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E´lite vs. People? Eurosceptic PublicOpinion in EstoniaRaivo Vetik aa Institute of International and Social Studies , Tallinn PedagogicalUniversityPublished online: 28 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Raivo Vetik (2003) E´lite vs. People? Eurosceptic Public Opinion in Estonia,Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16:2, 257-271, DOI: 10.1080/09557570302046

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Cambridge Review of International Affairs,Volume 16, Number 2, July 2003

Elite vs. People? Eurosceptic Public Opinion in Estonia

Raivo VetikInstitute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn Pedagogical University

Abstract This paper discusses Estonian public debate and public opinion regarding thepros and cons of joining the European Union (EU). It is shown that a stark contrastexists between the dispositions of Estonian elites and mass public opinion—the formerunambiguously pro-European, and the latter considerably eurosceptical. This paper aimsto uncover the reasons behind that euroscepticism through focusing on the issues ofidentity construction in elite EU discourse, limited popular trust regarding politicalinstitutions, high levels of social polarisation, and modest knowledge of EU-relatedmatters among everyday Estonians. It is argued that the result of the forthcoming EUreferendum in Estonia will most likely be a yes-vote, but that the success of furtherintegration into the EU will require policy changes both in the domestic arena and inthe relationship between the EU and Estonia.

Estonia is a small nation in the Baltic which has managed twice in its history—in1918 and then again 1991—to establish its own nation state and it is presentlyone of 10 prospective EU member-states. In this context, the forthcomingreferendum on EU membership which Estonia is facing is no less important achoice than the restoration of independence a decade ago.1 Nevertheless, societalsupport for these two events differs to a significant degree. Aspirations for EUmembership in Estonia are not driven by a natural craving that emotionallyinvolves the entire population (as with independence), but rather by geopoliticaland economic interests imposed from above by an elite. Accession implies thepartial surrender of Estonian sovereignty as a means of achieving other goals;these are not, however, sufficiently understood by, or convincing to, a largesegment of Estonian society. This is revealed in public opinion surveys ofthe past few years, in which Estonia demonstrates the lowest support amongthe potential member-states for joining to the EU (cf. Candidate Countries Euro-barometer 2001).2

Nevertheless, euroscepticism, which continues to hold a strong position inpublic opinion, has not sparked or informed a powerful political movement nor

]

1 The EU referendum is scheduled for September 14, 2003.2 It must be borne in mind that both question wording and the response scale employed

have an impact upon the public-opinion percentages which are reported. This article is basedupon research which used a three-point scale for the issue of accession support, i.e, ‘infavour’, ‘against’, and ‘undetermined’, or, those responses which most closely resemble thereferendum situation. Given that scale, support for accession has been around 30% in recentyears. The percentages obtained using a five-point scale are usually significantly higher,crossing the 50% threshold as a rule.

ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/03/020257-15 2003 Centre of International Studies

DOI: 10.1080/0955757032000096156

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Table 1. If a referendum concerning Estonia’s accession to theEU were held tomorrow, how would you vote? (%)

I would vote: 1995 1996 2000 2001 2002

In favour 44 47 34 27 38Against 14 24 26 24 20Undecided 32 38 40 49 42

Sources: Kirch and Kirch 2000; Research Report 2001; ResearchReport 2002.

a formidable actor in the public debate. There are no parties represented inRiigikogu who are publicly opposed to accession. The views of eurosceptics arerather marginal in media, and it is believed that their positions are based not somuch on genuine concern for the fate of the Estonian nation, but in the hope ofgaining popularity through their EU-opposition (Talts and Kirch 2000).

One does not need to look far back into history to understand the founda-tions of euroscepticism within Estonian public opinion—as some Estonianeurosceptics believe (cf. Silberg and Leito 2001). After Estonia’s secession fromthe Soviet Union in the beginning of 1990s, the European Union was, for mostEstonians, primarily associated with freedom and democracy—goals for whichEstonia itself was striving. Public opinion polls from the mid-1990s—when aninvitation to join the EU was still a distant dream—demonstrate that Estoniansupport for accession was fairly high (Kirch and Kirch 2000). In the interveningyears, it has declined considerably (see Table 1), and thus the reasons behindpopular euroscepticism must be sought in developments which have taken placein that period.

Furthermore, it must be taken into account that the contrast between eliteand popular opinion on EU matters is not unique to Estonia. Since its onset,European integration has been generally driven by elites, while public opinionhas remained relatively sceptical.

The theoretical literature on EU-related public opinion in Eastern Europe isquite limited, but it is possible, to some extent, to make reference to the literatureon previous accessions and European integration generally. One trend in theliterature has been that support exists for European integration when there areperceived economic gains associated with membership (Gabel and Palmer 1995;Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). A competing trend holds that domestic politics area critical determinant of public opinion regarding the EU (Franklin et al. 1995).As they are complementary, both theories will be considered in this paper.Nevertheless, as euroscepticism is not institutionalised in Estonia, it is notpossible to make reference to literature that links euroscepticism to party politicsand/or interest groups (Taggart 1998; Svensson 1984). Thus far, much of theacademic discourse on the upcoming accession has taken public desire for EUmembership for granted (cf. Ehin 2001). The recent reality indicates that this isincorrect, and thus new conceptualisations of East European public opinion areessential. The importance of the Estonian case derives from the fact that itreflects the problems and challenges that are more or less characteristic of theaccession candidates in an extreme, clear-cut form.

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Public Debate on Joining the EU

Public debate on the EU in Estonia has developed via official relations betweenEstonia and the EU since the beginning of 1990s. The initial official contactsrelated to various aid programs. For example, in the first half of 1992, 6,000 tonsof wheat from France, 10,000 tons of rye from Denmark and 25,000 tons of barleyfrom Germany were sent to Estonia (Palk 1999b). At the end of 1991, the EU’sPhare economic assistance programme was extended to Estonia; its financinginitially focused on training and counselling programmes and subsequentlyshifted to projects related to bolstering the Estonian economy while adapting itto the EU marketplace. Trade and cooperation agreements between Estonia andthe EU were signed in 1992, and a year later Estonia became a member of theCouncil of Europe. In 1995, a Ministry of European Affairs was created withinthe Estonian Government as Estonia presented its application for EU member-ship. Estonia was among the first applicants invited to participate in accessionnegotiations at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997. Accession negotia-tions were completed at the Copenhagen European Council exactly five yearslater, and referendum on accession is scheduled to be held in Estonia on 14September 2003.

It is noted that public debate regarding EU accession has been relatively‘passive’ in Estonia (Talts 2000). In the past few years, as accession has begun toturn into a tangible reality, it has become livelier, corresponding to the theorythat, in EU debate, differences in intensity are closely related to their proximityto accession (Grabbe and Hughes 1999). In Estonian media, and in differentexpert forums, arguments for and against accession are being discussed, thoughthe former are dominant. The primary arguments in support of accession relateto its connection to more-rapid economic development (and a coincident in-crease in welfare), the strengthening of external security, and increases ineducational and tourist possibilities (Talts and Kirch 2000).

It is frequently argued that, in the most general sense, EU membershipsignals Estonia’s incorporation in the global development context. Although inthe past two centuries the nation-state has served as the pivotal social institution,the rapidly globalising economy, and increasing information flows alongsidepolitics and cultural consumption have effectively undermined its role (Smith1996). In this context, unions of states and regional groupings have becomeincreasingly significant centres of global power. From the perspective of Europeas a whole, enlargement will assist in maximising the new opportunities, whichaccompany globalisation while minimising the risks involved. There is, further-more, no reason to believe that the protection of Estonian national interests (e.g.,in its engagements with multinational corporations) will be less successfulwithin the EU than if it continued to act on its own (Palk 1999a).

Public debate related the EU accession focuses first and foremost on econ-omic development through market diversification and foreign investment.Hopes are pinned to the resolution of several social and regional issues bymeans of direct support programs. Because the EU operates a social marketeconomy—one which provided domestic concord between labour, capital, andthe purchasing power of the population—it is hoped the social environment inEstonia would follow suit (Kubo 1997). One major psychological effect ofaccession would be Estonia’s ridding itself of the stereotype of being a former

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Soviet republic. This would, in turn, assure investors of continued economicreform; Estonia’s EU-applicant status has already increased the confidence offoreign capital. In addition, the adoption of EU legislation would significantlyimprove the quality of guarantee and control mechanisms within Estonianeconomy and may assist in scaring away profit-seeking speculative capital(Veidemann 1997).

External security is the second major preoccupation of the accession debate.Although not a security organisation, the EU is generally held to provide somesecurity guarantees to its members (Veidemann 1997). Accession will alterEstonia’s external security situation, in that it would provide the preconditionsfor normalising relations with Russia and increasing stability throughout theregion (Laar 1997). As well, a number of new security risks are not related tomilitary activity, but consist of possible environmental catastrophes, organisedcrime, terrorism, and smuggling. In this context, EU membership is especiallyimportant.

The additional security guarantee implicit in EU membership is importantwithin Estonian public opinion. A recent survey on ‘the future of Europe’ showsthat more support than opposition exists for common European defence forcesand frontier guard, while the opposition is in the majority regarding a com-monly elected president and common constitution (Research Report 2002).Estonians thus perceive the EU as a security guarantor, yet remain sceptical offurther federalisation within the EU.

It must be noted, however, that knowledge regarding the allocation of powerwithin the EU is relatively meagre in Estonia. Public opinion, furthermore, doesnot make a distinction between different types of federation. In the case of theEU, it proceeds from the understanding that, as a federation, the EU would bean entity with a strong centre, i.e, that key decisions would be made in Brusselsand the competencies of member-states would be narrow. The best-knownexample, and that which has largely shaped Estonian attitudes toward feder-ation, was the former Soviet Union. As membership of this federation was anenormously negative experience for Estonians, it is commonly felt that smallcountries must avoid joining federations insofar as this would signal a loss ofsovereignty. Furthermore, the perceived potentially negative aspects of accessionplay an important role in the Eurodebate: that sovereignty will shrink; thatbureaucracy will increase while decision-making will be impeded; that priceswill soar; that the general tax burden and/or unemployment will rise; thatEstonian agriculture will suffer; that brain-drain will ensue; and, that the culturalidentity of Estonia will be damaged (Talts and Kirch 2000).

The accession-related security issue is primarily related in public debateto that of decreasing state sovereignty (Tarand and Voormann 1997), and liesin the argument that, while EU membership would provide certain additionalsecurity guarantees, it could create new problems due to Estonia’s partialwaiver of sovereignty—for instance, regarding minority policies (for whichEstonia has previously been criticised by the EU; cf. Agenda 2000 1997). There areindications in the literature that this, in turn, is one of the root causes ofeuroscepticism in Estonia (Kuus 2002). Seen from the EU’s perspective, the coreof the ‘Russian issue’ is international stability, access to natural resources, andmarket expansion. The debate in Estonia thus centres upon the question of‘should there arise a need for the major EU states to make concessions to Russia

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on the Estonian axis, what options, if any, would Estonia have to protect itsinterests’?

Further concern relates to economic development. While the present EU iscomprised of modern societies of the highest level, Estonia is still amidst aprocess of nation-building and modernisation, wherein the logic of develop-ment, its goals, and its driving forces are quite different (Vetik 2000). There existsthe potential difficulty of harmonising internal development necessities withexternally imposed restrictions within Estonia’s relationship with the EU. TheEU demands unification and abidance of regulation, yet Estonia’s internal needsoften call for spontaneity (Vetik 2000). Uncritical adherence to externally im-posed regulations and restrictions could bring about a situation wherein theinternal mechanisms necessary for societal development stagnate. Should a hostof new laws (the acquis communautaire, which occupies 80,000 pages of text),some unrelated to the actual needs of Estonia, be adopted in the compressedtimeframe of just a few years, they could, it is argued, inhibit Estonia’s naturaldevelopment; for instance, in applying the European Social Charter, Estoniawould assume the same obligations as richer countries, a burden which wouldbe inhibitory to the Estonian economy’s general development (Hansson 1997).

An important topic on the agenda is the appropriate balance between largeand small countries in EU’s mechanisms of power, as well as opportunities todecrease bureaucracy. Analysis of the EU’s earlier enlargements shows that theywere accompanied by a deepening of cooperation mechanisms (Preston 1997).As the current enlargement being more extensive than others by an order ofmagnitude, a clear enhancement of democratic procedures in EU will be re-quired, though that generates a contradiction between the principles of efficacyand representation. (Streimann 2000). Arguments in favour of efficacy indicatethat institutional reform should decisively increase the influence of large statesthrough terminating the consensus policy, for the machinery of the expandingEU may otherwise stall. This runs directly counter to the interests of smallercountries, whose natural instincts rather emphasise the principle of equalrepresentation (Laar 1997).

Public opinion regarding the EU

Public opinion polls in the past few years have indicated that the percentage ofEstonians who would vote against EU membership in an EU referendum wouldbe larger that that of other Central and East European candidate countries.Against this eurosceptic background, one might assume that Estonian percep-tions of the EU and the likely effects of membership in it are largely negative.Surprisingly, a series of surveys carried out by the author demonstrates that thisis not the case (Research Report 2001; Research Report 2002).3 Even thoseopposed or as-of-yet undecided about membership feel that the EU has many

3 The first survey (the discussion of this paper is based on it) was held from 11–17 June2001. Altogether, there were found 111 questionnaire items, where the interviewers locatedthe respondents under the starting address technique, using the younger man rule, to selecta respondent from the household. Interviewed were 972 respondents (671 ethnic Estoniansand 286 non-Estonians). Data file of SPSS was weighted in respect to the age group andgender of respondents subject to data of Statistical Office as of 1 January 2000.

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positive traits. The general image of the EU among potential opponents isgenerally neutral rather than negative, while four-fifths of those undecided iseither neutral or unclear. Only a sixth of undecided respondents feels thathis/her quality of life will worsen following accession, while among thoseopposed, only a third feels similarly. Approximately one-third of all respondentsbelieve that their lives will improve after accession, while another third believesthe EU will not have any influence on their lives.

Accession’s impact upon Estonia as a whole is seen to be positive rather thannegative. People feel that the impact of EU membership upon educationalopportunities, general economic development, the unemployment rate andsecurity issues will be overwhelmingly positive. Even those who have anotherwise negative opinion of the EU and those who still vacillate in theiropinion of it believe there will be positive developments in these areas followingaccession; almost half of those opposed to membership, and 70% of thoseundecided, feel, for example, that membership would have a positive impactupon economic development. Nearly two-thirds of all respondents agreed withthe statement that ‘although EU membership will create some problems forEstonia, it will eventually be beneficial’. Thus, even if strong sentiment againstmembership exists, most Estonians believe it would be beneficial to Estonia asa whole as well as to themselves as individuals. Why does this seeming paradoxexist? Through examining the survey data noted above, it has been possible toidentify three groups of correlations related to trust towards state institutions,social polarisation, and lack of interest in/knowledge about the EU.

Trust towards State Institutions

Data analysis confirms the hypothesis that popular attitudes toward accessionare strongly correlated to trust in state institutions. A similar correlation hasbeen noted in several present EU member-states, wherein those content withtheir current government are (seemingly) more positive towards EU integrationthan those who are not (Franklin et al. 1995). It has been seen that trust in stateinstitutions is the highest among EU supporters and lowest among eurosceptics,while those neutral in attitude toward the EU are situated between these twogroups (see Table 2); despite the fact that this result could have been easilyanticipated, it is surprising how well demarcated it is and, furthermore, that itpertains to all institutions mentioned (Raik 2001).

Theoretical arguments, within the context of popular lack of awareness andindependent opinion of the EU, hold that general trust in political institutionstranslates into support for membership (Ehin 2001). The Estonian case confirmsthis argument; Table 2 reveals that then-President of Estonia Lennart Mericonstituted an exception against a background of extensively low trust whichplagued Estonian political institutions. (It should also be noted, however, thatMeri’s Presidency was trusted by a majority of those who disagreed with hisvery strong support of EU accession.)

Large-scale social projects always have winners and losers. In previousenlargements, the wealthier strata of society were on the winning side (Barnard1999). Estonia will hardly be an exception in this regard, and this accounts inpart for the difference in support for membership among elites and the generalpopulation. As noted by one keen observer, the Estonian elite has assumed the

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function of an ‘EU subcontractor’, which enables it, in turn, to market itself at ahigher price (Ruutsoo 2000). The general population has little to do in theEuro-market and therefore lacks enthusiasm for it. It is thus no wonder that oneopinion poll revealed that 40% of respondents considered the application of EUstandards tantamount to the elite pursuing its own private interests (Kirch 2000).

Social Polarisation

A further explanation of the paradox existing among Estonian attitudes towardthe EU lies within the type of social stratification, which has developed inEstonia over the past decade. From a macroeconomic perspective, developmentin Estonia has thus far been rapid and successful. Yet, its social costs have beenhigh; Estonia’s Gini coefficient (0.37) is the highest among the EU-candidatesand is closer to that of Russia than to the present EU member-states. Highersocio-economic status is often associated with positive evaluations of EU mem-bership (Gabel and Palmer 1995). The author’s research similarly posed thehypothesis that opposition to EU membership exists primarily among disadvan-taged social groups (i.e., those who find it hard to cope in today’s Estonia), anddata analysis corroborated this.

Among all age groups, opposition to accession existed primarily amongsenior citizens; this can be accounted for by the general mistrust of change/inno-vation among those of advanced age. The young are in the forefront of thosesupporting accession; their knowledge of and interest in the EU is relatively highwhen compared to other age groups. In terms of educational levels, those withhigher educational qualifications were more likely to support accession thanthose with secondary- or grade-school qualifications alone. This is not to say,however, that opposition to accession should be lower among the highlyeducated than among the less-educated; the share of those indicating they wouldvote against accession is largest among the highest educated, which stems fromtheir being abreast of EU issues and having established firm preferences aboutthem.

In terms of income, the well-to-do are, predictably, more likely to favouraccession. Among the highest-income families, the percentage of those in favourwas twice as large as that of those opposed. Among families with the lowestincome levels, the percentage of those in favour proponents was roughly twotimes less than the percentage of those opposed. Indeed, the number of those infavour exceeded that of those opposed beginning at the level of an averagemonthly income of more than 2000 krooni (€130).

From the perspective of ethnicity, data analysis revealed yet another para-dox: while interest in, and knowledge of, the EU among non-ethnic-Estonianswas lower than among ethnic Estonians (as the former generally considered thepotential economic effects of accession to be potentially detrimental to them-selves and the country), they were more likely than ethnic Estonians to say theywould vote in favour of membership in a referendum.4 The reason for this is thegeneral dissatisfaction among non-ethnic Estonians with Estonian ethnic poli-

4 It should be noted that this result contradicts the literature, wherein ethnicity is notconsidered to be an important factor determining support for EU membership in Estonia(Ehin 2001).

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cies. These established Estonian as the nation’s official language as well asapplied the principle of legal continuation of the state to citizenship; thisprecluded a great number of non-ethnic Estonians from being granted automaticcitizenship following the re-establishment of Estonian independence, as well asinstitutionalised a process of naturalisation (Vetik 2002). Within this context, itcan thus be argued, joining the EU is viewed by many non-ethnic Estonians asan opportunity to improve their political status in Estonia.

Interest in and Knowledge about the EU

Because EU-accession issues are relatively new to the public agenda, Estoniansgenerally have limited knowledge of the EU. This, indeed, is in line with theliterature’s view that public attitudes toward the EU in East European countriestend to be relatively uninformed—a combination of myths, stereotypes, hopes,and anxieties (Millard 1999). In this survey, most respondents had little interestin the EU or did not display any interest at all; it was revealed that four-firthsof respondents did not know the number of EU member-states, and more thanhalf did not know which nation presently held the EU presidency state or thatBrussels was the home of the European Commission. Nevertheless, the datasuggests that knowledge of the EU is strongly correlated to the attitudes towardit: the more informed the person, the stronger their support for the EU, and thehigher their level of knowledge about it, the more likely they are to agree thataccession will be positive both in terms of safety and security as well asimproved standards of living (Kaasik 2001). The survey further revealed a linkbetween interest and attitudes: the lower a person’s interest, the more likely theyare to believe that accession will have negative consequences (and thus the morelikely they are to oppose accession). As many as 70% of those expressing aninterest in the EU would vote for accession in a referendum, with the remainingthird undecided—and thus there having been no opponents among this segmentat all (Research Report 2001).

Estonian Identity and EU Accession

This section will elaborate upon the political-trust hypothesis discussed abovethrough examining the construction of national identity within the EU discourseof Estonian elites. While general distrust of political institutions undermines thegovernment’s EU project, the manner in which the EU project has been repre-sented in Estonia lowers trust in political institutions. Thus, it is critical toattempt to uncover the hidden, socio-psychological mechanisms in operationhere.

Joining the EU is regarded by Estonian elites as a symbolic return to Europe,from which Estonia was illegally and wrongfully severed after World War II(Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997). Thus, EU discourse is based on concepts of‘catching up’, adaptation, harmonisation, etc., whose common denominator is anexternal environment, which is intrinsically familiar yet far more developed.Inwardly directed questions, such as those related to uniqueness and the dialogicnature of accession, are, however, unavoidably brushed aside within suchdiscourse.

It can be shown that EU discourse based upon such a premise essentially

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constructs a negative self-identity. The semiotic interface between ‘we’ and‘they’ represents a filter fulfilling two main functions: ‘we’ and ‘they’ are relatedthrough the interface, while the interface keeps the external separate from theinternal. While relatedness allows for communication with the outside world,separation preserves the uniqueness of ‘us’. Both functions must be present; allsemiotic systems of some complexity operate via their interaction. The problemfacing Estonian EU discourse has been that, in the great Eurowhirl, the innerprotection function has been abandoned. Public opinion in Estonia senses thataccession negotiations are not always carried out with national interests fore-most in mind, and rather that too many concessions have been made so as togain membership as quickly as possible (Vetik 2000).

In order to understand the identity-related meaning of EU discourse, it shallbe located in comparative historical perspective. Until the national awakening inthe mid-19th century, Estonians were a peasant people with ‘us’ (Estonians) and‘them’ (Germans) differentiated by class hierarchy. Since that ‘us’ was situateda lower rung of the social ladder, it created a negative identity which resultedin many Estonians becoming ‘Germanised Estonians’ (Loorits 2000). In contrast,during the period of Soviet egalitarianism (i.e., the latter half of the 20thcentury), the function of differentiating ‘us’ was fulfilled by culture—Estonianschool traditions, literature, music, etc. Despite Russification efforts undertakenfrom Moscow, culture’s vested task was generally successful, insofar as that ‘us’(Estonians) was seen to be higher than ‘them’ (Russians) on a cultural scale.

Thus, emphasising or negating the uniqueness of ‘us’, and opposing oneselfto or simulating ‘them’, are two possible strategies of national adjustment to theexterior environment (Smith 1993). The actual response depends upon both thenature of the external pressure and the inherent translation mechanism. Due tothe fact that, in the western semiotic environment, Estonia will be regarded (forthe time-being at least) as part of the ‘backward, post-Communist East’, thepressure to adopt a strategy of simulation is immense—as seen in the consump-tion of culture, for example. Research indicates that Estonian society’s culturalsustainability is coming into question, insofar as ‘the Estonians’ historicalexperience of cultural resistance is more likely to have created a ready basis forthe acceptance of anything from the West than it has helped to construct a newtype of identity to resist cultural levelling’ (Vihalemm and Keller 2001). Particu-larly devastating is the new semiotic situation in Estonian folk culture, which isfacing an Americanisation of tradition:

The danger lies in the marking of folk traditions in the cities that have nothing todo with the customs of the Estonian people. During the past ten years, thecustoms of various peoples have arrived—Halloween and Valentine’s Day arecelebrated instead of (the traditional) Mardi and Kadri days … We know nothingof the roots of Valentine’s Day, with its origins in Catholicism. As a result, all wedo is go to the tavern and present our friend with a heart (cited in Aarelaid 2000).

Previous analyses reveal that a similar semiotic simulation forms the basis ofthe Estonian elite’s current EU discourse. In a sense, such one-sidedness isinevitable. After independence was regained, the function of relating with theexterior became immensely important, as the nation had to ‘make up for losttime’ spent behind the Iron Curtain. The achievements and accomplishments ofEstonians for the past decade primarily have their source in the establishment of

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new external links. The rapid closing of the chapters of the acquis duringaccession negotiations was important in the sense that, among the five initialcandidates in the first enlargement round, Estonia was the only ex-Sovietstate—and one who strove to be ‘the best student in class’ in order to compensatefor such ‘backwardness’ (Kasekamp 2002). Yet, such an approach by necessityhas a price, one manifestation of which is public mistrust both of the elite andthe EU. Although public opinion largely agrees with the pragmatic consider-ations of the elite—i.e., that EU membership will boost economic developmentand provide a stronger security guarantee—the EU is also perceived as a possiblethreat to one’s identity, inasmuch as one vital function of the semiotic interface‘we’ and ‘they’ has been disregarded in the official ‘Europroject’.

One, furthermore, cannot ignore the fact that numerous aspects of EUmembership are both new and strange to people, and therefore many Estoniansperceive a strong element of alien-ness in the EU. As seen in the analysisdiscussed above, this point is further reinforced by surveys conducted using thesemantic differential method. These show that the qualities most stronglyreflected in the Estonian image of the EU are development, growth, and,especially, potential. At the same time, the quality of closeness is quite weak,remaining on the ‘they’ side of a ‘we-they’ scale (Past 2001). This suggests that,in the Estonian cultural space, attitudes that originate from the country’s historyand geopolitical location, as well as those based upon an opposition betweenperiphery and metropolis, dominate. Estonian veneration of Europe, as well asfear of it, is very much based upon recognition of being part of the periphery.While the periphery seeks acceptance by the metropolis (if Estonians are doingwell on a European scale, they will develop a feeling of ‘sameness’ and trusttowards the metropolis), the sense of being at the periphery is a source of protestand antagonism (due to the sense that the metropolis is a privileged ‘not-us’).5

4. The Forthcoming EU Referendum

Euroscepticism revealed in Estonian public opinion surveys does not providesufficient grounds for predicting that Estonians will vote against accession in theforthcoming referendum. It can be assumed that the popular expectations ofpositive consequences, which is seen to be connected with accession (as notedabove) will play a far more influential role in the referendum itself than in publicopinion polls. At the same time, there are a number of factors which increase thelikelihood of a ‘no’ answer. Public opinion will be greatly influenced by theresults of the European Convention on the Future of Europe. The chairman ofEstonia’s largest party, for example, declared in December 2002 that his partywould make its final decision about joining the EU when the Convention haddecided upon an EU institutional structure—and if the solution was unfavour-able to Estonia, their decision would be a negative one (Savisaar 2002).

5 This is supported by an analysis conducted in relation to the Eurovision Song Contest.After the Estonians won in May 2001, many commentators claimed this was a reason forthe subsequent steep rise in support for the EU in Estonia. A survey conducted after theEurovision Song Contest, held in Tallinn in May 2002, included a set of questions whichdemonstrated that this hypothesis was correct (Research Report 2002). Therefore, it can beargued that emotional events and participation in large, common projects make the EU seem‘closer’ for Estonians, thereby helping to create a feeling of being an equal part of Europe.

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This demonstrates that the referendum is only one element in the long-termprocess of European integration. Both accession and further integration can onlybe successful if they develop as a dialogic process, wherein the interests of bothsides are taken into account and pragmatic calculations are accompanied by thedevelopment of a common European consciousness. In the long term, the latterwill be particularly important. Consciousness is based upon the exchange ofmessages, beginning with signals between the lobes of the brain and endingwith contacts between cultures (Lotman 1983). A European consciousness canthus also only arise on the basis of an exchange of messages. It is important torealise that Europe is not a substance, a thing in and of itself, but a constructionbuilt through dialogue between countries, peoples, and individuals (Kivimae1998). It has been argued that the logic of economic efficiency imposes a‘unidirectional dictate to be unequivocally accepted by candidate countries’(Ellman 1997). The logic of successful, long-term integration, however, presup-poses mutual dialogue—lest we lose the ‘Europe’ from the ‘EU’ (Vahamaki1991).

In this respect, the question of a referendum campaign emerges, one, whichhas both tactical and strategic aspects. Regarding the tactical, many Estonians, aswe have seen, are not aware of EU policies which might be of benefit tothem—for example, regional and social development policies; as many as 43% ofrespondents felt that accession would not change regional development inEstonia at all (Research Report 2002). In addition, the fact that even if Estoniawere to remain outside of the EU, EU decisions would strongly influence Estonia(given that Estonia and the EU belongs to a common economic space, andexports to the EU constitute 80% of Estonia’s total exports) has been overlookedin the public debate.6

Such tactical issues related to the referendum could be dealt with via aproper information campaign. Yet, from a strategic perspective, it is importantto provide a multi-sided information base to which voters could refer whenmaking their decision. In the long-term, it could be harmful if something soimportant with regard to the future of Estonia were decided merely uponsuccessful propaganda—as it happened in Sweden in 1995, where only duringthe month of the referendum were the scales tipped in favour of accession. Asa result, there was sharp societal cleavage, and Sweden remains the mosteurosceptic member of the EU (Jennsen and Gilljam 1998).

The EU information campaign in Estonia in recent years can be seen to havebeen relatively successful in the sense that Estonians’ knowledge of the EU hasincreased quite rapidly. In the 2001 survey, less than one-fifth of respondentsknew that there were 15 EU member-states, and less than a half knew theEuropean Commission was located in the Brussels, while by the summer of 2002,those respective percentages had already reached 37 and 59.7 While, for example,these numbers are not comparable with Norway’s (where prior to the 1994referendum on accession, the number of EU member-states was known by 55%of respondents, and the location of the Commission by 93% (Research Report

6 The statement ‘decisions made in the EU influence Estonia, when it is outside the EU,practically as much as when Estonia gains membership’ won support by only a quarter ofrespondents, 40% being unable to tell their opinion.

7 The survey was a repeat of the 2001 survey, with the addition of several new questions.

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1995), the reason for the difference is understandable, in that accession had beenan issue in Norway for more than 30 years and thus facts related to the EU hadbeen common knowledge for some time.

The above analysis shows that increased knowledge of EU-related issues hassome influence upon popular support for accession. Analyses of public-opiniondynamics confirm that, within a year, the percentage of those supportingaccession has increased, while the percentage of those opposed and thoseundecided has decreased. In June 2001, 27% of voters indicated they would vote‘yes’ to accession, and by June 2002, they increased to 39%; those who wouldvote ‘no’ decreased from 24 to 20% in the same period, while the undecideddecreased from 49 to 42%, respectively (Research Report 2002).

Additional information on the probable result of the Euro-referendum can bederived from accession opponents’ answers to this question from the 2002survey: ‘Do you think there might also be good reasons to vote for the EU?’Responses show that only a third of those opposed to accession fail to seeanything positive regarding the EU. A further third see some positive traits ofaccession, such as faster economic development, optimism about the future,better possibilities for work and education, greater assistance and subsidies, andbetter social guarantees. Analysis also demonstrates that only a third of thoseopposed do not want accession to ever take place—the remainder supportaccession dates after 2004 (Research Report 2002).

To conclude, public opinion toward the EU depends not only upon prag-matic, cost-benefit calculations but is strongly related to the manner of identityconstruction as well as a society’s larger political and social issues. The particu-lar contribution of this article lies in its focus on contradiction between elite andpopular attitudes toward joining to the EU, as well as in situating that withinbroader historical, socio-psychological, and semiotic contexts. A Europroject ofthe elite resulting in negative or indifferent public attitudes towards the EU anddistrust towards state institutions has engendered a complex set of problemswhich are difficult to address. Not only does the ultimate result of the Euro-referendum depend upon their successful resolution, the future of Europeanintegration does as well.

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