http://emr.sagepub.com/Emotion Review

http://emr.sagepub.com/content/4/1/66The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/1754073911421384 2012 4: 66Emotion Review

Daniel D. HuttoComment: Understanding Reasons Without Reenactment: Comment on Stueber

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:

International Society for Research on Emotion

can be found at:Emotion ReviewAdditional services and information for

http://emr.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts:

http://emr.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:

http://emr.sagepub.com/content/4/1/66.refs.htmlCitations:

What is This?

- Jan 24, 2012Version of Record >>

by ancuta anca on October 25, 2014emr.sagepub.comDownloaded from by ancuta anca on October 25, 2014emr.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Emotion ReviewVol. 4, No. 1 (January 2012) 66 67

The Author(s) 2012ISSN 1754-0739DOI: 10.1177/1754073911421384er.sagepub.com

Abstract

This comment on Stuebers article clarifies the nature of the core disagreement between his approach to understanding reasons and mine. The purely philosophical nature of the dispute is highlighted. It is argued that understanding someones narrative often suffices for understanding the persons reasons in ordinary cases. It is observed that Stueber has yet to provide a compelling counter case. There is also a brief clarification of some of the empirical commitments of the narrative practice hypothesis.

Keywordsfolk psychology, reasons, reenactment, simulation

In his article Stueber (2012) makes a case for thinking that we simply cannot do without reenactive empathy when engaging with others viscerally or making sense of their actions in terms of reasons. He is right to set out his stall differently along these two fronts. One concerns low-level forms of intersubjec-tive interacting (which I call unprincipled enactive/embodied engagements) and the other concerns much more sophisticated, articulate and conceptually based forms of understanding (which I call folk psychology, stricto sensu). In this short com-mentary I focus exclusively on what Stueber has to say about the latter, for reasons of space.

Stueber (2012) acknowledges that the new trend of suppos-ing that narratives might play an important, and perhaps even fundamental, part in our understanding reasons has enriched the theory of mind debate. Nevertheless, he regards it as step-ping over the mark if we imagine that to understand Xs reason we need only understand Xs narrative. He rejects the idea that narrative understanding suffices or exhausts what it is to under-stand someones reason. Call this the narrative suffices for rea-son understanding (or NSRU) claim. Steuber thinks the NSRU cannot be true because it fails to acknowledge the utterly neces-sary and central (i.e., nonsuperfluous) role of reenactive empa-thy (or simulation) in enabling us to understand a persons reasons for acting. Call this the reenactment is necessary for reason understanding (or RNRU) claim.

Inspired by Collingwood and others, Stueber (2012) wants to establish the truth of the RNRU (and hence the falsity of its competitor, the NSRU). To assess the success of his efforts one must recognize the thoroughly philosophical character of this debate. Both claims under examination are claims about what is minimally required for understanding reasons, advanced on a priori grounds (no doubt some would regard them as attempts to express analytic truths). In his 2006 book, Stueber is admira-bly frank about the status of his claim (Stueber, 2006, p. 152).

Recognizing this point is important when it comes to assess-ing different strands of Stuebers argument. He devotes space to discussing some empirical findings and raises questions about how best to interpret them. But this is orthogonal to his main concern. Although the empirical issues are worthy of fur-ther scrutiny and discussion, they make exactly no contribution to deciding what is at stake in the NSRURNRU debate. Still, I cant resist clarifying my views on one issue (especially since Stueber invites me to do so). How do children move from having a piecemeal and partial grasp of mental state concepts to an integrated, articulate understanding of reasonsthat is, a full folk psychological competence? Children do this, I conjec-ture, by mastering and deepening their capacities for producing and consuming narratives. This is a slow process. It involves participating in shared, scaffolded, story-telling practices. The narrative skills required for this are in place only very weakly in early childhood, becoming stable only at around age 5 and growing more secure after that. Thus the proposal that our capacity to understand reasons only comes by developing narrative abilities concurs with the findings that

5- and 6-year-old children (who are old enough to pass false-belief tasks) still have problems understanding: how beliefs are acquired (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996; Robinson & Apperly, 2001) how beliefs interact with desires (Leslie et al., 2005; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998) and the emotional consequences of false beliefs (e.g., Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989; Ruffman & Keenan, 1996). (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009, p. 957)

Mastering all of this, the child in effect learns the core principles of folk psychology (as some philosophers would

Understanding Reasons without Reenactment: Comment on Stueber

Daniel D. HuttoSchool of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, UK

Corresponding author: Daniel D. Hutto, School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, de Havilland Campus, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, UK. Email: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk

421384 EMR4110.1177/1754073911421384HuttoEmotion Review

Comment

by ancuta anca on October 25, 2014emr.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Hutto Understanding Reasons without Reenactment 67

put it), but they do this, remarkably, without coming to possess or acquire any principles at all.

It is true, as Stueber (2012) stresses, that I accept that the exercise of imaginative capacitieseven capacities for cocognitionare important in enabling children to develop an understanding of reasons. But imaginative and cocognitive capacities do not, individually or jointly, add up to understand-ing an agents reasons. Full mastery of that special kind of understanding only comes as the result of engaging with narratives. If so, it follows that it cannot be a prerequisite for entering into the relevant narrative practices. Philosophers of a certain Platonic mindset tend to marvel as to how it is possible to learn something without already knowing it, but gradual mastery of skills and techniques is a quite common phenomenon.

This brings us back to the main question. Is it possible to fully understand someones reason for acting without putting ourselves in their shoes, identifying with them, or otherwise simulating their mindset? I agree with Stueber that theory theory is inadequate. Having general knowledge about the laws of folk psychologythat is, how mental states interrelatewill not suffice for understanding a persons reasons for acting on some occasion. For example, without knowing the appropriate backstory, being told that X ate an acorn because he believed it was an acorn and desired to eat an acorn it is likely to leave us puzzled, even though it is not irrational to do such a thing (in a strict sense of rational).

By contrast, if we flesh out enough of Xs story, Xs stated reason may become intelligible. Thus if we learn that this is part of an important religious ritual for Xif we can see a link between this sort of activity and activities that play, or could have played, a similar role in our lives, then it becomes possible to make sense of Xs reason. In getting the bigger picture by fleshing out Xs narrative we dont typically need the whole of

Xs story, we need just enough to see the relevant connections. But for Stueber, apparently even having the whole story would not suffice. Even if we had the full details of Xs storyin every detail and particularitywe wouldnt be able to understand Xs reasons; that is, until we also put ourselves in Xs shoes. For Stueber (2012), using all of this information provided by the narrative could provide a frame for making the relevant adjust-ments that would allow us to do just that.

A great deal in this debate hangs on what we mean by understanding a reason. Note that it seems perfectly possible to understand someones reason without endorsing it. We can understand someones reason while still finding it strange, unattractive, or repugnant to our moral sensibilities (as in thehopefully, imaginarycase of the student who desires to shoot his professor; or that of a suicide bomber). There is no doubt that more needs to be said about what that involves and what goes on in the closely connected phenomenon of imagina-tive resistance (for a good discussion see Currie, 2010, Chapter 6). But careful scrutiny of Stuebers (2012) article reveals only the repeated claim that understanding reasons, in folk psycho-logical fashion, essentially requires reenactment. What are not provided are compelling arguments or examples to support that claim.

ReferencesApperly, I., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track

beliefs and belief-like states? Psychological Review, 116, 953970.Currie, G. (2010). Narratives and narrators. Oxford, UK: Oxford

University Press.Stueber, K. R. (2006). Rediscovering empathy: Agency, folk psychology and

the human sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Stueber, K. R. (2012). Varieties of empathy, neuroscience and the

narrativist challenge to the contemporary theory of mind debate. Emotion Review, 4, 5563.

by ancuta anca on October 25, 2014emr.sagepub.comDownloaded from