Emotion and Consumption: Perspectives and Issues

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Motivation and Emotion [me] pp1209-moem-487193 May 5, 2004 21:57 Style file version Nov 28th, 2002

Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 28, No. 1, March 2004 (C© 2004)

Emotion and Consumption: Perspectives and Issues

Haim Mano1,2

Over the course of the last two decades, consumer research has been makingconsiderable contributions to the study of affect. The articles in this volume dealwith conceptual and methodological issues in affect research that bridge the gapbetween theory and practice and represent sample of the many research topicscurrently being explored by consumer researchers. In my remarks, I briefly dis-cuss each article and I provide some directions for future research in each of thespecific areas covered in the articles. Much research in affect is motivated by thedesire to test and extend theory and resolve theoretical debates stemming fromconflicting evidence. While the focus of affect research is increasingly on theory,we may not always be as careful about our constructs and methods and we need toapply additional, new and more precise methodologies to address old theoreticalproblems. I conclude that among the most important future tasks are the needs toadopt appropriate methods aimed at capturing affect’s influence and underlyingprocesses, and to refine the theoretical basis for such methods.

KEY WORDS: affect; persuasion; affect inductions; judgment and choice; satisfaction.

The pervasive emotional nature of consumption provides an exceptional oppor-tunity to study affect. Over the course of the last two decades, the psychologicalstudy of consumer behavior has recognized the importance of affect in consump-tion and, since the early eighties, consumer researchers have been exploring theinfluence of and the interdependence between emotions and many central aspectsof consumption such as persuasion, preference, evaluation, environment, and be-havioral intentions (Simonson, Carmon, Dhar, Drolet, & Nowlis, 2001). The fivepapers in this issue are just a sample of the many research topics currently beingexplored by consumer researchers. They should, however, be sufficient to indicatethe broad range of research activity in this area and the kinds of methods currently

1College of Business Administration, University of Missouri, St. Louis, Missouri.2Address all correspondence to Haim Mano, College of Business Administration, University ofMissouri, St. Louis, 8001 Natural Bridge Road, St. Louis, Missouri 63121; e-mail: [email protected].

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being employed. All the papers are at the cutting edge of consumer psychology,and by challenging old paradigms and in pointing the way to new ones, contributeto the understanding of the role of affect in psychology, in general, and consumerpsychology, in particular.

AFFECT SPECIFICITY, AFFECT CONGRUENCY, AND AFFECTREPAIR: COMMENTS ON THE PAPERS BY RUCKER AND PETTY

AND BY RAGHUNATHAN AND CORFMAN

The papers by Rucker and Petty and by Raghunathan and Corfman addressthe question of how emotions influence preference and both share a number ofunderlying themes. From a theoretical perspective, both advance the need for amore detailed (than the positive–negative valence) view of affect. Both suggest thatsimilarly valenced negative emotions—that differ on some other emotional qualitybesides valence—may have different impacts on preference. And both start fromand expand the mood-as-information theory’s premise that one’s emotional stateis often used as a cue in deciding (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001). Operationally,both studies examine their conceptual framework by comparing the effects ofsadness and another negative emotion (anger and anxiety) on preference.

However, despite their similarities, the two studies differ in their explanatoryframeworks each suggesting a somewhat different set of affective processes asguiding preference formation. Rucker and Petty posit anaffect congruencyviewwhereby specific emotions may signal or color preferences (thus, compared to sadpeople, angry people will have a higher preference for activity than for passivity).Their approach differs from Raghunathan and Corfman’s who suggest a moremotivationalaffect-repairposition whereby specific emotions lead people to seekstimuli that can repair the negative emotion (with sad people seeking pleasurablestimuli and anxious people becoming more attentive to information).

Petty and Cacioppo’s elaboration likelihood model (ELM) provides the mostwidely accepted approach for the formation of attitudinal preferences and persua-sion (Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993). In the ELM framework,emotional valence plays an important role primarily by coloring attitudes depend-ing on degree of elaboration. Under lower involvement, positive valence may leadto more positive attitudes. Under higher involvement, however, emotions may biasprocessing by focusing participants on the valence of the consequences of a per-suasive message; thus, participants experiencing positive emotions, are likely tofocus on the positive implications of the message, whereas those under negativeemotions are more likely to focus on the negative implications of that message. Itis noteworthy that, in addition to its congruency aspects (seeking stimuli consis-tent with one’s emotions), this hedonic contingency view of affect and messageprocessing has an important motivational facet to it. Individuals in a positive stateare seen as driven to attend to the aspects of a message that would maintain their

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Concluding Remarks 109

positive state, whereas individuals in a negative state are seen as inclined to focuson both positive and negative information (e.g., Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995).

In their present paper, Rucker and Petty expand the investigation of the role ofemotions in persuasion by specifying not only valence but also level of activationand thus providing a more detailed outlook of affect’s influence on preference.Rucker and Petty describe four distinct phases in the evolution of the study ofaffect from valenced to specific emotions. Their paper focuses on sadness andanger, two specific negative emotions differentiated, respectively, by low and highlevels of activation. They suggest that degree of activation may determine prefer-ence, by leading participants to develop a stronger preference for stimuli congruentwith their respective level of activation. Thus, sad participants had a higher prefer-ence for a quieter advertised resort, whereas angry participants preferred the moreactively framed resort.

The need for a more specific and detailed approach to affect is also at the centerof Raghunathan and Corfman’s paper who suggest that the underlying principleshaping preference is the need to seek stimuli that eliminate negative emotions.They posit that sadness leads people to seek enjoyable stimuli that can repair theirsad state, whereas anxiety motivates people to become more attentive to stimulithat can reduce their anxiety. Thus, sad participants, compared to anxious ones,expressed a higher preference to address first an enjoyable task than a necessarytask. And, among high-caffeine users, sad participants paid more attention andremembered more positive items from an essay on caffeine consumption thananxious participants (for low caffeine users, who may not have been as involvedwith that essay, there were no differences between sad and anxious participants inrecalling positive or negative items; still though, anxious low caffeine users had ahigher total—positive and negative—recall than sad participants).

The need for affect specificity is tied to a long stream of evidence in thisarea that the interdependencies between affect and preference are contingent andspecific involving interactions between affective and task variables. These intri-cate relationships are manifested when emotions of opposite hedonic tone result insimilar effects, or when similar emotions result in dissimilar effects. For example,positive emotions typically lead to higher purchase intentions (Bitner, 1992) yetnegative emotions may also enhance purchase intentions depending on activation(Menon & Kahn, 2001), or shopping-environment quality (Mano, 1999). Or, asseen here, similar negative emotions may result in dissimilar effects. And, de-pending on ad content, arousal may influence ad evaluation but valence may not;or, arousal may polarize evaluation depending on the ad’s affective tone (Gorn,Pham, & Sin, 2001). It is noteworthy that these contingencies exist not only be-tween affective states and nonaffective task variables (e.g., involvement, messagecontent), but more importantly, valence and activation may also interact in influ-encing preference. Given these intricacies, much of the recent research—includingthe two papers here—focuses primarily on interaction effects between affect andother variables.

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To date, a number of consumer researchers have gone beyond the unidimen-sional valence continuum and suggested the need for a more specific and detailedapproach to affect. Whether viewing arousal/activation as the second affect di-mension or considering specific emotions, this line of work has shed some lightinto how affect influences persuasion, preference, or choice. Using Russell’s andWatson and Tellegen’s two-dimensional PANAS view (Russell, 1980; Watson &Tellegen, 1985), Mano examined affect’s influence on attitude formation (Mano,1997) and intentions to purchase (Mano, 1999) and suggested that positive va-lence enhances cognitive elaboration, whereas higher arousal restricts attentionalcapacity and decreases allocation of processing resources (Mano, 1994).

Gorn et al. (2001) have also shown that preexisting arousal and valence couldcolor subsequent evaluations. They found that valence may color ad evaluationsbut only when the ad had an ambiguous affective tone. When the target ad hadeither a positive or negative tone and participants’ valence and arousal levels wereindependently manipulated, higher arousal led to more polarized ad evaluations.Raghunathan and Pham (1999) suggested that sadness and anxiety could resultin different outcomes: sadness may lead people to accept high-risk/high-rewardoptions, whereas anxiety may lead them to accept low-risk/low-reward options.Their explanation, as in the present Raghunathan and Corfman paper, is motiva-tional in nature: anxiety, by priming different goals, enhances one’s preoccupationwith risk while sadness enhances preoccupation with reward.

Menon and Kahn (2002) also manipulated valence and arousal/activation andfound that initial pleasurable experiences during an internet-shopping trip subse-quently led to increased approach behaviors (i.e., higher willingness to linger insubsequent sites, more browsing and exploration, and higher willingness to partic-ipate in product promotions). On the other hand, participants under higher initiallevels of arousal, showed alower desire for subsequent stimulation (e.g., less de-sire to web-browse, fewer visits to store sites, and less willingness to participate inproduct promotions). At first glance, Menon and Kahn’s (2002) activation resultsstand in contrast with Rucker and Petty’s findings that activated (angry) partic-ipants sought the more active resort. A number of plausible explanations couldaccount for these differences, including operational differences in the nature ofthe activation inductions (reading sad or angering articles vs. browsing in quietor stimulating websites) and/or differences in the nature of the dependent vari-able (predicted/expressed preferencefor a hypothetical resort versus explorationbehaviorsin a website).

Still though, such conflicting results highlight the need to understand themechanisms for explaining affect’s influence on preference, in general, and therole of activation, in particular. At the risk of oversimplification, there are fourhypotheses related to the three specific negative valence emotions (sadness, angerand anxiety) examined in the two papers. Because the three emotions differ interms of their activation one could summarize them as:

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1. H1: Sadness (low activation)→ prefer passive stimuli (R&P)2. H2: Anger (high activation)→ prefer active stimuli (R&P)3. H3: Sadness (low activation)→ prefer enjoyable stimuli (R&C)4. H4: Anxiety (high activation)→ prefer to attend to anxiety-reducing stim-

uli (R&C)

In examining these hypotheses, we see possible conflicts that could raise anumber of questions. For example, can sadness lead to preference forenjoyableactivestimuli (H1 and H3)? Because it involves high activation, can anger leadto preference for anger-reducingstimuli (H2 and H4)? Can anger-induced acti-vation lead participants to prefer anxiety-reducing stimuli (H2 and H4)? Thesequestions could be extended to encompass other conflicting empirical findings.For example, is it possible that anxiety-induced activation increases attention toanxiety-provoking stimuli (as suggested by Raghunathan and Corfman; see alsoClore et al., 2001), yet more “neutral” or pleasant activationrestrictsattention andimpedescognitive processing (Mano, 1999; Menon & Kahn, 2002)?

A number of explanations could, among others, account for reconciling theseand other conflicting questions. First, it could be postulated that, like specificvalenced emotions, activation may also be specific in nature; that is, activationassociated with a specific emotion may have its own distinct impact on prefer-ence. However, such an activation-specific explanation seems simplistic and maybe difficult to produce in experimental settings. Another explanation could be thedifference between anger and anxiety in terms of affect’s third dimension, con-trol (Russell, 1980). Yet another explanation could stem from the different natureof the dependent variables used in the studies: Rucker and Petty examinedpre-dicted preferences(i.e., when one is asked to rate their preference for a stimulus),whereas Raghunathan and Corfman dealt withpreference-proxies(“which taskwould you prefer to perform first” and recall for positive and negative items). Thedifference-in-the-nature-of-the-dependent-variable explanation could be extendedto differences between predicted preferences for a stimulus versusactual choicebehaviors(Menon and Kahn, 2002). Recently, Hsee, Zhang, Yu, and Xi (2003)suggested that predicted preferences may not be consistent with actual choicesand that such inconsistencies stem from the tendency of people to be influencedby “hot” affective factors when predicting preferences but adopting “cooler” (andmore “rationalistic”) criteria when making actual choices.

It appears that the question of whether the conflicting results stem from con-ceptual misspecifications and/or operational differences between the studies, and, ifso, how to explain them, awaits further research. Nonetheless, it also plausible thatmany of the seemingly conflicting results between studies that measure preferenceusing different constructs, may not be attributed to theoretical misspecificationsbut rather to inappropriate operationalizations of the theory and its constructs. Inparticular, the way we define or operationally induce affective constructs (e.g.,

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specific emotions or activation) and the measures used to capture preference (e.g.,attention-based, memory-based, expressed attitudes, predicted preference, actualchoice) are as critical in establishing the affect-preference relationships as arethe theories employed to explain them. For example, the constructs of “predictedpreference for a stimulus,” “attention-driven recall of stimulus features,” and “pref-erence for the activity to perform first” capture important aspects of preference.However, there is no assurance that these constructs tap into the same psycho-logical processes that lead to actual preferences. Only if we have an appropriateunderstanding of the different aspects of preference formation captured by theseconstructs, only then, we will have a better theoretical and empirical foundationfor examining affect’s influence on preference.

AFFECT INDUCTIONS, CONFOUNDS, AND EFFECTS ON IMPLICITMEASURES: COMMENTS ON ISEN, LABROO,

AND DURLACH’S PAPER

Affect inductions fulfill one of the most important functions in affect research.However, despite the strong research effort directed at assessing their influence,the underlying elements and processes that bring upon the change on subsequenttasks are not clearly understood. Many of the induction techniques used in affectresearch can be criticized for confounding effects, demand characteristics andthreats to internal validity (Hill & Ward, 1989; Mano, 1997). For example, usingpositive success feedback to induce a positive emotion, may not only induce thatemotion but may also enhance a higher degree of self-efficacy which, in turn, maylead to investing more effort (Hill & Ward, 1989). Similary, as Raghunathan andCorfman argue in this volume, procedures used to induce sadness may also evokeanxiety.

Such possible confounding problems are further exacerbated when, after theinduction, participants are asked to self-report their emotional state and researcherstake it for granted that self-reports reveal the true nature and strength of the in-duced emotion. As Isen, Labroo, and Durlach point out, self-reports may lackvalidity, may influence the results because of attention drawn to the self, or mayreduce cognitive capacity and thus interfere in subsequent task performance. Toovercome these difficulties, they propose the use of implicit measures of affectthat indicate that the desired affective state has been induced without the subject’sself-report. To establish their validity, such measures are triangulated on othermeasures that past research has shown are influenced by the desired state. In theirpaper, Isen, Labroo, and Durlach examine a previously unexamined technique forinducing positive affect, tasting a refreshing product (a brand-name iced tea), andcompare its influence with an established positive affect induction technique (afree gift of candy), and two no-affect conditions (control and a bottle of wateror unbranded iced tea). Comparisons of the methods on three emotion-sensitivetasks that previous research has shown to be influenced by positive affect, the RAT

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creativity task, pleasantness of associates, and uncommonness of associates, sug-gest the strong compatibility of the new and the established techniques and theirdifferences from the control conditions.

Besides the practical implications for marketers that the consumption of brandnamed products (e.g., iced tea) can generate positive affect, the study addressestwo important interrelated research issues, development of affect induction tech-niques and affect measurement. It is important to the study of affect to developand establish new and less prone to confounding affect induction techniques. Indeveloping such techniques, serious consideration must be given to methods thatare unobtrusive and realistic within the context of the study and thus minimizingthe possibility of participants suspecting the study’s goal. Moreover, it is not al-ways clear exactly how, or why (or, sometimes, even whether) a particular existingaffect-induction technique induces the intended emotion, let alone the possibilitythat the technique may also induce something else that could be ultimately respon-sible for the obtained results. If we allow for the lack of recognition of the correctsource of the observed phenomena, effects attributable to, say, valence, may in factstem from, say, attention to the self, activation/arousal, or need for social interac-tion. Because typical affect inductions may suffer from possible confounding andvalidity problems, the need for developing new valid techniques is paramount.

The second issue is the development of unobtrusive measures of affect bydrawing strength from multiple perspectives and the freedom from using self-reports. The notion of concept triangulation—using a multimethod approach toassess affective states—offers great opportunities for the study of affect. The useof unobtrusive measures in such new methods is particularly important given theextremely conspicuous and obtrusive nature of many established affect-assessmentmethods (e.g., self reports, neurological, physiological). And, as Isen, Labroo, andDurlach show, special attention should be given to validations that go beyond tri-angulation with established affect induction techniques and incorporate measuresthat arenot influenced by affect (in their study, overall well-being and willingnessto pay). Nonetheless, it may be desirable to examine the validity of a new inductionmethod by attending to aspects that may differentiate one induction technique fromanother (i.e., scales that would be differentially affected by a free gift of candy andconsumption of a brand-named iced tea). Such discriminant validation may alsobe necessary to establish the validity of new affect induction method.

The question though remains whether validation of a technique can be ac-complished solely with implicit measures. Our typical assumptions for the affect-generation process are that the induction technique influences affect and affect’sinfluence can be manifested both in explicit and implicit measures. We also knowthat explicit affect measures can, sometimes, be a bit problematic. Thus, we nowneed to examine carefully whether the links between affect and implicit measuresreliably capture the desired change in affect. One may suggest that, ultimately, val-idating a new affect induction procedure needs to include convergent both explicitand implicit measures of affect.

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There is little doubt that implicit measures are less obtrusive and, often, moreappropriate than explicit measures. Moreover, as pointed out by Isen, Labroo, andDurlach, it does not appear that there are two different types of affect, implicitand explicit. Thus, a nomological network that includes both established and newinductions as well as implicit and explicit affect measures may be required be-fore adopting a new affect-induction technique and the use of implicit measures.Finally, given the importance of specific affects (viewed either as dimensional orcategorical, e.g., fear, anxiety) in this line of research, methods aimed at generat-ing such emotions could also benefit from nomological validation—using implicitand explicit measures—that would distinguish the induced emotions from one an-other and from the broader spectrum of positive and negative affective states (cf.Raghunathan & Corfman, paper in this volume).

PREFERENCE CONSISTENCY, REFERENCE POINTS, ANDPREFERENCE MYOPIA: COMMENTS ON HEYMAN, MELLERS,

TISCHENKO, AND SCHWARTZ

Consumer behavior and decision making research have long been fascinatedand driven by the study of risk taking. To date, a considerable body of research hasexamined questions such as how people deal with risks and uncertainties, whetherthey use expected utility’s tenets, and, if not, what other rules do they use andwhy. This fascination is manifested in the breadth and depth of perspectives takenby consumer researchers who study risk taking and seldom does a topic appealto so many diverse research agendas (Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998; Simon-son et al., 2001; Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002). One of the interesting and importantphenomena studied in this line of research involves understanding how and whytasks that we expect to generate identical outcomes (e.g., judgment and choiceof the same alternative) produce systematically different and inconsistent prefer-ences. This focus on violations of rational and normative choice theory has led toexaminations of the different task factors that contribute to these violations.

One of the most salient factors in these violations is the degree of pleasurederived from the outcome of one’s risky choice. Heyman, Mellers, Tischenko, andSchwartz examine the question of how previous risky choice outcomes influencethe pleasure of later outcomes. In their study, two groups with identical startingand final monetary states, watched their earnings (or losses) change over time andrated the pleasure experienced after each outcome. Each group had a differenttrajectory of earnings: one started from $0, ascended to $24 accumulated earn-ings, and then descended to $0; the other, started from $0, descended to−$24 andthen ascended to $0. The study controlled the amount of money earned/lost (al-lowing for between-group comparisons), and the level of the unobtained outcome(allowing for the examination of the influence of “what-might-have-been-if-theother-outcome-occurred” on expressed pleasure).

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Heyman et al. examined the influence of background reference points (cumu-lative earnings and earnings trend) and immediate reference points (counterfactual“what-might-have-been” outcomes in each gamble). The results suggested that par-ticipants expressed more pleasure for the same outcome when that outcome wasreached while ascending than when it was reached while descending. Moreover,for the same gain (or loss), the presence of a different unobtained outcome (thecounterfactual “might-have-been”) led to different assessments of pleasure. Thisparticular effect reached the surprising extent that the pleasure associated with a$1 win that could-have-been-better by a gain of $4 was comparable to the “plea-sure” of a $1 loss that could-have-been-worse by a loss of $4 (cf. Kahneman,Frerickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993). The theoretical explanation offeredby Heyman et al. for these findings is decision affect theory (Mellers, 2000), whichposits that the pleasure from an outcome depends not only on its utility but alsoon the comparison with its background and immediate reference points. More-over, while both types of reference points influenced derived pleasure, Heyman etal.’s results support the myopic nature of pleasure assessment whereby immediatereference points (“what-might-have-been”) have a stronger influence on pleasurethan background reference points.

Heyman et al.’s results showing different pleasures for the same monetaryoutcome are part of the inconsistencies that have fascinated consumer and decisionresearchers for the last 30 years. For example, in the “classic” and most typicalinconsistency, the preference-reversal phenomenon, people are willing to pay morefor one of two gambles, but when asked to choose between the gambles, they choosethe gamble for which they were willing to pay less (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971).The explanation for the effect is the compatibility hypothesis, whereby the responsescale (price evaluation versus choice) shifts respondents’ emphasis to the attributemost compatible with that scale (e.g., dollars, in the pricing task) thus resultingin the reversal. The myopic tendency in the experience of pleasure—when morerecent outcomes have greater impact on pleasure—or the evidence that a loss canbe rated as more pleasant than an equivalent-in-value gain are also part of theseinconsistencies.

Yet, as soon as we consider these effects as demonstrating “inconsistencies”or as “inappropriate,” or “irrational,” the question is raised as to whether, and underwhat conditions, a more “appropriate” response could be attainable. Following thesuggestions of the preference reversal phenomenon, a possible answer to this ques-tion could involve asking people tochoosebetween final alternatives (as opposedto expressing their pleasure with the outcome). The results of a recent study (Hseeet al., 2003), where participants were presented with stimuli similar to Heymanet al.’s, support this position. Participants in the Hsee et al. study were presentedwith two possible prizes: Prize A consisted of four dinners with an increasingsequence of values; Prize B consisted or four dinners with a decreasing sequenceof values. The two prizes had about the same total value (A’s total value was $135and B’s $145). Half the participants were asked to predict which set of dinners

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they wouldenjoy more, and the other half which set they wouldchoose. Of theparticipants asked to assess enjoyment, 68% favored the ascending-in-value (and,even, a bit cheaper) prize. However, of the participants asked to choose between theprizes, 49% chose the ascending-in-value prize. In other words, when participantsmade a choice (and not just rated pleasure) they did choose in terms of “rational”economic gains and losses—and, because the two prizes were about of the sametotal value, no differences in choice were observed.

As seen, when both the Heyman et al. and the Hsee et al. (2003) studiesdealt with ratings of pleasure associated with a cumulative series of ascendingor descending values, the ascent from low to high seems more pleasurable thanthe descent from high to low. However, when the question posed is not “whichpath is more pleasant” but, rather, “which of the two paths would you choose totake,” it seems likely that participants would not have been inconsistent in theirchoices (but see Kahneman et al., 1993). Nonetheless, it should be noted that in theHeyman et al. study, the immediate reference points—which were not examinedby Hsee et al.—had a much stronger impact on pleasure assessments than thetrend of “earnings.” Future research awaits the examination of whether the strongimpact of the what-might-have-been-induced myopia decreases when participantsare given an actual choice task equivalent to the predicted-preference task.

Finally, it is important to compare the mechanisms offered by the two studiesfor these inconsistencies. Heyman et al. suggest a process whereby people are my-opic and overweigh the two factors that are closer to one’s present situation: thepleasure/pain that could-have-been experienced if the other outcome occurred andthe trend of the more recent outcomes. Hsee et al. explained the inconsistenciesthey found in terms of “hot” and “cold” attributes: when making choices, peopleassigned more weight to the “colder” attributes (value) but, when predicting pref-erences, the “hotter” attribute (pleasure) was assigned more weight. Thus, Hseeet al.’s “hot-versus-cold” considerations are similar in nature to Heyman et al.’spleasure-induced myopia in affect-driven decisions. This is the kind of myopiathat can take its most extreme form in impulsive decisions that ignore “cold” con-siderations and could even lead to addiction (Loewenstein, 1996). It seems that thestudy of “hot and myopic” affective considerations versus “cold and discerning”deliberations will continue being a “hot” topic of future research in the psychologyof affect, decision making, and consumption.

SATISFACTION AND INEQUITY: COMMENTS ONOLIVER, SHOR, AND TIDD

Consumer satisfaction research focuses on the factors that can influence sat-isfaction assessments, which, in turn, influence brand loyalty, intentions to re-purchase, in-store behaviors, store evaluations, or spreading positive word-of-mouth. These pragmatic marketing concerns have led to a plethora of psychological

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research that examines the cognitive, emotional and behavioral antecedents andconsequences of satisfaction, in general, and consumer satisfaction in particular.Being one of the first emotions studied in the field, satisfaction has always beenat the center of interest of consumer research, evolving from studies of cognitive-centered assessments of disconfirmation to a more affect-centered view that seesboth cognitions and emotions as satisfaction determinants (Oliver, 1997).

The emotional determinants of satisfaction have traditionally been consid-ered as varying across the valence continuum (Oliver, 1997). This view suggeststhat, because satisfaction is seen as a blend of positive/negative emotions, satisfac-tion/dissatisfaction also varies from positive to negative. This approach, however,neglects two important interrelated possibilities that both contribute to the complexnature of satisfaction. First, even though, traditionally, satisfaction has been con-sidered part of valence, it only constitutes a small part of the valence dimension.How other determinants of valence (e.g., elation, distress) contribute to satisfac-tion and how it contributes to them is an open theoretical and empirical question.And, second, we need to acknowledge the possibility that somespecificemo-tions ormixedemotions may also be part of the satisfaction response (e.g., pride,anger, anxiety, comfort, or frustration). This possibility stems from the plethoraof cognitive, behavioral, and emotional (specific and valenced) antecedents andconsequences of consumer satisfaction.

Oliver, Shor, and Tidd’s study focuses on two new and important facets insatisfaction research: the role of perceived justice in influencing consumer sat-isfaction, and the examination of these influences within the context of onlinepurchasing. The study shows that perceptions of inequity, generated by the pres-ence/absence of an online coupon, had a strong positive impact on satisfaction,purchase intentions, word-of-mouth, and future store loyalty.

Oliver, Shor, and Tidd treat postexposure satisfaction as an appraisal con-struct (i.e., fair price, good value, satisfied with purchase). However, a limitedpositive/negative appraisal satisfaction approach may offer only a partial view of(in)equity’s influence on satisfaction. (In)equity in the marketplace contributes toa host of emotions and some of them may not be adequately captured by a singlepositive-negative appraisal satisfaction construct. Past research (Mano & Oliver,1993) has suggested that the two affect dimensions, valence and arousal, are sig-nificant contributors to the satisfaction response. Moreover, because (in)equity un-doubtedly contributes to feelings of satisfaction, it can most certainly generate otheremotions that go beyond the construct of satisfaction and could mediate inequity’simpact on satisfaction. That is, (in)equity may indirectly contribute to satisfactionvia other emotions. Possible affective states that can mediate (in)equity’s influenceon satisfaction could include anger, guilt, pride, irritation, annoyance, frustrationor maybe even, fear (e.g., Adams, 1965; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999).Operationally, these mediating emotions could be construed either asvalenced(i.e., invoking the notion of pleasant/unpleasant), two-dimensional (pleasantness-arousal or positive-negative affectivity), orspecific.

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Future research in this area, may consider a structural approach that encom-passes the possible cognitive and emotional consequences of inequity and howthese consequences can, in turn, contribute to the satisfaction response. Such anapproach might be proven helpful by incorporating additional emotional and cog-nitive factors aimed at revealing the possible structural links among (in)equity,(dis)confirmations, affect and satisfaction.

CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR (EVEN MORE) SPECIFICITY

The five papers in this Special Issue reveal themes that cut across severaldomains and document ways that affect influences or is influenced by judgment,preference, memory, and performance. Research efforts in persuasion, judgmentand choice, affect-induction effects, effects on performance, and satisfaction arecoming together in explaining the many roles that emotions play in consumptionexperiences. The present studies and findings provide us with exceptional opportu-nities for increasing our understanding and knowledge of these interrelationships.Moreover, the interplay between basic and applied research comes across in thepapers’ recommendations and discussions and the papers in this volume deal withconceptual and methodological issues in affect research that bridge the gap be-tween theory and practice. Taken together, these papers reflect the great progressmade by affect researchers, in general, and consumer researchers, in particular, tounderstand the nature of the affective system.

However, despite major advances, there are many things that we do not yetunderstand on affect’s role in judgment and decision tasks. Perhaps more thanmany other fields of psychological study, affect research has its schisms and keepsfinding and trying to explain conflicts between “past” and “present” research. Theinvestigation and resolution of these conflicts is often interpreted as suggestingnew theoretical and empirical insights. Although we have definitely learned a lotabout affect, it is useful to be reminded that, just as emotions are intricate andspecific, the same should be true of the methodologies used to manipulate andmeasure them.

The studies and empirical results presented in this Issue—as well as researchin the field—should be viewed with an appreciation of the need for specificity intheoretical premises, in methodology and in measurement. These concerns evolvenot only around the need to investigate specific emotional states—as in the first twopapers in the Issue—but also to operationally define in a more specific way the waywe implement, measure and assess the validity of the independent and dependentvariables used in our studies. The focus of affect research is increasingly on theorybut we may not always be as careful about our constructs and methods. Muchresearch is motivated by the desire to test and extend theory and resolve theoreticaldebates stemming from conflicting evidence. Yet, we also need to apply additional,new and more precise methodologies to address old theoretical problems. Theories

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should become more sensitive to empirical constraints and experiments should bedesigned to more adequately test these theories.

The major theme of my concluding remarks is that affect research needs toexpand and examine our existing methods more carefully. We need to examineaffect’s influence on diverse dependent variables that focus on different aspects ofthat influence and provide a better understanding of the multitude and complexityof emotional outcomes. We also need to develop new and more specific affectinductions and affect-sensitive dependent variables. For even greater progress indealing with the important issues in the study of affect, developing appropriatemethods to capture affect’s influence and underlying processes, and refining thetheoretical basis for such methods, are among the most important future tasks.

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Emotion and Consumption: Perspectives and Issues