Emotion Knowledge, Emotion Utilization, and Emotion Regulation

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2011 3: 44Emotion ReviewSeidenfeld

Carroll E. Izard, Elizabeth M. Woodburn, Kristy J. Finlon, E. Stephanie Krauthamer-Ewing, Stacy R. Grossman and AdinaEmotion Knowledge, Emotion Utilization, and Emotion Regulation

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Emotion Review Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 2011) 44–52

© 2011 SAGE Publications andThe International Society for Research on Emotion ISSN 1754-0739 DOI: 10.1177/1754073910380972er.sagepub.com

Emotion Knowledge, Emotion Utilization, and Emotion Regulation

Carroll E. IzardElizabeth M. WoodburnKristy J. FinlonE. Stephanie Krauthamer-EwingStacy R. GrossmanAdina SeidenfeldDepartment of Psychology, University of Delaware, USA

Abstract

This article suggests a way to circumvent some of the problems that follow from the lack of consensus on a definition of emotion (Izard, 2010; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981) and emotion regulation (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004) by adopting a conceptual framework based on discrete emotions theory and focusing on specific emotions. Discrete emotions theories assume that neural, affective, and cognitive processes differ across specific emotions and that each emotion has particular motivational and regula-tory functions. Thus, efforts at regulation should target the specific dysregulated emotions. The positive effects of emotion regu-lation are more likely to be optimized when they result from or lead to emotion utilization—the constructive use of the energy of emotion arousal. Effective processes for regulation differ for basic emotions and emotion schemas. This article identifies neural systems that facilitate emotion experiences and emotion regulation processes. It considers the implications of the developmental change from basic emotions to emotion schemas, and also briefly discusses the effects of interventions on changes in emotion knowledge, emotion regulation, and social and emotional competence.

Keywordsbrain and emotion, emotion knowledge, emotion regulation, emotion utilization

Concerted efforts over the past quarter century have rather dramatically failed to find consensus on a definition of the term “emotion” (Izard, 2010; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981). It seems difficult to argue that emotion regulation meets the criteria for a scientific construct any better than does the construct of emotion (Cole et al., 2004). We try to circumvent at least some of the problems created by these ambiguous terms by focusing on specific emotions as targets for regulation. We chose this course because the emotions theory that provides our concep-tual framework for understanding and regulating emotions concerns discrete (separate, distinct) emotions.

Relevant Principles of Differential Emotions Theory (DET) and Key Terms

We propose that each discrete emotion has particular neural circuits that support a distinct feeling, may or may not result in readily observable changes in body, face, and voice (Izard, 2009), and always has motivational and regulatory functions. Several key terms are highlighted in DET. Emotion knowledge (EK) consists of accurate understanding of the expressions, feelings, and functions of discrete emotions. Emotion utilization (EU) consists of the processes involved in making adaptive use

Author note: We thank Fran Haskins, our lab manager, for her expert help in the preparation of this article for submission to Emotion Review. Thanks also to Sarahfaye Heckler, senior research technician, for her help. This work was supported by grant R01MH080909 from the National Institute of Mental Health. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institute of Mental Health or the National Institutes of Health.Corresponding author: Carroll E. Izard, Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, USA. Email: [email protected]

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Izard et al. Emotion Knowledge, Utilization, and Regulation 45

of emotion arousal. Emotion regulation (ER) is the neural, cog-nitive, and behavioral/action processes that sustain, amplify, or attenuate emotion arousal and the associated feeling/motivational, cognitive, and action tendencies.

According to DET, discrete feelings are the basis for the motivational aspects of emotions (Izard, 1971, 2009; Panksepp, 1982, 2003). Also, different emotion feelings have different motivational functions and are likely to lead to different effects. For example, anger feels different from sadness, and is more likely than sadness to lead to aggression, whereas sadness is more likely than anger to lead to withdrawal (Izard et al., 2008).

Another assumption of DET is that emotion expressions play a significant role in social communication (Keltner & Ekman, 2003), particularly in prelingual infants (Izard et al., 1995; but see Matias & Cohn, 1993). In support of these propo-sitions, we found that increasing EK increased ER in young children. Moreover, increased EK and increased ER mediated the positive effects of an emotion-based intervention on the development of social competence (Izard et al., 2008). Thus, we propose that after the acquisition of language, EK operates as a major (though not necessarily the only) factor in emotion regulation.

Effective ER changes arousal and its associated systems and processes as required by the perceived opportunities and demands of the situation. Emotion–cognition interaction is a major factor in virtually all processes that affect ER after infancy. For example, we assume that emotion–cognition interactions are a critical part of executive function (EF) and largely deter-mine its effectiveness. Based on our premise of the virtually continual interaction of emotions and cognition, we view EF as the ability to solve the problems of everyday life while effec-tively utilizing attentional, emotional-cognitive, and behavioral/action capacities (cf., Nelson, Thomas, & deHaan, 2006; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). Finally, consistent with the insights of others, we assume that one emotion can regulate another (James, 1890; Spinoza, 1677/1957; Tomkins, 1962).

Inter-relations of EK, EU, and ER

If we accept the adage that knowledge is power, perhaps it fol-lows that EK empowers a person to exercise a measure of control over emotion arousal and the subsequent emotion-motivated cognition and action. EK-mediated ER derives from the virtually continuous interplay of emotion feeling and symbolic/cognitive processes, which consist predominantly, but not entirely, of language. Because we have awareness and a working knowledge of only a relatively small portion of our own interactive emotion–cognition processes, particularly in highly challenging situations, we are unlikely to regulate and manage our emotions optimally or effectively all of the time. However, increasing EK and understanding of emotion acti-vation and emotion-attention/cognition interactions should increase ER and social and emotional competence (cf. Woltering & Lewis, 2009). Evidence showed that increasing EK did have these predicted positive benefits (including increased socio-emotional competence), even for young children living with poverty in high-risk neighborhoods (e.g., Izard et al., 2008).

We propose that for anyone at any age, EK and ER facilitate adaptive social communication and the development of con-structive interpersonal relationships. The ability to recognize and understand the emotion expressions of others enables us to have some appreciation of their feelings/motivations and inten-tions relative to a social interaction and some relevant anticipa-tion of their contributions to it. Such anticipation plays a part in generating and maintaining positive aspects and decreasing negative aspects of everyday social interactions. We would expect that achieving a high level of interpersonal and situa-tional EK and the potential increase in anticipatory thinking contributes to one’s own ER.

Basic Emotions and Emotion–Cognition InteractionsEmotion experiences differ in a general way along a positive–negative dimension, and more specifically across categories of discrete emotions (e.g., interest, enjoyment, sadness, anger, and fear; Izard, 2009). There are two broad types of discrete emotions—basic emotions, and emotion schemas which are usu-ally identified in the current literature simply as emotions. Each discrete emotion has either a positive or negative valence, but its valence alone does not necessarily predict the quality of its effects.

Basic negative emotions occur more commonly in early development, particularly in prelinguistic infants, and in later periods of development and adulthood in response to evolution-arily conserved stimuli or their conditioned facsimiles that represent intense challenge or threat. They become relatively rare after developmental processes lead to sufficient EK, ER, and self-protective skills to manage or avoid highly challenging and threatening situations. When a basic emotion does occur, it is usually activated rapidly, automatically, and nonconsciously. Basic emotion activation involves only the minimal first-order cognitive processes that are required for perception and simple automatic appraisals (Izard, 2007, 2009).

In contrast to basic emotions, a typical emotion in everyday adult life (i.e., an emotion schema) consists of affective proc-esses in interaction with higher-order cognition. Basic negative emotions typically occur at a high level of intensity. In sharp contrast, experiences of negative emotion schemas vary across a wide range of intensities. Low intensity positive and negative emotions may operate outside of verbally reportable awareness (Izard, 2009; Izard, Quinn, & Most, 2007). Low to moderate levels of the positive emotion of interest may frequently operate at a seemingly nonconscious level, in part because it is not rec-ognized and labeled by many (including some emotion scien-tists) as an emotion. Because we view emotion feelings as felt experiences we hold that they are always at some level of awareness and potentially accessible and reportable in some way (Izard et al., 2007).

The results of a recent fMRI study seem consistent with the distinctions we have made here and elsewhere between two types of emotions (e.g. Izard, 2007, 2009). Ochsner et al. (2009) found that “bottom–up emotions” (similar to our basic emotions) activated the amygdala more than did “top–down emotions” (similar to our emotion schemas/emotions). In contrast, Ochsner



46 Emotion Review Vol. 3 No. 1

et al. (2009) found that “top–down emotions” activated the orbitofrontal cortex relatively more than did the bottom–up emotions. Their findings also seem quite consistent with DET (Izard, 2007, 2009) which provides the conceptual framework for this article.

The distinction between basic emotions and emotion schemas is critical to the issue of understanding emotion to regulate emo-tion experiences in daily life. The stimuli that elicit basic negative emotions are sensed and perceived as highly challenging or as threatening and dangerous. Infants and young children often do not have the ability to utilize ER and cope effectively with basic negative emotion experiences. They usually require the caregiver’s assistance, which is normally triggered by the infant’s negative emotion expressions. On the other hand, the higher order cogni-tion (including language) in an emotion schema provides the individual a handle for ER and potentially for effective emotion utilization and adaptive behavior (Izard et al., 2008).

Neural Processes in the Activation and Experience of EmotionsWe favor the idea that each of the discrete emotions has some distinct neural circuits. However, we recognize that there are opposing views (e.g., Barrett, 2006; Barrett & Wager, 2006; but also see Izard, 2007 and Panksepp, 2007, 2008).

Activation of Basic Emotions

To serve their functions, basic negative emotions must be acti-vated rapidly and automatically. Their significance for survival and well-being suggest that they became functional early in the evolution of mammals, which may explain why they are sup-ported by brainstem circuits. Even children with encephalopa-thy (without a neocortex) smile in response to perception of a member of the family (Merker, 2007). Such observations sug-gest that basic emotion responses can be activated by neural processes in the brainstem and without the benefit of neural systems that support conceptual acts (cf. Barrett et al., 2007). We think that basic emotions are typically activated primarily by interactions among the emotion circuits of the brainstem and relatively nearby circuits in the ventral tegmental area, nucleus accumbens, and the insula. Basic emotion activation also depends on the circuits required for perception or perceptual analysis, the relatively simpler aspects of cognition.

Activation of Emotion Schemas

We assume that following an emotion-eliciting stimulus there are conjoint affective and cognitive processes in the activation of emotion schemas, and that they include interactions among the underlying neural systems of both emotions and cognition. The virtually simultaneous activation of emotion and cognitive circuits in an emotion schema provides the framework for the continual interplay of emotion feeling and cognition in emo-tion experience and ER. Because emotion schemas are the emotions of everyday life after infancy, they are the focus of our discussion of ER.

The activation of emotion schemas (the emotions of every-day life) may involve either relatively simple or highly complex appraisal processes and will always involve higher order cogni-tion such as concepts, thoughts, and memories. Memories can activate emotion schemas in the absence of appraisal processes (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003).

Emotion activation typically involves interactions among circuits in the amygdala, particularly the basolateral amygdala (BLA), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Lewis & Todd, 2007). The BLA is highly responsive to affective stimuli and in the modulation of emotion memories, processes which we consider as neural aspects of emotion–cognition interaction. The OFC also supports proc-esses in choice and decision making (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Rudebeck, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2008). The rostral ACC plays selective roles in modulating memory for emotion-related experiences (Malin & McGaugh, 2006).

Cortico-Limbic Processes in Emotion–Cognition InteractionsHolland and Gallagher (2004) showed that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is involved in the cognitive processes of emotion activation and emotion experiences. As already noted, the OFC is essential for the associative learning involved in generating anticipatory information, and for utilizing such information in thought and action. Anticipatory information facilitates strate-gic use of information in both the environmental context and in memory. Studies have also demonstrated that activity of the basolateral amygdala (BLA) is associated with emotional responding and emotion-related learning. The BLA is concep-tualized as a source of the feeling/motivational aspect (or affective mental states) that drives emotional learning and other emotion-related behavior (Izard, 2007). In general, the research on the BLA and OFC suggest that there are some clear and separable features that distinguish between emotion and cognition, at least at the level of brain and neural processes. This is a remarkable conclusion in view of the high degree of connectivity across neural circuits and brain systems (Lewis, 2005; Pessoa, 2008).

Holland and Gallagher (2004) proposed that BLA–OFC interactions are critical in generating and using reinforcer expectancies, which may be considered as emotion-driven or emotion-related anticipatory cognition. Researchers still debate the precise division of functions of BLA and OFC in processing emotion information and fostering emotion experi-ences. Some have proposed that BLA is relatively more responsive and discriminatory to affective stimuli (e.g., sweet and bitter tastes), and that OFC neurons are more likely to lose (forget) previously learned selectivity.

The BLA is crucial for forming cue-reinforcer expectancies or anticipations. The OFC is crucial for the mental processes and actions involved in the utilization of expectancy or anticipatory information to guide goal-directed behavior. Studies based on both animal and human models support these findings (Holland & Gallagher, 2004). This research also showed that even though the BLA and OFC may enjoy some relative independence and




prominence in certain of their functions, exchange of informa-tion between these two brain systems is necessary for normal coding in each region. This finding is consistent with data show-ing that lesions to BLA and OFC produce distinctly opposite behavioral effects and make distinctly different contributions to cognition (Winstanley, Theobald, Dalley, & Robbins, 2005).

The Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Emotion–Cognition InteractionsA considerable body of research suggests virtually continuous emotion–cognition interactions (Kober et al., 2008; Wager et al., 2008). The connectivity among the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and other brain regions in the limbic system and neocortex suggests that the ACC is critical in emotion–cognition interac-tions and hence in the regulation of mental processes and overt behavior. The ACC plays a significant part in processes relevant to emotion arousal, emotion feeling, and in the interaction between emotions and attention (Lane et al., 1998; Rudrauf et al., 2009). The role of the ACC in ER appears particularly evident in conditions that elicit intense emotion feelings where control is more likely to be needed for the processes involved in regulation (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). Consistent with this view, Rudrauf et al. (2009) concluded that their data suggest that the ACC becomes a major player in decision making and action under conditions that require the influence of attention and executive functioning. Similarly, a study of Rudebeck et al. (2008) suggested that the ACC has a distinct role in complex aspects of emotion responding, such as those in interpersonal relations and social engagement. Consistent with the finding of Rudebeck et al., an fMRI study by Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, and Hirsch (2006) showed that activity in the rostral ACC was associated with the resolution of emotional conflicts. These func-tions of the ACC are supported by its interconnectivity with dis-crete areas of the temporal lobe and subcortical circuits that are involved in controlling activity of the autonomic nervous system.

Emotion–Cognition Relations and the Neural Substrates of Emotion RegulationPessoa (2008) proposed a model of emotion–cognition interac-tions that is generally consistent with our position and the evi-dence we have reviewed here regarding the neuroanatomy of emotion–cognition interactions. He identified five hubs (inter-related brain regions that have high structural connectivity): nucleus accumbens, amygdala, ACC, lateral PFC, and OFC. Like Woltering and Lewis (2009), we would add the brainstem, thalamus, and hypothalamus as structures involved in the early stages of emotion activation and regulation.

On theoretical grounds, we disagree with Pessoa on two points. Pessoa seems to view cognition as the controller of behav-ior. We think cognition is crucial to ER yet still dependent on the motivational characteristics of emotions in delivering its effects on other mental processes and actions. We view emotions as the principle source of motivation, and emotion–cognition interac-tions as the principal controller of plans and actions (cf. Tomkins, 1991). We also disagree with Pessoa’s position that emotions and

cognition are integrated, if he means that they are combined into an integral whole. We think that emotions and cognition must retain their separate qualities and characteristics as independent mechanisms. In particular, to facilitate appropriate and adaptive behavior, emotion must retain its motivational power and cogni-tion must retain its intellectual properties, which enable perceptual analysis and interpretation of objects and scenes in the environ-ment. Thus, emotions and cognition retain their functional integrity while operating as highly and continually interacting processes. The interactive processes may become maladaptive because of too much or too little of either of its components.

Language, Emotion Labeling, EK, and EREmotion–cognition interactions are greatly influenced by lan-guage acquisition and development. Language growth plays a critical role in the development of both EK and ER. The crucial interactions among language, emotion labeling, EK, and ER depend on age-related development of the neural systems of language and those involved in the interconnections among emotions, language, and cognition. In particular, the develop-ment of EK depends on the development of symbolic processes and symbolization skills, and specifically on the acquisition of language and the linguistic skills necessary for symbolizing and reporting internal emotion experiences. EK also depends on the capacity to differentiate one discrete emotion experience from another and to give each of them a distinct label.

The foregoing processes are dependent on emotion feelings and the symbolic processes necessary for labeling and manag-ing them. In humans, symbols and symbolic processes, including the symbolization of feeling, can be readily learned. However, the discrete emotion feelings cannot be learned. Developing children can learn the many ways in which feelings are acti-vated, regulated, and otherwise influenced. However, neither children nor adults can learn how to feel joy, or sadness, or anger, or fear, or what it is like to experience them. Discrete emotion feelings, like all feelings, are products of evolution (Langer, 1967/1982). Associating names or labels with emotion expres-sions and emotion feelings probably represent the best method for understanding and managing them.

Basic Emotions and their Regulation in InfancyEmotion expression begins at a very early age; however, for infants, the regulation of these emotions is largely dependent on other individuals. Approximately 95% of infants’ facial expres-sions are accounted for by the basic emotions of interest, joy, sadness, and anger (Izard et al., 1995), all of which serve an adaptive function. In addition to these four basic emotions, infants are capable of expressing surprise, disgust, and fear by 7–8 months of age (Izard, Huebner, Risser, McGinnes, & Dougherty, 1980). From an early age, infants are able to recruit and express the appropriate emotion in response to an emotion-eliciting situation, such as expressing anger when a goal is blocked (Sternberg & Campos, 1990).




In addition to producing varied emotion expressions, infants are also capable of reacting to others’ facial emotion expressions. Neural processing studies support the notion that infants can detect emotions in faces and that there is activation in the amygdala in response to human faces (Johnson, 2005; Leppänen & Nelson, 2009). Furthermore, an ERP study with infants demonstrated differential arousal patterns to fearful versus angry facial expressions, suggesting that infants are capable of detecting differences between some emotion expressions (Hoehl & Striano, 2008).

Research demonstrates that infants not only react to others’ emotions, but use these emotion expression cues to further interaction. From about 9 months of age, infants engage in social referencing, using emotion expression cues from others as a source of information (Campos, 1983; Walden & Ogan, 1988). Twelve-month-old infants have been observed to predict which object an experimenter would grasp based on her visual gaze and positive affect (Phillips, Wellman, & Spelke, 2002). Infants’ ability to react to and use others’ facial emotion expressions suggests that EK begins to develop very early in life.

Infants are not only able to detect emotions in others; they also gradually begin to engage in affective exchanges with care-givers as early as two months of age (Abe & Izard, 1999). It is well established that interactions between a caregiver and infant are bidirectional: infants will alter their affective displays and behaviors based on their perceptions of the caregiver’s affect (Tronick, 1989). The still face paradigm is one example of infants’ ability and desire to establish a state of shared affect. During the still face procedure, the caregiver does not express any emotions during an interaction. Infants become distressed at the absence of emotion expression by the caregiver, suggesting they may have some expectation of perceptible emotion expres-sions (Mesman, Van IJzendoorn, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2009). The ability to engage in affective exchanges provides an important foundation for infants to communicate and regulate their emotions through social interaction.

Understanding infants’ early emotion expressions and cogni-tive abilities helps to inform strategies used for ER in infants. Research demonstrates that infant temperament has neurobio-logical roots. Although temperament contributes to ER, ER may often be quite dependent upon the caregiver and the context (Cassidy, 1994). Thus, infant ER depends largely on caregiver attention to the infant’s ordinary needs and on emotion commu-nication with parents as a means of sharing emotion experiences. Infants also use facial and vocal emotion expressions in an adap-tive manner to facilitate the building of an attachment relation-ship with caregivers. For example, anger expressions enable infants to protest against discomfort, and their joyful expressions facilitate the formation of social bonds and attachment (Abe & Izard, 1999). These emotion expressions serve the important purpose of communicating to a caregiver on whom the infant relies for comforting, which leads to ER.

Although infants engage in some self-soothing and regulatory behaviors on their own, infant–caregiver interactions and relation-ships are the predominant means of ER for infants (cf. Woltering & Lewis, 2009). Through timely comforting and nurturance,

caregivers exert an influence on infants’ emotions experiences and expressions (Cole, Michel, & Teti, 1994), which allows infants to create positive expectancies that their caregiver will help to regu-late their emotions. Through the dyadic relationship, an attach-ment bond is developed (Abe & Izard, 1999), which helps to determine the ER strategies that the infant will learn and use. For instance, if an infant is securely attached to their caregiver, she may come to expect the caregiver to respond differently to her different expressions (Abe & Izard, 1999). However, if the dyadic relationship is weak and an attachment bond is lacking, an infant will not rely on a caregiver for regulation and instead may learn to self-soothe. Research demonstrates that parental unavailability is a stressor for infants, and that infants are less able to successfully use ER strategies when a caregiver is uninvolved (Bridges, Grolnick, & Connell, 1997). Therefore, the importance of a secure attachment bond with a caregiver is evident for successful ER in early development, because caregivers are the primary source for the regulation of infants’ emotions.

Emotion Knowledge and Emotion Regulation in Young Children

As children reach preschool age, timely development of EK helps enable them to meet new environmental demands. During the three- to five-year age period, children begin to form bonds outside of their caregivers. Thus, increasing EK and the con-comitant ability to understand emotion expressions of others enables children to move beyond basic emotion experiences (and their more or less automatic responses to arousal). Children’s more comprehensive EK and the consequent increase in ER enables them to become more successful in using emotions in adaptive cognition and actions, regardless of the experienced emotion valence.

EK has two components, one related to emotion communi-cation and the other to emotion motivation (Izard, 1977, 1991). As preschoolers begin to recognize the expressions of emo-tions in themselves and in others, emotion expressions become a more important aspect of social communication. Another child’s lowered brows and narrowed eyes would quickly alert the perceiver to the possibility of forthcoming aggressive words and actions.

The preschool child’s rapidly developing language ability contributes in important ways to the development of EK as a communication tool. Language provides the tools necessary for labeling emotions, making them not simply feeling states, but both feelings and thoughts that help the individual understand and utilize emotion states (cf., Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007; Cole, Dennis, Smith-Simon, & Cohen, 2009; Izard, 1992).

The development of adaptive emotion schemas (emotion feelings associated with appropriate cognition) should provide children with tools for understanding cognitions and behaviors associated with a given emotion, as well as tools for under-standing the events and situations that might precede and follow it. Children with age appropriate EK should be able not only to associate angry feelings with another child’s furrowed brow and narrow eyes but also to understand that the angry child may




have aggressive intentions. Therefore, EK should provide impe-tus for ER that enables one to redirect highly emotional and impulsive reactions.

To understand ER, one must understand the factors that influence the development of EK. The development of EK in early childhood is closely tied to the individual child’s home and preschool social environment and emotional climate. Preschoolers learn by the way parents and teachers model emo-tion expression and emotion-related speech and actions. Abundant evidence links family environment, child EK, and behavior (Cunningham, Kliewer, & Garner, 2009; Garner, Dunsmore, & Southam-Gerrow, 2007; Sullivan, Bennett, Carpenter, & Lewis, 2008; Warren & Stifter, 2008).

In addition to the social climate, a child’s neurobiological development also contributes to the development of EK. As mentioned previously, the ACC and the OFC are necessary to activate emotion schemas, particularly those required for the control of behavior. Yet these areas are not fully matured in preschoolers (Lewis & Todd, 2007). More research is needed on the relation between the development of these neurobiological substrates and children’s ability to acquire EK. However, stud-ies that have explored preschoolers’ attention and inhibition have found high levels of individual variability among children in this age group (e.g., Groot, de Sonneville, Stins, & Boomsma, 2004). Those with low capacity for attentional focus and inhib-itory control may miss emotion signals and be unable to use emotion motivation adaptively. Such children may need help in focusing their attention on emotion signals and in slowing their behaviors to enable them to develop adaptive EK.

Considerations of these social and neurobiological processes may also positively or negatively impact the development of ER processes in preschoolers. ER occurs when children utilize their EK to self-regulate the experiences and expressions of their feelings in order to attain a desired goal (Izard, 2002, 2007). The benefits of adaptive ER are numerous, including improving the classroom climate and facilitating the learning process (Trentacosta & Izard, 2007). Additionally, adaptive ER may extend to a broader social context as it may relate to a child’s understanding of Theory of Mind (TOM), or the ability to understand the feelings and thoughts of others as distinct from one’s own feelings and thoughts (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Lack of ability to identify emotion expressions, to asso-ciate thoughts and behaviors with emotion feelings, and to slow or inhibit automatic basic-emotion reactions impedes the development of adaptive ER.

Intervening to influence the development of EK has two major components: teaching the recognition and labeling of emotions and helping to control associated neurobiological responses. Besides recognizing and identifying emotions, EK interventions should include learning the functions of emotions and their associated positive and negative consequences (Izard et al., 2001, 2008). By emphasizing the adaptive functions of emotions, for example, that anger expression can tell others that you are angry, children may consequently develop adaptive emo-tion schemas, associating anger with motivation to negotiate or transition to a different environment.

As children grow, interventions to facilitate the development of EK and ER should also focus on slowing the typically rapid processes in basic emotion experiences. Neurobiological devel-opment and EF studies show that preschoolers vary in their ability to effect ER via effortful control of emotion processes (Blair & Diamond, 2008; Rhoades, Greenberg, & Domitrovich, 2009). High arousal levels challenge developing inhibitory systems. Interventions targeting the time period during which the emotion is first felt may be effective in aiding children to learn to inhibit prepotent responses.

Behavioral strategies may be of particular benefit to pre-schoolers as they develop more complex EF skills and learn to better regulate emotions. Being able to access both EK and EF skills in an emotional situation allows young children to better understand the situation and begin to identify strategies for regulation. This process facilitates empathy and sympathy by providing means for perspective taking (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). Ultimately, young children who can readily access adaptive emotion schemas have better relations with peers, one of the main factors in a positive transition to grade school.

Factors in the Development of EK and ER Beyond Early ChildhoodAt all ages, two factors influencing the development of ER are emotionality and EK (Izard, 2009). Trait emotionality reflects the frequency and intensity with which one experiences and responds to emotions, and as such, plays a critical role in ER. Greater degrees of trait negative emotionality may overtax emotion-regulatory ability (Kochanska & Coy, 2002), interfer-ing with the development of effective ER and EU. However, the relationship between negative emotionality and ER is likely bidirectional, and effective ER may inhibit one’s temperamental tendencies to react with negative emotions. Positive emotionality helps to regulate and recover from negative emotion arousal. Individuals who tend to experience more positive emotions and those who are able to induce positive emotions may be more effective at regulating negative emotions than others (Izard, 2009). Because experiences of positive emotions facilitate cognitive processes and positive emotion–cognition interactions, they should help provide the foundation for acquiring and employing additional ER techniques, such as cognitive restructuring and problem solving (Izard, 2009).

The ability to accurately detect and understand emotion signals in facial, vocal, and bodily expressions increases an individual’s ability to regulate and adaptively utilize emotion arousal in social interactions. Thus socio-emotional and cognitive-behavioral inter-ventions for a wide variety of problems and disorders include a component focused on enhancing EK (Izard et al., 2008).

As children move beyond preschool, their EK expands beyond the ability to label facial expressions and interpret emotion cues to include more complex forms of emotion under-standing—including the consequences of emotions and com-plex emotion-situation knowledge (e.g., Denham, 1998). Interactions among rapidly developing neurobiological,




cognitive, emotional, and social systems and increasing EK form the foundation for effective emotion utilization. Emotions must be both understood (at least tacitly) and effectively man-aged in order to be fully utilized in proactive and constructive ways (Izard, 2007, 2009).

In line with our differential emotions theory, emotion differ-entiation (distinguishing among discrete emotions), particularly among negatively valenced emotions, may help facilitate ER (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001). Even emotions that are viewed as negative may have positive regulatory func-tions. For example, arousal of guilt may interact with and moti-vate inhibitory abilities and influence children’s regulation of anger-related behavior (Kochanska, Barry, Jimenez, Hollatz, & Woodard, 2009).

As EK and other regulatory systems become more aligned, children begin to integrate their own knowledge of internal cognitive processes, emotions, and external environmental influ-ences to better identify the potential causal role of emotions. An understanding of emotion–cognition–behavior links depends on an integration of knowledge about inter- and intra-individual influences and EK (Izard, 1977). Emotion schemas merge with aspects of social-information processing to influence emotion and action attributions in school-age children (Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000; Mostow, Izard, Fine, & Trentacosta, 2002). Disruptions and errors in these attribution patterns can lead to maladaptive social functioning, as is most clearly seen in the well-established role that hostile attribution bias plays in aggressive behavior (Halligan, Cooper, Healy, & Murray, 2007).

Because the emotion schemas of later development involve more complex cognitive appraisals, images, and thoughts, cog-nitive processes also become more important tools in their regulation. In fact, the adaptiveness of an emotion schema is highly dependent on the quality and appropriateness of its cognitive component (Izard, 2009). The cognitive component, built from current perceptual input information processing and memories, continually interacts with the emotion-feeling com-ponent and enhances its regulatory, motivational, and func-tional capacities (Izard, 2007). For example, an individual experiencing intense anger may be able to use imagery to induce positive emotions to help her recover from negative arousal and enable her to employ additional cognitive restructuring techniques.

ConclusionAs children’s challenges, opportunities, and emotion experi-ences become more complex over developmental time, effec-tive EU becomes a key developmental milestone. EU is related to, yet conceptually different from, ER. The process of EU involves making use of the inherent energy and motivation associated with emotion arousal for constructive purposes. Constructive emotion utilization (especially the utilization of the emotion of interest) is the key to adaptive functioning. For example, two often related adaptive functions of anger are self-assertion and defense of self or personal integrity. Given ade-quate EK and a supportive social context, young children can learn to utilize the energy and motivation in anger arousal for

positive self-assertion rather than for yelling or hitting. As children learn to link cognitive regulation strategies with the emotion feeling components in emotion schemas, they are increasing their ability to learn constructive emotion–thought–action sequences that foster constructive emotion utilization and the development of adaptive behavior patterns (Izard et al., 2008).

Constructive and effective EU is crucially important to chil-dren’s social and emotional functioning. Poor EK has been linked to increased behavioral problems and to decreased aca-demic competence, both concurrently and longitudinally (Izard et al., 2008). Difficulties in ER have been linked to both inter-nalizing and externalizing problems (Rubin, Coplan, Fox, & Calkins, 1995), and a number of other behavioral outcomes including aggression (both bullying and victimization), difficul-ties with attention, self-concept, and peer likeability and rela-tionships (e.g., Arsenio & Lemerise, 2001; Cole et al., 2004; Gross, 2002; Mahady Wilton, Craig, & Pepler, 2000; Schwartz & Proctor, 2000). Taken together, these studies suggest that the foundations of ER and EU are critical elements of development. The deleterious effects of a dysfunctional emotion system as well as the protective effects provided by a well-functioning emotion system suggest important avenues for both basic and intervention research on ER and EU.

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Emotion Knowledge, Emotion Utilization, and Emotion Regulation