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DOI: 10.1177/1754073911421387 2012 4: 81Emotion Review

Dan ZahaviComment: Basic Empathy and Complex Empathy

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Emotion ReviewVol. 4, No. 1 (January 2012) 81 82

The Author(s) 2012ISSN 1754-0739DOI: 10.1177/1754073911421387er.sagepub.com

Abstract

In my short commentary, I dwell on the distinction between basic and complex empathy, and suggest that a basic perception-based form of empathy might point to the existence of a type of social understanding that is more direct and more fundamental than the types of social cognition normally addressed by simulation theory and theory theory.

Keywordscontext, empathy, interpersonal understanding, phenomenology

Despite the recent upsurge of interest in and work on empathy, there is still no clear consensus about how to demarcate empa-thy from related phenomena such as emotional contagion and sympathy, in part, of course, because there is still no agree-ment on what precisely empathy is. Not only are conflicting definitions currently being proposed with diverging implica-tions for the contribution that empathy can supposedly make to interpersonal understandingsome claim that empathy is the glue that makes social life possible (Hoffman, 2000, p. 3; cf. Gallese, 2001, p. 43), others that it is a less direct and more mediated form of interpersonal understanding than the kind provided by cognitive perspective-taking (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006, p. 439)but there is also no agreement on whether empathy is a single unified phenomenon or rather a multidimensional construct.

Given this lack of consensus, I was pleasantly surprised to find myself in agreement with many of the points made by Hollan in his article Emerging Issues in the Cross-Cultural Study of Empathy (2012).

To start with, I think Hollan (2012) is right in distinguishing the that question from the why question, and also in sug-gesting that different forms of empathy might be involved. To see that another person is angry or performing a specific action is already a form of interpersonal understanding that arguably depends on a basic form of empathy. But even if one ascribes a certain primacy to this rather primitive, automatic and affec-tive form of social understanding, one also has to realize its clear limitations. It doesnt as such provide us with an under-

standing of why somebody is angry or performing the action in question. And if the latter kind of understanding also requires a form of empathy, we are dealing with a cognitively more com-plex type. As Hollan writes, The second type of empathy may grow out of and be dependent upon the visceral and perceptual mechanisms enabling the first, but its full realization also requires knowledge that is more sensitive to situation and context, and also more prone to misinterpretation and error (Hollan, 2012, p. 71).

Hollans (2012) claim that a comprehensive account of empathy needs to consider the role of context and the importance of background knowledge, should be familiar to readers of Schutz (1967), who in his classical contribution Phenomenology and the Social World argued that we have to go beyond a narrow focus on face-to-face interaction and embod-ied engagement, if we want to understand the full psychological life of others. Although it might be permissible to say that certain aspects of the others consciousness, such as his joy, sorrow, pain, shame, pleading, love, rage, and threats, are given to us directly and noninferentially, it does not follow from this that we also have a direct access to the why of such feelings. And in order to uncover these aspects, it is not sufficient simply to observe facial expressions and actions; we also have to rely on interpretation, and have to draw on a highly structured context of meaning. In short, if we wish to reach a deeper level of inter-personal understanding, we have to go beyond what is directly available (Schutz, 1967, pp. 2324, 168; cf. Zahavi, 2010).

One question to ask though is whether the role of empathy is restricted to face-to-face based forms of interpersonal under-standing, or whether there are forms of empathy that reach further. One problem with making the latter claimthat is, the claim that people in Copenhagen can, say, feel empathy with those affected by the March 11 tsunami and that they employ empathy in order to understand the stressful situation of the workers at the Fukushima Daiichi power plantis that it blurs the distinction not only between empathy and sympathy, but also between empathy and simulation-based or theory-based forms of standard mindreading. In my view, this should be avoided, since the existence of a basic perception-based form of

Basic Empathy and Complex Empathy

Dan ZahaviDepartment of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

Corresponding author: Dan Zahavi, Center for Subjectivity Research, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 140142, Copenhagen 2300, Denmark. Email: dza@hum.ku.dk

421387 EMRXXX10.1177/1754073911421387ZahaviEmotion Review

Comment

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82 Emotion Review Vol. 4 No. 1

empathy might precisely point to the existence of a type of social understanding that is more direct and more fundamental than the types of social cognition normally addressed by simula-tion theory and theory theory (cf. Zahavi, 2008, 2011).

Recognizing that there might be different types of empathy, and that some might be more basic than others, doesnt yet answer the question of whether and to what extent the more automatic forms can be affected by topdown modulation. I consequently welcome and endorse Hollans call for more studies that compare and explore the relation between the various forms of empathy.

Another important issue that Hollan (2012) touches upon concerns the alleged moral neutrality of empathy. It is important not to conflate empathy and sympathy. Whereas the latter neces-sarily involves a component of care and concern, this is not the case with the former. Just think of the skilled interrogator or the sadist. A high degree of empathic sensitivity might precisely be of use if one wants to humiliate somebody. Hollan, however, questions the epistemic purity of empathy. As he points out, empathy is very rarely simply a matter of passively understand-ing the thoughts and feelings of others; rather, it is something that impels one to action. But even if Hollan might be right in arguing that complex empathy is never neutral, but rather is

always found embedded in a moral context which affects both its likelihood and means of expression, and its social, emotional, and even its political and economic, consequences (Hollan, 2012), the question that needs to be asked is whether this also holds true for the most basic form of empathy.

Referencesde Vignemont, F., & Singer, T. (2006). The empathic brain: How, when and

why? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 435441.Gallese, V. (2001). The shared manifold hypothesis: From mirror neurons

to empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, 3350.Hoffman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and moral development: Implica-

tions for caring and justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Hollan, D. (2012). Emerging issues in the cross-cultural study of empa-thy. Emotion Review, 4, 7078.

Schutz, A. (1967). Phenomenology of the social world. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Zahavi, D. (2008). Simulation, projection and empathy. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 514522.

Zahavi, D. (2010). Empathy, embodiment and interpersonal understanding: From Lipps to Schutz. Inquiry, 53, 285306.

Zahavi, D. (2011). Empathy and direct social perception: A phenomeno-logical proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology doi: 10.1007/s13164-011-0070-3.

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