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DOI: 10.1177/1754073911421394 2012 4: 96Emotion Review

Fritz BreithauptAuthor reply: Empathy Does Provide Rational Support for Decisions. But Is It the Right Decision?

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Emotion ReviewVol. 4, No. 1 (January 2012) 9697

The Author(s) 2012ISSN 1754-0739DOI: 10.1177/1754073911421394er.sagepub.com

Abstract

This article examines the relation of empathy and rational judgment. When people observe a conflict most are quick to side with one of the parties. Once a side has been taken, empathy with that party further solidifies this choice. Hence, it will be suggested that empathy is not neutral to judgment and rational decision-making. This does not mean, however, that the one who empathizes will necessarily have made the best choice.

Keywordsempathy and decision-making, empathy and judgment, side-taking and empathy, three-people scenario of empathy

Empathizing with a specific person influences how one views and describes her behavior. Different descriptions of her behav-ior will suggest different rational arguments for or against her actions. Hence, empathy is not neutral to judgment and rational decision-making. This does not mean, however, that the one who empathizes will necessarily have made the best choice. Is it necessary for empathy that we feel ourselves out of a shared interactive emotionality (Sffner, 2012)? Probably so.

In the past two decades, most interest in empathy has been focused on its mechanisms and definitions. However, less attention has been paid to the situations that engender empathy. Which social situations lead one to be empathic? How does empathy pair with other emotions and social practices?

Central to the proposed three-person model of empathy is the assumption that empathy is not an automatic act, but rather a social practice that is engaged when needed. The article suggests that side-taking in observed situations of conflict often triggers empathy. However, there may be other social practices that may lead to empathys activation.

The basic model of three-person empathy applies to cases in which the decision of what side to take has not yet been made. If an observer is already affiliated with one side of an observed conflict (such as a spouse), there will not usually be an act of side-taking. The free choice, its uncertainty, and the actual

decision are essential elements of this model in so far as they mark the decision for a side as potentially preliminary. Hence, the empathic reinforcement of this model (Figure 1) serves to con-firm and stabilize the prior decision. In this sense, empathy might be an element of the confirmation effect (or halo effect) that makes first impressions stick. Observers who empathize with a taken side are likely to convince themselves that they made the right decision in the first place. Empathy thus helps to reduce the ambiguity or grayness of a social conflict and turn it into a black-or-white decision. This does not mean, however, that the one who empathizes will have made the best choice. Empathy can justify both sides.

Peter Goldie (2012) asks whether the empathic reinforcement simply adds more motivational oomph to a prior decision or whether it also gives normative support and reason for the decision in the first place. Goldie does not dispute the oomph, but won-ders about the normative dimensions of empathy. This is an impor-tant question.

Empathy, paired with side-taking, may not in itself provide rational arguments but stimulate the search for those arguments that can justify ones side-taking decision. And this includes rational arguments.

Goldie (2012) considers the sports example as irrelevant in this context. Is it? The assumption is that one can randomly side with a team and then observe a foul by the other team. The empathic observer can feel the pain of the fouled player. Does this empathy not fuel a rational argument that that team is unwor-thy of winning because it resorted to unfair play? Likewise, if one sided with the team that fouled, empathy may make one per-ceive the situation differently. One may perceive the man on the ground as a simulator who enhances his display of pain to draw a free shot. In this case, one could rationally conclude that a team using shady techniques does not deserve the victory.

Empathy influences the way we perceive the situation in the first place (foul or simulation). Social actions allow more than one description. The variety of descriptions includes differ-ences about basic facts of the event, as well as complex internal

Empathy Does Provide Rational Support for Decisions. But Is It the Right Decision?

Fritz BreithauptDepartment of Germanic Studies, Indiana University, USA

Corresponding author: Fritz Breithaupt, Department of Germanic Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405-6601, USA. Email: fbreitha@indiana.edu

421394 EMR4110.1177/1754073911421394BreithauptEmotion Review

Author Reply

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Breithaupt Empathy Does Provide Rational Support for Decisions 97

states, such as intentions (Anscombe, 1957). Hence viewing a situation from different perspectives (empathy) can alter its description in both emotional and rational ways. Empathy here does not in itself provide a normative argument for or against a side, but it changes how one describes the situation, and each description warrants a different set of rationale and normative arguments. (In general, it would be misleading to separate emo-tions and rationality too harshly; see Engelen, 2007). One can find support for most sides by means of empathy and thereby complicate normative assessments.

Jan Georg Sffner (2012) outlines models of swarm intel-ligence and shared interaction, and he asks how these phenom-ena relate to the three-person model of empathy. Sffner points

out that evolutionary biology increasingly champions cooper-ation, whereas the three-person model of empathy includes dark sides of exclusion, competition, and schadenfreude. In fact, he asks the pointed question of how we feel ourselves out of a shared interactive emotionality and gain or take per-spectives. The question is a good one, and it forces us to think about the evolutionary history of empathy that may still inform its structure today. Sffners question suggests that the devel-opment of empathy did not take place on the basis of shared emotionality, but as its limitation.

Indeed, Stephanie Preston and Frans de Waal have given an account of potential precursors of empathy and have identified shared emotions and emotional contagion as potential candidates (Preston & de Waal, 2002; see also Decety, 2011). They suggest that it is the line between self and other that increasingly limits the spillover of emotions from one to the other. In terms of my article, I am tempted to consider to which degree human and nonhuman animals may have developed a blocking mechanism against the prior shared interactive emotionality. More research is needed to understand such blocking and channeling mecha-nisms of empathy.

ReferencesAnscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press.Decety, J. (2011). The neuroevolution of empathy. Annals of the New York

Academy of Sciences, 1231, 3545.Engelen, E.-M. (2007). Gefhle [Emotions]. Stuttgart, Germany: Reclam.Goldie, P. (2012). Comment on Breithaupts A three-person model of

empathy. Emotion Review, 4, 9293.Preston, S., & de Waal, F. (2002). Empathy. Its ultimate and proximate

basis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 172.Sffner, J. G. (2012). Empathy and participation A response to Fritz

Breithaupts three-person model of empathy. Emotion Review, 4, 9495.

Observaon of social conflict

Mental side-taking

View, consider, and experience situaon from perspecve of chosen side (empathy)

Agree to chosen sideReinforce prior side-taking

e

Figure 1. The core model of three-person empathy begins with the observation of a social conflict and a mental side-taking, which is enforced by means of empathy.

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