ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO PRODUCTIVE MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC-SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE AT SENIOR LEVELS

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ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO PRODUCTIVE MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC-SECTORORGANIZATIONS: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE AT SENIOR LEVELSAuthor(s): OTTO BRODTRICKSource: Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 3 (FALL, 1986), pp. 294-309Published by: SPAEFStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40861317 .

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ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO PRODUCTIVE MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC-SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE AT SENIOR LEVELS

OTTO BRODTRICK Office of the Auditor General of Canada

Thank you for inviting me today to address you as financial officers and financial managers, as people who are interested in more productive management, as people who subscribe to the thesis of doing "more with less." [1]

As you know, I work in an Audit Office, even though I am not an accountant, nor a certified financial officer. My field is public sector management, and more particularly the behaviors of organizations in a public sector environment. The fact that I speak about management may seem somewhat of a paradox, because the two professions of manager and auditor stand in remarkable contrast to each other. As managers, we are essentially in business to tell people what to do to be successful. As auditors, on the other hand, we seem to be in business to tell people what not to do to be successful. In other words, as managers we have a largely positive mandate. But as auditors we have a largely negative mandate. And that is reflected in some of the audit reports we publish. On occasion, however, we undertake special research studies, particularly when we are faced with phenomena that we can't explain through conven- tional theories.

I had the privilege of working on the most recent such study our office did. It was a two-yeár project that began in 1981, and the results were published at the end of 1983 as part of that year's annual Report of the Auditor General which dealt with

"Copyright Office of the Auditor General of Canada." Reprinted with permission.



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Constraints to Productivity Management in the Public Service. The study attempted to shed some light on the question of

barriers and constraints that public sector managers face in their daily work. Are the barriers real? Or are they fabricated by managers who want to hide their incompetence or lack of motivation? Or are they just the normal by-products of any management job anywhere? And what about the other side: incentives and rewards? To what extent can they motivate public service managers? And in what direction? Let me share with you some of the background of the study- how it came about, how we carried it out and what we found. Because a diagnosis of the underlying causes of barriers to productive management will help in suggesting ways to eliminate or overcome such barriers.

For the first hundred years of his existence, the Auditor General did primarily financial attest and authority auditing. Then, in 1977, Parliament gave him an expanded mandate. He was now obliged to bring to the attention of the House of Commons any cases in which he had observed that expenditures were made without due regard to value for money. This led to the so-called Comprehensive Audits of departments and agencies. It added the value-for-money component to the traditional financial attest and authority audits. As you know, our comprehensive-audit reports have often referred to * 'managerial weaknesses." At the same time, however, our audits have noted numerous efforts by management to improve management practices. This paradox prompted the Auditor General in his 1980 Report to ask this question: "Why do serious managerial weaknesses persist even after years of conscientious efforts to overcome them?"

He asked the question, but he didn't answer it. Then, in 1981, there was a new Auditor General, Kenneth Dye. He noted the same phenomena, but from a different point of view. After he came to Ottawa from private practice, he met individual public service managers who were clearly intelligent, hard-working and imaginative. At the same time, he knew from the work of his office that the level of productivity in the public service did not match the ability and motivation of these people. In addition, members of the Parliamentary Public Accounts



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Committee were asking some questions. They wanted to know why there was an Auditor General's Report that said similar things every year, and yet not much seemed to happen to overcome the basic problem.

It was against this background that our office initiated the study on Constraints to Management. The study's purpose was twofold. We wanted to find out what underlying causes there might be that compel intelligent managers to do apparently unsound things. And we wanted to understand why it takes so long to bring about more productive management. We asked three specific questions to which we wanted to find answers:

•Why are management and productivity problems so persistent in the public sector? •Why are reforms so hard to implement and sustain? •Why do even good managers seem to have serious difficulties in achieving value for money?

If we wanted answers to these questions, we had to understand essentially the environment and culture of the public service. We started with the premise that public servants are inherently no different from other Canadians. In fact, we reasoned that even if somebody wanted to get together a quarter million people who are particularly lazy or incompetent or irrational, that would probably prove impossible to do. That led us to the second premise: If the underlying cause of management difficulties and productivity problems is not likely to be in the people, then it is likely to be in the environment in which people work. That, in a nutshell, were the reasons for the study, and our basic assumptions about it.

I will briefly describe what we did and what we found in our study. But before I do, let me share with you two different views of management in the public sector. One view sees it as a traditional soccer game. The team is an organized hierarchy. There is a coach, there is a team captain, there are assigned players, there are established rules for scoring goals. And everyone knows when the team is winning or losing.

The other view sees management as a soccer team, but this one is quite different. Here, the game is more like an organized



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anarchy. The team plays on a round field that is ringed by numerouos goals. There is no fixed number of players. Players enter and leave the field sporadically. There are several balls in the game, and each one is of a different size and shape. The players vigorously kick the balls toward one or another of the goals, and sometimes balls are even kicked from the outside. During all this time, there are men in green overalls who are busy moving the goals around to different positions on the field. The players sometimes judge themselves, and sometimes they are judged by others, but always according to ambiguous and variable scoring systems. This view of public-sector management may be exaggerated. But it is probably closer to the truth than the view which holds that public-sector management is an orderly, goal-focused, rational function that can be accom- plished if only there are enough regulations and controls that tell people what to do.

Here is another analogy to a soccer team. It is rare that players in the middle of a game can invent new plays. Even the coach cannot on the spot order his players to execute new routines that have never been explained and practiced. Rather, the players follow a number of established, rehearsed maneuvers that have been developed and refined gradually over time. The point is that organizations - especially large and established organizations - have a repertoire of things they can do, things they have mastered over time. And that repertoire cannot be changed suddenly, over night. Any attempt at change must take this into account. But I'm getting slightly ahead of myself. Let me go back to our study on Constraints.

As I mentioned, our study arose out of the question: ' 'Why do serious managerial weaknesses persist, in spite of conscientious efforts to overcome them?" Our office had for a number of years recommended better systems: Financial Systems, Measure- ment Systems, Information Systems, Planning Systems, Evaluation Systems and Reporting Systems. And many of those systems had been implemented. And particularly in the financial areas, significant progress had been made. But in the general management areas, weaknesses seemed to persist, in spite of more and more controls. We were beginning to ask ourselves whether our suggested solution was really the best



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one. In fact, we were asking ourselves whether there indeed is such a thing as a single, universal solution to such difficulties. To explore that question, we made up and tried to solve a simple problem that faces many people every week. Let me share it with you, to illustrate the kind of thinking we did at the very beginning of our study. I'm using this example to show that even a well-identified problem does not necessarily have a single, obvious solution.

Imagine an organization which requires that all employees submit a weekly Time Sheet every Monday by noon. Imagine also that there are chronic difficulties. Every week there are some people who are late, or who don't put their Time Sheet in at all. And the Administration wants to find an answer to the question: Why don't some people submit their Time Sheets? They also want to answer the question: What should be done about it? So they study this and find that there are a number of eminent social scientists who have developed theories that explain why people sometimes refuse to do certain things. Each of these theories is well-researched and is supported by a body of literature. And each theory has its own unique solution to the problem.

I will mention some of these theories. I will then apply the suggested solutions to our study. And I will finally explain how they influenced our methodology. We note that each theory is based on a particular model of human nature.

There is first of all the Cybernetic Model. It was developed by Norbert Wiener and published in 1962. It says that man is a rational animal who will act on feedback from his environment. The cause of the problem of the missing Time Sheets is that people don't know what is expected of them. They simply don't know that Time Sheets are due on Monday by noon. They also don't know the consequences of missing Time Sheets - which is administrative chaos. In short, the problem is lack of knowledge. And the solution is of course to give people appropriate information. They need seminars, administrative bulletins and guidelines. And then they will put in their Time Sheets.

We have secondly the Social Learning Model. It was published by B.F. Skinner in 1948 and says that man in a



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hedonistic animal who avoids pain and seeks pleasure. According to this theory, the problem is that there is no reward for submitting Time Sheets - nor is there any punishment for missing them. And the solution is naturally that there should be praise and punishment. The Administration must be nice to people who follow the rules and nasty to those who don't. And then people will put in their Time Sheets.

Next is the Psychoanalytic Model which came from Sigmund Freud in 1916. His theory says that behavior is based on unconscious motives. And to change the behavior of people, we must first understand what motivates them. The cause of the problem here is that some people get a sort of sadistic thrill from aggression against the Administration by not putting in their Time Sheets. And the solution is of course that these people must be sent to therapy. And then they will put in their Time Sheets.

The fourth theory is based on the Reflective Model of man. In comes to us from Eric Erikson and dates from 1957. This theory says that people's behavior is a reflection of their environment. The cause of the problem is that people say: "This is a lousy place to work. Why should I make any effort to submit my Time Sheets?" And the solution is obvious. The Administration should improve the environment. It should provide music, colour, flowers and some elegance. And then people will put in their Time Sheets.

My fifth model was published by Abraham Maslow in 1970. It is called the Humanistic Model. This theory says that people behave according to a hierarchy of needs. Only when lower-level needs - for example, hunger or sexual deprivation - are satisfied, will people be motivated to satisfy higher-level needs - for example, putting in Time Sheets. The solution is again quite obvious. The Administration should make sure that employees have adequate food and sexual satisfaction. And then they will put in their Time Sheets.

My last model is called Imitative Model. It was developed by Gustave leBon who published it in 1903. This theory says that feelings and behavior spread in a group of people and are imitated. Somehow in this organization the practice of not submitting Time Sheets started, and it spread. The cause of the



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problem is based on a simple argument: "If Harrison doesn't put his Time Sheet in, why should I?" Again, the solution comes to us almost automatically. What the Administration should do is pretend that all Time Sheets are in fact submitted. This will have an encouraging effect on offenders and they, in turn, will put in their Time Sheets.

Note well how all of these different explanations and solutions are applied to the same, simple problem. Note also that each theory is well researched, published by a recognized authority, and supported by a body of literature. You can imagine how we felt at this point of our thinking. But could we ever hope to reach definite conclusions about a subject as complex as the causes of management weaknesses and barriers to productivity? We felt that our only hope lay in asking and observing the managers themselves. Constructing theories about them was surely not the way to go.

Let me briefly outline what we actually did in our study. We interviewed over 200 senior people on an individual, confidential basis. We asked them for their experiences and for their views about management problems as well as solutions in their area of responsibility. The majority of the people we selected were senior executives in the federal public service. But we also interviewed some senior corporate executives. We consulted as well with leading scholars and researchers in Canada and abroad. And we finally included in our study senior executives from other public services: from Ontario, the United States, and Germany. That gives you a rough idea of how we went about doing this study. Now to the question: What did we find? We have three main findings and we draw attention to them as follows:

1. Political priorities have a significant impact on productive management, because the political process has concerns that tend to overshadow and, to some extent, displace productive management.

2. Management feels unduly constrained by administrative procedures and conflicting accountability requirements ... which limit managerial authority and autonomy.

3. There are few incentives in productive management, but many disincentives... Consequently, the basic attitudes that lead to attempts at improving productivity are scarce.

Let me emphasize here that this is not a confrontational



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Report. There was no reason to accuse or to attach blame. On the contrary, we were able to point out that there are no villains in this piece. For example, we say: (paragraph 2:14)

The nature of government everywhere seems to be that constraints to productive management keep emerging almost inadvertantly and steadily over time. We found this to be true in all public services we examined.

We also say, however, that this should not be interpreted to mean that nothing can be done. It should not mean that we merely look at the problems and abdicate. To support this position, we point out what's being done elsewhere. I am quoting from the Report again: (paragraph 2:14)

We observed that such constraints are being overcome ... in organizations where a sustained and concentrated effort is being made to do so.

This then is a summary of the three study findings. Let me now elaborate a bit on each one.

The first finding is that political priorities have a significant impact on productive management. What we say here is that the political process naturally has political aims. Yet, what is good for productive politics is not necessarily good for productive management. We define productive management as achieving satisfactory results at reasonable cost. That is, however, not the definition of productive politics. The political process needs votes, because the market test of politics is re-election.

That is the way our Canadian Parliamentary system functions, and it is recognized and accepted by managers. Things can get difficult, however, when senior executives are asked to come up with savings. They might propose savings such as closing marginally productive Customs Ports or reducing underutilized passenger train service.

Such proposals are sometimes seen by the affected parties not as desirable increases in government productivity, but as undesirable reductions in government services. And they are therefore rejected. You can imagine that this can have a negative effect on managers who make such suggestions. This is true especially when managers are at the same time criticized



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by the public for not being frugal with taxpayers' money. Another aspect of public sector management is that govern-

ment operates in a fish bowl. Results of management decisions are often scrutinized publicly, and are subject to public challenge - for example, in Question Period in the House of Commons. Public service managers must therefore try to ensure that as little political embarrassment as possible flows from their decisions. What all this amounts to is that there is limited encouragement for productive management.

The second of our three study findings is that management feels unduly constrained by administrative procedures which limit managerial authority. Let me give you an actual example. A senior public service manager in Montreal, let's call him Mr. Jones, needed to be in Boston for a series of meetings on some Monday by noon. Ten days before the trip, his secretary made travel and hotel arrangements. It turned out that there were no more seats left on the Monday morning flight, so he was scheduled to fly on Sunday evening and stay an extra night. The hotel rate was $70 per night. One evening some days before his trip it occurred to Jones that there might have been a seat cancellation. He called the airline from his home to enquire. There were no seats in economy class, but there were still some seats in first class. Jones remembered that travel regulations do not allow public servants to fly first class. He nevertheless asked what the difference in fare would be. It was $17 Canadian.

Next morning, he asked his secretary to change the booking. He was going to save $50 by flying first class Monday morning and not staying the extra night in a hotel. But this didn't work out. He was told that first class was not allowed and that he would have to go on Sunday. He argued that this would mean spending $70 to save $17, and that didn't make any sense. He was advised that there is no rule against staying overnight in a hotel, but there is a rule against flying first class.

Jones travelled Sunday evening. The taxpayer saved $17 in air fare, but paid several times that for hotel and meal expenses. When Jones related this incident to us, he said that the unnecessary extra cost was regrettable. He emphasized, however, that the impact on his attitude had been more damaging than the mere waste of money. "Why should I try to



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be frugal," he said, "when regulations force me to be wasteful?" What we see here is that rules generally emphasize processes rather than results. We also see a reliance on systems rather than on managers. We finally see that administrative constraints may help prevent outright bad management, but will rarely encourage good management.

There are other examples. The ones most commonly cited by managers as slow and cumbersome are the personnel rules: recruiting, transferring, dismissing, disciplining or demoting staff is a difficult, time-consuming, and costly process.

The third of our three study findings is that there are few incentives and rewards to productive management, but many disincentives. Incentives for public service executives, when compared to their colleagues in the private sector, are minimal. There are no stock options, no sizeable bonuses, and no limousines. [3]

Yet, when we discussed this with government managers, there was no apparent resentment. Money does not seem to be uppermost in their minds. They did indicate, however, that it would be nice to get some genuine recognition for performance that is especially outstanding.

On the disincentives side, the story is different. I will mention just one or two examples. There is a stigma attached to "lapsing" funds at the end of a fiscal year. The reason is that this can be taken as an indication of a manager's inability to budget and plan properly. This stigma acts as a disincentive to "return" non-essential funds. It acts on the other hand as an incentive to spend funds once they are approved, whether value for money is obtained or not.

Here is another example. Managers report that, during cut- backs, it is not uncommon to impose a budget cut to everybody without discrimination. Such across-the-board cuts affect cost- conscious managers more than those who still have "padding" in their budget. The practice can therefore be a disincentive to running a lean operation. Such disincentives have another effect. Since they discourage productivity management, controls are set up to counteract that inclination. But severe controls can in turn constrain productive management. This again breeds still more controls. Disincentives and more



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controls thus can feed on each other, and both detract from value for money.

When considering this, it is of course important to remember that administrative constraints weren't set up to frustrate managers. Regulations have a reason. They promote equity, for example, in staffing. They reduce public criticism and embarrassment, because it is possible to point to a rule. They provide review mechanisms for control agencies. And they provide a certain measure of peace of mind in a large and complex public service. But regulations can become counterproductive when they are applied "blindly." For example, when differences between departments are not recognized. Or when the costs of constraints are greater than their benefits. Or when different regulations conflict with each other.

So much for our main findings, and for some comments about the study itself. What about other governments, however? And what about solutions? One thing is quite clear. Canada is not unique in having difficulties with problems of constraints. I will give you two examples from West Germany. I have chosen Germany because its forerunner, the Kingdom of Prussia, is sometimes considered to have been the ultimate in bureaucratic efficiency.

About fifteen years ago, the government of North-Rhine Westphalia opened public and private forests for recreational purposes. To facilitate this, the municipalities were obliged to construct footpaths for hikers. And this brought droves of nature lovers out to enjoy themselves. A short time later, the equestrian associations asked for permission to use the forests also. They wanted to ride their horses. But the government had reservations about letting hikers and horses use the same trails. Accordingly, another law was passed that instructed the municipalities to construct an additional set of trails for the exclusive use of horseback riders. This was done and all seemed well. However, it turned out that some collisions between horses and hikers occurred at the points were hiking and riding paths crossed each other.

The government pondered this and ended up making a rule. The rule said that special traffic and right-of-way signs were to be erected at the crossings of hiking paths and riding trails. The



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signs were to be a miniature edition of the regular highway traffic signs. The rule was implemented, and all seemed to go well for a while. But then trouble started again. It seemed that there were some wild riders - or perhaps wild horses - who didn't observe the signs. As a result, there were again collisions between hikers and horses. But now the riders adopted the habit of just galloping away. And the poor hikers never knew which horse had hit them.

These new problems were again duly considered by the government. And the outcome was yet another set of regulations. It was now ordered that every horse that entered a forest had to be registered with the authorities. In addition, the owner of the horse had to keep an official log book which showed where the horse had been at any given time, and who its rider was. Finally, every horse had to be equipped with a chain on which was fastened a license plate which officially identified the horse.

During the first six months of 1981, more than 5,000 horses were registered on this basis. The direct costs to the State are estimated to be between five and six million German Marks per year. The direct costs to the municipalities are about 20 million Marks per year. And a survey shows that the present satisfaction of hikers and riders is far below the level it was before the forests were originally opened for recreation fifteen years ago.

The other example from Germany illustrates the exact opposite outlook on the part of the governing authorities. In 1980 the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg set up a Commission for Simplifying Government Administration. In the Department of Education, the work of the Commission focused on deregulating the administration of schools, colleges and universities. The Department employs 120,000 teachers and other public servants, and it used to manage its affairs with the help of 3,500 administrative directors. As a result of the deregulation effort, this number was reduced by 90% to 350.

The principal aim had been to encourage delegation of authority to the lowest possible level. This would in turn facilitate an increased span of control for individual managers and perhaps even the elimination of management levels. We



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interviewed a number of the managers and teachers, and most of them are elated. They say they can now manage the way they always thought they should. But some of the people are uncomfortable with their new-found autonomy. They find they can no longer "hide" behind regulations, but must make decisions they sometimes find uncomfortable. The reduction in rules was achieved over a period of somewhat less than four years. Our interviews show that most of ficials - including the State Auditor General - have reached the consensus that the purging of rules has had a salutory effect on management in the Department.

Now for a word on our suggested solutions. We made four suggestions in our Report. They were:

1. Encourage and support productive management by making it a key priority.

2. Reduce disincentives, increase managerial authority and clarify accountability.

3. Emphasize the development of managers, giving them the skills they need to manage productively in a difficult environment.

4. Support experiments to improve productive management.

These suggestions are based on the view that there are no quick fixes, and that any attempt at improvement must be seen as a long-term and indeed permanent process. They are also based on the view that it would make little sense simply to abolish all regulations and controls indiscriminantly. What we advocate is an effort to reduce the paradoxes, the perplexities and the problems selectively down to a level that can be tolerated by all concerned.

A number of people have reproached us for not making a specific recommendation to "solve the problem, once and for all. ' ' Our response is that we don't believe there is ' *a" problem that can be solved by "a" solution. What we encountered in our study was a feeling of general frustration, discouragement and low morale. It is not due to any one thing. Indeed, managers told us repeatedly that any given barrier or disincentive can be tolerated. But when innumerable aggravations come together,



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the collective and cumulative effect can be very frustrating. We can perhaps liken the situation to pollution. Acid rain is recognized to be a very serious problem. Yet, we can't solve it simply by ordering up a new atmosphere or by taking our present atmosphere to a terrestrial laundromat. To get rid of acid rain, we have to take very small steps right here on earth.

Similarly with productive management. We doubt that an institutional solution would be very effective; for example, creating a new central agency in charge of productive management or setting up another government-wide process with a catchy acronym. Such an approach would merely mean trying to fight a bureaucracy with another bureaucracy. We believe rather that the solution lies in the direction of encouraging managers to deal with specific difficulties at local levels through individual efforts. To do this, however, managers need leader- ship, encouragement, and support. They need a measure of autonomy; they need skills and motivation; they need freedom and support to experiment; and they need incentives and rewards.

What kinds of incentives and rewards do I have in mind? The traditional approach to incentives has been to give people more benefits: performance bonuses, higher pay, more vacation time, extra leave, greater pension benefits, paid medical plans and similar things. Note well that all these incentives have one thing in common: to enjoy them, you must be away from work! And what do we often do to the work environment itself? We make it unattractive and unrewarding. We bury the managers in regulations, we discourage them from taking risks, we limit their authority, we frustrate their innovation, and above all we put them under strict control. We must have read Lenin who said that control is better than trust.

I believe our challenge in the future will be to develop incentives that make work itself more attractive. I am talking about creating intrinsic satisfaction that comes from being at work rather than away from work. If we could make work itself so interesting that people would rather work than do something else, we might see surprising results. This is perhaps easier said than done. Yet, there seem to be basic human values that most of us share, which might be used to generate greater



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interest in performance. Many people enjoy doing work of high quality and craftsmandhip. Many people enjoy challenges and problem solving tasks. And almost anyone will respond to appeals to serve the public, to enhance living conditions and to improve government operations. I am certain that we have enough intelligence to make work in the public sector more interesting and satisfying and productive than it is now. I am not certain, however, that we have enough courage.

In closing, let me just say a word about the response to our study. From an overall point of view, the response has been positive. We know the government has stated that productive management is to be a top political priority. And we know that efforts are underway to strike an appropriate balance between the desire for greater managerial freedom of action and the need to maintain a system of accountability. Our study was of course not the only event that caused movement in this direction. But it has no doubt helped people understand better the causes of barriers to productive management. And it has helped people realize that management in the public sector is not the total wasteland of incompetents and unresponsiveness it is sometimes made out to be.

Somebody noted the following: it is possible in Canada to get a passport in a week. You can get a driver's license in a day. You can get a flu shot in an hour. And you can dial a long distance telephone call to almost any other telephone in the world within a few seconds. All these tasks are being performed by large, bureaucratic organizations that supposedly do not work very well. And yet they do. At the same time, there are large areas for improvement.

"More with less" is the theme of these sessions. The aim is to provide better or the same public services with fewer public funds. I am sure that removing some of the barriers to productive management will carry us a considerable way in that direction.

NOTES l.This article is a revision of remarks made during Professional Development

week, made before Certified Management Accountants and the Financial



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Management Institute, November 28, 1985, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. 2. In the United States, there is a more pronounced separation between the Legis-

lature and the Executive. The President is not a member of Congress, and Secretaries of Departments are appointed rather than elected. In Canada, the Prime Minister and all Ministers of Departments (with rare exceptions) are elected Members of Parliament. Also, in the United States there is a layer of political executives who typically leave when a new Administration takes over. Canadian public servants, including the Deputy Ministers, do not typically leave when a new government assumes power.

3. There are about 2,250 Senior Executives in the Canadian Public Service. Their salary is between $54,000 and $93,000 per year. In addition, there are about 120 Deputy Ministers (also career public servants) whose annual salary ranges from $86,000 to $120,000.

REFERENCES "Constraints to Productive Management in the Public Sector," in Report of the

Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Fiscal Year Ended 31 March 1983, Ottawa, 1983.

Quotes: Senior Executives Talk About Management in the Public Sector. Otto Brodtrick and Richard Paton, Ottawa, Office of the Auditor General, 1982.



Documents

ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO PRODUCTIVE MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC-SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE AT SENIOR LEVELS