Emotional intelligence: A promise unfulﬁlled? · Abstract: Emotional intelligence (EI) is a relatively new construct in differential psy-chology. Proponents of EI have made strong

Emotional intelligence: A promise unfulfilled?

GERALD MATTHEWS1* University of Cincinnati

MOSHE ZEIDNER University of Haifa

RICHARD D. ROBERTS Educational Testing Service

Abstract: Emotional intelligence (EI) is a relatively new construct in differential psy-chology. Proponents of EI have made strong claims for its importance in basic andapplied psychology. This article considers whether the promise of EI has been fulfilled.We examine various fundamental challenges to establishing EI as a major individualdifferences factor, including cross-cultural issues. We then examine strategies forassessing EI as a personal quality distinct from general intelligence and personality,and evaluate leading tests and scales for EI. Various sources of validity evidencedemonstrate the value of research on EI, but we also identify various weaknesses ofexisting instruments. It appears that there is no strong, over-arching general factor ofEI that shapes human emotional functioning across a range of diverse contexts.Instead, we advocate a “multipolar” conception of EI that discriminates tempera-ment, information-processing, emotion-regulation and acquired skills. Focusingresearch on more narrowly defined but conceptually coherent research domains maybe a more productive strategy than seeking to define an all-embracing general EI.

Key words: emotional intelligence, emotion, ability, personality, psychologicalassessment.

Emotional intelligence: A promise

not fulfilled?

Emotional intelligence (EI) may be broadlydefined as a set of aptitudes, competencies, andskills for managing emotion and emotiveencounters (Zeidner, Roberts, & Matthews,2009). From a Western philosophical perspec-tive, the concept of EI may be framed withinthe unresolved tension between seeing emo-tions as inferior to reason versus valuing emo-tions as a guide to action. The Stoic philosophyof ancient Greece exemplifies the view that pas-sionate emotions are dangerous, causing peopleto act foolishly in fits of anger or exuberance.Western thinking remains colored by the ratio-

nalist values of the Enlightenment, with anemphasis on reason as the principal means forguiding human affairs.

By contrast, other philosophical schools ofthought, such as 18th century Romanticism,have valued emotion and inspiration over areductionist analysis of the natural world. Emo-tions may provide a way of understanding theworld that is inaccessible to logic: in Blaise Pas-cal’s phrase, “The heart has its reasons whichreason knows nothing of.”The late 20th centuryseems to have seen a revival in the culturalfortunes of emotions, which are increasinglyseen as critical for providing motivation,purpose, and meaning in everyday life (Leahy,2007).

*Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to: Gerald Matthews, Department of Psychology,University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0376, USA. (E-mail: [email protected])

1We thank Naoko Yamada for comments on a previous version of this article.

Japanese Psychological Research2012, Volume 54, No. 2, 105–127

Invited Review

© 2011 Japanese Psychological Association. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5884.2011.00502.x

It is against this philosophical and culturalbackground that the new concept of EI hasbecome increasingly prominent in psychology.Studies of EI may be seen as a development ofconventional intelligence research. Some of thepioneers of IQ testing, including EdwardThorndike and David Wechsler, appreciatedthat intelligence, in the broader sense of insight-ful, purposeful adaptation to environmentaldemands and opportunities, requires more thanabstract reasoning ability (Wechsler, 1974).

Howard Gardner’s (1983) influential theoryof multiple intelligences discriminated twotypes of intelligence that pre-date EI. Interper-sonal intelligence refers to the ability to under-stand other people’s thoughts, feelings andemotions (corresponding to social intelligence).Intrapersonal intelligence describes abilitiesrelated to self-understanding and wisdom inguiding the course of one’s life. Another distin-guished intelligence theorist, Robert Sternberg(1985), emphasized the importance of practicalintelligence as a construct distinct from thegeneral academic ability measured by IQ tests.Real-world success may depend on “tacitknowledge” that is implicit, intuitive, anddependent on experience.

Peter Salovey and Jack Mayer are generallycredited with performing the first systematicprogram of research on EI in the 1990s (Salovey& Mayer, 1990). Their work presented a coher-ent conceptual model of EI, which differenti-ated multiple aspects or branches of emotionalabilities, such as emotion perception andemotion management. They also developed aseries of tests for assessment of EI, culminatingin the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intel-ligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso,& Sitarenios, 2003), which has been widely usedin research.The MSCEIT is modeled on conven-tional ability tests, to the extent that items areconsidered to have right or wrong answers, sothat it assesses a genuine ability.

Interest in EI has been inspired not just byacademic research on the nature of intelli-gence, but also by practical concerns. It hasbeen evident from the beginnings of the studyof psychology that difficulties in managingemotions contribute to a wide range of

personal and societal woes, including mentaldisorders, delinquency, criminality and thebreakdown of communal values (Zeidneret al., 2009). Programs were developed in edu-cation to address specific issues such as drugand alcohol abuse, and in organizationalpsychology to mitigate work stress. The originsof many of these interventions predate workon EI, but they may be reconfigured as effortsto enhance social-emotional functioning(Elias, Kress, & Hunter, 2006). An influentialbest-selling popular book, Goleman’s (1995)Emotional intelligence, picked up on the pos-sible social benefits of raising EI, arguing thattraining EI might be a remedy for all mannerof social ills. Indeed, programs in educationhave been shown to be quite effective. Arecent review and meta-analysis (Durlak,Weissberg, Dymnicki, Taylor, & Schellinger,2011) showed that such programs are quiteeffective in improving social and emotionalskills, attitudes, social behaviors, and evengrades.

The initial wave of enthusiasm for EI in bothpsychological science and popular culture wasfollowed by both data and some skeptical reac-tions (Brody, 2004; Davies, Stankov, & Roberts,1998; Landy, 2005). Our initial book on thetopic (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002)highlighted various problematic issues:

1 Lack of clarity of conceptualization. In someauthors’ accounts, the concept of EI seemedto be stretched to include almost any posi-tive quality that was not academic intelli-gence, such as having good moral character.The core qualities of EI seemed poorlydefined.

2 Lack of a “gold standard” for measurement.One of the strengths of conventional intel-ligence testing is that different tests are typi-cally highly correlated (convergent validityevidence), so that standardized assessmentis possible. However, the various tests of EIthat have emerged are not necessarily inter-related (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts,2007). In particular, questionnaire measuresof EI became popular, but they do notcorrelate substantially with ability-test

G. Matthews, M. Zeidner, and R. D. Roberts106

© Japanese Psychological Association 2011.

measures such as the MSCEIT (Van Rooy,Viswesvaran, & Pluta, 2005).

3 Overlap with existing constructs. If EI is adistinctive quality, tests should not correlatetoo highly with existing ability and person-ality constructs (discriminant validity evi-dence). The MSCEIT in fact shows gooddivergence from other constructs, but itsoon became apparent that questionnairemeasures failed this test, showing correla-tions as high as 0.6–0.7 with personalitytraits, such as those of the Five Factor Model(Dawda & Hart, 2000).

4 Lack of theoretical understanding. Muchearly work on EI was descriptive in nature,focusing on drawing up lists of relevantqualities rather than exploring underlyingneurological and psychological processes indepth. By contrast, conventional intelli-gence may be shown to be supported byfundamental cognitive processes such asstimulus encoding, working memory, andexecutive control (and their neural sub-strates).

5 Limitations in criterion-related validity evi-dence. Tests for EI were shown to have somecriterion validity in early studies (Mayer,Salovey, & Caruso, 2000; Schutte, Malouff,Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, & Dorn-heim, 1998), but this research also had limi-tations. Very often, the criteria linked to EIwere questionnaire assessments (e.g. self-reported well-being or job satisfaction)leaving open the extent that EI predictsmeaningful outcomes. In addition, much ofthe criterion validity of questionnaire mea-sures of EI seemed to derive from theiroverlap with established personality traitssuch as emotional stability (low neuroti-cism) and extraversion, threatening the dis-criminant validity of EI.

6 Uncertain practical relevance. As notedalready, there is solid evidence for theeffectiveness of well-designed trainingprograms for social-emotional learning(Durlak et al., 2011; Elias et al., 2006),although some interventions of this type arepoorly designed and evaluated (Zeidner,Roberts, & Matthews, 2002). However, it is

unclear that increasing EI is central to thebenefits of training. Often, some veryspecific skill such as “saying no” to drugsis targeted, and there may be no moregeneral enhancement of social-emotionalfunctioning.

7 Cultural influences on EI. In writing forJapanese Psychological Research, we wishparticularly to highlight cultural issues. Theextent to which EI, as a construct derivedlargely from Western psychology, could beuniversally applicable remains unclear.Although basic emotions are considereduniversal, display rules and other aspects ofemotional functioning may be culture-bound (Mesquita, 2001). Thus, adaptiveemotional behaviors may vary from cultureto culture. Also, research on EI tends tofocus on possible benefits for the individualsuch as personal well-being and social andcareer success. A concept of EI relevant toEast Asian cultures may be different inseveral respects from the Western model.

First, such cultures have a more collectivistexperience of both positive and negative emo-tions. For example, Japanese people appear tobe more prone to socially engaging emotions,such as friendly feelings and guilt, whereasNorth Americans experience disengagingemotions, such as pride and anger, moreintensely (Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa,2006). Furthermore, in Japan, general subjec-tive well-being is more closely linked toengaging one’s positive emotions than to dis-engaging emotions, a pattern that tends toreverse in the USA (Kitayama et al., 2006).Thus, if EI is defined in relation to emotionsthat promote personal well-being, its concep-tualization would be somewhat different in thetwo countries. At the same time, we should notignore cross-cultural similarities in emotionalfunctioning. For example, although Japaneseand Chinese respondents obtain lower averagescores on self-esteem scales, relative to theUSA, self-esteem appears to have the samefunctional relationship to well-being in allthese cultures (Yamaguchi, Lin, Morio, &Okumura, 2008).

Emotional intelligence 107


Second, there may be cross-cultural differ-ences in the intrinsic value placed on emotions.In Western thought, following Darwin, all emo-tions are seen as essentially adaptive, althoughsometimes subject to misregulation. By con-trast, Ekman, Davidson, Ricard, and Wallace(2005) point out that Indo-Tibetan Buddhismsees certain emotions as being intrinsically ben-eficial or harmful. Examples of the latter arecravings for some desirable object, hatred, jeal-ousy, and arrogance (compare, for example,Buss’s, (2000) evolutionary account of jeal-ousy). Interestingly, Ekman et al. (2005) alsodescribe trait-like concepts from Buddhismthat might loosely be seen as corresponding tohigh and low EI. The Sanskrit term “sukha”refers to a condition of happiness and flourish-ing that reflects mental equilibrium and aware-ness of the true nature of reality. Conversely,“duhkha” expresses a vulnerability to sufferingresulting from basic misapprehensions ofreality, including harmful emotional reactions.

Third,Western theories of emotion are proneto fractionate the construct into multiple psy-chological processes (or even brain systems).Much writing on EI is based on the idea of asharp separation of cognition and emotion,expressed in the classical metaphor of the chari-oteer (cognition) steering the horses that pullthe chariot (emotion) (Leahy, 2007), althoughsome authors have argued for a more integratedperspective (Averill, 2007). By contrast,“Eastern healing traditions respect individualsas unique entities living in the fluid dynamics ofcomplex personal-relational, environmental-physical and philosophical-moral interactions ofmen with the universe” (Chan, Ng, Ho, & Chow,2006). Similarly, Ekman et al. (2005) point outthat Buddhism does not make sharp distinctionsbetween emotions and other mental processes.From these holistic perspectives on emotionaland spiritual well-being, it may be difficult tosustain the Western notion of EI as a distinctive“thing in the head” of the individual.

Thus far, studies of EI have largely ignoredsuch cultural factors.Typically, researchers havetaken English-language tests for EI and trans-lated them into other languages with the aim ofcomparing psychometric properties across cul-

tures, with rather mixed outcomes (Ekermans,Saklofske, Austin, & Stough, 2011; Sharma,Deller, Biswal, & Mandal, 2009). In Japan, psy-chometric studies include those reported byFukunishi, Wise, Sheridan, Shimai, Otake,Utsuki, and Uchiyama (2001) and Toyoda andKawahashi (2005). However, the mean differ-ences in test scores sometimes reported arehard to interpret, in the absence of any theoryrelevant to interpreting cultural differences.Doubts about the construct validity of EI alsomake it difficult to perform meaningful cross-cultural comparisons.

In sum, EI is a construct that is promising asa way towards greater theoretical and practicalunderstanding of emotional functioning.However, establishing a strong scientific casefor its relevance to theory and practice faces anumber of severe challenges and obstacles,including uncertainty over its cross-culturalgeneralization. In the remainder of this article,we first identify the problem of measurement asa key issue. Without reliable and valid assess-ment of EI, using standardized tests, researchprogress is unlikely.We then review attempts todevelop ability tests for EI, with right or wronganswers similar to conventional intelligencetests. We focus primarily on the Mayer-Saloveytests (Mayer et al., 2003), but we will alsodiscuss some alternative measurement strate-gies, including recent interest in situationaljudgment tests. Next, we consider whether EIcan be measured by self-report items containedin questionnaires, and identify difficulties withthis approach. In the final part of this article, wepropose that EI may be best understood as acollection of rather different types of constructthat may be only weakly inter-related, ratherthan as a unitary factor akin to general intelli-gence (“IQ”). This “multipolar” approach mayresolve the various problematic issues justdiscussed.

Measurement strategies

Conventional intelligence tests have the advan-tage of veridical scoring. That is, an objectivedetermination of the right answer can be made



for each test question, for example, by refer-ence to the laws of geometry or the dictionarymeaning of words. A central problem for thedevelopment of tests of EI is the lack of a clearrationale for scoring test items on a right orwrong basis. For example, test items might askthe respondent to indicate the best way toresolve an emotive situation, such as dealingwith an angry colleague at work. We may infor-mally judge that some responses (e.g. talk to theperson calmly) are better than others (e.g.punch him in the face), but there is no indepen-dent criterion for making the judgment. Indeed,attempts to develop tests for social intelligencefoundered in part because of this problem(Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987).

There are several types of solution to thescoring problem. A popular approach has beento avoid the scoring issue altogether by relyingon questionnaire assessments. Perhaps, peopleare able to report on various attributes of EIsuch as effective mood regulation and socialskills, so that there is no need to test EI directly(Bar-On, 2000). Questionnaires have theadvantage that we can probe real-life events(more accurately, memories of events), but self-reports of emotional functioning may be vul-nerable to a variety of distortions and biases(Paulhus & John, 1998).

Other researchers have persisted in trying todevelop objectively scored tests. The mosteasily justified approach is to use speeded tasksthat require processing emotional stimuli, andrecording response latency and accuracy. Forexample, Austin (2005) used an “emotionalinspection time” test that required participantsto discriminate briefly presented, masked facialemotion stimuli. Similarly, the emotionalStroop test (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985) pro-vides an objective index of the person’s abilityto ignore irrelevant emotional information. Inaddition, facial expressions of emotions are suf-ficient to develop objective tests of facialemotion recognition, such as the JACBART(Matsumoto, LeRoux, Wilson-Cohn, Raroque,Kooken, Ekman, Yrizarry, Loewinger, Uchida,Yee, Amo, & Goh, 2000). The strengths andweaknesses of using processing tasks are theobverse of those of questionnaires. They afford

objective performance measures, but their rel-evance to the complex social-emotional sce-narios of real life is questionable.

In developing their initial ability test, theMulti-factor Emotional Intelligence Scale(MEIS; Mayer et al., 2000), Mayer and Saloveyused neither of the scoring methods that wehave described. Instead, they adopted twoapproaches that are novel for ability testing.Thefirst scoring method was “consensus scoring.”The assumption is that groups possess a collec-tive knowledge of emotion (Legree, Psotka,Tremble, & Bourne, 2005), sometimes called the“wisdom of crowds,” that can be used to assessthe test taker’s responses. The test is adminis-tered to a large sample, representative of thepopulation of interest, and the group response isdetermined. The individual then receives creditfor accurate response to the extent that the indi-vidual’s answers to questions match the groupconsensus.An advantage of consensus scoring isthat it may accommodate cultural differences inthat the group consensus for response can beestablished separately for different cultures.Mayer and Salovey’s second scoring methodwas “expert scoring.” They recruited a panel ofexperts on emotion, such as academic psycholo-gists, to use their professional judgment to deter-mine the best answers to the test questions,providing a means for scoring the responses ofthe individual.

Both methods are open to criticism(MacCann, Roberts, Matthews, & Zeidner,2004). It is questionable whether group consen-sus is necessarily correct: in many cultures con-sensus has historically included negative viewsof racial minorities, for example. In addition,consensus scoring penalizes the “emotionalgenius” who has an understanding beyond thenorm. On a difficult intelligence test item, only aminority of respondents will select the correctresponse. Consensus scoring judges the mostpopular incorrect answer to be right, favoringconformity over unusual insights.Expert scoringalso has its difficulties.Academics with expertisein emotion may have more knowledge of psy-chological theory than of emotion managementin real-life settings.Experts may also be prone tothe prejudices of their culture.



The point here is that measurement of emo-tional competency is highly challenging.Indeed, in many real-life settings it is unclearthat there is any one “correct” answer to anemotional dilemma. The various methods wehave outlined may each be acceptable forcertain aspects of emotional functioning, and,of course, each method can be evaluated inrelation to the empirically demonstrated valid-ity of test scores. For example, although self-reports appear highly suspect as a means formeasuring ability, perhaps questionnaires willprove to have meaningful relations with valuedoutcomes such as work performance, personalwell-being and satisfying social relationships.We will turn next to the success and failures ofthe different forms of assessment of EI, focus-ing particularly on the Mayer-Salovey abilitytests, and questionnaire measures.

Ability tests for emotional

intelligence

In this section, we provide a brief appraisal ofthe Mayer-Salovey tests (see Rivers, Brackett,

Salovey, & Mayer, 2007, and Roberts, Schulze,& MacCann, 2008, for more extended reviews),as well as surveying some alternate measure-ment approaches.

The Mayer-Salovey testsMayer and Salovey’s (1993) four-branch modelrepresents one of the more coherent concep-tual accounts of EI (see Table 1). The first twobranches, emotion perception and assimilationof emotion into thought, are sometimesgrouped together as “Experiential EI.” Theyform a foundation for the remaining branches,grouped together as “Strategic EI,” which isemotion understanding and emotion manage-ment. In developing the MEIS and MSCEITtests, Mayer and Salovey used the four-branchmodel as a means for developing tests repre-senting each branch. The MSCEIT (Mayeret al., 2003) has two tests per branch. Fortu-nately, the branch scores tend to correlate posi-tively, so that a total EI score can be justified.There are two kinds of issue to consider inevaluating the tests. The first is whether thebasic psychometric properties of the tests, such

Table 1 The Mayer-Salovey four-branch model of emotional intelligence as represented withinthe Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test

Level Abilities and indicators

General Emotional intelligence

Areas “Experiential EI” is the ability to perceive,respond, and process emotionalinformation without necessarilyunderstanding its meaning

“Strategic EI” assesses ability to understandand manage emotions without necessarilyexperiencing the feelings of emotion

Branches The ability to “PerceiveEmotions” in faces andpictures

“Facilitating Thought” bycognitive processing ofemotions

“UnderstandingEmotions” and howthey blend andchange over time

“Managing Emotions” byusing feelings to createbetter outcomes

Tests • Rating emotions infaces

• Rating emotions inpictures

• Judging the similarityof emotions to physicalsensations

• Rating the helpfulnessof moods withinspecific scenarios.

• Assessments ofwhich combinationsof emotions formcomplex, blends ofemotions.

• Assessments ofwhich emotions arerelated to particularsituations.

• Ratings ofeffectiveness of variousactions for managingone’s own mood invarious scenarios

• Ratings ofeffectiveness of variousactions for managingthe moods of others invarious scenarios

Note. EI = emotional intelligence.



as reliability, are acceptable. The second iswhether the test scores are supported by arange of validity evidence.

Psychometric properties. In fact, theMSCEIT provides highly reliable measurementof overall EI (Cronbach’s a > 0.90), and scoresare stable over time. Most of the branch andsubtest scores also have acceptable internalconsistency. Although we questioned therationales for consensus and expert scoringabove, Mayer et al. (2003) showed that consen-sus and expert scores converged quite highly.Mayer et al. (2003) demonstrated that thefactor structure of the MSCEIT fits the four-branch model. Where psychometric problemshave emerged they have primarily concernedthe Assimilating Emotions factor. The testscores for this branch may be somewhat low inreliability, and, contrary to the initial analysis ofMayer et al. (2003), it has proven difficult torecover Assimilating Emotions as a separateconstruct in factor analysis (Barchard &Hakstian, 2004; Roberts, Schulze, O’Brien,MacCann, Reid, & Maul, 2006).

Criterion-related validity evidence. Onthe one hand, quite extensive research hasshown that the MEIS and MSCEIT are reason-ably successful in predicting various indices ofwell-being (Rivers et al., 2007). On the otherhand, in controlled laboratory settings, theMSCEIT appears to be only weakly related tomore adaptive coping (Matthews, Emo, Funke,Zeidner, Roberts, Costa, & Schulze, 2006). TheMSCEIT may relate particularly to interper-sonal functioning. For example, Lopes, Brack-ett, Nezlek, Schütz, Sellin, and Salovey (2004)obtained self- and peer-ratings of the person’squality of social interaction with friends. TheMSCEIT Managing Emotions branch (but notthe other three branches) predicted higherratings. There is also some evidence for theclinical relevance of MSCEIT scores. Testscores were lower in various patient groups,including those with major depression, border-line personality disorder (BPD), and substanceabuse disorder (SAD) (Downey, Johnston,Hansen, Schembri, Stough, Tuckwell, &

Schweitzer, 2008; Hertel, Schütz, & Lammers,2009). Lumley, Gustavson, Partridge, andLabouvie-Vief (2005) found small but statisti-cally significant negative correlations are foundbetween the MSCEIT and alexithymia. Thisterm refers to difficulties in verbalizing, under-standing and communicating emotion, and sooverlaps conceptually with low EI. Variousemotional disorders are associated withalexithymia.

High hopes have been expressed for theimportance of EI in job performance, capturedby claims that high EI may even be moreimportant than IQ for success in business(Cooper & Sawaf, 1997). Such claims are justi-fied by the importance of group interactions atwork, and of coping with job stress (Goleman,1998). The hypothesis that high EI is associatedwith superior job performance is harder to testthan it seems. A fundamental difficulty is thatobjective measures of job performance areoften lacking. Research on individual differ-ences in performance at work often relies onindirect measures, such as supervisor ratings, oreven self-ratings. Such ratings may be biased byother personal characteristics of the employee.Indeed, an employee who was emotionallyintelligent in the sense of being charming andsocially skilled might receive a high perfor-mance rating, even if, objectively, his or her per-formance was undistinguished. Furthermore,there is a lack of research on the specific pro-cesses, competencies and skills that maymediate associations between EI and jobperformance.

A number of studies have used the MSCEITor MEIS as predictors of job performance. VanRooy and Viswesvaran (2004) conducted ameta-analysis of studies that attempted topredict job performance using a variety of dif-ferent measures of EI. Eight of these studiesused the MEIS.The meta-analysis estimated thetrue correlation (r) between the MEIS and per-formance at 0.19. This correlation exceeds zero,but compared with findings for general mentalability is quite small in magnitude. By compari-son, Schmidt and Hunter (1998) estimated thatthe true correlation between general intelli-gence and job performance was 0.53.



Subsequent studies using the MSCEIT present arather mixed picture. Both Bradberry and Su(2006) and Harms and Crede (2010) failed tofind any significant correlation between theMSCEIT and leadership job performance.However, a study of an insurance companyshowed that MSCEIT scores related positivelyto company rank and pay increases for merit(Lopes, Grewal, Kadis, Gall, & Salovey, 2006).Arecent investigation of undergraduate studentsperforming group project work related to busi-ness studies also substantiated that the MSCEITwas associated with leadership (Côté, Lopes,Salovey, & Miners, 2010).

More recent reviews of the relevance of EIto occupational psychology (Cherniss, 2010;Jordan, Ashkanasy, & Ascough, 2007) havetended to make more modest claims for therelevance of EI to the work environment,emphasizing its role in organizational commit-ment, job satisfaction, and morale. It is alsoplausible that EI is associated more stronglywith performance in certain jobs and notothers. Joseph and Newman (2010) focused onthe role of emotional labor, that is, the need toregulate emotional expression. In some servicejobs, employees are required to always appearfriendly and cooperative (e.g. service jobs),whereas in others (e.g. accounting), such emo-tional displays may be viewed with suspicion.They updated the Van Rooy and Viswesvaran(2004) meta-analysis and also tested whetherthe relationship between EI and job perfor-mance varied with emotional labor. Overall,they confirmed that performance-based EI(measured by MEIS or MSCEIT) was onlyweakly related to job performance (estimatedcorrelation, r = 0.17). Consistent with theirprediction, the correlation was larger for highemotional labor jobs (r = 0.23) than for lowemotional labor jobs (r = 0.01). With personal-ity and general intelligence controlled, the asso-ciation between EI and performance on highemotional labor jobs was reduced, but still sig-nificant. Joseph and Newman (2010) cautionedthat the effect size for the association is modest,but it suggests the potential for further researchto identify the exact work settings in which EI ismost adaptive.

Construct validity evidence. Establishingconstruct validity for a test of EI begins withconsidering its convergence with conceptuallyrelated measures, and divergence from unre-lated measures. Convergent evidence requiresthat the MEIS and MSCEIT correlate substan-tially with other alternate tests for EI. Here,problems arise. Two meta-analyses have con-cluded that ability tests are only minimallyrelated to questionnaire assessments of EI(Joseph & Newman, 2010; Van Rooy et al.,2005). Indeed, on occasion, the two types ofassessment may provide conflicting outcomes.Zeidner, Shani-Zinovich, Matthews, andRoberts (2005) examined EI in a sample ofintellectually gifted children, selected forspecial classes. Confusingly, gifted childrenscored above the mean on the MSCEIT, butwere relatively low in EI according to a ques-tionnaire measure. As further discussed below,one might argue that questionnaires are simplynot appropriate for measuring any kind of intel-ligence, in which case the lack of convergence isnot problematic. More troubling are failures ofMSCEIT scores to converge with objectivetests of emotion processing, such as Matsumotoet al. (2000) the JACBART test and other per-formance tasks (Farrelly & Austin, 2007;Roberts et al., 2006).

In addition, MSCEIT scores should divergefrom other ability or personality constructs, orwe risk simply measuring an existing constructusing a new label. The relations between theMSCEIT, general cognitive ability, and the FiveFactor Model (FFM) of personality have beenquite extensively investigated. Meta-analyses(Roberts et al., 2008; Van Rooy et al., 2005)have found that the Mayer-Salovey tests aremoderately related to general ability, and moreweakly associated with personality. Forexample, Van Rooy et al. (2005) reported a r of0.33 for the association between EI and generalability. In the Roberts et al. (2008) study, thestrongest association was between crystallizedability and the Emotion Understanding branchof the MSCEIT (r = 0.38). Other MSCEITbranches were only weakly related to ability(rs < 0.20). Fluid intelligence was not stronglyrelated to any branch (rs < 0.20). In analyses of



personality, Roberts et al. (2008) also foundonly one r > 0.20 (agreeableness vs. MSCEITManaging Emotion: r = .27). Most authors, suchas Roberts et al. (2008), have concluded thatthe MSCEIT shows good discriminant validity;some level of association with general intelli-gence is to be expected on the basis that allmental ability tests should correlate positivelyto some extent (Spearman, 1923).

Construct validity also requires that we candevelop interpretations of test scores based ontheory.Here, the validity of the MSCEIT is opento question. The test provides a coherentdescriptive scheme of different aspects orbranches of EI, but the psychological meaningof the branches is less clear (Zeidner et al.,2009). For example, Fiori (2009) argues thatthe four branches of EI in the Mayer-Saloveymodel may depend on both explicit processes,accessible to consciousness, and implicit,“automatic”processes.Currently, it is difficult tosay how someone who scores highly on theEmotion Management branch,for example,pro-cesses information about an emotional encoun-ter differently from someone with a lower score.

Overall, we may arrive at a rather mixedappraisal of the Mayer-Salovey tests. Althoughsome psychometric issues remain (Fiori &Antonakis, 2011), for the most part it seems thatthe MEIS and MSCEIT tests assess elements ofemotional functioning beyond those picked upby conventional ability and personality mea-sures. Furthermore, these ability tests havesome incremental validity over general intelli-gence and the FFM in predicting criteriarelated to effective emotional and social func-tioning (Lopes et al., 2004; Martins, Ramalho, &Morin, 2010). The typically modest magnitudesof the validity coefficients (correlations areoften less than 0.3) suggest that whatever quali-ties are assessed by the MSCEIT are helpful,but not of critical importance, in real-life set-tings. For further progress, it is also imperativethat the bases of the MSCEIT at a processinglevel can be better specified.

Other ability testsBefore turning to questionnaire assessments,we also look briefly at other strategies for mea-

suring EI as a true ability or intelligence. Ingeneral, these approaches have been used toonly a limited degree in research and practice,so it is difficult to provide any conclusive evalu-ation of their worth.We present them here withthe aim of suggesting alternative directions forability-based assessment. There are too manytechniques that have been used to assess one orother aspect of emotional competence toreview them all here, but we will identify threegeneral themes.

Emotional information processing. Wehave already noted that there is a variety oftasks that assess the speed and accuracy ofresponse on simple tasks requiring processingof emotional stimuli, such as Austin’s (2005)emotional inspection time task. The majorityof efforts of this kind have focused on emotionperception (e.g. facial emotion). One of themore comprehensive tests of this kind is theMultimodal Emotion Recognition Test(MERT) developed by Bänziger, Grandjean,and Scherer (2009). They used actors toportray dynamic expressions of 10 emotions, inboth visual and auditory sense modalities, asthey deliver nonsense sentences, giving theimpression of listening to an unknown foreignlanguage. Respondents must identify theemotion portrayed. The test has quite goodpsychometric properties as a measure ofemotion recognition. Scores correlate substan-tially with other emotion perception tests(convergent evidence) but only to a smalldegree with general intelligence and personal-ity (discriminant evidence). Bänziger et al.(2009) found that the MERT assesses largelyindependent factors of visual and vocalemotion recognition. The separation of factorscalls into question whether the emotion per-ception component of EI can be treated as aunitary dimension. The main limitation of thetest (as with other information-processingtasks) is that its relations with real-worldcriteria for emotional competence areunknown.

Clearly, there are many other information-processing tasks that might be used in additionto those based on emotion perception. Atten-



tion, perception, decision making, and memoryall appear to be promising fields for develop-ing systematic tests that might measure spe-cific emotional abilities. For example, theStroop test has been widely used in attentionresearch, and it may be administered as a sys-tematic group test to measure individual dif-ferences in selective attention (Hakoda &Sasaki, 1990; Song & Hakoda, 2011). The stan-dard Stroop forms the basis for the emotionalStroop test, which specifically measures selec-tive attention to irrelevant emotionalattributes of the stimulus, and may relate to EI(Hakoda, Komatsu, Koizumi, Tanaka, Sonoda,& Nakamura, 2009). Modern dimensionalmodels of information-processing may be usedas a basis for testing. For example, the Miyake,Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, andWager (2000) model of executive processinghas proved to be a useful framework forunderstanding effects of anxiety on informa-tion processing (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011),and it may be of value to look at EI in relationto executive control of emotion.

The extent to which specifically emotionalprocessing abilities exist remains unclear Forexample, Fellner, Matthews, Funke, Emo,Zeidner, Pérez-González, and Roberts (2007)found that a single ability (correlated withfluid intelligence) appeared to account forindividual differences in visual search forfacial emotion and search for non-emotivetarget stimuli. However, the measurement ofemotional abilities using speeded processingtasks appears to be a fruitful avenue for futureresearch.

Emotion in language and thought. Oneof the key conceptual themes of EI research isthat integrating emotions into thought usinglanguage is beneficial. For example, in severalstudies, Pennebaker (Pennebaker & Beall,1986) found that writing about emo-tional, potentially distressing events leads tobenefits in well-being and even in physicalhealth. The person’s use of emotion languagemay also be analyzed objectively, using com-puterized language analysis (Tausczik & Pen-nebaker, 2010).

Lane (2000) developed a language-basedtest of emotional awareness on this principle,the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale(LEAS). Lane describes five levels ofincreasing sophistication in organizing emo-tional experience, ranging from physical sensa-tions to complex blends of emotionalexperience. The LEAS presents respondentswith emotive scenarios, and asks them todescribe the feelings of both a protagonist inthe scenario, and themselves. Computer scoringis now available to determine complexity anddifferentiation in the respondent’s use ofemotion words (Barchard, Bajgar, Leaf, &Lane, 2010). Scores on the LEAS have beenshown to relate to clinical criteria in studies ofpatients with emotion disorders, includingbrain-imaging criteria (Frewen, Lane, Neufeld,Densmore, Stevens, & Lanius, 2008). Oneconcern is that complexity of language use maysimply reflect verbal ability rather than anyemotional ability (Matthews et al., 2002). Inaddition, the LEAS seems to be poorly corre-lated with other measures of EI (Lumley et al.,2005).

Another language-based approach is throughconditional reasoning tests (James, McIntyre,Glisson, Green, Patton, LeBreton, Frost,Russell, Sablynski, Mitchell, & Williams, 2005).On these tests, respondents answer questionsthat appear to require reasoning, such as select-ing between various reasons for the decline inthe US market share obtained by American carmanufacturers. In fact, the test assesses not rea-soning but the respondent’s willingness toendorse justifications that include aggressivecontent (such as hostility towards foreign manu-facturers in the example given). A recent meta-analysis (Berry, Sackett, & Tobares, 2010)showed that conditional reasoning tests foraggression were modestly but significantly cor-related with counterproductive work behaviors.Although not a measure of EI per se, the condi-tional reasoning test appears to provide an inno-vative means of testing the extent to which theperson’s thought processes may be biased byemotions. In the content of aggression, such biasmay indicate a lack of emotionally soundjudgment.



Situation Judgment Tests (SJTs). A per-sistent issue for measurement is that it is diffi-cult for test developers to simulate or representthe kinds of complex real-life dilemmas forwhich EI may be most important. SJTs arequite a well-established approach towardsevaluating individual differences in respondingto realistic scenarios (Motowidlo, Dunnette, &Carter, 1990). An SJT is linked to a specificcontext, such as contributing to team perfor-mance at work. Normally, experts on thatcontext contribute to item development. Eachitem describes a critical incident, in some detail,and presents a set of response options. Expertsin the domain of interest determine the optimalresponse. SJTs are a useful tool for personnelselection because they predict job performanceover and above standard ability and personalitymeasures (McDaniel, Hartman, Whetzel, &Grubb, 2007).

SJTs might be used for the measurement ofEI, by assessing the person’s responses to rela-tively complex emotional scenarios (Schulze,Wilhelm, & Kyllonen, 2007). Indeed, theMSCEIT subtests that assess emotion manage-ment in self and others take the form of rathersimple SJTs, in that each item describes anemotionally challenging situation, and asks theperson to rate different response options.MacCann and Roberts (2008) developed twonew SJTs for facets of EI: the Situational Testof Emotional Understanding (STEU) and theSituational Test of Emotion Management(STEM). Both are based on theories ofemotion, such as appraisal theory. They alsosample systematically from personal and work-related contexts. In a series of studies, MacCannand Roberts (2008) showed that both STEUand STEM were appropriately correlated witha range of measures of emotional functioning,such as lower levels of alexithymia and distress.The two SJTs also predicted grades on a psy-chology course, even with vocabulary and per-sonality controlled. The method appearspromising.

A general limitation of the SJTswe have discussed so far is that they rely onverbal descriptions of critical incidents. Thus,they lack the richness of actual emotional

events in which we can view facial expre-ssions and body postures, listen to vocal into-nations, and follow the dynamic interchangesbetween different individuals. Recently, SJTshave appeared that use multimedia presenta-tions, that is, videos with sound that portrayrealistic social interactions. The higher fidelityof multimedia may lead to greater validity inpredicting criteria such as leadership andteamwork skills (Christian, Edwards, &Bradley, 2010). Recently, Roberts, Betancourt,Burrus, Holtzman, Libbrecht, MacCann,Matthews, Minsky, Naemi, and Schulze (2011)have developed a multimedia SJT for EI,using professional actors to follow emo-tional scenarios, such as dealing with anincompetent co-worker. Response options arealso filmed. Initial findings suggest that scoreson the SJT are related to appropriate criteriasuch as experiencing positive affect duringsocial interactions. The research is still at anearly stage, but it suggests the potential forassessing EI using the naturalistic simulationsthat are possible using technology. Eventually,tests may be based on immersive virtualrealities.

Questionnaires for emotional

intelligence

Next, we examine the other popular means forassessment of EI, using questionnaires that relyon the person’s self-reports of their emotionalfunctioning. Our coverage here will be rela-tively brief, because we believe that question-naire assessments are more appropriate formeasuring personality than for assessing trueabilities or intelligences.

Early studies: “Mixed-model”assessmentsQuestionnaires for EI started to appear soonafter Mayer and Salovey’s pioneering work,such as those by Bar-On (2000) and Schutteet al. (1998). Early measures were based onwhat Bar-On (2000) termed the “mixed model”of EI.That is, emotional competence was said toreside in both conventionally defined abilities



and personality traits such as assertiveness thatmight facilitate the practical expression of abili-ties. On the face of it, using questionnaires toassess ability seems highly questionable.Research on conventional measures of intelli-gence shows that self-assessments of EI corre-late approximately 0.3 with objective test scores(Chamorro-Premuzic, Moutafi, & Furnham,2005). Research in occupational contexts(Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004) shows thatpeople often have poor insight into their ownsocial-emotional contexts, perhaps because ofthe lack of systematic standards for evaluatingoneself. It is also paradoxical to expect indi-viduals with low EI to have sufficient self-awareness to provide meaningful questionnaireresponses (Zeidner et al., 2009).

Nevertheless, criterion validity evidence hasbeen obtained for a range of “mixed model”questionnaires (see Matthews et al., 2002, for areview), particularly in relation to well-beingand freedom from psychopathology. However,three problems are evident (Matthews et al.,2002; Zeidner et al., 2009). First, the factorstructure of “questionnaire EI” is unclear. Dif-ferent researchers identify differing dimensionsof EI, which sometimes failed to replicate, suchas Saklofske, Austin, & Minski (2003). Thesepsychometric difficulties may reflect lack ofconceptual clarity. Second, questionnaires forEI have proven considerably more effective inpredicting other questionnaire criteria thanobjective outcomes, such as work performance(Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). Indeed, someEI questionnaires include items asking aboutthe general mood of the respondent, which maypartially account for their associations withwell-being criteria.

Third, these questionnaires turn out tooverlap highly with existing personality scales,such as those for the FFM. For example, Bar-On’s (2000) EQ-i is largely a mixture of extra-version, agreeableness, conscientiousness, andlow neuroticism. Thus, much of the validity ofthis questionnaire simply reflects overlap withtraits of the FFM. Indeed, any personality scalethat is substantially correlated with low neu-roticism will inevitably predict greater well-being and lower stress vulnerability (Matthews,

Deary, & Whiteman, 2009). A few studies, suchas that by Saklofske et al. (2003), have shownmodest incremental validity for EI scales overthe FFM, suggesting that the scales may havesome novel content.

Questionnaires for “trait EI”As a result of the problems just discussed, theidea that any true ability can be measured usinga questionnaire has fallen into disfavor(Murphy, 2006; O’Sullivan, 2007). However, anew perspective on questionnaire assessmentsis provided by the concept of “trait EI.”Accord-ing to Petrides and Furnham (2003) we shouldsee questionnaires for EI as a means forextending our understanding of personality.Specifying traits for emotional functioningelaborates existing personality models, such asthe FFM. Petrides and Furnham (2003) devel-oped a new questionnaire, the Trait EmotionalIntelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue), whichcomprises 15 trait scales. It has been quite suc-cessful as a predictor of various well-beingindices (Martins et al., 2010) and other relevantcriteria (Petrides, Furnham, & Mavroveli,2007). Some studies also show that the TEIQueis predictive of objective as well as subjectivecriteria, including cortisol response to stress(Mikolajczak, Roy, Luminet, Fillée, & deTimary, 2007), and emotional memory (Mikola-jczak, Roy, Verstrynge, & Luminet, 2009).

In a recent appraisal of trait EI measures, wesuggested that they share some of the weak-nesses of their predecessors (Matthews,Zeidner & Roberts, 2011). For example, Pet-rides et al. (2007) state that the FFM explains50–80% of the variation in the TEIQue, sug-gesting that the problem of overlap with exist-ing personality measures has not been solved. Itis worth emphasizing that much individualvariation in emotional functioning can be quitewell explained by existing personality models(Reisenzein & Weber, 2009), without any needto refer to EI. Indeed, the Big Five traits relateto distinct aspects of “EI” that may be betterseparated than lumped together (De Raad,2005; McCrae, 2000), including sociability(extraversion), resilience under stress (low neu-roticism), self-control (conscientiousness),



empathy and caring for others (agreeableness)and sensitivity to emotion (openness).

The issue then is whether recent trait EIstudies add anything that is genuinely novel toexisting personality models. Here, we may findsome grounds for optimism. Although somedimensions of trait EI do no more than pin anew label on existing traits, others appear to bemore original. For example, Vernon, Villani,Schermer, and Petrides (2008) identified fourhigher-level factors in the TEIQue, labeled asemotionality, self-control, sociability, and well-being. The well-being factor is an example ofredundancy of measurement, and it appearsto be largely a mixture of high extraversionand low neuroticism (Matthews et al., 2011).However, the emotionality factor correlated atonly approximately 0.20–0.30 with the traits ofthe FFM in a large sample of North Americanrespondents (Vernon et al., 2008), suggestingthat it is distinct from existing personalityconstructs.

In fact, the term “emotionality” used byVernon et al. (2008) is misleading. Usually, emo-tionality refers to the person’s tendencies toexperience emotions frequently and intensely;typically, extraversion is linked to positive emo-tionality and neuroticism to negative emotion-ality (Matthews et al., 2009). The TEIQueprimary scales that define “emotionality” are infact emotion perception (in self and others),emotion expression, relationship skills, andempathy. The common element here may beregulating emotion in social settings througheffective communication of emotion, which inturn requires sensitivity to one’s own emotionalstate.

More generally, we propose that what may bemissing from the FFM is constructive emotionregulation. Some associations between theFFM and emotion regulation have been estab-lished, but they most commonly take the formof correlations between neuroticism andmaladaptive regulative strategies such as rumi-nation (Matthews et al., 2009). Individual dif-ferences in intrapersonal emotional regulationare assessed using the Trait Meta-Mood Scale(TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, &Palfai, 1995) which includes scales for Attention

to one’s emotions, Clarity of thinking aboutemotion, and Mood repair. The high scorer onthe TMMS has awareness and insight into his orher emotions, and can use that understanding toregulate mood effectively. The TMMS appearsto be acceptably distinct from the Big Five, andto have some validity as a predictor of objectivestress responses (Extremera & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2005; Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, &Epel, 2002). Like the Vernon et al. (2008) “emo-tionality” factor, the TMMS may assess aspectsof emotion regulation that are not well repre-sented in standard personality models;although we should be hesitant to label thesequalities as “abilities.”

Re-evaluating EI: What can the

construct deliver?

More than 20 years have passed since Mayerand Salovey’s (Mayer & Salovey, 1993; Salovey& Mayer, 1990) studies first kindled interest in apsychological science of EI. This is still a fairlyyouthful field of inquiry, but there is nowsufficient research to draw some tentativeconclusions.

There are two respects in which the initialpromise of EI has failed. Particularly in popularwritings (Cooper & Sawaf, 1997; Goleman,1995), the vision was of a major feature ofhuman personhood, as or more important thangeneral intelligence. For example, Bar-On(2000) put “EQ” on a par with IQ. This is astrong claim but one that could be straightfor-ward to substantiate with evidence. In addition,the idea of an EQ suggests that there should bea strong general factor spanning the multifari-ous tests of EI, just as the robust intercorrela-tions of diverse mental ability tests mayindicate a general factor of cognitive ability.Contrary to this prediction, we have seen thatdifferent methods of assessment of EI often failto converge.

We would also expect to see substantialeffect sizes for correlations between EI scoresand relevant criteria for emotional functioningin the laboratory and real-life settings. Ques-tionnaire measures of EI are quite effective in



predicting subjective well-being (Martins et al.,2010), but they owe much of this evidence forcriterion validity to their overlap with standardpersonality factors. Otherwise, while tests forEI can add to our understanding of ability andpersonality, their criterion validities tend to bequite modest, particularly when overlaps withexisting constructs are taken into account(Joseph & Newman, 2010; Van Rooy & Viswes-varan, 2004).

A second failure has been the mixed-modelapproach to EI advocated by Bar-On (2000).The hope was that the multifactorial array ofabilities supporting social-emotional adapta-tion might be assessed using questionnaires. Ithas become clear that much of the variance inthese questionnaire assessments simply reflectsexisting personality traits, including those of theFFM (Zeidner et al., 2009). Indeed, the use ofEI scales spreads confusion by mixing togethertraits that are better understood as separatepersonal attributes (McCrae, 2000).

In response to such difficulties, someauthors have expressed strong skepticismabout the value of studies of EI (Landy, 2005).Our view is that extreme skepticism is notjustified, and that empirical research hasmade real advances that should be acknowl-edged. For example, the MSCEIT does seemto be measuring personal qualities that are notwell measured by existing personality andability tests, and relate at least modestly to avariety of emotion-related outcomes (Riverset al., 2007). Questionnaire studies haveidentified some novel traits, such as those foremotion regulation, that add to under-standing of personality. The trait EI approach(Petrides et al., 2007) expresses the positionthat such traits are part of personality, notability. In addition, practical studies of trainingprograms in schools support the view that atleast some aspects of social-emotionalfunctioning can be improved, as evidenced bya recent meta-analysis (Durlak et al., 2011).The theoretical bases for these programs areoften unclear (Zeidner et al., 2002), butfurther research may specify more clearlywhat kinds of knowledge and processing canbe trained.

Thus, the new concept of EI remains promis-ing, but a reconfiguration of research aims maybe needed. Our contention is that betterprogress will be made if researchers abandonthe untenable aim of establishing a major “EQ”factor akin to IQ. Instead, our review here hasemphasized the diversity of the multiple con-structs that have been labeled as “EI,” includingtrue abilities, personality traits, and acquiredknowledge and skills. In the final part of thisarticle, we sketch out a “multipolar” perspec-tive on EI that may guide future research. Thecore assumption is that EI has been used torefer to at least four, qualitatively different per-sonal qualities that should be distinguishedfrom one another.

The future of EI: Four fields of

inquiry

Previously (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts,2004; Roberts et al., 2007; Zeidner et al., 2009)we have suggested that at least four differentkinds of construct should be differentiated.Table 2 lists these constructs and some of theircore attributes.

1 “Temperament” corresponds to broad-based personality traits that are related toindividual differences in emotionality,notably extraversion and neuroticism in theFFM. Much of the variance in questionnairescales for EI can be attributed to tempera-mental qualities. Indeed, in a study of twins,Vernon et al. (2008) found that the TEIQuescales had heritabilities similar to those ofstandard personality traits.

2 “Information processing” refers to specificroutines or modules for processing emo-tional information, such as encoding facialemotion. Several performance tasks used inEI research measure processing on the basisof accuracy or response time measures.Testsfor EI are typically only weakly predictiveof such processing measures at best (Austin,2005; Fellner et al., 2007).

3 “Emotion regulation” refers to the clusterof traits measured by instruments such asthe TMMS that relate to the person’s stable



beliefs about their own functioning andstrategies for managing emotions. Emotionregulation is influenced by temperament,but is psychometrically distinct.

4 “Emotional knowledge and skills” describesvarious learned skills for understanding anddealing with emotive situations. Often theseskills are linked to a specific context,although these constructs include the kind ofgeneral knowledge of emotions assessed bythe MSCEIT.We can also distinguish explicitdeclarative knowledge (also measured bythe MSCEIT) and implicit procedural skills,such as nonverbal expressions of emotion.

Rather than lumping these various qualitiestogether as a unitary EI, our recommendation

is that each is studied separately, generating itsown set of measures and theories. Better con-ceptualization and measurement within eachdomain will then support investigations ofinter-relationships between them. In the intro-ductory section of this article we listed six issuesthat have proved generally problematic inresearch on EI (Matthews et al., 2002). We willlook briefly at how our multipolar conceptionof EI may help to resolve these issues.

1 Lack of clarity of conceptualization. As wehave just argued, lack of clarity is a conse-quence of using the term “EI” to refer tomultiple, distinct constructs. Each one of thefour construct types can be defined moreclearly than unitary EI.

Table 2 Four distinct types of constructs for research on emotional intelligenceConstruct Possible current

measuresKey processes Adaptive

significanceTrainability

Temperament Standard personalitymeasures (e.g.Five FactorModel)

Many trait EI scales

Systems ofintegrated neuraland cognitiveprocessescontrollingarousal, attentionand reinforcementsensitivity

Mixed: mosttemperamentalfactors confer amixture of costs andbenefits

Low: temperamentis set by genesand early learning

Information-processing Speeded facialemotionrecognition tasks

Tasks requiringimplicitprocessing ofemotional stimuli

Specific processingmodules forprocessingemotional stimuli

Uncertain: Is speedof processingnecessarilyadaptive?

Low: exceptthat fixedstimulus-responseassociations maybecomeautomatizedthrough training

Emotion regulation Selected trait EIscales

- Trait EmotionalIntelligenceQuestionnaire“emotionality”

- Trait Meta-MoodScale

Self-concept andself-regulation

Predominantly but notexclusively positive

Moderate:temperament hasan influence, butspecific strategiesmay be learnt,e.g., via modelingand directedpractice

Context-bound emotionalknowledge and skills

Mayer-Salovey-CarusoEmotionalIntelligence Test(declarative skills)

Situation JudgmentTests

Multiple acquiredprocedural anddeclarative skills

Adaptive withincontext for learning:may be irrelevant orcounter-productivein other contexts

High: Learning ofspecific skills andknowledge

Note. EI = emotional intelligence.



2 Lack of a “gold standard” for measurement.It follows that there is no single test that canassess each of the multiple constructs.Indeed, each domain calls for its ownmethods of assessment, including question-naires for temperament and emotion regu-lation, simple performance tasks forinformation processing, and more complexassessments for skills. Declarative knowl-edge may be assessed using instrumentssuch as the MSCEIT, but measuring proce-dural knowledge remains challenging. Wehave suggested that multimedia SJTs offer apromising approach.

3 Overlap with existing constructs. By defini-tion, temperament overlaps with standardpersonality traits. Emotion regulation traitsand knowledge should overlap with person-ality to a lesser degree. For example, studiesof the MSCEIT (Roberts et al., 2008) and ofpersonality (Jensen-Campbell, Knack, &Rex-Lear, 2009) suggest modest correla-tions between acquired social-emotionalskills and agreeableness. We also expectassociations between cognitive abilities andthe two remaining constructs, information-processing and knowledge. It remains anopen question whether there is any basic“fluid” aptitude for emotional processingthat is distinct from general fluid ability.Therelation between acquired emotional skillsand crystallized intelligence also requiresfurther investigation (although see Robertset al., 2008).

4 Lack of theoretical understanding. Thedelineation of separate fields of inquiryalso aids theorizing. Temperamental quali-ties can be explained using existing biologi-cal and cognitive personality theory(Matthews et al., 2009). Individual differ-ences in information processing are accom-modated within cognitive neurosciencetheories of the types increasingly prevalentin research on ability (Neubauer & Fink,2010) and personality (Eysenck & Derak-shan, 2011). Emotion regulation can alsobe approached in terms of both cognitive(Wells, 2000) and neuroscience (Gross,2002) theories. As in other respects,

explaining knowledge and skills is the mostchallenging construct to understand,although developmental perspectives mayhelp (Zeidner, Matthews, Roberts, &MacCann, 2003). It may also be importantto tie theory to the specific contexts inwhich skills are learned, such as the work-place and intimate relationships.

5 Limitations in criterion-related validity evi-dence. The problem here was that tests forEI are often only modestly predictive of cri-teria, particularly when overlaps with otherconstructs are taken into account. In experi-mental research, we would like each type ofconstruct to be strongly related to keyunderlying processes. Stronger conceptual-ization, theory, and measurement maysupport this aim. In field research, it maywell prove that some facets of EI are moreimportant for real-life adaptation thanothers. For example, rapid processing ofemotional stimuli may be less importantthan acquired context-bound skills (Mat-thews, 2008).

6 Uncertain practical relevance. Following onfrom the previous point, it is plausible thattraining specific skills is the most effectivemeans for improving social-emotional func-tioning in education, industry, and othercontexts, as suggested by the Durlak et al.(2011) review. An emphasis on skills is alsoconsistent with the role of moderatorfactors, such as the need for emotional labornoted by Joseph and Newman (2010). Tem-peramental factors are, of course, less mal-leable than skills, but the assessment oftemperament and personality has provenuseful in clinical, educational, and occupa-tional contexts (Hogan & Holland, 2003;Matthews et al., 2009; Zeidner & Matthews,in press). In practical settings, assessment oftraits is useful in understanding the emo-tional issues that individuals may face, andin providing counseling or therapy. Thepractical relevance of emotion regulationand information processing constructsawaits further investigation.

7 Cultural influences on EI. Cross-culturalsimilarities and differences in EI may also



vary according to the facet of EI studied.Dimensions of temperament show somegenerality across cultures, although culturalfactors may influence how traits areexpressed in important ways (Draguns,2009).One of the challenges here is evidencefor differences in trait structure across cul-tures. Studies in China suggest that dimen-sions of “Chinese tradition” (e.g. honoringparents and ancestors: Bond, 2000) andinterpersonal relatedness (Cheung, Leung,Zhang, Sun, Gan, Song, & Xie, 2001) may beas important for personality definition as theWestern Five Factor Model. Such findingssuggest that understanding of dispositionaldifferences in emotional functioning cannotbe fully separated from the cultural context.For example, the person’s style of managingfamily conflicts might be an aspect of EI, butunderstanding this aspect of individual dif-ferences would likely need to refer to Bond’s(2000) Chinese tradition dimension in thisparticular culture.

We would also expect basic information pro-cessing routines, such as those for facialemotion perception, to be somewhat robustacross cultures, to the extent that they dependdirectly on brain structures such as theamygdala. However, some authors have sug-gested that people may find it easier to judgeemotion in others of their own culture (Elfen-bein & Ambady, 2003), and there appear to beother subtle “cultural dialects” in emotion per-ception (Wang, Toosi, & Ambady, 2009). Theremay also be cultural differences in the use ofcontextual information in emotion perception(Ko, Lee, Yoon, Kwon, & Mather, 2011).

Cross-cultural differences in emotion re-gulation have been neglected in research,although differences in use of strategies such assuppression and reappraisal have been demon-strated (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Nakagawa, 2008).Luomala, Kumar, Worm, and Singh (2004)argue that ease and efficiency of mood-regulation is higher in collectivistic culturesthan in individualistic cultures, because emo-tional control is a strong normative value in theformer. Failure to maintain control over one’s

moods causes shame, embarrassment, and lossof face. The broad philosophical differences inWestern and Eastern conceptions of emotionthat we discussed in the introduction to thisarticle also imply cultural differences in“emotionally-intelligent” mood regulation.Implicit in Western accounts appears to be theneed to attain personal mastery over one’smoods, in order to experience greater happi-ness. By contrast, Buddhist understandingemphasizes mindfulness of negative emotions,developing consciousness of inner states andliving in the moment (Ekman et al., 2005). Cor-respondingly, the “Eastern mind-body-spiritmodel” (Chan et al., 2006) encourages a varietyof therapeutic techniques such as breathingexercises and meditation that are intended toimprove emotion regulation without promotingdirect control of emotion. There are pointsof contact between Western and Easternapproaches. For example, Western metacogni-tive therapy (Wells, 2009) is based on attention-training techniques that promote detachedmindfulness, so that patients can experienceanxiety without the experience leading to dys-functional worries or avoidant behaviors.

Finally, we might expect to see the largestcross-cultural differences in contextual skillsfor managing emotion, given the differences insocial structures across cultures. For example,one area for SEL training (Durlak et al., 2011)is building personal assertiveness. However, thespecific skills required to be assertive in a con-structive manner are likely to be very differentin individualist and collectivist cultures, forexample, American self-confidence and direct-ness is not always appreciated overseas.

Conclusion

The initial promise of research on EI has notbeen fulfilled, and it seems that the dream ofestablishing an “EQ” factor as important inhuman affairs as IQ will not be attained. None-theless, the new construct of EI has proved itsworth in stimulating a variety of new and pro-ductive lines of research, including the potentialfor enhancing practice in several applied fields.



We have argued that all existing tests for EIhave both strengths and weaknesses, althoughwe believe that innovations in ability-basedtesting may have more long-term potential thanpersonality trait questionnaires. We have pro-posed also that future progress may depend onabandoning the search for a single EI factor,and separating multiple fields of inquiry, eachrequiring its own theories and measures. Such astrategy may provide psychology with a richerunderstanding of individual differences in emo-tional functioning, and support practicallyuseful techniques for assessing and enhancing“emotional intelligence” in real life.

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(Received June 4, 2011; accepted September 6, 2011)



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Emotional intelligence: A promise unfulﬁlled? · Abstract: Emotional intelligence (EI) is a relatively new construct in differential psy-chology. Proponents of EI have made strong