Electronic Voting and Automation

Electronic Voting and Electronic Voting and AutomationAutomation

Cheryl A. YagerCheryl A. YagerUnion UniversityUnion University

February 13, 2004February 13, 2004Capstone Seminar PresentationCapstone Seminar Presentation

AgendaAgenda

History of voting machinesHistory of voting machines Fundamental ProblemsFundamental Problems Desirable Characteristics of Voting Desirable Characteristics of Voting

MachinesMachines In-Depth Look - Lack of Audit TrailsIn-Depth Look - Lack of Audit Trails In-Depth Look - Lack of SecurityIn-Depth Look - Lack of Security In-Depth Look - Lack of UsabilityIn-Depth Look - Lack of Usability Congressman Rush Holt’s ProposalCongressman Rush Holt’s Proposal

History of Voting Machines – Before History of Voting Machines – Before BallotsBallots

Judges administered an oath to a Judges administered an oath to a voter, where the voter swore on a voter, where the voter swore on a bible that he was entitled to vote and bible that he was entitled to vote and had not already done sohad not already done so

No right to a secret ballot, voter No right to a secret ballot, voter called out his choices to an election called out his choices to an election clerkclerk



- PROBLEMS -- PROBLEMS -

Lack of privacy – voters could be Lack of privacy – voters could be bribed or intimidated to vote a bribed or intimidated to vote a certain waycertain way

Vote selling – voters could be paid to Vote selling – voters could be paid to vote a certain wayvote a certain way

History of Voting Machines – The First History of Voting Machines – The First BallotsBallots

Ballot (def.) – translation of the Italian word Ballot (def.) – translation of the Italian word ballota, meaning ballballota, meaning ball

Ancient Athens used “ballots” by depositing Ancient Athens used “ballots” by depositing little clay balls into an appropriate clay potlittle clay balls into an appropriate clay pot

Voter was given a white ball and a black ball – Voter was given a white ball and a black ball – white was a selection, black was a rejectionwhite was a selection, black was a rejection

Voting machines consisted of a ballot container Voting machines consisted of a ballot container for each candidate and voters would place for each candidate and voters would place their ballot into the appropriate containertheir ballot into the appropriate container

History of Voting Machines – The First History of Voting Machines – The First BallotsBallots


Ballot box – it was possible for voters Ballot box – it was possible for voters to “stuff the ballot box” when no one to “stuff the ballot box” when no one was lookingwas looking

Lack of privacy – voters could be Lack of privacy – voters could be bribed or intimidated to vote a bribed or intimidated to vote a certain waycertain way

Vote selling – voters could be paid to Vote selling – voters could be paid to vote a certain wayvote a certain way

History of Voting Machines – Paper History of Voting Machines – Paper BallotsBallots

In 1629, first paper ballots were used In 1629, first paper ballots were used in the U.S. for the election of a Salem in the U.S. for the election of a Salem Church pastorChurch pastor

Ballots were either provided by Ballots were either provided by candidates, political parties, or the candidates, political parties, or the voters themselvesvoters themselves

Voters would write-in the names of Voters would write-in the names of their choices for various officestheir choices for various offices



By the mid 19By the mid 19thth century, parties were century, parties were printing ballots (party tickets) printing ballots (party tickets) naming all the candidates endorsed naming all the candidates endorsed by the party by the respective officeby the party by the respective office

By the 1880’s, parties were By the 1880’s, parties were intentionally designing ballots so that intentionally designing ballots so that names could not be written in and names could not be written in and voters must vote “straight party” voters must vote “straight party”



- PROBLEMS -- PROBLEMS - Ballot box – it was possible for voters to “stuff the ballot Ballot box – it was possible for voters to “stuff the ballot

box” when no one was lookingbox” when no one was looking Lack of privacy – voters could be bribed or intimidated to Lack of privacy – voters could be bribed or intimidated to

vote a certain way, handwriting could give them away, vote a certain way, handwriting could give them away, abandoned requirement that voters not disclose their abandoned requirement that voters not disclose their votesvotes

Vote selling – voters could be paid to vote a certain wayVote selling – voters could be paid to vote a certain way Hard to use – developing ballots made it intentionally Hard to use – developing ballots made it intentionally

difficult to read and alter to fit the voter’s intent.difficult to read and alter to fit the voter’s intent. Hard to determine a winner – ballots were sorted by ticket Hard to determine a winner – ballots were sorted by ticket

style, then each style counted, along with the strike-outs. style, then each style counted, along with the strike-outs. Each candidate’s total was determined by subtracting the Each candidate’s total was determined by subtracting the strike-outs from the votes. Finally, all write-ins and strike-outs from the votes. Finally, all write-ins and handwritten additions would be counted and added. Need handwritten additions would be counted and added. Need to interpret handwritingto interpret handwriting

History of Voting Machines – Australian Paper History of Voting Machines – Australian Paper BallotsBallots

Created in 1858 for an election in Created in 1858 for an election in Victoria, Australia, adopted in the Victoria, Australia, adopted in the United States in 1888United States in 1888

Ballots were printed by the Ballots were printed by the government and standardized, listing government and standardized, listing all the candidates for each officeall the candidates for each office

Voters would go to a polling place Voters would go to a polling place and receive one ballot for voting and receive one ballot for voting



New York and Massachusetts were New York and Massachusetts were the first U.S. states to use the the first U.S. states to use the “Australian Secret Ballot” in 1888“Australian Secret Ballot” in 1888

Southern U.S states used the Southern U.S states used the Australian ballot, but requested that Australian ballot, but requested that voters scratch out the rejected voters scratch out the rejected names, rather than marking choices names, rather than marking choices with “X”s with “X”s




Hard to determine a winner – Australian Hard to determine a winner – Australian ballot requires interpretation on what is ballot requires interpretation on what is considered a “valid vote”. Michigan law considered a “valid vote”. Michigan law (as of 2001) states that a vote is valid if (as of 2001) states that a vote is valid if the intersection of the X or corner of the intersection of the X or corner of the check is within or on the border of the check is within or on the border of the box printed on the ballotthe box printed on the ballot

XValid Invalid

History of Voting Machines – Lever History of Voting Machines – Lever MachinesMachines

Lever voting machines were first Lever voting machines were first used in Lockport, NY in 1892used in Lockport, NY in 1892

Jacob H. Myers (inventor) stated that Jacob H. Myers (inventor) stated that machines were designed to “protect machines were designed to “protect mechanically the voter from mechanically the voter from rascaldom, and make the process of rascaldom, and make the process of casting the ballot perfectly plain, casting the ballot perfectly plain, simple, and secret”simple, and secret”


Voters cast their votes by closing the Voters cast their votes by closing the curtain (using the main center lever), curtain (using the main center lever), making their selections by depressing the making their selections by depressing the appropriate lever, and allows their votes to appropriate lever, and allows their votes to be tallied by opening the curtain and be tallied by opening the curtain and resetting all the depressed leversresetting all the depressed levers

Lever machines have been out of Lever machines have been out of production since 1982, but are still in use production since 1982, but are still in use across the country, including New Yorkacross the country, including New York




No audit trail – there’s no proof that No audit trail – there’s no proof that the vote was recorded correctlythe vote was recorded correctly

Loss of votes (the “99” syndrome) – Loss of votes (the “99” syndrome) – gears that weren’t maintained gears that weren’t maintained frequently recorded 99 as the frequently recorded 99 as the number of votes a candidate got, number of votes a candidate got, couldn’t get to 100 because of gear couldn’t get to 100 because of gear failurefailure

History of Voting Machines – Punch Card History of Voting Machines – Punch Card BallotsBallots

Herman Hollerith developed the punch card Herman Hollerith developed the punch card for vital statistics tabulation for the for vital statistics tabulation for the Baltimore Board of HealthBaltimore Board of Health

IBM furthered Hollerith’s work by developing IBM furthered Hollerith’s work by developing pre-scored punch cards and the Port-A-pre-scored punch cards and the Port-A-Punch card punch Punch card punch

In early 1960’s, Professor Joseph P. Harris In early 1960’s, Professor Joseph P. Harris furthered IBM’s work and developed the furthered IBM’s work and developed the Harris Votomatic company to sell his voting Harris Votomatic company to sell his voting machinesmachines

In 1965, IBM bought the Harris Votomatic In 1965, IBM bought the Harris Votomatic companycompany


Votomatic ballots contain 228 or 235 Votomatic ballots contain 228 or 235 voting positions (by number)voting positions (by number)

Candidates are referenced by Candidates are referenced by number in a book placed in the number in a book placed in the voting boothvoting booth

Voters use a stylus to poke out the Voters use a stylus to poke out the number position corresponding to number position corresponding to the chosen candidate – remaining the chosen candidate – remaining hole is counted as a votehole is counted as a vote




Hard to determine a winner (The “hanging Hard to determine a winner (The “hanging chad” problem) – Punch cards may require chad” problem) – Punch cards may require interpretation on what is considered a interpretation on what is considered a “valid vote”. “valid vote”.

Hard to understand – The 2000 Hard to understand – The 2000 Presidential election was a nightmarePresidential election was a nightmare

Voter Fraud – The book used to identify Voter Fraud – The book used to identify candidates could intentionally be swapped candidates could intentionally be swapped or marked incorrectlyor marked incorrectly

History of Voting Machines – Optical History of Voting Machines – Optical ScannersScanners

- Mark-Sense Ballots -- Mark-Sense Ballots -

Mark-sense scanning was developed Mark-sense scanning was developed in 1937 by IBMin 1937 by IBM

Similar to SAT or ACT testing, where Similar to SAT or ACT testing, where graphite pencil marks are detected graphite pencil marks are detected on paper by their electrical on paper by their electrical conductivityconductivity

Mark-sense ballots were first used in Mark-sense ballots were first used in 19621962


- Mark-Sense Ballots -- Mark-Sense Ballots -



Usability Problems – If voters didn’t Usability Problems – If voters didn’t fill in completely their choice, it fill in completely their choice, it might not get recorded correctly might not get recorded correctly as a vote. Stray marks on a ballot as a vote. Stray marks on a ballot could also invalidate it, even could also invalidate it, even though the human voter may not though the human voter may not detect such a mark as being a detect such a mark as being a threat. threat.

History of Voting Machines – DRE Voting History of Voting Machines – DRE Voting MachinesMachines

DRE: Direct Recording ElectronicDRE: Direct Recording Electronic

PC computers with a touch screen, PC computers with a touch screen, packaged in a secure case, so a packaged in a secure case, so a keyboard or mouse can’t be plugged keyboard or mouse can’t be plugged into it during the electioninto it during the election

Contains a UPS (uninterruptable Contains a UPS (uninterruptable power supply) for back-uppower supply) for back-up

History of Voting Machines – DRE History of Voting Machines – DRE Voting MachinesVoting Machines

Fundamental ProblemsFundamental Problems- The Voting System Standards Program - The Voting System Standards Program

-- As early as the 1970’s, it was As early as the 1970’s, it was

recognized that there were problems recognized that there were problems with electronic voting machineswith electronic voting machines

Government didn’t have enough Government didn’t have enough expertise in the technology being expertise in the technology being usedused

Government conducted a study to Government conducted a study to create guidelinescreate guidelines

Fundamental ProblemsFundamental Problems- The Voting System Standards Program - The Voting System Standards Program

-- In 1975, released a paper “Effective Use of In 1975, released a paper “Effective Use of

Computing Technology in Vote-Tallying” Computing Technology in Vote-Tallying” Biggest cause for computer related problems: lack of Biggest cause for computer related problems: lack of

knowledge and appropriate technical skills by knowledge and appropriate technical skills by government officials to create and implement government officials to create and implement standards for hardware and software to be tested and standards for hardware and software to be tested and evaluated against.evaluated against.

Recommended to improve the procedures used to Recommended to improve the procedures used to design and develop such machines, the extensive use design and develop such machines, the extensive use of audit trails and other internal controls, and further of audit trails and other internal controls, and further documentation authenticating the results of electionsdocumentation authenticating the results of elections

Unfortunately, none of these performance and testing Unfortunately, none of these performance and testing standards has helped solve the problems of DRE standards has helped solve the problems of DRE voting machines voting machines

In-Depth Look: Characteristics of Voting In-Depth Look: Characteristics of Voting MachinesMachines

Anonymity: the ability for the voter to remain Anonymity: the ability for the voter to remain anonymous throughout the voting process. anonymous throughout the voting process.

Scalability: the ability for the voting machine Scalability: the ability for the voting machine to be used among all size groups of people, to be used among all size groups of people, small or large.small or large.

Speed: the amount of time it will take a voter Speed: the amount of time it will take a voter to use the system. to use the system.

Audit capability: refers to its ability to prove Audit capability: refers to its ability to prove the votes if need be, for example, if a recount the votes if need be, for example, if a recount is necessary.is necessary.

Accuracy: the votes have been accurately Accuracy: the votes have been accurately reported and counted as the voter intended.reported and counted as the voter intended.

In-Depth Look: Problems DRE Voting In-Depth Look: Problems DRE Voting MachinesMachines

- Lack of Audit Trails -- Lack of Audit Trails -

DRE machines are a paperless DRE machines are a paperless processprocess

No way to reconstruct an election or No way to reconstruct an election or provide a recountprovide a recount


- Lack of Audit Trails - Solutions - Lack of Audit Trails - Solutions

Move away from DRE machines to a Move away from DRE machines to a paper-based process with an audit paper-based process with an audit trailtrail

Implement a voter-verifiable audit Implement a voter-verifiable audit trail, where the DRE machine prints a trail, where the DRE machine prints a receiptreceipt


- Lack of Security -- Lack of Security -

Unintentional programming errors – Unintentional programming errors – missed semi-colonmissed semi-colon

Intentional programming errors – Intentional programming errors – “Trojan horses” “Trojan horses”

Outside threats – hackers, corrupt Outside threats – hackers, corrupt poll-workerspoll-workers


- Lack of Security - Solutions - Lack of Security - Solutions Better development, testing and scrutiny Better development, testing and scrutiny

of code by vendorsof code by vendors Allow outside, independent audits of code Allow outside, independent audits of code

by individuals designated by the by individuals designated by the government government

Better testing by states – Texas is noted as Better testing by states – Texas is noted as having a 3-step processhaving a 3-step process

Government needs to impose standards Government needs to impose standards on vendorson vendors


- Lack of Usability -- Lack of Usability - Major problem – lack of understanding on how to use Major problem – lack of understanding on how to use

them. Voters aren’t being trained. This is more them. Voters aren’t being trained. This is more apparent in older adults compared to younger apparent in older adults compared to younger adults. adults.

The DRE machines also provide accessibility issues, The DRE machines also provide accessibility issues, especially for the disabled. especially for the disabled.

Poll-workers are also not trained on how the system Poll-workers are also not trained on how the system works, so they can usually offer little or no help, works, so they can usually offer little or no help, especially during the inevitable system especially during the inevitable system malfunctions.malfunctions.

Issues usually stem from budgetary constraints or Issues usually stem from budgetary constraints or lack of programmer knowledge on what the users lack of programmer knowledge on what the users need. Often times, trade-offs need to be made and need. Often times, trade-offs need to be made and people sacrifice usability for security or even moneypeople sacrifice usability for security or even money


- Lack of Usability - Case Study- Lack of Usability - Case Study Benjamin Bederson, Paul Herrnson, and Richard Niemi Benjamin Bederson, Paul Herrnson, and Richard Niemi

conducted a study on the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting conducted a study on the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting systemsystem

Conclusions – Conclusions – Inconsistent Terminology/Labeling (5 reviewers) Inconsistent Terminology/Labeling (5 reviewers) Color usage (4 reviewers)Color usage (4 reviewers) Inserting/Removing card (4 reviewers)Inserting/Removing card (4 reviewers) Help / Instructions (4 reviewers)Help / Instructions (4 reviewers) Layout (4 reviewers)Layout (4 reviewers) System information shown (4 reviewers)System information shown (4 reviewers) Glare on screen (3 reviewers)Glare on screen (3 reviewers) Changes / Feedback (2 reviewers)Changes / Feedback (2 reviewers) Poor graphics/design quality (2 reviewers)Poor graphics/design quality (2 reviewers) Privacy (1 reviewer)Privacy (1 reviewer)


- Lack of Usability - Solutions - Lack of Usability - Solutions

Training for all registered votersTraining for all registered voters Special training for all poll-workersSpecial training for all poll-workers Require that vendors work with Require that vendors work with

states to determine what states to determine what functionality is needed functionality is needed

A Solution: Rush Holt’s BillA Solution: Rush Holt’s Bill- H.R. 2239 -- H.R. 2239 -

The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 (H.R. 2239) was created on May 22, 2003 as a response to (H.R. 2239) was created on May 22, 2003 as a response to address the overwhelming concerns from election reform address the overwhelming concerns from election reform specialists and computer scientists with respect to the integrity specialists and computer scientists with respect to the integrity of future elections. of future elections.

Proposal:Proposal: Use of a voter-verified paper trail in all voting machinesUse of a voter-verified paper trail in all voting machines Prohibiting the use of undisclosed software and wireless Prohibiting the use of undisclosed software and wireless

communication devices in voting systems and limits communication devices in voting systems and limits electronic communication to outgoing reports of vote totals electronic communication to outgoing reports of vote totals onlyonly

Requirement that electronic voting systems be provided for Requirement that electronic voting systems be provided for persons with disabilities by January 2006persons with disabilities by January 2006

Requirement that mandatory surprise recounts will take place Requirement that mandatory surprise recounts will take place in .5% of domestic jurisdictions and .5% of overseas in .5% of domestic jurisdictions and .5% of overseas jurisdictionsjurisdictions

Requirement that all voting systems must meet these Requirement that all voting systems must meet these requirements in time for the general election in November requirements in time for the general election in November 20042004

A Solution: Rush Holt’s BillA Solution: Rush Holt’s Bill- H.R. 2239 -- H.R. 2239 -

States may try to object to the bill, stating that States may try to object to the bill, stating that there is no way they could possibly meet these there is no way they could possibly meet these requirements.requirements.

Holt’s bill tries to address such issues by Holt’s bill tries to address such issues by allowing states to request additional funds from allowing states to request additional funds from the government to meet these requirements the government to meet these requirements

Bill also allows states that think they can’t Bill also allows states that think they can’t meet the voter-verifiable paper trail meet the voter-verifiable paper trail requirement by November’s election to use a requirement by November’s election to use a more traditional paper system, funded by the more traditional paper system, funded by the government, as an interim process until the government, as an interim process until the DRE machines are updated.DRE machines are updated.

QUESTIONS?QUESTIONS?

Documents

Electronic Voting and Automation