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DOI: 10.1177/1754073911421388 2012 4: 20Emotion Review
Arthur M. JacobsComment on Walter's ''Social Cognitive
Neuroscience of Empathy: Concepts, Circuits, and Genes''
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Emotion ReviewVol. 4, No. 1 (January 2012) 20 21
The Author(s) 2012ISSN 1754-0739DOI:
10.1177/1754073911421388er.sagepub.com
Abstract
In his review, Walter (2012) links conceptual perspectives on
empathy with crucial results of neurocognitive and genetic studies
and presents a descriptive neurocognitive model that identifies
neuronal key structures and links them with both cognitive and
affective empathy via a high and a low road. After discussion of
this model, the remainder of this comment deals more generally with
the possibilities and limitations of current neurocognitive models,
considering ways to develop process models allowing specific
quantitative predictions.
Keywordsbrain mappers, empathy, functional ontology,
neurocognitive process models
In his exemplary review, Walter (2012) links conceptual
per-spectives on one of the most investigated social constructs in
neuroscienceempathywith crucial results of neurocogni-tive and
genetic studies. Walter discusses seven features likely to help
distinguish between affective empathy and related phenomena such as
cognitive empathy, emotional contagion, or sympathy. According to
this multiple-component approach, affective empathy is composed of
six essential features: affective behavior, affective experience,
affective isomorphy, perspective taking, selfother distinction, and
other orientation, whereas the feature prosocial motivation is
neither necessary, nor sufficient for it. Affective empathy shares
only three features with cognitive empathy, but five with sympathy.
Since Walters proposal so far is purely qualitative, providing no
feature weights, it is hard to say whether this means that sympathy
and affective empathy necessarily overlap more than affective
empathy and cognitive empathy. Walter also points out that in real
life and phenomenal experience, cognitive and affective empathy and
sympathy might well co-occur most often.
He augments his view on empathy by a static, descriptive,
prequantitative model that identifies neuronal key structures and
links them with both cognitive and affective empathy via a
high (i.e., topdown) and a low (i.e., bottomup) road. The high
road to cognitive theory of mind (ToM) proceeds from the stimulus
(i.e., an affective state of other) to the so-called ToM or
mentalizing system (i.e., the temporo-parietal junction, the
superior temporal sulcus, the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, and
the postero-medial cortex). The low road to affec-tive empathy
involves an affective-motivational nociceptive network (i.e., the
anterior insula and midcingulate cortex)that is also hypothesized
to support interoceptive awareness and metarepresentations of
emotionsand a complex formed by the amygdala, the secondary
somatosensory cortex, and the inferior frontal gyrus which may be
part of a human mirror neuron system. Both networks are linked
through the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex which is supposed to
support cognitive empathy, that is, affective ToM. Although not
explicitly integrated into this model, Walter (2012) also
hypothesizes that some genes related to oxytocin and dopamine, and
a gene of unknown function related to schizophrenia, are part of
the empathy pic-ture. With this approach, based on both the results
of meta-analytic studies and research from his own group, Walter
presents a theoretical framework, a kind of descriptive
neuro-cognitive model that allows the generation of testable
hypoth-eses and revised models of empathy.
In the following, I would like to comment more generally on the
possibilities and limitations of current neurocognitive models,
such as Walters (2012). In general, neurocognitive models should
help specify hypotheses on the role of brain activity in the
functioning of mental processes in a way allow-ing to test and
falsify them by using neurocognitive methods, such as functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electro-encephalography (EEG),
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), or functional
near-infrared imaging (fNIRS). In practice, this means that they
must specify which neuronal responses are triggered under which
conditions by which stimulus context and how those relate to
subjective experience and objectively observable behavior (Jacobs,
2008). Since neurocognitive methods lead to a wealth of new
dependent variables (DVs),
Comment on Walters Social Cognitive Neuroscience of Empathy:
Concepts, Circuits, and Genes
Arthur M. JacobsExperimental and Neurocognitive Psychology,
Freie Universitt Berlin, Germany
Corresponding author: Arthur M. Jacobs, Freie Universitt Berlin,
Allgemeine und Neurokognitive Psychologie, Dahlem Institute for
Neuroimaging of Emotion (D.I.N.E.), Habelschwerdter Allee 45, 14195
Berlin, Germany. Email: [email protected]
421388 EMRXXX10.1177/1754073911421388JacobsEmotion Review
Comment
by ancuta anca on October 25, 2014emr.sagepub.comDownloaded
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Jacobs Comment on Walter 21
such as hemodynamic response functions, neurocognitive models
face the challenge to predict these new DVs both quali-tatively and
quantitatively within the context of psychological experiments,
together with the behavioral and subjective DVs. A big challenge
for the future, therefore, is to turn what seem to be primarily
descriptive models into process models, that is, ones that not only
specify essential components of a social construct and hypothetical
mental activity such as empathy (Walter, 2012) or literary reading
(Jacobs, 2011), but also make explicit how these components
interact with each other in time to produce the subjectively
reportable, and dynamic behav-ioral and neuronal, effects
interpreted as markers of the mental process in a given task
environment.
Currently, a process model specifying the dynamic interac-tions
between the component (sub)processes, neuronal circuits, and
genetic factors contributing to the social construct empathy is not
in sight, but Walter (2012) sketches a useful framework for such a
model. Further useful steps into this direction might be made using
the functional ontology approach (Lenartowicz, Kalar, Congdon,
& Poldrack, 2010; Price & Friston, 2005). Two probabilities
must be maximized in this approach which aims at mapping mental
functions to their neural substrates (or to behavioral or genetic
variables) and which requires a close cooperation and
cross-fertilization between brain mappers and neurocognitive
modelers, something which currently seems to be more wishful
thinking than fact (Jacobs & Carr, 1995; Jacobs & Rsler,
1999): (a) p(ACT/COG), that is, a number specifying the selectivity
of the brain area believed to be the neural substrate of some
cognitive process, and (b) p(COG/TASK), that is, a number
specifying the belief that a given task really affords a certain
cognitive process in a maximally selective fashion (Poldrack,
2006). Whereas the first number can be maximized by developing
precise
(neuro)-cognitive process models, if possible in form of
simula-tion models that fulfill a number of criteria for model
develop-ment and evaluation (Jacobs & Grainger, 1994), the
second probability can be maximized by using technical tools such
as BrainMap (Lenartowicz et al., 2010). Perhaps future issues of
Emotion Review will see applications of this functional ontology
approach to Walters neurocognitive model of empathy.
ReferencesJacobs, A. M. (2008). Kognitive Modellierung und
Simulation/diagram
making. In S. Gauggel & M. Herrmann (Eds.), Handbuch der
Neuro-und Biopsychologie (pp. 5460). Gttingen, Germany:
Hogrefe.
Jacobs, A. M. (2011). Neurokognitive Poetik: Elemente eines
neuro-kognitiven Modells des literarischen Lesens [Neurocognitive
poetics: Elements of a neurocognitive model of literary reading].
In R. Schrott & A. Jacobs (Eds.), Gehirn und Gedicht: Wie wir
unsere Wirklichkeiten konstruieren (pp. 492524). Munich, Germany:
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Jacobs, A. M., & Rsler, F. (1999). Dondersian dreams in
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Lenartowicz, A., Kalar, D. J., Congdon, E., & Poldrack, R.
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