroom theory and classroom instruction would not be effective. If the team could properly model how to use traditional public affairs tools, and then demonstrate the power and objectives behind using those tools to create and distribute products, then perhaps the Afghans could emulate those behaviors.

Immersion, not theory and concepts, was selected as the most viable method of instruction with the greatest chance at success for a 6-month mission. Instructors shared the following saying with their Afghan students, “There are two ways to learn how to swim: slowly dip your feet in, or jump in.” There was no time to take things slowly.

immersion: A prActicAL cAse study in A Frontier conFLict region

Immersion theory is widely used in language acquisition, perhaps most notably by Rosetta Stone. Compared to subject teaching, immersion delivers three key components: (a) the effective use of a minimal time investment, (b) the intensity of use, and (c) the quality of exposure. One of the most outstanding expeditions into immersion is the attempt by Quebec public school systems to teach French as a second language; both total and partial immersion theories were put into use with much success during the 1960s and 1970s (Johnson & Swain, 1997). Similar to immersion language programs where a student is “implanted” into a foreign vernacular, public affairs students were imbedded in an environment where their every task was aimed toward completing a published work.

MPAAT-2 had to develop a full-immersion public affairs training program, recruit students, and find a suitable training environment within 10 days—all in the middle of a war. Individually, no member of the team was capable of developing a comprehensive course framework. But individually, each member of the team could contribute subject matter expertise according to his or her particular core skill sets. By melding and assimilating their skills, the new American team of instructors could produce a comprehensive immersion course.

The team instituted a foundational principle—an underlying and guiding criterion—that had to be met if the training was ever to move from the subjective to the objective: everything had to be measured. Every component of the immersion course had to be tied to metrics. If it couldn’t be measured, it wouldn’t be included.

The MPAAT-2 incorporated eight components into the public affairs immersion training program in Afghanistan:

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1. Production of a 27-module textbook and companion DVD, both translated and produced in the Pashto language, for after-class, self-guided study in the barracks

2. Approval to build a 1,200-square-foot dedicated media lab and classroom on the Afghan military base

3. Establishment of a recruiting function for new PAO students through the Operational Command Center for the Region (OCC-R) to identify and recruit Afghan soldiers and police officers for public affairs training

4. Creation of a 3-week, hands-on immersion course to be conducted once each month (Weekly immersion assignments, which included a 1-week photojournalism project, a 1-week media promotional project, and a 1-week TV news package, were given.)

5. Development and coordination of a distribution network among local Afghan media and news outlets so that the public affairs students would enjoy the “payoff” of widespread dissemination

6. Provision of a personal point-and-shoot camera with video so that the students had personal equipment to learn with and keep for both personal and professional use

7. Implementation of a daily attendance policy and the formulation of a final exam that would measure and compare different levels of mastery and proficiency

8. Incorporation of a motivational tool so that the students would inherently recognize that they had the most powerful weapon that any army on the planet could possibly possess: the pen

textbook And dvd in pAshto

Developing a textbook that encompassed the basics of public affairs was the first and most difficult task. With a small training window, MPAAT-2 chose the essentials that would best create a successful and operational Afghan public affairs officer. Given a 3-week immersion course schedule, the team decided which traditional public affairs skill sets could be modeled and mastered, and which ones could not. Twenty-seven modules were developed and written based on a probability of mastery as exhibited from the informal photography training. The PAO Immersion Course focused on six overarching disciplines:

1. Basic public affairs duties, principles, and strategies2. Overview of practical multimedia formats suitable

for a frontier conflict region3. Video broadcasting to include stand-up, voiceover,

sign-offs, slates, and editing



4. Photographic and photojournalism deliverables including composition, three-shot sequences, interviews, writing, and editing

5. Radio production, editing, compression, and distribution6. Basic software navigation and electronic distribution

Once the textbook was instructionally designed, written, and edited by the American team, translation into Pashto began. MPAAT-2’s main interpreter, Abdul Rahman, translated the material as a second interpreter verified the language used and fact-checked the content. The textbook became the foundation for the companion DVD. After building a makeshift studio, the team videotaped Abdul reading portions of the textbook and demonstrating the proper use of cameras, tools, and software so that students could model the actions. Abdul became the Afghan face of the 104-minute instructional DVD. These two items, the textbook and DVD, became the auxiliary training elements that enabled students to learn in the media lab classroom as well as through self-paced study.

dedicAted cLAssroom

Charged with training ANSF in all things public affairs, MPAAT-2 needed a classroom from which training could be headquartered. The team met with the Afghan Commander of Education, Colonel Assif, and requested a dedicated classroom and media lab to administer training.

Col. Assif provided the team with a 1,200-square-foot partition in a transient soldier barracks. After acquiring lumber and building supplies, the team constructed walls separating the classroom from the common area of the building. MPAAT-2 was given tables and chairs and prepared the area for class, which started a day later.

occ-rMPAAT-2 members worked closely with the Operational Command Center

for the Region (OCC-R) and, through them, reached out to recruit students. The OCC-R is a hub of Afghan army and police forces that work with coalition nations to secure the region. Representatives from nearly every unit of the Afghan National Security Forces, including police and border patrol, reside in the OCC-R. Using this organization’s far reach, MPAAT-2 was able to populate the classroom with OCC-R recommended students.

three-week hAnds-on course

As officer in charge, McKellips speaks to the class first through an interpreter.

Each of you has the power to make a real difference in Afghanistan. Use the pen to empower your people with hope and inspiration; use the pen to tell the truth even when the truth may not be popular; use the pen, and the people will respond.

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During initial deployment training, all U.S. Armed Forces members are given a basic cultural briefing. One point that applies directly to NTM-A’s training mission is the literacy rate of Afghanistan. Only slightly more than 25% of Afghans over the age of 15 are able to read and write.

The team decided that 3 weeks of training would allow MPAAT-2 the time to graduate three or four classes before their tour ended in June 2011. One week would be spent between the 3-week course to analyze the previous course and make modifi- cations for the next. The course was broken into three 1-week immersion projects:

1. Week One. Produce a TV recruiting commercial for ANSF.2. Week Two. Produce a photojournalism print story, distribute it for

print, and record the story for radio.3. Week Three. Produce a TV news package complete with B-roll,

voiceover, interviews, and a stand-up; produce an MP3 version for radio and distribute both.

Recognizing the learning, cultural, and equipment limitations of an Afghan soldier turned public affairs student, some fundamental criteria become less fundamental. For example, explaining that light travels at 186,000 miles per second and other multimedia tenets is not “must know” knowledge. Immersion is less about abstract, advanced topics and more about immediate modeling and use of process, technique, and outcomes. Students are enveloped in practical processes and master results-based projects.

Photo 2.Afghan National Army Sergeant First Class Abdul Kareem learns to stabilize his shooting hand in case a tripod is not available for news broadcasts.



Applying immersion means that the course material is taught, reviewed, and then quickly put into hands-on practice. Students spend less than one day in their chairs before putting their hands on a camera, laptop, pen, and paper.

mediA distribution

The experience of news release distribution in Western societies couldn’t be further from the reality of what happens at the provincial level in Afghanistan. Getting anything published requires coordination with civilian and military press, which adds another dynamic to mentoring.

After writing, filming, or recording a story or news release, students were able to view a finished product of their work. MPAAT-2 taught the Afghans one simple lesson: If you don’t get your stories distributed and published, then all of your work was for nothing. This resonates loudly in a society where nothing is wasted; the students quickly make the connection between production and distribution.

In MPAAT-2’s area of responsibility, there are two major news distribution outlets. One is the Afghan military monthly, Thunder Magazine. The other is the Radio Television Network of Afghanistan, or RTA. Students are given the contact phone numbers and e-mail addresses of all local media outlets and trained how to promote and distribute their products.

Distribution of immersion student stories has been unparalleled. From the March 2011 class, four student-produced stories were aired via radio and posted multiple times both regionally and nationally, and they reached 6 million households in Afghanistan through RTA. Eight students from the April 2011 class recorded and produced ANSF recruiting commercials that were distributed via radio and TV multiple times to a national audience.

donAted cAmerA equipment

One challenge the team did not expect to find 7,000 miles away from American stores was the lack of media equipment to train and mentor the Afghans. MPAAT-2 deployed to Afghanistan with only personal professional gear—nothing more. NTM-A had no provisions for training equipment, so the team started a camera drive among friends and neighbors. Less than a month later, MPAAT-2 received 30 new, and sometimes used, consumer cameras with double-A batteries and smart cards. The cameras were a gift to each student, and they were encouraged to use their cameras for both personal and professional use. Personal ownership of a comparatively expensive camera would serve two purposes. First, the students took pride in personal ownership. The camera was a cultural status symbol that they were, in fact, professional public affairs officers. Second, the personal ownership of the camera meant that the student’s commander could not confiscate the equipment, since graft runs rampant in both Afghan military and government circles.

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AttendAnce And A FinAL exAm

The team established guidelines for measuring success and mastery. Students were required to maintain a 70% attendance rate. All three immersion projects—promotions, photojournalism, and broadcasting— had to be completed each week. Students were also required to achieve a score of 70% on the final exam in order to graduate. If any of these three components were lacking, the student did not graduate. While four students dropped out of the training, all 13 students who completed the 3-week course also completed the three immersion projects, attended 70% of the classes, achieved passing marks on the final exam, and graduated the course.

vAcLAv hAveL: A motivAtionAL tooL

Afghanistan has been in a constant state of crisis for more than three decades. The population is tired, and despair is a common theme. Identifying the social need for change and the opportunity to serve in an inspirational capacity was communicated to each student in every session. Proper motivation and encouragement happened on Day One of every class.

The former president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, was elected as a regional icon the Afghans might be able to relate to. Havel was not perceived to be Western, and his background was that of a writer. Havel’s career with the pen, which led to democratic reforms in the Czech Republic (Biography.com, 2010), served as the comparative framework that the Afghan PAO students could aspire to. They were able to make the connection between the power of the pen and the outcome of hope.

The students learned that through poetry, plays, and essays one man, Vaclav Havel, was able to unite a nation. They learned that with the pen, one man can make a difference in a struggling nation, even a frontier conflict region like Afghanistan.

On the wall next to the classroom exit door, the team placed a montage of photos featuring Havel and his accomplishments. Next to Havel’s photo, the team taped the outline of a hand with an inscription underneath, in both Pashto and Dari Persian, that read: “I have the power to make a difference in Afghanistan.” Each student was given a daily mandate. If they believed those words to be true, they were required to slap the hand on the way in and out of class. The sound of hands slapping the wall reverberated throughout Afghan FOB Thunder for several months. The team hopes the slapping will be heard in Afghanistan for many years to come.



Photo 3.On his way out of class, a student slaps a poster that reads, “I have the power to make a difference in Afghanistan.”

metrics

Regardless of the teaching style used, whether it is immersion or traditional subject instruction, metrics must be in place to measure whether learning took place.

In the United States and in other developed countries, traditional educators like to use the rubric as a tool to measure the quality of performance and learning. A quality-based rubric was deemed to be a pointless tool to assess the performance of largely uneducated Afghans, assigned to become public affairs officers, and for untrained men who had never touched a camera, written a news story, or even seen themselves on video.

The language barrier and interpreter disagreements made evaluation of word choice almost impossible. Pashtun is a tribal language, and seldom did two Pashto–English interpreters agree on what the correct word choice was or even what the selected words meant. Instead, the MPAAT-2 team created a mastery rubric as a type of pass-fail evaluator to measure whether the students successfully modeled the immersion practices.

QualityQuality was measured by whether the Afghan media would print or

broadcast the stories the students created. If the 203rd Corps’ Afghan senior public affairs officer cleared the student stories, then the team measured that

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as immersion achievement. If the quality met media standards, then the team measured that as immersion achievement as well. Each week, team members mentored and demonstrated quality protocols such as photo composition, exposure, and framing; sound levels and angles for video production and pace of editing; and the use of music and graphics to support promotional products. Each team instructor awarded each student a subjective assessment score (1—low, 5—excellent) based on student demonstrations of core skill sets the American mentors were trained on. Scores were given for photography, writing, TV news production, and radio broadcasting.

QuantityThe word inshallah is a common expression, a colloquialism in the Middle

East, and an idiomatic expression throughout Islamic countries. Literally translated, inshallah means “God willing.” Measuring quantifiers is important in a frontier conflict region that is also Islamic. Class attendance, immersion project completion, and self-paced study are not commitments as much as they are inshallah.

CompletionSeeing a task through, from concept to completion, is a major accomplishment

in Afghanistan. Immersion is all about completing the projects. But completion was not achieved until distribution was verified. Recording a radio news story to play for several other students in a classroom is one thing; e-mailing a compressed MP3 audio file to a station manager and then listening to that news story on the radio is something entirely different.

The public affairs mentoring rubric (Table 1) served as a suitable subjective device and achievement assessment tool, but it lacked the objective quantifiers necessary to determine if immersion theory in a frontier conflict region could have predictable outcomes. If results can’t be replicated, then the training has little value.

Recording every possible statistic was essential in reviewing immersion theory success. Students were given an entrance demographic survey on Day One of each class. Attendance was taken twice daily, in the morning and after lunch. Instructors met before graduation day and graded students in photography, writing, TV news, and radio production. A standardized final exam was given on the last day of every class.

The team tested the public affairs immersion theory training with the six students attending the March 2011 course. Every possible metric was measured and analyzed. The student who achieved the lowest score on the final exam (a 19-year-old entry-level police officer with a ninth-grade education scored a 71% then became the pass-fail baseline for all final exams. The lowest attendance level for the March class was 72%, which also became the baseline for pass-fail.



Table 1.Student Assessment Rubric

Excellent Good Satisfactory Needs Improvement

Quality Media displays quick mastery. News stories were eloquently written and required few changes. Editing media was performed quickly and accurately.

Media was of good quality and needed few corrections. Story needed only moderate editing. Editing was done with few errors.

Media usable but not of best quality. Stories needed major overhaul. Photo/video leaves a lot to be desired.

Media barely usable, stories illegible or need to be completely rewritten. Photo/video editing needs one-on-one mentoring.

Quantity An abundance of media was captured, enabling the student to get the most out of the final product. Excellent attendance.

Student captured the proper amount of media to have multiple options when editing. Student attended class most of the time.

Met attendance quota. Enough media was documented to deliver a usable product.

Student did not provide many samples to choose from. Poor attendance.

Completion Student went to great lengths to have the best product in class. Helped others, asked questions, and quickly mastered tasks.

Student completed tasks quickly and took steps necessary to get work published.

Tasks completed on time and to the standard.

Student barely finished prescribed task. Little commitment was displayed.

In both attendance and final exam scores, each of the lowest-achieving students completed his immersion projects, performed the self-study from the textbook, and successfully achieved national distribution.

The new baseline standards were then communicated to the April class. To graduate from the immersion course and receive a certificate, each student had to complete three immersion projects, attend a minimum of 70% of the classes, and score at least 70% on the final exam. The lowest attendance in the April class was 92%, and the lowest final exam score was 80%. Every student completed all of his immersion projects and achieved national distribution.

The charted metrics also provided a valuable correlation that even the Afghan students paid attention to: attendance had a direct correlation with final exam scores. That might be viewed as self-evident in some cultures, but in Afghanistan’s inshallah culture, it was highly informative.

Overall, public affairs proficiency was determined by averaging a student’s mastery of subjects combined with his final exam score. As of May 2011, student aptitudes ranged from 68 to 99.5 on a scale of 1 to 100.

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During the instructional design of the course curriculum, the team theorized that if photographic principles were demonstrated first, then students would be more likely to grasp video and broadcasting concepts. As the first class wrapped up, student proficiencies began to prove this theory. Once a second class graduated a month later, the conclusion was certain. After receiving training on photography, all student video scores were greater than or equal to their photo scores.

A biographical chart was created for every student to capture the data and provide future training and mentoring teams with a comparative framework. Education level, language capacity, ethnicity, attendance, final exam scores, and skill set scores were all documented (Figure 1).

Figure 1.Biography Index

Traditional expectations about attendance versus overall grades proved to be true. Students who showed up to class scored higher, on average, than those who did not.

concLusions

This style of teaching and learning delivered performance competence in a very short time. The Afghan soldier-students behaved like children who were handed video game controllers. Public affairs tools were placed in their hands with very little theoretical framework or constructs in place. The scenarios unfolded in front of them were not too dissimilar from the plots in a new video game. They used the tools (cameras, computers, software) immediately through



experiential knowledge, just as children might immediately start using a gaming device or smart phone functions. They told stories, produced TV news packages, wrote speeches, and developed talking points in response to the scenarios that were taking place in Afghan culture and throughout the war.

At the conclusion of each 3-week immersion course, students were encouraged to consider traditional classroom settings for comprehensive learning. Afghan soldier-students who had never considered formal journalism or public affairs pursuits felt empowered to pursue degree programs at the University of Kabul because they understood how to use the tools.

The MPAAT-2 team concluded that performance competency with the tools produced a learning passion for the discipline (public affairs) that simply could not be measured or quantified. Performance competency with the tools resulted in soldier-students wanting to spend nights, weekends, and even parts of holy days learning more about their craft in the traditional classroom setting.

Before the MPAAT-2 team took over public affairs training with the Afghan National Army in January 2011, soldier-students were brought into a traditional classroom where they received a syllabus, learning objectives, assignments, and expectations (operating manuals). The system had relied on a traditional classroom setting, and comprehensive knowledge was mission critical.

Senior officers with the United States military had grown frustrated and suggested senior Afghan military officers and government officials were intention- ally blocking Afghan soldier-students from distributing and performing traditional public affairs duties.

But the MPAAT-2 team uncovered a greater problem. The soldier-students understood what they were supposed to do (comprehensive knowledge), but they lacked the performance competence (experiential knowledge) and the passion to do their jobs. It might be akin to requiring a child to read and master the operations manual before being allowed to consider “playing.”

Immersion theory is a powerful technique that is suitable for challenging situations like those found in a frontier conflict region. Moreover, it could be an incredible “first step” technique in the traditional classroom setting. In the first 5 minutes of “Day One,” traditional classroom teachers will stimulate more passion and energy for the public affairs craft by placing a camera in the hands of a student than they will by placing a marker on the whiteboard.

Understandably, the traditional classroom teacher probably does not embrace immersion fully, because the theory capitalizes more on a student’s desire to “play” than to “learn.” But if absolute and measurable learning takes place in the end, does it really matter what the emotional motivations were in the beginning?

Training and mentoring Afghan public affairs officers according to modern, Western standards was a pointless exercise. The classroom presentation of public affairs theories, principles, and strategies was ineffective because the vast majority of PAO students had never seen or used a camera before, and none of the students trained in these immersion classes had ever seen themselves on video.

The NTM-A team arrived at two major conclusions during their mission to train and mentor Afghan public affairs officers in a frontier conflict region.

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First, the character trait of “truth” is, perhaps, universal in all cultures and is certainly an inherent component of Islam and part of the Pashtunwali code. Truth, though its use is arguably selective and often comes in various shades of gray, serves as the foundational starting point for immersion training. Delivering the truth, as obvious as it seems in a Western society, became the backbone of the training.

The MPAAT-2 team learned through classroom discussions that the Afghan students embraced the concept of truth as well. The team was able to convey an important message to the students: Even if the technical quality of their public affairs work was not at a university graduate level, the people will forgive the techni-cal shortcomings if they embrace the messages and information as being truthful.

For example, in March 2011, two American helicopters fired on what they thought was a group of Taliban fighters trying to escape. The After Action Report (AAR) determined that the 11 boys killed were from a local village and were simply out gathering firewood. The truth was uncomfortable, but the American forces released the information.

The Afghan students were upset by the incident and missed the point that the Americans told the truth. Afghan National Security Forces routinely deny through government media any reports that the Taliban may have killed their troops or damaged ANA vehicles. The Taliban then releases photos and videos of their attacks to independent media outlets. Accordingly, the people of Afghan-istan have learned not to trust government news outlets, military leaders, or government officials for truthful and accurate information.

Second, immersion is the most practical tool for teaching largely uneducated soldiers and police officers in a third-world country how to perform public affairs duties. Just as infants model the behavior of a parent to learn how to put food on a spoon and feed themselves, the MPAAT-2 team used immersion modeling to demonstrate and teach how to take photographs, write stories, record radio programs, and produce television news packages. More important, the MPAAT-2 team put the public affairs tools in the hands of soldier-students and told them to go play (conduct public affairs work).

Rather than letting the students see and model polished public affairs products—which they might not be able to replicate given their limited access to modern digital tools—the team set them up in small production teams with the mission of never letting the tools leave their hands. Whenever practical, the team would show them—not teach them—shortcuts and tricks that they could model and incorporate into their products. In many instances, the Afghan students learned from each other when one of them discovered a new technique or a best practice.

Immersion uses a time constraint to create the pressure to deliver a product within a specified amount of time. During the 3-week immersion course, three different projects were given to the students. For example, during the Sunday morning classes, they were told what finished product they would be exhibiting for a large audience (including Afghan generals) on Wednesday afternoon. There was not enough time for a student to contemplate or question whether he could complete the project. The only choice each student was given was either to “jump in” and immerse, or quit.



MPAAT-2 team members partnered with functional public affairs officers from Thunder who had been performing PAO duties for several years. It was immediately clear that the “immersion” graduates possessed more technical skills and abilities. For example, uneducated Afghans were able to record, edit, and distribute broadcast video; take photographs, record, edit, and distribute radio broadcasts; and write news stories. They graduated the immersion class with a fuller suite of technical skills than most of their American PAOs possessed.

The obvious weakness was the quality of their work. Given the amount of students that needed to be trained in an accelerated time frame, the team substituted the emphasis on quality and replaced it with the focus on truth.

Quality is subjective. The Western eye might never embrace third-world Afghan quality as being good enough.

Truth is, or at least should be, a universal trait. NATO trainers who share no language or cultural similarities with an uneducated Afghan student have a greater chance of success if they let truth trump quality while allowing immersion and replication to substitute for classroom theory, principles, and strategy.

The MPAAT-2 team successfully trained 33 Afghan students. Each student released public affairs products that were consumed by more than 6 million Afghan households.

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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2011, May 26). Afghanistan. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

Johnson, R., & Swain, M. (1997). Immersion education: International perspectives. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lanier, J., & Biocca, F. (1992). An insider’s view of the future of virtual reality. Journal of Communication, 42(4), 150–172.

Nagorski, T. (2011, June 7). Afghan War Now Country’s Longest. Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/afghan-war-now-longest-war-us-history/story?id=10849303

Nordland, R. (2011, May 29). Afghan Bank Commission Absolves President’s Brother in Fraud Case. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/world/asia/30kabul.html

Rheingold, H. (1992). Virtual Reality. New York: Simon & Schuster.

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Christopher Hummel is a public affairs specialist and a decorated professional photographer, media producer, and teacher. In 2011, Hummel was deployed to a remote base in Afghanistan, where he was tasked as the media trainer for the Afghan National Army. His successful efforts persuaded NATO to invite him to Kabul to share his techniques with the rest of the NATO forces, trainers, and advisors. Hummel left the United States Air Force after 10 years of honorable service and now is a media and communications consultant for the biomedical research community.

Maritza Freeland is a Master Sergeant in the United States Air Force and has served as a photographer for more than 17 years. In 2011 she was the noncommissioned officer in charge of the 17th Public Affairs Detachment near Gardez, Afghanistan. Freeland is currently the Chief of Visual Information at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland.

Eric Craft is a Technical Sergeant in the United States Air Force, where he specializes in videography, editing, and broadcasting. His highly decorated service has spanned more than 14 years and includes multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Technical Sergeant Craft is currently stationed at Aviano Air Base, Italy.

Paul McKellips spent 25 years in the motion picture industry and has written, directed, and produced three motion pictures. McKellips was a national TV correspondent covering the Pentagon and State Department before he deployed to Iraq in 2006 as a media trainer to the Iraqi Army and independent Iraqi journalists. At the invitation of General David H. Petraeus, McKellips deployed to Afghanistan as the officer-in-charge of public affairs training to the Afghan National Army. McKellips is the executive vice president at the Foundation for Biomedical Research in Washington, D.C., and the author of two bioterrorism novels.


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