Eliminative MaterialismEliminative Materialism

The Case Against Folk The Case Against Folk PsychologyPsychology

Intertheoretic ReductionIntertheoretic Reduction

Certain (usually older) theories can be seen as special cases of Certain (usually older) theories can be seen as special cases of other (usually newer) theoriesother (usually newer) theoriesWe say the older theory reduces to, or is reduced by, the newer We say the older theory reduces to, or is reduced by, the newer theorytheory

Kepler’s planetary astronomy reduces to Newton’s Laws of MotionKepler’s planetary astronomy reduces to Newton’s Laws of Motion Newton’s Laws of Motion reduce to Einstein’s General RelativityNewton’s Laws of Motion reduce to Einstein’s General Relativity Common sense theory of sound reduces to physical theory of Common sense theory of sound reduces to physical theory of

compression waves in a plastic mediumcompression waves in a plastic medium Common sense theory of heat reduces to kinetic theoryCommon sense theory of heat reduces to kinetic theory

A genuine reduction occurs when, in the newer theory, we can A genuine reduction occurs when, in the newer theory, we can derive a set of claims about certain objects and their relations which derive a set of claims about certain objects and their relations which are relevantly isomorphic to (sufficiently mirror) the claims of the old are relevantly isomorphic to (sufficiently mirror) the claims of the old theorytheory

Note that this is a matter of degreeNote that this is a matter of degreeWithin Newton’s system, one can basically deduce Kepler’s systemWithin Newton’s system, one can basically deduce Kepler’s systemWithin General Relativity, Newton’s Laws turn out only to be very close Within General Relativity, Newton’s Laws turn out only to be very close approximations requiring the assumption of low masses, low velocities, and approximations requiring the assumption of low masses, low velocities, and short distances short distances Not every aspect of common sense theory of sound/heat reduces to physical Not every aspect of common sense theory of sound/heat reduces to physical theorytheory

Intertheoretic ReductionIntertheoretic Reduction

When a Reduction occurs, the language of the old theory When a Reduction occurs, the language of the old theory may be dispensed with, but (a significant amount of) the may be dispensed with, but (a significant amount of) the structure of the old theory lives on within the new theorystructure of the old theory lives on within the new theoryThus reduced theories are NOT eliminatedThus reduced theories are NOT eliminatedThey are, in a sense, given legitimacyThey are, in a sense, given legitimacyThey are incorporated into a new and more They are incorporated into a new and more encompassing theoryencompassing theory

Identity Theorists think that FP will reduce to NeurologyIdentity Theorists think that FP will reduce to Neurology Functionalists and Classical AI theorists think that FP will reduce Functionalists and Classical AI theorists think that FP will reduce

to a more abstract theory of formally specified symbols and to a more abstract theory of formally specified symbols and operationsoperations

Dennett Rejects the question of reduction as inappropriate, Dennett Rejects the question of reduction as inappropriate, misunderstanding the function and success of FPmisunderstanding the function and success of FP

Theory EliminationTheory EliminationWhen the resources of a new theory outstrip that of an When the resources of a new theory outstrip that of an old theory, and there is no portion of the new theory old theory, and there is no portion of the new theory which sufficiently mirrors the old, the old theory is said to which sufficiently mirrors the old, the old theory is said to be eliminatedbe eliminatedThe New replaces the OldThe New replaces the OldThe Old loses its legitimacyThe Old loses its legitimacyLittle to no structure of the old is preservedLittle to no structure of the old is preserved

Copernican/Newtonian (heliocentric) view of the Solar system Copernican/Newtonian (heliocentric) view of the Solar system eliminates the Ptolemaic/Aristotelian (geocentric) vieweliminates the Ptolemaic/Aristotelian (geocentric) view

Kinetic theory of heat eliminates the caloric theoryKinetic theory of heat eliminates the caloric theory Oxidation theory of combustion eliminates the phlogiston theoryOxidation theory of combustion eliminates the phlogiston theory Neuro-psychological theories of mental illness eliminate theories Neuro-psychological theories of mental illness eliminate theories

of humors and daemonic possessionof humors and daemonic possession

We find is that we were seriously wrong about what We find is that we were seriously wrong about what objects existed and how they interrelated to produce the objects existed and how they interrelated to produce the phenomena we were theorizing aboutphenomena we were theorizing about

Eliminative MaterialismEliminative Materialism

Folk Psychology is a “radically false” and Folk Psychology is a “radically false” and “radically misleading” conception of human “radically misleading” conception of human cognition and the causes of human behaviorcognition and the causes of human behavior

FP will be replaced by a “completed FP will be replaced by a “completed neuroscience”neuroscience”

““Our mutual understanding and even our Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted within introspection may then be reconstituted within the [more powerful] conceptual framework of the [more powerful] conceptual framework of completed neuroscience”completed neuroscience”

The Case Against FPThe Case Against FP

1.1. Serious Explanatory, Predictive, and Serious Explanatory, Predictive, and Manipulative povertyManipulative poverty

2.2. History of Stagnation and RetreatHistory of Stagnation and Retreat

3.3. Little Hope of Integration into Overall Physical Little Hope of Integration into Overall Physical TheoryTheory

4.4. 1.–3. combine for a story of failure, stagnation, 1.–3. combine for a story of failure, stagnation, retreat, lack of promiseretreat, lack of promise

5.5. A priori, the likelihood of elimination is greater A priori, the likelihood of elimination is greater than that of reductionthan that of reduction

1. Explanatory, Predictive, and 1. Explanatory, Predictive, and Manipulative PovertyManipulative Poverty

a.a. Normal mental processes poorly explained or Normal mental processes poorly explained or not explainednot explained

Sleep, learning, memory, creativity, motor Sleep, learning, memory, creativity, motor coordination, differences in intelligencecoordination, differences in intelligence

b.b. Abnormal mental processes poorly explained Abnormal mental processes poorly explained or not explainedor not explained

Mental illness, effects of brain damage, intoxication, Mental illness, effects of brain damage, intoxication, psychopharmacological effectspsychopharmacological effects

c.c. Special importance on explanation of learningSpecial importance on explanation of learning

1.c. Special importance on 1.c. Special importance on explanation of learningexplanation of learning

i.i. No account of pre- and non-linguistic No account of pre- and non-linguistic learninglearning

ii.ii. No good account of learning a first No good account of learning a first languagelanguage

iii.iii. No good account of the underlying No good account of the underlying dynamics and kinematics of learning in dynamics and kinematics of learning in generalgeneral

iv.iv. No good account of conceptual change No good account of conceptual change in the individualin the individual

2. History of Stagnation and 2. History of Stagnation and RetreatRetreat

a.a. Virtually every other folk theory has been Virtually every other folk theory has been eliminated—motion, heaven, fire, life, etc.—eliminated—motion, heaven, fire, life, etc.—unlikely we got this one right on the first tryunlikely we got this one right on the first try

b.b. Many domains of phenomena once explained Many domains of phenomena once explained via the intentional categories of FP, now via the intentional categories of FP, now explained in physical terms—behavior of explained in physical terms—behavior of seasons, weather, animals, geology—seasons, weather, animals, geology—intentional categories of FP are in retreatintentional categories of FP are in retreat

c.c. FP has not significantly advance in 3–4 FP has not significantly advance in 3–4 millenniamillennia

3. Little Hope of Integration into 3. Little Hope of Integration into Overall Physical TheoryOverall Physical Theory

Biology, physiology, evolutionary theory, Biology, physiology, evolutionary theory, neurology—all show a high degree of neurology—all show a high degree of integration into our basic physicsintegration into our basic physics

FP shows little or no hope of such FP shows little or no hope of such integrationintegration

FP shows little or no hope of progressing FP shows little or no hope of progressing Further to address its failings (stagnation Further to address its failings (stagnation again)again)

4. Profile of of failure, stagnation, 4. Profile of of failure, stagnation, retreat, lack of promiseretreat, lack of promise

1.–3. combine for a story of failure, 1.–3. combine for a story of failure, stagnation, retreat, lack of promisestagnation, retreat, lack of promise

A Priori ArgumentA Priori Argument

A priori, the likelihood of elimination is greater A priori, the likelihood of elimination is greater than that of reductionthan that of reduction

More ways for Neuroscience to be successful More ways for Neuroscience to be successful while eliminating FP, than way for Neuroscience while eliminating FP, than way for Neuroscience to be successful while reducing FPto be successful while reducing FP

See pp. 46-47 of See pp. 46-47 of Matter and ConsciousnessMatter and Consciousness

See Also p.45 for “The Vision”See Also p.45 for “The Vision”

Some Standard Objections to EMSome Standard Objections to EM

FP is not an empirical falsifiable theoryFP is not an empirical falsifiable theory Rather it is the abstract descriptive core Rather it is the abstract descriptive core

required to understand any system as required to understand any system as intelligent and rational (no matter the intelligent and rational (no matter the instantiation)instantiation)

Traditional functionalism, classical AI, Dennett’s Traditional functionalism, classical AI, Dennett’s intentional stanceintentional stance

Rather, its central core concerning Rather, its central core concerning Propositional Attitudes is normative, Propositional Attitudes is normative, characterizing the ideal reasonercharacterizing the ideal reasoner

Being normative it cannot be falsified (?)Being normative it cannot be falsified (?)Dennett? Fodor?Dennett? Fodor?

Some Standard Objections to EMSome Standard Objections to EM

I can Introspect Beliefs, Desires Qualia, I can Introspect Beliefs, Desires Qualia, How could I be wrong about what I most How could I be wrong about what I most directly know?directly know?

Self-Effacing/Incoherent—see p. 48Self-Effacing/Incoherent—see p. 48

Mountains out of MolehillsMountains out of Molehills

Clark’s ObjectionsClark’s Objections

Tension between the propositional modularity Tension between the propositional modularity apparently required by our notion of mental apparently required by our notion of mental causation and extreme holistic nature of neural causation and extreme holistic nature of neural netsnets Could there be a deeper unity?Could there be a deeper unity? Deny that FP committed to inner propositions Deny that FP committed to inner propositions

(Dennett, scattered causes)(Dennett, scattered causes) Accept incompatibility and go eliminativistAccept incompatibility and go eliminativist (Not Noticed By Clark) Find a deeper unity, but of a (Not Noticed By Clark) Find a deeper unity, but of a

structure which does not vindicate FP (Churchland, cf. structure which does not vindicate FP (Churchland, cf. p. 76 of p. 76 of MindwareMindware))

Clark’s ObjectionsClark’s Objections

Thought is systematic (Fodor and Pylyshyn)Thought is systematic (Fodor and Pylyshyn) So internal representations must be structuredSo internal representations must be structured Connectionist models lack structured internal representationsConnectionist models lack structured internal representations So connectionist models are not good models of human thoughtSo connectionist models are not good models of human thought

Clark’s two suggested responsesClark’s two suggested responses Classical symbol systems not the only way of supporting Classical symbol systems not the only way of supporting

structured representations (Churchland)structured representations (Churchland) Human thought might gain what systematicity it displays from Human thought might gain what systematicity it displays from

the structure of human language (Clark? Dennett)the structure of human language (Clark? Dennett) Bag-of-tricks—no central code or processor, but a bunch of Bag-of-tricks—no central code or processor, but a bunch of

different (possibly multi-tasked and/or redundant) modules different (possibly multi-tasked and/or redundant) modules (somehow) working in concert (Dennett, Churchland) (somehow) working in concert (Dennett, Churchland)

Clark’s ObjectionsClark’s Objections

Biological RealityBiological Reality Artificiality of tasksArtificiality of tasks

Choice of problem structureChoice of problem structure

Abstraction and over-simplificationAbstraction and over-simplification

Dimensionality of inputDimensionality of input

Lack of exploitation of real-world structure for Lack of exploitation of real-world structure for problem solvingproblem solving

One-network-one-task attitudeOne-network-one-task attitude

Over-simplification of the structure and function of Over-simplification of the structure and function of neuronsneurons