i

ELECTORAL POLITICSIN

NWFP. 1988-1999

Submitted byMUHAMMAD SHAKEEL AHMAD

Supervised byDr. NAUREEN TALHA

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PAKISTAN STUDIESQUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY

ISLAMABAD2010

ii

ELECTORAL POLITICSIN

NWFP. 1988-1999

A dissertation submitted to the National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-I-Azam University Islamabad (Pakistan) in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Pakistan Studies.

ByMUHAMMAD SHAKEEL AHMAD

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PAKISTAN STUDIESQUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY

ISLAMABAD2010

iii

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research, and that it has

not been submitted concurrently to any other university for any other degree.

Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad

iv

CONTENTSS. NO TITLES PAGE NO1 LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND DIAGRAMS vii2 ACRONYMS xi3 GLOSSARY xii4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT xiv5 ABSTRACT xv6 INTRODUCTION

Aims and Objective of the StudyResearch Question-Hypothesis and ModelsSignificance of the ProblemReview of LiteratureResearch MethodologySummary of Chapters

xvixviixviiixixxxixxxiii

PART-1 THEORIES AND CONTEXTS7 CHAPTER-1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF

ELECTORAL POLITICS1.1 Introduction1.2 Electoral Politics and the political organization1.3 Electoral politics and political participation1.4 Militaricracy to Electocracy1.5 Impact of elections on legislature1.6 Basic practices in Electoral Politics1.7 Reforms in Electoral Politics1.8 Conclusions

1-32

17141923262830

8 CHAPTER-2: NWFP’S ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY2.1 Introduction2.2 Central NWFP2.2.1 Geography and Population2.2.2 Agriculture and canal system2.2.3 Economy2.2.4 Politics2.3.1 Northern NWFP2.3.2 Geography and Population2.3.3 Economy2.3.4 Politics2.4.1 Southern NWFP2.4.2 Geography and Population2.4.3 Economy2.4.4 Politics2.5.1 North-Eastern NWFP2.5.2 Economy2.5.3 Politics2.6 Conclusions

33-61333738384143464648495152525355565760

9 CHAPTER-3: ELECTORAL HISTORY OF NWFP3. Introduction3.1 British Period (1932-47)3.2 Legislative Council Elections 3.3 Elections 19373.4 Elections 19463.5 Referendum in NWFP 19473.6 Post Partition (1947-1955)3.7 Elections during Ayub Era (1959-65)3.8 Conclusions

62-89626264657176818586

v

PART-II CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS10 CHAPTER-4: VOTING TRENDS IN NWFP

4.1 Introduction4.2 Characteristics of Sample data4.3 Interest in Politics and Information4.4 Awareness and Access to Electoral Process4.5 Trust in Institution4.6 Perception of Electoral fraud, Coercion and Violence.4.7 Perception of Democracy4.8 Electoral and Democratic Participation.4.9 Conclusions

90-1899097104113127142160165178

11 CHAPTER-5: ELECTORAL POLITICS: A CASE STUDY OF PESHAWAR.5. Introduction5.1 Electoral Results5.2 Urban Rural Periphery Polling Stations5.3 Industrial Polling Stations.5.4 Lower Middle Class Polling Stations5.5 Middle Class Polling Stations.5.6 Upper Class Polling Stations5.7 Old City Polling Stations5.8 Peshawar Cantonment Polling Stations5.9 Constituencies Results5.10 National Assembly NA-15.11 National Assembly NA-25.12 National Assembly NA-35.13 Case Study NA-15.14 The Constituency5.15 The Candidate5.16 NA-1 results5.17 Comparison of 1988-1997 Election Results.5.18 Gender Differences in Voting behavior5.19 Party/ Leader Identification in Peshawar5.20 Conclusions

190-215

190191192192193193194194194194195199201202203204206209209211213

12 CHAPTER-6: PARTY POLITICS IN NWFP 1988-1999.6. Introduction6.1 Party politics at Macro Level in NWFP.6.1.1 Political Legacy of PPP6.1.2 PPP Organisational weaknesses6.1.3 Legacy of General Zia-ul-Haq6.1.4 Patronage of Nawaz Sharif6.1.5 New Trade and Business activities in NWFP in 1980s6.1.6 The Rise of Traders6.1.7 Decline of Organised labour6.1.8 Ethnic/Regional Legacy of ANP in NWFP6.1.9 Politics of Pashto in NWFP6.1.10 Religious Legacy in NWFP: Establishment of

Conservatism in NWFP.6.2.1 Party Politics at Micro level in NWFP.6.2.1.1 Central NWFP6.2.2 North-Eastern NWFP (Hazara)6.2.3 Northern NWFP6.2.4 Southern NWFP

216-27421621218219223225227228230232233235

243243249254261

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6.3 Conclusions 268

13 CHAPTER-7: THE URBAN-RURAL DIVISION OF ELECTORAL POLITICS.7.1. Introduction7.2 Urban-Rural division in Historical Perspective7.3 The Jagirdars vs the Bureaucrats 1947-19587.4 The Ayub Era 1958-19697.5 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 1970-19777.6 General Zia-ul-Haq 1977-19887.7 The Urban Rural Divide in Electoral Politics7.8 Analysis of Constituency Results in Urban Rural NWFP7.9 Conclusions

275-297

275275277278280284284293295

14 CHAPTER-8: SOCIOLGICAL DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL POLITICS IN NWFP.8. Introduction8.1 Gender8.2 Women in electoral politics of NWFP 8.3 Gender differences in voting behaviour 8.4 Rigging in Female Polling Stations8.5 Conservatism of Female voters 8.6 PML (N) Election Campaigns 8.7 Other gender related findings8.7.1 Impacts of Candidate’s Gender on Voting8.7.2 Gender differences in support for religious parties 8.7.3 Female voter education 8.8 Class8.9 Postal Ballots 8.10 Islamabad Results 8.11 Age 8.12 Literacy and levels of education 8.13 Minorities in electoral politics of NWFP 8.14: Religious Determinants.8.15 Sectarianism 8.16 Maulvis, Pirs, and Sajjada Nashins8.17 Factionalism 8.18 Biradari8.19 Conclusions

298-332

298298300303304305305305306307308310311313315316318319320321323328

15 CHAPTER-9: POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL POLITICS IN NWFP.9. Introduction9.1 Party leader identification in NWFP.9.2 Voting for delivery9.4 Democratization of patronage politics 9.5 Patronage and legislature 9.6 Commercialization of politics 9.7 Political instability 9.8 National/provincial issue orientation9.9 Conclusions

333-349

333333336339341342343344347

16 CONCLUSIONS 350-35417 BIBLIOGRAPHY 355-36518 APPENDIX-1: QUESTIONARE 366-372

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LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND DIAGRAMSCHAPTER-1Figure 1: How an Election Result is Determined.Diagram-I: Paradigm for the study of electoral Behaviour.Diagram-II: Michigan Model of Voter Behaviour.CHAPTER-2Map 2.1: Map of NWFP.Table 2.1: Election Results by NWFP Regions.Table 2.3: Voting Detail Table 2.5: Socio economic comparison of four NWFP regions. Table 2.6: Participation rate of economically active population (Central NWFP)Table 2.7: Results Showing Close electoral competition less than 5000 votes and

greater than1001 and more close contest i.e less than 1000 votes (Both NA and PA):Table 2.8: Voting Detail Table 2.11: Central NWFP Election Result Table 2.12: Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and

above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1988 (Northern NWFP).Table 2.14: Northern NWFP Election ResultTable 2.16: Voting detail Table 2.17: Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and

above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1998 (Southern NWFP)Table 2.18: Southern NWFP Election Result Table 2.21: Voting Detail Table 2.22. Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and

above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1988 (North-Eastern NWFP).Table 2.24: North-eastern NWFP Election Result Table 2.26: Voting DetailCHAPTER-3Table 3.1: Results of the 1937 Elections in the NWFP.Table 3.2: 1937 elections in the NWFP. Distribution of the Muslim Rural seats by

districts:Table 3.3: Results of the elections to the NWFP Legislative Assembly, 1946Table 3.4: Distribution of Muslim Rural seats by districts in the Legislative Assembly

elections in the NWFP 1946:Table 3.5 Results of 1946 ElectionsTable 3.6: The detailed picture of referendum is shown in following table:Table 3.7: Table showing the turn out in seven Constituencies of Hazara. Comparison

between 1946 elections and the 1947 Referendum.Table 3.8: Table showing the turn out in the Muslim Rural constituencies of

Peshawar and Mardan Districts. Comparison between 1946 elections and the 1947 Referendum

Table 3.9: Table showing the detail of Elections in NWFP, 1947-1997CHAPTER-4Table 4.1.1 a: Distribution of Urban and Rural Population.Table 4.1.1 b: Urban and Rural localities:Table 4.2.1a: Age and Marriage Status, by Gender (Questions Q2, 3, 1)Table 4.2.1b: Employment Status, by Gender (Q10)Table 4.2.1 c: Occupation Classification, by Gender and Urban/Rural Classification Table 4.2.1d: Average Household Size and Housing Tenure, by regions of NWFP:

Owner of Respondents' Home (Q7)Table 4.2.1e: Percent Population per Household Income Category, in Rural and

Urban Areas:Table: 4.2.2a Educational Attainment, by Gender and Urban-Rural ClassificationTable 4.2.2 b: Language Distribution.Table 4.2.2 c: Distribution of Mother Tongue Speakers Across four regions of

NWFP: Percent Respondents Speaking Mother Tongue in regions.Table 4.2.2d: Single-Language Literacy, by regions and Urban-Rural ClassificationTable 4.2.2e: Urdu, English, and Mother Tongue Literacy; by Mother Tongue,

Urban/Rural Classification, Gender, and Regions wise.Table 4.2.2f: Urdu Speakers, by Mother Tongue and ProvinceTable 4.3.1 a: Self-Reported Political Interest, by regions (figures in %)Table 4.3.1b: Political Interest Index by Age, regions, Income, and Educational

Attainment

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Table 4.3.2a: Frequency of Media Use.Table 4.3.2b: Use of Television and Radio, by Occupational ClassificationTable 4.3.2 c: Use of Television and Radio, by Language GroupsTable 4.3.3a: Sources of Political Information Volunteered by Respondents, by

Demographic GroupsTable 4.3.4a: Preferred Modes of Election Information:Table 4.3.4b: Distribution of Newspaper and Broadcast Media Preferences for

Election Information, by Regions and Milieu.Table 4.3.4 c: Distribution of Newspaper and Broadcast Media Preferences for

Election Information, by Level of Political Interest (Index)Table 4.3.4 d: Preference for Posters/Illustrations as a Preferred Mode of Receiving

Election Information, by Class, Education, and Urban/Rural MilieuTable 4.4.1a: Awareness of Time Period for 2007/2008 ElectionTable 4.4.1b: Awareness of Registration Location.Table 4.4.1c: Perception of voters.Table 4.4.1d: Index of Election Awareness: Number of Policies of Which

Respondent is Aware.Table 4.4.2 a: Respondent Exposure to National Door-to-Door Registration Process

by Demographic Category:Table 4.4.2 b: Likelihood of Registering Outside of Home if Travel Required, by

Respondent Distance to Election Registration Office / District Returning Officer Likelihood of Registering if Travel to EC Required

Table 4.4.2 c: Possession of Different Forms of Identification (Q48)Table 4.4.2 d: Possession of NIC (Q48)Table 4.4.3 a: Importance of Lack of Identification at Polling Station as Reason for

Non-Voting, by Class and Education.Table 4.4.4a: Attribution of Election (Un)Fairness to National versus Local

Government, by Age, Educational Attainment, and ProvinceTable 4.4.4 b: Perception about the Fairness of upcoming elections as Compared with

Past Elections:Table 4.4.4c: Trust in Election Commission of Pakistan, by Milieu, Class, and

GenderTable 4.4.4d: Confidence that Eligible Voters in Community Will Be Registered,

by Regions and Gender:Table 4.4.4e: Confidence in the Accuracy of the Electoral List in Your Community.Table 4.5.1 a: Trust in National and Provincial Assembly, by Milieu, Class, and

Gender.Table 4.5.1b: Likelihood of Recommending MNA or MPA to Resolve Local

Problems, by Gender and Educational Attainment.Table 4.5.1c: Perceived Power of the Provincial Assembly, by ProvinceTable 4.5.4: Trust on Police:Table 5.6: Likelihood of Recommending Local Government to Solve a Problem,

by Age, Regional Milieu, Class, and Educational AttainmentTable 4.5.8a: Likelihood of Recommending Religious Leaders to Solve a Problem, Class and

Educational Attainment.Table 4.5.8b: Likelihood of Recommending “Feudal Leaders” to Solve a Problem.Table 4.5.8C: Likelihood of Recommending Biradari Leaders to Solve a Problem.Table 4.6.1: Corruption in Political Parties (Q53e)Table 4.6.2: Importance of Perceived Election Fairness in Decision to Abstain in

One or More Elections, by Educational Attainment.Table 4.6.3a: Statements that Best Describes Responsibility for Rigging Elections,

by Province.Table 4.6.4a: Importance of Fear of Violence in Decisions to Abstain from Voting,

by ProvinceTable 4.6.4b: Importance of Fear of Religious Leaders' Influence in Decisions to

Abstain from Voting, by Province.Table 4.6.4c: Importance of Being Convinced by Family Members in Decision to

Vote:Table 4.6.4d: Importance of Fear of Danger in Motivation for Voting.Table 4.6.5: Most Likely Targets / Victims of Electoral Intimidation and ViolenceTable 4.7.2: Pakistan's Citizens have Power to Influence Government.Table 4.7.3a: Most Important Factors Essential for DemocracyTable 4.7.3b: Essential Features of Democracy (Response Types)Table 4.8.1a: Past Electoral Participation (Number of Elections in Which

Respondent has Voted)Table 4.8.2a: Voting out of a sense of duty, by demographic subgroup

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Table 4.8.2b: Difference respondent's vote will make in 2008, by demographic subgroup:

Table 4.8.5: Participation in 2002 and 2005 Elections, by Political Interest

CHAPTER-5Table 5.1: Gender Balance during 1988-1997 elections:Table 5.2: Breakup of population in urban and rural areas of NWFP:Table 5.3: Literacy Ratio (10 years and above) by Sex, Rural/Urban areas.Table 5.4: Party Position in PeshawarTable 5.5: Registered Votes and Votes Polled in NWFP Provincial AssemblyTable 5.6: Party’s position in National Assembly from Peshawar:Table 5.7: Number of polling stations in Peshawar.Table 5.8: Peshawar City1988-1997 NA Election Results by electoral/polling

areas Categories.Table 5.9: Peshawar Constituency Results:Table 5.10: PPP electoral result in Peshawar.Table 5.11: ANP vote position in NA-1.Table 5.12: Votes cast infavour of each party:Table 5.13: NA-1 Election Results by Gender and ClassTable 5.14: Results of ANP:Table 5.15: Comparison of Provincial Assembly and National Assembly Election

Results:

CHAPTER-6Table 6.1: Voting percentage of political parties in NWFP.Table 6.2: ANP electoral situation during 1988-1997Table 6.3: Party politics in central NWFP (National Assembly)Table 6.4: Party politics in central NWFP (Provincial Assembly)Table 6.5: Party position in Peshawar (National Assembly)Table 6.6: Party position in MardanTable 6.7: Party position in CharsadaTable 6.8: Party’s position during 1988-1997 in NowsheraTable 6.9: Party’s position during 1988-1997Table 6.10: National Assembly results from Hazara during 1988-1997Table 6.11: Provincial assembly results from Hazara during 1988-1997Table 6.12: Party’s position in Abbottabad during 1988-1997Table 6.13: Party’s position in Mansehra during 1988-1997Table 6.14: Party’s position in Battagram during 1988-1997Table 6.15: Party’s position in Kohistan DistrictTable 6.16: Party’s Position in Haripur district during 1988-1997Table 6.17: National Assembly’s situation in Northern NWFPTable 6.18: Provincial Assembly’s situation in Northern NWFPTable 6.19: Party’s Position in Swat DistrictTable 6.20: Party’s Position in Upper Dir DistrictTable 6.21: Party’s Position in Lower Dir DistrictTable 6.22: Party’s Position in Chitral DistrictTable 6.23: Party position in Shangla DistrictTable 6.24: Party’s Position in Malakand:Table 6.25: Party’s Position in Buner 1988-1997Table 6.26: Party position on National Assembly seats from Southern NWFPTable 6.27: Party’s position on Provincial Assembly seats from Southern NWFPTable 6.28: Position in Kohat:Table 6.29: Party position in Bannu District during 1988-1999Table 6.30: Party’s Position in DI. KhanTable 6.31: Party’s Position in TankTable 6.32: Party’s Position in HanguTable 6.33: Party’s Position in KarakCHAPTER-7Table 7.1: Urban and rural population in NWFP.Table 7.2: Showing the Name and party affiliation of winning candidates

(National Assembly) in 1970 elections.Table 7.3: Name and party affiliation of winning candidates (Provincial

Assembly) in 1970 electionsTable 7.4: PPP/PDA Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results of

National Assembly SeatsTable 7.5: IJI/PML-N Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on

National Assembly seats

x

Table 7.6: ANP Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on National Assembly seats

Table 7.7: Table Showing JUI-F/Religious Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on National Assembly seats

CHAPTER-8Table 8.1: Summary of 1993 Urban and Rural Results by GenderTable 8.2: Large City Election Results (NA) by GenderTable 8.3: Detail of female candidates for NWFP Provincial AssemblyTable 8.4: Detail of female candidates for National Assembly in NWFP:Table 8.5: Detail of rigging at Female Polling stationsTable 8.6: Increase in registered voters in NWFP 1990 and 1993.Table 8.7: Status of religious parties from NWFP in National AssemblyTable 8.8: Lower and Middle/Upper Class Neighbourhood Voting Patterns

(Provincial Assembly) in NWFP cities.Table 8.9: Detail of NWFP 1997 Postal Ballot ResultsTable 8.10: Exit Poll Survey Result-Effect of Age, Literacy, and Education on

Voting Behaviour.Table 8.11: Detailed results of elections to the seats reserved for minority

communities in the provincial assembly of NWFP: seat reserved for Sikh, Budhist, Parsi and Non- Muslim communities (1 Seat)

Table 8.12: Detailed results of elections to the seats reserved for minority communities in the provincial assembly of NWFPseat reserved for persons belonging to the Quadianis group or Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis) (1 seat)

CHAPTER-9Table 9.1: Political parties contested provincial assembly elections in urban

NWFP.Table 9.2: Detail of National Assembly elections in urban NWFP.Table 9.3: Status of independent candidates for Provincial Assembly (NWFP).Table 9.4: Status of independent candidates for National Assembly (NWFP).Table 9.5: Status of religious parties for NWFP Provincial Assembly elections.Table 9.6: Status of religious parties for NWFP National Assembly elections.Table 9.7: Voters perception about the candidate to whom they vote.

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LIST OF ACRONYMSAICC All India Congress CommitteeAIML All India Muslim LeagueAINC All India National CongressANP Awami National PartyARD Alliance for the Restoration of DemocracyCOAS Chief of Army StaffCOP Combine Opposition partiesCSP Civil Service of PakistanFAFEN Free and Fair Election NetworkF.R. (Chief Secretary’s) Fortnightly Reports. FR 1 Jan. means

‘Fortnightly Report for the first half of January”, FR II Jan. ‘for the second half”, etc.

FPCC Frontier Province Congress CommitteeHoe Poll. Home PoliticalIOL India office Library and recordsIJI Islami Jamhoori IttehadIJM Islami Jamhoori MahazISI Inter Service Intelligence AgencyJI Jmaat-i-IslamiJUI Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-IslamJUI (F) Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman Group)JUP Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-PakistanK.B Khan Bahadur (honorific title awarded the Muslims by the government)K.S. Khan sahib (honorific title awarded the Muslims by the government)KT Khaksar TehrikLAD Legislative Assembly debatesLFO Legal Framework orderMLA Member of the Legislative AssemblyMMA Muttahida Majlis-i-AmalNAP National Awami PartyNDI National Democratic InstituteNAI National Archives of IndiaNAP National Awami PartyNWFP North West Frontier ProvincePATA Provincial Administered Tribal AreaPDA Pakistan Democratic AlliancePDP Pakistan Democratic PartPIF Pakistan Islamic FrontPILDAT Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and

Transparency PKMAP Pushtunkhwa Milli Awami PartyPML (N) Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)PML(J) Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo faction)PML(Q) Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam)PPP Pakistan People PartyQAP Quaid-i-Azam PapersR.S Rais Sahib (honorific title awarded to the Sikhs or Hindus by the British

government)S.C Supreme CourtSSP Sipah-i-Sahaba PakistanTI Tehriq IstiqlalTNFJ Tehriq-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqa JafiriahTNSM Tehriq-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi

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GLOSSARY:This is a selected list of those important terms which appear more than once or twice in the text. Other Pashtu and urdu word are defined in parentheses within the text.Akhund, Hazrat, Sufi, Faqir Title denoting distinction with in the Sufi

traditionAkhuwwat StrengthAlim Muslim religious scholar (pl. “Ulema)Amir Ruler within the Muslim traditionAmir-Badshah Ruler with temporal and religious authorityAnjuman Association, societyAstanadar Individual with inherited spiritual statusAzad Free, independentBaiat Vow of spiritual allegiance given by a murid to his pirBaradari Social groupings based on kinshipBaraka Spiritual power of a holly manBuzurg, Buzurgan Eder; pl., eldersCrore 10,000,000 (unit of measurement)Dak MailDarasgahs SchoolsDargah Sufi shrineDarul harb Place of war or persecutionDashatgardi TerrorismDasturbandi Coronation (lit. turban tying)Durbari Derived from the word durbar, a ceremonial reception by

senior officials to honour prominent Indians. A durbari was a person who was entitled to participate in a durbar.

Fatwa Formal religious-judicial decreeFirenghi Foreigner, EnglishmanGhairat HonourGundi Pakhtun factionHamsaya lit.: one who share shade; client, dependentHartal StrikeHijrat Religiously motivated emigration from a non-Muslim

country to a Muslim one.Holy man. Pious PersonHujra An area for entertaining guestsHukumat GovernmentInam Cash grant bestowed by the governmentInamdar Person enjoying an inam.Inqilab RevolutionIslah ReformIttihad UnionJagir Land or cash grant from the governmentJagirdar One who holds a jagirJahuri, jamhuriat Democratic, democracyJamaat Gathering Jihad Struggle for the faith, war against non MuslimsJirga Pakhtun tribal council; partyKacha non-metallicKafir Heretic, non-believerKamin Landless menial laborerKandi Village wardKhan Chief, landlordKhandaan Family, used also for ‘tribe’ or ‘clan’Khel Iineage; clan or small subdivision of a tribe

xiii

Kilafat Adj., “-movement”, political movement among the Indian Muslims in the 1920s to protect the khalifah, the sultan of Turkey.

Kisan PeasantLambardar Village revenue officialLashkar Tribal war partyLathi Bamaoo cane used by the policeMadrasah Muslim seminaryMajlis –e- Shura Gathering of notablesMalik Tribal leaderMarakka Tribal council, tribal meetingMasjid MosqueMaulana Religious leader with formal trainingMaulvi Religious leader with formal trainingMuhajarin Religious refugeeMujahid Warrior for the faithMurid Religious disciple, Follower of a ‘saint’, e.g., a

pirNang HonorNawab (Lit.: deputy, governor); honorific title bestowed by the

British Government; may be held for life or hereditarilyNawabzada Son of a NawabPaka MetallicPakhto Shortened form of Pakhtunwali.Pakhtunwali Pakhtun’s system of valuesParajamba FactionalismPir Hereditary “saint”Purdah Seclusion of womenQaum Nation, used also for tribeQuaid-e-Azam The great leader, title given to JinnahRazakar Volunteer one Sajjada nishin Hereditary religious leader; successor to leadership of a

ziarat and order of sufi devoteesSalar General, commanderSalar-i-azam Commander in ChiefSatyagraha Gandhian non-violent civil disobedience

movementSayyid Descendent of the prophetShariat Islamic LawTahsil Administrative unit in a districtTappa Traditionally, the area inhabited by a major Pakhtun clan;

under the British, an administrative division of a tehsil.Tarbur (Lit.: first cousin); enemy among one’s close patrilineal

cousinsTarburwali Rivalry between patrilineal cousinsTehsil Largest administrative subdivision within a

districtUlema Plural of alimUrs Death anniversary of a holly manWesh Periodic redistribution of landZamindar landowner, landlordZanana Women’s quarters; used to refer to something associated

with womenZiarat Tomb of a holly man

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSIt was Prof. Pervez Iqbal Cheema from the Department of International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad, who encouraged me towards the study of electoral politics in NWFP. Today, drawing breath and looking back in the years I have devoted to this study, I am grateful to him for that. In my own Institute, my supervisor Dr. Naureen Talha, I wish to thank her for all the trouble she has taken over my work, for the encouragement she has given me and for helping me to find means to complete my Ph.D research work. Dr. Lubna Saif and Dr. Badshah Sardar have read the thesis in manuscript and subjected it to their constructive criticism. Thanks to Dr. Waqar Ali Shah from Heidelberg University Germany, whose knowledge on NWFP politics and history has been of great value. I am grateful to Higher Education Commission of Pakistan for their funding at the University of Southampton UK to finalise this research work. I am thankful to Prof. Ian Talbot in the Department of History, University of Southampton. Thanks to Prof. Iftikhar H. Malik from Bath UK, Prof. Younas Samad, Ayesha Jalal, Katherine Adeney and Lawrence Seaz for their valuable comments and support during this research work. I regard my time in UK the most fulfilling. I thanks to all the friends in UK specially Umar Khitab, Sadaqat, Sohail, Rida, Claire Woolgar, Shaje, Waqar, Salman Bangash, Basharat and Pakistani community in UK. Only people who have been to the NWFP can understand how many people I became indebted to. Here I shall only mention Mohammad Jawad, Dr. Bakht Rawan, Prof.Qasim Khan Marwat, Prof. Riaz Hussain and Prof. Mustafa Khan who always gave me whatever help I needed and, even more important to a warmth of a family atmosphere. All the others, who showed hospitality and shared their time with me, I must thank collectively. I have in the course of my work incurred debts of gratitude to the staff of several archives and libraries. I must thank the staff of the India Office Library and Records and British LibraryLondon to whom I have always been happy to return. In Pakistan I am indebted to the staff ofNIPS, PIDE, National Library of Pakistan, Allama Iqbal Open University, Press Information Department Islamabad and library Provincial Archives Peshawar. I must thank the microfilming staff of the National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad. My thanks are also due tomy friends, Mr. Himayat Ullah Khan, Altafullah Khan, Dr. Nasim Ahmad, AR. Bodla, Hassan, Fazal-i-Rabbi and Fasiullah who strongly encourage me during this research work. I am particularly thankful to the staff of election commission of Pakistan in Islamabad and Peshawar, specially Secretary Election Commission, Ishtiaq Ahmad Khan and Section Officer Fiaz Ahmad. Thanks to my friends Marium Kiani (Daily Dawn) and Mr. Karim Ahmad (Radio Pakistan) who have gone through my manuscript and made linguistic improvements. Finally, I had in the course of my work made some friends. Rahimullah Yousaf Zai, correspondent BBC Peshawar. His knowledge of Frontier affairs is unrivalled and on, account of his fairness, he is respected in all camps. Shakerullah, Bilal, and Habib-un-Nabi Producers Radio Pakistan Peshawar, with whom I have shared many adventurous and innumerable thoughts since I first met him in Peshawar. Thanks to the high officials of Radio Pakistan including Mujtaba Aamer, Abdul Hafeez, Aftab Mehmood, Rais Saleem, Sajid Durrani and Sarfaraz Khan who gave me opportunity to visit the different places in NWFP for field survey. Many thanks to the respondents of the survey whose responses make this research work possible. Many thanks to my colleagues in Allama Iqbal Open University including Dr. Aman Memon, Dr. Ilyas and Dr. Rasheed A. Naeem, for their encouragementduring this research work.Thanks to my family, relatives and friends whose love, confidence and support has given me the strength to finalize this thesis. I must express my deep love to my daughter, Manahil whose loving pranks helped me to finalize this research work in her own way. I must thank my wife Saiqa Jabeen Shouket (Chanda), who would be more pleased than anyone else on the successful completion of this work.

xv

Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad

ABSTRACTThe main objective of this study is therefore to provide one of the detailed analysis of

electoral politics and voting behaviour in NWFP. This study challenges the common

perception in NWFP that voting decisions are largely determined by social factors

such as traditional ‘feudal’ relationship, and ties of family, faction, clan, or tribe. It

argues, that political determinant of voting behaviour, such as party and party leader’s

loyalty in urban areas and patronage orientation in rural areas, are more important

than social determinants of voting behaviour. The scope of study is limited to NWFP.

It focuses on the results of National Assembly and Provincial Assembly from 1988-

1997 (Elections 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997). This study is based on both published and

unpublished sources as well as on information collected in interviews with politicians

and political observers. Perhaps the most original contribution of this work is

extensive quantitative and qualitative analysis of electoral data, particularly polling

stations returns. The focus of this study is to enquire about the events and

circumstances that lead to the determination of the voting behavior, practical

participation and involvement of masses in the electoral process; and to analyse

different factors which have affected electoral politics and voting behaviour in

NWFP. This thesis is the answer of main research question i.e to what extent electoral

politics affect voting behaviour of people in NWFP? In other words who is voting for

whom and why? What are the determinants of voting behaviour and electoral politics?

The research works starts from two assumptions/hypothesis. First, it has been

assumed that social factors were the dominant determinants that effect voting

behavior and second is political determinants that predominantly effect voting

behavior in NWFP. To answer the basic research questions and assumptions electoral

models including sociological model often identified as School of Columbia, the

psychosocial model also identified as School of Michigan, and rational choice theory,

also referred to as a model of economic voting, or even as School of Rochester, were

utilized in this research work.

The period under study have unique significance, as the rules of electoral systems

were same, restoration of democracy and repeated elections. During this period there

were four national and provincial elections were held. They provide considerable

scope for an analysis of electoral politics.

xvi

INTRODUCTION

In this study an attempt has been made to determine electoral politics and voting trends in

NWFP during the period 1998-99. The literature on electoral behaviour reviewed in thesis

indicates that there is difference of opinions among scholarly community and have little

consensus on what determines voting behaviour in NWFP. Some scholars have emphasised

the importance of a groups, while others have maintained the role of the individuals. Some

have argued that the decisive factor is kinship, while others have asserted that it is a class.

Some have highlighted the role of socio economic changes while others have stressed the role

of local power structure. These different interpretations underscore the complexity of the

problem and compelled the researcher to select this topic for research. This study has a

multidimensional approach towards analysing the determinants of electoral politics and

voting behaviour in the NWFP.

The main objective of this study is therefore to provide one of the few detailed analysis of

electoral politics and voting behaviour in NWFP. This study challenges the common

perception in NWFP that voting decisions are largely determined by social factors such as

traditional ‘feudal’ relationship, and ties of family, faction, clan, or tribe. It argues instead,

that political determinant of voting behaviour, such as party (and party leader) loyalty in

urban areas and patronage orientation in rural areas, are more important than social

determinants of voting behaviour. The scope of study is limited to NWFP. It focuses on the

results of National Assembly and Provincial Assembly from 1988-1997 (Elections 1988,

1990, 1993, 1997). This study is based on both published and unpublished sources as well as

on information collected in interviews with politicians and political observers. Perhaps the

most original contribution of this work is extensive quantitative and qualitative analysis of

electoral data, particularly polling stations returns.

It is important to understand electoral politics in the NWFP because of the region’s unique

strategic importance, cultural characteristics and colonial political and economic heritage of

the region1. Since the creation of NWFP as Governor’s Province in 1932, the people of

NWFP were allowed to choose their representatives under 1935 Indian Act through election.

First elections were held in 1937 in NWFP after the promulgation of 1935 Act. Before

discussing Electoral Politics in detail first the researcher would like to elaborate the

introduction of NWFP. NWFP is the North Western Province of Pakistan. It is located on

both banks of the river Indus and stretches from the Himalayas in the north to the deserts in

the south where its borders touch with Baluchistan and Punjab Provinces. On its west, is

Afghanistan, which is accessible via the Khyber. On its north, the Northern areas and north-

east lies Kashmir. The capital of the province is Peshawar. It covers an area of 74,521 Sq.

xvii

Km. according to 1998 census, the total population of NWFP was approximately 14 million

out of whom 52% are male and 48 % are female. The density of population is 187 per sq. km.

North West Frontier Province, runs for over 1100 Km (680 miles) along the border with

Afghanistan. The valley of Peshawar, fertile and well watered by Kabul and Swat rivers, is its

heart. The northern half of the province consist of five rivers valleys running roughly parallel,

north to south: the Chitral, Dir, Swat, Indus and Kaghan. These valleys are on the northern

edge of the monsoon belt, so are fairly green and partly wooded in their southern sections.

Northern Chitral and the upper regions of the Indus valley are mountainous deserts, where

cultivation depends entirely on irrigation. The NWFP south of Peshawar is below the

monsoon belt and consists of low, Rocky Mountains and wide, gravely plains.

Nearly one third of the population of NWFP is non-Pakhtun. In the border area of Hazara and

DI. Khan, social norms are present which more closely resemble those in Punjab and

Kashmir. Clan groups remain important, but mainly as social networks, particularly for

marriages. Chitral has a separate language and culture of its own. This cultural difference also

affected voting trends in NWFP. ANP is considered to be the Party of Pakhtun , so non-

pukhtuns areas in this province voted in favour of national/religious parties or independent

candidates. Around 68% of the households in NWFP are Pashto speaking, 18% are Hindko

speaking while Saraiki is the mother tongue of 4%. Around 8% of households speak local

languages, such as Kohwar in Chitral district, while Urdu and Punjabi speaking migrants

accounts for only 2% of the households. With the exception of Sindh, Islam came to NWFP

earlier than to any other part of South Asia.

In NWFP, central districts, like Mardan, Swabi, Charsada, Peshawar and Nowshera were the

stronghold of the ANP. In southern districts like Kohat, Hangu, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank,

Karak and DI Khan, there were mixed religio-political situation during the period under

study. Hazara region, comprising Haripur Hazara, Abbottabad, Mansehra, Battagram and

Kohistan had their political affiliation with PML-N in 1990s. Northern NWFP including Dir,

Malakand, Swat, Buner, Shangla, and Chitral had mixed political affiliation with PML-N and

PPP. Ethnically not all of them come from a Pukhtun dominated or Pushto speaking area but

have also a distinct different tinge and tone of culture, language or dialect of their own.

Bannuwals call their lingua franca Bannussi (Bannusay) and not Pushto. Kohistani ‘Pushto’ is

again not easily comprehensible by many. Apart from these variations Hindku is the second

largest language of the province. On the basis of ethnic politics of ruling political party ANP

in NWFP and its alliance with PPP at Federal level, the NWFP was renamed as Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa under eighteenth constitutional amendment on 15 April 2010.2 The name of

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was NWFP during the period under study, so NWFP will remain with

same nomenclature in this study.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

xviii

Electoral politics is based on electoral system and voting behaviour. Different governments in

Pakistan have taken steps to establish and improve sound voting system and electoral process

to improve the participation of the people in the decision making process. This study has the

following hypothesis, aims and objectives.

1. To enquire about the events and circumstances that lead to the determination of

the voting behaviour.

2. To find out the degree of practical participation and involvement of masses in the

electoral process;

3. Different factors which have affected electoral politics and voting behaviour in

NWFP.

MAIN/SUPPORTING RESEARCH QUESTION

Main research question is to what extent electoral politics effect voting behaviour of people in

NWFP? In other words who is voting for whom and why?

ASSUMPTIONS/HYPOTHESIS:

Two assumptions has been conceived for this study, one is about political determinants i.e

political determinants were the dominant and key factor that affected electoral politics and

voting behavior in NWFP during 1988-1999-(People voted on the bases of Political

Determinants during 1990s) and second is about social determinants, i.e. social determinants

were the dominant and key factor that affected electoral politics and voting behavior during

the period under study - (People voted on the bases of Social Determinants during the period

under study)

MODELS AND THEORIES USED:

The following models and theories are used:

Different well known models and theories are used to prove this thesis. These models include

sociological model often identified as School of Columbia, with the main reference in

Applied Bureau of Social Research of Columbia University, whose work begins with the

publication of the book The People’s Choice (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944) and

focuses on the influences of social factors. In Columbia School voters are understood to be

like consumers and ads make a difference in their decisions. Its consumer hypothesis was

proven false in NWFP electoral politics. People still voted for the candidate they supported

early on. What was found instead was that voters would vote for a candidate that looked like

them and shared things like religion, social-economic status, and ethnicity. The psychosocial

model also identified as School of Michigan, which has its major reference in the work of

Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) —The American Voter — and assumes that

party identification is the main factor behind the behavior of voters. The Michigan Model is a

party identification model. People vote because they feel a belonging to a certain party.

xix

Rational choice theory, also referred to as a model of economic voting, or even as School of

Rochester, whose landmark work is the work of Anthony Downs (1957) — An Economic

Theory of Democracy — and that puts emphasis on variables such as rationality, choice,

uncertainty and information. The Downs and Economic Model says that voters are rational

utility maximizes who vote to gain the most happiness. The major problem with this model is

that voters need much information for it to work. In Retrospective Model voters, vote on past

and present aspects of the election. The popularity of the incumbent government is obviously

important here. The question is the performance of the current government.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM

The period 1988-1999 saw the restoration of democracy following the Zia Martial Law era.

During this period there were four national/provincial elections were held. They provide

considerable scope for an analysis of electoral politics. The focus is the province not on

FATA or neighbouring PATA Tribal areas, also the focus is given on electoral determinant

and voting behaviour. Given the legal, institutional and behavioural pattern operative in the

country, what was the meaning of the Electoral Politics in Pakistan especially in NWFP? This

study explores the meaning of elections and electoral politics for people, including voters as

well as non voters, who experienced the electoral dynamics in various ways. The present

research also explores the meaning of elections for various political parties in and outside the

government. This research work will be helpful for the Election Commission officials,

politicians, electoral personal, and NGO’s promoting political awareness in this area.

Moreover this will be helpful in strengthening democracy in NWFP and will be a valuable

literature. Other significant points are:

The thesis is able to make original findings because of its sources.

The thesis utilizes a large number of interviews with politicians and activists.

It also contains highly original analysis of polling station results in Peshawar.

The thesis is able to provide a detailed and authoritative account of electoral politics

which fills an important gape in the literature on party politics in Pakistan.

Most published work focuses on the national level, or on Punjab. The thesis thus

represents an important contribution to Pakistan’s political Science literature.

Researcher always relied on such studies as Erland Janson’s (1981), India, Pakistan or

Pakhtunistan: A Nationalist Movements in North West Frontier Province, 1937-1947,

S.A Rittenberg’s Ethnicity, Nationalism and Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement on

India’s North West Frontier Province (Durham: NC: Carolina Academy Press, 1988) and

Waqar Ali Shah’s Muslim League in NWFP and Ethnicity, Islam and Muslim

Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North West Frontier Province, 1937-1947 for the

xx

discussion of the dynamics of electoral politics in NWFP. This is new study because it

covers more recent period.

WHAT HAVE I DONE?

Analysis of Polling Station’s/constituencies results.

Analysis of Survey of respondents on electoral politics.

Theoretical analysis of electoral politics.

Zonal wise analysis of electoral politics in NWFP.

Urban Rural Trends of Electoral politics.

Party Politics and electoral trends in NWFP.

Analysis of Social and Political trends in electoral politics.

Case Study of Peshawar

The thesis is well grounded study of voting behavior and its determinants in NWFP.

The reader is made aware of urban-rural and gender dimensions and there is highly

impressive use of case study material.

The thesis utilizes both quantitative and qualitative research methods in order to

analyse voting trends and electoral politics.

It provides new data and argument for a relatively unstudied subject.

The different regional characteristics of voting behavior in NWFP come across very

well.

This thesis offer a useful list of acronyms, a glossary, a description of study, a good

review of literature and a description of research methodology.

WHY HAVE I DONE?

Study of Electoral politics is a new approach to fill the scholarly gap in party politics

and other political science literature in Pakistan. To fill this gape I have done it.

I have done it for the promotion of further research in this field.

HOW DID I DO IT?

Both Qualitative and Quantitative approaches are used.

I have used both primary and secondary sources for this research.

I have visited various libraries to consult primary and secondary sources.

I have visited various parts of NWFP now KPK for field survey and interviews.

During the course of field research eighty formal interviews out of 640 were conducted

from politicians and political activists through Random Sampling.

xxi

2270 responses were recorded from registered voters (approximately 6651974 at the time

of 1997 elections) for survey to find the voting trends in NWFP through purposive and

judgmental sampling.

The work is well referenced and contains a wealth of source material drawn from field

work interviews and data analysis.

There is also evidence of good engagement with the existing literature on electoral

history in Pakistan and theories of voting behavior.

WHAT HAVE I FOUND?

The major finding is that Political determinants of voting behavior are more important than

social determinants with party affiliation and access to patronage and development being key

factors.

X. IMPLICATIONS OF THESIS

This study will be helpful for further research on elections and electoral politics in

Pakistan.

It will be helpful for ECP and other organization working for strengthening

democracy

PLAN TO DISSEMINATE THIS RESEARCH WORK:

I will publish this research work for wide audience to disseminate this research

work.

Publishing of research papers on the topic.

Encourage other researchers to undertake research on the topic.

Introduction of electoral studies at university level

Electoral awareness programmes

MAJOR CONTRIBUTION(S)

The major contribution of this study is the statistical analysis as statistic without

analysis is nothing. Throughout the study I have listed important people involved in

politics. This is very useful information and will be a gate way for further research.

This is the first ever research based study on electoral politics of NWFP and it will be

base line study for future researcher.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Many scholars from Pakistan have taken up research on elections and electoral politics. Most

of these studies were published in academic journals. The NWFP does not feature heavily in

these studies. There are few official or non official institutions specifically reserved for the

study of election trends, analysis of constituencies and collection of data in general. The

xxii

available academic research on elections is generally related to the performance of political

parties and alliances, the nature of the campaign and other macro-level electoral currents. Few

systematic studies of voting trends at the micro-level are available. Lack of institutional

funding, absence of academic interest in field research in terms of house-to-house

investigation and the lack of a tradition of teamwork are some of the factors responsible for

the dearth of scholarly research on elections at NWFP.

Kamran Bashir3 focused on purely 1970 elections and electoral data related to NWFP. This

work is related to socio-economic a feature of different constituencies in NWFP during 1970

elections and it is little bit associated with the historical analysis of the main argument, “at

what extent electoral politics effect electoral behavior in NWFP during 1990s”. Sociological

or political determinants are not focused which is the core assumptions of this study. Imdad

Ali Khan4, has analysed the non-party system of elections of 1985. The study has tried to find

out viewpoints of the then NWFP; Assembly members regarding local councils and

aspirations of voters towards participation in decision making and implementation of

development schemes. Imdad’s work is based on the interviews of the Assembly members

and not the voters. Imdad’s work reflects little bit reflections on sociological and political

determinants in the interviews of assembly members. Mohammad Waseem5 focused on

theoretical aspects of elections in Pakistan during 1993 and 2002. This is the only scholarly

work on the elections in Pakistan in which theoretical framework is established for the study

of elections. However this work is focused on national level and not related to NWFP which

is the main area of research of this thesis. David Washbrook6, Ayesha Jalal,7, and

Mohammad Waseem8, have also focused on historical background of electoral politics and its

relations with colonialism. Waseem shows how the colonial legacy of bureaucratic rule has

enabled powerful civil-military bureaucracy to maintain its hold on power in post

independence Pakistan. Andrew R-Wilder9 has the opinion that the first electoral studies in

South Asia focused on the social determinants of voting behaviour. Later studies began to

include political determination such as party identification and issue orientation. The limited

amount of electoral research conducted in Pakistan has meant that neither social nor political

determinates of voting behaviour have been systematically analysed. Andrew R. Wilder work

focused on Punjab andhe also highlighted electoral history before partition which is to some

extent related to historical analysis of the researcher’s core arguments. Inayatullah in his

article “Perspective in Rural power structure in West Pakistan” argues that traditional social

structures and group identities of family and biradari determine voting behavior. This

arguments also supports the biradari politics in NWFP which is also an important social

factor in the electoral politics of NWFP

Hamza Alvi10, supports the views of Saghir Ahmed11. Both believe that the voting behaviour

is determined more by class than traditional kinship. They argue that voters who are

xxiii

economically dependent on others will vote according to the dictates of those upon whom

they are dependant, and only those who are economically independent are likely to vote along

the lines of kinship or caste. Craig Baxter12 and Sharif-al-Mujahid13, and Mushtaq Ahmed14

provided useful overview of the background of elections, the contestants, the campaigns and

the results. Iftikhar Ahmad’s15 focused on electoral contest, campaign issues and historical

background. Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter’s, Pakistan in transition, is related to

voting behaviour of the people with their socio economic conditions. Maleeha Lodhi16 has

analysed the 1993 elections in terms of turnout, candidates, and importance of vote and

voting. Ijaz Shafi Gillani’s17, work is based upon a scientific exit poll survey of voters during

the 1985 elections. This survey was conducted nationwide and not focused on NWFP.

Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad18, has examined in his unpublished M. Phil thesis, the functions

of electoral models and state of electoral politics in Hazara region of NWFP. He argues,

“electoral politics in Hazara region of NWFP is determined more by social factors.

In addition to official, non official and scholarly publications on electoral politics in Pakistan,

the press is a very important source of information about individual and organizational

activities surrounding elections, such as alliance-building, tribal and factional feuds, sectarian

conflict, patterns of seats adjustment and negative campaigning. English language

Newspapers such as Daily Dawn, Daily The News, the Nation, the Frontier Post and the Daily

Times published extensive reports on local patterns of leadership as well as the demographic

composition of electoral constituencies in ethnic, tribal, sectarian and caste terms. While some

articles presented a good analysis of trends in various localities, a majority of them simply

contained descriptive accounts electoral politics. Also, the media showed a visible bias in

favour of the high and mighty. While it focused on the noise and the multitude, as reflected

through rallies and public meetings, these did not necessarily represent the real voting

patterns. Some party leaders such as Qazi Hussain Ahmad of JI were able to project their

message forcefully through the media, for example in 1993. It turned out to be totally

disproportionate to their following in terms of voting. The Urdu press generally reflected a

more detailed but, by the same account, more partisan and position-related analysis. While the

Sindhi press is more developed in the vernacular press than Urdu, it has generally provided an

ethno-nationalists perspective on electoral politics.

Weeklies such as Takbir, Zindgi, and Friday Times and Monthlies such as Herald and

Newsline provide an interesting background to political events ranging from in-depth study of

specific groups and parties to sensational news about politicians and their alleged underhand

deals. The foreign press, both English language and non-English, generally touches on widely

predictable and macro-level activity, usually focusing on the leading personalities and their

chances of going up or going down, or only going down but not out. One can perhaps argue

that most of the print media’s coverage of elections lacks analytical content in order to merit

xxiv

the status of a serious election study. The dearth of writings on elections reflects not only a

low level of response from the academic community but also the problematic nature of the

political contest itself in terms of controversies surrounding the constitutional framework,

party profiles, means of communication and the government’s commitment to hold free and

fair elections. Electoral studies may be divided into three categories corresponding to the

three ‘democratic’ periods in the history of Pakistan, viz. from 1947 to 1968 (minus the

martial law years 1958-62), 1970 to 77 and 1985 to 1999. There is persistent scepticism in the

existing academic literature about electoral politics during the pre-1970 election period

relating to the legitimacy of polls. The period (1947-68) can be divided into two phases: the

parliamentary phase (1947-58) when four provincial elections were held: in Punjab and North

West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1951, in Sindh in 1953 and in East Bengal in 1954. No

election was held at the National level during this period. The major issue in this phase was

poll rigging, both at the local and provincial levels, even as constitutional debates continued

about such issues as separate electorates for minorities, the role of Islam in the new state and

a suitable form of government for Pakistan. The situation on the ground constantly

deteriorated as electoral malpractices were rampant, and the public was wary of electoral

democracy as it came into operation in Pakistan. The approach of the government in British

India to the holding of fair elections has been essentially legalistic inasmuch as the mass

exercise in polling was backed by a bureaucratic apparatus. The franchise was limited to a 15

percent of the population, which meant that the local bureaucracy could manage the electorate

in well mannered way.

After independence, the bureaucracy was formally bound to serve the new political bosses,

who had high stakes in elections at the provincial and national levels. Similarly, the

introduction of adult franchise suddenly opened up opportunities for political participation to

a large number of people., who became pawns in the hands of local elites everywhere in the

absence of issue-oriented political mobilization. All this led to an unabashed exercise in

election rigging. The Leghari Report listed various malpractices: gerrymandering of

constituencies, arresting of rival candidates, disallowing the filling of nomination papers by

the rival candidates, using he revenue administration to put pressure on the latter, and even

coming down to cattle stealing and disrupting the supply of water through the irrigation

canals.19

K.B. Sayeed20 in his study focused on constitutional debates, especially the centre-province

relations which has indirect connection with electoral politics at national level. Keith

Callard21 concentrated on the analysis of relations between politicians and bureaucracy and it

has also considerable historical relations with electoral politics. Binder22 studied Islam in

terms of Muslim League heritage, ulema’s lobby, public demand and the ideological

predispositions of the ruling elite. Binder study is also helpful for analyzing religio-political

xxv

trends in electoral politics. Mushtaq Ahmad traced the parallel growth of legislature,

executive and other wings of the state in a somewhat formalistic approach to the institutional

apparatuses of the new order.23 Richard L. Park looked at the 1954 elections and raised the

alarm over what he considered a victory for communists and pro-communist elements.24

While elections in the parliamentary phase lacked legitimacy in an operational sense because

of procedural malpractices, elections in the presidential phase from 1962 to 1969 suffered

from a gap of legitimacy in a structural sense. Here, the focus was on the issue of

disenfranchisement of the public. Indirect elections for president and the National Assembly

in 1962 to 1965 missed out on general acceptance by the people. The issue of separate

electorates to religious communities, which continued to be at the centre of constitutional

debates, had been virtually shelved in the 1956 constitution. The 1962 elections were held on

the basis of joint electorates. Mahfooz-ul-Haq’s book Electoral problems in Pakistan traced

the debate over constitutional issues, especially separate electorates, from 1952 to 1962.

Haq’s book reflects the prevalent approach to electoral democracy, which was essentially

focused on legal and constitutional provisions for various aspects of elections rather than on a

sociological analysis of the people’s political, social and cultural attitudes relating to their

electoral choices.25 The second period of electoral politics in Pakistan’s history started with

the 1970 elections. These elections came close to the model of ‘realignment elections’ in the

US, inasmuch as a radical shift took place in the pattern of alignment between social forces.26

A consciousness emerged about public activity surrounding industrial and agricultural

development, urbanization, horizontal and vertical mobility as well as the emergence of a vast

number of the educated unemployed. The contributions of these developments to political

change was visible through the works of Sharif-al Mujhaid, Iftikhar Ahmad, Craig Baxter,

Maleeh Lodhi, Philip Jones and several other writers and researchers The long absence of

general elections on the basis of adult franchise had kept the military-bureaucratic

establishment, as well as politicians, in complete darkness about the respective following of

various political parties. While they continued to dwell on the ideological basis of the state

and concerned for national security in the context of the perceived Indian threat, large

sections of the society had moved onto understanding the economic and political issues as the

real basis for making electoral choices.

The most popular mood of analysis for 1970 elections in Pakistan was couched in the

modernization thesis. This model was based on an understanding of political change where

electoral mobilization, itself drew upon a model of social change linked with economic

development. The argument was that in the relatively developed districts of the Punjab, in

both industrial and agricultural areas, the established social structure had been destabilised.

Combined with high population density, improved contacts between towns and country side,

and rapid process of urbanisation, this situation had led to political mobilization along radical

xxvi

lines.27 Burki and Baxter dwelt on this theme and added the dimensions of rate of growth as

well as the level of development. They found the relatively fast developing ‘urban’ and ‘rural’

tehsils of Punjab to be voting predominantly for the PPP.28 Philip Jones’s research covered a

wide scope incorporating social change and its political articulation in various districts of

central and northern Punjab.29 The focus on social change in the context of modernisation was

generally at the expense of analysing the organizational input in terms of elections strategies

of the PPP and other political parties for mass mobilisation. One reason given was that the

institutional level of these parties was very low.30 Similarly, the PPP leadership was divided

between ‘ideological’ and ‘political’.31 At the top, Z.A. Bhutto exhibited the characteristic of

‘patrimonial authority’.32 In the overall atmosphere of the breakdown of traditional hierarchy

and expanded social mobilisation, a whole new generation came-up and were elected into the

assemblies. As Baxter noted, only ten out of seventy five former elected members of the

National Assemblies (MNAs) in (W) Pakistan survived in the new house.33 The general

concentration on social change and mobility along class lines not only ignored the role of

party cadres in terms of organisational and ideological work but also took for granted the

underlying legal and institutional framework of elections. There was no general debate on the

prevalent election system based on the first- past-the post-system, especially as the country

had only recently moved back from the indirect system of elections with restricted franchise

to direct elections on the basis of one man one vote. Nor indeed was the pattern of

delimitation of electoral constituencies generally taken up as determinates of the decline of

the traditional elite over the electorate. For example those tehsils and districts, which served

as electoral constituencies in their entirety, returns the members of the dominant families and

thus insured continuation of their power. The situation prevailed largely in Sindh and

Balochistan where 16 out of 27 and all four National Assembly seats respectively were based

on the existing administrative boundaries. No big shake-up was experienced in these areas.

On the other hand, only 13 out of 82 in Punjab and 4 out of 18 constituencies in NWFP were

based on the regular administrative units. Here, electoral units cut across the traditional

strongholds of tribal and laded elites, and indirectly facilitated the task of party cadres to

infiltrate the area and mobilise people along radical lines.34 Research on the role of

apportionment as indeed, on various related issues ranging from the nature of the election

system to the roles of leadership, biradari, party organisation and multiple candidature

remained relatively under developed. It focused on Islamic ideological mobilisation on the

side of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), to the exclusion of such issues as redistribution of

wealth, generation of employment opportunities and expansion of social infrastructure. Z.A.

Bhutto focused on the defense of PPP government’s achievements during their tenure in

government. As for as Bhutto’s decisions to go ahead with elections were concerned, Ziring’s

study stressed his need to seek a fresh mandate to get rid of what Bhutto considered

xxvii

obstructionist elements in the party in the context of ‘centralization of powers’ in his own

hands.35 Mujhaid’s article noted the way the landed elite managed to get the PPP tickets for

election, the negative campaigning that marred the quality of election and finally electoral

malpractices that robbed the elections of legitimacy.36 Weinbaum focused on the revival of

‘feudal’ influence and the emergence of a united alliance of opposition parties, as well as the

distortion effects of the electoral system whereby the PPP got 108 out of 116 NA seats from

Punjab (including Islamabad) i.e. 94.5% seats by winning only 61% of the vote.37 Palmer

compared the two elections held in India and Pakistan in 1977. He broadly covered two

themes: that these elections were expected to be routine and unexcited efforts to re-legitimize

controlled regimes, and that these expectations were-because of the anti authoritarian ‘waves’

in the two countries against powerful leaders.38 While he was concerned about rigging in the

elections, he stressed the need to go beyond this to explain the continuing popularity of PPP

in Pakistan.39 One can argue that the perceived participatory function of 1970 elections, which

had impressed many scholars and influenced their findings, was largely replaced by the

legitimacy functions of elections in 1977 as the central theme of studies. There was long

interregnum of Zia’s martial law years (1977-85). Political parties in general and the PPP in

particular, were out of action for all this period. The latter’s cadres and workers were subject

to severe repression at the hands of the Zia government. Some PPP stalwarts defected from

the party after the execution of Z.A. Bhutto and chose to become members of Zia’s nominated

Majlis-e-Shoora along with others from various factions of the PML and Islamic parties. A

persistent focus on Islamisation over long years against the backdrop of the Afghan resistance

movement against the communist regime in Kabul, in which Pakistan played an active role,

provided a political context for the pervasive ideological idiom during the 1980s.

As pointed out by Richter, the Zia government wanted to test the efficacy of the new political

order which it had created, and now wanted to preserve, under the new democratic

dispensation.40 It is interesting to see that, somewhat un-typically, the voter turnout in the

rural areas was larger than in the urban areas during the 1985 elections. This was due to the

reassertion of ‘feudal’ power, which was reflected in the tied vote blocs activated with the

help of lower revenue officers.41 Secondly, the non party character of these elections brought

in multiple candidates in each constituency, who divided votes amongst themselves, and thus

brought down the winning majority of the victorious candidates. Some of the new MNAs and

MPAs poll was low as 8.7 %, 6.8% and even 5.9% of the registered votes.42 Zia’s deviations

from the constitution in terms of non party polls raised the issue of the relatively

inconsequential victory of the election candidates whose representative character on the

strength of a mere fraction of the electorate was questionable. This process of de-

‘institutionalising politics’ separated election promises from accountability.43 While several

elections have followed the 1985 elections, such as in 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997 and 2002, the

xxviii

political agenda is still not back in real sense, except of course as part of the polemical

debates carried on during various election campaigns. The Junejo period (1985-1988)

contributed two factors as emerging shape of the democratic dispensation: first, it created an

almost new party out of the sitting members of the parliament under the old name of Pakistan

Muslim League (PML), which comprised the winners of 1985 elections. Belonging to

different ideological or policy positions, they only shared the fact that they carried local

influence and willingness to go along with the ruling dispensation for whatever patronage it

could bring irrespective of its lack of moral or constitutional legitimacy. Secondly, it set in

motion a process of transformation of the anti Bhutto vote in a pro-ML vote, which came to

fruition during the 1993 and 1997 elections. The SC gave its verdict in 1988 in favour of

party based elections. That mobilised the establishment to recreate a PNA style anti PPP

groupings of parties. The Muslim League formed a United Front Islamic Jamoori Itehad (IJI)

with other parties against the PPP for election purpose. The ascendancy of Zia’s protégé

Ghulam Ishaq to the post of President gave confidence to the establishment to face the PPP in

the elections. It was here that Benazir Bhutto’s credentials were obviously strong. The PML

tried to make a virtue out of what was otherwise an embarrassing legacy of Zia. The PML

choose to stress the Islamic aspect of this legacy, especially against the back drop of

Afghanistan’s resistant movement. The 1988 election was essentially about the past, in terms

of regard of the two previous rulers, Bhutto and Zia. The PPP enjoyed a high moral position

in the form of its vehement struggle for democracy, which had now borne fruit. Within Sindh

the resurgence of the PPP was countered by a new development, which was yet to be

understood in-terms of its impact on the future shape of events. This was the complete

political division along ethnic lines between the generally urban based Muhajirs and the rural

based Sindhis. Benazir Bhutto’s ascendancy to power came too soon for the Zia

establishment, which was still in place. A series of misunderstandings and conflicts between

the PM on the one hand and the President, who largely represented the old guard, on the other

led to a show down on 6 august 1990 when the Bhutto government was sacked. Not

surprisingly, the October elections of 1990 were marred by controversy surrounding Bhutto’s

dismissal. Again, the political debate centered not on society but on the state, not on issues

and polices but on the legitimacy of the President’s action against the PM, not on the future

plans but on past elections. William Richter discussed the questionable nature of Ishaq’s

action, the absence of neutrality of the caretaker setup, in the controversial nature of the NDI

report of the international delegation of election observers, which had certified these elections

as genuinely representative of the public opinion. Richter, endorsed the NDIs findings.44 He

noted that the transfer of power had taken place without overt military intervention, but that

the country had to go along way yet to graduate as a democracy free of electoral

malpractices.45 Anwar H. Sayed discussed the 1988 and 1990 elections along similar lines. He

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observed the absence of policy issues, the localization of politics, and the 1990 elections as

being a referendum on the legitimacy of the Presidential action of removing Benazir Bhutto

from office.46 He attributed this phenomenon to the IJIs election strategy of confronting. The

PPP candidates with the consensus candidates of it own.47 Curiously, Richter noted a shift in

the social base of politics away from the ‘feudal’ class.48 On the other hand, the general mood

among articulate sections of the public continued to be against what was still perceived to be

the complete domination of elections by ‘feudals’. The ascendancy of Nawaz Sharif, who was

an industrialist, to the position of prime minister in 1990 and again in 1997, though

symptomatic of the gradual opening up of the system to other elites, could not be considered

representative of a definite trend in electoral politics. The 1990 election was marred by

controversy about rigging. The PDA opposition published a comprehensive White Paper on

the way the caretaker government and the President allegedly perpetrated an electoral fraud

on the nation. Its focus lay on various forms of pre-poll rigging such as the appointment of

partisan judges and members of the Election Commission, maligning the PPP through

television, provision of ‘development funds’ to the Islami Jamuri Itehad (IJI) candidates and

general harassment of the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) candidates.49 The National

Democratic Institute (NDI) report of election observers also indicated serious malpractices

committed by the caretaker government.50 Only it differed from the PDA White Paper

inasmuch as it did not consider such practices to have made a qualitative difference to the

results. Previously, the NDI observers’ report on the 1988 elections had suggested that

Pakistan should develop an accountable government and an independent judiciary as well as a

non-partisan military establishment, in order to allow society a free exercise of choice of its

rulers.51 It was also noted that the task of the election observers was tedious and unenviable.

Henry Carey, who studied the role of election observers including those in Pakistan for the

1988 and 1990 elections, noted foreign observers’ poor knowledge about legal and cultural

realities of the society and an understanding of the potential or actual voters.52 The 1993

election was relatively free of controversy. In Ziring’s view, electoral politics in Pakistan had

reached the ‘second stage’ and now opposition was too rooted and too popular to be

neutralised by a government.53 Andrew Wilder’s study of the Punjab’s electoral scene in 1988

and 1993 brought out interesting observations. His analysis revealed that unlike the common

perception, women voted more for PML than PPP, 18% more in five large cities, 4.1% more

in small towns and 1.4% more in villages.54 He also claimed that the PPP had lost 8.5% of the

lower class vote between 1988 and 1990.55 Wilder tried to look at the two election results to

give a profile of electoral trends in terms of group, gender and class, in an ambitious attempt

to provide a sociological perspective on electoral politics in Pakistan. Mohammad Waseem

analysed the democratic potential of the state and the electoral trends at the macro and micro

levels in a study of the 1993 elections.56 It attempted a typology of electoral candidates

xxx

comprising five categories: tribal and feudal elites; biradari or community leaders; industrial

elite; middle and lower middle class; and ulema.57 His work offered a detailed statistical

analysis of voting patterns in various constituencies at the national and provincial levels such

as: the urban-rural and north-south divides in the Punjab, the decline of votes for Islamic

parties, the emergence of fiscal culture in cities which proved to be the undoing of the PPP in

urban Punjab only to be compared with the developmental euphoria created by the PML; the

complete ethnic divide in Sindh along Mohajir-Sindhi lines; the triangular voting patterns in

the NWFP between the PPP, PML and Awami National Party (ANP); and the divide in

Balochistan between Pathans and Baloch on the one hand and the tribal Sardars and Ulema on

the other, from the perspective of the inter-generational transition of political leadership.58

The study also attempted a voter profile of Pakistan in terms of a four-fold typology: civic

voter, client voter, maverick voter and primary voter.59 Various political parties, independent

groups, NGOs and individual writers deliberated on the subject.60 On the eve of the 1993

elections, the PPP’s manifesto promised to restore the joint electorates system, enact a law to

end floor crossing and to restore parliamentary sovereignty.61 The NDI’s report on the 1993

elections pointed to the need for improving electoral rolls and the means to correct

identification of voters, as did the Commonwealth, EU and South Asian Association for

Regional Cooperation (SAARC) observers’ teams, which also recommended a change in the

cumbersome and discriminatory election system for minorities.62 Faqir Hussain put together

recommendations for electoral reforms as discussed and elaborated on them in a workshop

held in Islamabad. Some of these recommendations related to: making the Election

Commission financially and institutionally independent; asking political parties to hold

internal elections, nominate candidates collectively and issue at least 10 % of the tickets to

women; disqualifying party members from the membership of assemblies for floor-crossing;

abolishing the separate electorates system; and extending adult franchise to tribal areas.63

Dieter Nohlen in his recommendations for electoral reforms in Pakistan proposed a Mixed

Member List System (MML), incorporating direct elections for two-thirds of the house and a

proportional list based on parties for one third of the house. In this way, 100 ‘list’ seats would

be added to the existing 217 single member constituencies and thus the basic character of the

existing system as a majority –based system would be retained.64 Nohlen’s scheme provided

60 additional multi-members deputies for Punjab, twenty for Sindh, 12 for NWFP, 5 for

Balochistan and 3 for Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).65 Such views reflected

the fact that the lobby for proportional representation had expanded in Pakistan against the

back drop of criticism of disproportional between votes and seats.66 The issue of electoral

reforms continued to be a part of the political discourse in Pakistan. The Benazir Bhutto

government (1993-96) announced a reform package in February 1996, which led to fierce

public debate. These reforms included: the right of double voting for minorities, simultaneous

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elections for the national and provincial assemblies and the elimination of ID cards as a mark

of voter’s identity.67 Prime Minister Bhutto claimed that these reforms would decrease

election expenditure by 50% and ensure transparency.68 The PML opposed the measure of

waiving the condition of producing the ID cards at the time of polling while the JI Chief

considered these reforms as an attack on the ideology of the country.69 The PML challenged

the electoral reforms in the Supreme Court, terming it a part of the government’s pre-election

rigging scheme.70 The religious parties in general threatened to go on strike if the proposed

reforms were carried out. The PPP government’s plan to put the electoral reforms before the

National Assembly were shelved and no compromise was reached with the opposition on

such crucial questions as the abolition of separate electorates and holding of elections for

national and provincial assemblies on the same day. The PPP government did not make any

move towards adding 100 seats to the existing number of the National Assembly seats to be

elected under the PR list system as stated in its election manifesto. As for free and fair

election, the PML opposition made it clear that it would not settle for anything less than a

neutral caretaker government until the next elections. Under the existing situation of extreme

polarization between the government and the opposition, the case for electoral reforms was

lost.

The scope of academic enquiry into Pakistani elections particularly on NWFP has been

limited to macro-level analysis of electoral trends which are defined according to party

loyalties for specific elections. Studies are generally not accompanied by analysis of political

attitudes in the long term perspective, nor is there examination of support bases of political

parties in terms of class, sectarian loyalties, sectoral divide or ethnic commitment, nor indeed

of such social, economic and cultural processes as migration, urbanisation, industrialization,

Islamisation or globalization. Most of the available research is limited to overt political

activity inside or outside the parliament, often accompanied by a discussion of court cases

relating to this phenomenon. Secondly, micro-level analysis of voting patterns is largely

absent. Universities and research institutes do not have the funding for undertaking in depth

enquiry of this nature, which would typically require network through various stages of

interviews, tabulation of results, development of a conceptual framework and publication of

findings. Even apart from financial resources, the academic institutions are ill-equipped to

take up research of this kind because of the lack of scholarly talent and professional training.

There are various kinds of writings that dealt with elections in Pakistan both as commentary

on electoral behaviour and as a source of information for political analysis. These literatures

include official publications, enquiry reports, white papers and institutional reports. There are

three kinds of government publications relating to the conduct and outcomes of elections. At

the end of each election, the government has published a report covering the nature of the

legal and institutional framework, historical growth of constituencies and electoral rolls, the

xxxii

judicial and, where applicable, military involvement in the conduct of elections as well as

party lists, electoral laws, provision for secret ballot and other forms of moral and material

input into the exercise in mass voting. These reports also include the detailed results of

elections for the national and provincial assemblies and sometimes a comparison with

previous election results to bring out long term electoral trends. This exercise also followed

the elections for the Senate as well as for President.

In enquiry reports, Governments have responded to public demands for holding enquiries into

electoral malpractices and sometimes-if not always-by publishing these reports. The Leghari

Report on rigging during the local bodies elections in Sargodha district in 1952-3 remains a

classic study of the ways and means of influencing the election outcomes in Pakistan.71

In white papers, government publishes its findings on some previous elections conducted by

its predecessor with the specific purpose of undermining its existing support base and

maligning it in order to legitimize itself in the public eye. The White Paper on the 1997

electoral malpractices is a key example of this kind of literature.72 No report was published by

the PPP government on the 1977 election, which was marred by controversy about rigging. It

was the Zia government that published a White Paper on these elections. Later, the report of

the 1990 elections including an additional volume as a rejoinder to the grave allegations of

malpractices from the Peoples Democratic Alliance (PDA) opposition about the caretaker

government of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and the Election Commission (EC). Similarly, the

latter’s publications include such periodical reports as compilations of the Supreme Court

judgments on appeals relating to elections at the National and Provincial levels.73

In non-official, institutional and group reports, the opposition party or alliance of parties put

together information about electoral malpractices and publish it to put pressure on the

government and challenge the legitimacy of its election victory. The PDA’s 1990 White

Paper was the most elaborate exercise in this category.74 Other non-official publications

include various reports of election observers groups, especially those published by the NDI

for International Affairs, Washington D.C.’ and International Centre for Ethnic Studies,

Kandy, Sri Lanka as well as reports of the Commonwealth Observers group, EU observers

group and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) observer group.75 Certain

NGOs focus on specific aspects of election studies of the electoral behaviour of trade unions,

professional associations, sectarian groups, women or minorities. The tradition of conducting

public opinion polls has not taken root in the country. The only poll regularly published in

Pakistan, the Gallup Poll, ran into controversy a few times, allegedly because of its apparent

position on the far right, in favour of a small but active Islamic party, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI).

From the above review of literature it has been found that there is scarcity of the study of

electoral politics and voting behaviour in NWFP. Voting behaviour and electoral politics in

NWFP has not been taken up for scholarly and comprehensive study by political scientists and

xxxiii

social analysts. No attempt has been made to reach the masses, to find out their perception

about the existing polity, political parties, electoral candidate’s turnout, women suffrage and

election campaigns in detail. This research work is an effort in this direction. An attempt has

been made to determine electoral politics and voting trends in NWFP during the period 1998-

99.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: The findings are based on an analysis of qualitative data

collected in personal interviews and from Election Commission's sources, and on extensive

quantitative data collected from primary sources. During the course of field research eighty

formal interviews out of 640 were conducted through Random Sampling and 2270 responses

were recorded out of total voting age population, i.e registered voters (approximately

6651974 at the time of 1997 elections) for survey to find the voting trends in NWFP through

purposive and judgmental sampling. One-third of these were with senators, candidates and

members of the National and Provincial Assembly, and the remainder with academics,

businessmen, election campaign managers, human rights activists, industrialists, journalists,

labour leaders, political party workers and women’s right activists. In this study both

qualitative and quantitative instruments are used to ascertain different dimensions and depths

of electoral politics and voting behaviour in NWFP. Both historical and descriptive method is

used. In order to execute the study and collect the relevant information both primary and

secondary sources are included in this study. These include Electoral forms, polling stations

results, Official reports, government publications, booklets and pamphlets, election

commission report, Enquiry Reports, White Papers, Non-official, Institutional and Group

Reports, Academic Research. SPSS software is used for data analysis and statistical purposes.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS:

The purpose of this study is to provide an empirically based analysis of electoral politics in

NWFP. This study is organised in two major parts. The first is focused on theories and

context of the study and second part is based on case studies and analysis.

Introductory chapter focused on introduction to the problem, its objectives and

methodology. One of the strength of this study is use full “Review of Literature” where the

researcher looks at electoral studies and electoral issues. This is good starting point for those

looking at elections in NWFP.

In first part there are three chapters, the first chapter focused on theoretical framework of

electoral politics in NWFP. In this chapter three major theoretical approaches to the study of

elections, the Michigan approach, the Columbia school and the Downs theory (rational

choice) have been outlined. Electoral politics, political participation, basic practices in

electoral politics, reforms and shifting patterns of public opinion have been analysed.

Michigan Model is closely associated for the study of elections in NWFP. This is so because

it attracted both partisan and political motives of a voter and candidate.

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Electoral Geography is a second chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to map out the

electoral geography of the NWFP by referring to the distinctive historical, socio-economic,

and political characteristics of each region, and to show how these have contributed to

regional differences in voting behaviour. The Chapter on “NWFP’s Electoral Geography” is a

sound study of how the NWFP’s voting patterns are based on historical, socio-economic, and

political characteristics of the province. It divides the study into northern, central, southern

and north eastern parts (Hazara). In north-eastern (Hazara) region, the voting behaviour was

largely tilted towards Muslim League during 1990s due to historical, linguistic and political

reasons. In central NWFP electoral politics affected the voting behaviour in favour of ANP

due to Pakhtun ethnic cleavages, while in southern and northern parts of NWFP electoral

politics attracted religious and ethnic sentiments along with mainstream political parties’ i.e

Muslim League and PPP. It was shown that the key to electoral success is in central NWFP,

which had one third of the Provincial Assembly seats. It was the most densely populated,

urbanized and industrialized of the NWFP’s four regions, and hence politically the most

volatile. The PPP’s strongest regional support in 1988-1997 came from northern and central

NWFP, the region most dependent on agriculture, whose political elites resented the decline

in their influence relative to the politicians of north-eastern NWFP (Hazara) and southern

NWFP.

Chapter-3 of part-1 is related to Electoral History of NWFP. The focus of this chapter is on

historical background of electoral politics in NWFP. Electoral politics in NWFP which was

started during controlled suffrage period (1932-1970) were rooted in four historical

developments, i.e. British System of indirect rule, the impact of Khilafat Movement, the

reform issues and the legacy of period of civil disobedience in 1930-32. During pre

independence period, the electoral politics in NWFP revolved around the colonial interest and

post independence period (1947-1970) it revolved around the authoritarian political culture of

Pakistan. During 1937 and 1945-46 elections politicians used the voters for their personal

interest and voters became patronage seekers under the garb of these politicians (rational

choice-Downs theory).

Part two of this study consists of case studies and analysis.

Chapter-IV regarding voting trends in NWFP is based on surveys about electoral

trends in NWFP. Structured and unstructured questions regarding voting trends were

asked from the purposely taken sample from different regions of NWFP. Data were analysed

carefully and tabulated in this chapter. This chapter presents the key findings of the voting

trends in NWFP including electoral knowledge, attitudes, and political participation of the

electorate with respect to the Electoral Politics and electoral behaviour. This survey also

reflect the main argument, that how electoral politics effect voting behaviour in NWFP. The

study found significant disparities based on gender, rural/urban location, income, education,

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age, regions in province, and other demographic characteristics regarding knowledge, access,

and attitudes toward electoral procedures and issues. Since there were repeated elections

during 1990s, the survey measured voters’ experience with electoral processes, including their

exposure to and perceptions of electoral politics, in order to identify populations vulnerable to

disenfranchisement or misrepresentation as a result of these problems. These findings

highlight the prevalence of different types of irregularities that have been common in

elections for different population subgroups, which might help to inform those involved in the

interpretation of electoral conduct before, during, and after Election Day.

Chapter V examined in detail voting behaviour in the NWFP’s largest city, Peshawar. An

analysis of polling stations results from the 1988-1997 elections revealed that while levels of

support for the PPP and the IJI/PML and ANP have changed over time, patterns of class

support have remained consistent. The PPP continued to do better in the poorer urban-rural

periphery polling stations and in the polling areas with large concentrations of industrial

labour. The IJI/PML and ANP consistently received its strongest support from the middle and

upper class wards. Therefore class remained an important determinant of voting behaviour,

and the PPP’s reputation as ‘the party of the poor’ continues to be warranted. Class, however,

seems to be losing ground to party and/or party leader loyalty. Through an analysis of polling

areas results from the 1988-1997 elections, this chapter has shown that while levels of support

for the PPP and the ANP have changed over time, patterns of support have remained

consistent. In all four elections the PPP did best in the urban-rural periphery areas and in the

polling areas with large concentrations of industrial labour, which confirmed its reputation as

the party of the poor. The ANP always received its strongest support from the middle and

upper class polling areas. These findings were supported in the more detailed analyses of

various constituency results which showed that class still played an important role in

determining voting behaviour. The case study on NA-1 also revealed that there were gender

differences as well, and that female voters preferred the ANP to the PPP. Biradari did not

seem to be a major determinant of voting behaviour except perhaps in some of the polling

areas in the urban-rural periphery of the city. Candidate loyalty also did not seem to be a

major determinant as relatively unknown candidates like Zafar Ali Shah got victory in 1993

and Qammar Abbas were able to go considerable votes on PPP ticket in 1997 elections. The

major conclusion of this chapter is that the most important determinant of voting behaviour in

Peshawar was party or party leader identification. Almost all those who held PPP and ANP

ticket holders won elections alternatively due to party identification.

Chapter-VI is based on Party Politics in NWFP 1988-1999. The purpose of this chapter is to

focus on party politics of leading political parties in NWFP i.e. ANP, JUI-F, PPP and PML-N

and their alliances. Moreover the electoral process including preparation of elections,

Selection of candidates, Election manifestos and slogans, electoral campaigns, electoral

xxxvi

arrangements is to be discussed in this chapter. There were analyses of different factors

affecting party politics electoral strategies in NWFP. These factors go a long way towards

explaining the important reversal whereby the PML-N coalition party ANP replaced the PPP

in its former stronghold in urban NWFP. No list, however, will comprehensively explain this

complex issue. Furthermore, as this role reversal proves, the political situation in urban

NWFP is not static. Political preferences and voting behaviour changes over time, and change

more rapidly in urban than in rural areas. The urban voters, who voted for the PPP in 1988

and for the ANP in 1993 and 1997, may well change their voting behaviour once again. There

is also an analysis of how the legacies of ANP, PPP and General Zia-ul- Haq had helped,

create and consolidate a strong ‘anti-PPP’ party based in urban NWFP. It examined how

organizational weakness and factional politics within the PPP contributed to its decline, while

the patronage at the disposal of Nawaz Sharif contributed to the PML(N)’s rise. Another

important factor contributed to the reversal in urban NWFP was the effect that the prosperity

of 1990s had on the ‘party of the poor’. Related to this prosperity was the economic and

political rise of middle class traders and businessmen who formed the core of the ‘anti-PPP’

party and the decline of groups, such as organized labour, who were the strongest urban

supporters of PPP.

Chapter-VII on Urban-Rural Division of Electoral Politics shifts attention from the regional

differences in voting behaviour to an analysis of urban and rural differences. It shows how the

rural landed elites have been dominating NWFP politics ever since the colonial period. The

chapter analyzes constituency returns for the 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997 elections, and

polling station returns for the 1988-1997 elections, and highlights the changes that have taken

place between the voting behaviour of urban and rural NWFP. This chapter offers a very good

discussion of the urban rural division of electoral politics. Discussion on “covering

candidates” and the significance of female voters is again, a very useful one . Role of religion

and party identification has become more important. In electoral politics of NWFP there are

considerable regional differences in the rural results. The region where an urban-rural divide

is clear is in Hazara, Northern and southern NWFP where the PML-N had lead over the PPP

in the rural areas in 1988-97. Electoral democracy in NWFP largely depends on rural areas

and rural stakeholders dominated political structure. The urban middle classes have generally

prospered under electocratic governments for whom maintaining stability in urban areas is of

prime importance. electocratic governments, seeking to win elections from NWFP, must turn

for support to rural elites who can influence the voting behaviour of the majority of voters

living in rural areas. But socio-economic and demographic trends ensure that the importance

of urban areas will continue to grow relative to rural areas. This chapter also showed how the

countryside has traditionally dominated the cities. It then highlighted the important change

that took place in the 1990s elections when the PML(N) electoral alliance with ANP replaced

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the PPP as the strongest party in urban NWFP. From small towns to large cities in all four

regions of the province, the PML(N) and ANP consistently out performed the PPP. This

indicates that party and party leader identification played a major role in determining the

voting behaviour of urban voters. The PPP, however, did better than PML(N) in the far more

numerous rural constituencies and therefore ended up winning more seats. As the majority of

the province’s population live in rural areas, elections have reinforced the political dominance

of rural NWFP and rural politicians. However, in a country that has one of the highest

urbanization rates in the world, and with the communications revolution rapidly narrowing

the distance between cities and countryside, it is clear that the cities are gaining political

ground at the expense of the countryside. If economic interests increasingly become

articulated along urban versus rural lines, which seems likely, the urban-rural cleavage will

become even more important in determining party alignments and voter behaviour.

Chapter-VIII on Sociological Determinants of Electoral Politics in NWFP reflects a popular

perception that voting behaviour in the NWFP, especially in rural areas, is determined more

by social then political factors. Traditional group loyalties of family, factions or biradri (clan)

are thought to influence voting decisions to a much greater extent then more modern or

political factors, such as party loyalty, patronage, or issue orientation. This chapter focuses its

attention on the social factors that influence the voting decisions beginning with detailed

analysis of polling stations to compare gender and class differences in voting behaviour.

There is ample evidence to suggest that candidates are increasingly being judged on the basis

of their performance as deliverers of patronage and development. Increasingly, in order to win

elections candidate will have to add ‘development votes’ to their ‘biradari votes’.. In the

1990s , biradari seemed to be a more significant determinant of voting behavior. In general,

the importance of biradari is greater in central and northern NWFP than in southern and north

eastern NWFP, in rural than in urban constituencies, and in local than in national elections. Its

importance is reduced by biradari and factional rivalries within constituencies, by class

tensions between the haves and have-nots, and by the fact that both parties take biradari

factor into consideration when awarding tickets. The evidence indicates that party loyalty in

urban areas and the performance of candidates in providing patronage and development to

their constituents in rural areas play an important role in determining voting behaviour. This

supports the overall conclusion of this study that political factors are growing in importance

relative to social factors in determining the behaviour of the voters in the NWFP. This

chapter examined the role of gender in influencing voting decisions and showed that women

in urban NWFP favoured PML(N) and ANP over PPP. Exit poll survey data revealed that a

significant percentage of younger voters, who traditionally had supported the PPP, shifted

their support to the ANP/PML(N) in 1990s. The effects that literacy and education had on

voting behaviour closely approximated to those of class, with illiterate voters preferring the

xxxviii

PPP and literate voters the ANP/PML(N) . The Chapter then looked at the role of religion in

determining voting behaviour. The poor performance of religious parties in elections

illustrated that it was not a major factor, although sectarianism and the influence of traditional

religious leaders do effect the voting decisions of some voters. Overall, voters decided not to

‘waste’ their votes on religious parties which were not expected to win, and which would

therefore not be in a position to provide patronage. The chapter ended by looking at the

influence of faction and biradari, which are viewed by many to be the most important

determinants of voting behaviour in the NWFP.

Chapter-IX on Political Determinants of Electoral Politics in NWFP presents the detailed

analysis of political determinants. During the analysis of political determinants of voting

behavior, it has been found that political determinants are more powerful than social

determinants. It has been also found that local bodies have localized electoral politics and

local issues seems much important than national issues. This has been the affect of local

government elections and impact of non-party campaigns on local issues. During the period

under study it has been found that unemployment and inflation are becoming increasingly

important and throughout the electoral race during 1990s it has an important factor in

determining peoples voting behavior. Finally chapter nine discussed the growing importance

of political determinants such as party and party leader identification, patronage orientation,

and national issue orientation. Party identification (Michigan approach) was the most

important determinant of voting behaviour in urban NWFP, but even in rural areas it was

much more important than was assumed. While parties still needed strong candidates in rural

constituencies, strong candidates increasingly need strong parties to win. The chapter than

emphasized the growing importance of patronage and development in determining voting

behaviour. Voters, especially in rural areas, are therefore casting their ballots for the

candidates and parties they perceive will be the most effective conduits for delivering

patronage. The chapter concluded by arguing that national issues, while not major

determinant of voter behaviour in 1990s were likely to become more important in coming

years. Concerns over the economic issues of inflation and unemployment could divert

attention away from local issues to national issues.

In conclusion it has been concluded that electoral politics in NWFP during the period under

study was representation oriented not movement oriented. Political Parties are less cadres

oriented and more leaders oriented.More candidate oriented than issue oriented. Electoral

Politics is an exercise to access patronage that’s why voters failed to influence

policies.During the study of electoral politics in NWFP (1988-1999) four major categories of

voters also exist as indicated in Muhammad Waseem study of 1993 elections. First, there was

a civic voter. This voter tended to be a party voter, even an ideologue but more generally the

holder of a partisan opinion on public issues. Secondly, there was the client voter. Typically,

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he belonged to feudal areas where his economic dependence on the local landlord-politician

was complete. Thirdly, there was a maverick voter. He was a typical patronage seeker, who

was not prepared to wait till after the elections. His demand could be either individualistic or

even community oriented. Finally there is a primary voter. He voted for either ethnic identity

or sectarian identity. Electoral politics in NWFP revolved around the characteristics

represented in these categories of voters in a varying degree. However further research is

needed for accurate measurement of these voters. It is important to remember that voting

behaviour is not static, and with time new divisions may emerge or old ones becomes less

salient. Generational change may lead to political re-alignments. Rapid urbanization and

industrialization may increase the political relevance of the urban-rural divide and industry

versus agriculture cleavages, and decrease those based on kinship or faction. Furthermore,

new cross-cutting issues such as inflation or environmental concerns may emerge that do not

immediately lend themselves to existing categories but could lead instead to ‘issue-oriented’

voting. Finally, new charismatic political leaders could emerge, create new political

alignment, and transform the political landscape.

1 For detail see Naureen Talha, Economic Factors in the Making of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000)2 Daily Dawn (Internet edition), 15 April 2010.3 Javed Kamran Bashir, N.W.F.P. Elections of 1970: An Analysis (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1973)4 See Imdad Ali Khan, Voting Behaviour in Rural NWFP: A Study of People Participation in Election (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1986).5 See Muhammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of 2002 elections (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006)6 See David Washbrook, ‘The Rhetoric of Democracy and Development in Late Colonial India’, In Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, eds. Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India (Dehli: Oxford University Press, n.d)7 See Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).8 See Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1994)9 Andrew R. Wilder, See Andrew R. Wilder, The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).10 See Hamza Alavi, ‘Kinship in West Pakistan Villages’, In T.N. Madan, ed., Muslim Communities in South Asia(New Delhi: Vikas, 1996).11 Saghir Ahmad See Saghir Ahmad, Class and Power in Punjabi Village (Lahore: Punjab Adbi Markaz, 1977).12 See Craig Baxter, ‘Pakistan Votes, 1971’, Asian Survey 11 (March 1973). See Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, (ed.) Pakistan in Transition, (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975).13 See Sharif-al-Mujahid, ‘Pakistan: First General Elections’, Asian Survey 11 (February 1971).14 Mushtaq Ahmad Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi, 1970)15 See Iftikhar Ahmad, Pakistan General Elections, 1970 (Lahore: South Asian institute, Punjab University, 1976)16 See Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan Encounter With Democracy (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1994).17 See Ijaz Shafi Gillani, Pakistan at the Polls (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan1985).18 Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad, Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad, Electoral Politics in Pakistan with Special reference to Hazara region of NWFP. (1988-2002), (M. Phil thesis: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-E-Azam University Islamabad, 2003).19 A.M. Khan Leghari, Report on the Sargodha District Board Elections 1952-53 (Lahore: Punjab Printing Press, 1954), pp.13-28.20 K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, (Boston: Houghton Miffin,1968).21 Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, (London: G. Allen, 1957).22 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, (Barke;ey: , University of California Press, 1961).23 Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, (Karachi: Space Publishers, 1970).24 Richard L. Park, ‘East Bengal: Pakistan’s Troubled Province’, (Far Eastern Survey, 1954), p.72.

xl

25 Mahfuzul Haq, Electoral Problems in Pakistan, (Dacca: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1966), p.66-69, 80-82, 115.26 Bruce A. Campbell and Richard J. Trilling, eds., Realignment in American Politics, Austin, 1980.27 Pakistan economist Research Unit (PERU), The General Elections 1970: An analysis of Socio-Economic Trends in West Pakistan (Karachi, 1973), p. 15-23.28 S.J Burki and C. Baxter, Socio Economic Indicators of the Peoples Party Vote in Punjab: A Study at the Tehsil Level, in W.H. Wriggins ed, Pakistan in Transition, (Islamabad University Press, Islamabad 1975), pp. 169-67.29 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power. 2003, pp. 15-25.30 Iftikhar Ahmad, Pakistan General Elections, 1970, p.69.31 Philip Jones, The hanging Party Structures in Pakistan: From Muslim League to Peoples Party’, in Manzooruddin Ahmad (ed.) Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy and Society, (Durham, 1980), pp. 128-129.32 Maleeha Lodhi, ‘Bhutto, The Pakistan Peoples Party and Political Development in Pakistan 1967-1977’, Ph. D Thesis, University of London, 1980, p. 379-380.33 Crag Baxter, ‘Pakistan Votes, 1971’, Asian Survey 11 (March 1973), p. 216-217.34 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, (National Institute of History and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1994a), p. 253.35 Lawrence Ziring, ‘The Campaign before Storm’, (Asian Survey, July 1977), pp. 584, 594.36 Shariful Mujahid, ‘The 1997 Pakistani Election: An Analysis’, in Manzooruddin Ahmad, (ed.), p. 79.37 MG. Weinbaum, ‘The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost’, (Asian Survey, July 1997), pp.605-613.38 Norman D. Palmer, ‘The Two Elections: A Comparative Study’, (Asian Survey, July 1977), pp. 648-649.39 Ibid, p. 661.40 William Richter, ‘Pakistan in 1985: Testing Time for the New Order’, (Asian Survey, February 1986)41 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State, p. 398.42 Ibid, p. 661.43 Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law 1979-1985, (Lahore, 1987), p.42.44 William Richter, ‘The 1990 General Elections in Pakistan’, in Pakistan: 1992, Charles H. Kennedy ed, (Westview Press, Boulder, 1993), pp. 27-35.45 Ibid, p.36.46 Anwar H. Syed, ‘The Pakistan People’s Party and the Punjab: National Assembly Elections, 1988 and 1990’, Asian Survey, July 1991, p. 584.47 Ibid.48 William Richter, The 1990 General Elections in Pakistan’, in Pakistan: 1992, Charles H. Kennedy ed, p. 38.49 PDA White paper, How election was stolen 1991, pp. xvii-xxiv.50 NDI for International Affairs, The October 1990 elections in Pakistan, (Washington D.C., 1991), pp. v-vi.51 Ibid, Appendix IV, p. 127.52 Henry Cray, ‘International Election Observers: Panacea or Problematic participation ,’ (Seminar Paper, Columbia- New York Universities Conference on Crossing National Borders: Invasion or involvement,’ December 6 1991), pp. 1- 4.53 Lawrence Ziring, ‘The Second Stage in Pakistani Politics in Pakistan: The 1993 Elections’, (Asian Survey, December 1993), pp. 1179-1183. 54 Andrew R. Wilder, ‘Changing Patterns of Punjab Politics in Pakistan: National Assembly Elections Result, 1988 and 193’, (Asian Survey, April 1995), p.379.55 Ibid.56 Mohammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan, (Lahore: Vanguard, 1994)57 Ibid, pp. 75-96.58 Ibid, Chapters 4 and 6.59 Ibid, 240.60 Ibid, 259.61 Mohammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections, pp. 48-149.62 Ibid.63 Faqir Hussain, ‘The Electoral System in Pakistan’, in ed. Faqir Hussain, Electoral Reforms in Pakistan(Islamabad: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1995).64 Dietor Nohlen, Electoral System in Pakistan: Options for Pakistan, (Islamabad: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1995), pp. 80-84.65 Ibid.66 Tariq Jazzi, ‘Proportional Representation System’, in Faqir Hussain Electoral reforms, 1995, pp. 80-91.67 The News, February 27, 1996.68 The Pakistan Times, February 28,1996.69 Daily Pakistan Observer, February 28, 1996.70 Ibid, March 04,1996.71 A.M. Khan Leghari, Report on the Sargodha District Board Elections 1952-53, pp. 23-30.72 Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the conduct of General Elections in March 1997, (Islamabad, 1978).73 See Election Commission of Pakistan, Compilation of Judgements of The Supreme Court of Pakistan In Cases Relating to the National Assembly, Provincial Assemblies an the Senate (1957-1987), Islamabad, 1988.

xli

74 How an election was Stolen: The PDA White Paper on the Pakistan Elections 1990, (Islamabad: MadasiaPublications, 1991).75 Mohammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan, pp. 147-151.

1

CHAPTER-I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTORAL POLITICS

1.1 INTRODUCTION: In this chapter theoretical framework of electoral

politics is drawn to analyse the voting behaviour of the voters in NWFP. Electoral

theories and electoral models are discussed in this chapter for focused analysis of

electoral politics and voting behaviour.

Electoral politics are the most visible and symbolic form of political participation.

Periodic, genuinely, free and fair elections are essential for the achievement of

effective democracy. The free, fair and transparent elections reflect the will of the

people, which provide the basis of the authority of the government. Henry J. Steiner

in his work, states, “Countries with markedly different political systems have termed

political participation the vital human right. In its absence, it is said; all others fall to a

perilous existence”1 Elections are, therefore, the means by which the great mass of

citizens can participate directly in the political process and in NWFP citizens do

participate in this way and elect their representatives for public offices. Electoral

politics is a participatory play in governing process through elections in which both

voters and politicians want to achieve power, ‘to control the behaviour of others

through force, threats, or withholding of resources’.2 Study of electoral politics

renders an understanding of how government’s policies, political parties’ strategies

about elections operates and how people behave. This study involves the investigation

of citizens interacting with each other. Electoral politics in NWFP have different

dimensions of socio-political nature, tenants-landlords relations and parties’ electoral

play. Political parties used influential people amongst the Frontier society to win

elections and these influential people used political parties to get power within their

constituencies over the district administration for the fulfillment of their own interests.

In this way the study of electoral politics is an interesting topic due to its practical

applications. Electoral politics is concerned with the distribution of advantages and

disadvantages among people based on their interests. In urban and rural areas of

NWFP citizens have different wants and needs which are acquired by “arguments,

persuasion, threats, flattery and other forces”.3 Citizens are constantly interacting with

each other, and since the satisfaction of many of a person’s needs depends upon the

relationships he establishes with others, the preferences and interests of some

individuals will inevitably come into opposition with the preferences and interests of

2

others. This opposition of preferences and interests may result in competition or

conflict and in attempts by those concerned to reach some sort of accommodation,

varying from elimination of the competitor to a reconciliation of differences.

“Payoffs” are distributed among the parties in conflict. It depends upon two factors.

(1) The type of decision making process, and (2) the people and the resources

involved. The distribution of advantages and disadvantages are dependent upon both

the types of decision making process and the people involved.4 On the basis of

electoral politics, elected politicians gain office from the votes of a certain number of

people, geographically defined i.e. from their constituencies. They owe their election

to the votes, campaign funds, party work, and efforts of those who elected them as

their elected representatives. They enjoy their work and desire to remain in office.

Hence they pay attention to those who played a role in putting them there. The

stronger the support, the greater will be the obligation by the politician to the

supporters5 and all this has happened in the electoral politics of NWFP since their

inception.

Factors such as socio-economic status, religion, family influence, and the state of the

national, local and provincial affairs affect political attitudes; but the people’s

conscious feelings about the parties, issues and candidates are the most immediate

determinants of voting behaviour.6 Throughout one’s life a variety of agents exert

influence on a person’s political outlook. A considerable portion of this learning

occurs before the individual is old enough to enter the voting booth i.e. in the early

days of life. Family background can determine voting and party preferences.7 Many if

not most, individuals adopt the same party identification as their parents. It was

assumed that parents transmitted their partisanship to their off springs through a

process called political socialization.8 In NWFP paternal political influence on

electoral politics is deeply rooted in Pakhto (Pakhtuns codes of life) and this paternal

influence reflects in the younger generations in Pakhtun society9. Participation of the

people in the electoral process is the substance of procedural democracy and during

every election large number of people participated in procedural democracy from

NWFP within social chains. A free election which is the highest degree of a

consolidated democracy is still waiting in NWFP. Elections are the hallmark of

democracy. Robert Dahl, in an introduction to democratic theory suggests that

political parties and elections are two requisite institutions of any democracy.10

Electoral politics and political process both have direct relation with each other.

3

Electoral process establishes political institutions whose success and failure depends

upon the rate of political awareness. Democratic elections are a fair competitive

examination for recruitment of leaders by the electorates.11 Electoral systems

determine the rules according to which the voters may express their political

preferences and according to which it is possible to convert votes into parliamentary

seats.12 In electoral politics people are mostly concerned with style issues about war

and peace, prosperity and depression, corruption and “good” governance. In election

campaigns politicians are interested in getting re-elected.13 During election process

and campaigns politicians used the language of voter, they liberally use “should” and

“ought to”, they deal in generalities and half truths, they say things which they

probably don’t mean and don’t understand themselves. In electoral politics, politicians

have different strategies and techniques. The strategy of the politicians is clear. They

make broad, vague, ambiguous, and emotional appeals in the hopes of winning as

many votes as possible. This strategy serves a function for both politicians and

people: for politicians it is generally the only strategy that will result in success (given

the nature of the electorate), to people it gives the kinds of things they want to hear.

Campaigns help to assure voters that they are making the right choice.14 Issues are

always highlighted at party platforms and political parties used issue style politics in

NWFP but the MNAs or MPAs who represented constituencies used traditional ways

such as biradari supports, friends influence and past developmental works. Voters

often did not bother to ask any candidate his motivation for seeking election and

reasoning at the grassroots level is sometime out of the question15.

The major component of electoral politics is voting. The act of voting gives a concrete

example of the individual citizen responding to stimuli, making decisions, and finally

either acting or choosing not to. It provides a useful and illuminating case study of

political behaviour.

In electoral politics, a high voting turnout among the citizens is considered to be a

significant indicator of the health of the political system, because political

participation is assumed to be essential to the proper functioning of the democracy.

Most political studies also assume that the act of voting is an indication that the

individual citizen views himself as an active participant in the political system. If the

individual feels, on the basis of past experience, that the results of elections do

influence the decision of the government and that the efforts of individuals like

himself can affect the results of elections then he will be motivated to participate in

4

the electoral process. If the citizen is motivated, he may put more of his time, energy,

and resources into the process by studying the issues involved in the election, making

contributions to campaigns, or actively working to help create support for a candidate,

party, or position on some issue. If his effort is not rewarded by some sense of

accomplishment, he is likely to make less of an investment in future elections.16

The voter is a prospective in an exchange relationship. Through party platform,

speeches, statements of position, and personal contacts, the various candidates

promise various benefits that will accrue to him if he invests his vote in their cause.

Additional benefits (such as positions in the governmental structure) may be offered

to induce the citizen to give active personal or financial support to the campaign.

Completing the bargaining cycle, the prospective voter makes his various needs and

demands known to the candidates, usually through organised pressure groups and the

machinery of political parties. During the course of a pre-election campaign, this

bargaining process may lead to shifts of position by both the candidates and the

prospective voters.17 The basic logic of voting as mentioned in Down’s work is

‘rational choice’, i.e. voters, vote as per their self interests and parties or candidates

who receive votes are also rational because they have their own interests. These

interests are not clear but always uncertain. This uncertainty situation always becomes

the backbone of electoral politics. Politicians act solely in order to attain the income,

prestige, and power which come from being in office. According to rational choice

theory, politicians never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies;

their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office. They treat policies purely as

means to the attainment of their private ends, which they can reach only by being

elected. Parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections

in order to formulate policies. 18 The election is a multivariate phenomenon. To

understand how elections are won and lost, one must consider not only the influence

social characteristics have on the individual voter, but also the roles played by such

institutional arrangements as election laws-these also affect how many seats each

party wins in its national parliament. The relationship between the multitudes of

influences is represented schematically in figure 1. The entries above the line indicate

influence upon individual voters: eligibility to vote rules, turnout considerations, party

actions and political events, social characteristics, standing party identification, and

issue predispositions. Many studies of voting terminate with statements about the

preferences of individual voters. The most important political phenomena are not

5

individual choices but the aggregate distribution of seats in the national parliament,

effecting control of executive government. In a country with simple two-party system

the result is conceived as total victory or defeat; in multiparty system in which

coalition government is the norm there are complications in converting parliamentary

seats into coalition shares.19

PartySystem

Turn Out Party SocialRules Actions Characteristics

Turn Out PoliticalFactors Events Standing Party

Identification

Issue Pre-Dispositions

The electoral process is a means of decision that lies within a broader political order,

and in research on voting it is valuable to have the wider political system in which the

electoral process is found. Timely elections would seem to be obviously related to

political developments. They have to be considered in the context of the political

culture and sentiments about legitimacy and commitment to the system; they have a

direct and often decisive bearing on the capacity of a political system and on the

performance of the authoritative structures of government in many political systems.

They have a central role in the non-authoritative structures and the general political

process. Elections induce the important element of accountability into a political

system, and provide a means by which such accountability is achieved in greater or

lesser degree. Accountability also seems to be related to political development. As

John Badgley has reasoned, “A civil polity is one in which the public interest is

NationalAggregate

Vote

Conversion Rules:Votes to Seats per Constituency

NationalElectionResult

Figure 1: How an Election Result is Determined.

Eligibilityto Vote Rules

IndividualElectors

IndividualVotes

Population

6

served by the process of accountability”.20 While on the other hand Samuel

Huntington believes that in many countries, elections serve only to enhance the power

of disruptive and often reactionary social forces, except on short run basis.21 Elections

and political parties have a direct relationship with each other. During elections,

parties are most prominently on display, or, to put it in another way, on trial. An

election provides an unrivalled opportunity to examine the organisation, the

personnel, and the policies of the parties. Parties are the main agencies for organising

and for providing political direction to the electorate, and for political choice. The

electoral system affects the political life of a country mainly through the parties.22

Elections are a mechanism which parties use to maintain their support base. Elections

help to establish links between the society, mainly non-political, and the political

system, in which parties function and of which they are apart. In heterogeneous

society, people who are psychologically and emotionally attached to their political

groups, have two perspectives i.e. traditionalist perspective and revisionist

perspective.23 According to the traditionalist perspective, party identification is

primarily an emotional attachment and not the result of the individual’s consideration

of which party might be more likely to better serve his or her interests.24 It is thus a

sort of psychological identification and is therefore not based on policy concerns. This

perspective could be rational in the sense that with the passage of time partisan ties

strengthen due to frequent use of their vote and exposure to agreeable information.

Thus a citizen refrains from changing his party loyalty he has acquired so early in life

without paying any heed to the multiple issues and policies surrounding him.25

According to the revisionist perspective, model partisanship is not merely a

psychological attachment without political meaning; rather it reflects the citizen’s

judgement of the parties’ performance on issues important to the citizen.26 This

perspective comes closer to the rational activist model, according to which the public

supposedly controls the behaviour of its public officials by exercising influence at the

ballot box in a rational fashion. It implies that a voter takes into account all the factors

i.e. issues, candidates, parties, manifestos, etc. before casting his vote. With all the

information regarding political parties, campaign, candidates and contemporary issues

at his disposal, it seems quite reasonable to state that issues and policy matters play an

important role in determining an individual’s partisanship.27

Electoral politics is concerned with all these issues and is based on wide range of

factors such as political system, political parties, interest groups, military and

7

bureaucracy. In electoral politics historical, social, psychological and other ecological

factors directly effect on electoral process. Electoral politics is also conditioned by

deep-seated historical and societal factors.28 Gopal Krishna observed that the decision

to vote for one candidate rather than another may be governed entirely by non

political considerations and the voter may often be unaware of the political choice

he/she is making through the act of voting.’29 The importance of considering the

electoral process within the societal as well as the political framework, and the role of

elections as providing a crucial link between the society and the polity calls attention

to the relationship between the political and the social system.30 The most generally

discussed electoral propositions, namely that ‘social characteristics determine political

preferences’.31 It holds true globally. Every society has some kind of political system.

Political systems vary from society to society. Max Weber was of the opinion that the

type of the political system depends upon the nature of its legitimacy. Legitimacy

rests on three factors, i.e. traditions, charismatic personality, legality.32 Today

Democracy i.e. the government where the power is vested in the people is considered

to be the popular system. Democracy has different principles and necessary

conditions. Among these the most important principle is the strong desire and full

commitment of the masses toward democracy.33

1.2 ELECTORAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS

Political organisation refers to the means by which a society maintains order

internally and manages its affairs with other societies externally.34 Such organisation

may be relatively decentralised and informal as in bands and tribes, or centralised and

formal, as in chiefdoms and states. In other words, political organisation is the system

of social relationships that provides for the co-ordination and regulation of behaviour,

insofar as that behaviour is related to the maintenance of public order. Political

organisation is the means through which a society maintains social order.35 Elections

are complex events involving individual and collective decisions, which directly

effect, and are effected by, the total political and social process. They open up

channels between the polity and the society, between the elite and the masses,

between the individuals and his government. They are major agencies of political

socialisation and political participation.36 Elections broadly considered, are

complicated political processes, which are to be analysed within the context of the

total political and social system. An election itself, wrote V.O. Key, ‘is a formal act of

8

collective decision that occurs in a stream of connected antecedent and subsequent

behaviour.’37

Robert Lane has developed a useful “paradigm for the study of electoral behaviour”38

which calls attention to the broader dimensions of the electoral process and to a

variety of types, attributes, and factors which may be considered as either dependent

or independent variables. The types of political behaviour listed under ‘responses’

represent, ‘collectively and individually, the dependent variable,39 the psychological

attributes of individual, listed under ‘organisation’ and ‘the social or environmental

factors listed under stimuli’ represent the independent variable.

Diagram-I: Paradigm for the Study of Electoral Behaviour.Diagram-I: Paradigm for the study of electoral Behaviour.

Source: Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get involved in Politics (Glencose, III, the Free Press, 1959), p. 6.On the other hand the Michigan Model of voter behaviour has a core theme on social

psychological pattern.40 It depends on many factors. Events follow one another,

converging in a series of causal chains and moving from the mouth to the stem of the

funnel. Thus a multitude of causes narrow in to the voting act. At the mouth of the

funnel are sociological background characteristic such as (ethnicity, race, region,

religion, and the like), social status characteristic (education, occupation, class), and

parental characteristics (class, partisanship). All these factors affect the person’s

choice of party identification. Party identification in turn influences the person’s

evaluation of the candidates and the issues, which takes us further into the funnel.

Then comes the campaign. Closer to the tip are the conversations which the voter has

with family and friends about the election. Then comes the vote itself.41 Michigan

researchers concentrated, then and now, on those variables that are closest to the

Stimuli Economic status and institutions

Group membership(Family, Ethnic, Class) etc.

Community situation

Political Institutions

The Media

Social and Political attitudes

Core Personality (Needs)

Organisation

Responses

Containing Politicians

Voting and electioneering

Reading and listening to politics

Contributing to parties and interpret groups.

Discussing politics

Joining political groups and movement

9

voting decision. This approach can be attributed to the influence of social psychology

on modern political science.

Diagram-II: Michigan Model of Voter Behaviour.

Source: Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, Controversies in American Voting Behaviour (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1996), p.12.

Political scientists also have the opinion that “the immediate determinants of an

individual’s behaviour lie more clearly in his attitudes and his perceptual organisation

of his environment than in either his/her social position or other ‘objective’ situational

factors”.42 The Michigan Model suggests that long term factors are most important in

determining party choice. But there is not a simple step from social locations to voting

behaviour. Rather, the social position that an individual occupies affects the kinds of

influence that he or she will encounter in interacting with family, friends, neighbours,

workmates and so on. As a consequence of the interactions-especially within the

family-the individual acquires a party identification. This means sense of attachment

to party, feeling of commitment to it, being the supporter of the party-and not just

someone who happens to vote for the party from time to time.43 When there is an

election, there is an interaction between a voter’s long term party identification and

various short term influences, such as current political issues, campaign events, the

personalities of party leaders or candidates and, the tactical situation in the local

constituency, to produce a vote decision. The Michigan Model emphasises that it is

the long term factors that are usually decisive. Indeed a person’s party identification

will influence how the voter interprets and evaluates issues, party leaders and so on.

The concept of Party identification is central to the Michigan model and there are

three clear differences between party identification and voting. Firstly, party

Campaign issueSSS

Time The voting

Family and friends

Party identification

Candidate and issue evaluation

Sociological characteristics

Parental characteristics

Social status characteristics

10

identification is psychological while voting is behavioural. That is, identification

exists in a person’s mind; one cannot observe it directly. Voting however a definite

action-putting a stamp on a piece of paper-and it is in principle, observable (normally

done in secret). Secondly, voting is time specific while party identification is not.

Voting can take place only at an election-and elections occur frequently in NWFP-

whereas identification is ongoing and continuous. There does not need to be an

election in the offing for people to consider themselves supporters of a party. Thirdly,

party identification varies in intensity and voting does not. Some people will be very

strong party supporters, others not very strong or just weak supporters. All votes

count equally, however, whether the voter marks the ballot with a great thick black

cross or a tiny faint one44.

Party identification is, then, distinct from voting. This means that it can be used to

help explain party choice in election, as in the Michigan Model. According to the

theory, party identification serves important functions for the individual. It simplifies

the task of understanding the complex world of politics. Identification also acts as a

sort of psychological filter or prism through which political messages pass to the

individual; it provides a framework within which political events are understood and

evaluated. If people identify with a party they are not likely to shoot off in all

directions at successive elections. Rather, they will have a ‘normal’ vote which in

most cases will remain stable from election to election.

The Michigan approach was based on a sample survey of voters, aimed at bringing

out a correlation between party identification and volatility.45 It drew upon the social

psychology of individual voters. Its focal point was to the voting behaviour as the end

product of election activities, ranging from the announcement of candidature, media

input and party propaganda to the act of casting the ballot at the polling station. The

voter is the king-pin of the electoral process according to the Michigan approach, with

scant attention given to the social context of voting. Some times a survey is conducted

to cover the changes in the voter preferences during different phases of election

phases of the election campaign, modeled after a ‘rolling thunder design’.46 The

concept is that the voter is sovereign in terms of taking decisions about which of the

alternative political parties and patterns of leadership should be delegated his or her

trust in the matter of policy making. On the other hand, the Columbia school of

thought focused on a sociological perspective to understand the partisan dynamics of

elections. This perspective deals essentially with attitudinal determinants of voter

11

along the continuum of policy preferences on the left-right ideological orientations.

Here, the contexts of class, race, caste, ethnicity, religion, rural or urban sectors

gender and generation influence the voter in varying degrees and styles. In this regard,

the political communications approach revolves around the issue of the construction

of electoral choice for the voter.47 Alternatively the Downsian theory of voting

behaviour is based on the voter calculation of cost and benefit leading to the act of

voting. This so called economic theory of voting behaviour is coached in the

rationality thesis, whereby each voter is supposed to seek maximization of his or her

interest by carefully analyzing the gains emanating out of preferring one party or

candidate over the other.48 This approach depends heavily on the profile of the citizen

who demonstrates stable issue preferences, credible information about policy

alternative and knowledge of both short term and long term consequences of the

ballot. These approaches have led to the corresponding research models applicable to

filled surveys covering conceptual frameworks and methodological issues relations to

the elections. Researcher can look at the three models in traverse order: spatial

studies, alignment studies and party organizational studies. The spatial model

corresponds to the Downsian Theory based on voter maximizing strategy. According

to this approach, the issues positions of various parties converge with the issue

dimensional of voter outlook.49 This ‘proximity Theory’ reflects the meeting point of

the electorate and political parties.50 In order to establish contract with voter parties

try to control the dimensionality of a campaigns issue space in NWFP, the approach

could be applied to the study of the specific election, which must demonstrate a high

level of issue salience. For example, only 1970 and to some extent 1977 elections are

candidates for analyses and under the spatial model. Otherwise, given the increasingly

non-issue character of general elections in Pakistan and in NWFP, an interest

maximizing role of mass voting needs to be defined in terms of short term patronage-

individual or collective rather than long term policy, along with its envisaged impact

on the larger political community. The alignment model of electoral politics,

envisaged typically based on party identification at the national or provincial level,

has been a role rather than an exception throughout country’s history. The party

alignment model has a great explanatory value, given the voters’ entrenched

partisanship based on shorter term factors.51 Indeed, party alignment, de-alignment

and re-alignment are persistent features of electoral politics in NWFP as elsewhere in

the other provinces of Pakistan. A stable pattern of party voter alignment is the norm

12

in the medium to long term perspective in Pakistan. PPP, MQM, ANP, Jiya Sindh

Mohaz, JI, Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP), JUI as well as the oldest mainstream party

PML have all enjoyed stable constituencies over decades.

The party organizational model revolves around the growing organizational fluidity of

political parties. Generally, parties in NWFP and other provinces kept their support

bases more or less intact. This was despite the fact that they were discredited by

military governments and rendered non-functional for many years. Non- party

elections were held at the national or provincial levels in 1962 and 1985 and the local

level throughout Pakistan’s history. The two mainstream parties PPP and PML

continued to dominate the scene for three decades, from the 1970s to the 1990s at the

national level and with the coalition of ANP and others independents in NWFP. The

PML underwent a transition that was essentially in terms of leadership and a new

factional identity, and not by way of change in the support base. Political parties did

not frame any new policy –based identities during the period under study. Instead,

they struggled for survival in the face of the government’s accountability drive

throughout the 1990s due to the power tussle between PPP and PML-N backed by ISI.

In this situation, the experienced voters stayed in line but the undecided voters, who

actually made the difference between the two rival contenders for powering terms of

victory in elections, remained immobilized. The two mainstream parties PPP and

PMLs, the so-called cartel parties, in so far as these bagged nearly 70 per cent of

polled votes in 1997 and nearly as many in the preceding elections, had displayed an

overly office seeking behaviour for more than a decade.52 Once they lost their

mobilizing potential, they became susceptible to allegations of collaborating with

each other in order to keep the levers of power in their own hands by means of

shutting of lesser parties from aspiring to form the government in Islamabad. The

military cadres, civil bureaucracy, the professional middle classes, the business

community as well Islamic parties grew increasingly cynical about the two prime

ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharief, who were allegedly playing musical

chairs between themselves during the 1990s, in Pakistan, political parties are

considered the villain of the piece. It is remembered for misrule, corruption,

selfishness, nepotism, electoral malpractices, a non-responsive attitude towards the

public at large and absolutism of the party hierarchy. To understand the political

context of elections in the years under study, we need to delineate the role of parties

as understood and accommodated in their scheme of things by the state managers.

13

While much changed during the last three quarters of a century, one thing remained

intact: parties were imagined as intruders on the district scene in their capacity as non

local political resources carrying a great destabilizing potential for a local power

structure. In the absence of party based national elections on the basis of adult

franchise for a quarter of a century after independence, the district administration

continued to represent the ultimate source of the authority at the local level. Parties

were reduced to a collection of bigwigs, with a following based not on aggregation of

interests but on alliances between factional groupings. In India, local patterns of

leadership were interviewed with the party high command straight after

independence. Instead, Pakistan experienced not only an incomplete transition from

the dynamics of micro to macro-politics as the foundation of electoral democracy, but

also a process of rendering local government into an instrument to constrain the

influence of politicians in the locality operating at higher levels. The mainstream

parties in Pakistan, PPP and PML, like the archetypal mainstream party in India-

Congress-are ‘inclusive’ and heterogeneous rather than ‘cohesive’ in nature. These

are ‘catch-all’ parties, representing multiple support bases across ethnic, religious,

sectarian and sectional boundaries. By the same account, these parties are somewhat

autonomous with social cleavages of different kinds in different contexts. Their lack

of cohesion is not necessarily counter productive in terms of their ability to aggregate

local influence structures in order to form a government. However, their

organizational weakness means that there is no managerial class of politicians who

would operate as ‘link men’ and bring ‘faction chains’ together in a larger and more

meaningful entity.53 In Rajni Kothari’s view, the success of the ongoing democratic

framework of politics in India draws, among other things, on the overall democratic

intellectual climate which provided meaning to political activity of politicians.54 As

opposed to the (Hindu) majority-based public ethos in pursuit of collective causes, the

emergent Muslim middle class everywhere in British India sought accommodation in

the system from a (Muslim) majority perspective. The state rather than society was

the focus of its activity by way of seeking employment in the public sector, and thus

representing a status quo orientation in terms of issues and policies.55 The overall

potential of the much-cultivated sense of national insecurity in the country, often

couched in the defecation of state, can be gauged from the continuously hostile

attitude of the ruling elite towards politicians. Politics in Pakistan operates in an

intellectual climate that is not very conducive to democratic ideals and norms.

14

1.3 ELECTORAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Electoral politics is a key factor for political participation and political behaviour in a

society. People inform themselves through interaction with each other, political

groups and mass media. By interacting with different information agencies, a

common man acquires the capability to form a clear judgment and other issues

confronting a country.56 Civic culture includes a sense of obligation to participate in

political input activities, as well as a sense of competence to participate.57 Citizen’s

active participation in the political process may be in the shape of becoming member

of a political party, taking part in election campaigns, voting during elections and

pressing for demands to the government through a democratic manner.58 Electoral

politics strengthen democracy in which power over significant authoritative decisions

in a society is distributed among the population. The ordinary man is expected to take

an active part in the governmental affairs, to be aware of how decisions are made, and

to make his views known.59 According to the democratic theory the health of a

democracy depends on the existence of a potentially informed and active citizenry. By

working for, and voting for candidates who represent their views, and by making their

views known to elected leaders, citizens could collectively translate their various

policy preferences into government action.60 This is in fact what may be called the

democratic ideal in which both the government and masses act in a reciprocal manner.

The citizens put forth their demands, and those in power try to placate them by

responding in a positive manner. With both sides playing their due roles, democracy

gets the conducive atmosphere to flourish. In short the more the masses keep a vigil

on what their elected representatives do while in office, the more the latter will be

responsive to the demands and grievances of the former. The act of casting one’s vote

in a rational manner doesn’t only and necessarily mean electing members of

legislature and hence the entire government. It goes even beyond. J.S. Mill considered

electoral politics and political participation as moral imperative.61 Democracy has

been used ever since the times of Herodotus to denote that form of government in

which the ruling power of a state is largely vested, not in any particular class or

classes but in the members of the community as a whole.62 With the entire emphasis

on people’s participation in a democracy, it thus become incumbent upon the

members of a community to take an active part in the decision making process. A

government, which does not reflect the collective will of people, cannot be called a

15

democratic government. Indeed, it is representation of masses in the affairs of their

state, which distinguishes a democratic government from that of a military,

authoritarian and despotic regime. An ordinary citizen, expressing himself freely in

rational manner, at elections or without it, performs the key function to keep

democracy alive. Democracy, says Prof. Lindsay, is participation, it means doing

things in common with others, and taking share of responsibilities involved.63 It has

been justly said that, like liberty, the price of democracy is eternal vigilance.

The transfer of power from British India to its successor states also contributed to the

emergence of two separate traditions in these countries. Pakistan experienced an

anomalous situation from the beginning. Political leaders from those provinces and

areas, which became part of India instead of Pakistan, dominated its ruling party

Muslim League. The migrant leadership of the Muslim League had left its electoral

constituencies in India and could not hope to win any election in Pakistan. Nor could

it rely on the current members of the assembly as a support base for their routine

exercise of power. In this situation, the government choose to operate from outside

the parliament rather than from inside it. Migrants from other areas of India also

dominated the bureaucracy. In Pakistan, recourse to elections was considered suicidal

by the migrant led government at federal capital Karachi because there was no way it

could win elections and return to power in the centre. Elections were considered

dysfunctional for the political system of Pakistan in the immediate post independence

period.64 Electoral politics in Pakistan and particularly in NWFP can be analyzed as

politics of holding elections in such a way that the ruling elite keep its privileged

position. If that was not possible, it preferred not to hold elections at all. This rational

choice model is also applicable in NWFP where Khudai khidmatgars seems to be

powerful after partition. 1951 elections in NWFP were rigged; otherwise there was no

chance for Muslim League to win the elections. The focal point of every electoral

system is the formula of decision, which is fundamental in nature. There are two types

of electoral systems; i.e. majoritarian and proportional. Decision in the majority

system is according to a majority of votes polled and in the proportional system it is

according to proportion of votes polled. The majority system has two main types; the

relative majority and absolute majority system. Proportional system has also two main

types; party list voting and non party list voting or single transferable voting system.65

Both systems were in practice in Pakistan’s electoral setup. From 1988-1997, as

elections were held on separate electorate basis and for minorities, seats were reserved

16

according to the proportion of their population. The functioning of an electoral system

is greatly affected by the social structure political system and political party system of

a country. In view of this position, transplantation of electoral system from one

country to another can be problematic. It has been stated by Mackenzie that, only one

thing is certain, that each country has its own political life and that old institutions

will work differently in a new setting.66 NWFP like other parts of Pakistan is a

heterogeneous society so one single electoral system is impractical for the whole

province. In Frontier society the basic electoral unit is not the individual as seen in the

West but the leader or spokesman of the local community, be it tribe, caste, sub-caste,

sect, faction, trade union, migrant or settler group or women’s activist group. The

electoral candidates operating from the platform of political parties contacted not men

and women in their homes but the local ‘big men’ who would deliver votes in

hundreds or even thousands. Elections in Pakistan and particularly in NWFP were

held in a social context which was characterized by the continuing domination of the

tribal and landed elites over their respective areas of influence. Three distinct features

of the political system of Pakistan can be ascribed as playing a determining role in

this respect: first there is the primacy of administrative authority for allocating

resources, operating the structures of public services and regulating the process of

accountability. This authority firmly rests with the civil bureaucracy. Under these

circumstances, the function of elected representatives would typically be reduced to

one of projecting local demands and securing access to the state’s legal and

institutional resources. In other words, politics would be a way to the administration

and therefore a channel brokerage. Instead of being understood in terms of its

designated function of law making, parliament would be considered a pumping station

for local interests. Over time, it assumed an ‘ombudsmanic’ rule.67 Secondly, an

essential framework for understanding electoral politics is provided by the district.

The British bureaucracy established its patronage structure in and around the district

administration. When it introduced electoral politics in British India, it ensured that

the existing power structures based on tribal and ‘feudal’ linkages were preserved and

integrated with the district administration. Thus, democracy was grafted upon a well-

established bureaucratic system. The bureaucracy presided over the process of

demarcation of electoral constituencies and making of electoral laws relating to

various stages in the process of holding elections, ranging from preparation of

electoral rolls and laying out of the election schedule to the announcement of results

17

and hearing of legal cases. The idea was to preserve the status quo under the new

system, which was potentially unpredictable inasmuch as it was based on the

emerging source of legitimacy in the form of mass mandate.

This leads to the third feature of the electoral system, viz. the political party. As a

typical supra-district variable operating at the national or provincial level, political

parties represented the potential for destabilizing the district politics. While the All

India Congress was able to establish itself at the grassroots level by generally co-

opting the rural elite into its organizational matrix, the Muslim League failed to

replace bureaucracy as patron of the local elite due to its lack of organizational

resources. The Congress had already formed governments in several provinces in

1937 and assumed a credible role as patron of the local leadership, while the Muslim

League’s (ML) ascendancy to political office saw the light of the day, in a real sense,

only after partition. Thus, Pakistan inherited a model of district politics where extra-

local input through the party was minimal. The super-ordinate position of the

bureaucracy in the new government only ensured that there was no mobilization and

projection of alternative policy structures by political parties. Moreover the ongoing

political system on Congress patterns was largely suffered when Muslim League

came into power in NWFP in 1947. Both the military and the bureaucracy favored a

model of district politics, which approximated to the colonial pattern, characterized by

provision for local bodies as the principle of political participation by public

representative, restricted franchise, non party elections and diarchy. Both Ayub and

Zia showed preference for local bodies and held regular elections for district and local

councils on a non party basis. The Ayub system was based on disenfranchisement of

the public via indirect elections. On the other hand, Zia institutionalized diarchy

through the 8th Constitutional Amendment, which increased presidential powers by

including the powers to dissolved the parliament and appoint judges of the higher

courts and the chiefs of the armed services.68

From 1958 onwards military governments influenced the shape of electoral politics in

Pakistan. Foremost among these changes was the shift of power from parliament to

the president, which involved the loss of sovereignty for the former. The passing of

8th amendment by the National assembly of Pakistan in 1985 represented an attempt at

constitutional engineering, which robbed parliament of its efficacy as a symbol of

ultimate power. This reduced the legislature to the function of brokerage, to a mere

institutional link between politics and administration. A second and even more

18

significant contribution of the military governments was localization of electoral

politics. These has been a consistent pattern of thinking among the top brass to hold

local bodies elections regularly as a way of taking the steam out of the alienated

public and provide it with a semblance of political participation without involving the

question of transfer of power to public representatives. Localization of electoral

politics was further institutionalized through non-party elections at the higher levels in

1985. These elections depended wholly on individual candidates’ influence in the

locality and their efforts to mobilize financial resources, tribal and community or

biradri ties as well as contacts with the district administration. While the subsequent

elections were held on a party basis in a formal sense the fundamental candidate-

orientation of elections has not changed ever since 1985. Parties have functioned as

umbrella organizations, seeking the support of local people of influence even more

than the latter looking for organizational backing.69 Localization of elections reflected

a wide spread malaise of the body politics of Pakistan in the form of a virtual absence

of issues and an issue base policy structure. While there were all kinds of promises

made during the elections, policy was conspicuous by its absence. Both contestants

and voters were increasingly conscious that it was not policy but patronage that was at

stake. Change through policy via legislation has always been considered remote and

indirect. Patronage through clientele structures operating in the locality was more real

and direct. Policy for large sections of the population was not considered viable in the

absence of interest groups, trade union-based activity or other forms of collective

behaviour. Personal gains in the short term have moved to the center of the voter’s

choice structure. It can be argued that successive elections have not necessarily

increased the level of political participation among the general public, or even the

commitment to democracy among the political leadership. The 1985 elections were

meant to provide legitimacy to Zia government. Similarly, the subsequent elections

essentially provided legitimacy to the power structure ruling Pakistan, with the army

occupying a central position. Electoral politics was effectively de-ideologiesed, and

debate over policy virtually disappeared from the political discourse in the 1990s. The

ruling elite felt comfortable with election as a source of legitimacy, especially as the

global political culture was increasingly defined by the concept of ‘democracy’s third

wave’.70 This phenomenon was also reflected through the absence of participatory

activity at the mass level once elections were over. Indeed, politics in provincial and

national level in Pakistan in the period between elections has been typically non-

19

existent. The holding of local bodies’ elections became increasingly more erratic. On

the other hand, the issue of holding elections for various non-governmental

organizations never took root in the public imagination in frontier society as well as in

Pakistan. Therefore, in the absence of participatory culture and tradition in the

country, the legitimacy function of general elections remained the most visible

indicator of electoral democracy in Pakistan.

Two factors stand out for contributing to the lack of scholarly attention to elections in

NWFP and other provinces, one substantive and the other procedural. Substantively

speaking, the ultimate power to make policy generally eludes public representatives in

Pakistan. Procedurally speaking, the representative character of elected assemblies

has been rendered suspect in the public eye due to a long history of rigging. Both

factors represent interesting challenges to an academic enquiry into the meaning of

elections for voters, candidates, political parties as well as the two state apparatuses,

army and bureaucracy in Pakistan. The most obvious fact about the elections held in

1988-1997 was the political context for an exercise of the powers of ISI behind the

mass voting and indirect of penetration of military in electoral politics. The most

significant event is the formation of IJI by ISI in 1988 which was established to

counter PPP massive campaigns in the election71. Latter on such type activities of ISI

was continued for breaking the affiliation of PPP, MPAs and MNAs from the party72

and hence introduced a new term of lotacracy in Pakistani politics. Dr. Mohammad

Waseem had the opinion that 1962, 1970 and 1985 and later on 2002 elections were

the transition from military to civilian rule. Three military rulers Ayub, Zia and

Musharaf had themselves ‘elected’ through referendum prior to holding general

elections, thus securing the continuity of political initiative in their own hands after

the installation of a civilian parliaments.

1.4 MILITARICRACY TO ELECTOCRACY: The elections 1988, 1990,

1993 and 1997 were preceded by three general elections held in 1970, 1977 and 1985.

The period under study covered four governments of Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif,

Benazir Bhutto again and Nawaz Sharif again at National level and their coalition

governments in NWFP. The February 1997 election brought Nawaz Sharif back as

prime minister with a heavy mandate, only to be dismissed by an army coup in

October 1999. The 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections were held in an ongoing

democratic context, organized and supervised by ‘civilian’ caretaker governments.

20

Except in 1988, these governments were led by civilian caretaker prime ministers and

chief ministers. While the army was never too far from the election scene in the

1990s, the electoral dynamics increasingly bore the clear stamp of the strategic

planning and operational thinking of politicians and political parties. The fact that

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were able to operate as opposition leaders and

become prime minister successively pointed towards the prospects of a self sustaining

political process finally taking root in at national and provincial level. The

phenomenon of transition carries a great explanatory potential for understanding the

conduct of elections held under the army. Each transition put new rules of the game to

install new democratic setup in Pakistan. Democracy itself has not always been

clearly defined. The term has been used loosely, but there is a world of difference

between what may be called ‘procedural’ and ‘social’ democracy. The former means

little more than the holding of regular ballots, while the latter implies a participatory

element in the exercise of power and the removal of social inequalities. In its absence,

only lip-service to democracy can be paid. Pakistan may be seen as having made the

transition from authoritarianism to procedural democracy, but as lacking any of the

characteristics of a consolidated democracy.73

The Democratic transition can be best conceptualized as a ‘transformation’. Despite

the formation of the multi-party MRD in 1981, democracy ‘emerged’ following the

voluntary withdrawal of the military after Zia’s sudden death in August 1988. The

post Zia Military elite was thus able to exert power behind the scenes by brokering a

deal which ensured the unity of anti-PPP political forces under the leadership of

Nawaz Sharif. Thus, the PPP could not sweep the polls. These ‘understandings’ rested

on the assurance that the defense budget was sacrosanct and Army retained a veto in

vital foreign policy and security matters. The armed forces were able to enforce this

veto through their allies in the bureaucracy led by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Zia’s

successor in the office of President, whose powers had been appreciably augmented

by the Eighth Amendment to the constitution. The PPP’s enforced enfeeblement was

compounded by economic crises and the ethnic conflict in Sindh and Afghan

refugees’ problems in NWFP, a legacy of Zia era. The weakness of the Government

was laid bare by its inability to bring forward any meaningful legislation during a

two- year period. Indeed Pakistan’s experience in 1988-90 lends weight to those

understandings which maintain that transitions unilateral imposed by armed forces are

at best likely to result in fragile democracies which eschew the improvement in

21

economic equity while maintaining guarantees of political freedom, but which are

more likely to produce a hybrid mix of electoral forms and authoritarianism. The

latter a has been dubbed ‘electocratic rule’74

Given his questionable democratic credentials, PML-N was in a stronger position than

his PPP predecessor to tilt the balance of power in favour of the elected institutions

over the state structure. This resulted from both his power-base in the politically

crucial Punjab region and his greater acceptability to the Islamic parties. Neverthless,

although the civil-military bureaucracy had engineered (IJI) Nawaz Sharif’s rise to

power in 1990, relation between the new Premier and the establishment became

increasingly uneasy as he sought to carve out an independent political agenda. This

formed the background to Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s second dismissal of an elected

leader. The President’s subsequent resignation in a deal brokered by the Army to end

the constitutional crises was sparked off by the Supreme Court’s restoration of Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif, but it did not mark the breakthrough many hoped for.

Democratic transformation was too easily elided into consolidation in this analysis.

Pakistani democracy has in reality remained extremely fragile and is still in the early

stages of the unfolding sequence from transition to consolidation. Two critical tasks

await Pakistani democracy: first to further loyal opposition and responsible

government through process of institutionalization and consociation; second to

encourage wider political participation and re-establish civilian supremacy over the

armed forces.

Pakistan in 1988-1999 represented the civilian rule indirectly backed by military

establishment. The most important question relating to this process deals with the

location of authority to take decisions and make policies. More specifically, one needs

to ask whether this authority has in reality shifted from the military to the hands of

elected members of parliament. This question is relevant because in various countries

transition has taken place in name only. For example, parliament in Thailand

generally rules on sufferance of the army, bureaucracy and royal dynasty. In

Indonesia, the Suharto years represented the predominant role of the army for three

decades under a façade of democracy. Under the New Order, Suharto had the power

to appoint 100 members of parliament, three quarters from the army and one quarter

from civilians, in addition to 360 directly elected deputies. In Pakistan, the process of

civilianization of the Zia government in 1985 had ensured that the president continued

to have powers to dissolve the National Assembly and thus dismiss the elected

22

government under the controversial 8th Amendment. In defining the context for the

elections from 1988-1999, one needs to point to the attitudinal changes in the way the

electorate viewed elections, parties and contestants. Through its intensive campaign of

discrediting politicians, Presidency plus military produced widespread cynicism in the

general public about the authenticity of partisan positions identified with the political

leadership at the national, provincial and local levels. In addition, the military

establishment managed to create factions out of the main political parties, led by

secondary leaders, and thus de-institutionalized politics still further.75 The combined

effect of official propaganda against the political class as a whole and the official

strategy of undermining the credibility of individual leaders through a vehement

accountability drive was the phenomenon of wide spread political de-alignment.76 In

view of the fact that the lines dividing political parties in terms of their policy and

ideological framework became increasingly blurred, this process acquired the

character of partisan de-alignment in as much as ties with parties were loosened. All

this led to de-politicization of public attitudes towards the national agenda, and

created voter apathy in general. Only slightly more than one-third of registered voters

polled their votes in the four elections from 1988-1997. The partisan de-alignment

was buttressed by class de-alignment on the one hand and partial ethnic de-alignment

on the other.77 Class-based issues such as poverty, unemployment, economic

insecurity, health and educational facilities for the general population, as well as land

tenure and industrial relations were conspicuous by their absence from the election

campaign. Correspondingly, those parties which were identified with one or more of

these issues suffered de-alignment. Additionally, ethnic de-alignment took place in

terms of the loss of credibility of the top and middle rank leaders of traditional ethnic

parties such as ANP, Baluchistan National Party (BNP), PNP, Muttahida (previously

Mahajir) Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Sindh National Alliance (SNA), especially as

they had been part of various coalition governments in the 1990s at one time or

another. Leaders of the two major ethnic parties, MQM of Sindh and ANP of NWFP,

were prosecuted for corruption by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). Ethnic

de-alignment contributed to partisan de-alignment in general in the sense that people’s

unquestioning loyalty to certain political parties could not be taken for granted any

more. However, primordial loyalties to ethnic, linguistic and territorial identities were

not overtaken by the mainstream political parties, PPP and PML-N. These parties

23

were themselves positioned on the wrong side of the military regime, which cost them

heavily in terms of credibility and public support.

1.5 IMPACTS OF ELECTIONS ON LEGISLATURE

Elections-the product of electoral politics have deep impacts and direct relations with

legislature. Legislatures at provincial and national level of Pakistan established on the

basis of elections. The literature on democracy deals with the function of the

legislature as the goal setting agencies from the larger public in terms of policy

making, while the executive as supposed to implement policy on the ground. In

reality, the influence of the legislature in this regard has been circumscribed by the

over arching role of the executive.78 This happened in several ways. The party or

parties in power and in opposition tended to control the way their legislators voted or

did not vote and spoke or did not speak on the floor of the parliament. In this since,

the party leadership operated essentially from outside the legislatures to steal

legislation, including constitutional amendments. One can argue that, in as much as

speaker and the floor take positions on issues of relevance from the treasury or

opposition benches, a legislature’s structures, a political conflict and provides public

forum for debate on contentious issues. In Pakistan, and else where, where issue

formation does not generally take place out in the civil society, legislatures at both the

national and provincial levels have provided both security and legitimacy for

politicians speaking in public about problems ranging from constitutional

amendments to the quota for Hajis (pilgrims to makka) in any specific year. During

the 1990s the National Assembly of Pakistan produced several debates relating to

such contentious issues as military operation in Sindh 1992-94, the Shariat Bill 1998

as well as the visit of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Lahore (1999), which

symbolize a change of policy towards India end therefore became controversial. An

important function of election for the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies

in Pakistan has been the recruitment of legislatures. In the Parliamentary framework

of politics in the country, this has been the standard point of entry into the political

system dating from Jinnah in pre Partition days today. This applied to; the

independence generation of politicians including Liaqat, Suhrwardy, Khaleequzaman,

Noorul Amin, Daultana, Shouket Hayat, Madudi and Ayub Khoro, khan Abdul

Qayum Khan, Dr. Khan Sahib; the second generation including ZA. Bhautto, Wali

Khan, Mujeebur Rehamn, Shah Ahmad Noranni and the Baloch triumvirate of

24

Mangal- Bugti- Marri; and the third generation including Nawaz Sharif and Late

Benazir Bhutto of course, some of them started their career outside the legislatures

and were only later elected into the assemblies. This include Qazi Hussain Ahmad,

Imran Khan, Asghar Khan, late Azam Tariq and Ajmal Khattak in their case, their

struggle to get into the political system did not succeed until they were finally elected

into parliament. Therefore, it can be safely argued that elected assembles in Pakistan

generally attract a lot of attention from ambitious politicians as the most secure and

legitimate method of entry into the system. The aspect of politics in Pakistan is crucial

for the understanding of the hold of parliamentary norm and procedures on the public

mind as the ultimate source of state authority.

What kind of legislatures emerge out of general elections in Pakistan? This is

important to understand in order to place the parliament and provincial assemblies

within the power structure of the country. The perceived or actual role of the

legislature and legislation provided a clue to the authenticity of the whole process of

elections. The British House of Commons is a co-ordinate legislature, inasmuch as it

has the ability to legislate freely within the context of a stable executive-legislative

relationship led by a disciplined majority. This remains the ideal of the present and

would-be parliamentarians in the Commonwealth countries, including Pakistan.

However, the reality is that parliament in Pakistan is a subordinate legislature. Here,

the executive is, without exception, a pre-eminent player on the national scene. It

initiates decisions in party forums, which are translated into law through the

legislative procedure, and are than rigidly defined, implemented and controlled by the

bureaucracy. Given the domination of extra-parliamentary forces over the power

structure of Pakistan, parliamentary institutions are often considered by political

players as necessary accoutrements of a modern ruling structure. In other words, these

institutions legitimize the existing political order. Even if real power resides outside

the legislature, the power holder needs to win legal and moral authority. Not

surprisingly, each of the four military governments tried to fill the gap of legitimacy

by holding elections, in 1962, 1970, 1985 and 2002.

Parliamentary institutions in Pakistan have often performed what is called the ‘exit

function’ of legislatures. Whenever the pressure or legitimacy raised high and restive

elements of the public threatened to destabilize the system, elections for legislatures

opened up an opportunity for them to stand up and be counted for the purposes of

either government formation or oppositionist politics. Elections take them from

25

‘voice’ to ‘exit’ from the street and thus to ‘disengagement’ from a potentially extra-

systemic activity. For example, the 1970 election was a direct result of the 1968-69

anti Ayub movement that had mobilized millions of industrial workers, students,

peasants, tribal and ethnic nationalists and ‘socialist’ element throughout the country.

Every shade of political opinion and ideology won a share of votes and seats in the

1970 elections, including ethnic nationalists from East Pakistan, Sindh, Baluchistan

and NWFP, trade unions, Islamic parties, the left and, to a lesser extent, professional

middle classes.79 The Yahya regime adopted a strategy of brutal suppression of the

Bengali movement, which led to the loss of East Pakistan. While the 1970 elections

represented popular forces of all shades, the 1985 elections bypassed popular forces,

represented by the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which had

boycotted the whole exercise of mass mandate as unconstitutional and illegal. In clear

swing of the pendulum to the other side, the 1988-1997 elections gave representation

to all the major and minor political parties, groups, factions and individuals. It can be

argued that this was again a case of the exit function of elections, where all the

relatively enterprising sections of the political community opted out of potentially

agitation politics and chose to play according to the prescribed, though controversial,

rules of the game. While legislatures in Pakistan structured the political conflict,

served as an entry point to the political system, provided legitimacy to the ruling elite

and performed an exit function for radical opposition, these also served as channels

for ‘constituency service work’ inasmuch as public representatives often mediated

between the government and the public. The process of elections linked the potential

legislatures with the electorate, whereby the latter defined a role for the former

pumping station for the interest of their respective constituents through various

informal channels. This brokerage function of members of elected assemblies has

generally overtaken their function as law-makers. Mohapatra outlined the demands

constituents in terms of a) beating the system, such as for out-of-turn favours; b)

expediting the administrative process for businessmen, students and petitioners of all

other kinds; c) pork barrel requests, such as funds for development projects; and d)

helping the helpless individuals who are stuck in the morass of things.80 This model

applies to Pakistan in a comprehensive way. In a typical electoral constituency for the

National Assembly or a provincial assembly, the potential and actual voters want their

representatives to act on their behalf to get things done, and practically do the errand-

running if need be. The voter turnout, finally, is the measure of people’s trust in this

26

struggle in pursuit of a step up the ladder, which would provide them access to the

coveted window of a department in the state’s machinery. Conversely, it indicates the

level of the public’s faith in the capacity of the system to deliver.

1.6 BASIC PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL POLITICS

Electoral politics based on some basic practices which attract a genuine commitment

of contestants and voters to the competition for office only if the results of elections

are not a foregone conclusion. That was the case in certain communist systems or

one-party states. In other words, only competitive elections can be taken seriously for

the purpose of establishing the rule of public representatives. In Fred Hayward’s

words:

The basic principles and expectations of competitive elections can be summarized as follows: all the law abiding adult citizens are entitled to vote; political organizations are free to put up candidates, debate their merits freely, and criticize opponents; political organizations campaign with the objective of winning; each voter caste one vote and is not hindered in expressing a choice (preferably in secret); votes are honestly counted and the results faithfully reported; the candidate, party, or coalition with the most votes wins; the losing individual or party does not try to use force to alter the outcome or prevent the winner from taking office; and the party in power does not restrict political participation and competition which are within the parameters of existing rules.81

Myron Weiner similarly outlined four characteristics of electoral democracy;

competitive elections; ability of political parties and contestants to canvas in a free

atmosphere; acceptance of results in order to move on to the task of the formation of

government as well as opposition; and location of supreme authority in the hands of

the elected government accountable to the electorate.82 The last factor entails a

requirement for parliamentary sovereignty, which has been problematic in Pakistan

over since independence. Given the context of elections for a non-sovereign

parliament, and similarly vulnerable provincial assemblies lower down, we need to

outline the relevance of the election campaign, party mobilization, media input and

the actual polling of votes for the process of democratization in the country. While

elections in Pakistan are competitive according to other criteria, the lack of

parliamentary control over the levers of power in a final sense makes the whole

process suspect in the eyes of political activists and analysts.

Why Study Elections in Pakistan and especially in NWFP? How far can the exercise

of seeking to explain individual decisions of casting votes and collective results of

voting be useful for a study of politics in Pakistan? How can the analysis of one

specific election explain the general electoral behaviors of the public? In the presence

of widespread allegations of rigging, does it make sense to try to understand the

public mood with the help of expression through the ballot? Since the elections were

27

held as a part of the process of transition from authoritarian to civilian rule, and were

by the same account atypical of elections as normally held in an ongoing democratic

process, how can the present study bring out the pattern of predictability of election

cycle? To answer these questions, one needs to point out the latent concern of the

establishment to win over legitimacy from the constitutionally provided source of

mass mandate. There is widespread understanding among various sections of the

population, ranging from the tribal and landed elite and professional middle classes

down to students, trade unionists and peasants, that election mean power. The

electorate interprets the meaning of elections in terms of accessibility to the power-

welding administrative regime in the federal and provincial capitals. Electoral

candidates look at the whole exercise in terms of opportunity for providing patronage

in the locality along with a social status commensurate with the ability to perform the

brokerage function. The military establishment and its cohort civilian bureaucracy

find elections the legal cushion for exercising power. All this makes democracy the

overarching normative ideal, which inspires the rulers and the ruled alike. It is with

reference to this ideal, and behavioural standards accruing from it, that allegations of

electoral malpractices emerge and proliferate. The ideal that democracy is the all

encompassing normative ideal of the general public underlines the current research

into the electoral behaviour in Pakistan.83

The nature of this consensus is mainly procedural, not substantive.84 Most of the

complaints about foul play relate to failing standards of democratic behaviour at

various stages of the cumbersome process of election. These include: filling

nomination, withdrawing names of candidature, scrutiny of papers, equal access to

media, apportionment of electoral constituencies, grossly biased nature of appellate

tribunals dealing with wrongdoing at various stages of the election process, location

of polling stations, coverage by the electronic media, impersonation of voters as well

as violence at the polls. These procedures are defined and safeguarded by the legal

and institutional framework of the state. Thus, these are elevated to high principles of

public morality by various incumbent governments, caretaker or otherwise, which try

to adhere to the formal requirements enshrined in election laws. Government often

relay on the cumbersome process of litigation, including dilatory tactics and legal

loopholes, to save off the crisis of legitimacy in the short run. Most of the rigging

practices are rooted in attempts to dodge the rules and regulations which otherwise

follow the pattern of he legal and institutional practices of mature democracies,

28

especially the UK. Given the legal, institutional and behavioural pattern operative in

the country, what was the meaning of the elections in Pakistan? This study explores

the meaning of elections for people, including voters as well as non voters, who

experienced the electoral dynamics in various ways. This study also endeavours to

analyze the evolving civil-military relations in the wake of political mobilization of

the wider public during the campaign, in the context of the legitimacy function of the

exercise in mass voting. The present research also explores the meaning of elections

for various political parties in and outside the government. Similarly the meaning of

elections for various civil society organizations is an interesting field of enquiry. The

question whether these elections have provided access to the ultimate power of

allocation of resources to the non establishment elements of society in general, and

political forces in particular, forms a significant part of the present inquiry.

Elaborating on this theme further, a question arises whether elections in Pakistan have

the potential to translate mass mandate into public policy once the government

formally assumes the responsibility for decision making. This question acquires its

relevance from the fact that bureaucracy is typically inclined to prevent elections from

influencing policy. Often, public office holders, who are hierarchically superior to the

government officials in various departments, find themselves handicapped in the face

of administrative routine and the establishment’s thinking.85 In this model of ‘overall

democracy’, the higher the level of professionalism in bureaucracy the lower would

be the level of acceptance of the election agenda and party positions as material for

sound policy.86 The fact that bureaucracy enjoys a higher institutional level than

political parties in terms of merit-based recruitment, strict post-recruitment

socialization and a hierarchical structure operates decisively against any possible

impact of election on policy.87

1.7 REFORMS IN ELECTORAL POLITICS: The issue of electoral

reforms is the heart and core of electoral politics. The demand for electoral reforms

and change in the prevalent electoral system dated as for back as the first elections in

1951 held in Punjab and NWFP. The idea was that the first-past-the-post system, as

inherited from the British India, led to the formation of governments which had not

won the majority vote. After all, an election system is the most specific manipulative

instrument of politics.88 It translates votes into seats in a certain predetermined way

and thus shapes a predictable kind of party system. It is part of the traditional wisdom

29

that the plurality system tends to create a two party system, even as it allows smaller

parties to operate on the margins. This is so because the plurality system tends to

create two party systems, even as it allows smaller parties to operate on the margins.

This is so because the plurality system produces a stable majority in parliament. The

Proportional Representation system (PR), alternatively, promotes maximum

representation of all shades of public opinion. One is like projector, bringing out an

imperative mandate of the electorate with a view to forming a government and

possibly pursuing a prescribed set of policies. The other is like a camera, reflecting

the representative mandate of the public but leaving the task government formation

and implementation of the political agenda to the new legislators.89 Citizens end up

contributing to formation of stable party governments in the former case but

delegating authority to form what is often an unstable coalition government to their

representatives in the latter case.90 In Pakistan the protagonists of the plurality and

PR Systems tended to be polarized. Under the one party dominance model of politics

in Pakistan during the 1970s, the smaller parties of the opposition demanded the PR

system. Under the two party systems of the 1990s again PR was the preferred system

of smaller parties. Even more significantly, the urban middle classes, military officers

and bureaucracy in general disliked strong majorities on the floor of elected

assemblies, led by what they called the feudal leadership. They argued against the

plurality system, because: i). the local influential, especially tribal lords and the

landed elite, would enjoy a level of representation on the floor of parliament which

was disproportionate to their vote. ii). this would lead to the emergence of strong

prime ministers who would seek to change policy and mobilize the public in pursuit

of their agenda; and iii). it would leave the educated middle class high and dry out in

the field due to its lack of support in the locality.

It is not uncommon to see government officials, who generally hail from the middle

class, argue against the plurality system. They strongly uphold the standard criticism

of the system, e.g. that the vote of defeated candidates is wasted and that the

victorious parties and contestants are elected with only a minority of polled votes. The

1990 election fully exposed the anomalous link between votes and seats. Each of the

two mainstream political parties PML-N and PPP polled nearly 37 per cent of vote,

with a difference of less than one per cent. But the former took more than double the

seats of its rival. In 1997 the PML-N polled twice the votes of PPP in the National

Assembly. Over-amplification of small vote margins into huge seats margins

30

characterized the electoral system of Pakistan throughout the 1990s. It also ensured

that a kind of two party systems continued to dominate the electoral scene. To that

extent, Duverger’s law was in operation in Pakistan. In addition to social factors

affecting the outcome of elections in Pakistan, including the tribal system, caste

system, Islamic and ethnic orientations and the role of the ‘invisible’ government,

exogenous factors, such as the election system, played a significant role in mapping

the electoral space. This role has been defined in terms of the ‘mechanical effect’ of

the election system, because no human agency is supposed to interfere in the

implementations of laws.91 This is closely related to the ‘psychological effect’ in as

much as the system accommodates a large number of parties and candidates to contest

elections, and lays out ideological, issue-based and policy-based public profiles.

1.8 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter three major theoretical approaches to the study of elections, the

Michigan approach, the Columbia school and the Downsian theory i.e rational choice

theory have been outlined. Electoral politics, political participation, basic practices in

electoral politics, reforms and shifting patterns of public opinion have been analysed.

Michigan Model is closely associated for the study of elections in NWFP. This is so

because it attracted both partisan and political motives of a voter and candidate.

1 Henry J. Steiner, Political participation as Human rights (New York: McMillan and Company Ltd., 1960), p.60.2 David Robertson, The Penguin Dictionary of Politics (England: Penguin Books, 1987), p.88.3 Leon Mayhew, Society, Institutions and Activity (Davis: University of California, 1971), p.123.4 Ibid. pp.2-4.5 Ibid. pp. 6-8.6 Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), p.301.7 Ibid, p.113.8 Ibid, p.51.9 Ajmal Khattak, Interview by author, Nowshera, 23 March 2005.10 Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p.158.11 Muhammad Tariq Jazy, The Mixed Proportional Electoral System for Pakistan (Islamabad: Friedrich Ebert Stifting, 200), p.1.12 Dietor Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems (Bonn; Friedrich Ebert-Stifting, 1966), p.84.13 J. Blondel, Voters, Parties, and Leaders: The Social Fabric of British Politics (Australia: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 27-28.14 J. Blondel, Voters, Parties, and Leaders: The Social Fabric of British Politics (Australia: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 27-28.15 Ajmal Khattak, Interview by author, Nowshera, 23 March 200516 J.F.S. Ross, Elections and Electors (London: Eyere and spottis woode, 1955), p.33.17 Thomas A. Reilly. Political Bargaining, (Manchester: Manchester School Press, 1968), p.37.18 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brother Publishers, 1957), p. 28

31

19 Richard Rose, Comparability in Electoral Studies, Ed. Richard Rose, Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative Handbook (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1974), pp. 8-920 John Badgley, Asian Development: Problems and Prognosis (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p.139.21 Samual Huntington, “Made about Mega”, Newsweek (New York: June 21, 1988), p.12.22 Ibid, p.33.23 Ibid, p.45.24 Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion, p.30.25 Ibid, p.30.26 Ibid, p.55.27 Ibid, p.31.28 Ibid, p.28.29 Ibid, p.29.30 Samuel J. Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmad, Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behaviour in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.89.31 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.155-56.32 Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p.33.33 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p.345.34 Academic American Encyclopaedia, Vol. 19 (Connecticut: Grolier Incorporated, 1987), p.104.35 William A. Haviland, Cultural Anthropology (New York: MC Grand Hill Publishing Company. 1990), pp.321-22.36 Rebert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get involved in politics (Glencoe, III , the free press, 1959), p. 6.37 V.O. Key, ‘A theory of critical elections’, Journal of Politics, XVII (February 1955), p.3.38 Rebert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get involved in politics (Glencoe, III , The Free press, 1959), p. 6.39 Ibid, p.8.40 Richards G.Niemi and Herbert F.Weisberg, Controversies in American Voting Behaviour (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and company, 1976), P.12.41 Ibid, p.14.42 Ibid, p.18.43 David Denver, Elections and Voting Behaviour in Britain (London: Phillip Allan, 1989), p. 2744 Ibid.45 Jack Denis, ‘The Study of Electoral Behaviour,’ in Political Behaviour Ed, William Crotty, (Evganston, Illinois: North Western University Press, , 1991), p.5546 Ibid., pp.59-61.47 John Curtice, ‘The State of Election Studies: A Mid-Life Crisis or New Youth?, Electoral Studies,vol.21, no.2 (June 2002), p.162.48 K. Kight and M. March, ‘Varieties of Election Studies’, Electoral Studies, vol. 21, no. 2 (June 2002), pp.74-75.49 Ibid, pp.175-76.50 K. Shepsle and R. Cohen, ‘Multiparty Competition, Entry, and Deterrence in Spatial Models of elections’, in eds. J.m. Enelow and M. J. Hinich, Advances in the Spatial Theory and Voting(Vambridge University Press, New York 1990), pp.12-16. 51 A. Westholm, ‘Distance versus Direction: The Illusory Defeat of the Proximity Theory of Electoral Choice’, American Political Science Review, no. 91, (1997), pp.869-70.52 R.J Dalton, S.C. Flanegan and PA. Beck (eds.), Realignment or De-alignment (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984)53R.S Katz and P. Mair, ‘Changing Model of Party organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of a Catch –all Party’, Party Politic, no. 1, (1995), pp.5-28.54 Rajni Kothari et al,, Party system and election Studies, (New Dehli: 1967), pp. 4-5.55 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and State in Pakistan.56 Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books ltd, 1994), p.30.57 Ibid, p.255.58 Peter G.J. Pulzer, Political Representation and election in Britain (London: George Allen and Unwin ltd, 1976), p. 93.

32

59 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), p.88.60 Ibid, p.61.61 Ibid, p. 162.62 Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion, p. 301.63 J.S. Mill quoted in Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.8.64 Mazhar-ul-Haq, Political Science (Lahore: Book Land Publishers, 1994), p.29. 65 W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, (Lahore: Ripon Printing Press, 1947), p.363.66 Dietor Nohlen, Election and Electoral Systems, (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 1996), p.84.67 M.K Mohapatra, ‘The Ombudsmanic Role of Legislature in an Indian State’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, August 1976.68 Mohammad Waseem, ‘Pakistan’s Lingering Crises of Dyarchy’, (Asian Survey, July 1992)69 Mohammad Waseem, ‘Democratisation in Pakistan: The Current Phase’, in Contemporary Political Studies 1996, (Belfast, 1996), p.261.70 Samuel Huntington, ‘Demoracy’s Third Wave’, (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, no 2 Spring 1991)71 General ® Hameed Gul, Interview with author, Islamabad 23 April 200672 Benazir Bhutto, Interview with author, Dubai 26 August 200573 IanTalbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), p. 29174 Ibid., p.279.75 Interviews with politicians, among others-Mohammad Iqbal Jhagra PML-N, Peshawar, 13 April 2008.76 I. Crew, ‘The Electorate: Partisan De-alignment Ten Years On’, in H. Barrington ed. Change in British Politics, (Frank Cass, London 1984), pp.193-200.77 G. Evans, The End of Class Politics? (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). pp.25-3078 Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics; also, K.B. Sayeed, The political system.79 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State, pp.243-54.80 M.K Mohapatra, The Ombudsmanic Role, pp. 301-281 Fred Hayward, Introduction in Fred Hayward, Elections in Independent Africa ed. (Boulder, 1987), p.3.82 Myron Weiner, ‘Empirical Democratic Theory’ in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun eds, Competitive Elections in Developing Countries (London: Duke University Press, 1987), p.3.83 Interviews with cross-section of the elite, including generals, bureaucrats, and diplomats and partyleaders and workers, as well as the members of general public. 84 Myron Weiner, Empirical Democratic Theory, p. 2085 Hamza Alavi, ‘The Army and Bureaucracy in Pakistan Politics’, Paper later published in Armee et Nations dans les Trois Continents ed. A. Abdel Malik, (Alger, 1975), pp. 25-3086 Ibid, pp. 38-4387 Charles Canady, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University press, 1987)88 Arend Ligphart, ‘the Field of Electoral system research: A Critical survey’, Electoral Studies, (1985), 4:1, p.3.89 Maurice Duverger, ‘Which is the Best electoral system’, in eds. Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, Choosing an Electoral system (Praegar, 1984), pp. 31-35.90 Ibid91 Kenneth Benoit, ‘The Endogeneity Problem in Electoral Studies: A Critical Re-Examination of Duverger’s Mechanical Effect’, Electoral Studies, vol. 21, no.1 (March 2002)

CHAPTER-2

NWFP’s ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to map out the electoral geography

referring to the distinctive historical, socio

each region, and to show how

behaviour and electoral politics

This study has divided

(Hazara) parts as illustrated in Map

consideration several factors including geographical boundaries, official district and

division borders, voting behaviour, regional economic differences, and variations in

irrigation, agriculture, and cropping patterns, and distinct historical, cultural, and

linguistic influences in each region.

Map 2.1: Map of NWFP.

Northern NWFP consists of seven districts including Swat, Chitral, Shangla, Upper

Dir, Lower Dir, Malakand and Buner. Central NWFP

Peshawar, Charsada, Nowsh

NWFP’s ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

his chapter is to map out the electoral geography

referring to the distinctive historical, socio-economic, and political characteristics of

each region, and to show how these have contributed to regional differences in voting

and electoral politics in NWFP.

This study has divided NWFP into northern, central, southern and

as illustrated in Map 2.11. These divisions have taken into

nsideration several factors including geographical boundaries, official district and

division borders, voting behaviour, regional economic differences, and variations in

irrigation, agriculture, and cropping patterns, and distinct historical, cultural, and

linguistic influences in each region.

Map 2.1: Map of NWFP.

Northern NWFP consists of seven districts including Swat, Chitral, Shangla, Upper

Dir, Lower Dir, Malakand and Buner. Central NWFP has five districts which include

Peshawar, Charsada, Nowshera, Mardan and Swabi. North-Eastern NWFP (Hazara)

33

NWFP’s ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY

his chapter is to map out the electoral geography of the NWFP by

economic, and political characteristics of

these have contributed to regional differences in voting

into northern, central, southern and north eastern

These divisions have taken into

nsideration several factors including geographical boundaries, official district and

division borders, voting behaviour, regional economic differences, and variations in

irrigation, agriculture, and cropping patterns, and distinct historical, cultural, and

Northern NWFP consists of seven districts including Swat, Chitral, Shangla, Upper

five districts which include

Eastern NWFP (Hazara)

34

has five districts, including Abbottabad, Mansehra, Haripur, Battagram and Kohistan.

Similarly southern region of NWFP consists of seven districts, including D.I. Khan,

Tank, Hangu, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat and Karak.2 In all these regions the

economically active populations are potential political participants in elections. Total

economically active population in NWFP is 19.4 % which includes 19% in rural areas

and 21.3% in urban areas. Economically Female are more dependent on Male both in

rural and urban areas. In economically active population male ratio is 36.8% while

female ratio is 1.1%.3

Table 2.1: National Assembly Election Results by NWFP Regions. Political Parties Central 8

seats South 5 seats

North-East 7 seats

North 6 seats

Total 26 seats

%age Seats %age Seats %age Seats %age Seats %age Seats 1988 PPP 50 4 0 0 0 0 66.6 4 30.76 8 IJI 0 0 40 2 57.14 4 33.33 2 30.76 8 ANP 25 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.69 2 Religious 12.5 1 60 3 0 0 0 0 15.38 4 Independent 12.5 1 0 0 42.8 3 0 0 15.38 4 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1990 PDA 0 0 40 2 0 0 50 3 19.23 5 IJI 12.5 1 20 1 57.14 4 33.3 2 30.76 8 ANP 75 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 23.07 6 Religious 12.5 1 20 1 28.57 2 0 0 15.38 4 Independent 0 0 20 1 14.28 1 16.6 1 11.5 3 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1993 PPP 62.5 5 0 0 0 0 16.67 1 23.07 6 PML-N 0 0 60 3 85.71 6 16.67 1 38.46 10 ANP 25 2 0 0 0 0 16.67 1 11.53 3 Religious 12.5 1 40 2 0 0 33.33 2 19.23 5 Independent 0 0 0 0 14.29 1 16.67 1 7.69 2 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1997 PPP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PML-N 0 0 80 4 85.71 6 83.33 5 57.69 15 ANP 100 8 20 1 0 0 16.67 1 38.46 10 Religious 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Independent 0 0 0 0 14.29 1 0 0 3.84 1 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections

1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)

There were eighty provincial seats and twenty six National Assembly seats for NWFP

during 1988-1999. In National Assembly, Central NWFP had eight seats, Southern

NWFP had five seats, North-East region had seven seats and North region had six

seats. Percentage of seats and seats won by each party on National Assembly from

NWFP is indicated in table 2.1. The electoral results for provincial assembly show

that the party which was in wining position at center obtained considerable vote

strength in NWFP. Table 2.2 illustrates the detailed picture of electoral situations in

NWFP.

35

Table 2.2: Table showing the Provincial Assembly Election Results by NWFP Regions.

Central 27 Seats

South 16 seats

North-East 19 seats

North 18 seats

Total 80 seats

%age Seats %age Seats %age Seats %age Seats %age Seats 1988 PPP 51.85 14 6.25 1 0 0 38.89 7 27.5 22 IJI 7.41 2 37.5 6 52.63 10 50 9 33.75 27 ANP 37.04 10 6.25 1 0 0 5.56 1 15 12 Religious 0 0 12.5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Independent 3.70 1 37.5 6 47.37 9 5.56 1 21.25 17 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1990 PDA 7.41 2 12.50 2 0 0 11.11 2 7.5 6 IJI 22.22 6 43.75 7 42.11 8 66.67 12 33 33 ANP 66.67 18 12.50 2 5.26 1 11.11 2 28.75 23 Religious 0 0 6.25 1 5.26 1 0 0 2.5 2 Independent 3.70 1 25 4 47.37 9 11.11 2 20 16 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1993 PPP 37.04 10 6.25 1 5.26 1 55.56 10 27.5 22 PML-N 0 0 25 4 52.63 10 5.56 1 18.75 15 ANP 59.26 16 6.25 1 5.26 1 11.11 2 25 20 Religious 0 0 6.25 1 5.26 1 22.22 4 7.5 6 Independent 3.70 1 37.5 6 26.32 5 5.56 1 16.25 13 Other 0 0 18.75 3 0 0 0 0 3.75 3 1997 PPP 3.7 1 0 0 0 0 16.67 3 22.5 4 PML-N 14.81 4 37.50 6 73.68 14 44.44 8 22.5 18 ANP 77.78 21 18.75 3 5.26 1 27.78 5 37.5 30 Religious 0 0 6.25 1 0 0 0 0 1.25 1 Independent 3.7 1 25 4 21.05 4 11.11 2 13.75 11 Other 0 0 12.5 2 0 0 0 0 2.5 2 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). The electoral geography of NWFP is unique due to its physical features and

topography. NWFP comprising 74521 Square Kilometres area possesses a population

of 17,735,912,4 which is spread on hilly areas of north and north-eastern parts of

NWFP, Plain areas of central districts and deserts areas of southern parts of NWFP.

Electoral politics in these areas revolves around political elites of rural areas including

Khans (Elders), landholders, religious seminaries, and titled gentry of the British

period. In NWFP the nucleus of electoral politics lies in rural areas.5 The detail of

party positions in National and Provincial assemblies from 1988-1997 are shown in

table 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. The detail of valid, rejected, registered and percentage

of vote polled is shown in table 2.3. Table 2.3 and 2.4 shows that the registered voters

for provincial assembly is not matched with the registered voters of national

Assembly. Percentage of vote polled for provincial assembly is more as compared to

the vote polled for national assembly. Similarly number of contesters for provincial

36

assembly is also seemed more as compared to the number of contesters for national

assembly.

Table 2.3: Voting detail (Provincial Assembly for 80 seats) Elections Valid Rejected Total Registered %age Contesters

1988 2174550 37331 2211881 5940182 37.24 594

Party Position IJI: 27, PPP:22 ANP:12,IND:17, JUI-F:2

1990 2995129 30606 2325735 5974565 38.93 538

Party Position IJI:33, PDA:6, ANP:23,IND:16, JUI-F:2

1993 2376193 32896 2409089 6268525 37.83 510

Party Position PPP:22,ANP:20, IND:13, PML-N:15, PML-J:4, IJM:1, MDM:1, PIF:4

1997 1933623 49384 1983007 6651930 29.81 622

Party Position PML-N:32, PPP:04, ANP:30, IND:11, JUI-F:1, PML(J):2.

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). PPP formed the government in 1988 (as later in 1993) with the coalition of

independents, ANP and some religious elements. Similarly in 1990 and 1997, IJI and

PML-N formed their governments with the coalition of ANP, independents and

religious elements. This shows that the party which formed a Government at the

Centre would also establish a provincial administration in NWFP.

Table 2.4: Table showing voting detail (National Assembly for 26 seats) Elections Valid Rejected Total Registered %age Contesters

1988 1974315 45014 2019349 5939165 34.29 56

Party Position PPP:8, ANP:2, JUI-F:1, IND:4, IJI:8, JUI-F:2, JUI-D:1

1990 2098123 31343 2129446 5983415 32.9 147

Party Position ANP:6, IJI:8, JUI-F:4, PDA:5, IND:3

1993 2148897 39430 2188327 6367968 34.55

128 Party Position

PPP:6, ANP:3, IJM:2, PM-N:10, MDM:1, IND:1, PIF:2,

PKQP:1

1997 1868838 54194 1923032 6651974 29.01 175

Party Position PML-N:15, ANP:10, IND:1

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Table 2.4 shows the detail of National Assembly voting from NWFP. The maximum

turnout rate was during 1988-1997 elections with 34.55 per cent and the minimum

was 29.01 per cent in 1997. Similarly for 26 National Assembly seats the maximum

contesters were 175 and minimum were 56. Table 2.5 provides a comparison of key

socio economic statistics for each region.

37

Table 2.5: Socio economic comparison of four NWFP regions. Population Central North North-East South Total 1998 Population (1000) 6402 4262 3505 3564 17735 1998 Population (%) 36.10 24.03 19.37 20.10 100 1998 Urban Population (%) 26.20 6.16 7.04 14.33 16.9 1998 Rural Population (%) 73.74 93.84 92.96 85.67 83.1 Area (Square Kms) 7176 29871 17064 20410 74521 1998 Population Density (Per square Km) 892.25 142.40 205.44 174.66 238 Literacy and Languages Total Literacy (%) 37.58 28.14 35.2 33.70 35.4 Male Literacy (%) 54.16 43.59 48.52 53.34 51.5 Female Literacy (%) 19.86 12.57 21.74 14.10 18.8 Urban Literacy (%) 48.24 32.64 42.98 55.01 54.3 Rural Literacy (%) 32.68 27.14 33.42 29.56 31.3 Household Speaking Pushto 93.48 72.86 24.66 82.27 68.31 Household Speaking Punjabi 1.38 0.07 0.84 0.89 0.79 Household Speaking Urdu 0.94 0.17 0.44 0.83 0.59 Household Speaking Saraiki 0.16 0.06 0.6 13.19 3.50 Household Speaking Other Languages 3.96 26.84 71 2.71 26.12 Economy and Employment Total Labour Force 5.9 52.6 21.8 14.8 23.77 Agriculture Labour Force-%age in NWFP 6.0 45.6 23.3 18.2 23.27 Agriculture Labour Force-%age in Regions 30.4 18.5 26.4 23.2 24.62 Labour, Production, Transport-% of NWFP 7.1 59.4 16.2 10.5 23.3 Labour, Production, Transport-% in regions 28.2 30.3 22.8 20.4 25.42 Service, Sales, Prof/tech., Admin/Mgmt.-% in NWFP 08.4 59.5 16.8 8.2 23.22 Service, Sales, Prof/tech., Admin/Mgmt % in Regions 8.1 59.6 15.9 8.7 23.07 Government Employees-% of NWFP 16.2 57.8 14.2 8.9 24.27 Government Employees-% in Regions 26.4 30.2 20.8 24.2 25.4 1998 Manufacturing employment-% of NWFP 5.7 68.9 12.5 7.6 23.67 1998 Manufacturing employment-% in regions 6.2 68.8 12.8 6.8 23.65 1998 Manufacturing -# of units-% of NWFP 5.2 68.3 11.8 7.5 23.2 1998 Manufacturing -# of units-% in regions 17.2 33.8 25.6 24.8 25.35 1998 number of registered factories 2.4 70.1 17.3 5.2 23.75 Agriculture (average figure from 1990-99) Irrigated Land (1000 Hectares) in %ages 46 15 25 14 25 Wheet (1000 Tons) in %ages 32.2 24.9 12.1 31 25.05 Cleaned Rice (1000 Tons) in %ages 4.23 65.84 10.69 19.25 25 Sugarcane (1000 Tons) in %ages 85.55 5.52 0.12 7.0 24.54 Cotton (1000 Bales) in %ages 6.2 0 0 93.79 24.99 Tobacco (1000 Tons) in %ages 79.16 13.85 6.99 0 25 Sources: Government of Pakistan (GOP), Handbook of Population Census Data 1988, NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation Press, 1987)

The researcher will turn in the next sections to look in more detail at these varied

socio-economic contexts between the regions of NWFP and how they contribute to a

distinctive electoral geography.

2.2 CENTRAL NWFP: Central NWFP is not only the province’s geographic

centre, but also its political, economic, and cultural centre. Total area of central

NWFP is 7176 sq.km having population 6402000.6 It is the most urbanized,

industrialized, agriculturally productive, and densely populated of the four regions of

the NWFP. Eight National Assembly seats out of twenty Six of NWFP and twenty

seven provincial assembly seats out of eighty of NWFP lies here. This area is thus of

crucial importance for election outcomes. During elections 1988-1997 voters’ average

percentage participation in central NWFP was 32%.7

38

2.2.1 GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION: Central NWFP comprises

districts Peshawar, Nowshera, Charsada, Mardan and Swabi.8 It is situated near the

bank of river Indus and Kabul. The canal system of these rivers helped to irrigate the

lands of these districts which have made central NWFP the agriculturally richest

region in the Province. Agriculture is the principal occupation of the population living

in these areas. Apart from agriculture, a number of manufacturing industries have

absorbed a large number of skilled and unskilled labours. Gadoon Amazai is one of

the biggest Industrial estates of the North-West Frontier Province having 580

industries and mills it lies in central NWFP (Swabi District). To the east of central

NWFP lies Afghanistan border and the west is Punjab. The fertile agricultural land

has made central NWFP the most densely populated region of Pakistan. Its population

in 1998 was 64.02 million9, approximately 36 percent of the NWFP’s total

population. The other most notable geographical feature of central NWFP is that it is

plain and fertile area of river Indus and Kabul. The river Indus serves as the boundary

between central and southern, and north-eastern NWFP. Another feature that

distinguishes central NWFP is that it has the most urbanized population in NWFP.

The largest cities like Peshawar, Nowshera, Mardan, Swabi and Charsada are located

in central NWFP. In 1998, 26.26 percent of the population was living in urban areas.

The average growth rates of urban areas are 3%.10 This shows that within the next 10-

20 years central NWFP’s urban population will outnumber its rural population.

2.2.2 THE AGRICULTURAL AND CANAL SYSTEM: The rivers of

the NWFP i.e Kabul and Indus provide water to the canal irrigation system of the

central region of NWFP. The construction of proper canal irrigation system was for

the first time adapted by the British government in 1885 AD11., when the lower Swat

canal was opened at Manda Qila of Swat river. This first ever canal in the province

irrigated whole southern area of Charsada and middle tracts of Mardan. Upper Swat

canal which takes off from the Swat River at Amandarra in Malakand Agency was

first opened in 1914 to irrigate the areas in the north of Mardan and Swabi in the

extreme north eastern corner of Charsada. Kabul River canal was opened in 189312

from the right bank of Kabul River near Warsak and irrigate considerable areas in

Peshawar and Nowshera. One advantage of the construction of this canal was that the

Warsak canal which was primarily a flood channel was converted into a regular canal,

and the base for canal system of irrigation was also laid in other parts of the province.

39

Pehur Canal takes water by way of a cut from the Indus a few miles from Topi in

Swabi district. Due to heavy silt it is not regularly used for irrigation Warsak High

level canal, Right and Left Bank Canals are also the major source of irrigation in

central NWFP. Before the introduction of the major canal networks in central NWFP,

barani (rain-fed) agriculture was possible in the sub-mountainous regions of Swabi,

Charsada, Peshawar, Mardan and Nowshera districts, and in the eastern settled

districts of central NWFP through well irrigation and occasionally seasonal

inundation canals. In the western regions of central NWFP cultivation took place in

the riverian regions, but the un-irrigated higher lands in the alluvial terraces (bars) of

the doabs13 were wastelands, virtually uninhabited except for some pastoral tribes. It

was in these barren and sparsely populated western bar lands that the canal colonies

were established and settlers brought into cultivate the lands they were allotted. The

addition of millions of acres of irrigated land brought prosperity to central NWFP.

The irrigation process of the land in the province was started centuries ago. Due to the

limited sources, and technical know how people had started construction water

channels on the river sides and water courses according to their requirements. In these

channels the flow of water always to be blocked due to the low water level in rivers.

As the time passed on and the requirements of the people increased the construction

of these water channels were also changed, and these channels were constructed

collectively.14 Agriculture in Central NWFP is associated largely with these canal

systems and it is the most important agricultural region in Pakistan. Land is divided

into three main categories, i.e. Barani Land, Partly irrigated land and cash crop land.15

In this agricultural based environment, landlords, nevertheless, have considerably

more influence than statistics would seem to indicate. For one thing, though

individual holdings are numerous they are often small or extremely fragmented,

whereas the areas commanded by landlords though proportionality smaller in number,

run into thousands of acres. Before Martial in 1964 came into effect a Nawab of Hoti

owns as much as 50,000 acres of top quality land in Peshawar Basin. The Ayub’s land

reforms laws prohibits persons from holding more than 500 acres of irrigated lands,

150 acres of orchards and 1000 acres of barrani (rainy) land, most of the large

landholdings still remain intact. By skillfully dividing the shares of land among all of

their family members, the landlords have managed to circumvent all land reforms

almost entirely.

40

In a society where social status and political power are traditionally directly related to

the amount of land owned, it is important to note the policies adopted by the British to

distribute these vast expanses of newly irrigated canal colony land. In general, four

categories of land grants were given. The first was to ‘peasant proprietors’ who

receive one-two squares of land. The second category was to ‘yeoman farmers’ who

received four or five squares of land in the hope that their abilities and resources

would help in the development of the colony. The third was to the landed elite, or the

‘hereditary landed gentry’ as they were referred to by the British, and was motivated

primarily by political concerns16. In the words of Malcom Darling: …Society was still semi-feudal in character, and there were obvious advantages in propitiating the landed gentry with valuable grants of land; and the hope was cherished that this would help to restore the influence of a class, which had been seriously impaired by recurring partition of family estates and by the rise to power of a prosperous and educated middle class in the towns.17

The fourth category was conditional land grants given to those who undertook the

breeding of horses and camels for the military.18 Kabul river canal and Lower Swat

canal system was one of the great canal system and was established at a time when the

British were motivated by the desire to ‘preserve the tradition of the NWFP as peasant

farmers like Punjab’.19 By the time the other two colonies of Charsada and Swabi

were settled in the years following World War I, the Indian Nationalist movement, led

primarily by urban professionals, was gaining momentum. The Government’s

priority, therefore, shifted from preserving the peasant to preserving the rural landed

elite. This British priority created a distance between big and small khans and finally

this policy paved a way towards the emergence of new political group in Frontier

politics, i.e. Khudai Khidmatgars as pointed out in previous chapter on ‘historical

background’. In these colonies, much more land was auctioned to ‘capitalists’ or

allocated to the ‘hereditary landed gentry’. This was especially true in Charsada, and

Mardan where all the major asharafi families Hoti, Khans, Afridis, Pir and Syeds-

received large colony grants.20 The political impact of this policy is felt to this day, as

the larger landholdings have enabled the landed elite in Mardan to wield considerable

influence in the District’s politics. In Charsada district, the policy of preserving the

‘peasant farmer’ left few large landholders, with the result that control of land plays a

less important role in the politics of Charsada than in most other rural areas of the

NWFP. British also introduced canal colony setup in west Punjab, where large

numbers of lands were awarded to new landlords who were in the interest of British

government. In this way a new class structures was emerged and old hereditary

jagirdars were also persuaded to support British government in sub-continent. In

41

Punjab some new canal colonies were established with the help of outside settlers

taken from overpopulated districts. These settlers were generally chosen from the

‘agricultural tribes’, namely the Jat Sikh, who were considered as the best settlers as

they further recruited for military purposes, and the Arain, ‘the prince of market-

gardeners’.21 The soldiers who were recruited from Punjab were also awarded land

after retirement. For this purpose a considerable land in Lower Bari Doab Colony was

also set aside for military pensioners.22

2.2.3 ECONOMY: In 1947, NWFP had no industrial infrastructure. Eleven small

scale units and a sugar mill were the first developments. Pakistan Industrial

Development Corporation (PIDC) established some major industries in the 1950s.

Sugar Mill at Charsada, paper and woolen Mills at Nowshera were established in

early 1950s. During 1960s, 132 large and small scale industrial units with a total

investment of Rs. 1467 millions were established. In 1991 exemption of custom duty

on raw material for Gadoon Industrial Estate was withdrawn. Later on, other

incentives were withdrawn in 1995.23 Central NWFP is the major trade centre of the

whole of the NWFP. All kinds of trading via railway is handled at Peshawar dry port.

Several factors combined to make the region the centre of the province’s economic

activities. These included an extensive river and canal system, few large feudal

estates, more small and mid sized owner-operated farms, and relatively progressive

farmers willing to use high yield varieties of seed. With 46.5% of the NWFP’s

irrigated land and 47.1 percent of its agricultural labour force, central NWFP produces

82 percent of the province’s rice, 68 percent of its sugar cane, and 46 percent of its

wheat. Economically active population is shown in table 2.6.

Table 2.6: Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1988 (Central NWFP) (In %age).

District All Areas Rural Urban

Both Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female Peshawar 28.6 50.1 4.5 21 44.4 0.6 27.2 49.3 1 Nowshera 32.2 60.2 1.5 22.2 46.9 0.5 33.3 56.9 2.9 Charsada 30.8 57.9 1.5 34.6 66.9 1 0 0 0 Swabi 28.9 57.1 1 29.3 56.1 1.2 32.8 55.7 2.8 Mardan 31.1 59.3 1.3 31.2 60.1 1.3 35 60.5 2.2 Total 30.32 56.92 1.96 27.66 54.78 0.92 25.66 44.48 1.78

Source: Government of NWFP, NWFP Development Statistics (Peshawar: Bureau of Statistics, 2000) In addition to being the agriculturally richest region of the NWFP, in 1998, 71.9

percent of all the NWFP’s registered factories were located in central NWFP, and

68.7 percent of its manufacturing units in 1988.24 Most of the industries are located in

Peshawar, Mardan, and Nowshera and along the main transportation routes linking

42

these cities. In the 1980s and early 1990s a large number of industrial units were put

up in the newly established Gadoon Industrial Estate located near Swabi. Central

NWFP is also the centre of import and export. Export from dry port Peshawar which

was established in 1996,25 is mainly consisted upon the precious stones, carpets,

especially hand made dry fruits, honey and antique furniture. The import mainly

consists upon the plastic material for the small industrial estate at Gadoon Amazai and

spare parts for locomotive factory Risalpur. Peshawar is also the main fruit Market.

All the Provincial head offices of the commercial banks and Sarhad Chamber of

Commerce and Industry are situated at Peshawar. Another trade centre of central

NWFP is Charsada which is famous for goods industry in Chappal (footwear) making

and local made cloths known as Khamata (Khaddar). Charsada is also famous for

agriculture products like Gur (Sugar) and tobacco. Mardan and Swabi are also trade

centres known for their agriculture products like tobacco and sugarcane. The largest

sugar Mill of Asia known as Premier Sugar Mills Mardan26 is producing sugar for

export and for internal supply with in country.

The small scale manufacturing and services sectors of the economy, rather than large

scale manufacturing, have experienced the highest growth rates during the 1980s and

1990s. There has been a long tradition of ceramic industries in some of the cities and

towns of the central NWFP. Peshawar, for example, has traditionally been famous for

its artisans who produce high quality utensils, supporting goods, cutlery, and surgical

instruments. During the last two decades, in and around the cities of central NWFP, a

growing class of traders and entrepreneurs emerged and prospered by establishing

small and medium scale industries engaged in rice-husking, flour milling, food

processing and in manufacturing items such as fans, washing machines, leather goods,

electrical appliances, plastic ware, shoes, ceramics, carpets, soaps and cosmetics. This

growing class of traders and manufactures is making its presence felt in the politics of

the NWFP. While they may be relatively few in number, they have access to ready

cash which is increasingly becoming the life blood of politics in the NWFP. They also

have ‘shutter power’ which they can use to close down entire business districts to

protest government policies. The trader community’s unequivocal support for ANP

was an important contributing factor to the strong performance of the ANP in urban

NWFP in the 1988-1997 elections.

43

2.2.4 POLITICS: Central NWFP as already noted is the politically dominant

region of NWFP. Table-2.1 provides a breakdown of the 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997

National Assembly election and Provincial Assembly’s results by region, and

highlights the critical importance of central NWFP in the electoral politics of the

NWFP. Central NWFP’s 8 National Assembly seats out of 26 and 27 provincial

assembly seats out of 80 shows significant number of seats in Provincial and National

assembly. Similarly, its 27 Provincial Assembly seats out of eighty are more than one

quarter of the NWFP Assembly. Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Aftab Ahmad Khan

Sherpao, Arbab Muhammad Jahangir Khan, Mr. Muhammad Bashir Khan, Maj

General (Retd.) Nasirullah Baber, Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Muhammad Ajmal

Khan Khattak were the prominent political figures during 1988-1997 electoral politics

from central NWFP. During elections from 1988-97, PPP and ANP were the major

parties in central NWFP while IJI and PML-N had little role in electoral politics of

this area. The results of many individual seats showed the close competition.

Following table shows the close competition in different seats in central NWFP.

Table 2.7: Results Showing Close electoral competition less than 5000 votes and greater than1001 and more close contest i.e less than 1000 votes (Both NA and PA)

Provincial Assembly 1988 1990 1993 1997 Total Less than 1000 votes 7 5 5 5 27

Less than 5000 and More than 1000 votes

14 14 14 12

National Assembly 2 0 2 1 08

Less than 1000 votes

Less than 5000 and More than 1000 votes

3 0 2 0

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) Table 2.7 shows that there was close competition in seven provincial seats in 1988

provincial assembly elections and close competition in five seats in 1990, 1993 and

1997 elections. Similarly the situation in National Assembly seats shows huge voting

gap among the candidates. Table 2.9 shows that only one seat in 1997 election had

less than one thousand vote gap and two seats in 1993 and 1988 elections had less

than one thousand vote gap. During the electoral contest for National Assembly seats

from 1988-1999, the whole electoral game seemed to revolve around ANP and PPP

contesters. In 1998 National Assembly elections PPP won 4 and in 1993 5seats out of

eight from central NWFP while ANP won 2 seats in 1988, 6 in 1990, 2 in 1993 and 8

in 1997 out of eight National Assembly seats. During1988 and 1990 elections, IJI

have won only one national assembly seat in 1990 elections, while in 1993 and 1997

44

PML(N), a major coalition partner of IJI during 1998 and 1990 elections have shown

poor results in central NWFP without winning any seat. One of the most noted facts is

that with the decrease of the PPP vote bank, ANP vote bank seemed to be high. ANP

and PPP, results are both inversely proportion to each other. Voting detail both for

national and provincial assembly is shown in table 2.8.

Table 2.8: Voting Detail Provincial Assembly

Elections Valid Rejected Total Registered %age

1988 726762 10831 737593 190452 38.95 172

IJI (2), PPP (14), ANP (10), IND (1)

1990 756936 8177 765113 1929592 40 179

IJI (6), PDA (2), ANP (18), IND (1)

1993 777108 9500 786608 2009288 39.51 166

PPP (10), ANP (16), IND (1)

1997 615650 14794 630444

2083303

30.44

178

PML-N (4), PPPP (1), ANP (21), IND (1) National Assembly

1988 669850 15093 684943

1908242

36.16 44

Party Position PPP (4), ANP (2), JUI-F (1), IND (1)

1990 724443 9795 734238 1929741 37.44 39

Party Position ANP (6), IJI (1), JUI-F (1)

1993 711210

12056

723266

2009288

36.13

35

Party Position PPP (5), ANP (2), IJM (1)

1997 565095 15932 581027 2083303 27.62 55

Party Position ANP (8) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) The electoral contest between Mian Muzaffar Shah (PPP) and Mr. Abrar Khattak

(ANP) from NA-4 Peshawar-IV in 1988 was decided by just 85 votes. Similarly

results shows that in 1993 elections the contest between Haji Muhammad Yaqoob

Khan (PPP) and Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan (ANP) from NA-7 Mardan-II, had a

difference of 410 votes. In Provincial Assembly elections, the results also show that in

some seats the electoral contest among the candidates were very close. The result

from PF-5 Peshawar-V in 1997 elections, between Haji Abdur Rehman Khan (ANP)

and Mr. Kiramatullah Khan (PPP) shows a difference of 44 votes.

The electoral contest in provincial assembly seats during 1988-1997 elections, shows

that PPP won 13 seats in 1988, PPP in coalition with PDA won 2 seats in 1990, 10

seats in 1993 and one seat in 1997 with the coalition of PML-J out of 27 seats from

central NWFP. ANP have 11 seats in 1988, 18 seats in 1990, 16 seats in 1993 and 21

seats in 1997 out of 27 seats. IJI have won 2 seats in 1988, 06 in 1990 elections.

45

PML-N, previously had a alliance with IJI during 1988 and 1990 elections have won

4 seats in 1997 elections and could not win any seat in 1993 elections. The PPP-

PML(J)’s 1993 National Assembly results was stronger than the 46.22 percent of the

votes it won in the 1993 elections. One of the reasons can be attributed to the strong

performances of PPP in Mardan, Nowshera and Peshawar. More significant is the

increase in the ANP’s vote from 37.79 percent in 1988 to 51.54 percent in 1997.

Bearing in mind the closeness of many of the contests, a further vote increase of a few

percentage points could have dramatically altered the number of seats won by either

party. This is essentially what happened in the 1990’s elections when the ANP won 6

out of 8 National Assembly seats and 18 out of 27 Provincial Assembly seats.

Similarly, in 1997 election PML-N and PPP lost their national assembly seats and

ANP won 100 percent seats from central NWFP.

Table 2.9: Central NWFP Election Result Provincial Assembly

Districts 1988 1990 1993 1997

PPP IJI ANP PDA IJI ANP PPP PML-N ANP PPP PML-

N ANP

Peshawar 37.4 12 23.6 27.5 12.3 31.2 31.4 8.7 29.4 18.5 10.3 46.6 Charsada 30.7 7.2 34.6 13.1 0 42.5 23.6 0 33.5 24.4 0 45.3 Nowshera 27.2 18.4 36.1 30.8 6.2 49.4 36.4 0 31.3 15.9 15 50.7 Mardan 32.9 25.2 18.4 28.2 32.3 17.9 28.6 17.3 18.7 22.7 28.3 25.6 Swabi 10.3 27.7 37.8 13.9 9.5 42.4 14.9 5.7 36.6 9.6 15 35.6 Total 27.7 18.1 30.1 22.7 12 36.6 26.9 6.3 29.9 18.2 13.7 40.7

Seat won 14/27 2 10/27 2/27 6/27 11/27 10/27 0 16/27 1/27 4/27 21/27 National Assembly Peshawar 43.4 10.9 35.6 31.9 0 49.5 41.5 0 39.1 19.9 0 62.1 Charsada 0 33.0 60.7 0 0 42.4 44.5 0 45.4 0 0 50.5 Nowshera 37.1 21.9 37.0 31.0 0 36.3 42.9 0 35.6 30.9 0 60.5 Mardan 42.2 8.3 27.8 31.0 21.7 20.8 42.5 0 34.2 22.9 0 48.0 Swabi 28.3 31.1 33.9 0 49.8 44.6 0 0 44.6 11.2 33.4 36.4 Total 30.2 21 39 18.7 14.3 38.7 34.2 0 39.7 16.9 6.6 51.5 Seat won 4/8 0/8 2/8 0/8 1/8 6/8 5/8 0/8 2/8 0/8 0/8 8/8 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) Another important consideration was that the religious parties from central NWFP

during 1988-1997 elections won only one seat of National Assembly from NA-8

Swabi on IJM ticket. Their vote bank was less than 10 percent in provincial assembly

elections. Table 2.9 provides a breakdown of central NWFP election results by

district. The table indicates that the PPP has consistently done slightly better and ANP

much better in Central NWFP. The large fluctuations from election to election and the

presence of few discernible patterns in voting behaviour are striking. Voting

behaviour in central NWFP remained relatively fluid, making it difficult to comment

on party strongholds. It is not surprising that the region undergoing the most rapid

46

socioeconomic changes, and which has the highest industrialization, urbanization, and

population density rates, was also undergoing the most rapid political changes.

2.3.1 NORTHERN NWFP: Area wise it is the largest of the province’s four

regions having area comprising 29871 Sq. Km and population is 4262700 million.

93.84 populations lived in rural areas and 6.16 per cent in urban areas. Northern

NWFP’s 1998 literacy rate of 28.14 per cent is the lowest of the NWFP’s four

regions. Agriculturally, it is the poorest as its hilly terrain makes canal irrigation

impossible. As a result, it has the lowest percentage of its labour force employed in

the agricultural sector and the highest percentage employed in the semi skilled

business, cattle grazing.

2.3.2 GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION: Northern NWFP consists of

Swat, Shangla, Malakand, Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Buner and Chitral districts. Its

boundaries touch to Afghanistan from its north-western sides, on the southern part its

boundaries touches with central parts of NWFP. i.e. Mardan and Swabi. Hazara lies

on its eastern side. The area is dominated by very high mountains and rugged

topography. The hills are loftier, soaring to great heights with inaccessible narrow

valleys. Chitral is the most northern district with deep valleys and lofty ranges mostly

treeless. Thickly wooded hills lie in Dir and Swat. These areas have fertile valleys of

Panjkora and Swat rivers. The Hindu Kush runs east and west along the northern-

eastern and northern frontiers of the province, and at its north eastern side touches a

continuation of the outer Himalayan chain which crosses the Indus above the Kaghan

Valley. From this chain minor ranges descend in a north-western direction,

transversing Bajaur and Swat, until they meet the curved range of hills which

connects the mid Himalaya with the Sufaid Koh and encircles the Peshawar valley on

the north. From the Hindu Kush a long broken line of mountains runs almost due

south, dividing the province from Kafiristan, and farther south from other parts of the

Afghanistan. It is pierced at Arnawai by the Chitral river, which runs then, under the

name of the Kunar, parallel with it in Afghan territory. Thus the Hindu Kush and the

two ranges which run south-ward from it enclose the entire area of Chitral, Dir and

Swat. The whole intervening space is filled by the minor ranges which run south-ward

from it encloses the entire area of Chitral, Dir and Swat. The whole intervening space

is filled by the minor ranges which descend from them. The western line is again

pierced after its junction with the Kunar by the Kabul river, south of which it merges

47

in the Khyber hills, which form the eastern extremity of the Sufaid Koh. Sufaid Koh

also runs almost in east and west direction forming the watershed between the Kabul

and Kurram rivers. East-ward minor ranges descend from its southern slopes to the

Indus. The Sulaiman range runs up the western border of the province to meet the

Sufaid Koh, and also throws out a series of parallel spurs to the east traversing while

the Kohat district. In northern NWFP, Daggar in Buner district is famous for fine

quality marble products prepared from the local material and exported to other

countries and also supplied within country.

Dir district which is situated in northern side of Swat district is famous for timber,

potato, food grain walnut etc. Dargai and Batkhela are the main trade centres of

Malakand district famous for timber marketing. Swat is also famous for tourism and

fruit markets, althouth the increased militancy in the region was eventually to end this

industry in the post 2001 era. The most important river of Northern NWFP is Swat

river. This river formed by the junction at kalam in Swat Kohistan of the Gabral and

Ushu. The former rises on the east of the Budugai Pass and the latter comes down

from the higher hills of Bashkor to the north. From Kalam the swat river flows almost

due south for about 109 Kilometre, but at Manglaur turns abruptly to the south-west

and west for 38 Kilometres until it is joined by the Panjkora. In northern NWFP

People used Shalwar, Kameez, Kohati chappal and white cape as their dress. Women

used Dopatta on Shalwar, Kameez in their homes while out of home they used Burqa

(veil) or Chaddar in both rural and urban areas. The golden and silver ornaments are

used in routine life as well as in functions and festive occasions. In northern NWFP

rice is used as food more than wheat and maize. Meat is an important part of the meal

in lunch and dinner. Maize bread with curry (type of dish), dessi Ghee (butter), honey,

walnuts are also used as food item. The use of tobacco and snuff is universal and no

hujra is considered complete without Hooka or Chillam (locally made smoking

items). Political and other societal issues are discussed in these hujras (common guest

house in a village). With the arrival of Afghan refugees their restaurants are preparing

varieties of food especially rice known as kabuli pullao(dish of rice).

An important factor that helps explain the relative poverty of the Northern NWFP,

and which continues to shape their politics, is the persistence of feudal landholding

patterns and more traditional and conservative social structures. The presence of large

landholding tribal maliks, in particular those of the Akhundzada and Yousafzai’s

tribes, has impeded social and economic development and slowed political change in

48

the region. From the beginning of 2001 the power of these traditional landholders

becanme threatened by militants who were to eventually coalesce around the TNSM

in the Malakand Division under the umbrella of the Taliban organization.

2.3.3 ECONOMY: The geography of Northern NWFP has shaped its economy.

The barren hilly terrain in the south and west, and the mountainous terrain in the

north-east, have made it impossible to introduce irrigation schemes that

revolutionized agriculture in the rest of the province. Northern NWFP has less than

one per cent of the NWFP’s irrigated land and what little agriculture it has is

dependent on rain. Consequently, the region accounts for only six per cent of the

province’s total wheat production, and virtually none of the other major crops such as

sugar, cotton, and rice. At the time of the 1981 census only 38.4 per cent of the

region’s total labour force was employed in the agriculture sector, the lowest in

NWFP. In addition to being agriculturally poor, northern NWFP has also been

relatively slow to industrialize.27 In this agriculturally poor and industrially

underdeveloped region, the only employment opportunity left for many is in the

services and livestock sector of the economy. Government service, in particular, is the

career of choice for the literate. Of northern NWFP’s total labour force in 1981, 17.8

per cent were government employees. In the urban areas of Swat, one-third of the

entire labour force was employed by the government.28

Table 2.10: Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1988 (Northern NWFP). (Figures in %age)

District All Areas Rural Urban

Both Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female Buner 30.1 60.1 1.1 28.9 55.3 1.2 33.2 61 1.6 Chitral 30.7 58 2.7 30.3 57.8 2.7 34.2 594 3

Lower Dir 25.6 51.5 1.4 28.9 57.3 1.1 29.1 56.9 0.9

Malakand 26 48.2 2.3 30.4 57.4 1.5 28.3 60.1 1.6 Shangla 34.6 66.4 1 22.1 45.7 0.9 25.5 47.8 2.8 Swat 29.6 56.1 1.3 25.4 49.5 1 29.4 54.3 2.1

Upper Dir 25.6 51.5 1.4 28.9 57.3 1.1 29.1 56.9 0.9 Total 28.89 55.97 1.60 27.84 54.33 1.36 29.83 56.63 1.84

Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Census Data, NWFP (Islamabad: Statistic Division, Population Census Organization Press, 1987) Working abroad as migrant labourers was another important source of employment

for northern NWFP’s surplus labour force.29 Since the mid-1970s, the Gulf States

have provided the greatest opportunities for Pakistan’s migrant workers. Since the late

1970s, remittances from these workers helped fuel the economic boom of the 1980s

that enabled many to buy land, build houses, and join the ranks of the middle classes.

49

2.3.4 POLITICS: The IJI showed its strongest performance in the 1988, and

1990 election in northern NWFP. The detailed electoral results both for national and

provincial assembly are shown in table 2.11.

Table 2.11: Northern NWFP Election Result Provincial Assembly

Districts 1988 1990 1993 1997

PPP IJI ANP PDA IJI ANP PPP PML-N ANP PPP PML-

N ANP

Swat 21.8 23.8 21.5 27.6 26.5 11.5 33.1 24.5 18.3 6.23 38.2 16.6 Buner 12.3 25.9 22.5 10.5 18.2 16.1 25.1 16.1 24.5 14.1 27.3 38.4 Shangla 30.0 35.1 9.7 22.6 45.6 0 28.3 26.6 23.7 7.5 26.8 13.4 Chitral 37.7 20.9 5.96 33.7 52.0 0 0 17.1 8.61 24.7 40.4 0 Lower Dir 21.8 48.1 0.16 30.5 39.9 3.81 29.4 13.8 8.07 30.2 37.6 0

Upper Dir 21.36 39.08 13.01 9.4 35.6 0 34.5 24.2 0 42.3 28.1 2.8

MKD 34.5 14.6 17.7 28.2 23.1 14.5 38.8 7.6 25.6 28.9 0 53 Total 19.8 25.2 15.0 15.5 26.3 14.5 18.2 21.9 14.8 10.2 29.4 20

Seat won 7/18 9/18 1/18 2/18 12/18 2/18 10/18 1/18 2/18 3/18 8/18 5/18 National Assembly Swat 20.5 25.4 11.5 18.6 30.5 0 0 39.4 0 12.1 34.3 15.4 Buner 29.7 26.8 28.5 36.3 31.4 8.6 0 0 29.4 20.3 0 34 Chitral 54.4 38.8 0 31.5 53.8 0 26.7 24.6 0 23.6 47.0 0 Dir 37.9 46.1 13.5 41.4 39.4 0 34.7 15.7 0 34.1 48.6 0 MKD 43.5 25.8 16 34.0 32.5 0 49.3 0 0 32 47.9 0 Total 23.1 26.8 17.2 20.6 27.1 14.3 16.6 25.8 14 9.8 33.7 19.3

Seat won 4/6 2/6 0/6 3/6 6/6 0/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 0/6 5/6 1/6 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) In 1997 elections, the PML(N) did especially well in the more urbanized, literate, and

economically developed areas of Northern NWFP. Northern NWFP has also been a

PPP strong hold. PPP did well in 1993 elections. In 1993 elections PPP won the most

votes from the poorer and more rural constituencies of Northern NWFP. There are

several explanations for the IJI and latter PML(N) strong performance in northern

NWFP. The best explanation seems to lie in its candidates social orientations in these

areas. For example Mian Gul Aurangzeb, Shujahat Ali Khan, Shahzada Mohi-ud-din

and Alhaj30 Muhammad Khan have high social prestige in Northern NWFP. See table

4. Religious parties have very negligible role in Northern NWFP. Only in 1993

election they have won 4 seats in provincial Assembly out of 18 and 2 seats in

National Assembly out of 06. A related explanation is that northern NWFP’s

economy is the least dependent on agriculture, and therefore its rural voters were not

affected by the perception that Nawaz Sharif favoured commercial and industrial

interest at the expense of agriculture interests. In interviews, the most common

explanation given for the strong performance of Muslim League in northern NWFP is

50

the strength of the Biradari and social values of the region makes voter ideologically

closer to the PML than to the PPP.

Furthermore, the Zia legacy of strong antipathy towards the PPP and open support of

the PML was carried on by his successor, General Mirza Aslam Beg, who was chief

of army staff until 1991. In the 1988 elections, the military Inter-Services Intelligence

(ISI) agency actively participated in forming the Islami Jamoori Ittehad (IJI) (Islamic

Democratic Alliance)- a coalition of right-wing parties led by the PML to confront the

PPP. By his own admission, General Beg was instrumental in the dismissal of Benazir

Bhutto’s government in 1990. He also acknowledged receiving large amounts of

money from Mehran Bank to finance the ISI’s Election Cell that was set up to rig the

1990 elections in favour of the IJI.31 In 1993, however, the popular perception was

that after facilitating the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif’s government, the generals would

not want him to return to power. Voting detail both for national and provincial

assembly is indicated in table 2.12.

Table 2.12: Voting Detail Provincial Assembly Elections Valid Rejected Total Registered %age Contesters 1988 468585

10599

479184

1383977

34.04

122

Party Position IJI (9), PPP (7), ANP (1), IND (1) 1990 477868

6805

484673

1391676

34.11

119

Party Position IJI (12), PDA (2), ANP (2), IND (2)

1993 508248

8020

516268

1486989

34.46

105

Party Position PML-N (1), PPP (10), ANP 1997 365567

11044

376611

1555885

23.69

129

Party Position PML-N (8), PPP (3), ANP (5), IND (2) National Assembly

1988 435409

10652

446061

1383969

34.12

29

Party Position PPP (4), IJI (2)

1990 449898

8818

458716

1391677

35.25

33

Party Position IJI (2), PDA (3), IND (1)

1993 457686

10225

467911

1483556 33.21 28

Party Position PML-N (1), ANP (1), PPP (1), PIF (2), PKQP (1)

1997 360475

12907

373382

1555929

25.97 39

Party Position PML-N (5), ANP (1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) In Northern NWFP electoral contestants have mostly belonged to big biradaris and

have socially high prestige. Major Political parties such as PML(N), ANP and PPP

used these political figures for their own political interest. It is also noted that

Military, police and revenue department also affected voting behavior. There is no

empirical evidence, however, to show that the political preferences of the military’s,

51

police and revenue leaders determine the voting behaviour of the rank and file.

Indeed, there is evidence to the contrary for the 1970 elections.

In his study of the PPP, Jones compared the postal ballot results from military

recruiting areas, and the polling station’s results from the military cantonments, as a

sample of the voting behaviour of military officers and the ordinary rank and file. He

concluded that ‘the older and more senior officers tended to support the established

parties (the Leagues), while the PPP-JI ideological polarization, evident elsewhere,

affected the junior officers ranks’. The PPP, however, seemed to be the strong

favourite.32 In recent years, both the mainstream parties have tried to win the military,

police and revenue officials vote in northern NWFP through the selection of their

candidates. In northern NWFP there is close relations between local influential

political candidates and police department. Moreover members of the district

administration often visit the homes (Hujras) of local Khan. As the local people have

no access to these officials directly due to bureaucratic hurdles. At district level local

khan is the key central figure between the district administration and local people. In

this way district administration mould the voting behaviour in the favour of any

candidate.

2.4.1 SOUTHERN NWFP: Kohat , Hangu, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Karak, Tank

and DI Khan districts are included in southern NWFP. In Kohat, Hangu, Bannu,

Karak and Lakki Marwat majority of the people speak Pashto while Saraiki is the

major language of DI Khan District. Southern NWFP is less urbanized, industrialized,

and literate than central NWFP, and has an agriculturally-based economy. See table of

literacy rate. Kurram, Tochi and Gomal rivers also lie in this region. Dress and

appearance is clearly marked in this area and displays a regional variation which

culturally marks it out from other parts of the NWFP. In southern NWFP people like

to wear turbans on their heads or Qrakulli (cap made of hide of sheep, goat etc) and

rarely used white cape which is worn by the people of upper NWFP.

The people of southern areas wear special Chappal (shoes) which differs in design

from district to district. In southern part, the dress of women consists of Choli, Frock,

shalwar and Dopatta. The Pathan women of the middle and upper classes in towns

wear loose wrinkled trousers but the Jat women of the rural area wear Tehband or

Manjla. The dress of the peasants consists of a turban, a loose shirt or baggy trousers

tied around the waist by running string and two or three shawls or a Swati blanket

52

wrapped round the waist or placed on the head as a protection against the Sun.

Waistcoat are worn uncommonly. A leather belt called (qamarband) is always worn

on a journey by those who have arms to put in it. In parts of southern districts among

the Jats the trousers are replaced by loin cloth and a shet is thrown over the shoulders.

Women wear upper garments, forming a bodice and skirt in one piece dark blue in

colour and a red border and a yoke. Underneath are worn a baggy trouser and above is

Shawl. Sandals of grass or leather or shoes are worn by both sexes. In winter Pathan

wear sheep skin coat with wool inside. In the south hair is generally allowed to grow

and sometimes to curl into ringlets.

2.4.2 GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION: Southern NWFP containing

Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Karak, Hangu, Tank and DI. Khan touches its

boundaries to Punjab from its Eastern and southern side, North and South Waziristan

(Tribal belt of FATA) lie in its western side, Baluchistan Province lies in its south-

western side. In 1998, southern NWFP had a population of 3,564,872 i.e 20.10 per

cent of the NWFP’s population. Only 14.33 per cent of its 1998 population was

living in urban areas, and 85.6 per cent in rural areas. Its 1998 population density rate

of 174.66 per square kilometer is also much lower than central and North-Eastern

NWFP. Southern NWFP’s literacy rate of 33.70 per cent is also lower than those of

central and north-eastern NWFP. In 1998, the mother tongue of 84.57 per cent of the

population of the central NWFP was Pashto while in Dera Ismail Khan 72.5 percent

population speaks Saraiki.

2.4.3 ECONOMY: Southern NWFP’s is heavily dependent on agriculture and

Dairy products. NWFP produces 93.7 per cent of NWFP’s cotton. In addition to

cotton, with 14 per cent of the NWFP’s irrigated land, southern NWFP produces 31

per cent of the NWFP’s wheat, 7 per cent of its sugar cane. In 1998, 26.4 per cent of

its total labour force was involved economic activities.

Table 2.13: Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1998 (Southern NWFP) District

All Areas Rural Urban Both Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female

Bannu 29.1 56.1 1.3 25.3 52 1.3 31 55.7 2.9 Lakki 25.8 39.8 1.1 29.8 57.4 1.1 36 66.5 1.7

DI. Khan 32 59.2 1.4 26.2 48.7 2.4 24 43.5 1.7 Tank 27.7 52.1 0.97 31.9 59.4 1.1 32.9 58.7 2.9 Hangu 22.4 46.3 0.9 37.5 65.4 0.8 0 0 0 Karak 22.4 45.9 1 27.6 56.1 1.2 30.6 56 3 Total 26.40 49.94 1.12 29.27 56.30 1.24 26.84 48.03 2.23

Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Census Data, NWFP (Islamabad: Statistic Division, Population Census Organization Press, 1987)

53

While southern NWFP does not yet compare with central NWFP, industrialization is

increasing and by 1998, 18.3 per cent of registered factories in the NWFP, and 14.6

per cent of all units engaged in manufacturing, were located in the south. Not

surprisingly, most industries, including cottage industries, are linked to cotton crop.

These include cotton ginning and pressing, the manufacturing of textile and carpets,

the production of dyes and chemicals for the textile industry, and the dying,

bleaching, and finishing of textiles. The fact that the major north-south road and

transport networks pass through southern NWFP has been a catalyst for industrial

development in the region.

2.4.4 POLITICS: Table 2.14 provides a breakdown of southern NWFP’s election

results by district and sub-region. The most significant feature of the 1988, 1990,

1993 and 1997 Provincial and National Assembly elections in southern NWFP was

the sharp increase in support for the PML (N). The increase of nearly 4 per cent over

the 1988 and 1990 vote percentages resulted in the IJI led by PML(N) getting its best

regional result in southern NWFP.

Table 2.14: Southern NWFP Election Result Provincial Assembly

Districts 1988 1990 1993 1997

PPP IJI ANP PDA IJI ANP PPP PML-N ANP PPP PML-N ANP

Kohat 10.3 26.5 5.8 13 21.6 0 16.1 19.6 19.6 2.3 24.4 11.4 Hangu 0 20 11.4 3.9 30.1 0 0 45.8 0 0 26.8 28.1 Karak 0 31.7 17 0 27.7 17.9 9.4 7.6 12 0 15.6 30 DI. Khan 16.1 27.6 0.72 9.7 5.01 0.29 7.9 33.8 0 2.05 48.8 0.04

Tank 0 13.2 20.4 0 44 9.2 0 34.7 0 0 9.24 0 Bannu 0 30.1 15.8 2.3 24.2 9.38 0 19.4 12.3 8.18 10.2 13.9 Lakki 22.8 48.9 2.09 0 62.9 0 8.5 29.9 0 0 34.1 8.4 Total 19.8 25.2 15 15.5 26.3 14.5 18.2 21.9 14.8 10.2 29.4 20 Seat won 1/16 6/16 1/16 2/16 7/16 2/16 1/16 4/16 1/16 0/16 6/16 3/16

National Assembly Kohat 22.4 36 12.9 31.2 29.7 0 17.1 33.6 0 0 63.7 0 Karak 0 37.5 8.16 0 26 0 0 32 0 0 10.4 40.1 DI. Khan 0 23.1 0 40.6 8.5 0 0 33.5 0 0 42.6 0

Bannu 0 22 11.2 21.5 19.4 0 0 38.2 0 0 29.4 0 Lakki 0 49 4 0 50.5 0 0 38 0 0 40.8 0 Total 4.48 33.5 7.25 18.6 26.8 0 3.42 28.4 0 0 37.3 8.02 Seat won 0/5 2/5 0/5 2/5 1/5 0/5 0/5 3/5 0/5 0/5 4/5 1/5

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) The most important explanation for the PML (N)’s strength is its ability to make use

of factional and biradari ties in this region. Mr. Javed Ibrahim Piracha, Syed Iftikhar

Hussain Gillani, Haji Muhammad Kabir Khan Marwat, and Mr. Anwar Saifullah were

the strong electoral candidates on PML(N) ticket during 1988-1997 Elections due to

their factional and strong biradari relations.

54

Another factor contributing to the PML(N) strong performance was the defection

from the PPP to the PML(N) of prominent members of southern NWFP’s landed elite,

such as Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani and Mr. Javed Ibrahim Pracha. This led to the

unusual situation of the two traditional rival ashrafi families of Kohat, the Gillani and

Pirachas, living on the same side of the electoral divide. A central versus southern

NWFP political rivalry partially explains why an increasing number of politicians

from southern NWFP’s landed elite are found in the ranks of the PPP. Traditionally,

these ashrafi notable families were the ones who dominated NWFP’s politics.

Although Saraiki nationalist parties,33 have never fared well in electoral politics,

primarily due to the absence of a significant Saraiki middle class, the matter of

Saraiki locals versus the NWFP settlers is still a factor in the politics of the DI. Khan.

This is particularly true in DI. Khan region where the Saraiki issue is linked to the

remnants of the Saraiki (Province) Movement.34 In the 1970 elections the PPP backed

the NWFP settlers as Bhutto did not want to upset his support base in the NWFP. As a

result, the PPP received its lowest result in the old settled tracts of Southern NWFP.

In the 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections the situation was even more confusing as

the southern region have mixed electoral position of parties. IJI and PML-N have

simple majority in this region. Prominent local and settler politicians were found in

both parties. Nevertheless, it was believed that the PPP, led by a Sindhi, would be

more sympathetic to Saraiki interests than the PML(N), led by a Punjabi. In the

constituencies of Saraiki speaking district of DI. Khan a comparison of polling station

results (mostly populated by local Saraiki speakers)35 support the perception that the

settlers tended to back the PML(N) and the latter the PPP.36 This is particularly true in

the constituencies of DI. Khan district where the local versus settler rivalry is

especially intense. The traditional rivalry between the two was further exacerbated

during the 1980s by the patronage provided by General Zia to follow NWFP’s kundi

who had settled in the district, which included gerrymandering constituencies to the

advantage of settlers. This point was noted by Fazal-ur-Rehmn, a former MNA from

southern NWFP: Basically it’s the local versus non-local conflict. There is an inherent conflict. I heard it much more in DI. Khan…. They constantly talked about the Kundis coming in, and Zia-ul-Haq creating a constituency for the Kundis in DI. Khan in 1988 which the Kundis keep on winning because of the way the constituency is delimited…. There’s a feeling of great resentment amongst the locals and because they are Siraiki speaking it is reflected as that.37

This political cleavage between the local and settlers is clearly revealed in table 3-6,

which compares the results of polling stations located in urban, local villages, and

55

canal colony villages in constituencies. In Dera Ismail Khan the old settled tracts

generally lie to the east of the Indus, DG. Khan lies in north-south. In the 1993

elections, the PML(N) won more than 60 per cent of the vote in the urban areas and in

the canal colony villages dominated by settlers, but only 36.9 per cent in the non-

colony villages dominated by Siraiki speakers. The PPP, on the other hand, won

nearly 60 per cent of the vote in the non-colony villages but only 35.1 per cent in the

colony villages38. Voting detail both for national and provincial assembly is shown in

table 2.15.

Table 2.15: Voting Detail Provincial Assembly

Elections Valid Rejected Total Registered %age of votes Contesters

1988 474095

6781

480876

1265296

38.32 158

Party position IJI (6), PPP (1), ANP (1), JUI-F (2), IND (6)

1990 519637

5885

525522

1272193

41.57

119

Party position IJI (7), PDA (2), ANP (2), JUI-F (1), IND (4)

1993 539362

7464

546826

1378009

39.77

125

Party position PML-N (4), PPP (1), ANP (1), PML-J (3), IJM (1), IND (6)

1997 475509

11542

487051

1445364

33.86

166

Party position ANP (3), JUI-F (1), PML-J (2), IND (4)

National Assembly 1988 417316

6970

424286

1264497

32.97

43

Party position IJI (2), JUI-F (2), JUI-D (1)

1990 434652

4665

439317

1272193

33.95

32

Party position PDA (2), IJI (1), JUI-F (1), IND (1)

1993 462817

7386

470203

1380885

33.93

37

Party position PML-N (3), IJM (1), MDM (1) 1997 469703 12538 482241 1445364 32.87 46 Party position PML-N (4), ANP (1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)

2.5.1 NORTH-EASTERN NWFP: North-Eastern NWFP comprises Hazara

region of NWFP including Abbottabad, Mansehra, Haripur, Battagram and Kohistan.

It is the least urbanized, literate, and economically developed region of the NWFP.

Much of this can be attributed to the retrogressive effects of the still prevalent

conservative tribal and semi-feudal social structures. For the same reason, this region

has witnessed the least political change over time as prominent tribal leaders and

landed elite maintain their political and economic hold over their tribesmen and

tenants. The land between the Indus, and Kunhar known as the Pakhli maidan, rush

and Haripur and the In-Indus Batagram and Kohistan together comprise the region of

north-eastern NWFP. It encompasses Haripur, Abbottabad, Mansehra, Bettagram and

Kohistan. In north the Indus separates North NWFP from north-eastern side. In the

56

south, the Indus river serves as the border between central NWFP and the North-

eastern NWFP. In the south lies the border with Rawalpindi. In the east, the Kashmir

and Gilgit on its northern side. In 1998, the population of North-eastern NWFP was

3,505,000, approximately 19.3 per cent of the NWFP’s population. Population wise

north-eastern NWFP is the smallest of the NWFP’s four regions, its population

density rate of 205.44 per square kilometer in the NWFP. It is the least urbanized

region with only 7.04 per cent of its 1988 population living in urban areas. This

reflects the semi-developed nature of the region as compared to other regions of

NWFP. North-Eastern NWFP can be further subdivided along linguistic and cultural

lines into northern and southern regions. In the northern region, encompassing the

districts of Battagram, Kohistan and Pashto speaking areas of Mansehra, and southern

parts i.e Hindko speaking areas of Mansehra, Abbottabad and Haripur, the mother

tongue of 74.72 per cent of the population, according to the 1998 census, is Hindko.

In the southern region, encompassing Mansehra, Abbottabad and Haripur 95 per cent

of the population speak Hindko.

Another distinguishing feature of some areas of North-eastern NWFP is the presence

of an operative tribal system not found elsewhere in the NWFP. In Mansehra district,

tribal leaders in the provincial administered tribal area (Kala Dhaka) still exert

influence over their tribes. In Mansehra the Syeds, Swatis, Sardars, and Tanolis are

the main tribes. These tribes are still in conflict with one another, but today the ballot

usually replaces the bullet. In Mansehra constituency of NA-14, the Sardar and the

Syeds usually oppose each other, with the Swatis. Sardar biradari won elections

1990, 1993 and 1997 and have politically most strong biradari in this constituency. In

the Abbottabad constituency of NA-11 in 1990-97, the Sardars have defeated the

Jadoons. in National Assembly elections. In other areas, the biradari system has

broken down over time, but prominent families of Jadoon, Tareen, Awans and the

Queshis still exert influence.39 In Kohistan, Pakhtoon tribes such as the yousafzai

exist, but again the tribal system has mostly disappeared and control over land rather

than control over a tribe is the basis for political power.

2.5.2 ECONOMY: According to one study that ranked the districts of Pakistan

by levels of development, North-eastern NWFP’s districts fall into the bottom third of

NWFP’s districts.40 Like other regions of NWFP, North-eastern NWFP’s economy is

heavily dependent on agriculture. In 1998, 21.8 per cent of its total labour force was

57

engaged in agriculture. With 25 per cent of the irrigated land, North-eastern NWFP

produces 12.1 per cent of the wheat, 0.12 per cent of sugar cane, 6.99 per cent of

tobacco, and 10.69 per cent of rice. An important factor contributing to North-eastern

NWFP’s poverty is the survival of the large landlord. Although both Ayub Khan and

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did institute land reforms, they were halfhearted measures that

were easily circumvented.

Table 2.16. Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1988 (North-Eastern NWFP).

District All Areas Rural Urban

Both Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female Abbottabad 27.9 55.2 1.3 27.5 54.1 0.55 25.4 48.1 1.5 Batagam 33.9 64.5 1.4 30.1 60.1 1.1 0 0 0 Haripur 25.8 51.1 1.2 33.9 64.5 1.4 0 0 0 Kohistan 37.5 64.4 0.8 25.4 50.8 1.02 28.6 53.3 2.4 Mansehra 27.7 56.1 1.3 31.6 60.1 0.7 25.7 40.6 8.4 Total 30.56 58.26 1.2 29.7 57.92 0.954 15.94 28.4 2.46

Source: Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Census Data, NWFP (Islamabad: Statistic Division, Population Census Organization Press, 1987) In 1980, 40 per cent of all the farms in central NWFP over 150 acres were in North-

eastern NWFP.41 North-eastern NWFP is the least industrialized of the NWFP’s four

regions on a per capita basis. In 1989, only 5.2 per cent of registered factories were

located in North-eastern NWFP. An important contributing factor to the slow pace of

industrialization is that the major north-south transportation arteries bypass north-

eastern NWFP and instead pass through southern NWFP into central NWFP.

2.5.3 POLITICS: That the least developed, industrialized, urbanized, and literate

region of the NWFP, should exhibited the least political change should come as no

surprise. The following description of Oghi Tehsil of Mansehra District reflects the

situation in much north-eastern NWFP. Every five miles or so is the house of a tribal

or religious leader, who maintains a band of retainers to enforce his influence on his

poor neighbours, and to conduct his feuds with his equals. The poor man pays

blackmail for his cattle to these local chieftains and for his soul to his pir, who may or

may not live in the neighbourhood, but visits his followers yearly to receive his dues.

As would be expected, the bulk of the land is held by the rich men, who are increasing

their possessions. Peasant proprietors exist on the outskirts of the small towns:

elsewhere the small lordless man cannot hold his own. If he attempted to do so, his

cattle would be driven, his women folk carried off, himself prosecuted before an

honorary magistrate on a charge of cattle theft, and in a short time he would be glade

to hand over his land and secure protection on any terms. Society then in the main

consists of the land-holding squires, when local authority is only limited by their

58

mutual jealousies, and of their retainers and tenants, who, holding non share in the

land which they till, and knowing that an appearance of wealth will lead to exaction

from their feudal or spiritual masters, or content to lead a hand-to-mouth existence.42

There are many similarities between the socio-economic conditions in north-eastern

NWFP today, and this description written by Malcolm Darling in 1931. The slow

pace of change, and the social and political conservatism of north-eastern NWFP, is

no accident-it was the intended outcome of British colonial land settlement policies in

the region. Prior to the Mutiny of 1857, the primary objective of land settlement

policies was to create a class of peasant proprietors. After the Mutiny, political

imperatives took precedence and the priority changed to creating a class of ‘hereditary

landed gentry’ who could maintain peace and stability in the country side. In the post-

Mutiny settlement districts (mostly in north-eastern NWFP), the British distributed

titles, pensions, and large land grants to create and strengthen the political hold of the

conservative landed elite. Jones noted that ‘in political geography of the province, the

line separating the pre-Mutiny settlement districts from the post-Mutiny ones

represents a major political cleavage that is distinctively visible on the map of the

1970 elections.

Table 2.17: North-Eastern NWFP Election Result Provincial Assembly

Districts 1988 1990 1993 1997

PPP IJI ANP PDA IJI ANP PPP PML-N ANP PPP PML-

N ANP

Abbottabad cum Haripur 14.9 27.4 0 5.7 40 0 19.2 41.6 0 2.9 62 0

Mansehra 6.8 21.9 2.2 1.7 27.7 1.6 0 45.2 0 0 40.2 5.2 Haripur 15.4 36 2.3 13.9 65.5 0 0 50.5 0 0 57 0

Battagram 0 37.1 3.5 0 0 27.6 0 42.8 0 0 18.5 27.3 Kohistan 9.9 20 7.1 0 12.7 0 0 17.5 0 2.8 11.1 6.7 Total 11.6 27.9 1.7 5.6 37.8 2.07 5.4 41 2.5 1.09 48.7 3.6

Seat won 0/19 10 0/19 0/19 8/19 1/19 1/19 10/19 1/19 0/19 14/19 1/19 National Assembly

Districts PPP IJI ANP PDA IJI ANP PPP PML-N ANP PPP PML-

N ANP

Abbottabad cum Haripur 18.1 41.2 0 12.8 56.7 0 0 65.8 0 3.6 6.5 0

Mansehra 5.8 7.8 0 0.48 33.5 0 0 52.2 0 0 46.5 0 Battagram 28.3 34.8 0 0 0 0 0 39 0 0 48.4 0 Kohistan 0 30.7 21.2 0 16.1 0 0 25.8 0 3.3 33.8 0 Total 14.4 30.2 0.82 7.5 43.3 0 0 58.3 0 2.34 58.2 0

Seat won 0/7 4/7 0/7 0/7 4/7 0/7 0/7 6/7 0/7 0/7 6/7 0/7 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) In these elections, as in those of 1946, the post-Mutiny settlement districts were a

bastion of a conservative chiefly control, quite impervious to the JUI/ANP flood

(Muslim League in 1946) which swept virtually every other part of NWFP.43 At no

59

time is the political conservatism of north-eastern NWFP more visible then at election

time, when the same names of influential tribal leaders and landed elites appear on the

ballots, although often with the different party labels. The most distinctive feature of

election results in north-eastern NWFP, and a further example of the powerful hold of

its ruling class, is the high percentage of votes won by candidates running without

party tickets. In contrast with the strong move towards a two party system in the other

regions of the NWFP, tribal leaders and the large landlords in north-eastern NWFP

can still get elected contesting as an independent candidate. The strong presence of

independent members in north-eastern NWFP is one aspect of NWFP politics where

there has been remarkably little change since 1970. Independent candidates in 1988,

1990, 1993 and 1997 obtained a significant number of seats as mentioned in table

2.28. This compares favourably with 42.86% won by independents in 1988, 14.29%

in 1990, 1993 and 1997.

Table 2.18: Voting Detail Provincial Assembly

Elections Valid Rejected Total Registered %age Contesters 1988 505108 9120 514228 1382457 36.01 142

Party Position IJI (10), IND (9)

1990 540688

9739

550427

1390104

39.38 121

Party Position IJI (8), ANP (1), JUI-F (1), IND (9)

1993 551475

7912

559387

1494239

36.13

114

Party Position PML-N (10), PPP (1), ANP (1), PML-J (1), MDM (1), IND (5)

1997 476897

12004

488901

1567378

30.18

149

Party Position PML-N (14), ANP (1), IND (4) National Assembly

1988 451760

12299

464059

1382457

33.26

40

Party Position IJI (4), IND (3) 1990 489130 8065 497195 1389804 35.63 43

Party Position IJI (4), JUI-F (2), IND (1)

1993 517184

9763

526947

1494239

34.35

28

Party Position PML-N (6), IND (1)

1997 473565

12817

486382

1567378

30.44

35

Party Position PML-N (6), IND (1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) This trend was even more visible in the provincial assembly elections, where in 1988

independent candidates won 47.37% of the vote and 09 out of 19 seats. Furthermore,

to a much greater extent then in the NWFP’s other regions, the majority of votes that

are won by the major parties are not votes for the party itself but vote for the

influential elites who are given tickets by the party. In addition to independents, the

60

religious parties also garnered more support in the culturally conservative north-

eastern NWFP than in any other region of the NWFP except the south.

In the 1970 election, the Islamic parties won 38.6% of the vote in the north-eastern

NWFP-there strongest performance ever in Pakistani elections. In the 1990 elections,

their strongest performance was still in north-eastern NWFP. A high percentage of the

Islamic party votes in northeastern NWFP are won in Battagram and Kohistan, due to

the volatile sunni-deobandi sectarian politics of these districts. The above table

illustrates the fact that IJI/PML has always received a large number of seats from

north-eastern regions but PPP had worse results from north-eastern NWFP. In 1970,

for example while the PPP swept the polls in the rest of the NWFP, it did not win a

single seat from this part of NWFP. The PPP has consistently done better in the

southern saraiki speaking districts of western NWFP then in the northern NWFP

districts, whereas the PML(N) has tended to do better in the latter then the former.

2.6 CONCLUSIONS

In northern, central, southern and north eastern (Hazara) zones of NWFP, electoral

politics effected voting behaviour in different ways. In north-eastern (Hazara) region,

the voting behaviour was largely tilted towards Muslim League during 1990s due to

historical, linguistic and political reasons. In central NWFP electoral politics affected

the voting behaviour in favour of ANP due to Pakhtun ethnic cleavages, while in

southern and northern parts of NWFP electoral politics attracted religious and ethnic

sentiments along with mainstream political parties’ i.e Muslim League and PPP.

In next chapter historical roots of electoral politics in NWFP is analysed to find out

the intensity of electoral politics on the voting behaviour in NWFP.

1 The idea for classification taken from Malcom Darling and Philip E. Jones, See Malcom L. Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (London: Oxford University Press, 1925) and also see Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 514. 2 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, 2000). 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, 13 January 1997. 6 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP, pp.2-3 7 Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997. 8 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP 9 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP 10 Ibid. 11 David Dichter, The North West Frontier of west Pakistan: A Study in Regional Geography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.201. 12 Ibid. p.202 13 The doabs are named by compounding the name of the two rivers they lie between.

61

14 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP, p. 62 15 David Dichter, The North West Frontier of west Pakistan: A Study in Regional Geography, pp. 107-108. 16 Malcom L. Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, p.117 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid, p. 116 19 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power, p. 586 20 Ibid, p.587 21 Andrew R. Wilder, Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.39. 22 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power, p. 587. 23 Daily The News, Rawalpindi, 20 March 1993. 24 Ibid 25 Daily The News, Rawalpindi, 15 March 1996. 26 Government of NWFP, NWFP Development Statistics. 27 Iqbal Saigol [Industrialist], Interview with author, Tape recording, Muree, 9 May 2005 28 Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Census Data, NWFP (Islamabad: Statistic Division, Population Census Organization Press, 1987), pp.117-22 29 Ibid. 30 The word Alhaj means who perform more than one pilgrimage (plural of Haji). This word is widely used by the electoral contesters in NWFP to show their pious nature to get vote. 31 Idrees Bukhtiar, ‘Scandal’, Herald, April 1994, pp. 24-32. 32 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power, pp.510-12. 33 Daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, 21 April 1996. 34 Ibid. 35 Daily The News, Rawalpindi, 25 February 1993. 36 Ibid. 37 Maulan Fazal-ur-Rehman, interview with author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 24 March 2007. 38 Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results) 39 Government of Punjab, Gazetteer of the Hazara district 1883-4 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000) 40 Hafiz A. Pasha, Salman Malik and Haroon Jamal, ‘The Changing Profile of Regional Development in Pakistan’, Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics 9 (1990), p.21 41 Agriculture Census Organisation, Pakistan Census of Agriculture, 1980: Province Report NWFP, Vol. II Part II (Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, nd.) pp.1-8. 42 Malcom L. Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, p. 99 43 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power, pp. 75-76

62

CHAPTER-3

ELECTORAL HISTORY OF NWFP

3. INTRODUCTION: The history of electoral politics in NWFP started in 1932 when it

became a governor’s province under Sir Ralph Griffith on April 18, 1932. So, in this

chapter electoral history of NWFP is analysed in two major sections, one is 1932-1947

and second section is 1947-1970 i.e up to the introduction of universal suffrage.

3.1 BRITISH PERIOD (1932-47): The area under NWFP had been taken by the

British from the Sikh Darbar as a consequence of their victory in the second Anglo-Sikh

war of 1849 and had been brought under the administration of Punjab province,1 but first

time British came into direct contact with these areas of NWFP was in 1808 due to the

fear of French invasion through Persia and Afghanistan, and they sent a mission to

Afghan Amir.2 On 9 November 1901, Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy of India separated

the Frontier Region from Punjab and created a new province of NWFP. The newly

created Frontier province, consisting of the districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu

and Dera Ismail Khan and the political agencies of Malakand, Khyber, Kuram, North

Waziristan and South Waziristan, was placed under the charge of Chief Commissioner

and agent to the Governor General, appointed and directly responsible to Government of

India.3

On the formation of NWFP and by separating the five districts from the Punjab, these

areas did not experience the electoral and other constitutional benefits of British

representative institutions due to internal instability and strategic location of the

province4, but awareness of representative institutions had already been started in Frontier

after the uprising of 1857 when British introduced representative institutions in India to

strengthen the administration. Prominent notables were asked to join Governor’s Councils

which served as advisory bodies.5 In 1884, the first restricted franchise elections were

held for local government institutions. In 1892, members of these institutions were given

the right to elect some members of the provincial legislatures, who in turn elected a

limited number of central legislature members. The Government of India Acts of 1909

and 1919 continued to expand the franchise and the number of elected representatives.

Following the civil disobedience campaigns of the Khudai Khidmatgars, in 1930-32, the

British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald announced the elevation of its status to a

governor’s province like other provinces of India at the concluding session of Second

63

Round table Conference.6 The Khudia Khidmatgars had extended their influence in the

NWFP both by creating new organizations and as in Bannu taking over the old Congress

district organization. Earlier the loyalist Khans had petitioned for reforms which had

become a long standing Muslim demand. The Muslim League which drew its main

support from this social grouping had also supported the idea of reform from its platform.

Under the new scheme, Sir Ralph Griffith, the then Chief Commissioner of NWFP, was

made the first Governor of NWFP on April 18, 1932. On the same day, Lord Willingdon,

the Viceroy of India inaugurated the NWFP legislative council. The council consisted of a

total of 40 members (28 elected and 12 nominated). Among them 22 were to be Muslims,

5 Hindus, and one Sikh. The nominated members comprised of 5 Europeans, 1 Muslim, 1

Sikh official, 4 non-official Muslims and 1 Sikh non official. Sir Sahibzada Abdul

Qayyum was appointed the Minister in charge of the transferred Department, KB Ghafoor

Khan of Zaida, a nominated member, was made the first President, and Sheikh Abdul

Hamid, a member of the provincial civil service, was appointed as the secretary of the

council. It was made clear the council or the ministers had no say in the administration of

the tribal areas as tribal policy remained a central subject under the direct control of the

governor who served as the Agent to the Governor-General7. After the establishment of

Governor’s Province in 1932 electoral politics started in NWFP but they were rooted in

four earlier historical developments8, i.e. i). the British system of indirect rule, ii). the

impact of Khilafat Movement, iii). the reform issue, iv). legacy of the period of Civil

Disobedience in 1930-32.

The electoral politics revolved around the colonial interest in NWFP like other parts of

India. In order to have an efficient bureaucracy based on favourable public opinion, the

British rule emphasised the need for making some provisions for associating local

influential elements with the law making process, but through indirect channels.9 It may

be recalled that nomination system was confined to chiefs, nobles and members of the

landed aristocracy and it had nothing to do with the idea of popular representation. The

British in NWFP turned towards the leading khans (chiefs) to maintain their rule and

patronage was provided to them in return for maintaining peace and revenue collections.

This system worked smoothly until the 1920s when tenants vs. khanate discontentment

started. Small khans and tenants joined the Khudai Khidmatgar’s Movement and

government patronage seekers big khans removed out from political scene for a time

being and later on these big khans joined the Muslim League to safeguard their interest10.

64

The Khilafat Movement in 1919 had a deep impact on Frontier politics. The Congress’s

support in favour of Khilafat Movement created a tradition of cooperation between it and

the Frontier Muslims who supported khilafat campaigns and became prominent during

this period. Among these, the most notable persons were Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr.

Khan Sahib. The link between Khudai Khidmatgar movement and Khilafat Movement

was sustained through such organisations as the Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afghania (Society

for the Reform of the Afghans) which was formed in the wake of the collapse of the

‘Hijrat’ movement.11 The demand for political reforms in NWFP led to the strengthening

of the anti-British and pro-Congress attitudes which had emerged during the Khilafat

Movement among the younger sections of Khanate elite.

3.2 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS (NWFP): These developments formed

the background to the legislative elections in the second week of 1932, in which the

percentage of voting was very considerable as compared to other parts of India.12In the

absence of Congress, there was no organized party in the elections, which fragmented

into twenty-eight separate races with little or no bearing on one another. Restrictive

property qualification limited the electorate to four percent of the population and ensured

a legislature dominated by conservative, wealthy men13. The non-Muslims who were

elected espoused a sectarian philosophy characterized by a distrust of Muslims and

presentiments that the legislative council would prove disastrous for their communities.

The preference of the minority voters was best illustrated by the race in Peshawar where

Rai Sahib Mahr Chan Khanna, the Provincial Hindu Sabha leader, received a three to one

majority over C.C Gosh, the former PCC President.14 Mahr Chand Khanna, a banker and

urban landowner, had run as a defender of Hindu interests, while Gosh had downgraded

communal questions and campaigned as a representative of Congress opinion in a

province where the Congress was identified with the Pakhtun community. Similarly, Rai

Sahib Rochi Ram, a wealthy government contractor and the President of the Dera Ismail

Khan Hindu Saba, scored an easy victory over Bhanju Ram Ghandi, another former

Congressman, in Dera Ismail Khan. Nationalist alternatives were absent in the other

minority constituencies and the leading candidates fought the elections over who could

best protect their communities from the province’s Muslim Majority.15

In the two urban Muslim Constituencies, Pir Baksh, the former PCC General Secretary,

and Malik Khuda Baksh were elected on the basis of their nationalist reputations. In the

rural Muslim constituencies, in contrast, national credentials mattered less than the status

65

of one’s family and the strength of one’s gundi. All the successful candidates were

members or agents of the dominant elite in their constituencies, as were most of their

opponents. The victors included two hereditary Nawab and one appointed for life, two

Arbabs, three other individuals from families of tribal chieftains, one religious leader, and

seven men of high tribal status. In selecting the council’s nominated non-officials, the

governor reinforced its conservatism by appointing five Muslims with strong traditional

standing. Local considerations dominated the campaign in all constituencies. Tribal

divisions or factional alignments determined the outcomes in some, while religious issues

materially influenced the results in others. Three men associated with the nationalist

movement were elected, but in each case, family and faction had a more important

bearing on the outcome than voters’ patriotism. For example, Habibullah Khan’s record

as a former Vice President of the Bannu Congress was of secondary importance in his

election. He was victorious principally because he had the backing of one of the two

gundis into which the Marwat tribe was divided. Similarly Abdul Qayyum Khan of

Safaida captured a seat in Hazara due to personal feuds and religious controversies which

split the strength of the leading Swati Khans in his constituency.16

After the council convened, its members polarized into four groups17, Nationalist opinion

was represented by Azad Party headed by Malik Khuda Baksh, nine other Khans formed

the liberal Party and combination of nine professional and Khans formed the Progressive

party. The seven Hindus and Sikhs grouped together and formed minority party. These

parties had no organization and ideology.

3.3 ELECTIONS 1937 (NWFP): The constitution Act of 1935 was the first act

which was introduced in NWFP after its provincial status. The government of India Act,

1935 did not introduce the system of universal suffrage, and the right to vote was limited.

The property qualifications continued to be the main basis of franchise for both the

houses. A much higher standard was adopted for the Upper House with the result that

only the wealthiest and privileged persons of very high status enjoyed the right to vote.

The franchise for the Lower House was fixed at a level of much lower than under the act

of 1919. This resulted in the increase in the number of voters i.e. not more than 14% of

the total population of British India had the right to vote for provincial assemblies.

Previously only 3% of the population had enjoyed the right to vote.18 The bicameral

legislature under 1935 Act was a mixture of many principles and interests-both

democratic and autocratic elements. Provinces were to send directly elected

66

representative on their behalf, the states were given the freedom of sending the nominees

of the rulers as their representatives to the central legislature.

The provincial legislature did represent the people through general constituencies.

Instead, they were composed of members elected on the basis of constituencies organised

according to religion or race, interest or sex. The members of provincial legislatures were

elected directly, but the extent of the franchise varied from province to province and it

was determined on the basis of minimum land revenue, a person paid or on the basis of

the house rent. A certain minimum educational qualification or military services also

were considered adequate for franchise. It can be said that the electors were chiefly

governed by communal or provincial considerations in their choice while exercising to

vote.19 Under the 1935 Act, diarchy was replaced by provincial autonomy, while the

Governors remained the provincial chiefs; all provincial subjects were transferred to

ministers who served at the will of popular elected assemblies. The NWFP was conceded

the same reforms as other provinces under the Act, although the governor, in his capacity

as the Agent to the Governor General, retained sole control over tribal policy. In

December 1936 the nominations of 135 candidates for the Frontier Legislative Assembly

took place which later reduced to five parties and groupings. The largest and most

organized party was Congress which contested elections under the banner of Provincial

Parliamentary board as Congress was banned in Frontier due its civil disobedience

movement. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was also banned to enter in the province and his absence

Dr. Khan Sahib led the party. The Congress candidates were nominated on the basis of

loyalty to the nationalist cause and their prestige in society. In the Muslim rural

constituencies the Congress candidates were largely small Khans. Most of the Congress

candidates in the Muslim Urban and General constituencies were lawyers.

A large number of Khans stood as independent candidates. The leading one among them

was Major Nawab Sir Akbar Khan (Nawab of Hoti). Other prominent Khans standing for

election were Nawab of Teri, K.B Arbab Sher Ali Khan, Nawab Zada Nasrullah Khan,

Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan and Nawabzada Mohammad Said Khan. Most Khans

outside the Congress represented the same landed interest and mindset of loyalty to the

British but they were unable to form any party of their own or to find some other form of

cooperation during the election campaign. In several constituencies the Congress was able

to benefit from the fact that the anti-Congress vote was split by rival Khans.20 Electoral

Politics in the towns of NWFP was dominated by lawyers including Malik Khuda Baksh

67

and Pir Baksh. They represented the Independent Party, which had been the only real

opposition party in the old legislative council. Two other lawyers were Khan Abdul

Qayyum Khan and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar. In the 1937 Elections the former

represented the Congress and the latter contested as an independent. The urban Congress

candidates in the general constituencies were mostly lawyers or doctors. Their main

opponents belonged to the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party. This party was created during

the election campaign by members of the provincial Hindu Sabha and the Sing Sabha.

The leaders of the party were mostly prosperous businessmen, who were loyal to the

British.21 The major point of their electoral campaign was the demand of cancellation of

the so called Hindu-Gurmukhi circular which had been issued by Sir Abdul Qayyum in

October 1935, making Urdu and English the mandatory language of instruction from the

third standard in government-aided schools for girls.22 The Muslim League did not put up

any candidate in NWFP during 1937 elections. It had attempted without success since

1934 to found a NWFP branch. Jinnah had unsuccessfully attempted to establish an

eighteen member Parliamentary Board with Pir Bakhsh as its convener, during his visit to

the province in October 1936. Another group which emerged during 1937 elections was

the group of retired senior government servants. Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum

was the notable figure of this group. Others were K.B Kuli Khan, a retired publicity

officer of the Frontier government, and K.B Saadullah Khan, a retired deputy

commissioner who was also a leading landlord in the Charsada Tehsil in Peshawar

district. Sir Abdul Qayyum also had strong support from a number of Khans in Hazara

district.23

In Peshawar and Mardan, party identity seemed more important than elsewhere due to

political activities and influence of Khudai Khidmatgars in these areas. According to the

Governor, Cunningham., the elections in these districts were a straight fight between the

Congress and its opponents, irrespective of candidates. Programmes and policies were of

little or no importance and instead traditional following and factional considerations were

usually decisive.24 In electoral campaigns, many candidates exploited religious factors.

Anti-Congress candidates accused the Congress members, particularly the Khan Brothers

and their families, of being under Hindu influence.25 The role of religious factors along

with the more traditional factional politics was noted by the Secretary of State Lord

Zetland:

Only in Sindh and the North West Frontier Province were religious issues raised. in these provinces results turned largely on individual personalities, rivalries and tribal loyalties, although

68

in Peshawar and Mardan constituencies the issue upon which the election was fought was clear cut, Red shirts against the rest. In most of the constituencies the Red shirts won with clear majorities. In the Muslim constituencies in the Punjab general questions of polling counted little, and electors choose their loyal leaders. In Sikh and Hindu constituencies election propaganda was, however, diverted against government.26

There is also evidence of candidates standing for election in the hope that they would be

paid to withdraw their nomination papers. In many instances a multiplicity of candidates

have contested one seat, and there was reason to believe that a number of candidates

stood merely in order to secure a bargaining counter for their subsequent withdrawal.27 In

India as a whole and particularly in NWFP there cannot be the least doubt that many of

the electorate who voted for the first time were unfitted to exercise the franchise

intelligently. Many had little notion of what the election was about. In the backward rural

areas the Congress propaganda in the main took these forms, the first a declaration that a

vote for Congress meant a vote for Mr. Gandhi, and the second the making of the wildest

and most irresponsible promises, coupled with violent attacks upon government and upon

landlords.28 Khudai Khidmatgars widely used this technique in NWFP during election

campaigns. They extensively attacked in their speeches, the big Khans and government.

As the 1937 elections were the first large scale electoral experience in the Indian

provinces, so common people were ignorant about the value of their vote. The British

reported that in many provinces villagers were told that the Congress voting Box was the

Gandhi box or even the "Sarkari", or "Govt." box. Villagers in some constituencies were

informed that all ballot papers dropped in to Congress box would go straight to Mahtama

Gandhi, and that person who voted in this way would secure large reduction in rent, while

persons who voted against the Congress box would lose their lands altogether. They were

also told that the victory of the Congress box would be followed by the repeal of

unpopular laws. These stories were so implicitly believed that many voters came to look

upon the Congress box as invested with supernatural qualities. In some instances prayers

were made to the box, and letters and petitions to Mr. Gandhi, and even sums of money

were found in the boxes29.

Elections for a 50-member provincial assembly were scheduled on February 1937. The

secrecy and freedom of the ballot were however, very badly protected by the procedural

arrangements. There was a rule which allowed the marking of a ballot paper of an

illiterate voter to be witnessed by the polling agent of the candidate for whom the

illiterate voter declared he wished to vote. Naturally this made a mockery of the secrecy

of the ballot in very many cases and allowed the candidates to influence the voters by fair

69

means or foul.30 Polling took place between 1 February and 10 February, with 179,529

voters. This was around 14 per cent of the total population. Turnout rate was 72.8 per

cent. Turnout was highest in the rural Muslim constituencies and lowest among the Sikhs.

Result of 1937 elections in NWFP is illustrated in table 3.1 and distribution of Muslim

rural seats is shown in table 3.2.

Table 3.1: Results of the 1937 Elections in the NWFP.

PartyType of Constituency

TotalGeneral Urban

GeneralRural

Muslim Urban

MuslimRural

SikhLand-holders

Congress 19 1 3 - 15 - -Independent Muslims 21 - - 1 18 - 2Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party 7 1 3 - - 3 -Independent Party 2 - - 2 - - -Independent Hindu 1 1 - - - - -Total 50 3 6 3 33 3 2Source: Return showing the results of Elections in India 1937.

The Congress won 19 seats, Hindu-Sikh Nationalist captured seven and the Azad Party

won two seats. The remaining twenty two successful candidates were independents. It

was mainly in the Pakhtun rural areas that the Congress did well, especially in Peshawar

and Mardan districts. In Peshawar district all Muslim rural seats were won by the

Congress, and in Mardan the Congress won three out of five. In the remaining two

Mardan constituencies the Congress candidates had been disqualified, the Congress soon

captured these seats, too, by filing successful election petitions and then winning the by-

elections.

Table 3.2: 1937 elections in the NWFP. Distribution of the Muslim Rural seats.

PartyDistricts

Hazara Mardan Peshawar Kohat Bannu D.I. KhanCongress 2 3 7 1 1 1Independents 7 2 - 3 3 3Source: Returns showing the Results of Elections in India 1937

The Congress won 19 seats, Hindu-Sikh Nationalist captured seven and the Azad Party

won two seats. The remaining twenty two successful candidates were independents. It

was mainly in the Pakhtun rural areas that the Congress did well, especially in Peshawar

and Mardan districts. In Peshawar district all Muslim rural seats were won by the

Congress, and in Mardan the Congress won three out of five. In the remaining two

Mardan constituencies the Congress candidates had been disqualified, the Congress soon

captured these seats, too, by filing successful election petitions and then winning the by-

elections. In the heavily non-Pakhtun district of Hazara the Congress did very badly,

winning only two out of nine Muslim Urban seats. The Congress position among the

70

urban Muslims was very weak and no Congressite was returned from the Muslim urban

constituencies. The general seats were evenly divided by the Congress and the Hindu-

Sikh Nationalist party. All Sikh seats went to the Hindu-Sikh nationalists. The majority of

the successful Muslim independents were Khans closely associated with the British.

Shortly after the elections, Sir Abdul Qayyum formed his own party “United Nationalist

Party”31 in the Assembly with the help of independent members. Sir Abdul Qayyum

formed the ministry with the coalition of Hindu-Sikh Nationalist party leaders on 1 April

1937. On 22 June 1937, the Viceroy made a conciliatory statement which induced the

Congress to form ministries in the province. In July 1937 Congress Party took office in

seven out of eleven provinces including the NWFP. In NWFP, all the “progressive

forces” united round the Congress. Dr. Khan Sahib, the opposition leader, with the help of

Hindu Sikh Nationalist party and of Hazara Democratic Party, got strength to put a No-

Confidence Motion on 3 September 1937; it was passed by 27 votes to 21. Dr. Khan

Sahib formed a coalition government with Lala Banju Ram Gandhi, Qazi Atta Ullah

Khan and Muhammad Abbas Khan, who was a member of Democratic Party, the rest

were Congress nominees.32

The Congress Ministry in the Frontier remained in office for two years and six weeks.

The leading League candidates were Mian Ziauddin, Shah Pasand Khan (an old Khudai

Khidmatgar who had obtained league’s ticket), Rashid Tahir Kheli, and Sardar Bhadur

Khan. In the general elections of 1937, two Congress candidates had been disqualified in

two Muslim-Rural constituencies of Mardan, i.e. Razar and Amazai. Their election

petitions having been accepted, the two seats were declared vacant. In Razar- Muslim

Rural constituency, the contest was between Mian Zia-ud-Din and Kamdar Khan, while

in the Amazai Muslim rural constituency, the contest was between Allah dad Khan, a

nominee of Congress, and Shah Pasand Khan, a nominee of Muslim League. After tough

contest the Khudai Khidmatgars won elections from these two constituencies. By-

elections in the Hazara district were of immense importance from League’s point of view.

In Haripur North Muslim Rural constituency by-elections, Abdur Rashid Tahirkheli, the

League’s candidate defeated his rivals by a margin of 13 votes only. The total number of

votes were 3565. The Second World War broke out in September 1939. In common with

the rest of the Congress provinces the Frontier Ministry, after passing the anti-war

resolution on 6 November, 1939, tendered its resignation and governor rule was imposed

on 11 November 1939 under Sir George Cunningham.

71

3.4 ELECTIONS 1946: After the end of World War II in 1945, following the Simla

Conference, the Viceroy Lord Wavell announced that the Central and Provincial

Legislature elections would be held in the winter of 1945-6, after which a constitution-

making body would be set up. He announced that after the elections, the Viceroy would

set up an Executive Council that would have the support of the main Indian political

parties. After 1945, the demand for Pakistan had acquired considerable importance in

NWFP but Muslim League in NWFP was unable to get benefit from this due to its

factionalism. The Muslim League candidates were selected by the provincial Selection

Board. The President of the board was the Nawab of Mamdot from the League High

Command but the selection of candidates was in the hand of board convener.33 The

senior leaders, Aurangzeb Khan, K.B Saadullah Khan and Mian Ziauddin were all denied

nomination. All appealed to the Central Selection Board to review the decision but only

Mian Ziauddin’s appeal succeeded. Abdur Rab Nishtar was able to get re-nominated for

his old seat with great difficulty. Twenty-three persons applied for the nine constituencies

from Hazara district upon which fourteen persons failed to get nominated, six

nevertheless decided to contest against the official Muslim League candidates. In Hazara

district Ghulam Jan Tahirkheli, (the editor of newspaper and secretary of Haripur Muslim

League), Qazi Asadul Haq (a member of provincial election board who for many years

had been battling against Aurangzeb Khan and the League’s strongman in Hazara) K.B.

Jalaluddin, Khan Abdul Jaffar Khan and Abdullah Jan (two League leaders in Mansehra)

and K.S. Atai Khan of Battal (MLA from upper Pakhli) were all expelled from the party

for their anti-League activities during the campaign34.

Elections were held between 26 January and 14 February on the same franchise

qualifications as were laid down for 1937 election. The results of all constituencies were

announced by 18 February 1946. The Congress won an absolute majority, or in all 30 out

of 50 seats. The Muslim League in this Muslim majority province disappointingly

captured only seventeen seats. In the Pakhtun dominated areas the Congress won almost

all seats, whereas it could not show its popularity in non Pakhtun areas. In D.I. Khan the

Congress’s ally, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema succeeded. Following table shows the distribution

of the Muslim rural seats by districts. All General and Sikhs seats except one went to the

Congress. Seven out of nine general seats were uncontested. Detail of results of the

elections to the NWFP Legislative Assembly, 1946 are shown in table 3.3.

72

Table 3.3: Results of the elections to the NWFP Legislative Assembly, 1946Party

TotalMuslimRural

MuslimUrban

GeneralRural

GeneralUrban

SikhLand-Holders

Congress 30 18 1 6 3 2 -Muslim League 17 13 2 - - - 2Jamiat-ul- Ulema 2 2 - - - - -Akali Dal 1 - - - - 1 -Total 50 33 3 6 3 3 2Source: Government of India, Returns showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46 (Dehli: Manager, Government of India Press, 1948)Two parties, which had previously played a prominent role in Provincial politics, had

now dissolved. The groups which had supported Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party supported

either the Congress or the Muslim League, mostly the latter. In addition to the Congress

and the Muslim League, several other parties, the Ahrars, the Khaksars, the Jamiat-ul-

Ulema and the Sikh Party the Akali Dal, took part in the elections, but almost all leading

candidates belonged either to the Congress or the Muslim League. Thus the NWFP had

been drawn more closely into the orbit of all-India affairs and all-India issues would seem

to have set their imprint decisively on provincial politics. However, this development

must not be exaggerated.35 Table 3.4 showed the voting trends in different regions of

NWFP during 1946 elections. The table also reflected the traditional rivalries between

Pakhtun and non-Pakhtuns and other horizontal and longitudinal stratification which

determine the voting behaviour in NWFP.

Table 3.4: Muslim Rural seats by districts in the Legislative Assembly elections in the NWFP 1946.District Congress Muslim League Jamiat-ul-UlemaHazara 1 8 -Mardan 4 1 -Peshawar 6 1 -Kohat 4 - -Bannu 2 2 -D.I. Khan 1 1 2

Source: Government of India, Returns showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46 (Dehli: Manager, Government of India Press, 1948)As Cunningham reported the main feature of the elections was that they were fought not

on any kind of party programme (neither party has any programme intelligible to the

electorate), but on grounds of personal faction-feeling.36 In Bannu District, where he

spent a few days soon before the elections, Cunningham declared that, “the results in the

voting for the Muslim seats seem likely to be decided by the number of sheep each

candidate can kill to feast his supporters”, the general estimate being ten votes per

sheep.37 Table 3.3 shows that Congress won absolute majority, i.e. 30 out of 50 provincial

seats. The Muslim League won only 17 seats. Two seats went to Jamiat-ul-Ulema while

Akali Dal got one seat. In the province’s regions (Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, Bannu and

73

Tank Tehsil of Dera Ismail Khan) the Congress won sixteen of the nineteen territorial

constituencies it contested, losing the other by slender margins.38 The League emerged in

the elections as the representative of the Province’s non-Pakhtun Muslims, winning eight

of nine seats in Hazara, two of the three urban seats and both landlord constituencies.39

Other voting detail is given in table 3.5. Muslim League received more Muslim votes than

the Congress. League received 146,235 votes in the Muslim constituencies while

Congress scored 142,508 votes.40 Above table shows that in DI. Khan’s constituencies

were won by JUH candidates by securing 17741 votes, the ally of Congress. Cunningham

reported to the Wavell about the cause of failure of Muslim League in the NWFP. “It has

been said that if Congress had not been in office, very difficult for Congress to get a

dozen Muslim seats, because of favour the people by giving them cloth, sugar etc.41” It

was simply an excuse because most of the Muslim officials in superior appointments

favoured the Muslim League. The two reasons of the failure of the League were their bad

organisation and the internal rift within Muslim League in NWFP. Congress members

had made many promises in economic fields. “Muslim League presented a one-point

manifesto "if you want Pakistan, vote for the Muslim League".42 The election posters in

Hazara district reflected this sentiment:

The election is only for Pakistan. The arrogant Jawaharlal Nehru’s announcement that they [the Congress] will crush the Muslim League is a challenge to the faith and honour of every Muslim. Give him an effective reply for the success of the Muslim League and for the achievement of Pakistan.43

Table 3.5 Results of 1946 Elections.

Constituency ElectorateTotalvote caste

PercentVoting

MuslimLeaguevotes

Percent of electorate

Congress& JUH votes

Percent of electorate

MuslimUrban 80556 50567 62.77 23055 28.62 11241 13.95RuralHazara 109762 61508 54.03 29378 26.77 7686 7.00Peshawar 97088 70726 72.85 2853 26.63 43316 44.62Mardan 86777 63601 73.33 23162 26.69 35443 40.84Kohat 52020 34176 65.70 13922 26.76 19860 38.18Bannu 51080 38289 75.00 17592 34.44 9405 18.41D.I. Khan 45642 31896 69.88 12466 27.31 17741 38.87Total 442369 300196 67.86 122373 27.66 133451 30.17Totalterritorialseats

522925 350763 67.07 145428 27.81 144692 27.67

Landlords 1836 1359 73.75 807 43.95 447 24.34Total Muslims 524761 352117 67.10 146235 27.87 145139 27.66HinduUrban 21117 9748 46.16 - - 7512 35.57Rural 35521 - - - - - -Total 56638 9748 17.21 - - 7512 13.26Sikh 23164 14124 60.97 - - 7598 32.80Total Minority 79802 23872 29.91 - - 15110 18.93

Total 604563 375989 62.19 146235 24.19 160249 26.51

Pakhtun* 301527 218023 72.31 86003 28.52 112982 37.47Source: Government of India, Returns showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46 (Dehli: Manager, Government of India Press, 1948)

74

This approach had little appeal in the Paktun areas where the suggestion that there could

be such a thing as Hindu domination was only laughable44. The exact meaning of

Pakistan was left undefined in electoral politics of NWFP. In Governor Cunningham’s

opinion few people were thinking in terms of complete separation from India. What the

supporters of Pakistan were interested in was getting some safeguards of Muslim interests

in the central government. In November Jinnah visited the NWFP to boost up the Muslim

League electoral campaign. The Governor had asked several educated and intelligent

people what Jinnah had said about Pakistan, but no one could give a clear answer.45

On the other hand, Congress used Khudai Khidmatgars for its electoral struggle. The

Pakhtuns must be united but elections only led to a lot of factional feuds.46 He criticized

the Congress for having done nothing to eradicate corruption but letting it go on as

before. The ministry had no policy at all and discussed their programme neither with each

other nor with the party. The struggle was between the Nation and Firanghis (Britishers).

There was no third force. Those who were opposed to the Khudai Khidmatgars were

those who had always supported the British.47

Ghaffar Khan was very successful in articulating the Congress political philosophy in

Pakhtun society using the sentiments of Pakhto. As pakhto is the code of life of Pakhtun

society in which honour, dignity, spirituality, nationalism (here nationalism means

Pakhtuns group feelings) are the main ingredients. Pakhtuns possess hatred for all those

who threaten their Pakhto. So in all statements Ghaffar Khan projected Pakhto feelings in

order to popularize the Khudai Khidmatgar appeal.48 The other most important factor in

the Congress victory was the Pakhtun predominance in the NWFP. Although Pakhtuns

in settled districts were less than two-fifth of the population, they were socially and

politically dominant. Traditional Pakhtun tarburwali-political alignment structured the

operation of modern parties in the rural areas. The penalty of intermingling taburwali

with party politics was that if one local faction joined the Muslim League its traditional

rival would join the Congress and vice versa. The British patronage of big Khans and the

growing aspirations of smaller Khans also structured political developments. The latter

provided the leadership of the Congress Khudai Khidmatgar movement, while many of

big Khans turned to the Muslim League in the 1940s to safeguard their interests. The

Khan brothers based their power around the factions of the smaller Khan.49 Important

political repercussions flowed from virtual invisibility of the few Hindus and Sikhs in

the rural centers of the Pakhtun culture, while other Muslims might view them as a threat

75

to their religious and material interests, as for as Pakhtuns are concerned it was

conceivable that they might be ruled by non-Muslims.50 In electoral politics of NWFP

during these elections, the Congress avoided the name of ‘Akhand Hindustan’ or

‘Pakistan’ due to electoral strategy. The Congress members did not even publish their

election manifesto in NWFP. “If they had done so, they would have had to explain their

attitude on the question of Pakistan and then even the ignorant majority of the Muslim

Electorate would have probably become cautious. In fact they asked for votes in the name

of Khudai Khidmatgar movement, and not in the name of Congress as such.”51 The major

focus of Congress electoral campaign was on social and economic issues and the

corruption of Muslim Leaguers and officials. The Muslim Leaguers were accused of

being British agents and the elections were portrayed as being a battle between rich and

poor and the choice was also between freedom and foreign rule.

The Congress in NWFP contested all General and Sikh seats, twenty four out of thirty

three Muslim rural seats, one Muslim Urban and one landlord’s seat. In some

constituencies the Congress had come to an agreement with either the Ahrars or the

Jamiat-ul-Ulema that only the party with the best chances of winning the seat should field

a candidate and that the other party should support that candidate.52 Other factors of

Congress victory and Muslim League defeat in NWFP were personal influence of Abdul

Ghaffar Khan and the fact that the Muslim league was a political latecomer in the

Frontier. The Muslim League failed in all the districts of NWFP except Hazara, where it

won all the Muslim rural seats except one. The party also won two of three Muslim urban

seats. Thus the division between the Congress and the Muslim League by and large

coincided with the geographical distributions of Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns. Both the

landholders’ seats went to the Muslim League. The 1946 elections gave considerable

strength to the provincial Congress as compared to 1937 elections when it had won 19

seats and had no absolute majority. In 1946, the good Congress performance was due to

its organizational setup and appeal to the sentiments of poor classes. After the elections

the Congress claimed that the people of NWFP rejected the idea of Pakistan but in reality

they were fought on other issues and the appeal of Pakistan among the masses was not

really put to the test.53 By the end of February 1946, Dr. Khan Sahib formed the Ministry

and soon afterward Cunningham was replaced by Sir Olaf Caroe. The third Khan Sahib

Ministry consisted of four members, with Dr. Khan Sahib as the Chief Minister having

the charge of Home, Political, Public Health and Public works; Qazi Ata Ullah was the

76

Minister for Revenue, Industries and Jails, Mohammad Yahya Jan was Education

Minister and Mahr Chand Khanna was the Finance Minister. Allah Nawaz Khan was

unanimously elected the Speaker when the new House met on 12 March 1946 and Lala

Girdharilal became his Deputy. This ministry was in some respects a family affair as

Ghaffar Khan’s brother was Chief Minister, the Education Minister was his son in law,

and the Revenue Minister’s daughter had been married to one of his sons.54

On 10th March the Muslim League held a meeting under the Presidentship of the Nawab

of Hoti. Abdu Qayyum Khan was elected leader of the Opposition and the Nawab of

Tank was elected as Deputy Leader.55 The Congress held only one legislative session in

1946 which primarily served as a forum in which each side kept up the propaganda of the

election campaign. Khan Sahib ministry passed some significant economic and social

legislation, such as Punjab Tenancy (North-West Frontier Province) Amendment Act,

introduced administrative reforms, and began long term planning for the province. All

these initiatives tended to favour the Congress supporters, the lower class non Pakhtuns

and the smaller khans, at the expense of senior Khans in the Muslim League.56

By 1947, the election results of the previous year were no longer an accurate gauge of

political sympathies in the NWFP. In 1947 public opinion had shifted in favour of the

Muslim League, due to the clear signs of the emergence of Pakistan, but there was no

institutional way for the change because Congress had majority in the assembly. With no

legal resources, the League decided to resort to civil disobedience in order to displace the

Frontier Congress and ensure the further test of public opinion in NWFP. 57 By elections

were scheduled for mid February in 1947 in the area of Mardan district-a stronghold of

Muslim League. Ishaq Khan, the League nominee won the election by securing 8,941

votes and Congress received 8,353. In the by-elections the women workers of Muslim

League also supported the cause of Ishaq Khan against Mian Shakerullah, the Congress

nominee. They went to Mardan from Peshawar. During elections the Congress members

showed their resentment on the participation of women League workers from Peshawar.

3.5 REFERENDUM IN NWFP 1947

Mountbatten was given the charge of transferring power. The Viceroy told Liaqat Ali

Khan that one of the proposals under consideration was that provinces should be left to

choose their own future. But he said that as far as the case in NWFP the number of

elected members of the Constituent Assembly for this province was too small to leave the

decision in their hands. Mountbatten during his visit to the NWFP on 28-29 April 1947

77

had indicated the idea of referendum but he had not said what its form would be. The

draft plan of the partition which Mountbatten put before the Governors conference on 15

and 16 April 1947, envisaged the holding of fresh election. But neither the Provincial

Congress nor the Congress High Command was ready to accept the solution. On 6 May

Mountbatten wired to the Secretary of State for India that Nehru was prepared to accept

referendum provided it was not held under Governor’s rule and if the Ministry was

allowed to function in the normal way. When Jinnah was informed about holding of a

referendum instead of new elections, at first he was upset, but when he was told by the

Viceroy about the abolishment of weightage (12 seats in 50) which the Hindu-Sikh

minority had in the NWFP, he also preferred referendum to an election. On 2 June, 1947

Mountbatten presented his famous plan later known as 3rd June Plan before the principal

Indian leaders. In this plan there was a provision for referendum in NWFP. Commenting

on 3rd June Plan, Jinnah appealed to all the communities with a special reference to the

Muslims for the peaceful transfer of power in India. Referring to the question of

Referendum in NWFP, the Quaid said:

Hence it is clear that the verdict and the mandate of the people of the Frontier Province will be obtained as to whether they want to join Pakistan Constituent Assembly or the Hindustan Constituent Assembly. In these circumstances I request the Provincial Muslim League of the Frontier Province to withdraw the movement of civil disobedience which they had perforce to resort to; and I call upon all the leaders of the Muslim League and the Musalmans generally to organise our people to face this referendum with hope and courage., and I feel confident that the people of Frontier will give their verdict by a solid vote to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.58

This statement further affected the electoral politics and voting behaviour in this

referendum. Congress and Muslim League both accepted this plan, but Gandi and Abdul

Ghaffar Khan opposed it. It was agreed upon that the usual Provincial Election Staff

should be allowed to perform the ordinary duties at the polling stations in the province.

But they had to comply with the orders of the Members of Election Commission which

consisted of the Army Officers. According to the official letter issued by Army General

Headquarter, India on 18 June 1947, following team of officers were selected to assist

referendum in NWFP.59

1. Lt. Col. OH. Mitchell, Comd. 1FF Rif2. T/Lt. Col. V.W Tregear, FFR, AQMG, HQ (Northern Command)3. T/Lt. Col R.W. Niva, Comd. 4FFRif4. T/Lt. Col. MWH White, Comd. 2/9/GR5. T/Lt. Col. GM Strover, Guides Cavalry. AA & QMG HQ.1 Armed Div.6. T/Lt. Col. WI Moberley, OBE, Comd1 FFR7. Lt. Col. R.O.L.D Byrene 1AC8. Maj. E. De G.H. Bromhead, FFR

78

At the top was a Referendum Commissioner.60 Civilians were included in the lower

echelons of the referendum machinery and only under the close supervision of Army

personnel. The Viceroy met the Indian leaders and all agreed on following electoral

charter.

1. It is desirable that in this referendum: a). Electioneering speeches, which can only lead to bloodshed should as far as possible be avoided; and b) issue should be clearly put before the voters.

2. To achieve these objects, it has been suggested: a). That electioneering speeches should by agreement between the parties, be banned; and b). That election posters should be prepared containing side by side and in very simple and agreed language, the issue what the two future Dominions will be and the respective advantages they have to offer to the NWFP. A map should be printed showing the areas of the two dominions.

The Viceroy instructed the Governor NWFP that “each side should have equal

facilities in the matter of the supply of petrol” and that an amnesty should be

announced for the political prisoners, excluding those charged with serious criminal

offences. In proposed poster for the referendum, first of all in a short paragraph they

had discussed about the partition plan of India into two separate States of India and

Pakistan and also some sort of explanation of the third June Plan of His Majesty’s

government, which had already been accepted by the All India Muslim League

Council and the All India Congress Committee. The Pir of Manki Sharif was the only

member from the Frontier. The other members, I.I. Chundrigar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan

and Syed Wajid Ali, came from the central organization.61 Muslim League campaign

was on Pakistan issue while Congress continued to campaign for Pakhtunistan and

against Pakistan and referendum. From 1945 onward Pir of Manki Sharif supported

the cause of Pakistan and was deeply involved in Muslim League organizations from

his base in Nowshera. He brought many of his murids into the League as political

activists and supporters and encouraged Mian Gul Abdul Wadud (Wali-e-Swat) to

support Jinnah’s campaign. The Pir’s most significant organization of Tribal Areas

political activity in support of the League was to rally Shinwari and Milagros

tribesmen to stage a demonstration against Nehru when the latter toured the Tribal

Areas in 1946. 62By 1947 Pir of Zakori Sharif in Bannu had also demonstrated his

sympathy for League demands and popularized them in Waziristan. Faqir of Ipi

assured the League of his support for Pakistan.63 The polling began on 6 July 1947.

The referendum results were made public on July 20. According to the official results

there were 572,798 registered voters.64

79

Table 3.6: The detailed picture of referendum

Constituency Electoratevote caste

%Voting

Votes Pakistan

% of Electorates

%votes in 1946

% ofMuslim League votes in 1946

% of Congress & JUH votes in 1946

Votes for India

MuslimUrban 50627 35942 7099 35680 70.48 112.28 246.26 505.23 262RuralHazara 109762 83656 76.22 83269 75.86 135.38 283.44 1083.39 387Peshawar 97088 40470 41.68 39902 41.10 56.42 154.34 92.12 568Mardan 86777 36062 41.56 34852 40.16 54.80 150.48 98.33 1210Kohat 52020 32323 62.14 32207 61.91 94.24 231.34 162.17 116Bannu 51080 33282 65.16 33137 64.87 86.54 188.36 352.33 145D.I. Khan 45642 29461 64.55 29303 64.20 91.87 235.06 165.17 158Total 442369 255254 57.70 252670 57.12 84.17 206.48 189.34 2584Total Muslim

492996 291196 59.07 288350 58.49 87.17 209.87 211.46 2846

Total Minority 79802 922 1.16 894 1.12 3.75 - 5.92 28Total 572798 292118 50.99 289244 50.50 81.20 208.76 190.49 2874Pakhtun* 301527 150731 50.00 148649 49.30 68.18 172.84 131.57 2082

Source: Data calculated from Referendum Results 1947 (NWFP)*The difference between the 1946 and Referendum elections arose due to two changes in the voting.1). in 1946, each voter in Peshawar city could cast two votes; in 1947, they cast only one.2). in 1946, a small number of rural Muslims voted twice: in their regular constituency and in special landlord’s constituencies. In 1947, there was no voting in the latter. 21 rural constituencies, including all those in Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, and Bannu plus Tank Tehsil in D.I. Khan.

Out of them 50.99% exercised their vote. 289,244 (99.02%) votes were cast in favour

of Pakistan, and 2874 (0.98%) in favour of India. Due to the differences in the

electorates, the votes in 1946 and referendum are not directly comparable. These

percentages, therefore, had been computed by comparing the percentage of the

electorate voting for Congress and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind. One argument against

that there was a low turn out, only 51 percent. This indicated that Congress boycott

met with wide response and thus a significant share of the population was opposed to

Pakistan. In fact, the votes cast for Pakistan represented only 50.50 percent of the total

electorate. In Rittensberg’s opinion this boycott was “rather ineffectual”. He has come

to this conclusion by comparing the figures for the referendum to those of the 1946

elections. The electoral rolls prepared for 1946 elections were adopted for the

referendum without amendment in spite of the fact that many of those on the rolls had

since died and many others, including perhaps the majority of all Hindus and Sikhs,

had left their homes and were unable to exercise their franchise. In 1946 turnout had

been 62 percent and in 1947 it was 51 percent. Thus in spite of fact that the figure for

the total electorate in 1947 was much higher than the number of people who could

actually take part in the voting., the turnout in 1947 was only 11 percentage point

lower than in 1946.65 On the other side one analysis is that in 1946 seven out of nine

Hindu candidates had been returned unopposed. Thus no votes were polled in these

constituencies, which make the figure for the total turn-out a bit misleading. There

80

were so many factors which contributed to the overwhelming victory of Pakistan in

referendum 1947 including patronage and different connotations and meaning of

Pakistan for different people. The voting trends in NWFP shifted towards Pakistan

due to Pathans killings in various parts of India in 1946.66 Religious group

representing Pir of Manki Sharif and others considered the meaning of Pakistan, that

it will be suitable place where they can implement their own type of Islam. Provincial

bureaucracy considered that Pakistan meant the possibility of getting quick

promotions. For Muslims, businessmen it was understood as a place where they could

run their business without the competition of Hindus and Sikhs.67 So every group had

their own ideology about Pakistan under the cover of Islam. In referendum Pakhtun

tarburwali and parajama could not play their role due to the boycott of Congress. In

1937 and 1946 elections these two were the most effective electoral tools in the hands

of Congress. Another factor of the victory of Pakistan was the one sided nature of the

referendum. In the referendum Muslim Leaguers brought the voters to the poll,

feasting them or influencing them and then getting votes in return.68 Naturally this

increase was not totally due to bogus voting. Muslim League was better organized in

Hazara than elsewhere and it had a dedicated and efficient leader (Mohammad

Jalaluddin known as Jalal Baba). Table 3.7 shows the electoral comparison between

1946 elections and 1947 referendum.

Table 3.7: Table showing the turn out in seven Constituencies of Hazara. Constituency 1946 1947Tanawal 51.9 86.18Abbottabad West 58.3 85.8Abbottabad East 46.2 73.27Haripur North 48.8 75.00Haripur Central 60.8 78.8Haripur South 66.00 84.3Upper Pakhli 59.2 80.1(Source: Appendix III and Booth to Private Secretary to the Viceroy 20/7/47 enclosure IOL R/3/1/151 Folio 240.The Congress ally Khudai khidmatgars had its strong hold in Peshawar and Mardan

where boycott was effective. The figures of Mardan and Peshawar rural constituencies

are shown in Table 3.8. In the referendum Pakistan and Muslim League had the

support of the most articulate, vociferous and influential groups. Contest over political

legitimacy in the provincial legislature ultimately determined the fate of the province.

The administered and non-administered districts and agencies of NWFP were

transferred to the state of Pakistan through the referendum of 1947.69

81

Table 3.8: Turn out in the Muslim Rural constituencies of Peshawar and Mardan Districts. Constituency 1946 1947Bara Mohmands 70.4 55.7Khalil 78.7 46.6Hashtnagar North 82.3 37.5Hashtnagar South 72 20.6Doaba Daudzai 82 24.8Nowshera South 66 51.1Nowshera North 67.6 48.9Baizai 76.18 50.2Kamalzai 65.9 48.2Utmannama 73.8 37.5Razzar 76.6 27.3Amazai 78 36.27

(Source: Appendix III and Booth to Private Secretary to the Viceroy 20/7/47 enclosure IOL R/3/1/151 Folio 240.After referendum was over, the Muslim League in NWFP reviewed their demand of

the resignation of Dr. Khan sahib ministry. Dr. Khan Sahib had no intention of

resignation but in a private conversation he had said that if he is assured that a general

election would be held in the reasonable new future he would resign. The Viceroy

discussed the question of dismissing the ministry of the NWFP with Sardar Patel, who

had expressed the hope that nothing unconstitutional would be done, and that in any

case any step of this nature should be postponed until the 15th August. Sir George

Cunningham the new Governor of NWFP, who had taken over from Lockhart on the

13 July persuaded Mr. Jinnah, “to let him try his hand with Khan Sahib to obtain a

satisfactory, settlement without having recourse to such drastic means. On 15 August

1947, Pakistan came into being and within a week i.e. 22 August 1947 the Congress

ministry in the NWFP was dismissed. Abdul Qayyum Khan was installed as the new

Chief Minister of the province.

3.6 POST-PARTITION (1947-1955)

After partition, the political situation in NWFP entered a new scenario. NWFP have

only eleven years of electoral experience starting from 1937 but in other parts of a

new country like, in Punjab representative institutions were practiced for more than

sixty years.70 In NWFP Muslim League Ministry which was installed on 23rd August

did not for the time being have a majority in the Assembly. The Assembly was

convened for budget session in spring 1948, seven Congress MLAs had decided to

join the Muslim League and thus there was a majority for the ministry.71 In March the

Frontier Assembly met for the first time since partition. Dr. Khan Sahib became

leader of the Opposition. He and his followers took the oath of allegiance to Pakistan

along with the Muslim League MLAs.72 The Muslim League Ministry headed by

Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was made to continue as a caretaker Government until the

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elections, scheduled from December 8, 1951. Five political parties’ entered the

electoral race. The Muslim League put up 78 members, The Azad Yousafzai Muslim

League 44, The Islam League 6 and the Jamaat-i-Islami 3 candidates.73

The nomination papers of Qayyum Khan’s two opponents were turned down

allegedly on grounds of technical discrepancy.74 Many Jinnah Awami Muslim

Leaguers including Suhrawardy, the Pir of Manki Sharif, and Ghulam Muhammad

Khan of Lundkhur could not freely campaign because many places in the province

were declared off limits for them. e.g., the Pir of Manki Sharif was not allowed to

enter the southern Districts. Restrictions on him and on Suhrawardy were removed

only a fortnight before the polling day. Those on 27 other leaders were lifted after the

election. Other Jinnah Awami Muslim League leaders and candidates were under

detention. When the elections were over Khan Qayyum admitted that there were 60

political prisoners, but that they were all Red Shirts, he also admitted that only 170

persons were prohibited from moving out of their thana limits. There was no issue in

these elections. The Muslim League rested its case on these slogans, “Stand united

under the League”, “Vote for League is Vote for Progress”, “League victory is the

defeat of Pakhtunistan”. The opposition neither had a manifesto nor a programme to

sell to the electorate. The election was held according to schedule, but the polling was

far from free and fair. Muhammad Yousaf Khattak with two other colleagues

withdrew from the election, allegedly, on account of official involvement and

tempering of ballot boxes by officials. The opposition parties felt so indignant at the

way in which the elections were conducted that they not only planned to launch a civil

disobedience movement in the province, but also sent an eleven member deputation to

Karachi to appraise the Central government and the President on the matter. As

result of these elections Muslim League got 67 seats, Jinnah Awami Muslim League

obtained four seats, independent won 13 seats and non-Muslim got 1 seat out of total

85 seats.

The elections in NWFP were meaningless. On 19 July 1955 Sardar Abdur Rashid was

replaced with Sardar Bahadur Khan (Brother of Ayub Khan) as new Chief Minister of

NWFP. He remained Chief Minister for three months, and on 14 October 1955, the

post of Chief Minister was abolished and whole West Pakistan was amalgamated in

One Unit up to 1970 elections. Elections were also held in the areas that were

previously part of NWFP after becoming the part of One Unit with West Pakistan in

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1955. Many politicians emerged on the National level from the Frontier side. Ayub

Khan, Pakistan’s first military dictator was himself was from Haripur district of

Frontier. Table 3.9 shows the detail of elections in NWFP since 1947-1997. After

independence electoral politics in NWFP got new trends due to central government

involvement in Provincial politics and provincial politicians’ involvement in Central

Government. For Electoral analysis the researcher will focus both dimensions of

electoral politics i.e. central (national) and provincial together. At the national level,

the strategy of postponing elections was followed for the first decade after

independence. Muslim League politicians in alliance with the bureaucracy succeeded

in maintaining the façade of parliamentary democracy without holding national

elections from 1947-1958. Many of the Muslim League politicians had left their

constituencies behind in India when they migrated to Pakistan in 1947, and were

aware that holding elections at national level would be political suicide. Soon after

independence, real power passed from the politicians to the bureaucracy. The civil-

military bureaucracy also avoided holding elections which would have helped restore

the legitimacy and power of politicians at their expense. Another reason for delaying

elections at national level was the electoral dilemma confronting West Pakistan’s

political and civil-military bureaucratic elite. Elections.75 The One Unit scheme was

an electoral strategy adopted in 1955 to deny East Pakistan the advantage of its

numerical majority.

Table 3.9: Detail of Elections in NWFP, 1947-1997Year Election for Franchise Nature Winner1951 NWFP Legislative Assembly Direct Party based PML1970 National and Provincial

AssembliesDirect Party based N/A

1977 National and Provincial Assemblies

Direct Party based PPP

1979 Local Government (Local Bodies) Direct Non-Party N/A1983 Local Government (Local Bodies Direct Non-Party N/A1984 Presidential Referendum Direct Non-Party Zia-ul-Haq1985 National and Provincial

AssembliesDirect Non-Party N/A

1988 National and Provincial Assemblies

Direct Party based N/A

1990 National and Provincial Assemblies

Direct Party based IJI

1993 National and Provincial Assemblies

Direct Party based PPP

1997 National and Provincial Assemblies

Direct Party based PML-N

Source: Compiled by the author from Daily Dawn (Karachi) since 1951-1997.

84

Another reason for delaying elections at national level was the electoral dilemma

confronting West Pakistan’s political and civil-military bureaucratic elite. Elections

would have inevitably resulted in a transfer of power from the western to the eastern

wing of the country, since the bureaucracy would not have been able to preserve their

political dominance in the face of East Pakistan’s numerical majority.76 Strategy that

was considered, but not adopted until much latter by General Zia, was to have

‘separate electorate’ for minority voters. This would have moved 20 per cent of East

Pakistan’s Hindu voters fro the political mainstream, which would have given West

Pakistan a majority of Muslim seats in the National Assembly.77 In 1954 East

Pakistan Legislative Assembly elections, the hitherto dominant Muslim League, with

its base in West Pakistan, suffered a humiliating defeat from which it never full

recovered. It won only 10 of 247 seats in contrast to the 233 seats won by the United

Front, a coalition of the major East Pakistan opposition parties contesting on a

platform of greater provincial autonomy. This proved to e a harbinger of what was to

come when the national elections were held in 1970.78

Following the adoption of Pakistan’s first Constitution in 1956, it became increasingly

difficult for Pakistan’s ruling elite to continue postponing elections while maintaining

the façade of a parliamentary democracy. In October 1958, shortly before elections

were finally scheduled to be held, the façade was removed-President Iskandar Mirza

declared Martial Law, abrogated the Constitution, and cancelled the elections. Less

than three weeks later Mirza was removed by the Army commander, General Ayub

Khan, who was to govern Pakistan under a system of ‘guided democracy’ for more

than ten years.79 Despite the imbalance of pre-partition’s electoral experience amongst

the provinces, electoral history has been a decidedly chequered one.80 As Ayseha Jalal

notes, the ‘overt authoritarianism’ that Pakistan has experienced for much of its

history has been shaped ‘by institutional imbalances between the elected and non-

elected institutions of the state’81 Mohammad Waseem argues that most of Pakistan’s

electoral problems can be attributed to the imbalance between the two colonial

legacies, which Myron Weiner has termed ‘tutelary democracy’82. The first legacy

was the tradition of bureaucratic rule. Under John Lawrence’s school of paternalistic

administration, this tradition became much stronger in NWFP. The principle of

elections to the legislative councils and assemblies was therefore introduced at a much

slower pace in the former provinces than the latter. Consequently, at the time of

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partition, the regions that became part of Pakistan had much less experience with

elections than those that became part of India.83 Since independence, the main

impediment in the path of electoral democracy has been the unwillingness of the

powerful civil and military bureaucracy, often supported by civilian politicians, to

hold elections that would transfer power out of their hands. Indeed, the fundamental

electoral dilemma confronting Pakistan’s ruling elites since independence has been

how to accommodate the legacy of bureaucratic rule. The objectives have always

been to hold elections that would legitimize but not change the status quo. To a

considerable extent electoral history has been shaped by the various strategies that had

been devised to achieve this objective. These include the following six elements. i).

rigging elections; ii). promising but postponing holding elections; iii). holding local

rather than provincial and national elections, iv). holding indirect rather than direct

elections; and v). holding non-party rather than party based elections; vi). Writing

new constitutions or amending old ones in order to strengthen presidential powers

reduce those of electoral representatives.

3.7 ELECTIONS DURING AYUB ERA 1959-65

The first electoral strategy Ayub chose to preserve the status quo was to hold non-

party local government elections rather than party-based provincial or national

elections. In 1959, the first round of ‘Basic Democracy’ elections was held on the

basis of universal adult franchise. Eighty thousand (later increased to 120,000) ‘Basic

Democrats’ were elected to serve in multi-tiered local government institutions. Local

administration officials were also members of these institutions and had decisive say

in the allocation and administration of local development schemes. This placed them

in a strong position to influence and manipulate the decisions of the Basic Democrats.

As Philip Jones noted, ‘the BD System was destined to become less a means of local

representation than an arm of the bureaucracy’.84 Ayub’s second strategy for holding

‘no change election’ was to use the Basic Democrats as an electoral college to

indirectly elect the President, the members of the National Assembly, and the

members of the East and West Pakistan Assemblies. This system achieved the desired

result in a referendum in February 1960, when 95.6 per cent of Basic Democrats

elected Ayub Khan to be the President of Pakistan.

86

Following the promulgation of Ayub’s 1962 Constitution, the Basic Democrats

elected members of the National and Provincial Assemblies on a non-party basis. The

second round of Basic Democracy elections was held in November 1964. These were

followed by indirect Presidential elections in January 1965, in which President Ayub

won 63.3 per cent of the Electoral College votes compared to 36.4 per cent for his

rival Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Fatima Jinnah’s results were

surprisingly high, considering that it was Basic Democrats who were beholden to

Ayub that formed the “Electoral College”. The opposition parties were known to

oppose Ayub’s system of Basic democracy, so in voting for Ayub “the electors were

voting for themselves”.85 These elections were followed shortly by indirect party-

based elections to the National Assembly, and East and West Pakistan Assemblies, in

which the factions of the Pakistan Muslim League led by Ayub Khan emerged

victorious. In the National Assembly elections, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of

Ayub Khan won 54.8 per cent of the vote and 120 of 150 seats. In the West Pakistan

Provincial Assembly elections, the PML won 48.8 per cent of the vote and 96 of 147

seats.86 Ayub’s third strategy for keeping power out of the hands of politicians was to

write a new constitution. The 1962 Constitution replaced Pakistan’s traditional

parliamentary system of government with a strong presidential one. It greatly

enhanced the powers of President and severely curtailed those of the elected

Assembly members. It was Ayub’s success at ensuring that elections did not lead to

political change which resulted in political changes being brought about by voters in

the streets rather than voters in ballot booths. In March 1969, following a four months

anti-Ayub agitation movement, the President was forced to resign and hand power

over to Pakistan second military ruler, General Mohammad Yahya Khan.87

CONCLUSIONS

Electoral politics in NWFP which was started during controlled suffrage period

(1932-1970) were rooted in in four historical developments, i.e. British System of

indirect rule, the impact of Khilafat Movement, the reform issues and the legacy of

period of civil disobedience in 1930-32. During pre independence period, the electoral

politics in NWFP revolved around the colonial interest and post independence period

(1947-1970) it revolved around the authoritarian political culture of Pakistan. During

1937 and 1945-46 elections politicians used the voters for their personal interest and

voters became patronage seekers under the garb of these politicians. Nature and

87

dynamics of electoral politics in NWFP after 1970 is discussed in coming chapters of

section two in this study.

1 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, Muslim League in NWFP (Karachi: Royal Book Co. 1989), p.32 Erland Janson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wikell International, 1981), p.243 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, North West Frontier Province: History and Politics (Islamabad: National Institute of History and Culture research, 2007), p.124 William Barton, Journal of Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XIX, January 1932, part I, p.17.5 David Washbrook, ‘The Rhetoric of Democracy’, In Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, eds., Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).6 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, North West Frontier Province: History and Politics, p. 32.7 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1988), P.1268 Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of The Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937-47 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.59 Bannerjee, A.C., Indian Constitutional documents, Vol. 2, (Calcutta, 1948), pp. 135-54.10 Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of The Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937-47, p. 611 Ibid., p.712 Report of the Legislative council elections in the North-West Frontier Province for the Year 1932(Peshawar: Manager, Government Stationary and Printing, 1932), pp. 2-4.13 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, p.126.14 Lahore Tribune 20 March 1932.15 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, p. 126.16 Ibid., p.12717 Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province, 1932-33, p.1918 N.S. Gehlot, Elections and Electoral Administration in India (New Dehli: Deep & Deep Publication, 1992), p.1019 Ibid., p.1320 Governor’s Report 12/1/37, 22/2/3721 Governor’s Report 9/11/3622 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, pp130-3123 Governor’s Report 9/11/3624 Governor’s Report 22/2/3725 Erland Janson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47, p. 71.26 Zetland papers, Mss. EUR. D. 609/25B27 Ibid28 Ibid.29 Ibid30 Ibid.31 Waqar Ali Shah, Muslim League in NWFP, pp.28-2932 Erland Janson India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47, p.71.33 Erland Janson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47, p.14834 Ibid.35 Ibid. p. 150-5136 Governors Report 24/1/4637 Ibid

88

38 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, p.331.39 Ibid., p. 332.40 Abdul Waheed Qureshi, Tarikhi Faisala (Urdu) (Karachi: National Book Foundation, 1976), p.126.41 Cunnigham Papers,IOL, File Mss. Eur D 714/19.42 http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articlete... {Retrieved on 31 October 2009}43 Copies of the posters available in Jalauddin Papers, Abbottabad.44 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, Muslim League in NWFP, p. 103.45 Governor’s Report 8/12/4546 Pakhtuns 8/11/4547 Pakhtuns 1/1/4648 Niaz Pasha Jadoon, Interview by author, Abbottabad, 25 August 2005.49 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: a modern History (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), p. 82.50 Ibid.51 The Khber Mail, Peshawar, 5 April 1946.52 Tribune 11/12/194553 Erland Janson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47, p. 15254 Governors Report 9/3/4655 Civil and Military Gazette 12/3/194656 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, p.20257 Amit Kumar Gupta, North West frontier province, Legislature and Freedom Struggle: 1932-47 (New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical research, 1976), p.180.58 Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Broadcast, 2 June, 1947, NAI. F. No. 10, p. 38.59 Mountbatten Papers, File MB1/D23360 Gazette of extraordinary, 7/2/4761 Tribune 1/6/4762 Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo Afghan Borderland (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 174-7563 Ibid. p.17764 Mountbatten Papers, file MB1/ D233 Telegram C to secretary of state for India No. 288/CB dated 19 July 194765Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, p.39366 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam, and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province 1937-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 174-175.67 Ishtiaq Ahmad, Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan(London: Pinter Publishers, 1987), p. 8668 Noor Ahmad, Interview by author, Mansehra, 13 Jan 2006.69 Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo Afghan Borderland, p.178.70 David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988)71 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 27372 Erland Janson India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47, p.23273 Daily Dawn (Karachi), November 16, 1951.74 Ibid, November 10, 195175 Andrew R. Wilder, Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.19.76 Andrew R. Wilder, Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.19.77 Ibid., p. 25778 Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience (Darham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), pp.181-2.79 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1962-1969 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971).

89

80 David Washbrook, ‘The Rhetoric of Democracy and Development in late Colonial India’, In Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India, Sugata Bose and Aysha Jalal, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press,1998).81 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).82 Myron Weiner, ‘India’, in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., Competitive elections in Developing Countries (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1987), pp.19-20.83 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1994), p.3084 Phillip E. Jones, ‘The Pakistan People’s Party: Social Group Response and Party Development in an Era of Mass Participation’, Ph. D Dissertation, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1979, p. 18885 Sharif-al-Mujahid, Pakistan’s First Presidential Elections, Asian Survey 5 (1965), pp.280-94.86 Sharif-al-Mujahid, The Assembly Elections in Pakistan, Asian Survey 5 (1965), pp.538-5187 Wayne Wilcox, ‘Pakistan in 1969: Once Again at the Starting Point’, Asian Survey 10 (1970), pp.73-81

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CHAPTER-4: VOTING TRENDS IN NWFP

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is the analysis of voting trends in NWFP. The survey is

based on electoral trends in NWFP including knowledge of voters about elections and

electoral politics and to assess eligible voters’ access to information about the

electoral process, exposure to media, level of political awareness, participation in

public affairs, knowledge of specific voter registration and electoral procedures,

general attitudes about democracy, and expectations about the future. The survey

aimed to understand how ordinary men and women in NWFP have experienced

electoral processes and how they perceived contemporary developments in electoral

administration. Electoral strategies of politicians and political parties depend upon

electorate, which are convinced to vote and polarised on the basis of their voting

trends. During election campaigns politicians and voters interact with each other for a

limited time and for specific purposes. Citizens grew out of their local universe in the

wake of the expanding role of political parties, their workers and leaders, as well as

political issues and ideologies. The local universe came to be firmly underscored by

the extra-local organizational and ideological resources. The logic of the local power

structure was in due course hooked on to the meaning of the political conflict at

higher levels. No detailed study of the NWFP electorate and voting trend is available.

For analyzing voting trends in NWFP a comprehensive survey is conducted in

different parts of NWFP. However, two indicators were also considered for this study,

first voter turnout is a broad indicator of political participation and mobilization,

subject to the manipulative efforts on the part of government officials or local

influential’s to bring into play the tied vote phenomenon. This explains why

sometimes rural voters have turned out in greater numbers than urban voters, without

necessarily meaning a higher level of political awareness or motivation in villages to

participate in the business of the state. Secondly low level party dynamics, but high

level factional activity in an electoral constituency can result in partisan voting along

pre-existing social affiliations. These two factors are discussed in the chapter ‘Urban-

Rural Division of Electoral Politics in NWFP. In other words, non electoral dynamics

partially shape electoral behaviour and voting trends.

The question is whether the electorate in NWFP has followed the Indian pattern of

moving from vertical mobilization to differential and horizontal mobilization,

91

reflecting the transition from the hierarchical society to ‘empowerment of low social

orders’. It can be argued that this transition is not a linear process in progression. For

example, in 1970 NWFP showed a high level of political mobilization along the lines

of issues, policies and ideologies. The subsequent elections during 1990s showed a

gradually decreasing level of political mobilization. Beyond voter turnout, the

prevalence of pre-election bonds and political mobilization in general, the issue of

political communication enjoys a crucial place in the analysis of voting trends. NWFP

operates at two different levels of political discourse. The elite are engaged in dealing

with power and constitutional game with at provincial and federal level, Centre-

Province relations and centralization or devolution of powers. On the other hand for

the masses, the issues such as corruption, unemployment and law and order, as well as

ethno-linguistic and Islamic-sectarian identities have a greater significance. While the

two levels are grossly overlapping, still their analysis as two separate entities can have

a heuristic value contributing to an understanding of the epicentres of the two

disparate approaches to politics in the society. In this context, a profile of the

electorate and their voting trends in NWFP, is drawn in this chapter in terms of other

factors including low level of interest in politics, scant information about public

policy and a varying pattern of stable issue preferences.

The political leadership in NWFP operates at local, provincial and national levels; the

electorate is essentially constituency-bound. People do take into account the larger

ideological and organizational links of candidates. However, it is the capacity of

electoral contestants to localize the larger idiom for the constituency that shapes the

vote. F. G. Bailey’s research in India is couched in a functional paradigm rooted in the

‘interlocking’ and ‘nested’ arenas at various levels.1 In NWFP, electoral trends seem

to be encircled at links between the local politicians and the provincial and national

leadership, but also have links between the local elite and the state machinery. The

latter includes district administration and other non-electoral actors. This intervention

has played a deterministic role in various cases relating to candidature in elections,

patterns of party or factional alliances at the local and higher levels, and campaign

issues. All these issues in voting trends are tested in this chapter. The survey about

voting trends was carried out during field research work for doctoral study on voting

trends in NWFP in January-December 2007. The major focus of this survey is the

voting trends during 1990s but questions about some recent voting trends are also

included in survey questionnaire for in-depth analysis of voting trends.

92

A sample of the population over the age of twenty one at the time of any four

elections during 1988-1997 was selected using a purposive and judgement sampling,

which produced a sample of 2270 respondents out of total voting age population

7510110.2 A total of 2270 responses were recorded during face to face survey in four

regions of NWFP, i.e. Northern NWFP, Southern NWFP, Central NWFP and Hazara.

In all four regions of NWFP, each constituency and sample unit is purposively

selected by considering urban rural divisions in 212 rural out of total 7335 rural

localities and 25 urban out of total 55 urban localities. In every urban and rural

locality, selected for this study, ten questionnaires were recorded, including five from

males and five from females. All in-person interviews were conducted by men and

women in collaboration with local interpreters where necessary.

Informal interviews were taken and questionnaires were filled by 2270 respondents

from urban rural localities of total ten districts out of twenty four districts including

three districts from northern NWFP. i.e. Swat, Chitral and Upper Dir, two districts i.e

D.I Khan and Kohat were taken from southern NWFP. Peshawar and Mardan were

taken from central NWFP and three districts, Abbottabad, Mansehra and Kohistan

were taken from Hazara region of NWFP. The samples of 2270 respondents, 50

percent were men and 50 percent were women and 54 percent of respondents were

between 21 and 35 years of age during 1997 elections. The survey’s responses were

refined subsequently through statistical weighting techniques by using SPSS.

For detailed analysis of data about voting trends in NWFP, this chapter is divided in

to following sections. Section-1, Introduction, Section-2, Sample Characteristics,

Section-3, Political Interest and Information, Section 4, Awareness of and Access to

Electoral Processes, Section-5, Trust in Governmental and Nongovernmental

institutions, Section-6, Experience & Perceptions of Electoral Fraud, Coercion &

Violence, Section-7, Perceptions of Democracy and Section 8, Conclusions about

Electoral and Democratic Participation.

SECTION 4.1.1 SURVEY EXPLAINATION

The survey sought to assess the sentiments about the voting trends of the eligible

electorate with respect to:

1 The types of traditional, governmental, and nongovernmental authorities that citizens trust and hold accountable;

2 The types and forms of media and other sources of political information citizens use most often, and whether citizens with different religious, ethnic, and age profiles have different media preferences;

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3 Access to information about politics and participation in electoral processes; including voter identity cards, voter registration, and awareness of when, where, and how voting would take place;

4 Concerns about security in general and anticipated unrest, violence, or intimidation.

5 Perceptions and actual experiences of general and electoral corruption; and

6 The electoral experience of women and other typically disenfranchised groups.

Data collected from a sample of units both from urban and rural and all four regions

of NWFP with the intention that they should be representative of that universe

(NWFP). A sample of this kind is referred to as a purposive (or sometimes judgmental)

sample. The researcher selected a sample of the population over age of 213 using

purposive sampling technique. Villages in rural areas and census circles in urban

areas, taken from the 1998 census by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, constituted the

Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), in each region of NWFP. Purposively 28 locations

were taken from Northern NWFP, 33 from Southern NWFP, 31 from Central NWFP

and 35 from Hazara region of NWFP. Purposive and judgement sampling technique

was used while interviewing or filling the questionnaires. The overall survey response

rate for completed interviews was high by conventional standards, item non-response,

in which data is missing completely for a given question, and ambiguous responses

(Don’t Know/Don’t Remember) are common for most questions. The analysis does

not seek to make statistical corrections for missing data but presents frequencies and

percentages for those people who said they did not know or did not remember in

response to a question. People respond in this manner for many reasons. Researcher

recorded whether respondents refused to answer the question, had no opinion,

suggested another response, did not remember, or did not know. Only the “Don’t

Know” category is included in the analysis unless otherwise noted. The Questionnaire

can be found in the appendix. Social desirability bias, in which respondents tend to

tell researchers what is socially acceptable or desirable, is a problem in any survey.

This bias was likely a factor in questions about literacy, income, and social status, as

well as sensitive issues such as victimization or perpetration of corrupt or illegal

activities. Respondents may misrepresent their true feelings by choosing the socially

desirable response or may simply say they do not know how to answer. Respondent

perceptions of interviewer, the organization conducting the survey, and fears about

how the survey data might be used, even when they are assured of confidentiality, can

94

also lead them to respond in ways that they hope will please the interviewer or to

avoid choosing responses that might upset or offend the interviewer. In any of these

situations, had more respondents’ answered the question, the overall findings might

have been different. Nevertheless, given the large size of the sample, it is possible to

draw some useful conclusions about the nature of electoral trends in NWFP,

particularly how ordinary men and women seek information about elections, how they

participate in the process, and their views of the electoral process. The questionnaire

was designed to cover several areas of interest to organizations working in the field of

electoral administration, attitudes and perceptions toward state and non-state

institutions, preferred actual and potential sources of political information, access to

election-specific procedures and processes designed to ensure citizen participation,

and ordinary citizens’ views about the state of democracy as well as the broader

meaning of Democracy as a concept. Particular emphasis was placed on the

development of questions designed to measure both perceptions and experience of

electoral malpractices, corruption, and electoral violence. Careful attention was paid

to question order, particularly with respect to questions regarding awareness about

electoral procedures and voting behaviour, to reduce the probability of bias. In

addition to collecting substantive data about political institutions, democracy, and

elections, the questionnaire included questions on other topics to provide context

about the nature of the electorate. Each respondent was asked questions about their

household, education, previous employment, housing tenure, mother tongue/ethnicity,

and religion. Tables in this chapter are based on the responses calculated from survey

instrument (questionnaire).

4.1.2 WEIGHTING THE DATA: Data are weighted for respective

proportion of the population age 21 years and above in each region of the province at

the time of 1997 elections, the percentage of urban and rural residents in each region

of the province, and the proportion of men and women in the population. The

distribution of urban and rural population is shown in Table 4.1.1a. Table 4.1.1 a:

Distribution of Urban and Rural Population.

RegionsRural

RespondentsRural % sample

Rural % Census

Urban Respondents

Urban % Sample

Urban % Census

Total PSUs

Total Respondents

North 730 34.43 93.84 30 20 6.16 76 760South 350 16.50 85.67 40 26.66 14.33 39 390

Central 270 12.43 91.94 40 26.66 8.06 31 310

Hazara 770 36.32 92.96 40 26.66 7.04 81 810

Total 2120 24.92 91.1 150 25 8.9 227 2270

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In equal number (50% male and 50% female) responded to the survey than in the total

sample. The data are weighted accordingly. Table 4.1.1b presents the number of total

urban and total rural localities and number of samples taken from both urban and rural

localities. Table 4.1.1 b: Urban and Rural localities.

Region DistrictTotal localities Sample

UrbanSampleRuralUrban Rural

NorthSwat 1 215 1 20

Chitral 1 463 1 25Lower Dir 1 922 1 28

SouthDI. Khan 4 384 2 22

Kohat 4 141 2 13

CentralPeshawar 3 146 2 13Mardan 3 168 2 14

HazaraAbbottabad 6 346 3 22Mansehra 2 492 1 25Kohistan 0 1342 0 30

Total 25 4383 15 212

There are total 227 localities including 15 from urban areas and 212 from rural areas

where questionnaire were filled and interviews were recorded. From each locality, ten

questionnaires were filled, five from Male and five from Female. Total numbers of

filled questionnaires are 2270. Detail of urban and rural localities selected for this

study is as:

4.1.7 NORTHERN NWFP

SWAT: The rural localities selected for this study from Swat are mentioned here

where 200 respondents were recorded. These rural areas are Mankyal locality with

population124484 with small villages of Mankyal, Ramat, Gornai, Darwali, Ayin.

Khawaza Khela locality with population 24517 having small villages, Gashkor,

Bandai, Khawaza Khela, Tikdarai. Baidara locality with population 21994 including

small villages Baidara, Sambat, Cham. Koz Abakhel Kabal locality with population

20476 having villages, Kotlai, Dagai, Akhon Kalai. Aka Maruf Bami Khel locality

with population 16689 includes villages, Bishbanr, Kass, Kuz Qila. One urban

locality, Mingora M.C. with population173868 was selected from Swat, where 10

respondents (5 male and 5 female) respondents were recorded.

CHITRAL: 250 respondents were recorded from rural areas of Chitral including

Karimabad locality with population12292, having villages Pachili, Rondoor, Gaset,

Deh Bokhtuli, Kilishpi, Bokhtuligole, Bilbil, Telegram, Parsan, Tashqar, Madashil,

Shah, Loligram, Gree, Orolagh, Ajarandeh, Kiyar, Lasht, Susum, Petagram, Dardrai,

Shahniroon,Orghoch, Shoot, gram, Kulum, Dalmir,Hinjil, Sunich, Shershal,

Kherochum. 10 respondents were recorded from the urban locality, Chitral M.C. with

population 30622 selected for this study.

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LOWER DIR: 280 respondents were recorded from the rural localities of Lower Dir

selected for this including Balambat having population 22581 with small villages are,

Kurrai, Safarai, Dulai, Ghalo, Tangi, Sarazgho, Wali Korona, Sangar, Tangi, Banda

Bala,Banda Payeen, Gadla Bala, Gadla Pyn: Botano Kalai, Malakand Bala, Shah

Korona. Shera Malakand Payeen. Khema, Kandaro Bala, Kandaro, Pyn: Jabagai, Bala,

Jabagai, Pyn: Dandoona, Dherai, Yusuf Manai, Landai Shah, Sathandar Pyn: Sthandar

Bala, Shatai, Matta, Mirzaabad, Redawan. Ten respondents were recorded from

urban locality-Timargara M.C with population 44335.

4.1.8 SOUTHERN NWFP

DI KHAN: 220 respondents were recorded from rural localities selected for this study

from DI. Khan including Dhap Shumali with population 22529 having villages, Long

Khair Shah, Lodhra, Bochra, Beli Wala, Awan, Qazi, Naurang Luck, Saggu Shumali,

Shah Nawaz, Dhap Khand, Thathal, Machora Najaf Ali Shah, Ghauns Shah Shumali,

Najaf Ali Shah Dahotar, Shah Kot, Rakh, Shah Kot, Mubarak Shah, Rakh Band Kurai,

Civil Rakh Band Kurai Thatha, Sukha, Shah, Rakh Mangan. 20 respondents were

recorded from the urban localities including D.I. Khan MC with population 86969,

D.I Khan Cantt with population 5145.

KOHAT: 130 respondents were recorded from the rural areas of Kohat including

Marai Bala with population 22,267 having villages, Marai bala & Marai Payan, PC

Sherkot, Chili Badaber, Jab Gabroo, Khadi Zai & Sher Kot. PC Alizai, Alizai, Arazi

Nusrat Khel. Usterzai area with population18,614 including Usterzai Bala, Usterzai,

Payan, Landi Kachai, Musa Khel & Tora Warai. 20 respondents were recorded from

urban localities of Kohat M.C with population 95863, Kohat Cantt with population

30764.

4.1.9 CENTRAL NWFP

PESHAWAR: 130 respondents were reorded from rural areas of Peshawar including

Mera Kichori with population 25512 with Mera Kichori, Banda, Jat, Jagra, Rashida,

Mulago, Kani Hayat, Jogian and Nasirpur. Chaghar Matti locality with population

18425 having villages, Chaghar Matti, Garhi Ali, Muhammad, Heryan garh, Khat,

Barbar, Caranga Bala, Charanga Payan, Hajizai, Yekh Dhand. 20 respondents were

recorded urban areas of Peshawar Cantt. (68740)5 and Peshawar M. Corporation

(910807).

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MARDAN: 140 respondents were recorded from the rural localities of Mardan

including Bazar (22286) with villages Garo, Amankot, Landai, Surkhabi. Palo Dheri

(21137) is another locality include villages, Palo Dheri, Hamzakot, Cheena & Ali.

Qasmi (17555) include Tazagram, Ghazai Baba and Sarobi. Mohabatabad (24471)

with villages Mohabatabad and Sheikh Maltoon, Behram Khan Killi, Khora, Banda,

Plato, Surkh Dheri and Aminabad. 20 respondents were recorded from urban

localities of Mardan Cantt. (7297), Mardan M.C. (31115).

4.1.10 NORTH EASTERN NWFP (HAZARA)

ABBOTTABAD: 220 respondents were recorded from the rural areas of Abbottabad

including Baldheri (14796) area with villages Baldheri, Gojri, Hal, Maira Tarla, Hal

Maira Utla, Jalalpura, More Kalan, Sajikot, Tannan. Pawa locality with population

18326 having villages Kakot, Bandi Matrach, Bazurgal, Chatrhi, Garamri, Gogarhi,

Pando Thana, Pasial, Patheri, Seydan, Peshail, Sargal, Sherbai, Sial, Talehar,Thathi.

30 repondents were recorded from the urban localities of Abbottabad M.C. (47609),

Abbottabad Cantt.(58492), and Nawan Sher T.C. (19871).

MANSEHRA: 250 respondents were recorded from the rural localities of Mansehra

including Ghanool (7869), Hangrai (3506), Garlat (11956), Hassa (578), Kanshian

(5094), Attar Shiha (2265), Phagla (2946), Jaba (5615), Hado Bani (2109), Datta

(4610), Khushala (1028), Harrayala (1699), Behali (3544), Garala (934), Matyal

(1069), Jalo (2645), Shehlia (1703), Hamsherian (2411),Pano Dheri (3104), Pairan

(4261), Jabbori (6203), Sacah Kalan (8398), Hikot (6404), Battal (8720), Jalgali 3300.

10 respondent were recorded from urban locality of Mansehra M.C with population

49534.

KOHISTAN: There is no urban area in Kohistan, the whole of Kohistan comprises

a rural area. 300 respondents were recorded from Kohistan including Bar Sharyal

(12,186) in Pallas velley with villages, Andrak Banda, Bin Banda, Bar Gaidar, Bar

Nairri, Dadair, Dheri, Gaidar,Gakoi, Kachar Banda, Kat Banda, Khana Banda, Bakri

Banda, Maidan, Murid Baik, Sheri Banda, Shoom Jamat, Ganja Banda. Dassu (10,996)

with small villages, Lootar, Doch Bah, Sukrat Jeshal, Uchar, Jal kot, Jandar, Char,

Dadair, Kass, Tall, Zarif, Dadir, Kaiga, Bar Seen, Dassu.

SECTION 4.2: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE DATTA

Political institutions shape the quality of governance, nature of electoral politics,

voting trends, degree of democracy, and attitudes of citizens, population

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characteristics such as ethno-linguistic differences, socio-economic stratifications, and

literacy also influence voting trends and political behaviour. Some studies suggest that

a large middle class and mass literacy are necessary conditions for democracy6. While

it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze relationships systematically between

socio-demographic background characteristics and political outcomes, which would

require more complex multivariate statistical analysis, the socio-economic-linguistic

context of NWFP is important to understanding the survey data, voting trends, and

observing electoral processes. In societies that maintain largely oral traditions and in

which education is limited, the level of literacy, class and religious differences, and

other social factors can influence the interaction between interviewer and respondent

and interpretation of questions. Demographic information is also important for the

identification of populations most vulnerable to disenfranchisement as a result of lack

of access to information, deliberate omission from electoral registration processes, or

undue influence in order to measure voting trends. Analysts of past elections have

pointed out the importance of provincial, rural-urban, sectarian, age, occupational

status—particularly between employees and employers, and class divisions in

political party support as well as campaign strategy. 7 Political parties and non-

governmental organizations have chosen local-language press to reach rural

populations, while state-run Television and Radio were under the control of

government during 1990s. This section presents data describing the socio-economic

and demographic characteristics of the sample population, which are used in the

following sections to better understand variation in this diverse population’s

experience of elections and voting trends in 1990s elections.

4.2.1 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Like many developing societies, NWFP population is young. Seventy-six percent

were married (Table 4.2.1a).

Table 4.2.1a: Age and Marriage Status, by Gender Age Men (%) Women (%) Total (%)

21-24 years 27 32 29

25-34 years 25 29 27

35-49 years 26 23 24

50 years 28 16 22

Marriage Status

Married 79 73 76

Unmarried 25 16 20

Divorced 0 1 0

Widowed 2 5 3

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Whereas in some societies unemployment and housing shortages have reduced

marriage rates and increased the age of marriage among younger populations, income

and unemployment do not appear to be barriers to marriage in NWFP.

The majority of respondents were either employed full time-48% and 26% of men and

women, respectively—or working in the home (32% of men and 53% of women).

Students represent five percent of respondents, and retirees 3% percent. 5% percent

reported that they were seeking work (Table 2.1b). Only 37% of the survey

respondents were employed full time.

Table 4.2.1b: Employment Status, by Gender

Status Men % Women% Total%Full Time 48 26 37Part Time 6 2 4Seeking work 8 2 5Retired 5 1 3Homemaker 32 53 42Student 6 4 5Others 5 3 4

Occupational status has been salient in past NWFP electoral politics and voting trends.

Although land tenants seem to vote with landowners, employers and employees often

have been on different sides of local political divisions. In areas where a high

percentage of the labour force is employed in the civil and military branches of

government, such as Central NWFP, voter preferences have been distinct.8 Among

both male and female respondents, the most common reported occupation was

homemaker, but it is unclear whether men reported falling into this category because

they were unemployed, independently-wealthy, engaged in a stigmatized economic

activity or for other reasons. The unemployment rate in 2004 was 7.7 percent,9 while

the 1998 Census reported an unemployment rate of almost 20 percent.10 Agricultural

labourers and small and medium farmers made up 10% and 8% of the sample,

respectively. Nine percent of respondents are self employed, while 7% each work in

government and the private sector (Table 4.2.1c).

Table 4.2.1 c: Occupation Classification, by Gender and Urban/Rural Classification.Classification Men% Women% Rural% Urban% Total%Self employed 11 8 8 11 9Government 9 5 5 9 7Industry/private sector employee 9 5 7 7 7Agricultural Labour 13 7 12 6 10Small and Medium Farmer 10 5 9 5 8Landowner 1 1 1 2 1Professional/Managerial 1 1 1 1 1Education/Teacher Including Madrasa

3 3 3 3 3

Homemaker 33 59 46 45 46Other 10 7 7 11 8Total column % 100 100 100 100 100

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Reported housing tenure rates are high, with 80% of respondents reporting that they

or a relative own their current residence, a figure roughly consistent with figures from

2004 Living Standards Survey. 11 More respondents in NWFP said they live in

residences owned by landlords (Table 4.2.1d), a much higher number than that of

government statistics, a discrepancy that could be attributable to sampling bias. The

average household size, including adults and children, was ten.

Table 4.2.1d: Average Household Size and Housing TenureRegions

Average Household size (Adults/Children) (Q-6)

Respondent owns Relatives owns Landlord owns Others

North 10 40 33 25 2South 12 56 18 24 2Centre 10 68 22 6 4Hazara 9 27 23 45 4Total 10 55 25 17 3

Income distribution for the sample differed in rural and urban areas—but not region

wise, with lower income people living disproportionately in rural areas. Economic

studies consistently find higher rates of poverty in NWFP, which again points to the

possibility of sampling bias in this province.

Table 4.2.1e: Percent Population per Household Income Category (Rural and Urban)Monthly Income in

Rupees (Q13)Class Designation Rural (%) Urban(%) Population (%)

<Rs.1000Lowest Income

5.2 2.4 4.2Rs.1001- 2000 11.7 6.5 9.8Rs. 2001-3000 16.4 12.7 15.1Rs.3001-4000 12.5 10.2 11.7Rs.4001-5000 Lower middle 17.5 19.5 18.2Rs.5001-10000 Middle 18.4 24.4 20.6Rs.1001-15000 Upper middle 6.9 10.4 8.2

>15001 High Income/wealthy 9.5 11.8 10.3Don’t Know 1.9 2 1.9

Total column % 100 100 100

In 2001, the Government of Pakistan announced a poverty line of 749 Pakistani

rupees (Rs) per capita per month, which was about Rs. 900 in 2005 prices.12 Table

4.2.1e presents the household income distribution of the sample population in urban

and rural areas and defines five summary class categories that are used to ease

subsequent analysis. Below Rs. 4,000/month is considered below the poverty line for

a family of four.

4.2.2 EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE LITERACY: Limited

educational opportunities, linguistic complexity and high rates of illiteracy present

challenges to both political parties and electoral administration in NWFP. The

national print and electronic media in Pakistan is composed of primarily English and

Urdu sources, with some local language radio, television, and print media available

regionally and locally. The business of government is conducted in both Urdu and

English. Forty-two percent of respondents (38% of men and 45% of women) reported

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having no education. An additional 10% have a madrasa education or some primary

school. Fifteen percent passed the matriculation exam and 9% have an F.A./F.Sc

(Intermediate) degree (Table 4.2.2a). Reported educational attainment rates are

somewhat lower in rural areas. Because the number of respondents with bachelor’s

degrees or above is small, to those with the F.A./F.Sc degree and other higher degrees

are combined in further analysis.13

Table: 4.2.2a Educational Attainment

Education Level completed (Q 12)

Men % Women % Rural% Urban% Total%

None 38 45 45 35 42Madrasa 3 5 4 4 4Some Primary School 6 5 6 5 6Primary School 9 8 9 8 9Middle 9 7 8 8 8Matric 15 15 14 16 15Intermediate 9 8 8 10 9BA/B.Sc 7 5 5 8 6MA or Professional Degree 4 2 2 5 3Doctorate/Post Doctorate 0 0 0 0 0Total Column % 100 100 100 100 100

The level of educational attainment is virtually the same across age groupings. Youth

do not possess more education, even at the primary, middle school, and matric levels,

than older people (data not presented; results very close to the national averages, with

no statistically significant deviations). The number of respondents speaking each

mother tongue in the four regions of NWFP is presented in Table 2.2b. In Central

NWFP, 75.6% of respondents speak Pashto, followed by 20.3% who speak Hindko

and 2.1% who speak Urdu. In Hazara, 75.9% of respondents speak Hindko, 18.1%

speak Pashto, and 2.9% speak others languages including Kohistani. In Southern

region, 70.2% of respondents speak Saraiki, 20.3 speak Saraiki, and 3.9% speak

Urdu. 14 In northern NWFP, 1.2% respondents were speaking others language

including Kohwar language of Chitral.

Table 4.2.2 b: Language Distribution.Areas Pashto Hindko Saraiki Punjabi Sindhi Balochi Urdu OthersNorth 78.1 15.2 2.2 2.1 0 0 1.2 1.2South 20.8 2.5 70.2 5 0 0 3.9 0Centre 75.5 20.3 2.1 1.5 0 0 1.1 0Hazara 18.1 75.9 0 3.2 0 0 1.5 2.9Total 48.23 28.48 19.33 2.95 0 0 2.73 1.48

Table 4.2.2c presents data showing where mother tongue speakers are located. Almost

15% of native Urdu speakers live in Northern NWFP, while 35 % live in Southern

NWFP. The vast majority (50%) of Pashto speakers live in Central NWFP. Most

Seraiki speakers live in Southern NWFP (65%). Most Hindko speakers live in Hazara

region of NWFP (75%). In addition to identifying their mother tongue, respondents

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were asked whether they read and/or write each of the major languages of Pakistan

(Q9). Table 4.2.2d presents data for minimum literacy in each region, by urban and

rural areas. Those who said they could read, speak, and write at least one language are

defined as literate for the purpose of the analysis.15 47% of the sample is able to read

and write at least one language. Using this definition of literacy, the Northern NWFP

sample has the lowest literacy rate (30%), followed by Hazara (44%).

Table 4.2.2 c: Distribution of Mother Tongue Speakers Across four regions of NWFP: Percent Respondents Speaking Mother Tongue in regions.

Areas Pashto Hindko Saraiki Punjabi Kohistani Kohwar Urdu OthersNorth 35 5 5 15 50 100 15 33South 15 10 65 35 0 0 35 35Centre 50 10 25 20 0 0 10 14Hazara 10 75 5 30 50 0 40 18Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

According to 1998 census, the literacy rate in Hazara is 35.2%, Northern NWFP is

28.14, southern NWFP is 33.71 and Central NWFP is 37.58 %.16 It is important to

note that the survey findings indicate that minimum language literacy is Urdu literacy.

That is, if a person is literate in at least one language, that language includes Urdu,

even if the speaker may speak their maternal and other languages. 53% of respondents

cannot read or write any of the languages they speak. Of the 47% who can, 42% are

literate in Urdu and only 5% are literate in some other language but not Urdu.

Although the survey findings suggest that most people who can read and write at all

can read Urdu.

Table 4.2.2d: Single-Language Literacy, by regions and Urban-Rural Classification.

AreasCan not read or write any Language (Q9)

Reads and Writes at least oneLanguage

Areas Total% Urban% Rural% Total% Urban% Rural%

North 46 33 60 54 67 40South 70 56 74 30 44 26Centre 53 40 58 47 60 42Hazara 56 50 58 44 50 42Total 53 40 60 47 60 40

The data presented in Table 4.2.2e support the assumption that citizens of all four

regions of NWFP can understand Urdu and are more likely to read Urdu than their

mother tongue. 40% percent of Northern NWFP speakers are literate in Urdu,

compared with 60% who are literate in native language Pashto. In all languages, more

women than men are illiterate. In Urdu, 32% of women and 53% of men are literate.

Twenty-three percent of women and 44% of men are literate in their mother tongue.

Young respondents have higher rates of Urdu, English, and mother-tongue literacy

than do older people. For Urdu, 44% of 21-24 year-olds and 49% of 25-34 year-olds

are literate in Urdu, compared with 41% of 35-49 year olds and 36% of those over 50.

103

International and National news channels and radio programs dealing with elections

and politics tend to be broadcast in Urdu, Pashto. National Radio and Television also

broadcast electoral awareness in major local languages also. Table 4.2.2f shows the

number of people in each language group who speak Urdu, as well as the percentage

of people who can speak Urdu in each region. Urdu is spoken by 82% of Hindko

speakers, 62% of Punjabi speakers, 47% of Pushto speakers, 45% of Seraiki speakers.

Table 4.2.2e: Urdu, English, and Mother Tongue Literacy.

Mother Tongue

Urdu English Literate in Mother Tongue

No Urdu Skills %

Urdu Literacy%No English

Skill %English

Literacy%

Illiterate in Mother

Tongue%

Mother Tongue Literacy%

Pashto 32 68 72 28 32 68Hindko 49 51 82 18 70 30Saraiki 71 29 92 8 80 20Punjabi 45 55 79 21 63 37Chitrali 65 35 92 8 74 27

Kohistani 74 26 93 7 58 42Urdu 80 20 96 4 88 12

Others 64 36 89 11 83 17Milieu

Urban 44 56 77 23 56 44Rural 65 35 91 9 73 27

GenderMale 47 53 82 18 56 44

Female 68 32 89 11 77 23Age Category

21-24 56 44 84 16 57 4325-34 51 99 86 14 69 3135-49 59 41 87 13 69 31

50 and above 64 36 87 13 71 21Areas

North 60 40 86 14 51 49South 64 36 89 11 72 28Centre 54 46 84 16 70 30Hazara 72 28 94 6 85 15

Pop. Total 57 43 85 15 66 34

These findings indicate that written materials in languages other than Urdu seems less

effective than regional-language audio-visual or face-to-face electoral choices.

Politicians used some Urdu idioms for personal political benefits while telling the

voters about different meanings.

Table 4.2.2f: Urdu Speakers, by Mother Tongue and Regions.

Mother TongueUrdu Speakers

No YesPashto 53 47Hindko 18 82Saraiki 55 45Punjabi 38 62Chitrali (Kohwar) 53 47

Kohistani 59 41

Urdu 3 97

Others 34 66Provincial areasNorth 40 60South 52 48Centre 38 62Hazara 56 44

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For example from the National broadcast media (Radio and TV), before elections,

electoral awareness programmes were on aired in which voters were asked that, ‘vote

Qoum ki Imanat hay-Faisalay soch samaj ke kijiye (vote is the trust of nation-decide

thoughtfully)’17.

These findings indicate that written materials in languages other than Urdu seems less

effective than regional-language audio-visual or face-to-face electoral choices.

Politicians used some Urdu idioms for personal political benefits while telling the

voters about different meanings. For example from the National broadcast media

(Radio and TV), before elections, electoral awareness programmes were on aired in

which voters were asked that, ‘vote Qoum ki Imanat hay-Faisalay soch samaj ke

kijiye (vote is the trust of nation-decide thoughtfully)’18.

While interviewing a local political activist from Mansehra-politically Gujjar tribe

dominated area (Balakot), he explained how tactfully the local Gujjar candidate

highlighted this slogan in their own favour. The Gujjar candidate in their electoral

campaign said their voters that Gujjars are one qoum (nation), so vote for your Gujjar

qoum (Gujjar nation) and he won the elections.19 In this way due to illiteracy and

some unknown wordings of Urdu changed entirely the voting trends in favour of

those politicians who used such type of idiom/slogans for their political purposes.

SECTION 4.3: INTEREST IN POLITICS AND INFORMATION

Electoral participation declined significantly between the 1970 and 1990s general

elections. 20 When asked directly about their interest in politics (Q20), 67% of

respondents said they were either not at all or not very interested, while only 32%

were somewhat or very interested. However, self-reported political interest, belief in

democracy, and other general questions are often influenced by social desirability bias,

particularly among social groups where political interest is desirable (e.g., higher

income and educated groups).21 Indeed, higher income and educated respondents were

much more likely to report general interest in politics. On the other hand, self reported

disinterest in politics among some populations might be attributable to associating

politics and elections with violence, intimidation, or corruption, and wanting to stay

out of the fray. There was no evidence for a real difference in self-reported interest

between male and female respondents, contradicting common wisdom that women

perceive politics as “men’s work” and do not want to be involved. The data also

suggest that there is no real difference between urban and rural respondents with

105

respect to political interest. It is often said that people in rural areas of NWFP

participate in elections more than urban populations. Reasons offered include urban

elite cynicism about elections and feudal or tribal “capture” (control) over rural

populations, essentially forcing them to vote for particular candidates or acquiring

biradaris factional support. The self-reported equality of interest in politics between

urban and rural populations may contradict this analysis. More than one in five

respondents in Northern NWFP, compared with one in 10 or less in the other regions,

reported that they were “very interested.” However, in all the regions, about one in

three respondents said they were somewhat or very interested in politics. Table 4.3.1a

presents provincial differences in political interest.

Table 4.3.1 a: Self-Reported Political Interest, by regions (figures in %)

AreasNot at all Interested

Not very interested

Somewhat interested

Very interested

Don’t Know

North 41 42 16 20 2South 53 17 20 8 2Centre 47 21 23 7 2Hazara 52 16 21 10 0

Lower income people self-reported less interested in politics, with 56% of the lowest

income expressing no interest at all in politics compared with 36.5% of those who

have high incomes. Fifty-four percent of those in the lower middle class have no

interest, but of those in the middle class, the number expressing no interest at all falls

to 40%. Respondents who have some or a great deal of interest in politics tend to have

higher incomes; 28% in the lowest income group are somewhat or very interested in

politics compared with 24% in the middle class and 29% in the upper middle class.

The survey included additional questions to measure self-reported behaviour during

elections. To provide a more reliable measure of political involvement, these

additional questions are used to create an index of political interest. Questions 21a, e,

and f, asked respondents to indicate whether, for a number of different political

activities, they have, would be likely to, might, or would never engage in that activity.

Those questions dealing with low-effort or spontaneous engagement, such as

discussing elections with friends and family, telling people to vote for a particular

candidate, or getting into an argument provide a richer picture of the sample’s degree

of political engagement during an election. The survey results do not provide

evidence that women differ significantly from men in their likelihood of engaging in

any of these activities, nor in their general political interest, with the exception of

women in Central NWFP, where male respondents reported having some interest in

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politics twice as often as women. With respect to their participation in these activities,

the responses for rural and urban and young and old respondents also do not differ

significantly. While higher income and more educated individuals are more likely to

engage in these activities, income group differences are less marked than for

responses to the general question about political interest. The behaviour questions are

correlated with political interest and can be combined into a “political interest” index.

Those engaging in two or more activities and/or reporting high interest are

characterized as “high interest,” for example, and those with little or no interest and/or

only one reported activity are “low interest.” Some observers of Electoral politics in

NWFP have expressed concern about a lack of interest among younger people of

voting age. While the findings suggest that older respondents are more likely to score

high on the political interest index, 42% of the 21-24 year-olds fall in the middle of

the scale. Respondents between the ages of 35 and 49 are the most engaged, followed

by older people. (See Table 4.3.1b.) It is important to note that lower rates of

engagement among younger voters may be a function of lack of experience and

opportunities to become engaged, as opposed to fundamental generational

differences.22 Respondents in central NWFP score highest on the index, with 39%

showing high interest in politics, followed by respondents in Hazara (37%) and

Northern NWFP (36%). Southern has the lowest number of respondents in the high

interest category (28%).

Table 4.3.1b: Political Interest by Age, regions, Income, and Educational AttainmentLow% Medium% High%

Age Group21-24 Years 24 42 3425-34 Years 28 35 3635-49 Years 23 34 4350 and above 33 30 37

RegionsNorth 21 42 36South 31 41 28Centre 29 32 39Hazara 26 37 37

ClassLowest Income 32 39 29Lower Middle Class 25 39 36Middle Class 22 32 46Upper Middle Class 19 33 47High Income 22 27 51

Educational AttainmentNone 35 39 26Madrasa 27 35 38Some Primary 28 41 31Finished Primary 25 31 44Middle 24 28 48Matric 23 35 42Intermediate and above 16 33 38

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Overall, women and men have similar degrees of political interest when the various

forms of engagement are combined, as do respondents from both rural and urban

areas. Consistent with the findings of many surveys, the political index score is

greater the higher a respondent’s income and education23. Around one in three low

income respondents have a high interest score compared with one in two high income

respondents—a difference of 20%.

To the extent that this predictable trend is repeated for voting behaviour, belief in

democracy, and other attitudes associated with income, further results are not

presented unless the pattern is inconsistent with this general trend. For example, self-

reported political interest (Q20) alone increases with levels of education, but when the

index including actual behaviour is used (Table 4.3.1b), interest is much higher for

respondents who have finished primary school (44%) compared with those who have

only some primary school (31%), but is only 4% higher for those with a middle

school education.

Those in the high interest category with F.A./F.Sc degrees or more education are

fewer (38%) than those who have only finished middle school (48%), the same

percentage as high interest respondents with a madrasa education (38%). These

findings suggest that self-reported interest may be subject to social desirability bias,

particularly among those with more education, or people with different levels of

education may have different interpretations of how interest in politics is or should be

expressed. When discussing, arguing, or persuading others during elections are

included as measures of interest; less educated individuals appear as engaged as those

with more education.

4.3.2 PATTERNS OF MEDIA USE: Encouraging citizens to participate in

the electoral process and to do so in an informed, independent manner is challenging

in a society with high levels of illiteracy and linguistic diversity. The task is

particularly challenging in NWFP, because penetration of both the broadcast and print

media are limited. People tend to rely on personal networks and word-of-mouth rather

than the media. Government controlled national media in 1990s presented only those

programmes which were in the favour of incumbent government and it was observed

during field visit that people had little trust of official media. According to 2002

statistics, newspaper readership is 60% in urban areas but only 35% in rural areas24,

figures that tend to correspond with national literacy rates. Radio audiences are much

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smaller in NWFP-only 21% of the urban population and 27% of the rural population

listen to radio on a regular basis. Television access is low, with only about 3 million

homes owning televisions—1.5 million each in urban and rural homes.25 Pakistan

Television (PTV), the state-run network, is broadcast over the airways, but cable and

satellite channels are still lacking in rural areas of NWFP. Table 4.3.2a shows

respondents’ use of media sources within the four regions of NWFP. In Central

NWFP 72% of respondents never listen to radio, but report greater television use than

those in other regions (e.g., 43% report daily use compared with 32% in Southern

NWFP). The percentage of Southern NWFP’s respondents who listen to radio daily

(15%) is more than twice that in Central and Northern NWFP (7% each), while 11%

of Hazara’s respondents listen daily. Voting age populations in Hazara and Southern

NWFP, where penetration of television may be lower, rely more heavily on radio for

information. In Central and Northern NWFP, 50% of respondents watch television

frequently or daily compared with 40% in Hazara and 39% in Southern NWFP.

However, the percentage of respondents who report frequent or daily radio use does

not exceed a high of 24% (Southern region) in the province. Newspaper readership

never exceeds 28%.26

Table 4.3.2a: Frequency of Media Use.

Never Once in a while Frequently DailyTelevision

North 32 21 21 26South 46 16 7 32Centre 32 15 9 43Hazara 41 18 13 27

RadioNorth 55 28 10 1South 56 21 9 15Centre 72 15 5 7Hazara 63 18 9 11

News PapersNorth 56 19 15 11South 65 14 10 12Centre 65 13 8 14Hazara 57 15 11 17

Television is the media most watched by the electorate; 36% of respondents claimed

to watch television daily, while another 12% watch television frequently. Only 14%

read newspapers daily while another 10% read frequently. When asked about internet

use, 92% of respondents had never used the internet, and only 3% used this source

frequently or daily, despite the fact that the political parties have increased the quality

of the content and amount of material about their platforms in recent years.27 These

efforts appear to reach foreign audiences and a small elite within Pakistan and should

not be viewed as an influential source of political information. ‘These findings

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indicates that television is still the most common source of media used by citizens in

NWFP, and the voting trends specially the methods to cast the votes is largely

influenced by this medium. Not surprisingly, television use increases with age,

education, and income. Radio use, on the other hand, does not differ across income

categories, but more educated groups do listen to radio more frequently. The data

suggest that in NWFP, however, younger people of voting age are no more likely than

older voters to listen to radio. Media usage differs somewhat across occupational

classification and language group, although television is used more frequently by all

of them. Table 4.3.2b presents TV and radio use by occupational category.

Table 4.3.2b: Use of Television and Radio, by Occupational Classification.

Never or once in a while Frequently or dailyClassification TV Radio TV RadioSelf-Employed 48 84 52 16Government 34 65 66 35Industry/Private sector Employee 40 80 60 20

Agricultural Labourer 71 82 29 18

Small or Medium Farmer 68 77 32 23Landowner 40 68 60 32Professional/Managerial 12 91 88 9Education/Teacher Including Madaras 32 84 68 16Homemaker 52 93 48 7Others 58 81 42 19

Rates of both forms of media are particularly low among agricultural labourers and

small and medium farmers. Only 29% of the former group report watching TV

frequently or daily, compared with 88% of those in the professional/managerial

category and 65% of government employees, for example. Eighteen percent of

agricultural workers and 23% of farmers listen to the radio frequently or daily

compared with 9% of the professional/managerial class, 20% of private sector

employees, 16% of educators, 7% of homemakers, and 16% of those who are self-

employed. Respondents in all of the categories listen to radio much less than

government employees, 35% of whom report listening frequently or daily, and

landowners (32%). The first set of occupational groups—agricultural workers,

employees, homemakers, etc.—are also less interested in politics. These groups watch

television more often than they listen to radio, but at rates much lower than the other

occupational categories. This data illustrates how difficult it is to reach marginal

populations of potential voters through traditional media. Similarly, language groups

also have different patterns of media use, with Hindko, Seraiki, and Pushto speakers

reporting the lowest rates of both television and radio use (See Table 4.3.2c). Pushto

speakers report low usage of both television and radio overall, but a relatively higher

percentage of Pushto speakers listen to radio frequently or daily compared with the

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other language groups. Seraiki speakers report the lowest total rate of radio and

television usage.

Table 4.3.2 c: Use of Television and Radio, by Language Groups.

Mother TongueNever or once in a while Frequently or Daily

TV Radio TV RadioPashto 62 77 38 23Hindko 40 85 60 15Saraiki 59 88 41 12Punjabi 46 88 45 12Urdu 46 80 54 20Others 58 75 42 26

4.3.3 PREFERRED MEDIA SOURCES OF ELECTION INFORMATION

As a follow-up to questions about general media use, interviewers asked respondents

to specify sources they use for political and government information (Q16) in

particular. These open-ended responses varied widely, with 28% reporting different

sources, but 41% could not list any source. Many mentioned national, state-run media

including ( PTV, PBC28), and international media including (BBC29 and VOA30 ) one

of them.

Table 4.3.3a: Sources of Political Information by Demographic Groups.Areas None Various

State run media (PTV and PBC)

Mention international Media (BBC, VOA)

North 24 7 3 1South 2 1 4 0Centre 9 73 16 0Hazara 1 1 4 16Rural 44 26 24 6Urban 36 33 18 14

Mother TonguePashto 49 28 20 3Hindko 25 47 17 11Saraiki 45 31 19 5Punjabi 38 20 30 12Urdu 35 38 15 13Others 36 38 23 3Illiterate 51 22 21 6Literate in one Language

30 35 23 12

4.3.4 PREFERRED MODES OF ELECTION INFORMATION

Even among those people who report low rates of media use and decline to report

sources of political information under ordinary circumstances, many people may seek

out media use during elections or other periods in which political events are

particularly salient. When respondents were asked from which two sources they

would choose to learn more about elections (Q18), 38% indicated a preference for

television programs, followed by 27% who preferred posters and illustrations. The

third most common response was to suggest other ideas (Table 4.3.4a). “Reading

newspapers or internet”, “watching candidates or parties debates on TV”, and “radio

drama or comedy” were cited by 15%, 11%, and 6% of the respondents respectively.

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Table 4.3.4a: Preferred Modes of Election Information

Mode Mentioned% Not Mentioned%Radio Drama 6 94TV Programme 38 62Posters/Illustrations 27 73TV Debate 11 89Other Ideas 20 80No Opinion/ DK 16 84

Table 4.3.4b presents statistics for the combined responses to help understand the

degree to which voters prefer television to radio overall or a combination of both in

finding out about elections. Fourteen percent declined to mention any source, while an

additional 15% said they did not know which sources they would prefer. Television

(either debate or a program) was mentioned as both the first and second preference for

33% of respondents, followed by 19% who suggested one or more of their own ideas

exclusively. Only 10% indicated a preference for the combination of television and

newspapers and 2% both radio and television. Radio and newspapers were mentioned

as the sole preferred source of election information by only 3% and 4% of

respondents, respectively. Both urban and rural respondents mention only television

as a means for obtaining election news, but rural 13% of rural respondents compared

with 6% of urban respondents suggest their own ideas for obtaining election

information. Respondents in all four regions of NWFP mention television most

frequently, followed by a lack of preferences. Respondents suggest their own ideas

more often than selecting combinations of sources other than television, followed by a

preference for television and newspapers (about 10 or 11% for all regions).

Table 4.3.4b: Distribution of Newspaper and Broadcast Media Preferences for Election Information, by Regions and Milieu.

Combination of Two Type of Media preferred by respondent

Combined Responses TotalMilieu Areas

Rural Urban North South Centre HazaraDecline to mention 14 10 5 15 15 13 17Don’t Know 15 10 5 18 18 12 22Presents Own Ideas Only

19 13 6 14 17 22 14

Newspaper Only 4 3 2 5 5 3 8Radio Only 3 2 1 4 7 3 3

TV Only 33 18 14 32 24 35 24

Both News papers and TV

10 5 5 10 11 10 10

Broadcast Only (Radio + TV)

2 1 1 3 3 2 1

Respondents in southern NWFP were relatively more likely to mention radio as a sole

source of information (7% compared with 4% or less in the other three regions).

Higher income and more educated respondents were more likely to mention all

sources of media, including newspapers or the internet, radio, and television. Lower

income and less educated respondents were more likely to say they have no

preferences. Younger respondents expressed a preference less often, and were less

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likely to mention all forms of media. The number of respondents suggesting their own

ideas increased with age. These results reinforce the findings that reaching younger

eligible voters is a challenging task. Young people have low interest in politics.

Respondents with low or medium political interest mention TV more frequently than

any other combination of sources for election information, but 31% of those with low

interest present their own ideas, compared with only 20% and 19% of those with

medium to high interest. (See Table 4.3.4c.)

Table 4.3.4 c: Distribution of Newspaper and Broadcast Media Preferences for Election Information, by Level of Political Interest.

Combinations of Two Types of Media Preferred by Respondent:

Combined Responses (Q18) Low Medium High

Declines to Mention 10 12 8

Don't Know 19 8 5Presents Own Ideas Only 31 20 19Newspaper Only 3 5 7Radio Only 1 6 3TV Only 30 35 39Both Newspaper and TV 31 11 17Broadcast Only (Radio and TV)

6 3 2

Men and women have similar preferences for election information. Women declined

to express a media preference or said they did not know 1-2% more frequently than

men. Men were three times more likely to mention newspapers as their preferred

source than women (6% compared with 2%), but there is no evidence that there are

real differences in preferences for television, radio, and broadcast preferences by

gender.

Table 4.3.4 d: Preference for Posters/Illustrations as a Preferred Mode of Receiving Election Information, by Class, Education, and Urban/Rural Milieu.

Regions

Mentioned % Not Mentioned %North 28 72South 35 65Centre 20 80Hazara 30 70

Class Lower 33 67Lower Middle 33 67Middle 28 72Upper Middle 19 81High Income/wealthy 19 81

Education

None 28 72Madrasa 43 57Some Primary 27 73Primary School 27 73Middle School 36 64Matric 28 72Intermediate and Above 20 80

MilieuRural 30 70Urban 23 77

Political Interest

Low 22 78Medium 33 67High 36 64

While more educated, higher income, urban, and interested respondents were more

likely to learn about election through watching a TV program, lower income groups

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and less educated voters were more likely to learn about elections through illustrations

and posters in their communities.

Table 4.3.4d presents preference for posters and other illustrations. Forms of

illustrations common in Hazara and implicitly included in this category are picture

booklets (brochures/pamphlets) and “panaflex” banners—large, portable, and

waterproof “flip-chart”-style canvas posters all used for voting trends and campaigns

purposes. It is important to note that illustrations were mentioned less frequently than

television among all groups, but relatively more (35%) of respondents in Hazara

mentioned posters compared with 28%, 20%, and 30% in Central NWFP, Northern

NWFP, and Southern NWFP, respectively.

Posters and other illustrated print materials in the community, while mentioned less

frequently than television, are more likely to reach lower income and less educated

people. Politicians used banners; leaflets that can be brought into homes in local

communities—especially in rural areas—are an important means of supplementing

the broadcast and print media. Illustrations and posters are somewhat more likely to

reach people in NWFP. Like Pakistan, in NWFP, education is highly localized and

privatized, and most children live at home until they are married. Even then, many

remain with the older generation rather than establishing a new residence. The

average family size per household among respondents in the survey is 10-12, pointing

to the strong influence of numerous family members on an individual’s life. Parental

influence on voting trends is largely influenced as mentioned in Michigan Model.

SECTION 4.4: AWARENESS AND ACCESS TO ELECTORAL PROCESSES.

4.1.1 AWARENESS OF VOTER REGISTRATION: Interviewers asked survey

respondents whether they had heard about the upcoming national and provincial

assembly elections and whether they were aware that the elections were likely to be

held in coming months. About one third of respondents (35%) claimed to be aware of

the upcoming election, while two thirds (65%) were not aware that an election was

due. Of those who were aware of the election, 87% identified the election period

correctly, while 13% did not (Table 4.4.1a).

Table 4.4.1a: Awareness of Time Period for 2007/2008 Election31

Responses Yes Correct between 2007-2008 Gives incorrect Period/DKNot Aware 65 14 86Aware of upcoming Election Period

35 87 13

When asked to identify the location where eligible voters in the area could register,

only 15% of respondents answered correctly that a voter must go to the district

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election commission office, while 84% said they did not know or named an incorrect

registration venue (Table 4.4.1b).

Table 4.4.1b: Awareness of Registration Location. Q45: Responses %age AccuracyDistrict Election Commission office 16

16 %Union Council Office 34Tehsil Office 3

84%Others 2Don’t Know 46Total 100

As with levels of political interest, responses to these four questions are related—the

same respondents who report awareness of one policy change also report awareness of

the other policy changes. Combining these measures permits the creation of a

registration procedure “awareness index” that facilitates analysis of political

knowledge by location and demographic groups, as well as political interest. Overall

awareness of the changes was low, reinforcing concerns that the house-to-house

enumeration had been inadequate (re-registration requirement) and that frequent

voters might not even be on the new list. Men were aware of all the new policies

twice as often as women; 30% of men were unaware of any changes, compared with

62% of women; 20% of men compared with 11% of women were aware of two policy

changes; 13% and 5%, respectively, were aware of three policies; and 9% compared

with 5% were aware of all four (see Table 4.4.2d).

Table 4.4.1c: Perception of voters.Responses Yes No

Registration RequirementQ36: Are you aware that all citizens must register again if they want to vote in the upcoming elections, even if they registered to vote in the past?

23 77

Display of Provisional Voters List (June-July 2007)Q39: Are you aware that the provisional voters' registration list will be displayed in May and June2 and that registered voters can check the list to see if your name is correctly listed?

27 73

Special Registration OpportunityQ42: Have you heard that there will be a special registration period in May/June for all citizens of voting age who did not register during the past 12 months?

19 81

ECP Policy Change to Accept Old and New Identity Cards32

Q50: Have you heard that the Election Commission of Pakistan has decided to accept the old national identity card (NIC) for voter registration and elections?

27 74

These findings, combined with election commission data showing a lower than usual

percentage of women registered through the house-to-house enumeration, pointed to a

serious need early in the process to encourage and facilitate women to register to vote.

Awareness differed by regions, with respondents in Hazara and Southern NWFP,

surprisingly, more aware of the policy changes. (Table 4.4.1d).

In Central NWFP and Northern NWFP, 45% and 46% of respondents, respectively,

were unaware of any new election procedures, compared with 20% and 30% of

respondents in Hazara and Southern NWFP. In NWFP, 16% were aware of all four

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procedures, and in Southern NWFP, 18% were aware of all four. In contrast, 6% of

respondents in both Central NWFP and Northern NWFP were aware of the new

procedures. This may be attributable to sampling bias and smaller sample size in the

two less populous provinces, or information about new registration requirements may

have been distributed more extensively in these traditionally disadvantaged provinces.

There were no significant differences in awareness of the four policies according to

the respondent’s age.

Table 4.4.1d: Index of Election Awareness: Number of Policies of Which Respondent is Aware.

None One Two Three FourGenderMale 30 28 20 13 9

Female 62 18 11 5 5AreasNorth 46 23 15 10 6South 30 19 19 14 18Centre 45 25 16 9 6Hazara 20 23 26 13 16

Political Interest Index

None One Two Three Four

Low Interest 52 27 11 5 5Medium Interest 42 21 18 12 7

High Interest 33 26 21 12 9Total 42 24 17 10 7

However, when disaggregated for each question, the results suggest a slight difference

in awareness of acceptance of identity cards by age. Older voters--age 50 years or

more--were more likely to know that the ECP decided to accept the old NIC. These

findings indicate that major efforts are necessary to ensure that adults of voting age,

particularly women, are registered to vote in all four regions of NWFP. Without this

critical step, even those who are aware of an election, but unable to find out about

procedures necessary to register, will be unable to participate.

4.4.2 ACCESS TO THE VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESS

Questions about subjective awareness of different voter registration policy changes

were followed by objective questions to assess the extent to which election

commission efforts had succeeded in registering voters. Table 4.4.2a shows how

many of the respondents were aware if their household had been reached by the

national door-to-door registration process. Sixty-two percent of men and 35% of

women respondents knew that someone had come to their home. When respondents

were asked if they had actually registered as a result of this process, 89% of men

compared with 80% of women said they registered at that time. One in ten women

compared with one in 20 men reported that they were not registered even if they knew

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their home was reached by the enumeration campaign (Table 4.4.2a, Q28). There may

be a number of reasons for this finding. Many men and women who were aware of the

door-to-door visit may not have filled out the form themselves, even if someone in the

household had registered all members. Women, especially those living in separate

women’s compounds, may not have opened the door for an enumerator. Some may

have been unaware if the men in the household had registered on behalf of women. In

any case, certainty about final registration would require verification that one’s name

could be found on the registration list. At the time of the survey, a larger percentage

of urban respondents reported that they had been reached by the door-to-door process

as compared with rural respondents. Urban respondents reported being enumerated in

Central NWFP, Hazara, and Northern NWFP, at rates of 55%, 40%, and 47%,

respectively. Only in southern NWFP did a larger percentage of rural respondents

report door-to-door visitation at a higher rate (40% rural and 32% urban had been

reached). According to the survey, the lowest overall reported door-to-door access

rate was in Hazara and Southern NWFP (Table 4.4.2a).

Table 4.4.2 a: Respondent Exposure to National Door-to-Door Registration Process.

Was household reached by Door-to-Door registration (Q37)? Yes No Don’t Know

48 47 5

GenderMale 62 35 3Female 35 60 6

Regions

North Urban 47 40 12North Rural 43 53 4South Urban 32 64 3South Rural 40 57 3Central Urban 55 41 4Central Rural 48 48 4Hazara Urban 40 59 1Hazara Rural 28 65 7

Age

21-24 Years 44 49 725-34 Years 43 53 535-49 Years 51 47 250 and above 48 47 5

Follow-Up Question: (If Yes) Did a household member register at that time? (Q38)

85 7 7

GenderMale 89 6 5Female 80 8 12

About half of respondents in each age group were aware of an enumerator visit to the

household (44-51%), but older people were slightly more likely to have been reached,

with 44% and 43% of 21-24 year-olds and 25-34 year-olds, respectively, compared

with 51% and 48% of 35-49 and the over-50 age group receiving door-to-door

registration teams. However, any of these people may have been registered by their

family, a process that would have ultimately succeeded only if their family members

had included their NIC numbers on the registration forms. The number of people

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aware of the door-to-door process, therefore, may be lower than the actual number of

households reached.

Furthermore, the survey found that younger people are less likely to have the NIC

(see Table 4.4.2d in the following pages). Respondents were asked to report their

willingness to take the effort to register themselves, given their perceived distance to

the district election commission office. Of those reporting living close to the election

office, 65% reported that they would be somewhat or very likely to register. One third

(33%) reported that they were very or somewhat unlikely to register, even if they

lived close. Forty percent living very far were somewhat or very unlikely to register.

Fifty percent who did not know the location of the office were unlikely to register

(Table 4.2b). Figure 4.2a illustrates this relationship.

Table 4.4.2 b: Likelihood of Registering Outside of Home if Travel Required, by Respondent Distance to Election Registration Office / District Returning OfficerLikelihood of Registering if Travel to EC Required.EC Distance from

Respondents (Q 46)Don’t Know Very Unlikely

Somewhat unlikely

Likely Very Likely Row Total

Close 2 22 11 35 30 100Far 4 11 10 46 29 100Very Far 3 26 14 36 22 100Don’t Know 22 40 10 19 8 100Column Total 28 10 20 42 21 100

It was important to assess voters’ willingness to register through the normal process,

in order to know whether the display period would be an essential time for additional

voter registration, whether providing mere information about the location of display

centres and procedures would be sufficient to ensure registration, or additional

mobilization would be needed to assist more directly in the process itself. The fact

that 30% of all respondents who reported living close to the district election

commission office would still be unwilling to make the effort to register, among other

factors, convinced the partners to implement a three-part voter information and

mobilization initiative. The nationwide strategy was designed to (1) inform

communities about the need to register again and the procedures to do so; (2) help

eligible voters obtain their NICs; and (3) provide transportation and facilitation to

help people reach display centres and complete required voter registration forms.

Possession of identification is a critical requirement for both registration and voting

under Pakistan’s amended electoral law (Section 33, Representation of the People Act,

1976).33 Figure 4.2b shows the numbers of people in possession of different forms of

identification. Eighty-percent of respondents said they possessed NIC— 44% had the

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old card and 77% had the new card. Only 22% had a birth certificate, so many other

forms of identification must have been used to obtain the national identification cards.

Table 4.4.2 c: Possession of Different Forms of Identification Forms of Identification Yes NoNew Computerized Identity Card (CNIC) 77 23Old National Identity Card (NIC) 44 56National ID Card for Overseas Pakistanis 3 97Birth Certificate 22 78Respondent Possesses Either CNIC or NIC 87 14

It is important to note that the NIC is useful for access to many government public

services, so the respondent’s possession of this identification does not reflect anything

about his or her intention to register to vote.

Although a relatively large percentage of the total population possessed a NIC at the

time of the survey, Table 4.4.2d shows that women and younger adults were less

likely to have NIC. In the Central NWFP, respondents reported having ID equally in

rural and urban areas at a rate slightly higher than the national average (88%). The

results indicate that 19% of the rural electorate of the Hazara and Southern NWFP did

not have identification, compared with 13% and 10% of their urban electorates,

respectively. When respondents who did not possess a CNIC were asked why (Q49),

most mentioned a variety of different reasons too varied to analyze.

Table 4.4.2 d: Possession of NIC

GenderDemographic Neither % NIC %Male 6 94Female 21 79

Age

21-24 Years 25 7525-34 Years 17 8335-49 Years 6 9450 and above 4 94

Regions

North Rural 19 81North Urban 10 90South Rural 21 79South Urban 19 81Central Rural 12 88Central Urban 12 88Hazara Rural 19 81Hazara Urban 13 87Total 14 87

Eighteen percent of respondents said they did not know where or how one could

obtain the CNIC, while 15% said they had not heard of the ID. Another 15% reported

not wanting an ID, while 9% said the cost was too high. These findings indicate that

while the CNIC is required for citizens to access a number of state services unrelated

to the elections, ensuring that eligible voters have the CNIC is an important first step

in enfranchising them. With 30% of respondents without the CNIC saying they had

not heard of the card or did not want one, providing both education and intervention

to help eligible voters obtain the card should be an important part of voter education

programming. Based on the survey results confirmed that women, rural and younger

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people were less likely to have the CNIC. In addition, the assessment found that many

people had filled out all of the necessary paperwork but were still waiting for their

CNIC to arrive.

4.4.3 BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION IN PREVIOUS

ELECTIONS: The survey asked respondents question, why they had voted (Q26)

or abstained (Q25) in past elections. All sub-questions were asked of all respondents

unless they reported having voted in every election or never voting. These questions

asked respondents to indicate the level of importance of different factors in the

decision to vote or abstain, with 2-3 questions each in four broad categories: (a)

personal reasons, such as lack of time or interest, as well as belief in the efficacy of

their vote; (b) procedural or logistical barriers, such as distance to the polling station,

inability to register or to vote once inside the polling station; (c) personal exposure to

non-violent forms of election fraud, such as vote-buying; and (d) exposure to election

violence and intimidation.

This section presents findings for those questions addressing procedural and logistical

barriers as explanations for the respondent’s past voting and non-voting behaviour.

These questions deal with measures that are largely the responsibility of the election

commission and areas in which the partners could recommend improvements in

communication, logistical delivery of election materials and services, and attention to

pre-election empowerment of voters. Respondents were asked to talk about their past

experiences with polling-station access, accuracy of voter lists, and problems with

identification requirements at polling stations. When asked about the importance of

difficulty of reaching the polling station (Q25b) in decisions to abstain in one or more

past elections, 63% said this factor was not at all important, and additional 12% said

not very important. Only 10% said polling station access was a somewhat or very

important factor in a decision to abstain. Similarly, those who have not voted because

they did not know where the polling stations are in the minority—only 10% said this

factor was somewhat or very important in abstention. Surprisingly, difficulties finding

or getting to polling stations are reported equally by respondents in urban and rural

areas. Urban dwellers may be less likely to be connected to family and other

community networks of information about polling station locations, as well as

transportation options, especially if they are newly urbanized. Traffic, transportation,

and the complexity of the urban environment may make polling stations more difficult

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to find and reach, suggesting that, even when polling station distance does not seem to

be a major reason for abstention, other physical factors may be relevant. For

respondents in the Hazara, reaching the polling station was a somewhat more

common problem than in the other provinces. Nineteen percent in Hazara compared

with 5% in Central NWFP, 15% in Northern NWFP, and 11% in Southern NWFP

said difficulty of reaching the polling station was a somewhat or very important factor

in abstention. Women, the poor and younger voters were no more likely to report

polling station access as a problem than other demographic groups.

In contrast, 36% of respondents claimed that inability to register was a very important

factor in non-voting, while 55% said the problem was not at all or not very important.

The number of people reporting this explanation did not differ by regions, nor were

poor people or women more likely to name inability to register as a barrier to

abstention. Neither education nor Urdu or minimum literacy were related to

registration problems as an important factor in non-voting. These results may seem

somewhat surprising given the findings of the preceding section that show women and

rural electorates somewhat less likely to be registered. However, given that previous

elections did not require strict forms of identification, vested interests in the

constituencies may have helped mobilize likely supporters based on clan or family

ties, irrespective of demographic characteristics. Thus, to the extent to which people

were excluded from previous electoral lists, this exclusion, while substantial, does not

appear to have been based on particular ascribed characteristics such as race and class.

This is consistent with research on turnout and registration earlier in the histories of

advanced industrialized democracies, in which parties would mobilize voters

irrespective of race or other characteristics if they knew or could guarantee these

groups would support them.34

Almost as many respondents (29%) reported that they went to the polling station, but

that they couldn’t vote due to a lack of personal identification, while 42% said

identification was not a factor in abstention. While women and younger people did

not differ significantly in the importance they attributed to having personal

identification, there were significant differences among different levels of education

and lower and upper classes, especially the poorest category of respondents. As Table

4.4.3a shows, respondents in the two lowest income categories reported that lack of

identification was a somewhat or very important factor in abstaining more often (42%

in the lowest income category and 41% in the lower middle class category), compared

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with under 30% for the other income categories. Those with less education also cited

identification problems more often than better educated people. Forty-eight percent of

those with only a primary school education who answered the question, for example,

said ID was a somewhat or very important factor, compared with 22% high income

category.

Table 4.4.3 a: Importance of Lack of Identification at Polling Station as Reason for Non-Voting, by Class and Education.

Don’t Know % Not at all important% Not very important %

Somewhat % Very %

ClassLowest Income 14 36 8 10 32Lower Middle Class 16 40 3 4 37Middle Class 12 44 16 5 23

Upper Middle Class 6 51 14 3 27

High Income 13 55 11 1 21Educational Attainment

None 21 32 5 8 33Madrasa 2 40 17 7 34Some Primary 18 46 3 6 26Finished Primary 1 41 9 9 39Middle 9 45 13 5 29Matric 11 52 12 620Intermediate 6 59 12 2 21

For 24% of respondents, arriving at the polling station and not finding their name on

the voter list was a somewhat or very important factor in abstention, a result that does

not differ significantly across demographic groups or the provinces. These findings

reinforce results presented in the previous section about awareness and access to the

current election procedures, particularly with respect to ensuring that eligible voters—

especially the poor and less educated—register, verify that they are on the electoral

lists in their communities, and have the proper identification when they arrive at the

polling station.

4.4.4 PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

It is well-known that with each election in Pakistan, ordinary men and women, the

parties, the media, and civil society refer to the problem of “rigging” elections.

However, people in NWFP have different views about what “rigging” means, when

and where in the process it occurs, and who is responsible. Some observers may

imagine rigging to be a centralized process involving manipulation of the count, ballot

stuffing, and other election-day problems, but for ordinary people, free and fair

elections may be compromised by less obvious problems that occur well before

election-day by actors who remain largely behind the scenes. The survey asked

questions seeking to identify what types of problems most threaten free and fair

elections in the perception of ordinary adults, as well as what types of administrative

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and procedural measures would most effectively strengthen citizen confidence in the

efficacy of their participation in the electoral process. This section addressed citizen

perceptions of the types of problems that occurred in past elections and what actors

and levels of government are responsible. The final section presents data about

respondents’ reactions to potential recommendations in election administration. The

survey sought to assess the perception of ordinary citizens about the role of local

politicians and other actors in the quality of national and provincial elections in

NWFP. The sample population responded when forced to choose between two

statements designed to measure the level of government perceived as most important

in ensuring a fair election (Q31). Approximately one-third (29%) agreed with the first

statement—that the government at Federal level was taking positive steps to ensure a

free and fair election, while another one-third (36%) said they agreed with the

statement that local officials corrupt the process despite efforts at the national level.

An additional (35%) said they did not know, even though they were not presented

with this option. As both education and income increase, the number perceiving local

government influence over election processes increases; 52% in the highest income

group attributed corruption to local officials, compared with 34% in the lowest

income group. Those who are illiterate, live in rural areas, are less educated, younger

people, and lower income respondents said they did not know in response to this

question at much higher rates than urban respondents, those with more education, and

higher incomes (see Table 4.4.4a for illustrative example). Thirty-three percent of

rural respondents chose the second statement attributing problems to local officials,

compared with 41% of urban respondents, while 39% of rural compared with 28% of

urban respondents said they did not know how to choose between the two statements.

About the same percentage of rural and urban respondents (28% and 30%,

respectively) said the government in Islamabad was taking positive steps. It appears

that urban respondents are somewhat more likely to attribute problems in national

elections to local officials. Women chose a statement less than half as often as men

(50% of women compared with 20% of men said they did not know how to choose).

When they did choose a response, 45% of men attributed election unfairness to local

officials compared with 27% of women, but even fewer women (23%) compared with

34% of men said the government in Islamabad was taking positive steps to ensure a

free and fair election. The number of respondents who did not choose a statement

declined with increased age. Respondents of all ages were more likely to attribute

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responsibility for election corruption to local governments, but both 21-24 year olds

and those over 50 were significantly more likely to attribute problems to local

government than to credit national government. Thirty-six percent of 21-24 year olds

and 42% of those aged 50 and over blamed local officials, compared with 24% and

27%, respectively, who attributed election quality to the national government (Table

4.4.4a).

Regional differences indicate that eligible voters in the central NWFP and Northern

NWFP are more cynical about local officials’ role in the election process, while those

in the Hazara and Southern NWFP are more likely to believe in central government

steps to ensure free and fair elections. In Hazara and Southern NWFP, despite the fact

that more respondents appear underserved by objective measures of election access

and awareness, 34% and 42% of respondents said they believed the central

government was taking positive steps to ensure a free and fair election, compared with

29% and 23% of those in central NWFP and Northern NWFP. In the latter two

regions, 39% of all respondents’ confidence in central government measures was

tempered by skepticism of local politicians’ corruption of the process (Table 4.4.4a).

Table 4.4.4a: Attribution of Election (Un)Fairness to National versus Local Government, by Age, Educational Attainment, and Regions.

Demographic Group Government inIslamabad is Taking

Positive Steps to Ensure Free Election

It does not matter whatIslamabad does, local and

provincial politicianscorrupt the process.

Don't Know /Cannot Choose

Age 21-24 years 24 36 4025-34 years 30 33 3635-49 years 34 35 3150 and above 27 42 30

Region North 30 39 39South 42 28 30Centre 29 39 32Hazara 34 24 42

Education None 25 34 41Madrasa 23 30 47Some Primary 23 41 36Finished Primary 31 37 32Middle 30 37 33Matric 31 43 26Intermediate and above

37 36 27

When asked the respondents to compare their expectations for upcoming elections to

past elections in NWFP (Q32), 45% of respondents said they expected the level of

fairness in upcoming elections to be about the same as past elections. Only 12% said

they expected the election to be less free, while 45% said they expected the elections

to be somewhat or much more free than past elections. Expectations did not differ

significantly by age, educational attainment, and income, but there were significant

regional, gender, and rural-urban differences in expectations of fairness (Table 4.4.4b).

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Forty-five percent of rural respondents compared with 40 percent of urban

respondents said upcoming elections were likely to be somewhat or much more free

and fair compared with past elections, while slightly more urban (16%) than rural

(10%) respondents expected these elections to be less free and fair. Surprisingly,

comparatively more respondents in the Hazara expected the elections to be more free

and fair than past elections (53%), a result that may reflect their local, provincial, and

national representation. Women were less likely to expect major differences between

past and present elections, while more men thought elections would be less free (14%

compared with 10% of women) or more free (44% compared with 42% of women

(Table 4.4.4b). When asked about their confidence in the Election Commission of

Pakistan (ECP) (Q33f), the same percentage of respondents (35%) said they had no

trust at all or some trust, while fewer (25%) said they had a great deal of trust in the

ECP, results that did not differ significantly across levels of educational attainment,

regions, or age group. Urban respondents said they had no trust in the ECP more

frequently (44%) than rural respondents (34%), while rural respondents expressed

some or a great deal of trust more frequently than urban respondents.

Table 4.4.4 b: Perception about the Fairness of upcoming elections as Compared withPast Elections.

Demographic Group Somewhat or Much Less Free and Fair

About the Same Somewhat or Much More Free and Fair

Milieu Rural 10 45 45Urban 16 44 40

Regions North 11 43 46South 12 43 46Centre 12 48 40Hazara 13 34 53

Gender Male 14 41 44Female 10 48 42

Forty percent and 27% of rural respondents had some or a great deal of trust in the

ECP, while 34% of urban respondents had some trust in the ECP and 22% a great deal

(Table 4.4.4c). These response patterns may reflect the relative lack of exposure of

rural respondents to media and other analysis of the ECP, as well as more trust in

government institutions in general among people in rural areas. These results also are

consistent with the survey’s previous finding that rural populations are generally less

likely to have been reached by election registration efforts (See Table 4.4.2c).

Similarly, almost half (48%) of women said they had no trust in the ECP, compared

with less than one third (29%) of men. One in three men (32%) compared with less

than one in five women (16%) expressed a great deal of trust in the institution (Table

4.4c). These data may reinforce the findings that women are less likely to know about

and to be reached by election procedures or may reflect women’s greater awareness

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that some women face serious obstacles to voting on Election Day.35 Thirty-nine and

36% of men and women, respectively, had some trust in the ECP. The low level of

trust (16%) among women in the ECP, the Human Rights activist Afrasiyab Khattak

in an interview suggests, ‘there is need to do efforts to make women aware of their

rights as voters and to assist them directly in taking the steps necessary to exercise

their voting rights should be a major priority, while the ECP should be encouraged to

do a better job of registering women, facilitating their access to the election process,

and ensuring that they express their opinions freely in the polling booth.’36 When

asked about their confidence that most voting-age citizens in their communities would

be registered on the electoral list in time for the election (Q43), 21% said they were

very confident, 34% said they were somewhat confident and only 7% said they were

not at all confident. Classes and rural and urban settings did not differ significantly in

their level of confidence about registration, while those with only a madrasa education

stand out as much less likely to express confidence in the registration process (only 12%

of madrasa-educated respondents said they were very confident that people in their

communities would be registered in time, compared with 18-25% of respondents in

the other educational groups).

Table 4.4.4c: Trust in Election Commission of Pakistan, by Milieu, Class, and Gender.Demographic Group No Trust at All Some Trust Great Deal of Trust

MilieuRural 10 45 45Urban 16 44 40

Class

Lowest Income 33 39 28Lower Middle 37 40 23

Middle 43 35 22

Upper Middle 46 39 15

High Income 34 35 31

GenderMale 29 39 32

Female 48 36 16

The number of respondents who do not know how confident they are in registration

process decreases as the level of education increases. Confidence in registration for

the upcoming election differs by regions, with 12% of respondents in southern NWFP,

8% each in Hazara and Northern, and 5% in central NWFP saying they were not at all

confident of the registration process at the time of the survey. Respondents in

Northern NWFP said they did not know (49%) more often than those in the other

regions (Table 4.4.4d). More males than females were somewhat or very confident

that eligible voters in their communities would be registered (69% and 48% of men

and women, respectively); with more women also saying they did not know.

Women’s lower confidence level may indicate that women respondents had in mind

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the low level of women’s voter registration, whereas some men respondents may have

had in mind only men as registered voters. In any case, the data are consistent with the

survey’s other findings pointing to the need for targeted voter registration efforts

aimed at women.

Table 4.4.4d: Confidence that Eligible Voters in Community Will Be Registered,by Regions and Gender.

Demographic GroupNot at All

Confident (%)Somewhat

Confident (%)Very

Confident (%)Don't

Know (%)Regions North 8 25 18 49

South 12 39 14 35Centre 5 38 22 35Hazara 8 32 21 39

Gender Male 7 42 27 24Female 6 27 21 39

Similar percentages of respondents expressed confidence in the accuracy of electoral

lists in their communities (Q44), with 22% very confident, 33% somewhat confident,

and 8% not at all confident. Levels of confidence in list accuracy differed

significantly across most demographic groups except rural and urban respondents

(Table 4.4e). A lower percentage of respondents in northern NWFP and Southern

NWFP expressed high confidence in the electoral lists (16% and 14%, respectively,

compared with 25% and 21% in Central NWFP and Hazara), although more

respondents in Southern NWFP (40%) said they were somewhat confident— higher

than in the other regions (see Table 4.4.4e).

Table 4.4.4e: Confidence in the Accuracy of the Electoral List in Your Community.

Demographic Group Not at All Somewhat Very Don't KnowRegions North 10 28 16 46

South 9 40 14 37Centre 6 35 25 34Hazara 8 31 21 40

Age 21-24 10 31 17 4324-34 8 33 18 4035-49 8 33 23 35

50 and above 4 34 31 31Class Lowest Income 7 33 18 41

Lower Middle class

7 34 23 36

Middle class 9 33 21 38Upper Middle

class9 32 23 36

High Income 6 30 36 28Education None 7 29 19 45

Madrasa 6 40 14 39Some Primary 5 34 21 39

Finished Primary 8 30 25 37Middle 7 36 27 31Matric 9 35 29 26

Intermediate and above

9 36 22 33

Gender Male 8 38 28 25

Female 7 28 16 50

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The percentage confidence in the accuracy of the electoral lists increases steadily with

respondent age, with 17% of 21-24 year-olds compared with 31% of those over 50

expressing high confidence in the electoral lists.

This data is consistent with earlier findings of lower levels of voter registration among

youth (see Table 4.4.2a). While about one-third of respondents in each income group

said they were somewhat confident in electoral lists, the number saying “don’t know”

decreased with increased education, and the number of respondents who said they

were very confident in the lists increased with income—higher income groups said

they were very confident in the lists twice as often as the lowest income group, and at

least 13% more often than the other income groups (Table 4.4.4e). Finally, women

(16%) said they were very confident in the list almost half as often as men and women

were twice as likely to say they did not know about list accuracy in their communities

(Table 4.4.4e).

These results are consistent with findings that women have less trust in the ECP, less

confidence that people in their communities are registered and less knowledge about

whether their household is registered to vote. Equal percentages of respondents

expected names to be left off of electoral lists at polling stations as expected no

problems with electoral lists (39%), while 24% did not know how likely this problem

might be in the next election. Despite the fact that some groups reported personally

experiencing this problem in the past, demographic groups did not differ substantially

when answering this question about expectations for the coming election.

SECTION 4.5 TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

A population’s participation in elections and political processes reflects, in part, its

trust in political institutions. Greater levels of trust in political institutions have been

associated with higher levels of citizen engagement with political processes. Many

analysts consider trust in political institutions—particularly elected institutions and

their ability to regulate unelected leaders—as critical to the consolidation of

democracy.37 New research has questioned this assumption, arguing that citizens who

are more skeptical of institutions do a better job of holding governments accountable,

especially along with an independent judiciary and media.38 Survey questions that

measure citizen trust in a variety of institutions can shed light on the health of

governance and democracy. Furthermore, proposals for improvements in the election

process, including electoral administration reform and scrutiny of elections by

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observers, may be irrelevant if low trust in both bureaucratic and elected institutions

keeps eligible voters away from the polls. Understanding public regard for the

institutional landscape helps provide a context for interpretations of the quality of the

electoral process by long- and short-term election observers and civil society.

Additionally, in an environment of distrust, informing citizens about the nature of

reforms designed to increase their participation may be an important part of creating

public demand that hastens the institutional strengthening process. The survey asked

respondents a series of questions about their perceptions of a variety of state and non-

state institutions in country.

4.5.1 ELECTED ASSEMBLIES: When asked about their trust in a variety of

country’s institutions (Q33, respondents expressed little trust in the elected national

and provincial assemblies (Q33e), with 43% saying they had no trust at all in these

institutions. The assemblies ranked second after the police (67% distrust) with respect

to level of distrust, although more people had some trust in the assemblies--39%--

compared with just 23% who had some trust in the police. At the time of the survey,

more respondents in rural areas said they had some or a great deal of trust (63%) in

the assemblies than did urban respondents (48%). Over half (52%) of urban

respondents compared with 37% of rural respondents had no trust at all in the

assemblies. While it is beyond the scope of this survey to explain these differences

between rural and urban electorates, closer links between rural electorates and

patronage networks and family connections to representatives may explain this higher

level of trust. In addition, a more diffuse and transient urban electorate may be less

familiar with their representatives and their constituent activities (Table 4.5.1a).

Table 4.5.1 a: Trust in National and Provincial Assembly.Variables Demographic Group No Trust at all Some Trust Great deal of Trust

MilieuRural 37 42 21Urban 52 34 14

Class

Lowest Class 38 41 21Lower Middle 43 41 17

Middle 49 37 14Upper Middle 52 40 9High Income 41 34 26

GenderMale 35 43 22

Female 53 33 44

Women expressed mistrust of the assemblies more frequently than men, with one in

two women (53%) saying they had no trust at all in the assemblies compared with one

in three men (35%). Sixty-five percent of men had some or a great deal of trust in the

assemblies, compared with 47% of women (Table 4.5.1a).

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Respondents in the middle and upper middle class reported less trust in the assemblies

than higher and lower income groups; 47% and 49% of middle and upper middle class

respondents had some or a great deal of trust in the legislatures compared with 58% or

more of low and high income respondents. Interviewers asked respondents to assess

the likelihood of suggesting the their Member of the National Assembly (MNA) or

Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) (Q19) when asked: “Looking at the

problems in your area and the way they affect families like yours, or your relatives’

and friends’, who would you suggest to go to in order to resolve these problems?”

Fourteen percent said they would be likely to suggest the MNA or MPA to solve a

problem, while 16% and 65% said they were unlikely to or would never suggest,

respectively, the MNA or MPA. Fewer women (17%) than men (23%) were likely to

suggest the assembly members, and more women (69%) than men (59%) would never

recommend the MNA or MPA to solve a problem. Eighteen percent of men and 14%

of women respondents said they were unlikely to recommend these politicians. About

one in five respondents at all educational levels said they were likely to recommend

the MNA or MPA (Table 4.5.1b), with the exception of those who have a madrasa

education, who said they would recommend the MNA or MPA more often (about one

in three).

Table 4.5.1b: Likelihood of Recommending MNA or MPA to Resolve Local Problems, by Gender and Educational Attainment.

Demography Would Never Unlikely Likely

Education

None 70 13 17Madrasa 51 17 32Some Primary 70 13 18Finished Primary 60 15 25Middle School 64 14 22Matric 58 18 23Intermediate and Above

59 22 19

Gender

Male 59 18 23

Female69 14 17

However, the number of respondents saying they would never recommend an MNA

or MPA decreases with higher levels of education, which may reflect a greater

awareness on the part of educated respondents of the functions of the MNAs and

MPAs and how they might be contacted, as well as greater knowledge about their

constituencies’ representatives. Perceived power of the assemblies is not related to39

the respondents’ likelihood of recommending the MNA or MPA to solve local

problems. This result suggests that perceptions of the individual politicians and their

ability to deliver services at the local level shapes public views of MNA or MPA

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efficacy more than the influence of the institution itself. The Frontier electorate was

divided in its opinion about the degree of power the national and provincial assembly

have to direct political development in Pakistan (Q60); 26% said that the National

Assembly and Senate (Q60a) had no power at all, while 28% said it had a great deal

of power. The perceived power of the national assembly did not differ across regions

and demographic groups. More respondents had an opinion about the provincial as

compared with the national assembly. When asked about the Provincial Assemblies’

(PA) power to direct political development (Q60b), 26% of respondents said the PA

had some power, and about one in five respondents said it had no power, little power,

or a great deal of power, respectively. Forty-eight percent said the PA had some or a

great deal of power, compared with 42% for the National Assembly. Not surprisingly,

these findings vary somewhat by regions (Table 4.5.1c). In Central NWFP, 52% of

respondents said the PA has some or a great deal of power, compared with 44% in

Hazara, 41% in Northern NWFP, and 43% in Southern NWFP. In both Central and

Southern NWFP, 39% of respondents said the PA had little or no power. In Hazara

and Northern NWFP, respectively, 35% and 41% perceived little or no power in the

PA. Respondents in the Hazara were twice as likely to say they did not know how

much power the PA has.

Table 4.5.1c: Perceived Power of the Provincial Assembly, by Regions.Areas Don’t Know None Little Power Some Power

A Great deal of Power

North 18 18 24 23 18South 18 17 22 26 18Centre 9 20 19 27 25Hazara 21 16 19 26 18

National and provincial elected institutions enjoyed relatively little esteem from the

NWFP electorate; 43% of respondents—and 53% of women—had no trust at all in

elected assemblies; 64% would never recommend a member of the provincial or

national assembly to solve a local problem. Around 40% of the electorate perceived

that neither the Provincial nor the National Assembly had power to shape political

development. Furthermore, rural and less educated people may trust these institutions

more than urban, middle class, and educated populations, a finding consistent with

patronage patterns, rather than an informed electorate overseeing the performance of

electoral institutions.

4.5.2 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

The electorate expressed more trust in the national government compared with the

elected assemblies (Q33a); 34% had no trust at all in national government, but 38%

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and 28% had some or a great deal of trust, respectively. As with the elected

assemblies, women were less likely to trust national government; 41% had no trust at

all compared with 28% of men. Thirty-five percent of women and 41% of men

regarded the government with some trust, and 24% and 31% of women and men,

respectively, expressed a great deal of trust in the national government. The urban

electorate was also more skeptical of the central government; 70% of rural

respondents had some or a great deal of trust while comparatively fewer urban

respondents (60%) felt the same way. Forty percent of urban respondents had no trust

at all in the government compared with 30% of rural respondents. The low levels of

trust in national government correspond with a prevailing (39%) perception that

corruption is both a very common and major problem in government (Q53). Those

with more education as well as those with higher incomes were more likely to view

corruption as a frequent and serious problem. Only 30% of those with low education

compared with 54% with a F.A. / F.Sc degree or higher believed government

corruption is a common and serious problem. Women said more frequently that they

did not know about the level of corruption in government, but were otherwise similar

to men. An additional measure of corruption—the degree to which employment

depends on friends and relatives in government (Q52b)—was included to assess the

potential effectiveness of voting trends to make independent decisions based on

evaluation of party platforms and policies, rather than on candidate personalities and

personal benefit. Over one third (36%) agreed strongly with the statement

“employment depends on friends and relatives in government” and an additional 22%

agreed, for a total of 58% who view connections as important. A minority (26%)

disagreed with this statement. In the Hazara, 76% of respondents agreed or agreed

strongly that jobs depend on government connections, compared with 57% in Central

NWFP, 51% in Northern NWFP, and 65% in Southern NWFP. Twenty-six percent of

respondents in Central NWFP, 14% in Hazara, 29% in Northern NWFP, and 25% in

Southern NWFP disagreed with the proposition. Respondents in Hazara appear to

believe connections are more important to employment than those in the other four

regions of NWFP.

4.5.3 JUDICIARY

The survey asked about the third pillar of government, the judiciary, in part because

judges have a major role in elections in Pakistan. District judges approve polling

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station schemes and appointment of polling officials, oversee candidate nomination

and election observer accreditation processes, and manage the consolidation of

election results. At the time of the survey, levels of trust in the judiciary mirrored

support for other institutions (Q33b). Important national events regarding the

judiciary have taken place in the intervening period, such that survey findings do not

reflect views about judges of the current national or local courts.40 Data shows that

about one in three (31%) NWFP adults had a great deal of trust in the judiciary; while

an additional one-third (31%) had no trust at all. Thirty seven percent of respondents

had some trust in the judiciary. Urban respondents expressed distrust of the judiciary

more often; 37% said they had no trust while only 28% of rural respondents had no

trust. On the other hand, 26% of urban and 35% of rural respondents had a great deal

of trust in the judiciary. Equal percentages (37%) of both rural and urban respondents

had some trust in the judiciary. Similarly, women trust the judiciary less than men; 36%

and 27% of women and men, respectively, had no trust in the judiciary. Twenty-five

percent of women compared with 37% of men had a great deal of trust in the

institution, and 39% and 36% of women and men, respectively, had some trust. In

Central NWFP, 74% of respondents had some or a great deal of trust in the judiciary,

followed by 67% in Southern NWFP and 60% each in Hazara and Northern NWFP.

4.5.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS

Of the institutions respondents were asked to evaluate- the police (Q34c) were

trusted the least. Only ten percent of respondents had a great deal of trust in the police,

followed by 23% with some trust, and over two-thirds (67%) with no trust at all.

There were provincial differences in levels of trust for the police, and rural

respondents expressed trust in the police somewhat more than urban respondents. In

Northern NWFP, more respondents (75%) distrusted the police, followed by Central

NWFP (67%), Hazara, and Southern NWFP (57% each). Higher percentages of

respondents in Hazara and Southern NWFP, 42% and 43%, respectively, had some or

a great deal of trust in the police, compared with 33% and 24% in Central NWFP and

Northern NWFP, respectively (Table 4.5.4). Men and women did not differ with

respect to trust for police, but 59% of men and 49% of women had a great deal of

trust in the army (Q33d), 28% and 27%, respectively, had some trust, and 23% of

women had no trust at all compared with 14% of men.

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Table 4.5.4: Trust on PoliceRegions No Trust Some Great DealNorth 75 18 7South 57 26 17Centre 67 23 10Hazara 58 30 12

4.5.5 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Fewer people have a great deal of in trust provincial government (Q33g) (understood

as the Chief Minister and cabinet and to a lesser extent the Governor, who is

appointed by the President) 22%, than in national government 28%, but 38% of

respondents have some trust in both. Forty percent said they had no trust at all in

provincial government. These attitudes do not differ across the regions. The number

of respondents in urban versus rural areas who said they had no trust at all in

provincial government differed by 10% (47% and 37%, respectively). Forty percent

of the rural electorate expressed some trust and another 24% a great deal of trust in

provincial government, while only 35% of urban respondents had some trust and 18%

had a great deal. Gender differences in trust of provincial government are more

pronounced than for national government. The percentage of women expressing a

great deal of trust in provincial government was 16%, compared with 25% of men; 42%

had some trust compared with 32% of men; and 51% had no trust at all compared

with just 32% of men (table not shown). Perceptions about corruption in provincial

government (Q53b) mirror those of the national government, with a similar

distribution of responses, suggesting that those who believe there is a great deal of

corruption in NWFP perceive it as a problem at multiple levels of government.41 Forty

percent of respondents said the problem of provincial-level corruption is both

common and serious. Eight percent said corruption is not a problem at the provincial

level, while 18% said it is somewhat common and 11% said it was very common but

minor. The distribution of responses in each province is the same as the national

average. Respondents with higher levels of income and educational attainment view

corruption as a problem more frequently than those with lower incomes and with less

education.

4.5.6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Local Government is out of the scope of this study, but to find out electoral/voting

trends, questions about Local Government were incorporated in survey for more

comprehensive analysis of voting trends. Approximately one in three respondents

each have no trust (35%), some trust (36%), and a great deal of trust (29%) in the re-

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established local governments elected in 2001 and again in 200542 (Q33i). The level

of perceived corruption is also similar to that for provincial and national government,

with 39% of respondents saying local government corruption is a common and major

problem (Q53c). Again, those who think corruption is a major problem think that it

occurs at all levels of government.43 However, a greater percentage (59%) would

recommend local government to solve a problem (Q19g), a function, perhaps, of the

relative proximity of local government rather than high levels of trust or expectations

of low corruption. Women were less likely to trust local as well as the other levels of

government. Forty three percent of women compared with 29% of men have no trust

in local government. Women respondents report some or a great deal of trust less

often (33% and 24%, respectively) than men (38% and 33%), although they said they

were likely to recommend local government for solving problems as often as men.

Respondents ages 21-24 were less likely to name elected local officials as a resource

for resolving local problems. While 60% or more of respondents in each of the other

age groups recommended local officials, 51% of 21-24 year-olds do so, while 49%

said they the would be unlikely to or would never do so, compared with about 39% of

respondents in the other age groups (Table 4.5.6). In each of the region with the

exception of Southern NWFP, urban respondents recommend local government

officials more often than their rural counterparts do (see Table 4.5.6). Respondents in

Central NWFP and Hazara (64% and 60%, respectively) say they are likely to

recommend elected local officials more often than those in Northern NWFP and

Southern NWFP (49% and 46%, respectively).

The percentage of respondents in the two lowest income groups surveyed who said

they were likely to recommend local officials (50% and 62%, respectively), was lower

than that for the other income levels (between 66% and 65%) (Table 4.5.6). Within

the lowest income group, 37% would never recommend local officials, compared with

23%-31% in the other classes. As with other levels of government, this may reflect a

lack of knowledge about the process, or a general feeling of powerlessness to

influence government among the poor. Because income and education are related,

education may be the primary explanation for low government engagement by low-

income respondents. Those with no or some primary education were likely to

recommend local officials less often (48% and 54%, respectively, compared with 60%

or more for the other educational groups (Table 4.5.6). About 30% of respondents in

each of the four highest educational levels (those who finished primary school or

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more) were unlikely to or would never recommend local officials, compared with

about 50% of respondents with no education, madrasa, or some primary school.

Analysing the results for perceived corruption at other levels of government, the

percentage of respondents who perceive local government corruption as a common

and serious problem increases with income and education, but does not vary by

regions, age, gender, or urban/rural milieu. Respondents who view local officials as

corrupt recommended them less frequently as a solution to local problems. Of those

who said there is no corruption among local officials, 68% recommend them as a

solution to problems, compared with 58% of those who think that local corruption is

common and serious.

Table 5.6: Likelihood of Recommending Local Government to Solve a Problem.Variables Category Would Never Unlikely Likely

Age Group

21-24 Years 40 9 5125-34 Years 28 9 6235-49Years 28 11 6050 and Above 29 9 62

Area

North Rural 44 12 44North Urban 36 11 53South Rural 45 9 46South Urban 45 10 45Centre Rural 29 11 60Centre Urban 26 5 70Hazara rural 31 11 58Hazara Urban 21 9 69

Class

Lowest Income 37 13 50Lower Middle Class 31 7 62Middle Class 23 9 68Upper Middle Class 23 12 66High Income 30 3 67

Educational Attainment

None 42 10 59Madrasa 29 11 60Some Primary

34 13 54

Finished Primary31 8 61

Middle 22 10 68

Matric21 7 72

Intermediate and above

23 10 67

Thirty-five of these skeptics said they would never recommend local officials

compared with 22-25% of those who believe corruption is a minor problem or no

problem at all (data not presented). While many respondents would still consult local

government for a problem, the finding suggests that perceived corruption may reduce

the degree to which citizens view local government as a resource, perhaps leading

them to seek alternative sources of information and assistance. People in NWFP

understand “district government” as the district bureaucracy or civil service, namely

the District Coordination Officer (DCO) and subordinate Executive District Officers

(EDOs).

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It may also include the elected District Nazim, but most people probably think of

these elected representatives as part of the new “local government” structure.

Respondents were, overall, unlikely to recommend district-level officials as resources

in solving local problems (Q19h). Seventy-five percent said were unlikely or would

never recommend this resource, and only 25% would be likely to recommend district

officials to solve a local problem.44

4.5.7 PRESS: Historically, the domestic press has enjoyed more respect than other

institutions. Indeed, 72% of the survey respondents have some or a great deal of trust

in the press. Furthermore, trust in the press, surprisingly, does not vary with

respondent age, education, rural or urban milieu, frequency of use of any media—

television, radio, or newspapers – or interest in politics (both with self-reported and

the behavioral index measures (see section 3). Literacy in at least one language

corresponds with greater trust in the press, but it is interesting that even among those

who are illiterate, 64% have some or a great deal of trust in the press, compared with

78% of literate respondents. Not surprisingly, those with literacy in Urdu or English

have more trust in the press. Forty-three percent of those literate in Urdu have a great

deal of trust in the press, compared with 30% of those who cannot read, write, or

speak Urdu. English speakers have even more trust in the press, with 48% expressing

a great deal of trust compared with 34% of those without English literacy.

Respondents in Central NWFP and Northern NWFP express a great deal of trust in

the press more often (38% each) than those in Hazara and Southern NWFP (31% and

24%, respectively), who say they have no trust more often (40% and 36% in Hazara

and Southern NWFP, respectively) than the 25% and 26% who have no trust in

Central NWFP and Northern NWFP. The relatively high level of confidence in the

press, even in a population with low levels of media consumption, may have several

implications for voting trends. First, the electorate, even while not highly engaged

with the news on a personal level, may assume that the media is playing an important

role in representing their interests or in holding other institutions accountable.

Secondly, the electorate may rely on others who do consume media to share

information and thus form opinions about the quality of the media based on these

second hand accounts. Finally, people may not consume the media under normal

circumstances, but limited, elevated consumptions during salient events and crises

may influence perceptions of a larger audience. Further research would be required to

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confirm the speculation that people consume the press indirectly through educated or

more engaged family and community members, but the relative level of confidence in

the press may point to the importance of using the media as an important resource in

voter education, despite low levels of direct consumption.

4.5.8 SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS: In developing democracies, social institutions

often wield considerable influence over people’s lives as well as the political system

itself. These institutions, operating at the community level, are often closer to

ordinary people. Public opinion about the influence of local figures and institutions

should not be viewed as a static continuation of long-standing traditions, but rather as

a snapshot of the views of ordinary people given relatively recent changes in local

governance. In developing democracies, there is a tendency to assume that citizen ties

to local institutions are remnants of primordial social interaction, but there is evidence

that institutional changes are equally if not more influential.45 A 1999 study of the

Pakistani electorate, found that agricultural landowners’ influence on elections had

diminished as of the 1997 elections, 46 but recent research suggests that the new

devolution program and non-party local elections may have reversed that trends.47

The survey included questions to measure citizen attitudes toward three social

institutions—religious leaders (Q19b), landowners (feudal leaders) (Q19a), and

biradari elders (Q19c)—in anticipation of programming that might seek to engage

these local influential’s in voter registration, voter education, and other election-

related activities, or to encourage voter independence from them, depending on

various factors. Specifically, respondents were asked how likely they would be to

recommend each type of community member to solve a local problem. The goal of

the question was to identify what leaders people think of most readily when they have

a question or problem, which may be a proxy for measuring the level of engagement

between citizens and those institutions. Almost one in three respondents (27%) would

recommend religious leaders if they knew someone with a problem in the community.

This places religious leaders above nongovernmental organizations, political party

offices, Members of the National and Provincial Assemblies, district administration

officials, and feudal leaders as perceived problem solvers, even though 58% of

respondents would never recommend them and 15% would be unlikely to do so.

Respondents’ likelihood of recommending religious leaders did not differ by regions,

age group, gender, or urban/rural milieu. The percentage of respondents who

recommend religious leaders as a resource diminishes, to some extent, with income

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and education (Table 4.5.8a). Among low-income respondents, one in three (32%)

said they would be likely to recommend religious leaders, 14% would be unlikely to

recommend them, and 54% would never recommend them. In comparison, 19% of the

highest income group would recommend religious leaders while 82% would be

unlikely to or would never do so (Table 4.5.8a).

Table 4.5.8a: Likelihood of Recommending Religious Leaders to Solve a Problem.Demography Would Never Unlikely Likely

Class Lowest income 54 14 32Lower Middle Class

59 17 23

Middle Class 56 18 26Upper Middle Class

62 16 23

High Income 74 8 19Education None 56 15 29

Madrasa 33 17 50Some Primary 55 17 28Finished Primary 54 21 25Middle 67 9 24Matric 63 23 24Intermediate and above

64 15 21

The middle class respondents recommended religious leaders slightly more frequently

(26%) than did the lower middle class (23%) and the upper middle class (23%). Not

surprisingly, those with a madrasa education recommend religious leaders to solve

problems two times as often (50%) than the other education groups, with the

exception of those with no education and some primary school education (29% and

28%, respectively) (Table 4.5.8a). Four out of five (80%) respondents with

Matriculation or an F.A. /F.Sc degree or more education said they were unlikely to or

would never recommend these leaders, compared with 76% of those with a middle

school education, 75% with a primary school education, and 71% of those with no

education.58

Religious leaders could be a relatively important partner in reaching lower income

and less educated people. Religious leaders come to mind for one in three low income

respondents compared with one in four middle class respondents or one in five high-

income respondents in the context of solving local problems. Religious elements play

a key role in shaping voting trends in NWFP. Although declining, the so-called feudal

system still holds sway in the social dynamics of NWFP. Many low-income people

still depend upon landowners for their livelihood and income. In the political sphere,

the patron-client relationship between feudal elites and lower income groups persists

in some parts of the NWFP. For many years, observers of Pakistani politics have

argued that the influence of large landowners, who often parley their “landed power”

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into political power, is a critical obstacle to democracy in Pakistan. That is, where

landlords are influential, they dominate the electoral process.48 These feudal leaders

represent an important influence on the lives of their tenant farmers, and their political

influence, often manifested in the form of provincial and national assembly seats or

influence within political parties, means that understanding their role is critical to any

assessment of elections. Percentages of respondents who would suggest feudal leaders

to their relatives or friends to find solutions to their local-level problems are similar to

those for religious leaders. 26% of respondents said they were likely to recommend

these leaders in the event of a local problem, while 62% would never do so. Twelve

percent said they would be unlikely to recommend feudal leaders. Women and men

recommend feudal leaders equally often, as do different age groups. Less than half the

number of respondents in urban central NWFP as in rural Central NWFP said they

were likely to recommend feudal leaders to solve local problems (13% and 28%,

respectively), and 87% were unlikely or would never recommend them, compared

with 71% of those in the province’s rural areas. Urban versus rural respondents in

Hazara have similar responses (see Table 4.5.8b), while both urban and rural

respondents in Northern NWFP and Southern NWFP were more similar to each other

in their willingness to suggest feudal leaders, which is, perhaps, consistent with the

greater degree of influence these leaders may have overall in these two provinces in

both rural and urban areas.

Table 4.5.8b: Likelihood of Recommending “Feudal Leaders” to Solve a Problem.Demography Would Never Unlikely Likely

Areas North Rural 53 14 32North Urban 47 14 39South Rural 61 13 25South Urban 57 18 25Centre Rural 60 11 28Centre Urban 77 10 13Hazara Rural 63 10 27Hazara Urban 72 10 17

Class Lowest Income 52 9 38Lower Middle Class 66 14 20Middle Class 66 17 16Upper Middle Class 74 11 14High Income 83 4 13

Education None 52 10 38Madrasa 46 12 41Some Primary 66 11 22Finished Primary 60 17 24Middle 73 8 18Matric 75 10 15Intermediate and above

74 15 10

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Differences across income and education groups are striking; the lowest income

respondents suggest feudal leaders twice as often as the next highest income group

(40% compared with 20% of lower middle class respondents) (Table 5.8b).

While 61% of low income respondents are unlikely to or would never suggest feudal

leaders, 80% of lower middle class respondents would not. Similarly, about 40% of

those with no education or a madrasa education are likely to recommend feudals,

while 22% and 24% of those who have some or finished primary education,

respectively, would suggest feudals (Table 4.5.8b). A large percentage of the

uneducated and low income electorate think of feudal leaders when asked to

recommend someone to solve their problems, and existing research suggests the

electoral power of these influentials. This data shows that voting trends are under the

influence of local landlords.

An even larger percentage (70%) of the electorate is likely to turn to biradari elders.

The biradari, or clan, is more specifically a group of patrilineal kin who generally

reside in the same village, but who often extend their influence to those who have

migrated outside it.

Table 4.5.8C: Likelihood of Recommending Biradari Leaders to Solve a Problem.Demography Would Never Unlikely Likely

MilieuRural 9 6 75Urban 29 8 63

Regions

North Rural 22 8 70North Urban 31 6 63South Rural 25 9 66South Urban 19 8 72Centre Rural 16 6 79Centre Urban 28 9 63Hazara Rural 25 6 69Hazara Urban 40 9 51

Class

Lowest Income 18 5 77Lower Middle Class 23 5 72Middle Class 24 10 65Upper Middle Class 23 10 68High Income 36 7 57

Educational attainment

None 23 5 74Madrasa 10 6 84Some Primary 23 12 65Finished Primary 16 7 78Middle 25 5 70Matric 23 6 71Intermediate and above

28 12 60

These groups of elders may help members find employment, arrange marriages, and

collect and administer loans to poorer members, for example. Clan loyalty, or

biradarism, is reportedly strong during elections, in which people often follow the

recommendations of their elders as opposed to political ideology when voting.

Although biradari is an important informal institution to which many people turn, 30%

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of respondents say they would never or would be unlikely to suggest biradari to solve

problems. Of rural respondents, 75% would recommend biradari, while only 63% of

urban respondents would do so. Urban respondents never or are unlikely to

recommend biradari more often (37%) than those in rural areas (25%) (Table 4.5.8c).

These urban-rural differences are more pronounced by province. In rural Central

NWFP, 79% recommend biradari, compared with 63% in urban areas. Respondents

in Hazara are less likely overall to recommend biradari, and more urban respondents

(69%) than rural (51%) do so. Seventy percent and 63% of rural and urban

respondents, respectively, in Northern NWFP recommend biradari; while only in

Southern NWFP does the number of urban respondents who recommend biradari

(72%) exceed those in rural areas (66%) (Table 4.5.8c). The latter finding may be a

result of sampling bias. Those with higher incomes are less likely to recommend

biradari to friends and relatives to solve local problems—77% of the lowest income

respondents compared with 68% of those in the upper middle class said they were

likely to suggest biradari (Table 5.8c). Educational attainment does not seem to

diminish respondents’ willingness to turn to biradari, with over 70% (the national

average or more) of all educational groups likely to recommend clan leaders, with the

exception of those with F.A./F.Sc degrees or more education, of whom 60%

recommend biradari (Table 4.5.8c). The kinship system in NWFP is important,

particularly in rural areas.

4.5.9 NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups have been

increasing exponentially since the 1990s. A prevailing assumption is that ordinary

citizens view such elite-led groups with cynicism. While NGOs are not among the

first institutions respondents recommend to solve a problem (only 14% do so, while

86% would not recommend them) (Q19d), a majority (55%) do not know when asked

to agree with one of two alternate statements, “NGOs make a positive contribution to

society” or “NGOs are a waste of resources.” While 29% choose the former statement,

16% choose the latter (Q34). Similarly, 19% perceive corruption to be a common and

major problem among NGOs—much lower than that for elected and non-elected

government institutions—and 40% do not know (Q53d). Overall, respondents seem

generally unaware, ambivalent, or somewhat positive about the role of NGOs

compared with other institutions. Women say they would recommend NGOs as a

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resource less frequently (12%) than men (16%). Eighty-eight percent of women

would never or would be unlikely to recommend NGOs compared with 84% of men.

One in four women (25%) say NGOs make a positive contribution compared with one

in three men (32%); 15% and 17%, respectively, see NGOs as a waste of resources,

and 59% of women compared with 50% of men do not know. Respondents in Central

NWFP said they did not know whether NGOs’ role in society is positive or negative

twice as often (66%) as respondents in Hazara (30%) and Southern NWFP (36%).

Twenty-four percent of Central NWFP respondents viewed NGOs positively and 10%

negatively, compared with 40% and 30% in Hazara, 33% and 23% in Northern

NWFP, and 37% and 27% in Southern NWFP, respectively. Those with more

education and income recommend NGOs more frequently and are more likely to see

their contribution to society as positive.

The findings in this section indicate that the voting-age population is more likely to

trust and to turn to non-elected institution outside of government, such as biradari

elders and feudal leaders to solve problems. Some non-elected institutions have

persisted over time at the local level regardless of fluctuating political loyalties and

systems of government. They have had greater power to address people’s grievances,

if only as a function of their proximity and profile in their communities. The press and

NGOs represent non-elected institutions with relatively positive, but more weakly. All

these actors framed the voting trends in NWFP.

SECTION 4.6: PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL FRAUD,

COERCION, AND VIOLENCE: Electoral fraud and violence have occurred

in the electoral histories of most countries,49 and Pakistan is no exception. People

often talk about “rigging,” but little research has explored exactly what people have in

mind when they use this term. With a wide range of methods--from ballot stuffing to

vote buying to gerrymandering to various forms of intimidation—at the disposal of

political and social actors, every polity experiences electoral misconduct differently.

While some people think of “rigging” as a centrally managed and organized process,

others see electoral manipulation as a local phenomenon, carried out by specific

candidates, parties, or others in particular place. Understanding how voters define and

experience electoral misconduct can help voting trends.

The survey included a series of questions to assess the degree to which the electorate

has experienced different types of electoral misconduct. This section presents data on

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non-violent electoral fraud, as well as violence and intimidation, to identify the most

serious problems with various aspects of NWFP’s electoral strategy that influence the

quality of elections. Respondents were asked to discuss reasons why they have voted

or abstained in past elections in order to assess the degree to which they have

experienced electoral malpractice personally, and the degree to which their views and

actions are based on general impressions of elections. The survey asked about many

of the acts described as “electoral offences” or “crimes” in the election laws of some

countries in the world,50 ranging from spiritual coercion (involving religious figures to

influence voters), to landlord or employer intimidation of voters to candidate or party

vote buying. Other questions focused on direct experience of and impressions about

specific kinds of electoral fraud, such as ballot stuffing, and electoral violence. The

section concludes with data on the possible impact of remedies designed to mitigate

fraud and violence, such as a party code of conduct or election observers, on citizen

confidence in the electoral process.

4.6.1 PERCEPTIONS OF NON-VIOLENT ELECTORAL FRAUD

AND MISCONDUCT: Even when elections are relatively free and fair,

governments have access to many resources that give them an electoral advantage,

while parties seeking power can also promise allocation of resources according to

their electoral support. In Jamaica, for example, housing and other resources are

allocated based on party patronage. Similarly, the weakness of political parties and

ideology- or policy-based platforms in Pakistan has been connected in part to the

reportedly common practice of elected representatives promising their constituencies

and supporters development funding and other public service allocations. When asked

about their opinions of a number of statements seeking to measure perceptions about

patronage (Q52), 46% of respondents agreed strongly with the statement: “Public

services like road repair and water are delivered, improved, or repaired in this area for

the purpose of influencing elections” (Q52a). An additional 22% agreed, while 18%

disagreed. Respondents in Hazara agreed (29%) or agreed strongly (47%) that

government resources are used to influence elections more frequently than those in

the other regions of NWFP, followed by respondents in the Central NWFP, 21% of

whom agreed and 36% of whom agreed strongly with the statement. In Northern

NWFP, 20% agreed and 31% agreed strongly about the use of public service delivery

in elections, while 34% and 31% of respondents in Southern NWFP did so. In sum, 76%

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in Hazara viewed public service delivery as an instrument of electoral manipulation,

compared to 65% in Southern NWFP, 57% in Central NWFP, and 51% in Northern

NWFP. The percentage of those who disagreed or disagreed strongly by provincial

regions was 15% in Hazara, 25% in Southern NWFP, 15% in Central NWFP, and 26%

in Northern NWFP. Respondents in Central NWFP and Northern NWFP were almost

twice as likely to say they did not know about the issue (17% and 20% respectively,

compared to 8% and 9% in Hazara and Southern NWFP). Similarly, 47% agreed

strongly and 21% agreed with the proposition that political parties reward people for

supporting them by helping those who voted for them after the election (Q52c).

Seventeen percent disagreed.

Perceptions of party use of patronage to reward their supporters also differ by

provincial regions, with 79% of Hazara respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing

with the statement, “Political parties reward people for supporting them by helping

those who voted for them after elections”, compared to 71% of respondents in

Southern NWFP, 67% in Central NWFP, and 65% in Northern. The percentage

saying “don’t know” is similar to that for the previous question, while the percentage

disagreeing or strongly disagreeing was 12% in Hazara, 20% in Southern NWFP, 18%

in Central NWFP, and 14% in Northern NWFP. The perceived behaviour of the

political parties, as the primary political actors during elections, is an important factor

in both voter turnout and belief in democracy, regardless of the procedural quality of

the election. Political parties in Pakistan have been associated, traditionally, with

particular leaders and candidates, rather than ideological or policy positions. Political

parties are also commonly said to be internally undemocratic. The survey asked about

the related concept of “corruption” within the parties. Fifty-one percent of

respondents said that corruption is both a common and major problem within

Pakistan’s political parties (Q53e), and an additional 13 percent said it is common but

a minor problem. One in three (31%), however, said that corruption was only

somewhat or not at all common.

Table 4.6.1: Corruption in Political Parties

Regions Not at all Somewhat Common but

Minor Problem

Common and

Major Problem

Don’t Know

North 12 26 14 46 1

South 12 28 14 40 5

Centre 10 9 12 54 5

Hazara 6 20 14 52 7

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A larger percentage (54%) of respondents in the Central NWFP said the problem was

common and serious, followed by 52% in the Hazara, 46% in Northern NWFP, and

40% in Southern (Table 4.6.1).

Despite these differences in the perception of political party corruption across

provincial regions, the percentage of respondents who would recommend going to a

political party office to solve a local problem is the same in whole NWFP, with only

14% saying they would tell a friend or family to seek assistance from this resource

(Q19e). While the main actors in NWFP’s elections are perceived as delivering

services and rewarding supporters in order to enhance their electoral chances, they are

not viewed as a primary community resource for solving local problems. More people

recommend their MNA or MPA and NGOs than political party offices.

These findings indicate that a majority of the electorate views patronage, including

government or political party delivery of services to communities as well as personal

rewards to supporters, as important factors in the electoral process that shape the

voting trends. When interpreting election results, it is important to keep in mind the

social and institutional factors that may weaken citizen confidence in the electoral

process and democracy more generally. While it is difficult to encourage voters to

evaluate and support parties based on the quality of the party platforms and policies

rather than on expectations of short-term personal or community benefit.

4.6.2 EXPERIENCE OF TURNOUT-INFLATING AND

SUPPRESSING ELECTION FRAUD: The effect of flawed elections on

citizen participation over time can undermine support for democracy as well as the

effect of positive electoral reforms designed to make elections fairer. Alternatively,

when participation is affected by “turnout inflating” measures, such as vote-buying, or

“turnout-suppressing” measures, such as intimidation, the quality of election

administration may have little relationship with voter participation. In fact, voter

turnout diminished throughout the history of advanced democracies as electoral laws

limited the use of money, free refreshment, food, and other incentives to vote. The

survey aimed to identify the extent to which certain types of non-violent and violent

coercion, as opposed to objective measures of election quality, have influenced past

voter participation. The purpose of these questions was to highlight the situations that

mitigate the types of electoral misconduct that suppressed participation in the past,

security measures to allay fears of violence, or other aspects of the process.

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Respondents were asked how often they had voted. All those except those who said

they had voted in every election were then asked, for those elections in which they

abstained, how important a variety of factors were, from a sense of civic duty to being

forced to vote, in influencing their decision to vote in one or more past elections

(Q25).51 Only a small percentage (14%) said the elections not being free and fair

(Q25g) was either somewhat or very important in influencing their decision to stay

away from the polls. Whether the election was free and fair was “not at all important”

for 57% of respondents and “not very important” for an additional 13%. Respondents

in Hazara said the fairness of the election was somewhat or very important in their

abstention almost three times as often (30%) as those in the other regions of NWFP (9%

in Central NWFP, 11% in Northern NWFP, and 10% in Southern NWFP,

respectively). In contrast, 81% in Central NWFP, 69% in Southern NWFP, 61% in

Northern NWFP, and 47% in Hazara said election fairness was not at all or not very

important in the decision not to vote. The percentage of non-voting respondents who

abstained because of unfairness of the election is higher among those with the most

education as well as madrasa-educated respondents. Fourteen percent of both those

with F.A. /F.Sc and above and those with a madrasa education said fairness was a

very important factor in non-voting. Nine per cent of madrasa-educated respondents

said fairness was somewhat important, compared to 6% of those with the highest level

of education (Table 4.6.2). Less educated respondents said they did not know more

frequently, while the percentage of respondents saying fairness was not at all or not

very important ranged from 62% (those with no education) to 91% (those who have

finished primary school).

Table 4.6.2: Importance of Perceived Election Fairness in Decision to Abstain in One or More Elections, by Educational Attainment.Educational attainment

Don’t Know %

Not at all important %

Not very Important %

Somewhat Important %

Very Important %

None 27 50 12 7 4Madrasa 3 55 21 9 12Some Primary 22 61 3 8 6Finished Primary 3 72 19 2 3Middle 13 59 12 7 9Matric 12 67 12 6 3Intermediate and above 8 60 14 6 13

The relative insignificance of the substantive differences between educational groups,

compared to clear provincial regional differences, may indicate the degree to which

abstention depends on local and individual-level factors rather than educational

attainment. 52 Turnout-inflating, measures can include legal activities, such as

campaigning, as well as illegal activities, such as vote-buying. Incentives are also

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used to suppress turnout among certain demographic groups or in specific locations.

The survey asked voters about the importance of material or other non-violent

incentives or disincentives to abstain or to vote in past elections. Only 5% admitted

that receiving a gift or money was a somewhat or very important factor in their

decision to abstain, while 79% said this factor was not at all or not very important.

Survey respondents often hesitate to answer questions about such stigmatized

behaviour. Some who said “don’t know” may have said yes in the absence of social

desirability bias. Respondents in Northern NWFP said financial incentives were

somewhat or very important (9%) in non-voting twice as frequently as those in the

other regions (5% in Central NWFP, 4% in Hazara, 5% in Southern NWFP). Northern

NWFP also had the highest number of “don’t know” responses (23%, compared to 10%

in Central NWFP, 20% in Hazara, and 20% in Southern NWFP). In Central NWFP,

86% of respondents said financial incentives were not at all or not very important,

compared to 76% in Hazara, 69% in Northern NWFP, and 76% in Southern NWFP.

The percentage of respondents who reported having voted in one or more elections

because of material incentives is somewhat higher than the percentage saying they

abstained in response to economic coercion, if one includes questions about employer

influence on voting behaviour. Twelve percent of respondents admitted that employer

influence was a somewhat or very important factor in their decision to vote, while 88%

said this factor was not at all or not very important. The percentage saying they did

not know was only one percent, which may suggest that less stigma surrounds

questions that ask respondents to attribute their stigmatized action to a specific actor.

The importance of employer influence in voting varies by provincial regions, with 14%

of respondents in Southern NWFP saying employers were somewhat or very

important in their decision to vote, compared to 13% each in Hazara and Northern

NWFP and only in 8% in Central NWFP. In Southern NWFP, 22% of respondents

said this factor was not very important, while 63% said it was not at all important,

followed by 15% and 69%, respectively, in Hazara; 11% and 76% in Northern NWFP;

and 8% and 84% in Central NWFP. Based on these findings, employer influence on

voters may be more common in Southern NWFP and Hazara. It is notable that gender,

age, educational attainment, class, and rural-urban division where not individually

associated with higher or lower rates of employer influence.

The importance of material incentives, such as gifts or cash (Q26g), in voting is

reported even less often than that for abstention. This factor was important or

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somewhat important for only 3% of respondents, while 86% said it was not at all

important and 5% not very important. It is widely reported that parties and candidates

give cash incentives to potential voters in advance of elections in NWFP. Survey

results either indicate a very strong social stigma bias for this question or a

discrediting of the widespread belief that vote buying is common. The influence of

vote-buying in encouraging participation varied by regions but not urban-rural

divisions, with 4% of respondents in Hazara and Northern NWFP, respectively,

saying a gift or money was very important in their decision to vote, compared to 1%

in Central NWFP and 2% in Hazara. An additional three percent of respondents in

Hazara said receiving a gift or money was somewhat important, compared to less than

one percent in the other regions. This factor was not very important for 9% of

respondents in Northern NWFP, 8% in Southern NWFP, 7% in Hazara, and 3% in

Central NWFP, and not at all important for 75% in Northern NWFP, 85% in Southern

NWFP, 75% in Hazara, and 93% in Central NWFP. Respondents in Hazara and

Northern NWFP said they did not know twice as often (11% and 12%, respectively),

as those in Central NWFP (3%) and Southern NWFP (4%), which may point to higher

rates of vote-buying than reported in these two regions. Women were more likely to

say they did not know in response to this question (9% compared to 3% of men), but 3%

of both men and women said material incentives were somewhat or very important in

their electoral participation in one or more past elections. Four percent of women and

five percent of men said this factor was very important and 84% and 89%,

respectively, said it was not at all important. Respondents ages 50 and over said that

material incentives were somewhat or very important in their voting decision more

frequently (4%) than 35-49 year-olds (3%), 25-34 year-olds (2%), and 18-24 year-

olds (3%). Older voters have been exposed to more opportunities for vote buying, but

younger voters may have been somewhat more vulnerable to such incentives.

Younger voters said they did not know in higher numbers than older voters, but the

number saying this factor is not at all or not very important increases with each age

category (table not shown).53 Neither education nor class was related to reported

importance of material incentives in voting behaviour. The threat of economic loss

(specifically loss of job or land) (Q26k), was a somewhat or very important factor for

6% of respondents who report voting in past elections, while 6% said this factor was

not very important. Only one percent said they did not know, while 88% said

economic threats were not at all important. Responses differed significantly only by

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regions, with 11% of respondents in Northern NWFP reporting such threats as

somewhat or very important, compared to 7% in Hazara, 6% in Southern NWFP, and

3% in Central NWFP. In Northern NWFP, 10% of respondents said this factor was

not very important and 79% said it was not at all important, compared to 9% and 80%

in Hazara, 12% and 81% in Southern NWFP, and 4% and 92% in Central NWFP,

respectively.

4.6.3 PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF VARIETIES OF

ELECTION FRAUD: The types of non-violent election misconduct analyzed in

the previous section are those in which the electorate is directly involved. The

questions discussed in this section aimed to assess voter perceptions of the likelihood,

extent, and types of party-, candidate-, and government-driven misconduct that do not

involve voters. (Q54).54 Compared to offences that respondents report experiencing

directly, problems outside of their direct control and experience appear to be more

common in NWFP or at least more readily reported. A majority of respondents (53%)

believed that levels of cheating and fraud would be the same in the upcoming election

as in past elections (Q55) Twenty per cent expected reduced fraud, while 17%

expected more fraud in the upcoming election. The percentage of respondents saying

they did not know was smaller with higher incomes and education, while those with

more education expected more cheating more often. Ordinary people and those who

follow politics closely in NWFP refer frequently to the problem of “rigging” in

elections. The Survey included a question designed to understand better what people

mean when they use this term and at what level of the process they believe that it

occurs. Respondents were asked, “During elections, people talk about ‘rigging’. When

you hear talk about cheating or rigging in NWFP, which of the following three

statements best describes what happens, or is it something else”(Q57)? (1) Rigging is

something controlled by the central government. (2) The central government works

with certain parties and officials to rig results in different places around the country.

(3) Local politicians rig elections to benefit themselves, even if the central

government tries to stop it. About one in three respondents (32%) chose the third

statement, compared to one in four (26%) who chose the first. A substantial minority

(15%) chose the second statement, while 3% proposed other descriptions of the

problem. These findings differ slightly by regions, with respondents in Hazara saying

they do not know more frequently (33% compared to 20-25% in the other regions)

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and respondents in northern NWFP proposing something else more often (6%

compared to 1-3% in the other regions) (see Table 6.3a). Respondents in all regions of

NWFP attribute the problem to local politicians most frequently, but relatively more

do so in Central NWFP and Southern NWFP (35% and 33%, respectively, compared

to 27% each in Hazara and Northern NWFP). Perceptions of rigging do not differ

substantially among other demographic groups, although women, the poor, and less

educated respondents are less likely to express an opinion, as with most other

questions in the survey.

Table 4.6.3a: Statements that Best Describes Responsibility for Rigging Elections, by Regions.

Regions Don’t Know Central GovernmentParties and

CentralGovernment

LocalPoliticians

SomethingElse Happens

North 27 26 15 27 6South 25 25 13 33 3Centre 21 27 16 35 2Hazara 33 26 13 27 1

The survey also asked about specific forms of electoral manipulation or rigging.

When asked about the likelihood of certain candidates being prevented from running

for office (Q54a), 39% said the problem would be somewhat or very likely in the

coming election, while 9% and 29%, respectively, thought it would be somewhat

unlikely or very unlikely. Respondents believed that stuffing of ballot boxes by

officials or members of political parties was likely in the upcoming election (Q54e).

Forty-eight percent expected ballot stuffing to be very or somewhat likely, while

another 48% said it would be very or somewhat unlikely. In Central NWFP, 51% of

respondents expected ballot-stuffing, while 45% did not, followed by Northern NWFP,

where 44% percent expected stuffing and 53% did not; Southern NWFP, where 40%

expected stuffing and 54% did not; and Hazara, where 39% expected ballot-stuffing

and 48% did not. Respondents with higher incomes and educational attainment

expected ballot stuffing to be somewhat or very likely more often than the less

educated and poorer electorate. Of those with no education, for example, 35% thought

ballot stuffing would be somewhat or very likely to occur in the next election,

compared to 53% of those having graduated Matric. Madrasa-educated individuals

were an exception to this overall linear trend, saying ballot stuffing would be

somewhat or very likely at a higher rate than the other educational groups. While 30%

of those with an F.A./F.Sc or more education said ballot stuffing would be likely, 38%

of madrasa-educated respondents did so; 27% and 22% of F.A./F.Sc graduates and

151

madrasa graduates, respectively, expected ballot stuffing to be somewhat likely.

Expectations about ballot stuffing did not differ by gender, age, or rural/urban milieu.

A history of multiple voting,55 often organized by local leaders and parties, has been a

subject of complaints by political parties and candidates in past elections and is one of

the reasons a national identity card is now required to vote. The survey’s findings

indicate that much of the electorate had obtained identity cards and a little less than

half thought they had registered to vote.56. When asked how likely multiple voting

might be in the upcoming election (Q54f), 21% said very likely and 20% said likely.

Thirty-six percent thought multiple voting would be somewhat or very unlikely, while

one in four respondents did not know what to expect. When asked about the

likelihood of counting fraud (Q54g), 48% of respondents expected the problem to be

somewhat or very likely to occur in the next election, compared to 32% who said it

would be somewhat or very unlikely. While expectations did not differ by provincial

regions, urban respondents expected counting fraud to be somewhat or very likely

more often than rural respondents; 50% of those in urban areas thought counting fraud

would be somewhat or very likely compared to 41% of rural respondents. Thirty-four

percent in rural areas thought counting fraud was somewhat or very unlikely, while 25%

did not know; 38% of urban respondents thought counting fraud unlikely, and 22%

did not know (table not presented). Expectations about the likelihood of counting

fraud, as with other forms of fraud, were greater among those with higher levels of

educational attainment, as well as among madrasa-educated respondents.

Similar percentages of respondents believed that results would be changed after the

counting process (Q54j). Thirty-eight percent thought results manipulation would be

somewhat or very likely to occur, and the same percentage thought it was unlikely,

findings that do not differ by gender, province, age, or urban-rural milieu. As with

perceptions of other forms of fraud, those with higher educational attainment and

higher incomes were more sceptical of the process. Although most respondents did

not admit to having received gifts or money to vote or abstain, many believed that

counting fraud and ballot stuffing were likely to occur in the next elections with few

expecting improvement. When asked about what political actors they think of when

they hear people talk about rigging, about one third of respondents blamed local

politicians, while about one fourth blamed the central government. Together these

findings indicates that about 40% of the population believed some form of non-violent

electoral fraud was likely, even if they had not experienced or been affected

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personally by electoral manipulation. If self-reported rates of experience of either

turnout-inflating or turnout-suppressing activities, such as vote buying or intimidation,

are to be believed, procedural misconduct, such as ballot-stuffing and counting fraud,

appears to be more common than voter-level fraud. While personal exposure to fraud

differs by province, perceptions about polling station or centralized fraud are more

similar across provinces. If perceptions of fraud are, in fact, greater than actual

experience with fraud, confidence in the quality of the election is related not only to

local-level election administration and quality, but also to perceptions of the

nationwide quality of elections. Even if voters feel fraud in their own community is

limited, they believe that it occurs elsewhere and corrupts the process overall.

4.6.4 EXPERIENCE OF TURNOUT-INFLATING AND

SUPPRESSING ELECTION VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION

Although the severity of election violence, with respect to injuries, national impact,

and the effect on final vote tabulation, is often low compared to other forms of

political violence and means of electoral manipulation, even minor incidents can

weaken citizen trust in the process and convince losing parties to challenge results,

undermining support for the system itself. No matter how localized the incidents,

violence attracts disproportionate publicity, contributing to a perception that it is

simply the most visible manifestation of a more systemic disease of widespread

electoral irregularities that could include padded registration lists, vote buying, and

ballot counting or consolidation fraud. In addition to reducing participation, violence

undermines the perceived legitimacy of electoral outcomes and support for elections

as the preferred method of resolving disputes and choosing leaders. The survey aimed

to measure the degree to which the electorate had experienced electoral coercion and

violence personally, their perceptions of the problem of violence more generally, and

their expectations for the upcoming election.

Table 4.6.4a: Importance of Fear of Violence in Decisions to Abstain from Voting.Regions Don’t Know Not at all Not Very Somewhat VeryNorth 0 75 9 7 9South 6 79 6 2 7Centre 1 83 5 4 7Hazara 7 56 14 8 15

The survey responses were analysed to identify the types of violence. Respondents

who said they had abstained in one or more elections for which they were eligible to

vote were asked to estimate the importance of a number of different factors in their

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decision to abstain (Q25).57 Only a small percentage (14%) said that fear of violence

and unrest (Q25k) was either somewhat or very important.

Fear was “not at all important” for 77% of respondents and “not very important” for

an additional 7%. However, a disproportionate number of respondents in Hazara

(15%) said that fear of violence and unrest was very important in their decision to

abstain from voting, and an additional 8% of Hazara respondents said fear was a

somewhat important factor. 58 In Northern NWFP, 9% said violence was very

important in non-voting and 7% said it was somewhat important, compared to 7% and

4% in Central NWFP and 7% and 2% in Southern NWFP (Table 6.4a).59

Election laws in many countries prohibit involvement of religious leaders in partisan

activities and elections. These laws often refer to the use of religious leaders, symbols,

and teachings as spiritual coercion, which is listed alongside physical coercion in the

election crimes section of election laws in many Islamic countries. Religious

influence frequently takes the form of religious leaders using the opportunity of mass

congregation in their venues, such as Friday prayer, to suggest to citizens how to vote.

When asked whether instructions by religious figures to respondents not to vote was

important in their decisions to abstain in past elections (Q25l), only 5% said this was a

somewhat or very important factor, while 8% said it was not very important. Over two

thirds (71%) said religious influence was unimportant. Again, respondents in Hazara

said religious influence was somewhat or very important more than twice as often

(12%) as respondents in other regions (4% in Central NWFP, 7% in Northern NWFP,

and 4% in Southern NWFP) (Table 4.6.4b). In Northern NWFP and Hazara

respectively, 11% and 13% said religious influence was not very important, compared

to 6% in each of the other two regions. These findings suggest that, while relatively

low, self-reported spiritual influence is somewhat more important in Northern NWFP

and Hazara. Those with middle school and madrasa education were more likely to

report spiritual influence in non-voting behaviour. 15% of madrasa-educated

individuals and 12% of middle-school educated individuals reported religious figures

to be somewhat or very important in encouraging them to abstain, compared to no

more than 6% (finished primary school) in the other educational categories.

Table 4.6.4b: Importance of Fear of Religious Leaders' Influence in Decisions to Abstain from Voting, by Regions.

Regions Don’t Know Not at all Not Very Somewhat VeryNorth 22 60 11 3 4South 19 71 6 2 1Centre 10 81 6 2 2Hazara 20 55 13 3 2

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Social or family pressure is rarely defined as an election crime in election law, nor do

organizations involved in promoting democracy and free and fair elections measure or

attempt to influence such informal aspects of the electoral process. The influence of

culture and family is strong in NWFP and is often viewed as a factor that militates

against democracy and free elections. It is often said that women, in particular, are

subject to these influence in ways that may prevent them from voting or making

choices that would be in their own interest. When asked whether being stopped from

voting by family was an important influence in their reasons for not voting in past

elections (Q25n), twelve percent said this factor was somewhat or very important,

while 7% said it was not very important. Sixty-eight percent said it was not at all

important and 14% did not know. Women said family pressure was somewhat or very

important three times as often as men. Twelve percent of women said being stopped

by their family was a very important factor, while an additional 3% said this factor

was somewhat important. Six percent of women said family pressure was not very

important in non-voting decisions and 64% said it was not at all important. Only 5%

of male respondents said family pressure was somewhat or very important; 8% said it

was not very important, and 73% said it was not at all important. Women were also

more likely (15%) than men (14%) to say they did not know (table not shown). The

data provide evidence that women in Hazara experience family pressure more often

than women in other parts of the provincial regions;60 27% of women in the province

compared to 6% of men said that being stopped by family from voting was very

important, while 8% of women and no men said the factor was somewhat important.

Family pressure to encourage voting behaviour is more difficult to measure; the line

between normal influences in the family environment, which are well-documented in

surveys of electorates in advanced democracies, and coercion of those who would

otherwise abstain or choose different candidates is not clear, particularly in societies

where family ties are much stronger than in some of the world’s older democracies.

When asked why they had voted in one or more past elections, 24% of respondents

said that the influence of family or friends was very important, and another 15% said

it was somewhat important. 14% said this factor was not very important, while 42%

said the role of family in convincing them to vote was not at all important. It is not

possible to conclude from the data whether people view family influence as

unwelcome pressure, however, or part of the normal course of events. Neither class

nor educational differences are associated with a greater degree of influence by family

155

members in voting behaviour. However, women, younger people, and rural dwellers

all say family influence was a somewhat or more important factor in voting more

often than the others. There are also differences by regions (Table 4.6.4c). Family

influence was most important in the Hazara, where 12% of respondents said being

convinced by family members was somewhat or very important, followed by

Northern NWFP, where the percentage was 7%. Thirty-nine percent of women and 38%

of men said family influence was somewhat or very important, but women said it was

very important (27%) more often than men (20%). Only 16% of men said this factor

was not very important, compared to 41% of women, which may suggest that women

are more likely to experience more pressure to vote, even if they ultimately decide to

do so for their own reasons (Table 4.6.4c). Rural respondents placed more importance

on family influence. In rural areas, 26% compared to 18% of urban respondents said

being convinced by family was very important (Table 4.6.4c). Compared to family,

the role of political parties in pressuring or coercing people into participating in

elections (Q26f) is reportedly relatively minimal. Five and six per cent of respondents

said that having a party supporter make them vote was somewhat or very important,

respectively, and 9% said the party pressure was not very important. This factor was

not at all important for 73% of respondents.

Table 4.6.4c: Importance of Being Convinced by Family Members in Decision to Vote:

Demography Don’t Know Not at all Not Very Somewhat Very

Regions

North 22 60 11 3 2South 19 71 6 2 1Centre 10 81 6 2 2Hazara 20 55 13 3 9

GenderMale 3 42 16 18 20

Female 9 9 41 12 27

MilieuRural 7 35 15 16 26Urban 3 52 14 13 18

Age

21-24 11 49 10 11 1925-34 9 42 16 13 2235-49 5 42 16 14 23

50 and above 1 36 14 21 29

Party coercion was not reported as important disproportionately by class, education,

milieu, age, or gender, although both young and women respondents said they did not

know more frequently than older people and men. In Northern NWFP and Southern

NWFP, party influence was mentioned more frequently. Ten per cent of respondents

in Northern NWFP said party coercion was very important and 5% said somewhat

important, compared to 9% and 3%, respectively, in Southern NWFP. In Central

NWFP, 5% of respondents said party agents making them vote was very important

and 6% somewhat, compared to 6% and 6%, respectively in Hazara. Those who said

156

party influence was not very important totalled 19% in Southern NWFP, 11% in

Northern NWFP, 13% in Hazara, and 7% in Central NWFP. The sum of these

responses suggests that more voters in Southern NWFP may have actually

experienced attempted party coercion more often than those in other regions (41%

giving some importance to this factor compared to 26% in both Northern NWFP and

Hazara and 18% in Central NWFP). Respondents in Hazara (12%) and Northern

NWFP (11%) said they did not know more than twice as often as respondents in

Central NWFP (3%) and Southern NWFP (5%). Whether external influence by others

amounts to physical violence, in which people feel that they are in physical, spiritual,

or serious economic danger if they choose to participate or not, is difficult to assess.

Very few respondents said that feeling afraid was a somewhat (2%) or very (3%)

important factor in voting, while 6% said fear was not very or not at all (83%)

important (Q26h). Respondents in Hazara and Northern NWFP reported feeling in

danger if they did not vote in higher percentages; 10% of respondents in Hazara and 9%

in Northern NWFP said fear of danger was somewhat or very important, followed by

Southern NWFP, where 5% did so. Only 2% of Central NWFP respondents said fear

was somewhat or very important. The percentages in each region who said fearing

danger was not very important in voting were: Northern NWFP, 10%; Southern

NWFP, 10%; Hazara, 8%; and Central NWFP, 4%. Twelve per cent of respondents

each in Hazara and Northern NWFP said they did not know compared to 5% and 3%

in Central NWFP and Southern NWFP, respectively. These findings may indicate that

family or party coercion does not necessarily rise to the level of physical intimidation

or violence. Nevertheless, the fact that almost one in ten respondents in both Hazara

and Northern NWFP report that they voted because they feared that not doing so

would put them in danger is an unacceptable degree of fear in an electoral process in

any polity. The findings imply that at least 6% (Central NWFP) of the electorate in

each region was exposed to some threat of turnout-inflating intimidation in a past

election process, rising to 20% in Hazara, 19% in Northern NWFP, and 15% in

Southern NWFP (Table 4.6.4d).

Table 4.6.4d: Importance of Fear of Danger in Motivation for Voting.Regions Don’t Know Not at all Not Very Somewhat VeryNorth 12 70 10 3 6South 5 80 10 2 3Centre 3 91 4 1 1Hazara 12 71 8 5 5

The role of spiritual coercion in encouraging voting was reported about as frequently

as it was in discouraging participation. Six per cent of respondents said a religious

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figure’s instructions to vote was somewhat or very important in their decision to

participate, while 8% said it was not very important and 80% not at all important.

With turnout-suppressing religious influence, more respondents in Hazara (14%)

reported that this factor was somewhat or very important in voting, followed by

Southern NWFP (10%), Northern NWFP (7%), and Central NWFP (3%). The

percentages in each region who said religious figures’ influence was not very

important in voting were: Northern NWFP, 12%; Southern NWFP, 9%; Hazara, 12%;

and Central NWFP, 5%. Again, respondents in Hazara and Northern NWFP said they

did not know more often than in Central NWFP and Southern NWFP. Although no

single form of coercion is reported with overwhelming frequency by respondents,

significant minorities report that some form of coercion was significant in either

discouraging or encouraging them to vote, while the evidence suggests that even

larger numbers are actually exposed to coercion or external influence, even if that

influence may be relatively unimportant in their overall decision to participate in

elections. None of the measures of coercion are highly correlated—that is, the

respondents who report family influence as important are not the same respondents

reporting religious influence as highly important; those who fear danger are not the

same people reporting party pressure. This suggests that the cumulative sum of the

number of respondents who have been directly exposed to and influenced by various

forms of social, physical, economic, and spiritual pressure is substantial.

4.6.5 PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF VARIETIES OF ELECTORAL FRAUD, COERCION, AND VIOLENCE IN ELECTIONSSelf-reported exposure to and influence by violence and intimidation may be subject

to social desirability bias and stigma. Questions about general perceptions of coercion

in the electoral environment complemented more direct questions about personal

experience with such tactics. Media and party emphasis on specific instances of fraud

and violence may also increase voter concern about these problems even if they have

not experienced them directly. When asked about the types of things that can occur in

elections and whether they are likely in the upcoming election (Q54), the percentages

perceiving some intimidation in elections was much higher than for self-reported

experience. When asked how likely prevention of people from registering and voting

would be in the next election (Q54d), 25% said the problem would be somewhat or

very likely, while 52% said it would be somewhat or very unlikely. These

expectations did not vary by provincial regions, but 30% of urban respondents

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compared to 22% of rural respondents expected this in the upcoming election, while

48% of urban and 53% of rural respondents did not. Those with higher income and

education thought people would be prevented from participating in higher percentages,

while madrasa educated individuals were more likely than those with an F.A./F.Sc or

more education (37% compared to 31%) to expect this problem. Economic coercion,

in the form of single individuals who wield control over groups of people who depend

on them for jobs or land, is commonplace in the early phases of democratic

development. Many electoral laws make such economic coercion, which involves a

feeling of obligation to vote physically—at the same time and place—or ideologically,

or both, with other employees or land tenants, an electoral crime. These forms of

informal electoral coercion are by far the most frequently reported by the electorate,

according to the findings of this survey. When asked about the likelihood of

“employers getting employees to vote together as a group” (Q54h), 42% thought it

would be somewhat or very likely to occur, while 33% thought it would be somewhat

or very unlikely. An even greater percentage of respondents (45%) expect landlords to

get tenants to vote together as a group (Q54i) in the next election, while 31% think it

unlikely to happen. Surprisingly, there are no significant urban-rural or provincial

differences in responses to these questions. Additionally, although one might expect

those who are poor and less educated to be victimized by such use of influence more

frequently and therefore to think it more likely in the upcoming election, those who

are educated and have higher incomes anticipate such events in higher percentages.

This may point to a general perception among the more privileged that the less

privileged are less likely to think and act for themselves, when in fact there is no

reason to assume those groups are easily manipulated. Less privileged respondents

also may be afraid to answer honestly and complain openly about the local social

forces that operate in their lives, even when a survey interviewer reassures them of

anonymity. In fact, when asked who they expect to be the most likely targets of

intimidation and violence (Q58), the largest percentages believe candidates (27%) and

voters (35%) will be targeted, compared to only six percent who say that low income

people are most likely to be targeted, the same percentage who expect political party

supporters to be the primary targets (Table 4.6.5). Further research designed to

minimize the effects of question sensitivity on the results would be required to know

in what ways respondents believe candidates and voters will be threatened. A greater

percentage of urban respondents (41%) believe voters will be targeted, compared to

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32% of rural respondents. Twenty-five percent of urban respondents compared to 27%

of rural respondents expect candidates to be the primary targets of violence. Six

percent of women and 4% of men believe women will be the most likely targets of

coercion. When asked about their expectations of violence and unrest in the upcoming

election (Q51), 42% said they expected the same amount of violence, 14% expected

more, and 14% expected less. These results differ substantially by regions. At the time

of the survey, twenty-one per cent of respondents in Hazara expected more violence,

compared to 17% in Northern NWFP, 14% in Southern NWFP, and 12% in Central

NWFP. Greater percentages of respondents in Hazara (36%) and Northern NWFP

(37%) did not know compared to 26% and 24% in Central NWFP and Southern

NWFP.

Table 4.6.5: Most Likely Targets / Victims of Electoral Intimidation and ViolenceVictim Category

Percent(%)

Male(%)

Female(%)

Rural(%)

Urban(%)

Don't Know 6 4 8 7 4Candidates 27 28 25 27 25Voters 35 39 32 32 41Female Candidates 2 2 2 3 2Female Voters 5 4 6 6 4Election Workers 5 6 5 5 5NGO Workers 1 1 1 1 1Security Officials 1 0 1 1 0Low Income People 6 6 6 6 6Political Party Supporters

6 5 7 6 7

No One 6 3 8 7 3

In Central NWFP, 48% expected the same level of violence and 14% less, compared

to 28% and 15%, respectively, in Hazara. In Northern NWFP, 35% expected the same

levels of violence and 12% less; 41% expected the same levels and 22% expected less

in Southern NWFP. Consistent with expectations about the disproportionately greater

impact of violence on voter perceptions of election quality -- even though relatively

few respondents report direct exposure to physical fear, threats, and/or danger 38%

believe violence and intimidation will be a more serious threat to a free and fair

election than will fraud, while 43% believe fraud and malpractice are more likely than

violence to undermine the next election (Q56). Nineteen per cent believe that the

election will be generally free and fair. This finding does not differ across regions or

any other demographic group mentioned in the survey.

4.6.6 OPINIONS TO PREVENT FRAUD AND VIOLENCE IN ELECTIONS

The survey asked two questions about measures that could influence actual levels of

violence as well as voter expectations about violence. When asked about the

additional confidence that these measures might give to eligible voters if implemented

in the next election (Q59), over half (56%) said having trained observers from the

160

local area to monitor the whole process would give them somewhat or much more

confidence in the election process (Q59b). Twelve per cent said observers would have

no effect on their confidence while 10% said observers would decrease their

confidence. Signed and enforced party codes of conduct have been shown to decrease

levels of violence, as well as fraud, in other electoral contexts. When asked about this

measure, 64% of the electorate said they would have some or much more confidence

in the process if such a code were in place.61 These findings did not differ by regions

or demographic group, suggesting widespread support for such measures and the

importance of not only attempting to implement them, but also publicizing them in

order to reassure potential voters who fear violence and intimidation personally, as

well as more generally. Efforts to promote free and fair elections often treat violence

and intimidation as epiphenomenal, at best as factors beyond the control of voters and

at worst as irrelevant to electoral results unless they disrupt the process altogether.

Electoral violence is often seen as a security problem rather than a problem of

electoral institutions and regulation. Similarly, while ballot counting fraud and other

forms of non-violent manipulation can be documented in terms of the number of

ballots affected, providing clear evidence to election complaints bodies that can be

ruled upon, violence is rarely the source of complaints because its effect on elections

is rarely concrete enough to document systematically with respect to number of votes

inflated, changed, or suppressed. The survey results show, however, that violence and

intimidation, even if objectively low, are perceived by the electorate as a serious

threat to democratic elections. As long as a significant portion of the electorate

believes violence will compromise an election, citizens and competing candidates

may not accept the election process is free and fair, regardless of the quality of

procedural and administrative components of an election.

SECTION 4.7: PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Elections are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for democracy. When elections

are unaccompanied by other characteristics of democracy, such as the rule of law and

fundamental freedoms, repeated flawed elections and subsequent weak or corrupt

elected governments may, in fact, undermine support for democratic institutions.

While most respondents to surveys throughout the world say they support democracy

when asked directly, most people mean different things when they use this term. The

survey asked a short battery of questions aimed at assessing citizen perception of the

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power of democratic institutions, the status of freedoms characteristic of democracy,

and the meanings that people assign to democracy. In addition to electoral procedures,

voting rights, and the electoral environment with respect to fraud and security, these

questions were more relevant to measure voting trends.

4.7.1 PERCEIVED STRENGTH OF DEMOCRATIC

INSTITUTIONS: When asked respondents about their perception of the degree

of power of the national and provincial assemblies in determining the course of

political development in NWFP (Q60), 28% said the national assembly has a great

deal of power and 22% said the provincial assembly has a great deal of power. Almost

twice as many respondents said the provincial assemblies have some power (26%) as

said the national assembly has some power (14%), so that overall, 42% believed the

national assembly (NA) has some or a great deal of power, while 48% perceived some

or a great deal of power at the provincial level. Forty percent and 39% believed the

national and provincial assembly (PA), respectively, have little or no power. While

there were no significant regional differences in perceived power of the national

assembly, 54% of respondents in Central NWFP believed their PA has some or a

great deal of power, followed by 44% in Hazara, 41% in Northern NWFP, and 41% in

Southern NWFP. More than twice as many respondents in Hazara (21%), Northern

NWFP (18%), and Southern NWFP (18%) said they do not know how much power

the PA has than in Central NWFP (9%). Thus, in Central NWFP, even though more

people believed the PA has power, 49% say it has little or no power, compared with

35% in Hazara; 42% in Northern NWFP; and 39% in Southern NWFP. Those with

higher incomes and education were more likely to answer the questions, so that higher

numbers of educated and wealthier respondents said both that the PA and NA have

little to no power or some to a great deal of power.

4.7.2 PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND

FREEDOM: When asked about their level of agreement with three statements

about politics pertaining to democratic freedoms (Q61), a majority of the electorate

felt that ordinary people can influence government and have basic freedoms of speech

and association. Twenty-five percent strongly agreed with the statement, “citizens

have the power to influence the policies and actions of the government”, while an

additional 26% agreed (Q61a). Thirty-five percent disagreed. Respondents in Hazara

and Northern NWFP were slightly less likely to believe that citizens influence the

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government (46% in each province agree/agree strongly) than in Central NWFP and

Southern NWFP, where 53% and 52%, respectively, were optimistic about citizen

influence. Consistent with other survey findings, less educated and poor respondents

said they did not know more frequently than others for all three questions about

citizen efficacy and freedom. Although the lower and middle class respondents report

a slightly higher level of agreement about citizen influence in government (56% and

55%, respectively) than the other categories of income (ranging from 46% among the

lowest income respondents to 52% of highest income respondents) (Table 4.7.2a),

these differences are similar for all three questions. Education and income are

associated more generally with a better understanding of democratic rights and

freedoms, as opposed to perceptions about different degrees of freedom. With respect

to the number agreeing that citizens in NWFP have power to influence the

government, those with a madrasa education (62%) were more like those with middle

school (60%) matric (59%) or higher degrees (54%) than those with none (46%) or

only some primary school (40%) education (Table 4.7.2). The number of those who

express an opinion and view citizens as influential on government jumps between

those who have some primary and those who finished primary school, which may

point to the effectiveness of even basic education on democratic behaviour.

Table 4.7.2: Pakistan's Citizens have Power to Influence Government.Demography

Don't Know(%)

StronglyDisagree (%)

Disagree(%)

Agree(%)

StronglyAgree (%)

ClassLowest Income 21 15 17 24 22Lower Middle Class 11 17 17 31 25Middle 8 17 21 26 29Upper Middle 8 21 19 25 27High Income 5 22 23 25 26

Educational AttainmentNone 24 15 16 24 20Madrasa 9 10 20 37 25Some Primary 20 20 21 20 20Finished Primary 7 20 22 29 22Middle 7 17 16 28 32Matric 4 19 19 29 30Intermediate and above

4 20 22 26 28

A larger percentage of respondents agreed with the statement, “People are free to

criticize the government without fear” (Q61b) than the percentage who agreed that

citizens can influence government. 48% agreed or agreed strongly with the statement,

while 39% disagreed. As with opinions on citizen efficacy, Hazara, Northern NWFP,

and Southern NWFP respondents agreed less often with this statement (44%, 41%,

and 44%, respectively) than do citizens in Central NWFP (52%). When asked if they

agreed that citizens can join any party or organization they wish (Q61c), a much

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smaller percentage of respondents disagreed (19%), while 68% agreed or agreed

strongly. More respondents in the Hazara (73%) agreed or agreed strongly about

citizens’ freedom of association, followed by 67% in Hazara, 61% in Southern NWFP,

and 59% in Northern NWFP. Eight percent of respondents in Central NWFP and 17%

(Southern NWFP) – 21% (Hazara) did not know, while respondents in Northern

NWFP (25%) disagreed more frequently, followed by those in Southern NWFP (22%).

Eighteen per cent disagreed that citizens can join organizations without fear in Central

NWFP and 12% disagreed in Hazara. Respondents in Northern NWFP appeared to

question the freedoms of association more than those in other regions, while those in

Central NWFP and Hazara were relatively more likely to feel that citizens can join

any group or organization they want, even while those in Hazara reported a greater

degree of fear in criticizing government.

4.7.3 MEANING OF DEMOCRACY: For many people in developing

countries facing high unemployment, health problems, and other quality of life issues,

democracy often represents different things to different people, but is particularly seen

as related to economic advancement. The survey findings indicate that economic

advancement is an essential part of the meaning of democracy for many people in

NWFP. When asked to chose the two most important factors they felt are essential for

democracy (Q62), the most common response (chosen by 37%) was the provision of

basic necessities for everyone, followed by having a low gap between rich and poor

(32%) (Table 4.7.3a).

Table 4.7.3a: Most Important Factors Essential for DemocracyEssential Factors for Democracy Mentioned

%Not Mentioned

%1. Changing Governments Through Elections 28 722. Low Rich-Poor Gap 32 683. Freedom to Criticize Government 13 874. Absence of Any Violence 27 735. Basic Necessities for Everyone 37 636. No Influence of Religion in Politics 5 958. Other Suggestions 1 999. No Opinion 4 9610. Don't Know 11 90

The change of government through elections—a minimalist definition democracy—

was chosen by 28% of respondents, and the absence of violence was mentioned by 27%

of respondents. Table 4.7.3b shows the combined responses of the top two factors

each respondent said was essential for democracy. If a respondent mentioned only one

factor and said do not know for the other, they are counted only in the single-factor

row category. Elections and freedom of speech are grouped and described as

“political freedoms,” while all economic factors are combined under “economic

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security” and the absence of violence is described as “physical security.” One in three

respondents (33%) mentioned only economic factors as essential for democracy,

compared with 10% who mentioned elections and political freedoms only and 12%

who mentioned economic security in association with civic freedoms. Twelve percent

mentioned only physical security, while an additional 7% mentioned it in association

with economic security. Over half (54%) mentioned economic factors alone or in

conjunction with another factor, while many (19%) associated democracy with peace

and stability and 24% mentioned only political freedoms. Very few (4%) mentioned

separation of religion and government as essential for democracy. While lower

income respondents (36% of lowest income) mentioned economic security alone more

often than higher income respondents (26% of highest income), the number

mentioning economic security in conjunction with political freedoms and physical

security increases with income. The differences between education levels and those

mentioning economic factors are not significant, while those with higher education

mentioned secularism and civic freedoms more frequently.

Table 4.7.3b: Essential Features of Democracy (Response Types)Features of Democracy Mentioned

%Not Mentioned

%DK/No opinion 21 21Economic Security/Equality 33 53Economic and Institutional Factors 12 66Economic and Physical Security 7 73Economic Security and Secularism 2 76Institutional Factors 10 86Secularism and Institutional Factors 2 88Physical Security 12 100

While substantial percentages of the electorate believed that the elected assemblies

and ordinary citizens have some influence on the course of politics in the country,

larger percentages were either ambivalent or see citizen and elected institutions as

powerless or ineffectual. More than half of respondents believed that people have the

right to associate freely and to criticize the government without fear, but these

freedoms were not viewed as particularly effective in changing policies that influence

the lives or ordinary people. For over half of the electorate, democracy requires (and

perhaps promises) economic equality and well-being, while for one in five, it requires

physical security. Only 10 percent say elections and freedoms are alone essential for

democracy. Voting trends largely revolved around the needs and preferences of

citizens and these trends further articulated through the electoral process, rather than

seeing the process as an end in it. Even if they perceive an election to be free, fair, and

competitive, eligible voters in NWFP may be unlikely to feel that democracy as a

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system of government will make a difference for them personally. Political parties,

candidates, elected representative, and civil society groups that want to strengthen

“democracy” should understand how citizens perceive this term in order to help

ensure that Pakistani institutions live up to citizens’ hope and expectations.

SECTION 4.8 ELECTORAL AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

Participation in elections declined steadily in Pakistan between 1970 and 2002.62 Low

voter turnout undermines the legitimacy of elected governments as well as the extent

to which elected officials represent the population. Cynicism about the efficacy of

electoral institutions, the fairness of electoral processes, and the integrity of elected

representatives may weaken citizen participation. However, non-electoral

participation, such as contacting a government representative or attending political

party meetings, may be higher than electoral participation. In fact, those who respond

to calls for electoral boycotts by abstaining from voting are engaging in a form of

participation. The survey assessed the extent, nature, and voter characteristics, such as

educational attainment, that are associated with past political participation as well as

expected participation in the upcoming election. The survey also asked respondents to

identify political or personal motivations for participation/non-participation (in

contrast to the external factors, such as procedural barriers and coercion, explored in

sections 4 and 6, respectively). As the findings from previous chapters suggest,

NWFP women are as interested in politics as men, but they report less trust in

political institutions (Section 5), greater procedural barriers (Section 4), and more

influence by family and other social institutions in either voting or abstaining (Section

6). The first part of this section presents findings about participation in past elections,

respondents’ expectations about their participation in the elections, and their

involvement in preparations necessary to vote in upcoming elections. The second part

examines personal motivations for voting or abstaining in past elections, in order to

determine to what extent the electorate is motivated by “participatory” factors, such as

interest in the candidates, a desire to change policy. The third part explores forms of

democratic participation other than voting, and the fourth part addresses attitudes

toward women’s participation. The fifth part explores relationships between voting

and interest in politics.

4.8.1 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN ELECTORAL

PARTICIPATION: When asked about their past participation in elections (Q22), 33%

of respondents claimed to have voted in every election, 15% voted in many elections,

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16% recalled voting in 2-3 elections, and 9% in one election. Twenty-eight per cent of

the eligible electorate had never voted. Younger respondents said they had never

voted more often than older age groups; 36% of 21-24 year-olds had never voted,

compared with 30% of 25-34 years olds, 25% of 35-49 year-olds, and 18% of people

over 50. One in five (23%) of the youngest respondents said he or she had voted in

every election, compared with almost one in two (46%) of people over 50 (Table

4.8.1a).Women vote less frequently than men; 31% said they voted in every election,

while 34% of men reported doing so. The percentage of women who voted in many

elections (13%) was four percent less than the percentage of men (17%), and 15% of

women and 18% of men voted 2-3 times. One in three women (31%) reported never

having voted, while one in four men (24%) did so (Table 4.8.1a).

Table 4.8.1a: Past Electoral Participation (Number of Elections in Which Respondent has Voted)

Demography Never OnceTwo-three

timesMany

electionsEvery

Election

Age Group

21-24 Years 36 9 19 12 2325-34 Years 30 9 18 13 3035-49 Years 25 8 16 18 3250 and above 18 7 11 18 32

GenderMale 24 8 18 17 34Female 31 9 15 13 31

Regions

North 26 10 24 17 24South 32 11 14 12 31Centre 26 7 14 15 38Hazara 37 11 14 14 23

Class

Lowest Income 19 7 16 14 34Lower Middle class 27 8 17 20 29Middle class 22 13 14 13 38Upper middle class 27 11 15 18 29High Income 28 7 18 11 37

Education

None 28 5 14 19 34Madrasa 33 13 9 5 41Some Primary 28 10 14 16 32Finished Primary 24 7 18 11 39Middle 27 14 20 13 27Matric 29 10 17 10 33Intermediate and above

27 12 19 15 26

Rural and urban respondents did not differ significantly with respect to past voting

behaviour, which, consistent with findings in previous section, may be attributable to

stronger local ties at the rural level that increase the effectiveness of “get out the vote”

efforts, paired with greater cynicism about the electoral process in the urban electorate.

Voter participation differs significantly by provincial regions; 38% of respondents in

Hazara claim to have voted in every election, followed by 31% in Southern NWFP,

24% in Northern NWFP, and 23% in Hazara (Table 4.8.1a). The percentage of those

who had never voted (“non-voters”) is highest in Hazara (37%), followed by 32% in

Southern NWFP and 26% each in Central NWFP and Northern NWFP. While the

survey findings suggest that higher class and income are associated positively with

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levels of political interest, awareness, and many other pro-election attitudes, the data

suggest that they are associated somewhat negatively—or less systematically—with

actual voting behaviour. This result is consistent with findings that show that the

reasons for voting may include economic or physical coercion. Those in the middle

class report voting in every election more frequently than those in the other income

categories; 38% of middle class respondents voted in every election, followed by 37%

in the highest class and 34% in the lowest class. The percentage of respondents voting

in every election was 29% in both the lower and upper middle classes (Table 4.8.1a).

Almost one in two members of every class voted in many or every election—many

more than the number who report high political interest, media use, or other personal

political inclinations, suggesting a considerable influence of social or other external

motivations for voting. While most studies of political behaviour in advanced

democracies find strong links between education, income, and voter turnout, the

survey results for NWFP suggest a different pattern of electoral participation.

Education is also, somewhat surprisingly, almost inversely related to voting behaviour,

with madrasa students (41%), who reported voting in every election, followed by 39%

of those who finished primary school and 34% of those with no education (Table

4.8.1a). Those with an F.A./F.Sc degree or more education reported voting in every

election less often (26%) than all of the other educational categories. Those with these

higher degrees reported never voting at a rate (27%) similar to the other groups (24%

- 33%). Electoral participation often increases with age; younger people who study

away from home are less likely to register and vote. They are still in a process of

“political socialization.” In addition, the eligible voting age was lowered in 2000 from

21 to 18 years.

4.8.2 PERSONAL MOTIVATIONS FOR ABSTAINING OR

VOTING: Section 4.4 addressed some of the procedural reasons why people do not

vote, while section 4.6 analyzed external incentives and disincentives for electoral

participation. In reality, every individual votes or abstains for a multitude of reasons,

many of which are personal as well as circumstantial. To gain a better picture of those

who vote or abstain, the survey included questions designed to measure these

motivations for voting that are, in many cases, beyond the influence of voter

education or procedural reform. Because such reasons are highly individual, one

would not expect them to differ predictably across geographic regions or ascribed

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characteristics such as gender, but rather to be more a function of individual

circumstances, such as education and political socialization. Of those respondents

who said they had abstained from voting in at least one past election, only 12% said

they intended to vote but did not do so as a result of personal circumstances on the

day of the election (Q25a), while 62% said such circumstances were not at all

important. Those with more education gave this explanation significantly more often

(12% of degree holding respondents, for example) than less educated respondents (6%

of respondents with no education), as were respondents in Hazara, 13% of whom said

personal circumstances were very important in abstaining almost twice as often as in

the other provinces (6% in Central NWFP, 8% in Northern NWFP, and 6% in

Southern NWFP). There is no evidence that percentages for whom this explanation

was important differed by gender, class, rural and urban areas, literacy, or age. One in

five (21%) of non-voting respondents said that work was somewhat or very important

(Q25i) an explanation that differed only across educational groups, with about one in

five of those with middle school, matric, or higher degrees saying work was a very

important factor in abstaining, compared with only one in ten respondents with

primary school education or lower, despite the fact that election day is a non-working

day in Pakistan. The belief that one’s vote makes no difference (Q25f)—a quite

rational belief according to many political scientists—was a somewhat or very

important factor in non-voting for 22% of past abstainers. Not surprisingly, those for

whom this explanation is very important are more educated; 20% of those with

middle school education, 12% with matric, and 15% with higher degrees, compared

with 11% or less among those with less education (data not presented). This attitude

did not vary significantly by age, gender, or class, but 20% of respondents in Hazara

who abstained in at least one past election said this factor was very important,

compared with 13% in Northern NWFP and 9% each in Central NWFP and Southern

NWFP (data not presented). These findings confirm the general provincial trends

evident in previous analysis. Election-specific reasons for abstention, such as a lack of

enthusiasm for parties and candidates, are often associated with lower turnout in older

democracies and attributable to the nature of the political system and political

competition. These factors are often more common among those interested in politics

who have both access to information and the means to understand it. On the other

hand, it is often said in NWFP that voters have been jaded by the country’s mixed

governance history and believe that all politicians are the same and say, “whoever

169

gets elected, things won’t change.” However, only 16% of survey respondents who

abstained at least once said that dislike of the candidates was a somewhat or very

important factor (Q25h). These findings differ across educational groups; 16% of

those with higher degrees say this explanation was very important in their non-voting

decisions, compared with 8% of those with matric, 6% with middle school, and 11%

who finished primary school education. Of those with no education, 7% said

candidate choices were very important in non-voting, compared with 10% for

madrasa-educated people and 5% of those with some primary school (data not

presented). Respondents in Hazara also mention candidates as a very important factor

more often (15%) than those in other regions (less than 9%) (data not presented).

Further dispelling the common wisdom about disenchantment with politicians,

among the reasons that respondents gave for having voted in one or more elections,

feeling strongly about one of the candidates or parties (Q26b) was very important for

over one in three (35%) and somewhat important for one in five respondents (19%).

Over half (54%) of the voting electorate said strong feelings about a candidate

motivated them to vote. There is no evidence that these sentiments differed by gender,

rural urban area, class, or educational group, but literate voters were more likely to

mention support for candidates as an important factor (41%) compared with 32% of

illiterate voters. The importance given to candidate support as a reason for voting,

increases steadily with the respondent’s age. Finally, attachment to candidates appears

to be more important in voting for respondents in Central NWFP and Southern NWFP,

where 40% said support for the candidate was very important in voting, followed by

35% in Hazara and 27% in Northern NWFP. These data point to the possibility that

NWFP voters remain hopeful that their elected representatives, regardless of past

mixed performance, have the potential to govern well. Other possible interpretations

are that voters feel a strong connection either to prominent national party leaders

(even though their local representatives may disappoint constituents) or to local

politicians whom voters know (even if high profile national leaders do not live up to

expectations). A final explanation for respondents’ seeming optimism is that they

provided answers they expected interviewers would want to hear with regard to all of

the questions in this group. Providing further evidence that the electorate has not

given up on electoral politics, over half (56%) of those who voted in at least one past

election said that the belief that their vote makes a difference (Q26c) was very

important in their decision to vote, while 19% said it was somewhat important (Figure

170

8.2f).63 Men said this factor was somewhat or very important more than women (82%

and 64%, respectively). The percentage giving importance to this explanation also

increases with the age, literacy, and educational attainment of the respondent,

contradicting the notion that experience or information about past governments leads

to cynicism. More voters in Central NWFP (63%) see this factor as important,

compared with half of voters or fewer in the other three regions (50% in Southern

NWFP, 45% in Hazara, and 41% in Northern NWFP.

A desire to change things in (Q26j) was a very important factor for 38% of voters, and

somewhat so for 17%. A larger percentage of voters in Hazara (44%) say desire for

change is a very important reason for voting, compared with 38% in Central NWFP,

39% in Northern NWFP, and just 25% in Southern NWFP (data not presented).

Desire for change as a factor in voting increases with age, but not education or class.

Among literate voters, however, 48% said change was very important, compared with

29% of illiterate voters. Forty-six percent of voting men compared with 29% of voting

women said desire for change was a very important motivation, while 17% of both

men and women said it was somewhat important.

The most common explanation for respondents who have voted was the belief that

voting is a duty of every citizen (Q26a), with 74% saying duty was very important

and 12% somewhat important in past electoral participation. It is notable that this

attitude does not differ significantly across classes or educational groups, but that

literacy seems to make a difference in whether a person votes based on a sense of duty.

While there are no regional differences, rural voters attribute a sense of duty to their

voting behaviour less often (70%) than urban voters (82%) (Table 4.8.2a). Duty is

also a less important motivation for women than for men, with 66% of women and 81%

of men saying duty was very important in their decision to vote (Table 4.8.2a). It is

somewhat surprising that younger voters said duty was important about as often as

other age groups; 76% of 21-24 year-olds felt duty to be very important, compared

with 70% of 25-34 year-olds, 77% of 35-49 year-olds, and 74% of those 50 and older.

The youngest group was among the least likely to say duty was not at all important,

although more said they did not know than did older respondents (Table 4.8.2a).

When asked about their perception about the difference the respondent’s vote was

likely to make in the upcoming election (Q30), 49% said it would make a big

difference, 27% said some difference, and 24% said no or little difference.

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Table 4.8.2a: Voting out of a sense of duty, by demographic subgroup

DemographyDon'tKnow(%)

Not at allImportant

(%)

Not VeryImportant

(%)

SomewhatImportant

(%)

VeryImportant

(%)

Age Group

21-24 Years 10 5 2 8 7625-34 Years 9 4 4 14 7035-49 Years 3 7 3 13 7750 and Above 1 7 6 12 74

GenderMale 3 2 3 11 81Female 9 8 5 13 66

LiteracyIlliterate 9 8 5 16 61Literate 1 2 2 7 88

Milieu Rural 7 6 4 14 70

Urban 3 3 4 8 82

Younger respondents value their vote as a tool of change less than older respondents;

nevertheless, more than two-thirds (69%) of 18-24 year-olds said voting would make

some or a big difference, compared 77% of both 25-34 year-olds and 35-49 year-olds.

Eighty-three percent of respondents over 50 felt their vote would make some or a big

difference, once again dispelling the notion of growing cynicism with experience

(Table 8.2b).

Table 4.8.2b: Difference respondent's vote will make in 2008, by demographic subgroup.

DemographyNone(%)

LittleDifference

(%)

SomeDifference (%)

A BigDifference

(%)

Age Group

21-24 Years 19 13 29 4025-34 Years 14 9 30 4735-49 Years 14 9 27 5050 and Above 9 8 20 63

GenderMale 12 10 25 54Female 17 10 29 44

LiteracyIlliterate 16 9 30 45Literate 12 10 23 54

Areas

North 20 17 35 28South 25 8 27 40Centre 10 7 24 59Hazara 20 12 25 43

Educational Attainment

None 17 11 28 44Madrasa 19 12 25 45Some Primary 12 8 34 46Finished Primary

12 6 26 56

Middle School 7 11 23 59Matric 11 10 24 55F.A./F.Sc or above

15 7 27 51

More men (54%) than women (44%) said their vote would make a big difference in

upcoming elections, but more women (29%) than men (25%) said it would make

some difference, and equal percentages (10%) viewed voting as ineffective. More

women did not know how they would answer the question (Table 8.2b). Similarly,

although literate respondents said their vote would make a big difference more

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frequently than illiterate respondents (54% and 45%, respectively), 30% of illiterate

respondents compared with 23% of literate respondents thought it would make some

difference. Feelings about the efficacy of individual electoral participation also

differed across educational groups, but in a somewhat curvilinear fashion, with the

percentage saying their vote would make a big difference peaking with those who had

finished middle school, and slightly higher numbers of those with little and those with

more education saying their vote would make little difference (Table 4.8.2b)

Respondents in Southern NWFP (67%) and Northern NWFP (63%) said voting will

make some or a big difference less frequently than respondents in Central NWFP

(73%) and Hazara (68%). Those in Northern NWFP and Hazara who said their vote

will make little difference (17% and 12%, respectively) outnumber those in Central

NWFP (7%) and Southern NWFP (8%) (Table 8.2b).

4.8.3 NON-ELECTORAL DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

Voting is only one and, arguably, the least costly in terms of time and effort, of many

forms of political participation. In countries in which elections are not necessarily

associated with democracy or political change, abstention may be, in fact, a form of

political participation, especially when paired with formal electoral boycotts. The

survey sought to assess the extent to which the electorate has participated in other

forms of democratic action in addition to voting, in order to assess the best forms of

delivery of voter education messages, as well as to understand whether people

participating in non-electoral activities are different from those who vote.

Interviewers asked respondents about a variety of activities and whether they have

been involved, would be likely to, might be, or would never be involved in such an

activity. When asked in about participating in an election boycott (Q21b), 5% said

they have participated, while 13% said they might or would be likely to participate in

a boycott. Seventy-three percent would never boycott an election. The likelihood of

participating in an election boycott rises steadily with income and education, but does

not differ significantly by age, gender, rural urban milieu, or province.

Ten percent of respondents have participated in rallies or demonstrations (Q21c), and

an additional 13% said they might or are likely to do so, a finding that does not

change significantly by age, rural-urban milieu, or region. Not surprisingly, men

reported having participated in rallies more often than women (12% compared with

8%), but 5% and 4% of men and women, respectively, said they would be likely to

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participate in such an event. Seven per cent of women and 10% of men might attend a

rally, while 72% of women and 64% of men would never do so (table not presented).

Patterns of participation in rallies and demonstrations are not linear for different levels

of income and educational attainment. Those who have at least finished primary

school report higher participation (12% or more) in rallies than those with no or

madrasa education (6%), but 19% of those who have finished primary school say they

might participate or would be likely to participate, compared with 10% of those with

no education and 14% with the highest level of education (data not presented).

Similarly non-linear patterns are found for class, where 12% of the lower middle class

and 13% of the upper class claims to have participated in a rally. Higher percentages

of those in the middle three class categories report that they are likely or might attend

a rally compared with the highest class, which is also exceeded in likely

demonstration behaviour by the two lowest classes (data not presented). When asked

about attending a party or election-related meeting (Q21d), 14% of respondents said

they had already done so, while 18% said they might or would be likely to participate.

Fifty-nine per cent would never participate. As with other forms of participation,

women, less educated individuals, and illiterate voters are less likely to have attended

or to be likely to attend a party or election meeting (data not presented). Class is also

associated with meeting participation; 16% of lower middle class respondents have

attended a party or election meeting and 19% might or would be likely to do so.

Twenty-five per cent in the upper class have attended such an event, while 14% might

or would be likely to do so. Sixteen and 17% of middle class respondents,

respectively, have done or might participate in a rally (data not presented).

Finally, when asked about their likelihood of visiting a political representative’s office

(Q21g), 13% of respondents have done so, while 15% might or are likely to do so.

Education and income are associated with higher participation in this activity, and

men are more likely than women to visit a representative (data not presented).

4.8.4 WOMEN AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The survey found significant differences between women’s and men’s self-reported

political interest, access to information, perceptions of institutions, exposure to fraud,

and rates of participation. Again and again, the findings suggest that women are at a

disadvantage, both in terms of the lower rates at which they are educated and literate,

but also with respect to specific gender norms, particularly family influence and the

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relative neglect of women in voter registration efforts, the mechanisms through which

parties and civil society deliver their political and civic education messages, and

opportunities to engage in political action. The fact that women’s behaviour

demonstrates a level of interest and engagement in political issues on par with that of

men (see section 3) suggests that broader social and cultural norms may make

mobilization of women to participate in democratic processes difficult without

engaging society as a whole. The following section examines various attitudes of the

general electorate on women’s participation in electoral processes in order to identify

the types of messages that might be aimed at the voting age population more broadly,

not just women, to create a climate that is more conducive to their participation.

Respondents were asked to state their level of agreement with a series of questions

about types of women’s participation.64 Three-quarters of respondents agree or agree

strongly with the notion that women can run for political office (Q63a), dispositions

that are consistent with constitutional and electoral law65 and the increasing number of

women participating in government at the local level. 66 However, one in four

respondents (24%) disagrees or disagrees strongly with this proposition. These

percentages do not differ significantly by age, urban or rural area, or religious sect.

Respondents in lower levels of income and education are less likely to agree that

women can be political candidates (data not presented). It is interesting to note that

men and women are not substantively different in their responses to this question.

While over half of women (52%) strongly agree and 45% of men strongly agree, 25%

of women compared with 27% of men agree with the statement. Nine percent of

women and 10% of men disagree, and 11% and 16% of men and women disagree

strongly. A substantial number of female respondents (20%) do not support the idea

that women should represent them in political office.

Consistent with lower female participation rates in Hazara, respondents in this region

disagree or do so strongly more frequently (32%) than those in central NWFP (25%),

Southern NWFP (23%), and Northern NWFP (14%) (data not presented). Although

Pakistan was the first Muslim country with a female head of state, only 64% of survey

respondents agree that a woman can be head of a Muslim country (Q63b), while one

third disagree or disagree strongly with the idea of a Muslim female head of state.

Respondents in Hazara disagreed more often than those in other regions (43%

compared with 37% in Central NWFP, 29% in Southern NWFP, and 19% in Northern

NWFP). Respondents in Northern NWFP, , were more likely to agree or agree

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strongly; 47% agreed strongly, while 28% agreed; 41% of southern NWFP

respondents strongly agreed and 27% agreed; 39% of Central NWFP respondents

strongly agreed and 23% agreed, and 28% of Hazara respondents agreed strongly and

27% agreed (table not shown). Although three quarters of respondents agreed that

women can run for office, almost that many (72%) agreed with the proposition that

men are better suited to politics than women, while 26% disagreed. Regional patterns

follow the previous question (data not presented), as do linear relationships between

income and education and attitudes towards women’s suitability to politics. There are

no generational or rural urban differences in these attitudes, nor are there differences

by gender. It should be noted that were one to ask the same question to electorates in

western democracies, it is not unlikely that, while most would agree that women can

serve in elected office, given the relative paucity of women in office in most

democracies, many might also say that men are better suited to politics. Similarly, the

vast majority of all respondents, even women, also agree with the proposition that a

university education is more important for boys than for girls (Q63d). Perhaps

surprisingly, more women than men agree strongly with this statement—65% of

women compared with 58% of men, while 24% of women and 29% of men agree

with the statement (table not shown). This may be due to the fact that in NWFP,

women often rely on a son and his family to care for them in old age, so that a son and

a daughter-in-law are more important than a daughter for women’s personal

livelihood in older age. As with the other findings, these attitudes about women are

less frequent among those with higher incomes and educational levels.

These findings suggest that, while barriers exist and women are still thought to be less

suited to politics than men, NWFP society as a whole is receptive to an increased role

for women in politics. One possible explanation could be the increased representation

of women in national and provincial assemblies and local government councils,67 as

well as their increasing appearance in media talk shows, the work place, and other

public venues. However, barriers to women’s participation exist in general attitudes

about political roles for women among respondents of both genders.

4.8.5 ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION AND INTEREST IN

POLITICS: While surveys in older democracies find consistently that those with

greater interest in politics and are more likely to vote and participate in other ways,

the findings of this survey suggest that the relationship between interest and electoral

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participation is not so clear in NWFP. Income and education are not related to voting

behaviour in ways that are consistent with explanations for turnout in older

democracies. However, both the respondent’s self-reported level of political interest

and his or her interest index (calculated in section 3) does correspond with a higher

frequency of voting. Only 14% of those who report the highest interest report never

voting compared with 21% who are somewhat interested and 34% who are not at all

interested. While those who said they were very interested in politics reported voting

in every election somewhat (2%) more frequently than those who are not very

interested, 25% of those said they have a great deal of interest voted 2-3 times

compared with 16% of those who report being not very interested in politics. The

relatively high numbers (over one third) who said they voted in every election,

regardless of self-reported political interest may be attributable to the role of “get out

the vote” operations and family pressure among those who are uninterested, or,

perhaps, a greater level of trust in institutions and less skepticism of the electoral

process from one election to the next (see Section 6). Those who report that they are

somewhat or very interested in politics are more likely to say that they voted 2-3 or

many times; 22% of those reporting some interest said they voted in many elections,

while only 14% of those who expressed a great deal of interest in politics said they

voted many times. One-fourth (25%) of the very interested respondents said they

voted two to three times. When political interest is measured with an index of both

self-reported attitudes and actual behaviour (see Section 3), the findings are similar,

but there are greater differences between the low, medium, and high levels of the

index with respect to voting behaviour than between the lower and higher levels of

self-reported interest, and the lines cross less frequently. That is, the correspondence

between self-reported interest and voting is less clear than when actual engagement in

politics in the form of discussing politics with family and friends or other behaviors

are included in a measure of political interest. The relationship of the behavioral index

with voting behaviour is stronger than the self reported measure. This provides further

support for the findings in Section 3 that suggest that self-reported interest may be

linked to particular meanings of how interest is expressed, whereas including

behaviour better approximates a respondent’s actual willingness to participate in

different types of political activities. The findings show that willingness to engage in

political activities may translate into a greater likelihood of voting, even when self-

reported interest might be low. Forty-one per cent of those categorized as high-

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interest voted in every election, compared with 31% with medium interest and 28%

with low interest. Eighteen per cent of high-interest respondents report voting many

times compared with 14% and 11% of medium- and low interest respondents,

respectively. About the same percentage of those with medium and high interest (19%

and 18%, respectively) report voting two to three times, compared with 15% of those

with low interest. The index of respondents’ awareness of various types of electoral

procedures (see Section 4) is, surprisingly, unrelated to voting behaviour. Awareness

of current registration, identity card, and other requirements does not appear to

correspond to a respondent’s past participation. Both self-reported political interest

and the behavioural interest index are associated with higher self-reported voting in

both elections mentioned specifically to voters. These questions are less subjective,

rely less on memory than the general voting history question, and are less subject to

social desirability bias. As the foregoing findings indicate, both self-reported interest

and past voting behaviour may be somewhat unreliable measures. Table 4.8.5 presents

voting participation for 1988 and 1997 with both measures of political interest. The

percentage of respondents reporting having voted is, not surprisingly, higher among

respondents with both self-reported and behavioural political interest. However, it is

notable that over one in three of the lowest interest respondents by both measures

voted in one or the other election, and 36% or more of the most interested respondents

declined to vote in 1997 and/or 1988.

Table 4.8.5: Participation in 2002 and 2005 Elections, by Political Interest.Voted in 1997 Local Election? Voted in 1998 General Election?

Self-Reported Interest NO YES NO YESNot at All 59 41 62 38Not Very 47 53 52 48Somewhat 41 59 48 52Very Interested 36 64 41 59Don't Know 76 24 85 15

Behavioural Interest IndexLow 65 35 68 32Medium 49 51 54 46High 36 64 43 57

These findings point to several general conclusions. First, self-reported lack of

interest in politics or elections does not indicate an unwillingness or disinterest in

engaging in other kinds of democratic action, civic education, or community

participation. Second, low voter turnout does not measure the extent of cynicism, or

optimism, about democratic processes or the potential for greater public demand for

good governance in the country. Third, there may be a “silent majority” of citizens in

all demographic groups who are prepared to be more involved in broader civic

engagement if they had more information, opportunity, and a conducive environment

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to do so. All of these voting trends underlie the importance of more robust

programming giving people in NWFP the chance not just to hear about their basic

civic rights and responsibilities, such as the importance of voting, but also to take

action on a wider range of issues that directly affect their lives.

4.9 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter presents the key findings of the voting trends in NWFP including

electoral knowledge, attitudes, and political participation of the electorate with respect

to the Electoral Politics and electoral behaviour. This survey also reflect the main

argument, that how electoral politics effect voting behaviour in NWFP.

The study found significant disparities based on gender, rural/urban location, income,

education, age, regions in province, and other demographic characteristics regarding

knowledge, access, and attitudes toward electoral procedures and issues. Since there

were repeated elections during 1990s, the survey measured voters’ experience with

electoral processes, including their exposure to and perceptions of electoral politics, in

order to identify populations vulnerable to disenfranchisement or misrepresentation as

a result of these problems. These findings highlight the prevalence of different types

of irregularities that have been common in past elections for different population

subgroups, which might help to inform those involved in the interpretation of

electoral conduct before, during, and after Election Day.

During the analysis of survey results about demographic characteristics and

implications for electoral trends, 47% reported reading and writing at least one

language (almost always Urdu). In rural areas, 40% are literate, while 60% of the

urban electorate is literate. Among native Pashtun and Hindko speakers, 51% and

55%, respectively, are also literate in Urdu, while the other language groups in the

sample have 35% or less Urdu literacy. For all the major language groups, literacy

rates in Urdu are higher than that for literacy in the mother tongue, but substantial

numbers of Pushto speakers (27%) and Chitrali speakers (42%) are literate in their

mother tongue. Print materials with a large amount of text in any language may be

less effective than illustrations and audio-visual voter education strategies in regional

languages in rural areas, particularly in Northern NWFP and the Hazara (NWFP),

where the sample’s literacy rate is particularly low (30% and 44% respectively).

However, almost half of their populations speak and understand Urdu (44% and 48%,

respectively). In Southern NWFP and Hazara, about 60% of the population speaks

Urdu. In all languages, more women are illiterate than men. Only 23% of percent of

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women and 44% of men are literate in their mother tongue. More people are literate in

Urdu, with 32% of women and 53% of men reporting that they can speak and

understand it.

Only 5% youth reported as students, and about 40% of people in all age groups report

having no education. In fact, educational attainment levels are about the same across

generations. Young people have somewhat higher rates of literacy. Forty-three

percent of 21-24 year-olds are literate in their mother tongue compared with 31% of

both the 25-34 year-old and 35-49 year-old age groups, and 21% of respondents over

50. Forty-four percent of respondents in the youngest age group are literate in Urdu,

49% in the 25-34 age group, and 41% and 36% in the two oldest age groups,

respectively.

During the survey analysis about the interest on politics, the eligible electorate is

relatively disinterested in politics based on self-reporting. Only one in three

respondents (32%) said they were somewhat or very interested in politics and 67%

were disinterested. The behavior of the eligible voting population suggests that their

interest in politics is elevated during elections and that there are more people who are

actually engaged in politics than say they are interested in politics. One in three (32%)

discusses elections with friends and family and 20% say they are likely to do so. One

in four (23%) have told friends and family how to vote and 21% say they might or

would be likely to do so. One in five (21%) have argued about elections and 18%

might or would be likely to do so. Surprisingly, the survey did not provide evidence

that men and women respondents differ with respect to interest in politics or

likelihood of discussing politics with friends and family, trying to convince others

how to vote, or arguing about elections. Disinterest in politics is not more

characteristic of younger adults, but more young people tend to exhibit medium

interest in politics (42%) than high interest (34%). Lower income people are also less

interested in politics, with 56% of the lowest income respondents expressing no

interest at all in politics compared with 36.5% of those in the highest income category.

Fifty-four percent of those in the lower middle class have no interest, but of those in

the middle class, the number expressing no interest at all falls to 40%. Respondents

who have some or a great deal of interest in politics tend to have higher incomes; 28%

in the lowest income group are somewhat or very interested in politics compared with

24% in the middle class and 29% in the upper middle class.

While analysing the survey results about information consumption preferences it have

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been found that consumption of media is surprisingly low in NWFP; 60% of eligible

voters never listen to radio or read a newspaper, and 51% never or very rarely watch

television. Young people of voting age are no more likely than other segments of the

population to listen to radio or watch television. Neither are women, who one might

expect to be home more often then men. When asked to choose two among a variety

of potential media for receiving election information, such as a radio drama, a TV

debate, or newspapers, a plurality (38%) indicated a preference for some form of

television program. Twenty-seven percent would prefer to hear about elections

through illustrations and posters, particularly low-income (33% compared with 19%

of upper middle class respondents) and rural respondents (30% compared with 23% of

urban respondents). More respondents mention Radio (22%) and TV 9%) as their

primary source of political information than any other single sources, although 28%

prefer sources too diverse to identify. The lowest income members of the electorate

are less inclined than those with higher incomes to attend any kind of voter education

event; over half (54%) compared with 42% of wealthier respondents would decline to

attend any voter education activity. However, more (21%) of poor respondents prefer

private, home-based events while 15% are willing to attend rallies and other public

activities. Surprisingly, though one might expect younger people to be interested in

going out, there is no evidence of a real difference between age groups in public-

private venue preference, even when disaggregated by gender. More men are willing

to attend public events (22%) than women (13%). In NWFP, however, only 7% of

women compared with 35% of men prefer public venues, while 17% of women prefer

private events compared with 20% of men. Sixty-three percent of NWFP women say

they would not attend any event, compared with only 34% of men.

During the analysis of survey results about election awareness and access, it have

been found that awareness of registration procedures was low; 42% of the electorate

was unaware of any of publicized aspects of the electoral process. Women were

particularly uninformed; 62% were unaware of any of four election registration

procedures compared with 30% of men. Women were less likely to know whether or

not the national door-to-door registration process, carried out by the Election

Commission of Pakistan (ECP), had reached their homes. 62% of men and 35% of

women were aware that someone had come to their homes to register eligible voters.

Of those who were reached by the ECP registration, 80% of women and 89% of men

said they registered through this process, which results in an estimated registration

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rate of 28% of women and 55% of men, keeping in mind that more women may have

been registered by male family members. Four in five (80%) respondents said they

possessed either a new or old identity card required for both registering and voting,

but women and younger adults were less likely to have the necessary ID. The majority

(94%) of men reported having one of the necessary identity cards compared with 79%

of women. One-fourth of 18-24 year olds lacked the necessary ID. Surprisingly,

people in lower income groups are not less likely to have the necessary ID; about 85%

of people in all economic classes reporting having at least one form of necessary

identification. Nineteen percent of eligible voters in both NWFP did not have ID,

compared with 13% and 10% in their urban areas. Both rural and urban respondents

in Northern NWFP lacked ID more often than respondents in the other regions; 21%

in rural and 19% in urban areas had neither the old or new ID.

During the analysis of survey results about procedural barriers to political

participation it has been found that more than one in three (36%) respondents said that

inability to register was a very important reason for their lack of participation in

previous elections. Twenty-nine percent of respondents said that lack of identification

after reaching the polling station was a very important factor in non-voting. Low-

income and less-educated respondents reported that a lack of ID was a greater

problem than did the wealthy and educated. For 17% of respondents, showing up at

the polling station and not finding one’s name on the voter list was a very important

factor in not voting. Although difficulty getting to the polling station was an important

factor in nonvoting for only 10% of respondents, the percentage for whom reaching

the polling station deterred past voting was as high as 19% in central NWFP and 15%

in North Eastern NWFP (Hazara).

During the analysis of survey results about perceptions of electoral administration and

conduct it have been found that, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) was

regarded with a great deal of trust by only one-fourth (25%) of the electorate. Thirty-

eight percent of eligible voters had some trust in the ECP and another 38% has no

trust at all in the ECP. A significant portion of the electorate expected names to be

missing from electoral lists at the polling stations in the coming election; 13% said

this problem would be very likely and 26% said it would be somewhat likely. Better

training for election officials would give 40% of eligible voters much more and 18%

somewhat more confidence in the election process. Before knowing about the new

privacy screens being used in the elections, 24% of eligible voters thought it would be

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somewhat or very likely those authorities would know how they voted in the

upcoming elections. Almost half (45%) of the electorate expected the upcoming

election to be no more free and fair than past elections. Eighteen percent expected

them to be somewhat more free and fair and 27% expected them to be much more free

and fair. Only 12% expected the upcoming election to be less free and fair than those

in the past.

During the analysis of perceptions of proposals to increase election access and

fairness and when asked about types of measures that might improve fairness of

elections in NWFP, 42% of eligible voters said having a procedure for ordinary

citizens to complain about fraud would give them much more confidence in the

election process. Local trained observers to monitor the entire process would give 56%

of respondents somewhat or much more confidence in the election. More than a third

(38%) of the electorate would have more confidence in the election process if local

governments were dissolved during general elections—a proposal that has been

contemplated in the national media--while 37% would have less under these

circumstances.

During the analysis of survey results about the trust in governmental and

nongovernmental institutions, over two-thirds of respondents (67%) said they had no

trust at all in the police, who have responsibility for election security. The provincial

and national assembly’s ranked second to last after the police among institutions with

respect to citizen trust. Only 18% of respondents had a great deal of trust in the

elected assemblies, while 43% had no trust at all. More people had some trust in the

assemblies (39%) than had some trust in the police (23%). Only 20% would

recommend a Member of the Provincial or National Assembly (PA/NA) to a friend or

family member searching for a solution to a local problem, and one-fourth (26%) of

the electorate believed the MNA had no power at all. Over one in three (34%) of

respondents had no trust in the national government, while 38% had some trust and 28%

have a great deal of trust. Levels of trust in local and provincial government had a

very similar distribution. Similarly, 31% had no trust in the judiciary, 37% had some

trust, and 31% had a great deal. Over half (58%) of eligible voters felt it important to

have friends and family in government in order to get a job. Many potential voters

believed that corruption was a major and common problem. About the same

percentage of respondents (40%) said corruption was a major problem for all levels of

government--local, provincial and national, but more people (59%) said they would

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be likely to recommend local Nazims and Union Councilors to solve local problems—

a rate much higher than that for other levels of government. Social institutions had

greater trust among the electorate than government and elected institutions. While

only 27% of respondents would recommend religious leaders to solve a local

problems, these leaders ranked higher than district officials (25%) and members of

provincial and national assembly’s (20%). The electorate, even those who are

illiterate and those who rarely listen to radio, read a newspaper, or watch television,

had a great deal of trust in the press. Of illiterate respondents, 64% had some or a

great deal of trust in the press, compared with 78% of literate respondents, for a

provincial average of 72%. Biradari, or clan, elders are the institution most often

referenced as a likely source for solving local problems, regardless of the respondents’

level of educational attainment. Seventy percent of respondents would recommend

this source, while 30% would not. Rural and lower income respondent were

somewhat more likely to turn to Biradari. One-fourth of the electorate (26%)—even

higher percentages in rural Southern NWFP (39%) and those with no education

(38%)--said they would be likely to recommend large, influential landowners (“feudal”

leaders)to solve local problems.

While analysing the survey results about corruption and fairness in politics, and when

asked their opinions about a number of statements seeking to measure perceptions

about patronage, 46% of respondents agreed strongly that government delivers or

improves public services like road repair and water in their area for the purpose of

influencing elections. An additional 22% agreed, while 18% disagreed. Similar

percentages believed political parties and candidates reward their supporters by

helping those who voted for them after elections. The problem of corruption in

political parties was perceived to be common and major more often (51%) than for

other institutions. Over one-third (39%) of the electorate said they thought that it

would be somewhat or very likely that candidates would be prevented from

competing in the upcoming election.

During the analysis of survey results about “Rigging” and Misconduct in Elections it

have been found that in central NWFP, respondents who had abstained from voting in

past elections said the fairness of the election was a somewhat or very important (30%)

factor in non-voting almost three times as often as those in the other regions (9% in

Hazara, 11% in Southern NWFP, and 10% in Northern NWFP, respectively). Asked

about the likelihood that people would be able to vote more than once in the

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upcoming election, 21% said very likely and 20% said likely. Forty-eight percent said

they expected cheating in counting the ballots to be somewhat or very likely, and 38%

expected authorities to make changes in the count after the counting process. The

electorate was divided in its attribution of responsibility for election-rigging in NWFP;

26% said it is the central government that rigs elections, 32% said local politicians,

and 15% said that political parties work together with the government to rig elections

in NWFP.

During the analysis of survey results about about undue influence, intimidation, and

violence, it has been found that fourteen percent of respondents, who had abstained in

one or more past elections said that fear of violence and unrest was somewhat or very

important in their decision not to vote. Twelve percent of women said a somewhat or

very important factor in their decision to abstain from voting in past elections was that

family members had stopped them from doing so. While few eligible voters actually

reported experiencing intimidation personally in past elections, quite a few expected

different forms of malpractice to happen in the upcoming election; 42% said it was

somewhat or very likely that employers 45% said that landlords would get their

employees and tenants, respectively, to vote together as a group. Forty-two percent of

respondents said they expected the same amount of violence as in past elections, 14%

expected more, and 14% expected less. Candidates and voters were identified as the

most likely victims of electoral violence by the largest percentage of respondents (27%

and 35%, respectively, said candidates and voters would be targeted). Thirty-eight

percent of respondents believed violence and intimidation would be the most serious

threat to a free and fair election, while 43% said fraud and malpractice would be more

likely to undermine the results of the next election. Nineteen percent expected the

election to be free and fair. It is notable that the number who believed fraud and

violence might compromise elections exceeded the number who reported

experiencing voter-targeted fraud and coercion directly.

During the analysis of survey results about perceptions of proposals to reduce election

misconduct, over half (56%) of respondents said having trained observers from the

local area to monitor the entire process would give them somewhat or much more

confidence in the election. A signed and enforced party code of conduct would give

64% of respondents some or much more confidence in the election process.

While analysing the survey results about perceptions of democratic rights and

freedoms, twenty-five percent of eligible voters agreed strongly with the statement,

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“Citizens have the power to influence the policies and actions of the government,”

while an additional 26% agreed. Forty-eight percent of eligible voters agreed or

agreed strongly that citizens can criticize the government freely, while 39% disagreed.

When asked if they agreed that citizens can join any party or organization they wish,

68% agreed or agreed strongly and 19% disagreed.

During the analysis of survey results about beliefs on democracy and when asked to

chose the two most important factors essential for democracy, the most common

response (chosen by 37% of respondents) was the provision of basic necessities for

everyone, followed by having a smaller gap between rich and poor (32%). Almost one

in three (27%) mentioned absence of violence as essential to democracy. One in three

respondents (33%) mentioned only economic factors as essential for democracy,

compared with just 10% who mentioned elections and political freedoms alone.

During the analysis of survey results about political participation, one-third (33%) of

respondents claimed to have voted in every election, 15% voted in many elections, 16%

in 2-3 elections, and 9% in one election. Twenty-eight percent of the eligible

electorate, many in the younger age group had never voted. One in three women (31%)

reported never having voted, while one in four men (24%) had never voted. The

percentage of those who had never voted was highest in central NWFP (37%),

followed by 32% in Northern NWFP and 26% each in Hazara and Southern NWFP.

Forty-five percent of respondents said they were very likely to vote in the next

election and 24% said they were somewhat likely to vote. Eighteen percent were

uncertain whether they would vote and 14% were unlikely to vote. Eighty percent of

male respondents compared with 58% of female respondents were somewhat or very

likely to vote, and women said they were very unlikely to vote twice as often as men

(10% of women compared with 5% of men). The most important reason for voting in

past elections mentioned by the largest percentage (74%) of respondents was a belief

that voting is a duty for every citizen, followed by a belief that voting makes a

difference (56%), a desire to change things in NWFP (38%), and strong feelings about

the candidates (36%). Almost half of respondents (49%) said voting in election would

make a big difference, while 27% thought it would make some difference. One in four

(24%) thought voting would make little or no difference. Less than 20% of

respondents said they had or would be likely to engage in each of four other forms of

democratic participation—election boycotts, attending rallies, going to political party

meetings, and contacting representatives.

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During the analysis of survey results about women’s political participation it has been

found that three-quarters (75%) of respondents agreed or agreed strongly with the

notion that women can run for political office, one in four (24%) disagreed or

disagreed strongly, and respondents of both genders believed that men are better

suited for politics than women. Similarly, while one-third of respondents (64%)

agreed that women can lead Muslim countries, one-third disagreed.

1 See FG. Bailey, Structure and Change in Indian Society, Pacific Affairs, 1969-1970, Vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 494-502.2 Government of Pakistan, NWFP Census 1998 (Islamabad: Ministry of Population, 2002)3 Age calculated from 1997, 21 years means, age at the time of 1997 election. At that time the minimum age limit for voting was 21 years.4 All the population figures are taken from, Government of Pakistan, NWFP Census Report 1988 (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, 2002).5 Figures mentioned in ( ) represents the population.6 See Robert A. Dhal, Democracy and its critics (New Haven: Yale University, 1989) also see Charlas Tilley, Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007)7 For detailed study, see Mohammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006)8 Ibid.9 Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2005: South Asia, (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2005). 10 Government of Pakistan, NWFP Census 1998 (Islamabad: Ministry of Population, 2002).11 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM)(Islamabad: Statistics Division of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, 2004)12 Oxford Policy Management, Poverty and Social Impact Assessment: Pakistan Microfinance Policy (London: DFID, 2006).13 Education in NWFP is divided into five levels: Primary (grades one through five); Middle (grades six through eight); High (grades nine and ten, known as matriculation, or matric); intermediate (grades eleven and twelve), after which a diploma is awarded upon successful completion of a test. This diploma is now called the 'Higher Secondary School Certificate' or HSSC, but people still refer to the degree as F.Sc./F.A. (“Familiar of Science”/Familiar of Art”) or 'intermediate'.14 The survey included a question about religious affiliation. The Shia respondents in the survey was about 6% of respondents. No results were found to be significantly different according to religious sect, although the small number of respondents in minority religious groups is insufficient for robust statistical analysis at the subgroup level.15 Most people surveyed who read a language also write that language.16 Government of Pakistan, NWFP Census Report 1988 (Islamabad: Population Census Organistaion, 2002).17 Election Commission Electoral awareness slogan, Repeatedly broadcast from PTV and Radio before 1997 General elections. This advertisement was also printed in National Newspapers.18 Election Commission Electoral awareness slogan, Repeatedly broadcast from PTV and Radio before 1997 General elections. This advertisement was also printed in National Newspapers.19 Syed Junaid Qasim, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Balakot 14 April 2006.20 See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) and also see Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)21 See, for example, Voogt, Robert J. J., and Willem E. Saris, ‘To Participate or Not to Participate: The Link Between Survey Participation, Electoral Participation, and Political Interest’, Political Analysis 11 (2), 2003: pp.164-79.22 The difficulty of determining voting trends are whether age differences are due to age, or life-cycle effects, or enduring changes in attitudes across generations as a result of circumstances is well-

187

documented in the literature on survey research on political socialization. See, for example, Alwin, Duane F., and Jon A. Krosnick. 1991.23 "Aging, cohorts, and the stability of socio-political orientations over the life span." American Journal of Sociology 97 (1):169-95.24 For detail see, Government of NWFP, NWFP Development Statistics (Peshawar: Statistics Division, 2002)25 Adnan Rehmat and Aslam Khan, ‘Grace Under Pressure: Pakistani Journalists Hold Their Own in Changing Media Scene.’ In Press Freedom Reports, Islamabad: Intermedia, Internews Pakistan, and Green Press Pakistan 2002.26 The figure of 28% for frequent or daily newspaper use in NWFP may be inflated due to sampling bias in the province.27 See Muhammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections.28 PBC means Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, the state owned media, popularly known as Radio Pakistan.29 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) world service in Urdu/Pashto language is widely listening in NWFP.30 VOA (Voice of America) broadcast its programmes both in Pashto and urdu.31 Questions about the latest political development is also included to observe the past electoral trends.32 The question wording mentioned May and June for the display period, which was later delayed by one week, starting in June and lasting into July with the two-week extension.33 Voting Procedure.---(1) Where an elector presents himself at the polling station to vote, the Presiding Officer shall issue a ballot paper to the elector after satisfying himself about the identity of the elector and shall, for that purpose, require the elector to produce his identity card provided for in the National Registration Act, 1973 (LVI of 1973) or issued under the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000).34 See, for example, Tracy A. Campbell, ‘Machine Politics, Police Corruption, and the Persistence of Vote Fraud: The Case of the Louisville, Kentucky, Election of 1905’, Journal of Policy History 15 (3) 2003: pp. 269-300.35 See, for example, Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team, “Pakistan Local Bodies Elections, 19 and 25 August 2005,” pages 15-16, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/commonwealth-lb-elections.pdf36 Afrasiyab Khattak, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 25 June 2007.37 See, Richard Rose, and William Mishler, ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies’ The Journal of Politics 59 (2) 1997:, pp.418-51.38 Stokes, Susan Carol, and Matthew R. Clearly, Democracy and the Culture of Skepticism: Political Trust in Argentina and Mexico New York, (NY: Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 2006)39 Regression analysis has been used in this and subsequent cases to substantiate such findings from the cross-tabulated data.40 See Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 2007, Issued November 3, 2007, Amended November 15, 2007. http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_03nov07/pco_1_2007.html41 The correlation coefficient for these two questions is .87.42See Local Government Plan 2000 http://www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/LG_Final_Plan_2000.pdf and Local Government Ordinance 2001 www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/SBNP_Local_Govt_Ordinance_2001.pdf. retrieved on 25 February 2010.43 Correlation coefficients for the three questions relating to government corruption range from .75 to .86.44 See Rafi Khan, Shahrukh, Foqia Sadiq Khan, and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 264-265.45 See Richard Rose and William Mishler, ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies’ The Journal of Politics 59 (2) 1997:418-51.46 Andrew R. Wilder, The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in the Punjab(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)47 Rafi Khan, Shahrukh, Foqia Sadiq Khan, and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007)48 Rafi Khan, Shahrukh, Foqia Sadiq Khan, and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007) and also see Andrew R. Wilder, The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in the Punjab (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999) also see Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst 2009)

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49 See Fischer Jeff, "Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention." In IFES White Papers, ed. IFES. Washington, DC: International Foundation for Election Systems, 2002. Posada-Carbó, Eduardo, Elections Before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America (London: University of London, 1996). 50 Megan Reif, "Electoral Laws on Election Crimes Database (ELECD)." University of Michigan, 2008.51 “I’m going to read you a list of reasons why people do NOT vote. For each, tell me whether the reason has been very important, somewhat important, or not at all important for you when you have not voted in past election.”52 In developed democracies, surveys generally find a strong relationship between education and bases for making voting and non-voting decisions. Nevertheless, in advanced democracies, mobilization of voters and targeting of important districts has been associated with higher turnout. John Aldrich H, "Rational Choice and Turnout." American Journal of Political Science 37 (1) 1993 :246-78.53 Cross-tabulation results had more than sufficient numbers in each cell to conclude reliably that the small differences across age groups were nonetheless real, even while responses are undoubtedly tied to the number of opportunities each age group has had to vote in their lifetimes. These data are presented because they represent one of the few instances in which age seems a relevant factor in the survey.54 Question 54 wording: “Now I’m going to mention some other things that can happen during elections. For each one, tell me how likely you think each will occur in the next election.55 For related analysis of past Pakistan elections, see, Aurat Publication and Information Service Foundation, Unethical Electoral Practices: A Citizens’ Report on the Local Government Elections 2005, p. 16; European Union Election Observation Mission Final Report, Pakistan National and Provincial Assembly Election 10 October 2002,” p. 6; International Crisis Group, Pakistan's Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule, November 22, 2005, p. 9; and Human Rights Watch Background Briefing, Pakistan: Entire Election Process "Deeply Flawed". October 9, 2002.56 See Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), “Draft Electoral Roll 2007: Flawed but Fixable,” August 2007, www.fafen.org/admin/products/p4729d6fb5a19e.pdf. For related recommendations see FAFEN 2007 press releases, e.g. www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=44 and www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=45. See also Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency (PILDAT) Citizens’ Group on Electoral Process (CGEP), “Position Paper: Proposed Electoral Reforms,” September 25, 2007, pp. 5-6, www.pildat.org/CGEP/Publications/PDF/Electoral_Reforms_2007.pdf.57 “I’m going to read you a list of reasons why people do NOT vote. For each, tell me whether the reason has been very important, somewhat important, or not at all important for you when you have not voted in past election.”58 These findings are not surprising given the ongoing unrest in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), as well as parts of NWFP. See, for example, International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” December 11, 2006.59 See FAFEN Election Update 17, “FAFEN Introduces Election-Violence Monitoring, “February 16, 2008, http://fafen.org/admin/products/p47b739cba9396.pdf.60 Provincial differences were not statistically significant except when disaggregated by gender, and only in Hazara was there a gender difference bordering on conventional significance at the 99% level.61 See “Election Commission Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates for the Forthcoming General Elections, 2007-08,” November 20, 2007, http://ecp.gov.pk/COCFinal.pdf. Also see PILDAT CGEP, “Model Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Candidates, Government, and the Media, General Elections 2007/08,” June 2007, at http://www.pildat.org/eventsdel.asp?detid=203; and later recommendations by CGEP and FAFEN, such as “FAFEN Election Update 1,” November 30, 2007, at http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p4750048b2fda5.pdf.Also see National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, “Statement of the NDI Pre-Election

Delegation to Pakistan,” October 21, 2007.62 Mohammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006)63 Base weighted, 1836; unweighted, 1872.64 “Now I would like to know your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behaviour and situation of women in our society. I will read out some statements and I would like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them—whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.”65 Reserved seats for women were re-introduced in advance of the 2002 general elections. Women can compete for general (unreserved) seats in addition to winning reserved seats based on party allocations.

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There were 164 provincial and national constituencies with women competing for office in the 2008 elections.66 United Nations Development Programme, Political and Legislative Participation of Women in Pakistan: Issues and Perspectives (Islamabad: United Nations Development Programme, 2005).67 Ibid.

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CHAPTER-5ELECTORAL POLITICS: A CASE STUDY OF PESHAWARINTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the nature of electoral politics at micro level

i.e in Peshawar for narrow investigation of electoral politics on voting behaviour.

The provincial capital of the Frontier province, Peshawar is bounded by tribal

agencies on its three borders. It is the closest Pakistani city to Afghanistan, serving as

a key route for trade. At the height of the Afghan conflict it supported three million

Afghan refugees. Estimated population of nearly five million. Peshawar city is

famous for its Qissa Khawani Bazaar, Balahisar Fort and Chowk Yadgaar, the latter

built to commemorate the martyrs of the 1857 War of Independence against the

British. A sizeable Christian population lives in the heart of the region that is

synonymous with Muslim fundamentalism to the outside world. A small Sikh

population also resides in the city. Peshawar had three National Assembly seats and

eight Provincial Assembly seats during 1990s. In the 1988 elections, there were four

National Assembly’s seats in Peshawar, but after the creation of Nowshera district

adjacent to Peshawar, NA-IV was included in Nowshera district.

The politics of Peshawar have been dominated by the Bilours, long affiliated with

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s brand of Pashtun nationalism. The other prominent

political family is that of Arbabs. At the pinnacle of their political power, Arbab

Mohammad Jehangir Khan served as the provincial chief minister. Arbab Niaz is

another prominent politician. From 1988-1997, the major electoral contesters for

National Assembly seats were PPP and ANP.

Table 5.1: Gender Balance 1988-1997 elections:

Constituencies1988 1990 1993 1997

Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female

NA-1 69.20 30.80 67.50 32.5 66.40 33.6 69.86 30.14

NA-2 70.80 29.2 68.20 31.8 69.38 30.62 70.84 29.16

NA-3 72.50 27.50 68.80 31.2 71.24 28.76 73.42 26.58Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)

Total population of Peshawar in 1998 was 2026851, male 1065188 and female

961663 population density was 1612.5, urban share of population was 48.5 and rural

area population share was 51.5 average house hold size was 8.5. Total rural localities

are 246 out of 7335 from whole NWFP lies in Peshawar. 99.3 % population was

Muslim in Peshawar. 85.7 percent population speaks Pashto while 14.3 % speaks

Hindko and other languages. Literacy Ratio in Peshawar was 41.8 % with

considerable disparity between male and female literacy rate. Female literacy ratio

was 25.8 % and male literacy ratio is 55.9 %. There is also a significant difference in

the literacy rate in rural and urban areas of Peshawar. In rural areas the female literacy

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rate is 10.7 % while male ratio is 46.2 %. The total literacy ratio including both sexes

in rural Peshawar was 29 %. In urban areas the total literacy rate was 54.1 % and the

female ratio was 41.1 % and male ratio was 65.3 %. 1 Major clans are Afridi,

Khattak, Orakzai, Wazir, Mahsud and Punjabi (Hindko speakers). 47.4 % have their

own housing facilities and 68.26 % population had government sponsored water

facility. 94.99 % people had electricity facility. In employment, 25% were

professionals while 27 % had elementary occupation. As the provincial capital, and

the cultural, economic, and political centre of the NWFP, events in Peshawar

reverberate throughout the province, and often, throughout the country. It was

Peshawar in 1947 that became a central point in favour of Pakistan in 1947

referendum. Since Independence, Peshawar has remained the centre of political

activity, and one of the most politicized cities.. The city has often been the nucleus of

anti-government movements since British period, such as Khudai Khidmatgars non-

violence movement in 1930, the anti-Ayub movement of the late1960s, or the PNA

movement of 1977 that resulted in Bhutto’s downfall2. Prominent politicians like

Nawaz Sharif, Benazir Bhutto and leaders of religious parties and ANP tried to win

elections from Peshawar.

Table 5.2: Breakup of population in urban and rural areas of NWFP

Areas Both Sexes Male Female

Peshawar Cantt. 68740 42045 26695

Peshawar M. Corporation 910807 478128 432679

Peshawar University T.C 3269 1728 1541

Total Urban 982816 521901 460915

Peshawar Rural 1044035 543287 500748

Grand Total 2026851 1065188 961663

Source: Government of Pakistan, Hand book of Population and Housing Census NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2002)

Population wise, Peshawar is the NWFP’s largest city. According to 1988 census, its

population was 2026851 with annual growth rate of 3.63. Peshawar was mainly

consisted of three urban areas including Peshawar Cantonment, Peshawar

Metropolitan Corporation, Peshawar University Town Committee with 246 rural

villages.4 Table 5.3: Literacy Ratio (10 years and above) by Sex, Rural/Urban areas.

District

All Areas Rural Urban

Both

SexesMale Female

Both

SexesMale Female

Both

SexesMale Female

Peshawar 41.8 55.9 25.8 29 46.2 10.7 54.1 65.3 41.1Source: Government of Pakistan, Hand book of Population and Housing Census NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2002)

Table 5.2 shows the breakup of population in urban and rural areas of NWFP.5 With

1998 literacy rate of 41.8 per cent, Peshawar’s population was one of the NWFP’s

most literate areas (ranked fifth behind Abbottabad, Haripur, Kohat and Nowshera).

Literacy ratio of Peshawar is given in table 5.3.

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The mother tongue of 85.7 per cent of the population of Peshawar is Pashto, 8.7

percent is Hindko, 2.7 percent Urdu, 2.6 percent Punjabi and 0.2 percent is Saraiki.6

In the 1970 election, the NAP swept the polls in this symbolically important city,

winning seven out of eight Provincial Assembly seats and two out of four National

Assembly seats. PPP got one Provincial Assembly seat and QML won two National

Assembly seats from Peshawar in 1970 elections7. From 1988 to 1997 elections, the

NAP renamed party ANP obtained mixed number of seats from Peshawar. Party

position in Peshawar during 1988-1997 is shown in table 5.4.

Table 5.4: Party Position in PeshawarConstituency 1988 1990 1993 1997

NA (3) PPP(3) ANP(3) PPP(2), ANP(1) ANP(3)

PA (8) PPP(5), ANP (2), IND(1)

IJI(2), PDA(1), ANP(5)

PPP(3), ANP(4)IND (1)

ANP(7)PML-N(1)

Source: Compiled by the Author obtaining data from Election Commission of Pakistan, General Election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics for General Elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997, Government Printing Press, 1997. Numbers in () shows the number of seats.

The analysis of table 5.4 shows that ANP suffered a defeat in its former stronghold,

losing all three of National Assembly seats and 6 of 8 of the Provincial Assembly

seats in 1988 elections. In 1990 elections ANP got their strength both in National and

Provincial Assembly seats. In these elections IJI with the coalition of ANP got two

Provincial Assembly seats from Peshawar. In 1997 elections, ANP again got complete

victory from Peshawar. The detail of vote castes to each party and registered votes in

Peshawar during 1998-1997 are shown in table 5.5 below.

Table 5.5: Registered Votes and Votes Polled in NWFP Provincial AssemblyPolitical Parties 1988

Votes Share %

1990

Votes Share %

1993

Votes Share %

1997

Votes Share %

ANP 47354 23.7 66593 31.3 57212 29.4) 72893 46.7

IJI/PML-N 23995 12.0 26394 12.4 17043 8.8 16095 10.3

PDA/PPP 74080 37.1 58616 27.5 61119 31.4 28962 18.6

Religious Parties

JUIF

MDM

PIF

16831 8.4

- -

- -

24032 11.3

- -

- -

- -

476 0.76

9190 4.7

-

*Other Parties 5033 - 110 - 10957 - 15991 -

**Independents 29583 0.2 35026 0.2 35097 0.2 18886 1.2

Valid Votes 196876 210771 192103 152819

Rejected 3135 2232 2380 3348

Total Casted Votes 200011 213003 194483 156167

Registered 520272 536719 522682 599181

Casted as % of Registered

Votes

38.49 40 37.36 26.16

Total Contesters 35 48 44 36Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). *ANP-A, PAI PNP, PAT PML-J. PMN, IJM, HPG, PKMAP, WP, GAP, PTI 7315, PPP-SB, PMA, AQP , UNA , Diat Ithiad MKP(KBG) , ** No of Independent contesters were 28, 43, 32 and 26 respectively.

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From 1990 to 1997, IJI made an electoral alliance with ANP for National Assembly

seats to defeat the PPP from Peshawar. Following table shows the electoral position of

political parties for National Assembly seats from Peshawar.

Table 5.6: Party’s position in National Assembly from PeshawarParties 1988 share % 1990 share % 1993 share% 1997 share%

ANP 80076 35.7 121185 49.5 92693 39.1 98475 62.1

IJI/PML-N 24638 11 0 0 0 0 0 0

PDA/PPP 97510 43.4 78065 32 98264 41.5 31566 19.9

Religious (JUI-F) 1080 0.4 25077 10.2 35216 14.8 12415 7.8

*Others 1018 0.4 577 0.2 1482 0.6 8007 5.0

**Independents 15781/5 7.0 16706/6 6.8 4904/6 2.0 2099/7 1.3

Valid Votes 220103 241610 232559 154236

Rejected 4318 3049 4056 4101

Total 224421 244659 236615 158337

Registered 601126 606886 649235 676876

Percentage 37.31 37.97 36.44 23.85

Total contesters 10 11 11 15Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). *ANP-A, NDP, PAT, HPG, PKMAP, AQP, HPG, NPP-WG, PPP-SB, PTI, **No. of Independent contesters were 5, 6, 6 and 7 respectively.

This chapter will take a closer look at Peshawar’s election results in order to identify

patterns of voting behaviour in the area over time. The chapter classifies the city into

seven different categories, and identifies similarities and differences in 1988, 1993

and 1997 voting behaviour of these categories. It then examines the Peshawar

constituency results, provides a brief overview of the results in NA-01, NA-02, and

NA-03.

5.1 ELECTORAL RESULTSPeshawar is divided into three constituencies during the period under study. Numbers

of polling stations in NA-1 were 145 during 1988-1993 and 201 in 1997. The polling

stations as shown in table 5.7. In NA-2, polling stations were 112 during 1988-1993

and 145 in 1997. In NA-3, numbers of polling stations were 142 during 1988-1993

and 154 in 1997.8

Table 5.7: Election Results by electoral/polling areas Categories.

Polling Stations

1988

Figures in %

1990

Figures in %

1993

Figures in %

1997

Figures in %

ANP PPP R ANP PPP R ANP PPP R ANP PPP R

Urban-Rural 47 50 3 51 48 1 58 40 2 64 34 2

Industrial 48 51 1 54 46 0 55 44 1 62 37 1

Lower Middle 49 49 2 57 41 2 58 39 3 63 334

Middle 50 48 2 55 43 2 57 40 3 65 32 3

Upper 54 45 1 58 42 0 58 41 1 60 40 0

Old City 65 34 1 56 43 1 57 41 2 62 38 2

Cantonment 48 52 0 52 48 0 54 45 1 62 37 1

Source: Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results), for NA 1,2,3.

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These Polling areas have been classified into the following seven general categories:

“Urban-Rural Periphery” Industrial; Lower Middle Class;’ Upper Class;’ Old City;

and ‘Cantonment’. As polling areas could not always be classified precisely. For

example, upper class polling/electoral areas sometimes include katchi abadis (shanty

towns), and middle class housing societies can be found in lower middle class polling

areas. Nevertheless, these broad polling areas categories can be identified and their

voting behaviour analysed accordingly.9 The table below illustrates the voting

behaviour of these different categories of polling areas for the 1988 to 1997 elections.

5.2 URBAN-RURAL PERIPHERY POLLING STATIONSThe electoral units (polling stations and their jurisdictions) on the urban–rural

periphery of Peshawar still includes some rural areas as well as old villages that have

been incorporated into the sprawling city. To a certain extent these former villages

have retained some of their rural social relationships even after being incorporated

into the city. Here, traditional identities such as biradari (clan)10 play a more

important role in determining voting behaviour than in the rest of the city. These

peripheral polling areas, however, are also home to lower class neighborhoods and

katchi abadis that house the growing influx of rural migrants. For these migrants, the

traditional relationships which often determined the political behaviour in the villages

are no longer as relevant. Often they form new social and political identities that

differ from those found in the peripheral villages incorporated into the city.

The table 5.8 illustrates that the urban-rural periphery was a PPP stronghold in 1988.

These are some of Peshawar’s poorest electoral units, and the PPP’s 50 to 47 per cent

lead over the IJI/ANP supports the perception that the PPP is the ‘party of the poor’.

In 1993, the PPP could not show better results than ANP in the urban-rural periphery.

Between 1988 and 1997 the PPP lost more support, than the ANP in Industrial polling

areas as well as cantonment areas.

5.3 INDUSTRIAL POLLING STATIONSPeshawar is one of the industrialized districts in the NWFP and in 1998, 26 per cent

of all the NWFP’s registered factories fell within Peshawar’s boundaries.11 In addition

to the industries located in the city, all the major roads, i.e (Kohat Road, Jamrud

Road, Bara Khyber Road) leading out of the city whether to Afghanistan, Central

Asia or Punjab are lined with industries. Consequently, industrial labour comprised a

higher percentage of Peshawar’s work force than in most other cities of the NWFP.

Peshawar’s ‘industrial’ polling areas are those in which high concentrations of

organized industrial labour reside. They include the industrial zones of Kohat Road,

Hayatabad industrial zone as well as the Railway Workshops and railway worker

residential quarters in the centre (civil quarters) of Peshawar. In 1988, the PPP’s best

results were in the industrial areas where it won 51 per cent of the vote, Its best

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performance in all of Peshawar was in the industrial area of Sadder, where the PPP

received 55.3 percent of the vote compared to the ANP 45 per cent. As with the urban

rural periphery polling areas, however, the PPP’s 1993 results in the industrial wards

represented a serious decline over it 1988 performance.

5.4 LOWER-MIDDLE CLASS POLLING STATIONSPeshawar’s ‘lower-middle class’ wards are generally found north of the Grand Trunk

Road and west of the old walled city bordering the river Kabul. These polling areas

often include a substantial number of lower class neighbourhoods and katchi abadis.

Many of them lack basic civic amenities such as adequate water and sanitation

system, natural (Sui) gas, roads, health and education facilities.12 Most of these

polling areas, however, are also home to a thriving small-scale industrial and

commercial sector. A large number of workers in northern Peshawar are employed in

the scrap iron business and the iron and steel smelting foundries. Handlooms can be

seen operating in many of the homes, and cottage industries abound producing

everything from carpets and footwear to soaps and cosmetics.

It is surprising that the PPP did not do better than it did as a large percentage of the

population in these wards belong to lower income groups. The IJI/PML(N)/ANP did

better than the PPP in the lower-middle class polling areas in 1993-1997 as shown in

above table. When compared with the industrial polling areas, these results indicate

that the PPP receives much more support in polling units where labour is organized,

such as polling areas which include large industrial units or the highly unionized

railway workers. The PPP receives less support in wards where the labour force is self

employed or unorganized, as in the smaller-scale industrial and commercial

enterprises found in the lower-middle class neighbourhoods of northern Peshawar and

the Old City.

5.5 MIDDLE CLASS POLLING STATIONSPeshawar’s middle class’ wards are mostly located along and between University

Road in the west, Sadar (Mall Road) in the north and the Gulbahar area in the east.

These include traditional middle class neighbourhoods such as Rahatabad, Wazir

Bagh, Asia Park, and Bagh-e-Naran, as well as more recent middle and upper-middle

class housing colonies such as Hayatabad Town. In addition to physicians, Lawyers,

engineers, and other professionals, and members of the trading and business

community, these wards are home to large numbers of government employees who

live in government employee housing colonies such as Rahatabad Colony. The middle

class wards, along with the upper class wards, have been the least supportive of the

PPP during the last three elections. In 1988, the PPP won only 48 per cent of the vote

in the middle class wards as compared to the ANP’s 52 per cent, and only 32 per cent

in 1997 as compared to the ANP’s 65 per cent excluding religious votes.

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5.6 UPPER CLASS POLLING STATIONSPeshawar’s ‘upper class’ wards encompass the elite residential neighbourhoods of

Hayatabad Town, and Rahtabad Town that lie between the Peshawar to Jamrud Road,

Also included in this category is the highly sensitive red zone of NWFP (Khyber

Road) north of Sadar Raod, where many government high officials reside. In both

1988 and 1993, the IJI/PML (N)/ANP received its strongest support from the upper

class wards. In 1988, it received 54 per cent of the vote compared to the PPP’s 45 per

cent. By 1997, ANP’s support had increased to 60 per cent and the PPP’s vote bank

had decreased to 40 per cent. Between 1988 and 1997 the PPP lost five per cent of

their votes in upper class wards.

5.7 OLD CITY POLLING STATIONSThe old walled city of Peshawar is the most densely populated region of the city, and

is home to a wide spectrum of social groups ranging from the very poor to a

substantial number from the lower and middle classes. These areas include old

citizens residing here through centuries and newly migrated people from surrounding

districts and agencies of FATA but these migrated people could not cast votes in this

polling area. They are allowed to cast their votes in their respective constituencies.

Within its narrow winding streets and alleys a surprising amount of business was

transacted, both in terms of providing goods, as in its wholesale markets, and in

services in Qisa Khawani Bazzaar area and Haji camp lary ada (Bus Stations). As in

the rest of Peshawar, support for the PPP fluctuated dramatically between 1988 and

1997. In 1988, the PPP had a 34 % and ANP had 65% votes. By 1997, the PPP trailed

behind the ANP by 24 per cent. The religious parties received less support in the Old

City area of Peshawar.

5.8 PESHAWAR CANTONMENT POLLING STATIONSIn the cantonment, the range of social groups is even greater than in the Old City, as

some of Peshawar’s poorest localities are found next door to some of its wealthiest. In

addition to the Army Garrison and officers’ colonies, the Cantonment contains elite

residential neighbourhoods, defense officer colony, Shami Road, Army flats, Falcon

Complex middle class neighbourhoods Swati Phatak, Nauthia, Gulberg, labour

colonies. Katchi abadis, and villages Budhber, and Michni. The PPP’s best result in

1988 was in the Cantonment where it won 52 per cent of the vote. In 1997; however,

the PPP suffered its greatest setback in the Cantonment areas by winning only 37%

votes.

5.9 CONSTITUENCY RESULTSFollowing Table gives the results of the 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections in the

eight Provincial and three National Assembly constituencies of Peshawar. It illustrates

the reversal that has taken place, whereby the PML(N)/ANP has now replaced the

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PPP as the favoured party of voters. When the PPP contested elections in 1988, after

being out of power for 11 years, it still won a respectable 51.78 per cent of the vote.

In the controversial 1990 elections, the PPP won 50.17 per cent of the vote and only

one of Peshawar’s seats (NA-1).13 By 1993, its support had declined even further and

it won only 29.31 per cent of the vote and no seats. In contrast to the PPP’s decline,

the PML (N)/ANP’s support steadily increased from 41.68 per cent to 67.68 per cent

from NA-1.14 Between 1988 and 1997, the number of votes won by the IJI/PML

(N)/ANP in Peshawar increased, while those of the PPP decreased as shown in table

5.9. Table 5.3 also illustrates the development of a strict two-party system. In all three

elections few voters cast their ballots for third party and independent candidates.

Table 5.8: Peshawar Constituency Results.Constituency ANP PPP IJI/PML-N R Others Turnout

NA-11988 41.68 51.78 0 0 5.6 38.131990 53.18 40.42 0 0 7.2 60.341993 39.36 50.17 0 10.73 2.01 36.911997 67.76 29.31 0 0 6.1 24.51

NA-21988 32.95 41.15 1.43 1.83 18.62 37.171990 47.95 29.31 0 20.23 1.40 29.921993 32.50 42.93 0 19.60 3.50 36.581997 52.71 0 0 27.16 16.5 28.56

NA-31988 31.18 35.82 30.01 0 4.1 36.621990 46.56 24.11 12.60 19.83 6.8 41.701993 44.62 37.75 0 16.06 3.20 35.821997 65.19 27.30 0 0 6.8 33.44

Source: Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results), for NA 1,2,3.

5.10 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NA-1): NA-1 was dominated by ANP affiliated

Bilour family during 1990s. Both the PPP and the ANP had a vote bank in the

constituency. ANP and PPP both alternatively got victory from this constituency

during 1988-1997 National Assembly elections. Bilour defeated Benazir Bhutto in

1990 and Qammar Abbas in 1997. But in 1988 and 1993 it was the PPP’s Aftab

Ahmed Khan Sherpao and Syed Zafar Ali Shah who had emerged victorious. The

constituency was mainly inhabited by Hindko, Pashto and Persian speakers and a

sprinkling of minority community members. Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour was the

ANP candidate who continuously contested elections since 1988 to 1997. The major

factor of his victory in NA-1 was firstly his party affiliation with ANP, secondly as

there was dominance of Hindko speaking people inside city15 and Bilour is basically a

Hindko speaking person, so party identification and ethnic support were the major

factor of his success. In 1988 PPP candidate Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao (44658)

defeated Ghulam Ahmad Bilour (35947). Two independent candidates, Said Anwar

(1826) and Mohammad Rafique (2335) got considerable number of votes that effected

PPP victory from this constituency in 1988 elections. In 1990 elections, PDA leader,

Ms. Benazir Bhutto (38951) was defeated by Ghulam Ahmad Bilour (51233). Five

independent candidates including Ghulam Jaffar got 1507 votes, Maulana Muhammad

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Yousaf Qureshi (Jamia Ashrafia) got 1190 votes, Ms. Banazir another independent

candidate got 1067 votes, Qamar Abbas got 397 votes, Abdul Majid and Syed Javed

Hassan Shah got 290 and 95 votes respectively. Other minor parties candidates got

less number of votes, including PAT candidate Khalid Mehmood Durrani got 373 and

NDP candidate Qazi Shah Jehan got 204 votes. During 1993 elections, nine

candidates contested elections from this constituency. PPP candidate Syed Zaffar Ali

Shah got victory with 40343 votes (the major factor of victory was the business

community support. He was also the owner of widely circulated urdu newspaper daily

Mashriq in Peshawar, he was also the chief patron of Anjuman Khudamul Islam

through which he got religious votes) while Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour of ANP was

the runner-up with 35755 votes. PIF, the alliance of religious parties’ candidate Haji

Dost Mohammad (late) got 9725 votes while the HPG candidate Mrs. Zakira Aslam

got only 91 votes. Five independent candidates including Mr. Riffatullah (360), Syed

Javed Hassan Shah (408), Mr. Zahoor Khan (834), Mr. Ghulam Jaffar (1943) and Mr.

Muhammad Rafiq (447) could not show considerable vote strength from this

constituency. Haq Nawaz, a journalist from Peshawar explained that the considerable

rise in the religious vote bank during 1993 elections from this constituency was the

impact of Taliban regime in neighbouring Kabul.16

In 1997 elections, eight candidates contested for one National Assembly seat from

this constituency. ANP candidate Ghulam Ahmad Bilour won the seat by taking

25930 votes while the runner up was the PPP candidate, Qammar Abbas who

obtained 11275 votes. Five independent candidates, Aurangzeb Mohammad (223),

Rehmat Gul Afridi (150), Mr. Ghulam Mohammad Bazaz (193), Qamar Ali Shah (54)

and Mr. Mohammad Khurshid Anwar (67) could not influence the electoral trends of

the voters from this constituency. The constituency of NA-1 encompasses the

industrial town of Peshawar city, near Kohat road, as well as the Polling areas of

northern Peshawar. In addition to several large industries, hundreds of automobile

industries and small-scale manufacturing units operate in the constituency. NA-1 is

Peshawar’s economically mixed constituency, where lower, middle and upper class is

living and the majority of its inhabitants live in surrounding areas of Katchi abadis

and lower and lower –middle class neighbourhoods with inadequate civic amenities.

In 1970 NA-1 was part of the constituency of NW-1, where Khan Abdul Qayum

Khan received 64.5 per cent of the vote-the QML’s best result in Peshawar. Since

1988, however, the PPP seemed well in NA-1, as major contesters were PPP and

ANP. In 1988, the PPP candidate was Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao and won this seat

while in 1990 Benazir, herself contested this seat but was defeated by Ghulam Ahmad

Bilour, an ANP candidate. In 1993, the PPP ticket was given to Syed Zaffar Ali Shah,

a wealthy Syed businessman, who was selected with the expectation that his money

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and the support of the Syed biradari in NA-1 would make him victorious. The PPP

gave a Provincial Assembly ticket from this constituency to a Syed Ayub Shah from

1988-1997. Ayub Shah got victory in 1988 elections and in 1990, 1993 and 1997

elections, ANP candidate Bashir Ahmad Bilour was the victorious candidate from this

constituency. The ANP candidate for National Assembly, and his brother Bashir

Ahmad Bilour, ANP candidate for Provincial Assembly during 1990s were viewed as

a strong candidate because he had done a lot of development work in the

constituency. The pre-election analysis of the constituency that appeared in the press

focused on the PPP’s advantage with the Syed biradari and with lower income

voters.17 The ANP strengths were Ghulam Ahmad Bilour and Bashir Ahmad Bilour’s

good development record in the constituency. The PPP’s selection of candidates for

NA-1 was heavily influenced by biradari considerations, and yet biradari did not

appear to be a major determinant of voting behaviour. The PPP’s best results in 1988

were in the industrial and urban rural periphery polling area of Gulbahar, Nauthia,

Kakshal, and Wazir Bagh. The ANP top five ward results in all of Peshawar were in

the following wards of NA-1: Civil Quarters, Yakatoot, Asia Gate, Dabgari, and

Khalid Town. The electoral politics in this constituency, on the basis of above results

shows that the voters supported only the winning candidates for patronage or

sociological and political basis as discussed in the chapters of sociological and

political determinants of electoral politics in NWFP.

5.11 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NA-2): NA-2 is located is located in the east of the

city and is composed of 112 polling stations in 1988-1993 and 145 polling stations in

1997. Peshawar Metropolitan and Cantonment areas are also included in this

constituency. As with the rural areas surrounding most cities in central NWFP, the

dominant biradari on Peshawar’s periphery is Arbabs.18 These polling areas also

contain katchi abadis inhabited by rural migrants seeking to improve their lot in the

city. In the katchi abadis traditional rural vertical social structures play a less

important role in determining voting behaviour, NA-2 also encompasses some lower-

middle, middle, and upper class wards. In Peshawar Cantonment, some of Peshawar’s

wealthiest residential neighbourhoods are found next to poor neighbourhoods on the

urban-rural periphery. The 1993 contest in Peshawar was between the PPP’s Arbab

Muhammad Jehangir Khan and the ANP Abdur Rehman Khan. Aftab Ahmad Khan

Sherpao, a well-respected politician whose family was originally from Charsada, was

the PPP’s strongest candidate in 1990 from NA-2. In 1988, he defeated the IJI

candidate from NA-1 but in 1990 Benazir contested from NA-1 so Aftab was

contested from NA-2. From 1990 to 1997, ANP vote bank split up into religious

parties.19

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Arbab Jehangir Khan was a much stronger candidate than other candidates who

preceded him. As a well-educated and wealthy industrialist he appealed much more to

the conservative middle and upper class voters of this constituency than his

predecessors. For the poorer voter in NA-2, his reputation was good for having done a

lot of development work when he was the Chief Minister. He lived up to his

reputation during the 1993 campaign by financing development work and distributing

truckloads of food staples such as flour and cooking oil in poor neighbourhoods. His

industrialist back ground came in useful; both in terms of running what many political

commentators felt was the most expensive campaign in Peshawar, as well as one of

the best managed.20 Arbab Jehangir is an example of the growing number of

industrialist politician who are gaining prominence on Pakistan’s political landscape,

particularly in urban areas. His campaign illustrated some of the advantages that

industrialists have in electoral politics. First, they have access to ready cash which is

becoming increasingly important to win tickets as well as to finance election

campaigns. Second, they are better trained to use modern management techniques to

market themselves, and to run more efficient and organized election campaigns. As

the art of fighting elections develops in NWFP, money and organizations are likely to

become increasingly important, which will further strengthen the industrialist

politicians. Until 1997, this constituency was in the possession of the Arbab family.

But in 2002 Maulana Rahmatullah Khalil of the MMA stole the show, polling 37,728

votes against Dr Arbab Alamgir Khan’s 15,771. Dr Alamgir, a PPP candidate, stands

a better chance this time against Khalil and Arbab Najeeb Khan of the ANP. His

family has undertaken several key development projects in this constituency and some

analysts believe that Dr Alamgir will reap a rich harvest of votes as a result. Dr

Alamgir is the son of former chief minister Arbab Mohammad Jehangir Khan who

had won this constituency three times on two different party tickets: in 1990 as an

ANP candidate, in 1993 as a PPP man and in 1997 again on an ANP ticket. The PPP’s

Khan Bahadur Khan was the winner in the 1988 election. It is generally believed that

the candidates of other parties do not have many votes in the area. But some analysts

are skeptical about the PPP nominee’s chances, noting that Dr Alamgir could not even

win the local government election.

In 1988 six candidate contested elections for one National Assembly seats from this

constituency. PPP candidate Khan Bahadur Khan got 24,444 votes and won the seat

by defeating ANP candidate Arbab Saif-ur-Rehman who got 19402 votes. The third

leading candidate was Mr. Rafique Ahmad Khalil who got 10377 votes as an

independent candidate. Arbab Muhammad Jehangir Khalil, an IJI candidate got 840

votes and JUI-F candidate Mr. Salim Jan Khalil got 1080 votes. The candidate of

ANP (A), an ANP faction got 1018 votes. Tahir Khalil, a political worker from this

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constituency explained that it was personal character and influence of Khan Bahadur

Khan, that he won the elections.21 In 1990 four candidates contested elections, ANP

candidate Arbab Muhammad Jahangir Khan got victory with 31222 votes. The

runnerup was PDA candidate Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao who got 19137 votes. JUI-

F candidate, Mr. Mursaleen Khan got 13307 votes and independent candidate

Muhammad Hassan Khan got 891 votes. In 1993 elections, Arbab Jehangir Khan a

PPP candidate, who was the ANP candidate in 1990 elections once again got victory

with 27345 votes. The runnerup was the ANP candidate, Mr. Abdur Rehman Khan

with 20,804 votes. PIF candidate Mohammad Azam Khan Chishti was the third

candidate who got 12486 votes. Arbab Mohammad Humayun a PKMAP candidate

got 1173 votes, Arbab Mushtaq Ahmad HPG candidate got 218 votes. Mr. Mursalin

Khan Advocate, an independent candidate got 912 votes. Total valid votes were

62938, rejected 860, total 63398 registered 17439 and percentage of vote caste 36.5%.

During 1997 the total contesters were seven who started their electoral struggle to win

the votes out of 180496 registered voters. Total 45683 votes polled in which number

of valid votes were 44562 and rejected were 1121 votes. The vote cast percentage was

25.31%. Arbab Muhammad Jehangir Khan an ANP candidate in this election got

24094 votes. JUI-F candidate Haji Ghulam Ali who got 12415 votes was the runner-

up. Arbab Mustaq Ahmad HPG candidate got 631 votes, Imtiaz Elahi Paracha an

independent candidate got 570 votes, Mr. Taj Mohammad Amar NPP (WG) candidate

got 65 votes, Mr. Ibadatullah Khan PTI candidate got 4348 votes and Mr. Mohammad

Fayyaz Khan Khalil PPP-SB got 1859 votes. The results of this constituency shows

that the electors voted only personality of Arbab Jehangir irrespective of their party

affiliations, while interviewing from this constituency voters and political activist

have the opinion that Arbab Jehangir’s politics based on patronage and development

works along with their Arbab biradari.22 This behaviour shows that people voted

under Michigan Model and Downs theory as discussed in first chapter, theoretical

models of voting behaviour.

5.12 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NA-3): NA-3 composed of 140 polling

stations in 1988, 142 polling stations in 1990 and 1993 and 154 polling stations in

1997 elections. During 1988- 1999, ANP and PPP were the major leading parties in

this constituency.

In 2002, Qari Fayyazur Rahman of the MMA defeated Kiramatullah Khan, a joint

candidate fielded by the PPP and the ANP, by a margin of 19,000 votes. This time

Rahman has not been given a party ticket. In these circumstances, Engineer Iqbal

Zafar Jhagra of the PML-N, Hashim Khan Babar of the ANP and Noor Alam Khan of

the PPP are all eyeing victory. Maulana Azizuddin of the MMA and Intikhab Khan

Chamkani of the PML-Q are also contenders. The PPP has a strong vote bank in

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Vadpagga village, also known as Chota Larkana, one of the largest constituencies of

the province. The ANP has a traditional edge over its rivals here as its contestant

Arbab Sadaullah Khan polled 48,451 votes against Sardar Ali Khan of the PPP in

1997 when this seat was NA-3 Peshawar-cum-Nowshera. Arbab Zahir Khan had won

this seat in 1993 and 1990. ANP’s Babar is trying to secure this seat because his

party’s key political leader Zahir Khan is now contesting from the NA-4 seat. Unlike

Zahir Khan who used his personal charisma to win the seat twice, Babar banked

mainly on the party’s diehard supporters. PMLN’s Jhagra has also risen to

prominence, especially after the APDM meeting held at his native Jhagra village.

Alam Khan of the PPP tried to repeat the 1988 performance when his party colleague

Sardar Ali had won the seat by a margin of 5,000 votes.

During the 1988 polls, six candidates contested elections for 216553 registered votes

from this constituency. Total 79300 votes polled, in which the number of valid votes

were 78176 and rejected were 1124. PPP candidate Sardar Ali Khan got 28408 votes

and won the seat. ANP candidate Abdul Lateef was the runner up candidate who got

24727 votes. Third close candidate was Pirzada Nabi Amin (IJI) who got 23798 votes.

Three independent candidates, Haji Noor Muhammad ,Arbab Mohammad Zahir and

Nisar Khan got 614, 385 and 244 votes respectively.

In 1990, ANP candidate Arbab Mohammad Zahir defeated three other contestants i.e.

Mr. Abdul Lateef PDA (19977), Maulana Mohammad Usman JUI-F (11770) and

Pirzada Nabi Amin IND (11269). Total valid votes 81746, rejected 1103, Total

82849, registered 218206. Vote caste ratio 37.97%. In 1993, three candidates

contested, ANP candidate Arbab Mohammad Zahir won the seat with 36134 votes.

PPP candidate Sardar Ali was the runnerup candidate who got 30576 votes. PIF

candidate Mr. Abdul Haseeh got 13005 votes. Valid votes 79715, rejected 1271, total

80986, registered 226079 percentage of vote caste ratio is 35.82%. In 1997 four

candidates contested for one seat from this constituency. ANP candidate Arbab

Saadullah Khan got victory with 48451 votes. PPP candidate Sardar Ali Khan was the

runnerp candidate who got 20291 votes. PPP (SB) candidate Mr. Salim Akhtar Afridi

and independent candidate Mr. Mohammad Naheem Qasmi got 2149 and 842 vote

respectively. Valid votes 71733, rejected 2595, total 74328, registered 235412. Vote

caste ratio 31.57%.

5.13 CASE STUDY OF NA-1

The three constituencies briefly examined above identified patterns of PPP and

ANP/PML (N) support in the different polling area categories used in this study. The

following section will take a closer look at these and other patterns and trends by

conducting a much more detailed analysis of electoral politics and voting behaviour in

the Peshawar constituency of NA-1. Two features of the election in this constituency

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make it a good choice for a more detailed case study. First, the constituency provides

a good opportunity to analyse class-based voting behaviour as it contains some of

Peshawar’s richest neighbourhoods alongside poor neighbourhoods and colonies of

industrial labour. Second, the constituency was one of the few where the Religio-

political parties candidate won a considerable percentage of the vote.

NA-1 Peshawar 1 has traditionally been aligned to three major vote banks in the shape

of PPP(P), ANP and JI. Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao won this seat in 1988 but left the

seat to become the Chief Minister. In the subsequent power sharing deal by PPP(P)

for the Provincial Government with ANP, this seat was given to Ghulam Ahamd

Bilour who won the seat on by elections and also went on to defeat Benazir Bhutto in

the 1990 elections. Gulam Ahamd Bilour was defeated in 1993 by Syed Zafar Ali

Shah of PPP. The seat swung back to ANP in 1997. In the 2002 general elections

PPP(P) and ANP had an alliance in the Peshawar District and Usman Bilour who is

the nephew of Gulam Bilour was pitted against the seasoned JI activist and General

Secretary of MMA in NWFP Shabbir Ahmad Khan who went on to defeat Usman

Bilour with a huge margin. The constituency is split upon ethnic and urban/rural lines.

The part of the constituency which falls within the boundaries of the old city

predominantly votes in the favour of PPP(P) while the suburbs usually are aligned

with ANP and JI. In 2008 elections, the contest was between Syed Ayub Shah of PPP

and Ghulam Ahmad Bilour of ANP. Ghulam Ahmad Bilour was considered the

stronger candidate who was also the senior vice president of ANP but the family

reputation had received severe dents following the murder of Syed Qamar Abbass

(Former Provincial Minister and General Secretary PPP(P)NWFP) and the nephew of

PPP(P) candidate Haji Iqbal on the PF-3 constituency in which members of Ghulam

Ahmad Bilour family have directly been named. They were also facing criticisms

from within the party as three members of the same family are standing within this

constituency. As Ghulam Ahmad Bilour’s brother Bashir Ahmad Bilour and his son

Haroon Bilour were standing from PF-3 and PF-2 respectively. Another brother of

Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Ilyas Bilour is a senator from ANP ticket while his son is the

president of the Sarhad Chamber of Commerce. There is large scale discernment

within the party as its becoming a family soap opera for most of the ANP supporters

in the area. The wave of Public sentiment after the killing of Benazi Bhutto also

worked in favour of Syed Ayub Shah of PPP (P) who belongs from a lower middle

class background and was generally thought of as a very humble person and in high-

regards.

5.14 THE CONSTITUENCY

NA-1 composed of 145 polling stations in 1988-1993 and 201 polling stations in

1997. The constituency has been classified as’ upper class; middle class; or industrial

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Approximately 25 per cent of those who voted in 1993 lived in elite residential

neighborhoods in the polling areas of Wazir Bagh (West East, and Central). Quaid-e-

Abad, and Kakshal. Another 45 per cent lived in middle and upper-middle class

neighbourhoods in the polling areas of Nauthia, Dabgari, Gor Gathri, Nishtarabad,

and Sarfaraz Colony. About 30 per cent lived in working class neighbourhoods in the

industrial polling areas of Railway Quarters, Kohat Road, Pandu Road, and Gulbahar.

Many of the inhabitants of this last category are employed in the factories located in

and around Peshawar’s Industrial Area. These polling areas are located on the city’s

southern periphery so they are also home to sizeable populations of rural-to-urban

migrants, and therefore share some of the characteristics of the ‘urban-periphery’

polling areas discussed earlier.

5.14 THE CANDIDATES

ANP affiliated politician Bashir Ahmad Bilour was born in December 1939, Bilour

got his early education from the Khudad Model School and Islamia School Peshawar.

As a youth, Bilour participated in the election campaign of Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah.

He, however, joined active politics from the platform of the Awami National Party

(ANP) in the 1970s and ever since has remained with the nationalist party. Ghulam

Ahmad Bilour was first elected to the National Assembly in the 1988 by-elections. In

the 1990 elections, he again contested for the National Assembly and defeated the late

Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. Bilour recollects that the people of his constituency did

not let him down in that crucial contest, which was perhaps the toughest of his long

political career. In the 1993 elections, he lost to Zafar Ali Shah but regained the

National Assembly seat in the 1997 elections. Bilour did not contest the 2002

elections. He was again elected to the National Assembly in the 2008 general

elections, and is currently the federal minister for local government and rural

development.

Only late Ajmal Khattak and Afzal Khan Lala have been associated with the ANP for

longer period than Ghulam Ahmad Bilour. Of his more than 30-year-long political

career, he has spent six years behind the bars on different counts. He is widely

respected for not compromising on principles and remaining loyal to the party. He

considers securing the rights of the people of the province as his greatest

achievement; and losing his only son, Shabbir Ahmed Bilour, during the 1997

elections as his greatest loss. About entrance into politics he was also influenced by

parental sociological patterns as explained in Michigan Model.

As a youth I participated in the election campaign of Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, when she was

contesting for the seat of president as a candidate of the Combined Opposition Party against Ayub

Khan in 1965. I was not affiliated with any political party at that time. Late in the 1970s, I decided to

join the ANP as my father was a great admirer of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his political ideas. I was

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also impressed by Bacha Khan and the sacrifices he had rendered for the people of this area during

the British Raj. Since then, I have strongly adhered to the political manifesto of the ANP, and worked

hard to strengthen it in Peshawar in particular and the province in general. It was the result of my

hard work that the ANP won many National Assembly and NWFP Assembly seats from Peshawar in

the recent general elections.23

The PPP affiliated politician Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao was also the prominent

political figure during 1988-1999 from Peshawar. The rise of the Sherpao family to

political eminence has come within a short span of time. This is remarkable given the

fact that its home province, the NWFP, has traditionally been dominated by veterans

like late Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, his later brother Dr Khan Sahib (Abdul Jabbar

Khan) and his son Abdul Wali Khan. Besides the Khudai Khidmatgars (God's

servants) movement, led by Bacha Khan, this politically fertile land has given birth to

a peasant movement led by late Major Ishaq Mohammad and Afzal Bangash in the

early seventies. Some of the leaders of this romantic revolutionary movement are still

alive nursing their nostalgia. Hayat Mohammad Khan was amongst the earliest

lieutenants of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who brought politics out of the cozy

drawing rooms to the masses. He made an enduring relationship with the people,

particularly the lowest strata of society.

In 1967, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto called his friends at Sherpao to discuss his idea of

launching a new political party in the country. He went back with some half-baked

ideas and assembled his colleagues at the residence of Mubashir Hasan in Lahore. The

Pakistan People's Party was born. Like Yahya Bakhtiar, at that time, Hayat Khan was

also in the then Council Muslim League. His late father Khan Bahadur Ghulam

Haider was a staunch supporter of the Muslim League. Hayat Khan was the youngest

governor of the province. He was a senior provincial minister, when he was killed in a

bomb blast on Feb 8, 1975, in Peshawar University. His assassination stalled, for a

while, the PPP's smooth sailing in the province. After his death, ZAB got his younger

brother, Major Aftab Sherpao, retired from the army, and nominated him PPP's

provincial vice-president. When Nasrullah Khattak disappeared from the political

scene, Aftab was elevated as the party's provincial president24.

Aftab remained at the forefront during Ziaul Haq's regime. In 1988, he manoeuvred

the fall of the PML's government and became chief minister of the province. He took

an extra-nationalist line to appease the nationalist forces, hostile to the PPP, and

broadened his political base in their stronghold areas. In the PML's second tenure,

when he was on the opposition benches, he tabled a resolution, demanding that the

name NWFP be replaced with Pakhtoonkhawa, and then he left the field for the

centrifugal ANP and the centripetal PML to expose themselves. The house defeated

the PML but NWFP's name could not be changed owing to constitutional constraints.

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Aftab Sherpao, made of a sterner stuff, emerged as a shrewd politician in the

province. He succeeded in securing the support of a big chunk of bureaucrats and is

one on whom the establishment can bank. His close aides believe that he will make a

comeback and will play an important role in the country's future politics. His

differences with Benazir Bhutto came to light, when Maj-Gen Naseerullah Babar

mistakenly suspected Aftab's role in the allotment of party tickets in Nowshera.25

Babar considered it a move by Aftab to undercut him, though that had no basis. After

that Babar sided with all those, Masood Kausar and Khwaja Hoti, who were opposed

to Aftab. Now Aftab is running his faction of the PPP. Speaking to a public meeting

on Feb 8, on the occasion of his elder brother's death anniversary in Sherpao, he

called on Benazir Bhutto to restore democracy in the PPP, if she wanted democracy in

the country". But, some of Aftab's close aides say that they had not yet severed ties

with BB. They hope that Ms Bhutto will carry all of them along in her political

struggle. Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on 27 December 2007 in Liaqat Bagh

Rawalpindi during her election campaign. Aftab and his like-minded group think that

politics has become a hostage to the powers-that-be. When Aftab Shaban Mirani was

made defence minister instead of Naseerullah Babar, it was to be attributed to the

weakness of the party. They are caught in a dilemma: the party's agenda as an

opposition force does not work when it comes into power. They find their future only

in provincial politics. Aftab's family tree and cross-marriages in other influential

families has given him an edge over others in his ambition of realizing his dream of

reaching the corridors of power. His elder brother, Wali Mohammad Khan, was

related to the former president Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari. He himself is a son-in-

law of the Nishtar family. Two of his cousins, Abbas Khan (former IGP, Punjab) and

Azam Khan (former chief secretary of NWFP), carry much weight in local

administration. His elder son, Sikandar, has already jumped into politics. In 1988

elections, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao won the election on PPP ticket by defeating

ANP candidate Bashir Ahmad Bilour with vote’s difference of 8711. In 1990, the

political situation changed and the PPP leader Benazir Bhatto contested against Bashir

Bilour of ANP from this constituency while Aftab contested from NA-2. Bashir

Bilour defeated PPP leader Benazir Bhutto by vote difference of 12282. In 1993 again

PPP, Zafar Ali Shah taking lead over ANP by defeating constantly contesting

candidate of ANP, Bashir Ahmad Bilour. In 1997, ANP once again defeated PPP

contester Qamar Abbass by vote difference of 14655. So NA-1 is the constituency of

two parties, ANP and PPP while IJI/PML-N supported ANP candidates against PPP.

5.16 NA-1 RESULTS

Following Table provides the 1988 and 1997 election results for each of NA-1’s

polling areas. It is evident from the table that the PPP’s strength was in the industrial

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areas, and the ANP’s strength in the remaining middle and upper class areas. They

also reveal the consistent decline in the PPP’s percentage of the vote in all 15 polling

areas, and the increase in the ANP’s totals.

Table 5.9: PPP Electoral Results in Peshawar.Name of Polling area

CategoryPPP votes

S. No

Areas 1988 1990 1993 1997

1 Nauthia Middle Class 67.28 50.37 51.59 31.79

2 Civil Quarters Middle Class 45.83 31 40.66 16.93

3 Railway Quarters Lower Class 41.47 34.16 38.41 18.77

4 Wazir Bagh Middle Class 39.94 24.81 29.12 14.805 Asia Park Middle Class 48.02 41.80 48.82 24.89

6 Dabgari Middle Class 50.41 38.28 42.18 15.04

7 Jehingirpura Middle Class 60.15 48.77 49.28 31.21

8 Shahi Katha Middle Class 59.02 4.98 56.41 30.53

9 Yakatoot Middle Class 52.91 43.11 49.93 17.35

10 Zargarabad Middle Class 36.39 19.63 25.26 30.52

11 Ganj Gate Middle Class 63.49 60.27 59.66 49.81

12 Lahori Gate Middle Class 54.50 49.90 52.96 43.5213 Peshawar City Middle Class 70.19 59.55 49.25 57.27

14 Andar Sher Middle Class 60.18 49.74 51.28 30.38

15 Sheikh Abad Upper Class 35.43 22.98 28.47 22.01

16 Gulbahar Upper Class 49.41 38.79 41.42 51.08

17 Nishtar Abad Middle Class 54.20 39.79 43.33 35.87

18 Shahi Bagh Middle Class 54.44 42.41 38.21 42.59

19 Peshawar Cantt Upper Class 53.52 42.29 39.95 31.57

20 Landi Arbab Middle Class 40.96 32.36 39.12 24.70

21 Beri Bagh Lower 42.36 31.97 38.61 20.66

22 Hassan Garhi Middle Class 56.80 46.06 48.94 34.89

23 Lateefabad Middle Class 46.36 36.92 39.20 21.01

Total Upper Class 46.12 34.69 36.61 34.89

Total Middle Class 53.39 39.99 45.29 30.73

Total Lower 41.91 33.06 38.51 19.71

Total 47.14 35.91 40.14 28.44

Source: Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results), for NA 1,2,3.

Table 5.10 shows the electoral trends in favour of PPP in middle, lower and upper

class poling areas. ANP vote position in NA-1 polling areas are shown in table 5.10.

The major political parties in electoral politics of NWFP during 1990s were ANP and

PPP. The party of Nawaz Sharif PML-N had alliance with ANP during the 1990s. So

electoral trends in Peshawar revolves around two parties ANP and PPP and two other

minor groups i.e religious parties and independents. ANP, is also one of the leading

Political party in Peshawar. PPP and ANP both have mixed vote bank in different

clusters of Peshawar. PPP and ANP vote bank fluctuated in each election as shown in

table 5.9 and 5.10.

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Table 5.10: ANP vote position in NA-1.Name of Polling area

CategoryANP

S. No

Areas 1988 1990 1993 1997

1 NauthiaMiddle Class

27.28 42.88 35.07 64.30

2 Civil QuartersMiddle Class

48.51 62.46 45.14 79.80

3 Railway Quarter Lower Class 50 59.50 46.87 78.70

4 Wazir BaghMiddle Class

53 67.76 47.60 82.92

5 Asia ParkMiddle Class

46.87 51.96 38.16 73.85

6 DabgariMiddle Class

43.87 55.43 43.89 82.86

7 JehingirpuraMiddle Class

35.23 46.53 38.61 66.60

8 Shahi KathaMiddle Class

36.38 17.16 34.25 67.72

9 YakatootMiddle Class

42.11 51.31 37.05 79.98

10 ZargarabadMiddle Class

52.09 71.95 47.81 66.40

11 Ganj GateMiddle Class

32.20 33.97 43.49 48.32

12 Lahori GateMiddle Class

38.79 43.86 36.78 55.08

13 Peshawar CityMiddle Class

25.52 35.40 27.57 41.33

14 Andar SherMiddle Class

31.52 44.51 33.68 66.66

15 Sheikh Abad Upper Class 57.87 70.35 45.75 72.2316 Gulbahar Upper Class 43.81 55.44 42.85 46.83

17 Nishtar AbadMiddle Class

40.04 55.31 41.74 61.66

18 Shahi BaghMiddle Class

37.40 50.72 37.35 55.67

19 Peshawar CanttUpper Class

40.04 52.03 42.39 65.82

20 Landi ArbabMiddle Class

51.26 60.80 40.78 72.39

21 Beri Bagh Lower 50.18 59.92 39.38 74.83

22 Hassan GarhiMiddle Class

35.10 46.46 29 59.49

23 LateefabadMiddle Class

43.79 54.38 28.77 72.29

Total Upper Class 47.24 59.27 43.66 61.63

Total Middle Class 40.05 49.60 38.15 66.52

Total Lower Class 50.09 59.71 43.13 76.77

Total 45.79 56.19 41.65 68.31

Source: Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results), for NA 1,2,3.

Religious parties could not show better results in NA-1. In 1993 PIF candidate Haji

Dost Mohammad contested elections from this constituency and could get only 9725

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votes. Table 5.12 shows that ANP and PPP were the major leading parties from NA-1.

The turnout declined in 1997 elections as voters were disillusioned by what they

perceived as repeated and useless elections. Voters had no other option except PPP

and ANP and they were frustrated from the policies of PPP and ANP. Voters felt that

both parties were corrupt but they opted for the least corrupt while voting.26

Table 5.11: Votes cast infavour of each party:Parties Number of votes in each election

1988 1990 1993 1997

PPP/PDA 44658 38951 40343 11275

ANP 35947 51233 35755 25930

NDP Not contested 204 Not contested Not contested

PAT Not contested 373 Not contested Not contested

HPG Not contested Not contested 91 Not contested

PIF Not contested Not contested 9725 Not contested

AQP Not contested Not contested Not contested 49

Independent 4161(2) 4546 (6) 3992 (5) 687 (5)

Valid 84766 95307 89906 37941

Rejected 1470 1209 1925 385

Total 86236 96516 91831 38326Registered 226170 228734 248765 260968

Percentage 38.13 42.20 36.91 14.68

Winner PPP ANP PPP ANP

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For

General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

5.17 COMPARISON OF 1988-1997 RESULTS

Comparing the 1988 and 1997 election results reveals interesting similarities in voting

patterns through the years. The 1988 Peshawar constituency of NA-1 was the major

contest between one major National Party (PPP) and Regional Party (ANP). In the

polling areas that are today in NA-1, PPP’s weakest results were in Gulbahar and

Nishtar Abad where PPP won 52.4 per cent of the vote in both. PPP’s strongest result

was in Peshawar cantonment where he won 67.3 per cent of the vote.27 Similarly, the

PPP was still receiving its lowest results from middle and upper class polling areas of

Gulbahar and Gulshan Rehman. This comparison lends support to the perception that

the PPP’s policies during the 1990s further lost the party support from the already

skeptical middle classes, but that among the urban poor, at least until 1993, its

popularity remained strong.

5.18 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN VOTING BEHAVIOUR (PESHAWAR)

Most urban constituencies have separate male and female polling stations which make

it possible to analyse gender differences in voting behaviour. Table 5.13 gives a

detailed breakdown of the 1988-1997 election results for NA-1 by category of polling

area, and factors in gender differences in voting behaviour as well as voter turnout.28

The patterns of male and female voting behaviour in NA-1 are consistent with those

examined in previous Chapter for the NWFP’s urban constituencies as a whole. The

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preference of female voters for the ANP/PML (N) over the PPP is clearly evident as

women voted in higher percentages than men for ANP/PML (N) candidates in all

three categories of polling areas. The differences between female and male support

for the ANP/PML (N) was greater in upper and middle class polling areas than in

industrial polling areas, indicating that women living in middle and upper class

polling areas were more likely to vote independently of their male family members

than women living in poorer polling areas.

Table 5.12: NA-1 Election Results by Gender and ClassPolling area Category PPP

Upper

1988 1990 1993 1997

Male 46.5 36.2 45.3 24.8

Female 41.2 31.2 40.3 21.2Total 43.85 42.8

MiddleMale 47.7 36.41 48.9 27.5

Female 44.5 34.23 45.5 25.2Total 46.16 47.2

IndustrialMale 63.2 53.12 64.9 43.8

Female 63.3 53.52 62.8 43.2

Total 63.25 63.85

TotalMale 51.2 41.5 53 32.3

Female 48.4 38.5 48.9 27.2

Grand Total 51.78 40.42 50.17 29.31Source: Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan. ‘Form XVII Result of the Count’ (Polling station results), for NA-1.

The ANP and IJI/PML(N)’s coalition advantage with women voters was already

evident in 1988, when it won 49.4 per cent of the total female vote compared with

45.3 per cent of the total male vote. Between 1988 and 1997, however, female support

for the ANP/PML(N) increased by 4.1 per cent and male support by only 1.9 per cent.

Table 5-5 given the voter who turnout figures for the respective polling areas

categories by gender. The 43.8 44.8, and 42.9 per cent of registered voters who turned

out to vote in the upper, middle, and industrial polling areas respectively, indicate

there was not a major difference in voter turnout the three different polling area

categories. These figures seem to indicate that in 1993, at least, the popular perception

that the upper classes all stay at home on Election Day is not entirely accurate. There

was a significant difference between male and female voters, with the overall turnout

of the being 46.9 percent and the latter only 40.4 per cent. Women living in the poorer

industrial polling areas were the least likely vote (38.1 per cent). The significantly

lower female voter turnout weakens the argument of many PPP supporters that the

PPP’s poor performance with women voters was a result of massive rigging in the

female polling stations. If as they allege, thousands of bogus female votes were

registered in each urban constituency, and in particular in the poorer neighborhoods,

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female voter turnout should be equal to or higher than male turnout, and should be

particularly high in the poorer polling areas.

Table 5.13: Results of ANP.Polling area’s Category ANP

Upper

1988 1990 1993 1997

Male 36.2 37.2 27.4 53.2

Female 31.6 42.1 30.2 58.2Total 33.9 39.65 28.8 55.7

MiddleMale 37.5 48.2 37.2 64.4

Female 35.4 47.3 35.2 62.2Total 36.45 47.75 36.2 63.3

IndustrialMale 53.8 63.2 41.4 77.8

Female 53.4 63.4 41.2 77.5

Total 53.6 63.3 41.3 77.65

TotalMale 41.5 53.1 39.5 67.4

Female 38.4 50.2 36.2 63.5

Grand Total 39.95 51.65 37.85 65.45Source: Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan. ‘Form XVII Result of the Count’ (Polling station results), for NA-1

A more convincing explanation is the PPP does not do well with women because it is

less effective at organizing the women’s vote on election day As one PPP campaign

worker from NA-1 observed;

You see what happened in Andher Sher-my problem is manning the female polling stations

with women who can read and write. In ’88 I had to hire about 15 per cent of the polling

station agent-they were teachers, etc… There were enough volunteers from the People’s Party

but they couldn’t read and write. If you can’t read and write there is no point in doing the

polling station duty-you can do transport duty or bring out the voters, but you can’t be in the

polling stations because you have to tick names off lists, and you have to know what is going

on, and when counting takes place you have to be able to see what the person is writing down.

Now when you were hiring these people you don’t know who they are. You’re paying them

Rs.200-300, somebody else pays them Rs.500 and they’ll do anything. I don’t know if you

walked into a polling station but there is a tremendous difference [between the PPP and ANP

female polling agents].29

The explanation given by Salman Bangash, an academician from Peshawar, was as

follows:

In NWFP the majority of women are religious. They are very conscious about ethics, character for their

children, for society, for a family system. The majority of women dislike the women who associate in

mixed gatherings. This is a fact that the majority of women are anti-People’s Party because they think

that the People’s Party represents the liberal, the anti-Islamic, the western civilization.[I]f they have a

choice, they always vote anti-People’s Party.30

5.19 PARTY/LEADER IDENTIFICATION: The solidity of the PPP’s’vote

bank’, and the extent to which voters voted for parties rather than for candidates in

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NA-1, is shown clearly by comparing the National Assembly results with the results

of the Provincial Assembly elections held two days later. NA-1 is divided into two

Provincial Assembly constituencies PF-1 and PP-2. Approximately 40 per cent of the

voters in PF-1 live in the upper class polling areas of Kekshal (West, East, and

Central) and Jehangirpura. The remaining 60 per cent live in the industrial polling

areas of Dabgari, Zargarabad and Andher Sher (inner city). PF-2 includes the upper

class polling area of New Gulbahar, Sathian and Nishtar Abad, as well as the middle

and upper middle class polling areas of Sheikhabad, Sikandarpura. Zaryab colony,

Dilazak, Nanakpura and Gojiwara. Table 5-6 compares the results in PF-1 and PF-2

with their equivalent polling area results in NA-1.

Table 5.14: Provincial Assembly and National Assembly Election Results:Constituency Parties 1988 1990 1993 1997

NA-1

PPP 51.78 40.42 50.17 29.31ANP 41.68 53.18 39.36 67.76IJI/ PML-N 0 0 0 0Religious 0 0 10.73 0Others 5.23 7.21 1.24 5.62

PF-1

PPP 38.31 36.01 39.13 22.78ANP 31.91 52.89 39.26 70.80IJI/ PML-N 15.16 0 0 0Religious 8.89 9.33 2.37 0

Others 4.23 3.23 19.27 7.88

PF-2

PPP 56.85 40.38 47.14 26.06

ANP 22.51 0 0 0

IJI/ PML-N18.33 51.84 44 44.29

Religious 0 4.86 3.27 0Others 4.26 5.2 5.8 23.23

PF-3

PPP 19.67 11.75 37.06 24.47ANP 20.68 29.20 41.20 52.60IJI/ PML-N 19.18 0 0 0Religious 5.97 9.37 3.44 0Others 20.42 50.37 18.3 1.1

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

The 1988-1997 PPP candidate in PF-1 was Mr. Ayub Shah who, had won in 1988 by

defeating ANP candidate Bashir Ahmad Bilour with the difference of 2245 votes.

Bashir Bilour contested two seats, one from NA-1 and one from PF-1 but defeated

on both seats. In by-elections he was able to win the National Assembly seat, this

seat vacated by Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, as he retained provincial assembly seat

for chief ministership. In 1990 ANP candidate Bashir Ahmad Bilour defeated the

PPP candidate with the huge margin of 5552 votes. The contest in 1993 was very

close and ANP candidate Bashir Bilour won with 42 votes by defeating PPP

candidate, Ayub Shah. In 1997 ANP candidate Bashir Bilour won the elections. The

most interesting results were drawn by Religious Parties including JUI-F in PF. In all

these elections the third party was JUI-F. It has been seen by the results of Religious

parties that, whenever little bit increase came in religious votes then elections results

of ANP and PPP changed alternatively. It is surprising given Bilour’s prior

experience in the constituency, and greater appeal than Ayub Shah among the elite

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voters, he did not secure more votes. He won almost the same number of votes as

Ayub in 1993, indicating that PPP supporters voted along party lines irrespective of

the merits and demerits of the respective PPP candidates. As Ayub Shah is a Syed

and Bashir a Bilour, it also indicates that biradari was not a significant determinant

of voting behaviour in central Peshawar. The PPP and ANP candidate were the same

during 1990s, both familiarity with the constituency and contest always were tough.

From PF-2, PPP candidate Qamar Abbas defeated ANP candidate Mr. Adeel Ahmad

with the difference of 9429 votes. The third candidate was Shabir Ahmad from IJI.

During 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections, PML-N and ANP’s electoral alliance made a

better position in electoral politics. During these elections, ANP supported PML-N

candidate in Provincial seat and PML-N supported ANP on National assembly seats.

This strategy seems to be useful to bring ANP in National politics and PML-N into

provincial Politics. The major benefit was to the PML-N as it established its own

government in NWFP after 1990, 1997 with the coalition of ANP. During 1990 and

1993 the PPP and IJI/PML-N contests were very close. In 1990s, IJI candidate, Haji

Mohammad Javed defeated Syed Zafar Ali Shah with the margin of 3138 votes. In

1993 Qammar Abbas, a PPP candidate defeated PML-N candidate Syed Ali shah

with the difference of 853 votes. In 1997, PML-N candidate Syed Ali Shah defeated

PPP candidate Qamar Abass with great difference of 3397. PML(N)/ANP voters also

appeared to vote along party lines rather than for the candidates. The only difference

was the split in the conservative vote caused by the religious parties.

CONCLUSIONS

Through an analysis of polling areas results from the 1988-1997 elections, this

chapter has shown that while levels of support for the PPP and the ANP have

changed over time, patterns of support have remained consistent. In all four elections

the PPP did best in the urban-rural periphery areas and in the polling areas with large

concentrations of industrial labour, which confirmed its reputation as the party of the

poor. The ANP always received its strongest support from the middle and upper class

polling areas. These findings were supported in the more detailed analyses of various

constituency results which showed that class still played an important role in

determining voting behaviour. The case study on NA-1 also revealed that there were

gender differences as well, and that female voters preferred the ANP to the PPP.

Biradari did not seem to be a major determinant of voting behaviour except perhaps

in some of the polling areas in the urban-rural periphery of the city. Candidate

loyalty also did not seem to be a major determinant as relatively unknown candidates

like Zafar Ali Shah got victory in 1993 and Qammar Abbas were able to go

considerable votes on PPP ticket in 1997 elections. The major conclusion of this

chapter is that the most important determinant of voting behaviour in Peshawar was

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party or party leader identification. Almost all those who held PPP and ANP ticket

holders won elections alternatively due to party identification. 1 Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population and Housing Census NWFP (Islamabad:

Population Census Organisation, 2002)2 During the anti-government campaigns against General Ziaul Haq’s martial law regime, Peshawar

remained uncharacteristically docile.3 Government of Pakistan, Hand book of Population and Housing Census NWFP (Islamabad:

Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2002), pp.1-2.4 Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level N.W.F.P. (Islamabad: Federal

Bureau of statistics, 2002), p.3.5 Ibid.6 Ibid., p.217 Javed Kamran Bashir, N.W.F.P. Elections of 1970: An Analysis (Lahore: Progressive Publishers,

1973), p.18

Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results), for NA 1,2,3.9 It is important to bear in mind the limitations of using aggregate data, in this case polling station’s

results, to predict the voting behaviour of individuals living in polling units. Thus, while we can make

generalization about how, middle class wards’ or ‘industrial wards’ vote. We cannot conclude from this

how middle class voters or industrial voters vote.10 For a more detailed definition and discussions on this subject, see the section on biradari in chapter

eight.11 Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level N.W.F.P. (Islamabad: Federal

Bureau of Statistics, 2002), p.30512 Arguably, many of the lower middle class polling areas could have been classified under the eighth

category of ‘lower class’. This was not done in order to keep the number of categories to a minimum.

Furthermore, while the distinction between the lower middle and lower-middle class areas are more

difficult due to the higher population densities and more complex residential patterns in these areas. It

was therefore decided to use only the one category of lower middle class, bearing in mind that these

areas also include sizeable lower class neighbourhoods and katchi abadis.13 The figure in the last three columns led some support to those who argue that the 1990 elections were

partially rigged. Whereas voter turnout statistics have tended to decline steadily, there was a suspicious

increase of 2.2 percent in Peshawar in 1993 where less than the number cast in 1990, despite the fact

that more than 100000 new voters were registered during this period.14 Between 1988 and 1997, the number of votes won by the ANP, while those of the PPP decreased.15 Muhammad Jawad, Interview by author, Peshawar, 08 May 2010.16 Haq Nawaz, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 26 August 2008.17 See, Daily The News, 9 September 1993.

215

18 There are four prominent Arbab Families in Peshawar. These families are living in Landi Arbab,

Budhai, Daudzai and Tehkal. They were given the title of Nawaban of Peshawar. Arbab's residing in

Landi Arbab are known as "Momands" by Tribe and Arbab's residing in Tehkal are known as "Khalils"

tribe. In Peshawar Khalil and Momand were two brothers Migrated from Afghanistan. Arbab family of

Peshawar has so many contributions in the field of politics and still remains the repute of a very good

family. Arbabs often owned much of the land surrounding cities where they grew produce for the city

markets. As cities expanded outward, so did the value of his land, and with it the economic and

political fortunes of many Arbabs. Their political fortunes further improved under the rule of fellow

Chief Ministership of Arbab Jehangir Khan, who patronized many from his biradari, specially those

from his home town of Peshawar.19 Election results shows that ANP and PPP contest during 1990s were very close, both the parties

could not make an alliance with Religious parties however Nawaz Sharif extended full support to ANP

due to electoral alliance.20See Kamila Hayat, ‘For the poor, Democracy Means Nothing at All’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 9

December 1994, 1021 Tahir Khalil, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 28 August 2008.22 Arbab Aslam, Interview with author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 19 March 2008.23 Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 19 March 200824 http://www.pashtunforum.com/pashtun-history-8/aftab-ahmad-khan-sherpao-2335.25 ibid26 Haji Adeel, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 21 March 2008.27 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II:

Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government

Printing Press, 1997).28 The poling list giving the number of registered voters for each polling station could not be located for

1988, so it was not possible to calculate 1988 voter turnout statistics by gender and ward category.29 Name withheld, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar 20 April 2008.30 Salman Bangash, Interview by author, Peshawar, 25 April 2008.

216

CHAPTER: 6

PARTY POLITICS IN NWFP 1988-1999

6. INTRODUCTION

Party politics in NWFP had two dimensions. One was party politics at mainstream

level, i.e. Macro Level and the other was party politics at the constituency level, i.e.

Micro Level. Both levels go parallel to safeguard politician, voters and party interest

as per Downs’s theory. Political players in NWFP seek two prong strategies while

contesting elections. On the one hand they need electoral constituency to win the

election and on the other hand a space in political party or alliance(s) that has enjoyed

power. In this chapter both macro and micro level strategy will be discussed.

6.1 PARTY POLITICS AT MACRO LEVEL IN NWFP

The political situation in NWFP is different from the other provinces of Pakistan in its

historical and socio-cultural aspects. It is in the multi-polar mode with four major

players, and can be called it Quad-polar: the PPP, the ML(s), the Religious parties

(JUI, JI) and the Regional/Ethnic Political party (ANP). Since 1970, each one of the

four has secured around 20% of the vote although there have been ebbs and flows

from election to election. All the same, at one or another election, none has ever

crossed 40% limit on its own. The NWFP electoral politics is one of alliances or

electoral seats adjustments with ethnic political party or independents. The data in

table 6.1 show that until 1997 the Muslim League vote had been steadily rising since

early nineties (a gain of 10% points since 1988) cutting into the earlier vote bank of

PPP, which had been losing its share of votes. Since the 1970 elections it seems that

there are four clusters of voters: The PPP cluster, the Muslim League(s) cluster, the

Religious Parties cluster and Regional Parties cluster. Past electoral behaviour shows

that roughly 60% to 75% of votes are claimed by the first two clusters (PPP and ML)

while the remaining gets distributed among the other two clusters as well as

independents and miscellaneous parties.1 Since the 1970 elections it seems that there

are four clusters of voters. The PPP cluster, the Muslim League(s) cluster, the

Religious Parties cluster and Regional Parties cluster. Past electoral behaviour shows

that roughly 60% to 75% of votes are claimed by the first two clusters (PPP and ML)

while the remaining gets distributed among the other two clusters as well as

independents and miscellaneous parties.2

217

Table 6.1: Voting percentage of political parties in NWFP.

Major PoliticalParties

1970 1988 1990 1993 1997

PPP and PPP- led Alliances

% of votes 14% 23% 23% 16% 10%

No. of seats 1 9 5 6 0

PML and PML Led Alliances

% of votes 27 27 24 32 37

No. of seats 7 8 8 10 15

Religious PartiesPrimarily JUI and JI

% of votes 33% JUI-F:11%

JUI-F:20 %

PIF: 11%MDM:2%IJM: 11%

JUI-F: 8%JI Boycott

No. of seats 6 4 JUI-F: 4 PIF (2)MDM (1)IJM (2)

0

Regional PartiesPrimarily ANP

% of votes 19 18 15 15 19

No. of seats 3 2 6 3 10

Others % of votes 7 21 18 13 26No. of seats 8 3 3 2 1

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)

In the 1970 elections the PPP won only one national assembly seat and three

provincial seats from NWFP. NAP, QML and JUI emerged as leading political parties

by winning 11, 9 and 4 seats respectively out of 80 provincial assembly seats. After

the election JUI formed a coalition government in NWFP with NAP up to 15

February 1973 when JUI coalition government resigned on federal government

decision to dissolve the Baluchistan government.3 There were four political parties in

NWFP during 1990s electoral politics. These were PPP, PPP led electoral alliance

PDA in 1990 elections, PML-N, and PML led electoral alliance IJI in 1988 and 1990

elections and ANP. JUI-F also had a considerable vote bank in NWFP. PML-Nawaz

group contested 1988 and 1990 elections from the platform of IJI and PPP in 1990

contested elections from the platform of PDA. From 1988-1999 no political party had

got clear majority from NWFP so coalition governments were established during this

period. Each political party had their own vote bank in different parts of the province.

PML-N had strong hold in North eastern region of NWFP (Hazara), ANP in Central

Pakhtun districts and JUI-F in DI. Khan. PPP had a mixed share throughout NWFP

depending on the reputation of its ticket holders. At the macro level, during the period

under study there were four major parties in NWFP including two mainstream

political parties of Nawaz and Benazir, one ethnic and religious parties. Level of

support of these parties and percentage of winning the seats varies from 1988-1997

elections and it depends on various factors.4 There were different complex set of

factors contributed to power struggle in NWFP and no list of explanations will be

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comprehensive. This study has selected the following factors that to a greater or lesser

extent contributed to political development.

1. The political legacy of PPP2. Legacy of Zia-ul-Haq and the rise of PML-N3. Ethnic/Regional Legacy of ANP in NWFP4. Religious Legacy of Islamic Parties: Transformation and fragmentation in

NWFP and military-mullah intervention to establish conservative thoughts and military backed political environment for religious parties in NWFP.

6.1.1 POLITICAL LEGACY OF PPP: The legacy of PPP and the policies of

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from 1971-1977 still influence the voting behaviour of many

voters5. The PPP popular slogan i.e. Islam is our Faith, Democracy is our politics,

Socialism is our Economy and All Power to the People attracted voters from NWFP.

Even though the PPP founder Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was defeated by JUI leader Mufti

Mehmood in the 1970 elections from DI. Khan with the difference of 10,000 votes6

the PPP policies seem to exert a considerable impact on the electoral politics of

NWFP. There is a positive legacy that still wins the party support from PPP ‘jiyalas’-

the diehard party workers whose loyalty to Bhutto and the PPP resulted in lashes,

torture, and prison sentences for them during the Zia years. There is still a strong

‘vote-bank’ among industrial labours and the urban and rural poor for the PPP in

Peshawar, Mardan and Charsada. But for the urban middle classes in NWFP in

general and the business community in particular, there is a strong negative legacy,

which continues to influence their political attitudes and behaviour. The urban middle

and upper classes have never been the PPP’s strongest supporters7. Even in the 1970

elections, the PPP received the least support in urban NWFP from the middle and

upper class neighbourhoods. The policies of the PPP government soon turned the

initial ambivalence of the middle classes towards Bhutto into strong dislike. In many

cases, they were the ones most adversely affected by these policies, including the

nationalization of small and medium sized industries, the nationalization of private

schools catering to the middle classes, the politicization of the bureaucracy which

reduced their access on the basis of merit to government jobs, and the political

abandonment of the urban intelligentsia in favour of the traditional landed elites8. In

1977, these disenchanted middle classes coalesced into a united political force under

the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The PNA’s agitation movement,

which gave the military the excuse it needed to overthrow Bhutto, provides a vivid

example of the new-found political strength of the urban middle classes. The PNA

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Movement also gave birth to the ‘anti-PPP party’-a coalition of primarily urban

middle class forces which has remained remarkably resilient through the years.

The results of the 1988 and 1993 elections in urban NWFP indicate that while

memories of the ‘positive legacy’ that inspired the jiyala and the urban lower classes

are beginning to fade, the middle class’s memories of the ‘negative legacy’ are not.

For example, despite Benazir Bhutto’s publicly stated support for privatization and an

open economy, the business community still explains its dislike and distrust of the

PPP by citing the example of her father’s nationalization policy carried out more than

twenty years earlier. Few members of the business community seem to remember

some of the positive results of nationalization. For example, many of today’s small

and mid sized industrialists owe their existence to the PPP’s policy of nationalizing

banks owned by industrial families like the Habibs and Saigols. For the first time,

many middle class traders and businessmen were able to access credit that previously

had been monopolized by a few large industrial houses. One political observer

pointed out the double standards as follows:

[T]aking the granting of credit facilities out of the hands of a few industrialists was a big service to the majority of the business class, but…they are still anti PPP. The new families, the present boom during Zia’s time-they are all a product of the financial bureaucracy created by Bhutto. Otherwise the Saigols wouldn’t have given loan to any bloody fool and create a rival for them. Similar situation is with the Habibs. Before the nationalization of banks, the ordinary middle class person couldn’t ever imagine getting a loan from a bank. But after nationalization, they were able to cultivate friendship with the middle class bank bureaucrats and got maximum privileges. But they would not utter a word of thanks. All these people do is continue to harp about Bhutto’s nationalization policies. But these same never complain about Ayub’s nationalization of Pakistan Progressive Papers of Mian Iftikharuddin. They supported him in the nationalization. They have double standards.9

Sharafat Ali Mubarak, the President of the Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and

Industry, gave Bhutto’s policies as the most important reason for the business

community’s support for Nawaz Sharief and their alliance with ANP during 1990s:

[The] element which I consider to be the most important element of all was the shadow or the specter of the horror of the “70s that envelops and surrounds the image of the People’s Party [and which] hasn’t really been wiped out…. The Party promise of the elimination of feudalism to its established principles of socialism could not protect and advance the interests of peasantry in NWFP.10

6.1.2 PPP ORGANISATIONAL WEAKNESSES: The PPP’s

maintenance of a strong position in the NWFP in the absence of patronage and

support from the provincial bureaucracy is an impressive example of the loyalty of its

voters and the appeal of its leader, Benazir Bhutto. In 1988, despite strong opposition

from within the ranks of the military and civil bureaucracy, the PPP won the first

party-based elections to be held since 1977. Much of this victory, especially in urban

constituencies, can be attributed to the ‘positive legacy’ of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

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referred to earlier, the sympathy vote for the PPP which had been harshly suppressed

during the Zia regime, and the appeal of Benazir Bhutto who had fought a long and

hard battle for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan.

Once the PPP was in power, however, many voters were disappointed with its

performance,11 and did not protest when Benazir Bhutto’s government was dismissed

by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1990 on charges of corruption, incompetence, and

mismanagement. The PPP’s lackluster performance in office affected the politically

aware urban voters more than the rural voters, where a candidate’s reputation is often

more important in determining voting behaviour than a political party’s reputation. In

retrospect, it now seems that the 1988 elections were the last ones in which the PPP

could win seats based on past legacies and sympathies rather than on its performance

(or its opponents’ lack of performance) in office. Another important reason for the

decline of the PPP in urban NWFP was the weak and divided nature of the PPP party

organization. It is particularly important to have strong urban party organizations

because party loyalty and party-based voting are much more important in urban areas

than in rural areas. The PPP party organization has never been strong, but during the

martial law years it was further weakened through repression. From 1977 to 1988, it

also operated more as an anti-government protest organization than as a political party

oriented towards winning elections. Furthermore, once in power from 1988 to 1990,

issues of party organization were not placed high on the agenda. This alienated many

party workers who had suffered in the Zia regime (as well as many who had not) and

who, perhaps, had high expectations of what the new PPP government could do for

them. Nevertheless the lack of attention paid to party organization while in office

further weakened the PPP. The BBC correspondent from Peshawar, Haroon-ur-

Rasheed, explained the importance of remembering the party.

People are no longer working for the party with the same dedication that they used to.

This invariably happens when you move from the opposition into government. Once

in government, you forget the first Machiavellian maxim that when you become the

head of state you shouldn’t forget the party-you shouldn’t give up the party for

government. You get government, but use government to strengthen your party. It is a

classic PPP thing. Bhutto gave up the party when he became the head of the

government, and then he tried to create a new party. But it didn’t have the same kind

of organic links as the original PPP. So he began to rely on the bureaucracy and he

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lost touch with the party, which is why the party wasn’t around to bail him out when

he needed it. The same thing happened to Benazir Bhutto12.

In the 1990s, the PPP NWFP organization became increasingly divided under the

leadership of its President, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao. His differences with Benazir

Bhutto came to light, when Maj-Gen Naseerullah Babar mistakenly suspected Aftab's

role in the allotment of party tickets in Nowshera in 1993 elections 13 . Babar

considered it a move by Aftab to undercut him. After that Babar sided with all those,

Masood Kausar and Khwaja Hoti, who were opposed to Aftab. The PPP organization

was also divided into different factions and had to deal with an incompetent

leadership. It was generally believed that Sherpao deliberately appointed weak figures

as PPP office-bearers so that he could control the organization. The factions within

the PPP were numerous and were an important contributing factor to the PPP’s poor

electoral performance in the NWFP. Factionalism is not a recent phenomenon with in

the PPP. Jones points out that four distinct factions-rural political, urban political,

Islamic Socialists, and Left Socialists-were visible within the party as early as the

party’s founding convention in 196714. According to PPP leader from NWFP:

Every leader of the People’s Party is more interested about his rival inside the party

than his rival outside the party. Mr. Sherpao may be more interested in what Mr.

Naseerullah Baber is doing, and Naseerullah Baber is more interested in knowing

what Sherpao is doing, than both of them trying to know what JUI-F and ANP or

Nawaz Sharief is doing15. There was the Sherpao faction versus the non-Sherpao

faction, the old party workers versus the new party workers, and the left versus the

right. One of the most important divisions was along class lines, between PPP leaders

with working class backgrounds and those from elite families. The highly centralized

and personalized nature of the PPP party organization has contributed to factionalism,

and has alienated many party workers. Journalist Haq Nawaz points out that while

factionalism is not a recent development, the growing personalization of the party is

exacerbating the problem:

It’s a historical fact that the PPP has always been very factionalized, very personalized. The point is, and what I think is the real complaint against the PPP, is that it has become even more personalized and consequently more factionalized. Because there is no party ideology, party line, party policy on anything. The personality is far more important than anything else… It’s very intriguing, this interview she [Benazir Bhutto] gave to Arif Nizami in the Nation a few months ago, when they asked her, ‘What are the four pillars of your government?’ You expect her to say, ‘Democracy, Parliament, Judiciary etc., and she turned around and said, ‘Asif Zardari, Shahid Hassan Khan, Naheed Khan, and Hussain Haqqani.’ This to me is the epitome of the personalization of her second round in power. The four pillars are people and not institutions and structures16.

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An important factor contributing to this problem is that like most political

parties, the PPP has always appointed rather than elected its office-bearers.

While this is commonly justified on the grounds that elections are divisive. The

primary argument given by PPP leaders for not holding elections for party

leadership positions is that this would be divisive. However, Haneef Ramey, the

PPP leader has proposed that party elections be held on the basis of proportional

representation in order to strengthen the party’s organisation while minimizing

the divisive nature of elections. In a city ward, for example, party election could

be held and the winner declared the ward president, the runner-up vice

president, the third place candidate the General Secretary, and so on. This would

ensure that the party members with the most support in award all office bearers.

The ward office bearers, in turn, could elect the city office bearers, and also play

a major role in selecting the party’s Provincial and National Assembly

candidates from their respective constituencies. The advantage in having elected

office bearers is that it would show who had the support of the majority of party

members with in a constituency. Furthermore, if ward presidents had to get

elected, they would have vested interest in registering new voters and party

members in their constituency and doing work in their constituencies to win

support.17 It seems more likely that it is done to ensure that power remains in the

hands of the party leaders. The consequence, however, was that being a PPP

office-bearer was a reflection of the level of support someone had from Benazir

Bhutto and the party’s senior leaders, rather than from their party members in

their own constituencies. Labour leader Abdullah Qureshi from Peshawar

explained:

PPP workers are not in touch with the people. They believe in only one thing, to keep his boss happy, and his boss has only one concern, to keep his boss happy, and that person’s only concern is to dance around Begum Benazir Bhutto and to keep her happy. They don’t think that people are with them. They think that people are with Benazir Bhutto. On the other hand, the Muslim League worker is most interested in his constituency18.

Afrasiyab Khattak, a Human Rights activist explains that if political parties were

organized at the grassroots level, and if party office-because were elected rather than

selected, it would reduce the power of the party leaders. This would also strengthen

parties at the local level and improve their electoral prospects by ensuring that

candidates with the greatest support among party workers are the ones who are given

tickets. In 1993, neither the PPP nor the PML (N) had strong formal party

organization. The PML (N)’s control over Local Body politics during Zia era,

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however, gave it a strong informal party organization at the grassroots level. In urban

constituencies in particular, PML (N) candidates relied heavily on ward councilors to

manage and advise their election campaigns. An important contributing factor to the

PPP’s defeat in urban NWFP was the atrophied party organization which was not in a

position to assist PPP candidates in mobilizing voters and organizing their

campaigns19.

6.1.3 LEGACY OF GENERAL ZIAUL HAQ: Party politics during 1990s

were greatly affected by the Zia legacy. One of the reasons for decline in support for

the PPP in urban NWFP is the legacy of General Ziaul Haq. While Bhutto and the

policies of his government helped create an ‘anti-PPP’ party, the policies of Zia

contributed to its expansion and consolidation. On the one hand, he weakened the PPP

by banning the party and arresting its leaders and supporters. On the other hand, he

patronized and promoted the interests of the conservative urban middle classes who

formed the core of the anti-PPP party. In Burki’s words, ‘it was General Ziaul Haq

who had his finger on the quickening pulse of the Pakistani middle class’20. He

introduced Islamization measures that appealed to the conservative urban middle

classes, liberalized the economy which won him the support of the traders and

industrialists, and permitted private schools which catered in particular to middle class

children to reopen. In exchange for his patronage, the urban middle classes remained

politically passive for the duration of Zia’s eleven years in power.

One of General Zia’s most durable political legacies, and perhaps the one that has

been the most harmful to the PPP, was the ‘localization of politics’. This shifted

political attention away from national politics, where the PPP had a comparative

advantage as Pakistan’s only major national party, to local politics, where it was

politically weak. It also gave birth to a new political class that soon graduated from

local politics and effectively began to challenge the PPP in provincial and national

politics. The process of ‘localization’ began in 1979 when, after canceling national

elections for the second time, Zia announced that there would be elections to ‘Local

Bodies’ on a non-party basis21. These were designed to serve as a political pressure

valve after two years of military rule, and to deflect people’s attention from national

to local issues. In the NWFP, in particular, this strategy proved extremely effective. It

helps explain why, for example, when the PPP-led Movement for the Restoration of

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Democracy (MRD) was causing serious political unrest in Sindh province, the NWFP

remained quiet. Labour leader and political activist Abdullah Qureshi explained:

Zia did a very clever thing. He introduced Local Bodies and created an absolutely new class of political activists. For example, in 1983 the MRD movement coincided with the Local Body elections. One day I was returning from a demonstration at which only 100 or so people participated, and was feeling very dejected…. I was walking down the Peshawar Sadar, and there I saw various offices of electioneering local body candidates, tape recorders on, banners, flood lights. Suddenly I realized that this is where everyone was-people had an alternative. The youth felt that this was more realistic than my empty talk-it was more exciting than an MRD demonstration22.

Local identities and local issues became the substance of NWFP politics. Political

loyalties were increasingly determined by family, faction, and biradari ties, and

political power was determined by the amount of patronage at one‘s disposal. A

classic system of ‘machine politics’ developed where politics consisted not of

formulating and implementing public policies or concerning oneself with the national

interest, but in assisting constituents with thana katcheri [police station and court

house] problems, introducing local community development schemes, and in doling

out patronage in the form of government jobs, welfare funds, contracts, licenses,

loans, and land23. Zia’s strategy of diverting political energy from national to local

issues had the intended effect. During his reign, student politics were reduced from

demonstrating over national and even international issues, to fighting over campus

dorms. The labour movement was reduced from a powerful political force to a weak

and divided movement with little political importance. The political role of biradaris,

which had been virtually eliminated in the 1970 elections, again increased in NWFP

politics and MNAs/MPAs were converted into glorified councilors, whose days were

spent not dealing with national/provincial issues, but with writing chits to get their

constituents a job, or to got admission for medical treatments into a hospital, or out of

a thana [police station]24.

The 1985 National and Provincial Assemblies elections demonstrated that Local Body

politics had become the entry point into provincial and national politics. According to

one press account, 34 of the 80 members elected to the NWFP Provincial Assembly

were sitting members of Local Bodies and others had the strong support of local

bodies’ representatives25. This had two important consequences. First, it meant that

provincial and national politics began to resemble local body politics. Patronage

politics became the order of the day, and representing personal and constituent

interests became much more important for legislators than representing national

interests. The second important consequence was that this put the PPP which had not

actively participated in Local Body politics, at a severe disadvantage. In 1979, many

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PPP candidates did win in the Local Body elections contesting under the party

pseudonym of Awam Dost (friend of the masses). Many of these, however, were

subsequently disqualified by the military regime26. Thereafter, the PPP never took an

active interest in Local Body politics, and performed poorly in the 1983 Local Body

elections. This was not surprising, since an opposition party with no access to

patronage and bitterly opposed by the establishment had little chance of electoral

success in a system fuelled by patronage and easily manipulated by the bureaucracy.

From 1979 to 1985 therefore, the PPP was effectively sidelined from the most

important political arena in Pakistan and particularly in NWFP. The PPP’s boycott of

the 1985 elections compounded the problem by keeping the party out of the

mainstream of politics for another three years. By the time the PPP re- entered the

political mainstream at the time of the 1988 elections; the anti-PPP forces had a

virtual monopoly of power at the local level, which they were able to use successfully

as a platform to challenge the PPP at the provincial and national level.

6.1.4 PATRONAGE OF NAWAZ SHARIF: Another legacy of General

Ziaul Haq that contributed to the decline of the PPP and the rise of the PML (N) in

urban NWFP is Mian Nawaz Sharief. In 1981, Sharief was inducted into the cabinet

of General Ghulam Jillani, Governor of the Punjab. For the next 12 years he held

positions that enabled him to consolidate his position in the Punjab in general, and in

Hazara region of NWFP in particular. From 1981 to 1985, he had the important

portfolio of Finance Minister in the Punjab Provincial Cabinet, and from 1985 to 1990

he was the Punjab Chief Minister. In 1990, Sharief became the first Punjabi to

become Prime Minister since Feroze Khan Noon’s ten-month tenure in office in 1958.

Nawaz Sharief won the support of many in the Punjab and Hazara who wanted to see

a fellow-Punjabi as Prime Minister27. There were strong base of Nawaz Sharief in

Hazara region and southern region of NWFP. ‘This is because the Pakhtuns and non-

Pakhtuns rivalries and close ties of these area with Punjab’28. Without the benefit of

being the Chief of Army Staff like Zia, or of having strong ties with the traditional

landed elite and the support of their’ vote-banks,’ Sharief relied heavily on patronage

to create a base of support for himself, As Finance Minister, Chief Minister, and

Prime Minister, he was in a position to dole out patronage, which he did on a scale

never before witnessed in Punjab politics. In addition to patronage, Nawaz Sharief

had twelve years to develop ties with the Punjab provincial bureaucracy. This helped

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him to consolidate his position at the expense of the PPP. He was remarkably

successful in making the provincial bureaucracy subservient to a civilian politician.

The key to his success was his discovery that the carrot was much more effective than

the stick when dealing with the bureaucracy. Whereas Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had sought

to subdue the bureaucracy through intimidation and force, Nawaz Sharief bought their

loyalties. During his various tenures in office, Sharief was able to fill thousands of

government jobs with his supporters. He appointed hundreds of loyalist police

officers, particularly into the lucrative positions of Assistant Sub-Inspectors (ASIs)

and Station Head Officers (SHOs). This was especially significant as the police play a

central political role in Pakistan because of their ability to selectively apply laws in

order to harass political opponents or to turn a blind eye to the misdeeds of political

allies. Sharief could also use his position to transfer loyal and pliable bureaucrats into

key government posts and to transfer out those who showed signs of independence.

His control over the provincial government undoubtedly also made it much easier for

those sympathetic to the IJI/PML (N) to register to vote in the 1988, 1990, 1993 and

1997 elections than or the PPP supporters.

While Nawaz Sharief’s twelve-year monopoly over patronage and his control of the

provincial bureaucracy played a critical role in the rise of the PML (N) and decline of

the PPP in urban Punjab, they are still insufficient explanations. This trend also

affected the frontier politics where Nawaz workers extended their links with Punjabi

burucracy in NWFP for the deliverance of patronage in their localities. One indication

of this is the support for the PML (N) that was visible in the cities and towns

throughout the province. In contrast with Nawaz Sharief’s home town of Lahore,

many of these had not received much support or development assistance while he was

in power. The rise of the PML (N) also cannot be simply explained by an increase in

support for the anti-PPP party. Between 1990 and 1993 speech against President

Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Nawaz Sharief was transformed from a person of the

establishment into a popular national leader with a mass following, and in particular a

mass urban following. In 1993, there was clearly a considerable vote-bank of pro-

Nawaz voters, and not just anti-PPP and pro-patronage voters, which contributed to

the PML (N)’s strong performance in urban Punjab and Punjabi cultured areas of

NWFP. The real test of the popularity of Nawaz Sharief and the PML (N) will be the

extent to which they can retain support out of power, without access to patronage, as

the PPP was able to do from 1977 to 1988.

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6.1.5 TRADE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES IN NWFP IN 1980s: The 1980s were a decade of considerable prosperity in the Pakistan29, as well as in

NWFP in general. Remittances from migrant workers in the Gulf, the bonanza of

foreign aid following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a series of good harvests,

and increasing amounts of drug money all helped to fuel a ‘buoyant and vibrant

middle class revolution’ in Pakistan and NWFP30. Official statistics indicate that

remittance earnings alone during the decade totaled US Dollar 23.2 billion31. Between

1977 and 1988, Pakistan’s GDP grew on average by an impressive 6.9 per cent a

year32. Furthermore some have estimated that official statistics reflect only one third

of the actual economy, with the balance remaining hidden in the ‘black economy’33.

The statistics are reflected in shops stacked with consumer goods, streets crowded

with new Japanese vehicles, neightbourhoods filled with ostentatious new marble

mansions, restaurants filled to capacity on every other street comer.

Ironically, as a result of this prosperity the PPP’s reputation of being the party of the

poor, which used to be its greatest strength in urban NWFP, became a partial liability.

Many who were inspired by the PPP’s 1970 slogan of ‘roti, kapra, aur makan’ (bread,

clothing, and house) were aspiring to own VCRs, satellite dishes, and Suzuki vehicles

in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The PML (N), the party of the middle classes, could

well have gained much of it support in urban areas because cities and towns prospered

and became more middle class. According to I.A. Rehman of the Human Rights

Commission of Pakistan, the growth of the middle classes was a development the PPP

failed to recognizer:

[T]he PPP leadership…did not come to grapple with the socioeconomic change s that has been taking place over the last 20 years. In NWFP and in urban areas in particular, people have moved a couple of steps ahead in their pursuit of more rewarding labour. A mechanic has become a shop-owner. A small mechanic has become a bigger establishment. And the PPP, to may mind, did not comprehend the urges of this new addition to the Punjab’s lower middle class34.

There is evidence to support the conclusion that as voters moved from the lower

classes into the middle classes, they were likely to switch party affiliations from the

PPP to the IJI/PML (N). For example, the majority of migrant workers who went to

the Gulf in the 1970s and 1980s were from the lower classes, and thus likely to have

been PPP supporters. The remittances they sent home enabled many of their families

to enter the ranks of the middle classes. Gallup Pakistan’s 1990 exit poll survey

indicated that 41 per cent of recipients of overseas remittances supported the IJI in

1990, compared with only 31 per cent who supported the PPP35. This statistical

evidence is supported by anecdotal evidence collected in interviews. Arbab

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Muhammad Jahangir Khan, a PPP MNA from Peshawar-II in 1993, related the

following example.

What I have seen in the last ten years is that anyone who starts to prosper economically then wants to change his class. He quietly leaves the PPP, which represents the poorer classes, and tries to join the Muslim League which represents the class which he aspires to become a member of. I’LL give you a very good example. In 1977, there was a man who was a very staunch supporter of PPP. He started a little business exporting garments, and would come to visit me and would get advice from me. As he began to prosper, his support for PPP slowly began to fade….Then come the ’88 elections and I went to him and told him how we had known each other for a long time, how he had supported PPP candidate in ’77, and asked for his support once again. He said, ‘I’m sorry, I never supported you….Your people are terrible people. The PPP is not my party’. I was very surprised but then realized what he was doing. He wanted to leave his old class behind, and the party which represented it, and to enter the new class. He wanted more respect in society and to be viewed as a member of the class of shurafas [respectable people] which they think is represented by the Muslim League36.

Abdullah Qureshi, the labour leader, described a similar change in party affiliation

that takes place when a landless peasant moves to the city and prospers:

The kammies [members of low-status caste-like artisan and service groups] who had no respect, no land, no houses in the village, are the ones who migrate to the cities and adopt the new industrial life of the urban areas. These people are born Bhuttos and give their votes to the Bhuttos. The magic of the PPP is in the villages. Once kammies who move to the cities become prosperous, they leave the PPP and join the Muslim League37.

6.1.6 RISE OF THE TRADERS: Nawaz Sharief was the Pakistan’s first

industrialist Prime Minister. Without a traditional rural constituency, it was only

natural for him to turn to his friends and colleagues in the business community for

support. The traders and industrialists, who during the prosperous 1980s had grown

both economically and politically more powerful, gave him their overwhelming

support from NWFP. Strong ANP leaders made a power alliance with Nawaz during

1990s. This was a new and important development in politics as the business

community has traditionally kept a very low political profile38. Leading industrial

houses often engaged in politics covertly, but they usually tried to protect themselves

by maintaining links with both ruling and opposition parties. This cautious approach

was not surprising in a country with a highly regulated economy and a high

government turnover rate. Overt political support for one government could easily

lead to victimization by the next.It is in this context that the open and overwhelming

support which the business community gave to Nawaz Sharief gains its significance.

This support was dramatically apparent at the time his government was dismissed by

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, when several Chambers of Commerce and Industry

took out advertisements in the country’s leading newspapers, condemning the act and

expressing their solidarity with Nawaz Sharief. This was followed in 1994 and 1995

by a series of overtly political one-day strikes called by the business community to

condemn the policies of the PPP government 39 . Mr. Riaz Arshad, a leading

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industrialist and president of the Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industry, dates

the increasingly open political involvement of the business community to the

restoration of democracy in 1985.

Chronologically, I think the revival of democracy which started with Ziaul Haq installing the Junejo government in 1985, would probably be the time when the business community began to become more active in projecting its point of view. This period was preceded by a long period of martial law during which the business community lobbied in a very different manner40.

Several factors help explain the willingness of the business community to openly

support Nawaz Sharief. The first and most obvious reason was that as fellow

businessmen, he and his family had personal links with this community. As a result,

the business community had much more access to Nawaz Sharief than to any previous

national leader41. They also believed that as an industrialist himself, Nawaz Sharief

was committed to reducing the bureaucracy’s control over the economy with a policy

of privatization. According to Rahimullah Yosafzai, an analyst from Peshawar:

The bureaucracy has been running this country, and even the top industrialists of this country have had to go and grovel in front of Section Officers. They hate that. They think the time has come when they should have a voice in government, and Nawaz is the only one who promises to do that. He’s the only one who did something about it. That’s a very, very important psychological factor. They think that this is our government42.

The business community in general viewed Nawaz Sharief as the first political leader

who was sympathetic to urban commercial and industrial interests, in contrast with

the traditional politicians who defended the rural interests of the landed elites. By the

late 1980’s the business community was increasingly viewing politics in terms of

urban versus rural interests, or commercial/industrial interests versus feudal interests.

Akmal Hussein, an economist and businessman, explained this development as

follows.

The entrepreneurs and the business elite have recognized that over time economic advantage has been obtained by various pressure groups on the basis of organization…And I think this was the first time that they recognized that if they got their act together and organized, they could influence budget making…If they didn’t get their act together, the government, under pressure to raise revenues, would turn the screws on the entrepreneurs. That is one of the reasons also behind the feudal landlord versus capitalist rhetoric…The capitalists recognized that revenues could also be increased by placing a tax on the rural rich. So where the balance was struck with respect to tapping the available surplus in the urban and rural areas respectively would to some extent depend on how well organized the two elites were-rural and urban.. I think this is a phenomenon we have seen emerging essentially since the end of the Zia regime43.

Finally, the business community supported Nawaz Sharief because he generously

provided patronage to them in form of government loans, privatized industries, and

tax exemptions. As one close observer of NWFP politics noted:

You see, the entire business community of Pakistan has not grown in a normal competitive manner. It will be hostile to any effective government. Its liking for Nawaz Sharief was not for ideological reasons, but because of the tradition of a loose and arbitrary government; because he made nonsense of taxation by giving individuals and companies and groups exemptions on a very generous scale; because he was not opposed to the basic, some of them illegal, methods of accumulating money, So this entire industrial and business community grew in a hot house, without their own capital, without their own managerial skill, dependent entirely on the state’s goodwill and public resources and external loans. They would prefer a party that would continue this44.

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The rise of the trader and industrialist is reflected in the growing number who are

being elected as MNAs and MPAs. In the 1970s lawyers dominated urban politics,

whereas in the 1990s businessmen and industrialists figure prominently. In Peshawar

and Banu, for example, Arbabs, Bilour and Saifullah brothers entered into the

industrialist class and extend their coalition with PML-N in 1990s. Labour leader

Abdullah Qureshi pointed out the growing political influence of traders:

It is now the era of the trading class. In 1975, a trader of Peshawar came to me. He wanted some favour from the Deputy Commissioner and he came to know that I knew the D.C. So he came along in his car and took me to the Commissioner’s office and gave me the application. I told him to come in with me. He said, ‘no, you go-‘officeron se milna leaderon ka kam, Mein bahir kara hun. Ap kam kara lein’[Meeting with officers is the job of leaders. I will wait outside. You get the work done.] In the 1985 non-party elections this man was elected as an MPA. He is now a more active politician than the rest of us….45 Traders are now on the rise. Every gulli (street), every bazaar (shoping center), is now organized. Local people take a great interest in elections to their bazaar shopkeepers associations. These traders have ‘shutter power’. If a 2,000 worker factory is closed by workers in a rural area it has no effect. But say the shopkeepers of Qisa Khawani and Sadar Bazar close their shutters for two hours; it will have a much bigger effect. “A very big transformation has taken place ….I have been a great Nawaz Shariefhater, but objectively I have to admit that workers have been leaving the PPP and joining the PML Shopkeepers have led the movement. In every mohallah [neighbourhood] and every gulli (street) there are shopkeepers who have switched their support and are able to influence others to switch their support”46.

The economic and political influence of the traders and industrialists is increasing, but

their traditional antipathy towards the PPP is not decreasing. At a time when money is

playing a more important role in NWFP politics, the support of the commercial and

industrialist groups with the greatest access to ready cash has been important factors

in helping Nawaz Sharif to strengthen his position. Furthermore, the growing

commercial linkages between urban and rural areas also ensures the spreading of the

political urban and rural areas also ensures the spreading of the political views and

influence of urban traders into rural NWFP.

6.1.7 DECLINE OF ORGANISED LABOUR: Another important factor

contributing to the decline of the PPP and the rise of the PML (N) and its coalition

partner ANP during 1990s in urban NWFP is that while the social groups most

opposed to the PPP-such as the middle classes in general and the business community

in particular-are politically ascendant, the groups most supportive of the PPP- such as

industrial labour-are in political decline. The labour movement in NWFP has never

been particularly strong, but it did play an important role in bringing down the Ayub

government in 1969, and in supporting Bhutto in the 1970 elections47. As election

results in central NWFP revealed, that the PPP received some of it best results in1988

and 1993 in the wards with the highest concentrations of industrial labour. The most

important difference between 1970 and 1993 was that while the majority of industrial

workers still appeared to favour the PPP over the PML (N), PPP election campaigns

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no longer benefited from the organizational abilities of committed labour leaders and

cadres of organized workers. After partition Pakistan inherited a very weak labour

movement as most of the subcontinent’s industries and organized labour force were in

regions that became part of India. The fledgling labour movement that did exist was

entered in the Railways and was led by the Communist Party Leader, Mirza Ibrahim.

During the 1960’s the workers movement grew along with the rapid industrialization

that took place during Ayub’s government and was fuelled by the growing ideological

polarization in urban areas between the left and right. Many left-wing student activists

entered the labour movement after graduating from universities. Groups such as the

Mutahida Mazdoor Majlis-i-Amal, (MMMA) (United Worker’s Action Committee)

emerged and began to establish unions in factories and government institutions.

Discontent over working conditions and the perception that the benefits of rapid

industrial growth were not being shared with the workers, led labour unions to join

the student protests against Ayub’s government that eventually forced him to step

down in 1969.

Bhutto’s socialist slogans and promises to nationalize industries won him the

overwhelming support of organized labour during the 1970 election campaign. Even

Bashir Bakhtiar, head of the powerful WAPDA union, supported the PPP despite his

traditional position that the labour movement should remain aloof from politics and

focus on winning workers’ rights. However, following the PPP’s electoral victory, it

did not take long for many labour leaders to grow disillusioned with Bhutto. The 1972

police firing on workers demonstrating in Karachi and the dismissal of the left

oriented National Awami Party (NAP) governments in the Northwest Frontier

Province and Baluchistan and the ban on NAP in 1974 alienated many on the left.

Bhutto’s antipathy towards any independent pressure groups led him to adopt a carrot

and stick approach to take control of the labour movement. The stick was used to push

out the ideologically committed labour leaders whose primary loyalty was to the

workers, moment, while the carrot was employed to create a new group of leaders

who were politically dependent on Bhutto and the PPP. Increasingly, the labour

movement became weak and ineffectual as its ideologically committed leaders were

replaced by leaders on the government’s payroll. Despite the weakening of the labour

movement and the disaffection of many of its committed activists, the majority of

workers benefited from the pro-labour policies of the PPP government and remained

strong supporters of Mr. Bhutto. The PPP retained the votes of the majority of

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workers, but without its militant leadership cadres the labour movement played a

much less important role in the 1977 elections than it had in 1970. What was left of

the labour movement by the end of the Bhutto period virtually disappeared during the

Zia years. Abdullah Qureshi, leader of the Labour Party Pakistan, gave the following

reasons for the further decline of the labour movement48. (i) the suppression of the

labour movement and its leaders by General Ziaul Haq; (ii) the Gulf phenomenon,

whereby the active and dynamic sections of the working class left to make their

fortunes in the Gulf states; (iii) the introduction of new technologies that have reduced

the need for large numbers of workers in a factory; (iv) the collapse of the Soviet

Union and Communism and the resulting ideological vacuum on the left; (v) the

prosperity of the 1980’s that has contributed to the depoliticization of society; (vi) the

rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have absorbed many of the left-

leaning intellectuals and activists, but have ‘taken out their sting’ by giving them high

salaries and comfortable offices far removed from the masses; and (vii) the rise of

ethnic politics, which has divided labour unions along ethnic rather than class lines.

During the 1980’s labour politics experienced the same ‘localization’ that affected

nearly all political activity. Rather than involving themselves in national political

issues as they had in the 1960’s and 1970’s trade unions confined their activities to

their factories- struggling for salary increases, bonuses, and other privileges. As a

result they were sidelined room the mainstream of politics. In 1970, students and

labour unions played the most important role in organizing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s

campaign in urban NWFP49. By 1990s, these groups no longer played an effective or

important role in national and provincial politics, which contributed to the PPP’s poor

urban performance in 1990s.

6.1.8 ETHNIC/REGIONAL LEGACY OF ANP IN NWFP: The

Awami National Party draws its inspiration from the example and teachings of Khan

Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known as Baacha Khan. The Party is dedicated to the promotion

of democracy and freedom, the eradication of poverty, the protection of human rights,

the combating of extremism in all its forms and the creation of equal opportunities for

all citizens. It firmly believes in peace and non-violence as the best way to resolve all

issues. It is committed to securing for all the federating units of Pakistan their full

political, social and economic rights as equal partners in the federation and their fair

share in national progress and prosperity.50 In 1986, the National Democratic Party

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merged with several other progressive political and nationalist groups including

National Democratic Party, the Awami Tehrik of Sindhi nationalist Rasul Bux Palejo

and the Pakistan National Party of the Baluch Nationalist Mir Bux Bizenjo, to form

the Awami National Party. Abdul Wali Khan Son of the ‘Frontier Ghandi’ Abdul

Ghaffar Khan was elected its first president and Sindhi nationalist Rasul Bakh Palijo

was elected its secretary general. The party from 1986-1988 was a member of the

Movement for Restoration of Democracy. The party formed a coalition government

with the People's Party in NWFP and Islamabad after the 1988 election. This alliance

collapsed in 1989 after differences cropped up between the two parties. After the

election of Nawaz Sharief to power after the 1990 elections the ANP again formed a

coalition with former rivals Pakistan Muslim League. Ajmal Khan Khattak the

president of ANP from 1991-1999 held office in Nawaz Sharief’s federal cabinet as

minister for communication. This alliance proved longer lasting, surviving till 1998

when it collapsed over differences over Kalabagh Dam and renaming the province

Pakhtunkhwa.51

Table 6.2: ANP Electoral situation 1988-1997.Election National Assembly

NWFP Provincial Assembly seats won

National percentage of polled votes

1997 10 32 2.311993 03 18 1.67%1990 06 23 1.68%1988 02 10 2.80%

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)

6.1.9. POLITICS OF PASHTO IN NWFP: The Pakhtuns of North-West

Frontier Province (NWFP) had a strong sense of self identification and honour. The

‘Khudai Khidmatgar’ movement of Pakhtun nationalists had a popular rural base in

predominantly Pakhtuns areas especially in central districts of NWFP. It won both the

provincial elections of 1937 and 1946 and formed the provincial governments in

NWFP. The Pakhtun nationalists were not impressed by the Two Nation theory of All

India Muslim League and resisted against their inclusion in Pakistan. They demanded

an autonomous Pakhtun state in 1947. Their demand was not entertained and they

boycotted the referendum. The Pakhtuns Party Khudai Khidmatgar tried to persuade

Lord Mountbatten, the then governor general of India, to include a third option in the

referendum: a right to opt for Pakhtunistan, a state for Khudai Khidmatgar, next to the

options to join either Pakistan or India. However, Muslim League successfully

mobilised the masses in favour of Pakistan and ‘managed to get 99% of the polled

votes52’

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Pakhtunistan means ‘different things to different people, ranging from the demand

for the formation of a new state incorporating Pathan areas on both sides of the

Pakistan-Afghanistan border to mere change of nomenclature for the NWFP’53 .Soon

after the creation of Pakistan, the Pakhtuns stressed that by ‘Pakhtunistan’ they meant

regional autonomy of NWFP54. Afterwards, the temporal (April 1972- February 1973)

sharing of power with Pakhtun’s under the tripartite accord pursued Pakhtun

nationalists to abandon the Pakhtunistan issue. (In the general elections of 1970 the

Pakistan Peoples Party of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto got victory in the Punjab and Sindh.

Jamiat-ul-ulmai Islam (JUI) and National Awami Party (NAP) – the representative of

Pakhtun and Baloch nationalists – were the leading parties in NWFP and Baluchistan.

The three leading parties entered into the tripartite accord and decided to respect the

mandate of each party in its respective jurisdiction.).Abdul Ghaffar Khan – who

previously demanded a separate homeland for Pakhtuns – declared, ‘Our demand for

Pakhtunistan has been fulfilled’55 . The politics of accommodation – the resultant of

tripartite accord – were broken down soon. The central government intervened into

the minority provinces. Islamabad dismissed the NAP (National Awami Party)

government in Baluchistan. The coalition government of NWFP resigned as a protest

against the dismissal of Baluchistan government. The central government banned the

NAP alleging that it had been working against the integrity of the country. The

Baloch waged a war against the dissolution of provincial government and Pakhtuns

pursued ban on NAP by challenging the decision in Supreme Court. Accordingly, the

Pakhtun nationalist feelings resurfaced once again. On a question whether he was, ‘a

Muslim, a Pakistani or a Pakhtun first’, Wali Khan claimed that he was, “a six

thousands years old Pakhtun, a thousand years old Muslim and 27 years old

Pakistani”56 . Meanwhile, the gradual migration of Pakhtuns into Karachi and urban

centres of Punjab resulted in their ‘dominance in privately owned transport sector’

and larger share in employment. They acquired the share in the Pakistani power-

structure and the ‘primary source of incorporation remained the army’57. The majority

of Pakhtun soldiers and officials whom got jobs belong to the areas that had

traditionally been ‘stronghold of the Pakhtunistan movement’58. This incorporation

and accommodation of the Pakhtuns in the power-structure resulted in the decline of

the Pakhtunistan movement. This decline led to the argument that ‘Pakhtun

Movement had died down’59. Conversely, evidence suggests that all the way through

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Pakhtun Nationalist Party (ANP) has been successful to attain a considerable electoral

support in Pakhtun areas60.

6.1.10 RELIGIOUS LEGACY IN NWFP: ESTABLISHMENT OF

CONSERVATISM IN NWFP: Religion is a strong motivational force in the

electoral politics of NWFP. Maddaris and Mosques are the key centres during

election campaigns in NWFP. Religion in politics is deeply rooted in the historical

roots of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor General of Pakistan,

envisioned Pakistan as a democratic state upholding representative governance,

constitutionalism, civil and political rights and equal citizenship for all. They

maintained that such a polity would derive its ethical inspirations from Islam.61

However, Jinnah’s vision could not be fully converted into viable institutions and

processes. The political track record is marked by discontinuities, periodic

constitutional breakdown, military rule, absence of fair and free elections after regular

intervals, a selective enforcement of the rule of law and a poor tradition of

accountability of rulers. Pakistan experimented with two interim constitutions (1947,

1972) and three regular constitutions (1965, 1962, and 1973). The current constitution

(1973) was thoroughly revised by the military governments in 1985 and 2002. This

was in addition to four phases of direct military rule when the constitution was either

abrogated or suspended. The military-dominated power elite consciously discouraged

the development of autonomous political and societal activity and engaged in

constitutional and political engineering to entrench themselves in power. Several

factors explain state’s failure to evolve viable participatory political institutions and

processes.62 A major contributory factor is the inability of the major political interests

to evolve a consensus on the relationship between Religion and the state and society

in operational terms and the rapid rise of religious orthodoxy, fundamentalism and

militancy since the early 1980s against the backdrop of Pakistan’s active involvement

with the Afghan resistance to the presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan

(December 1979 to February 1989) and the subsequent development. The Islamised

politics, Afghan crises and military mullah alliance affected the electoral politics in

NWFP. All these factors contributed the establishment of conservative class in NWFP

that supported religious parties in elections. The rise of religious fundamentalism,

extremism and militancy (i.e. the jihad movement) in the 1980s and the subsequent

years, constitutes a major obstacle to governmental efforts to promote socio-cultural

pluralism and create viable participatory political institutions and processes. The

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democratic prospects have suffered mainly due to the emphasis on literalist and

fundamentalist interpretation of state religion, threat or use of violence by various

extremist and fundamentalist groups for pursuing religious based partisan political

agenda and religious-sectarian violence in their base camp of NWFP. These trends

increased socio-cultural intolerance and reduced the space for the autonomous

functioning of civilian institutions and process and stifled consensus building on the

operational norms of the polity through dialogue and accommodation. Religious

extremism and militancy flourished in NWFP mainly with the blessings of the

military regimes which used these groups to deflect participatory pressures and to

seek legitimacy because they did not always insist on participatory governance and

civilian supremacy. Most of them were willing to support any government that

allowed them to pursue their partisan religious agenda. These religious groups also

served the foreign policy agendas. At times, some civilian governments also appeased

them to win over their support to pressure their political adversaries. Maulana Fazal-

ur-Rehman, the leader of JUI-F and JI are still representing religious groups from

NWFP who had strong affiliation with establishment.63 Consequently, the rising tide

of Islamic extremism and militancy undermined the prospects of democracy. Islamic

groups and leaders can be divided into three broad categories for this study. First,

several Islamic political parties function like other political parties, engaging in

political mobilization, contesting elections and working towards assumption of

power. 64 Second, Islamic seminaries 65 pre-date the establishment of Pakistan.

However, these proliferated in NWFP during the last three decades. As institutions of

Islamic learning, Islamic seminaries inculcate extremely conservative and orthodox

Islamic orientations among their students who often develop a narrow religious

worldview and question the modern notions of state and participatory governance.

There are several Islamic groups who are not directly engaged in politics but pursue

literalist and fundamentalist Islamic perspective on societal and state issues. Like

Islamic seminaries they are critical of modern state system and participatory

governance as being contrary to the basis tenets of Islam. They talk of return to the

“ideal Islamic order” as it existed in the earliest period of Islam. A large number of

Islamic seminaries are formally linked with Islamic parties and make their students

available for street agitation. Similarly, some seminaries have linkages with the

militant groups involved in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir and help

their militant agenda. They also provided volunteers to the militant Islamic groups,

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especially those fighting in Afghanistan. Some of Islamic seminaries in NWFP and

Baluchistan would send a large number of their students to Afghanistan to fight along

with the Taliban against the northern alliance during 1996-2001. Third, a number of

militant Islamic groups surfaced with reference to Afghan resistance to Soviet

military intervention in Afghanistan. These groups were patronized by Pakistani

establishment, the U.S. and several conservative Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) collaborated with the U.S. intelligence

agency, CIA, for training and equipping these groups so that these fought effectively

against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. After the exit of the Soviet troops from

Afghanistan, the U.S. withdrew its support to these militant groups which continued

to function in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some of them devoted their attention to the

insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. Pakistan’s ISI continued to support them

because their active involvement in Indian-administered Kashmir served Pakistan’s

foreign policy agenda. Some of them extended their support to Islamic causes

elsewhere. Their involvement in Pakistan’s domestic affairs is limited mainly to

mobilizing support for their external agenda. Some militant organizations use their

organizational skills to propagate their perspective on Islam and periodically use

violence against those who subscribe to other perspectives on Islam. This causes

Islamic-sectarian violence which escalated as the militant groups gained strength. As

religious hardliners, these militants do not subscribe to the modern notion of

governance and political management. They advocate “jihad’ (holy war) in pursuance

of Islamic causes any where in the world and aspire to establish a truly Islamic order

as articulated by them.

Islamic parties and groups falling in the first category maintain a favourable

disposition towards the electoral process and an elected parliament. They view them

as instruments for securing power which they plan to use for implementation of an

Islamic order as articulated by them. For them, democracy is not an ideal but has

instrumental value to the extent it facilitates the implementation of their religio-

political agenda. If they come to the conclusion that they cannot win or share power

through the electoral process, they may have a greater tendency to resort to extra

constitutional means to pursue their Islamic agendas. Most groups and organizations,

especially the militants, falling in the second and third categories reject the modern

notions of participatory governance, the electoral process, assemblies and the existing

legal and judicial system. Rather than offering a detailed alternative Islamic political

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framework, they question the legitimacy of the modern notions of governance and

democracy and highlight the abstract Islamic principles or the narratives of the earliest

period of Islamic history as the foundations of a model Islamic state.66 However, they

hardly agree on the ways and means to interpret these principles and historical

narratives to build institutions and processes. They question each other’s

interpretation. Their denominational differences and mutual conflicts often produce

violence.

Religious political parties have been functioning in Pakistan since the early days of

independence, although the roots of some of them can be traced back to the pre-

independence period. Some of the leading Islamic political parties like the JI, Jamiat-

i-Ulema-e-Hind, the Khaksar Movement, and Majlis-i-Ahrar, opposed the political

movement for the establishment of Pakistan as a separate Muslim state. In the post

independence period some of these parties re-organized themselves and a couple of

new Islamic parties entered the political domain. They argued for making Pakistan an

Islamic state. The dominant political elite did not question the notion of Islamic state

but they diverged from the Islamic parties on its details. There is a lack consensus on

the institutions and processes to be set up under the rubric of Islamic state. Most

conservative and orthodox elements want to establish a puritanical Islamic state with

an emphasis on the punitive, regulative and extractive role of the Islamic state. Others

emphasize the egalitarian norms of Islam and underline the principles of equality,

socio-economic justice and the modern notions of the state, civil and political rights

and participatory governance.67 To them, Islam is a source of guidance and provides

the ethical foundations of the polity rather than a specific political structure or a legal

code for the modern times. 68 While subscribing to a democratic political order,

Pakistan’s various constitutions created a linkage between the Pakistani state and

Islam. However, these constitutions rejected the literalist and classical notion of an

Islamic state which the Islamic parties often advocated.

The Religious parties expressed varying degrees of reservations on the Islamic nature

of the constitutions and they continued the advocacy of their notions of Islamic state.

Three major factors helped their activism. First, Islam was closely associated with the

establishment of Pakistan. The Muslim League invoked Islam in the pre-

independence period as a mark of special Muslim identity and an instrument for

political mobilization. Second, the Muslim League leadership was convinced that it

could combine the modern democracy with the principles and teachings of Islam. This

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sentiment was reflected in the passing of the Objectives’ Resolution in March 1949.

Third, the fragmentation of the PML soon after the attainment of independence and

the unnecessary delay in constitution-making caused much political confusion. This

enabled the Islamic religious parties to insist on establishing an Islamic political and

economic order. However, they played a limited role in the power management during

1947-1970 and performed poorly in the elections. Islamic parties gained importance

and won-over some state patronage during the military government of General A.M.

Yahya Khan (1969-1971). It relied on some of these parties, especially the Jamaat-i-

Islami (JI), to build support for the federal government in East Pakistan. The military

government also adopted the oft-repeated slogan of the Islamic parties that the

ideology of Pakistan is the ideology of Islam in order to counter Awami League’s Six-

point political agenda in East Pakistan that aimed at converting Pakistan into a loose

federation that granted unprecedented autonomy to the provinces. The civilian

government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (December 1971 to July 1977) and the Islamic

political parties viewed each other as adversaries. The former adopted some Islamic

measures to take the wind out of the sails of the Islamic parties. However, these

measures proved counter-productive, adversely affecting the liberal credentials of the

Bhutto government and strengthening the Islamic parties, which spearheaded the anti

Bhutto agitation in March-July 1977. The steps undertaken by the Bhutto government

included the designation of Islam as a state religion in the 1973 Constitution.69 All

Pakistani constitutions assign a special place to Islam in the constitutional

arrangements but Islam was never declared a state religion until 1973. In 1974, the

constitution was amended to accommodate the demand of the Islamic parties and

groups to include the definition of a Muslim in the constitution, thereby declaring the

Ahmadya Muslim sect as a non-Muslim community. In 1977, the Bhutto government

imposed a complete ban on alcohol. These steps emboldened the Islamic parties that

were hostile to the Bhutto regime. Islamic political parties made the maximum gains

during the 11 years of General Zia-ul-Haq’s military government (1977-1988).

General Zia-ul-Haq’s domestic power imperatives as well as the international and

regional situation contributed to strengthening their role. General Zia-ul-Haq’s

military government pampered the Islamic parties and encouraged the orthodox and

fundamental groups to enter politics in order to undercut the support of his political

adversaries. The JI either openly supported General Zia-ul-Haq or maintained a

cooperative interaction with him until the withdrawal of martial law in 1985. His

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regime’s policy of encouraging religious orthodoxy encouraged all types of Islamic

parties and groups to get actively involved in the political fray. Several new religious-

sectarian and ethnic groups also surfaced, fragmenting the political process. The

regional and international context for rise of Islamic fundamentalism and militancy

was provided by the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979.

Pakistan willingly joined with the United States and some conservative Arab states to

strengthen Afghan-Islamic resistance to Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan.

These countries provided financial resources, weapons and training to the Islamic

groups fighting against the Soviet troops. The international financial and diplomatic

support strengthened the Zia regime in the domestic Pakistani context which

increased support to Islamic political parties, seminaries and other orthodox Islamic

groups. It gave special attention to strengthening militant Afghan and Pakistani

groups that were actively engaged in resistance to the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

This boosted religious orthodoxy in Pakistan and many such groups took advantage of

the Afghan war by getting hold of funds and weapons for advancing their partisan

agendas. General Zia-ul-Haq thus tilted the political balance in favour of orthodox

and conservative interpretation of Islamic polity. He made several administrative and

legal changes reflecting the puritanical Islamic principles as advocated by the

orthodox and conservative groups.70 The government made more funds available to

Islamic seminaries, causing their proliferation. It also encouraged political and social

discourse on conservative and orthodox lines and patronized Islamic militancy. These

developments strengthened Islamic extremist forces and increased religious and

cultural intolerance in Pakistan. Some of these groups functioned as religious and

cultural vigilantes and used or threatened to use coercion against those who did not

accept their vision of Islam. The official circles and the religious groups engaged in

massive propaganda against participatory governance, constitutionalism, and the rule

of law, equal citizenship and civil and political rights describing these as western

implants in Pakistan.71 Commenting on the rise of Islamic extremism and militancy in

Pakistan, President General Pervez Musharraf wrote in his autobiography: “The entire

decade of the 1980s saw religious extremism rise, encouraged by Zia…. Actually, Zia,

for his own personal and political reasons, embraced the hard-line religious lobby as

his constituency throughout Pakistan and well beyond, to the exclusion of the huge

majority of moderate Pakistanis. Fighting the infidel soviet Army became a holy

cause to the jihadis, and countless Pakistani men signed up.”72 After the withdrawal of

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Soviet groups from Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to support some Afghan

resistance leaders and their Pakistan supporters to install a pro-Pakistan government

in Kabul; the Taliban were the last such group that emerged in Afghanistan in 1994

and enjoyed Pakistan’s support. Pakistan also encouraged some Afghan war linked

groups and some new Pakistani militant Islamic groups to launch military operations

in Indian-administered Kashmir in support of the insurgency that ignited there in

1989-90. Despite the pro-Islam tilt in the disposition of the Pakistani state, the Islamic

parties did not perform well in the elections during the post-Zia period, 1988-1999.

Two clear trends emerged from the elections in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997. First,

Pakistan began to move in the direction of a two major political parties system. The

Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Group (PML-

N) emerged as the leading political parties but none could establish a government

without winning over some smaller parties. All governments during 1988-1999 were

coalitions between one major party (either the PPP or the PML-N) and some regional

and smaller parties. Second the Islamic parties performed poorly in these elections

except when they entered into an electoral alliance with the mainstream political

parties. Some Islamic parties shared power at the federal level in 1990 as part of the

political coalition, Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), dominated by the PML-N. However,

the partnership with the mainstream political party diluted the role of the Islamic

parties. In 1993, the JI launched a massive electoral campaign under the banner of

Pakistan Islamic Front in a bid to show that it could alone perform in the elections.

The election results were a major disappointment for the JI. The Islamic parties

performed exceptionally well in the October 2002 general elections organized by the

military government of General Pervez Musharraf. This can be attributed to the

peculiar political and ethnic context in NWFP and the Pakhtun areas in Baluchistan in

the aftermath of the U.S. military action in Afghanistan and the overthrow of the

Taliban government in Kabul. The Islamic parties also benefited from the policy of

the military government of General Pervez Musharraf to encourage them emerge as a

political force to counterbalance the mainstream political parties that openly

challenged his rule.

A major setback to democracy in Pakistan was the growth of religious extremism and

militancy and sectarian movements from the early 1980s. Pakistani state encouraged

these trends by extending support to the hard line Afghan-Islamic resistance,

especially the pro-Pakistan groups. The close relationship between the Pakistani

242

establishment, especially its intelligence agencies, and the extremist and militant

religious groups persisted after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The

Pakistani military authorities launched these militant Islamic groups in Indian-

administered Kashmir to bolster the on-going insurgency. The continued state

patronage of Islamic militancy boosted their fortune in NWFP and encouraged more

and more people to join such organizations. This caused the proliferation of militant

groups in NWFP.73 Pakistan based Islamic militancy is sectarian in character. Most

activists belong to Whabi/Slalafi, Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith traditions of Islam,

known for their hard line on socio-political and cultural issues. The Bralvis or the

Shia elements played a nominal role in militancy in Afghanistan and Kashmir.74 They

learnt to use violent means, especially modern weapons, mainly in Afghanistan and

Kashmir. Some of them took to violence to pursue their religious agenda within

Pakistan and attacked and killed those who did not share their perspective on Islam.

This stepped up Islamic-sectarian violence in Pakistan.75 Several Islamic-sectarian

organizations engaged in targeted killing of the prominent personalities of the

opposite sect.76 This type of violence was also caused by factionalism in the militant

Islamic movement. Each major group produced breakaway factions that functioned

independent of the parent organization and often resorted to violence against other

sects in order to make their presence felt.77 A good number of Islamic-sectarian

activists got military training in Afghanistan during the Taliban days or they took

refuge there when Pakistan’s security authorities decided to round them up.

Cultural and religious intolerance also increased as Islamic seminaries proliferated in

the 1980s and the 1990s. Most seminaries had sectarian-denominational character and

inculcated a narrow straight-jacketed worldview among the students marked by

religious extremism and intolerance towards other perspectives on Islam. Some of

these young people joined militant Islamic groups that were fighting in Kashmir and

Afghanistan. In other words, Islamic seminaries created a state of mind among their

students, making them vulnerable to the appeals for fighting a “holy war” to foil

“Christian-Jewish conspiracies” against Islam. Some of these young people were

recruited by Islamic-sectarian organization to pursue their sectarian agenda within

Pakistan. The rise of religious extremism and militancy undermined social and

cultural pluralism, political tolerance and respect for dissent. Such a political and

cultural environment is not conducive to growth of democracy, constitutionalism, and

the rule of law and gender equality. Most extremist and militant Islamic groups had

243

no faith in modern democratic institutions and processes and often described them as

western implants in Muslim societies which must be totally discarded. However, the

Islamic political parties were committed to democracy to the extent its processes

enabled them to win the elections so that they could argue that they possessed a

popular mandate to create a fundamentalist Islamic political order.

6.2.1 PARTY POLITICS AT MICRO LEVEL IN NWFP: For detailed

analysis of Party politics at micro level, the electoral politics in NWFP, it is divided

into four electoral parts i.e. central, southern, northern and north eastern (Hazara) as

mentioned in the chapter ‘Electoral Geography of NWFP’. In this section the

researcher will examine the election results area-wise, and then to explain them in

historical and sociological terms.

6.2.1.1 CENTRAL NWFP: Central NWFP consists of five districts, Peshawar,

Mardan, Charsada, Swabi and Nowshera.78 First electoral contest on the basis of one

man one vote was started in 1970s elections. Electoral politics during 1990s is to be

compared with 1970 elections for in-depth analysis. In 1970s elections central NWFP

consisted of two districts i.e. Peshawar and Mardan and had seven National Assembly

seats (4 for Peshawar and 3 for Mardan). In the Peshawar National Assembly

constituencies, NAP won two of the four seats with the total winning votes of 6922.

The remaining two seats were won by QML and JUI amounting to 60782, which is

less than the winning votes of NAP. To examine the total vote polled by winning and

non-winning candidates of each party, it will be realised that NAP polled more votes

than the other two winning parties. NAP got 91244 votes, QML got 21900 votes and

JUI won 58648 votes.79 In the Provincial elections, Peshawar was divided into eight

PA constituencies during 1970 elections. In these elections, NAP won seven out of

the eight seats with total winning votes of 112826. The remaining seats went to PPP.80

In 1970 National Assembly elections Mardan was divided into three National

Assembly constituencies. Of these three seats, NAP, QML, and PPP won one each.

By calculating in total the votes of the winning and non winning candidates of each

party, it will be revealed that NAP obtained more votes than any other party.

For purpose of the Provincial Assembly elections, Mardan was divided into five

constituencies (if we exclude Mardan-cum Hazara-PF). Of these five seats, NAP won

four, and PPP won one. In these elections the total vote polled by all NAP candidates

is more than that of any other party. NAP got 72529 votes, QML got 44789 votes,

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PPP had 47482 votes and JUI got 29307 votes. 81 Even if researcher includes Mardan-

cum Hazara constituency (where QML) won NAP still obtained the largest number of

votes as shown below82:-

NAP QML PPP JUI

72529 44789 47482 29307

352 13043 1902 1867

72881 57829 49384 31174 Total

During 1988-1999 the National Assembly results in Central NWFP are shown in 6.3.

Table 6.3: Party politics in central NWFP (National Assembly): Total Seats-8Elections

% votes/ seats won

ANP% votes/ seats

won

PPP/PDA% votes/ seats

won

PML-N/IJI% votes/ seats

won

Religious% votes/ seats

won

Others% votes/ seats

won

Independents% votes/ no. of

candidates/ seats won1988 40.55/2 21.41/4 12.60/0 19.83/1 0.17 3.68/10/11990 37.47/6 33.24/0 18.41/1 3.59/1 0.65 4.43/13/01993 39.52/2 36.10/5 0/0 19.77/1 0.38 2.52/9/01997 51.70/8 16.76/0 6.30/0 8.11/0 8.50 5.54/16/0

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

Above table indicates the strength of ANP in central districts, where it has huge

popularity and large number of vote bank. The second one in PPP and third one is

religious vote bank. During 1988-1999, the provincial assembly results from central

NWFP are as:

Table 6.4: Party politics in central NWFP (Provincial Assembly) constituencies=27Elections ANP

% votes/ seats won

PPP/PDA% votes/ seats won

PML-N/IJI% votes/ seats won

Religious% votes/ seats won

Others% votes/ seats won

Independents% votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won

1988 28.60/10 28.96/14 18.22/2 7.16 1.43 14.16/71/11990 34.61/18 23.57/2 13.63/6 9.98 0.42 16.71/93/11993 29.54/16 26.69/10 7.19/0 9.64 6.38 19.26/81/11997 39.82/21 18.64/1 14.74/4 0.15 8.72 15.59/69/1Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: GovernmentPrinting Press, 1997).Above data also revealed that ANP has got good votes from Central NWFP in

provincial assembly elections. The second largest political party is PDA/PPP and the

third is PML-N/IJI. For more brief analysis, party politics is to be analysed at district

level.

PESHAWAR: The provincial capital of the Frontier Province, Peshawar is bounded

by tribal agencies on its three borders. It is the closest Pakistani city to Afghanistan,

serving as a key route for trade and smuggling. At the height of the Afghan conflict it

supported three million Afghan refugees.83 Having an estimated population of nearly

three million, most of its inhabitants are professionals in contrast to its neighbouring

agrarian districts.Peshawar city is famous for its Qissa Khawani Bazaar, Balahisar

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Fort and Chowk Yadgaar, the latter built to commemorate the martyrs of the 1857

War of Independence against the British. A sizeable Christian population lives in the

heart of the region that is synonymous with Muslim fundamentalism to the outside

world. A small Sikh population also resides in the city.84

During 1988-1999, Peshawar had three National Assembly seats and eight provincial

assembly seats.85 The politics of the district has been dominated by the Bilours, long

affiliated with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s brand of Pakhtun nationalism. The other

prominent political family is that of Arbabs. At the pinnacle of their political power,

Arbab Mohammad Jehangir Khan served as the provincial chief minister. Arbab Niaz

is another prominent politician. Major clans are Afridi, Khattak, Orakzai, Wazir,

Masud, and Punjabi.

Table 6.5: Party position in Peshawar (National Assembly)Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997

NA (3) PPP(3) ANP(3) PPP(2), ANP(1) ANP(3)PA (8) PPP(5), ANP (2),

IND(1)IJI(2), PDA(1), ANP(5)

PPP(3), ANP(4) ANP(7), PML-N(1)

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: GovernmentPrinting Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.Above table shows that the main contest in Peshawar district is between regional

party ANP and mainstream parties PPP/PDA and IJI/PML-N. Key development

variables which to some extent moulded the shape of electoral politics are its

population which is 2.86 million, urban and rural literacy rates are 54.09% and

29.19% respectively. 68.62% population have water facilities and 94.99% have

electricity facility. In employment sector, 25% are professional and 27% have

elementary occupation. 47.4% have housing facilitites including kacha and semi

pakka houses.86 Key political players during 1990s are Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Syed

Zafar Ali Shah, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, Arbab Mohammad Jahnagir Khan,

Khan Bahadur Khan, Arbab Mohammad Zahir, Arbab Saadullah Khan, Bashir

Ahmad Bilour, Haji Mohammad Adeel, Sardar Ali Khan, Syed Ali Shah, Qamar

Abbas, Haji Mohammad Javed, Arbab Mohammad Jehangir Khalil, Arbab Saif-ur-

Rehman, Muhammad Azam, Abdur Rehman Khan, Arbab Muhammad Ayub Jan,

Iftikhar Ahmad Khan, Hidayatullah Khan, Haji Abdul Raziq and Muhammad Iqbal

Khan.87

MARDAN: Mardan, located in the Peshawar Valley, was made a district in 1937

with the bifurcation of the district of Peshawar. Swabi and Charsadda districts were

later carved out of Mardan in the 1980s. Mardan city is the second largest in NWFP

246

after Peshawar having six Provincial Assembly constituencies and two National

Assembly constituencies. Its history dates back to the Gandhara kingdom, the remains

of which are scattered around the district, including the Takht-e-Bahi Buddhist

monastery. The famous sons of Mardan include the late Mir Afzal Khan, former chief

minister of NWFP (1990-1993) and owner of Premier Sugar Mills. The main source

of employment in the district is agriculture and the main crops are Virginia tobacco,

sugarcane and wheat. Major clans are Yusafzai, Khattak and Mohmand. 88 Total

polupation of Mardan is 1.96 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 48.27% and

37.31% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 55.11% and electricity is 83.53%. In

employment sector, agriculture ratio is 34% and service ratio is 29%. Housing ratio is

50.28% includingkacha and pakka89.

Key politicians in this district during 1990s were Haji Nasim-ur-Rehman, Khanzada

Khan, Mohammad Azam Khan, Haji Mohammad Yaqoob, Khan Mir Afzal Khan,

Haji Mohammad Ahmad, Syed Manzoor Hussain, Khawaja Mohammad Khan, Mir

Afzal Khan, Abdus Samad Khan, Muhammad Sufaid Khan, Ghanidad Khan, Raza

Khan, Abdul Subhan, Abdul Akbar Khan, Munawar Khan, Muhammad Iqbal Khan,

Taufiq Muhammad Khan, Iftikhar Mohmand, Said Rehman Mohmand, Rahim Dad

Khan, Mohammad Akram Khan, Haji Bahadur Khan.90

Table 6.6: Party position in Mardan:Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) JUI-F(1), PPP(1) ANP(1), IJI(1) PPP(2) ANP(2)PA (6) PPP(5), ANP(1) IJI(3), ANP(3) ANP(3), PPP(3) PML-N(2), ANP(4)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: GovernmentPrinting Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.Above table shows that Mardan District has four clusters of votes, i.e. ethnic (ANP)

cluster, Religious cluster, PPP and PML-N cluster.

CHARSADA: With a history that dates back to the ancient Gandhara civilisation,

Charsadda is known for being the home district to many of the well-known politicians

of NWFP. However, its most famous son has been Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known

among his disciples as Bachha Khan. The leading exponent of non-violence in this

part of what was then undivided India, Khan was known as the Frontier Gandhi91. The

district is divided into three tehsils: Charsadda, Tangi and Shabqadar with five

provincial assembly constituencies and one nationalism assembly constituency. It is

also the hometown of former Chief Minister of NWFP Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao.

Major clans are Mohammadzai, Gigani and Mohmand.

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Total polupation of Mardan is 1.35 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 39.82%

and 28.97% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 16.25% and electricity is 90.53%.

In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 35.1% and service ratio is 9.3%. Housing

ratio is 71.72% includingkacha and pakka92.

Key political players during 1990s in this District were Asfandyar Wali, Molvi

Hassan Jan, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Mohammad Hashim Khan, Begum Nasim Wali

Khan, Iftikhar Ahmad Khan, Javed Iqbal Khan, Rehmatullah Khan, Amir Khisro

Khan, Asfandyar Wali Khan, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao and Muhammad Bashir

Khan93.

Table 6.7: Party position in Charsada.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) ANP(1) JUI-F(1) ANP(1) ANP(1)PA (5) ANP(3), PPP(2) ANP(4), PDA(1) ANP(4), PPP(1) ANP(5)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

NOWSHERA: Nowshera is famous for cantonments, a military college and a

Pakistan Air Force academy. Nowshera is surely military-dominated area and mapped

out as district in 1988. It is the Frontier’s link to the Punjab and is at the heart of the

debate about the Kalabagh Dam. The other most known landmark in the district is

Darul Uloom Haqqania at Akora Khattak, the seminary from where most of the senior

Taliban leadership, including Mullah Umar, received their religious education.

Nowshera is represented by one National Assembly seat and four provincial assembly

seats during 1990s. Major Clans are Khattak, Durrani, Awan, Khakakhel and

Malyar.94 Total polupation of Nowshera is 1.16 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio

is 55.64% and 37.59% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 30.40% and electricity is

90.50%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 21.8% and service ratio is 33.6%.

Housing ratio is 32.31% includingkacha and pakka95.

Key political players in this District during 1990s were Wali Mohammad Khan,

Naseerullah Baber, Ajmal Khan Khattak, Mian Muzaffar Shah, Mian Iftikhar Hussain,

Iqbal Hussain Khattak, Tariq Hamid, Pervez Khan Khattak, Haji Wali Muhammad,

Syed Inayat Ali Shah, Mian Muzafar Shah and Jan Mohammad Khattak96.

Table 6.8: Party’s position during 1988-1997 in Nowshera.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) PPP(1) ANP(1) PPP(1) ANP(1)PA (4) IJI(1),PPP(1), NP(2) ANP(4) ANP(1), PPP(3) ANP(4)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

248

SWABI: Swabi was separated from Mardan and made a district in July 1988. This

area has a rich history dating back to the ancient kingdom of Gandhara and such

archaeological sites can be found at numerous places. This district also has an

important connection with education as Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan, the founder

of Islamia College, Peshawar, was from Swabi. The district is home to the Ghulam

Ishaq Khan Institute for Science and Technology at Topi, former Communist leader

Abdul Khaliq Khan and senior bureaucrat Roedad Khan. Swabi is also famous for its

white marble. The world’s largest earth-filled dam, Tarbela Dam, is also located in

this district. Swabi is represented by one National Assembly seat and four provincial

assembly seats during 1990s. Major clans are Yusafzai, Razar, Rajar, and utman,

Jadoon, Gadoon and Khattak.97

Total polupation of Swabi is 1.96 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 43.35%

and 34.45% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 69.18% and electricity is 83.38%.

In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 52.6% and service ratio is 21%. Housing

ratio is 30.57% includingkacha and pakka98. Key politicians in Swabi during 1990s

were Haji Rehmanullah, Qazi Maulana Fazlullah, Abdul Khaliq Khan, Saleem Khan

Advocate, Haji Zain Mohammad Khan, Ghafoor Khan Jadoon, Inayatullah Khan,

Muhammad Shuaib, Asmatullah Khan, Awal Sher Khan, Abdul Majid and Sher

Zaman Khan99.

Table 6.9: Party’s position during 1988-1997Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) ANP(1) ANP(1) IJM(1) ANP(1)PA (4) ANP(2), IJI(1),

PPP(1)ANP(2), IJI(1), IND(1)

ANP(4), IND(1) ANP(2), PML-N(1), IND(1)

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: GovernmentPrinting Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.SOCIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CENTRAL NWFP: The

majority of inhabitants of central NWFP belong to the Yusufzai tribe. It will be noted

that the Yousafzais are Afghanis i.e. decedents from the Bannu Afghana tribe, which

was Jewish tribe that many years ago migrated from the Middle East and settled in

Afghanistan. The other Pathan tribes in NWFP are known by the general name of

Kirlani and include the waziri, Masood, Afridi, Khattak, Bangash, Marwat, Niazi and

Ghalzai tribes. The Kirlanis do not call themselves Afghani since they claim descents

from Alexander the Great. Most Kirlanis claim that the Afghani language was a

bastardised from the Arabic. The chiefs of the Yousafzai tribe were the Hotis. When,

inspite of Pathan resistance, the British Government got established, the Hoti loyalty

249

was purchased by a present of 40000 acres areas. The Yusafzais thenceforth ceased

paying allegiance to the Hotis, and transferred it to Ghaffar Khan, whose opposition

to the Rowlett Bill of 1919 and after his association with Gandhi’s non-cooperation

movement. Ghaffar Khan opposed the Muslim League, and in the elections of 1937

formed a Congress government in the Frontier. The Muslim League did not win in the

Frontier till the referendum of 1947. In those elections, the main opposition to the

Muslim League came from Mardan and Charsada where Muslim League was badly

defeated. The main support for Pakistan came from Hazara and southern districts of

NWFP. In the 1970 elections, the main opposition was directed against Qayyum Khan

of QML, mainly because of the Babara firing incident of 1952 and because Qayyum

was a Kashmiri and not a Pakhtun. Inspite of this opposition to QML however, it will

be noted that QML obtained the second highest total vote in Mardan National

Assembly elections. The main NAP slogan during the elections was “Pakhtunkhwa”

(a pure pathan culture), and main demands were (a) a government of Pathans, (b).

restitution of rights taken away by Punjabis and (c). revenge for the cruelty

perpetrated by Punjabis.The ANP the rename of NAP, politics during 1988-1999 was

also the renaming of NWFP, Kalabagh Dam issue and provincial autonomy. In the

Peshawar constituencies it has been seen that urban and rural areas are in opposite

camps. Urban areas inclined towards PPP and PML-N, while the rural areas went to

ANP. It seems that urban and rural political aspirations were divergent. In Mardan on

the other hand, urban politics seems to have had a small effect on rural areas near the

cities. The most striking feature in the 1988-1997, NWFP elections is the fact that the

areas of ANP and JUI strength, at least for purposes of the NA elections, are the same:

Namely, the over-half constituencies. In these areas ANP enjoyed a fixed and non-

fluctuating support, unlike JUI.

6.2.2 NORTH EASTERN NWFP (HAZARA)

Hazara belt of NWFP consists of five districts including Abbottabad, Haripur,

Mansehra, Battagram and Kohistan.100 During 1970s elections, the strongest party

was the QML. Probably accepting it as a QML stronghold, the NAP contested only

two out of four National Assembly constituencies, and only seven out of the nine

provincial assembly constituencies in Hazara. 101 In the four National Assembly

constituencies, QML and JUI won two seats each. QML got 78051 votes while JUI

250

got 40103 votes. During 1988-1999, the National Assembly results from North

Eastern NWFP (Hazara) are as:

Table 6.10: National Assembly results 1988-1997: Constituencies=7Elections ANP

% votes/ seats won

PPP/PDA% votes/ seats won

PML-N/IJI% votes/ seats won

Religious% votes/ seats won

Others% votes/ seats won

Independents% votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won

1988 0.82 14.46 30.23/4 5.34 9.77 36.72/14/31990 0 7.50 43.40/4 8.53/2 1.90 37.02/26/11993 0 3.45 34.906 13.61 19.73 6.50/9/11997 0 2.34 58.26/6 7.05 5.12 24.28/13/1Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

In 1970s elections, the provincial assembly elections, only QML contested in all nine

constituencies. NAP contested in seven PPP in six and JUI in four constituencies. In

these elections, QML won six seats, JUI won two seats, and NAP won one seat. QML

got 90867 votes, JUI got 40103 votes and NAP won 1935 votes. During 1988-1999,

the party position for provincial assembly from Hazara is as:

Table 6.11: Provincial assembly results from Hazara: (Total Seats=19)Elections ANP

% votes/ seats won

PPP/PDA% votes/ seats won

PML-N/IJI% votes/ seats won

Religious% votes/ seats won

Others% votes/ seats won

Independents% votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won

1988 1.71 11.67 27.93/10 5.28/1 3.39 48.24/76/91990 2.07/1 5.62 37.81/8 8.07/1 0.48 44.18/78/91993 2.56/1 5.41/1 41.02/10 13.11 6.49/1 30.00/67/51997 3.64/1 1.09 48.77/14 1.60 4.25 38.17/93/4Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

ABBOTTABAD: Lying on the fringes of the Himalayas, Abbottabad in its 1,967

square kilometres wide expanse is famous for its Galiyat, the summer escape of the

well-heeled and the hoi polloi alike. Abbottabad city itself is a popular hill station.

Originally part of the Hazara division, of which the city served as the headquarters.

Abbottabad, the name derived from its first Deputy Commissioner James Abbott, was

given district status in 1981. It has two National Assembly and five provincial

assembly seats. Major clans are Dhund, Karlal, Awan, Tanoli, Syed, Jadoon and

Gujjars.102 Total polupation of Abbottabad is 1.05 million. Urban and rural literacy

ratio is 76.63% and 51.58% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 78.30% and

electricity is 74.98%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 19.1% and service

ratio is 71.2%. Housing ratio is 32.97% including kacha and pakka103. Prominent

names from the district include Amanullah Khan Jadoon, Air Marshal Asghar Khan,

Sardar Mehtab Khan, Fareed M. Jadoon, Sardar Haji Gul Khitab Khan, Javed Iqbal

Abbassi, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharief, Sardar Haiderzaman, Ali Afzal Khan

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Jadoon, Shamroz Khan Jadoon, Sardar Gulzaman, Sardar Ghulam Nabi, Haji Munsif

Khan, Khurshid Azam Khan and Muhammad Ayub Khan.104

Table 6.12: Party’s position in Abbottabad during 1988-1997.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (2) IJI1, IND1 IJI2 PML-N2 PML-N2PA (5) IJI3, IND2 IJI4, IND1 PML-N4, PPP1 PML-N5Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

MANSEHRA: Home to the most spectacular mountain ranges, Lake Saiful Muluk

and Karakoram Highway, Mansehra has had a flourishing tourism industry. Most sites,

however, stay closed due to inhospitable weather for a good part of the year. The area

consists of two NA and six provincial assembly seats. Major clans are Gujjar, Swati,

Tanoli, Awan and Syed.105 In Mansehra the age old domination of the Gujjars by the

Syeds and Swatis, who represented less than a third of the population but owned more

than two third of the land and forestry resources, seems to be on the wane. Two

factors are central to this transition. First, as the economy expanded and

communications improved, the Gujjars population has had opportunities to work in

cities within the country and also abroad. The remittances coming back have made the

households less in awe of landowners and dependent on the Syed/ Swaties for

livelihoods. Second, repeated elections and populist ideology, starting with the PPP

populism of the 1970, have taught them that their numbers represent strength and they

have been more willing over time to exercise this political muscle to ensure service

delivery to them as constituents.106

This final goal of getting service delivery interacts in a complex fashion with the

politics based on quom (caste such as Gujjars, Syed, Swati or Awan, biradri, clan or

sub clan. In fact, an electoral alliance could take the form of jamba that is the

formation of a group or faction for that particular election. It is possible that the

faction could cut across biradri lines in a particular election. Pragmatism and

expediency were in evidence among the candidates, given the change in the political

reality.107 The quantitative findings were not as rich as the qualitative analysis. None

the less, we quantitatively established that education, land owned and being a village

notable like member of committees like the Zakat or Khidmat committee or being a

Numbardar significantly enhanced the probability of becoming a candidate. This is

not surprising because success depends on more intangible factors like ambition, drive,

and the ability to build social and political capital and use these to deliver to

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constituents or to get ahead despite not doing so via intimidation and other

methods.108

Total polupation of Mansehra is 1.15 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 68.49%

and 34.40% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 26.74% and electricity is 49.10%.

In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 44.2% and service ratio is 9.9%. Housing

ratio is 36.54% includingkacha and pakka109.

Key political players in Mansehra during 1990s were Sardar Mohammad Yusaf, Syed

Qasim Shah, Nawabzada Salauddin Saeed, Zar Gul Khan, Muhammad Hanif Khan,

Syed Ghulam Nabi Shah, Tariq Khan Swati, Asif Akbar Swati, Baber Nasim Khan,

Mian Wali-ur-Rehman, Akhtar Hussain Shah, Shazada Muhammad Gustasip khan,

Abdus Sattar Khan, Ashiq Raza Swati, Waji-uz-zaman, Haq Nawaz Khan, Faiz

Mohammad Khan Sakhi Mohammad Tanoli, Habib-ur-Rehman Tanoli, Zareen Gul

Khan and Muhammad Afsar Khan110.

Table 6.13: Party’s position in Mansehra during 1988-1997.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (2) IND(2) IND(1), IJI(1) PML-N(2) PML-N(2)PA (6) IND(4), IJI(2) IJI(1), IND(5) PML-N(4), IND(2) PML-N(5), ANP(1)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

BATTAGRAM: Battagram obtained the status of district in July 1993 when it was

upgraded from a Tehsil and separated from Mansehra District. Before Battagram

obtained the status of district, it was a Tehsil of the Mansehra District. It has

geographical borders with Kohistan District, the Tribal Area of Kala Dhaka (Black

Mountain of Hazara), Shangla District and Malakand Division. The district consists of

two sub-divisions or Tehsils, containing one National Assembly constituency and two

Provincial Assembly constituencies.111 Tribal divisions rather than political ideals

determine the voting pattern in Battagram. Each clan seems to cultivate new enemies

during national and provincial elections. A majority of the candidates during 1990s do

not have any affiliation with a political grouping. Among the clans residing in the

constituency, the Swatis are quite strong. Other clans are Akhundkhel and

Medakhel.112 Total polupation of Battagram is 2.89 million. Literacy ratio is 18.37%.

In utilities water ratio is 30.84% and electricity is 42.35%. In employment sector,

agriculture ratio is 60% and service ratio is 21%. Housing ratio is 34.59%

includingkacha and pakka113. Key political players in Battagram during 1990s were

Mohammad Nawaz Khan, Alam Zeb Khan, Muhammad Ayub Khan and Fateh

Mohammad Khan.

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Table 6.14: Table showing the Party’s position in Battagram during 1988-1997:Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) IJI(1) JUI-F(1) PML-N(1) PML-N(1)PA (2) IJI(2) IND(1), ANP(1) ANP(1), PML-J(1) IND(1), PML-N(1)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

KOHISTAN: Kohistan is one of the largest yet most sparsely populated districts in

the NWFP. The district has been victim to a host of invasions and is therefore mottled

with ethnic diversity. It sits on the border of two aggressive tectonic plates, the

Eurasian plate and the Indian subcontinent, making it susceptible to earthquakes. The

area comprises three provincial seats and one National Assembly seat. Kohistan faces

many a dilemma with the lowest literacy and employment rates in the NWFP, and

severe paucity of utilities. Major clans living in Kohistan are Manzar, Money, Koka,

Mankekhel and Darramkhel.114 The elected representatives have failed to do much in

the way of improving the lot of people of this impoverished district. Agricultural

development is not promising at all, with only one crop growing in high altitudes and

two in lower areas. Cultivation of crops such as barley and rice has almost ceased.115

Total polupation of Khistan is 4.69 million. Literacy ratio is 11.08%. In utilities water

ratio is 19.90% and electricity is 2.90%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is

83% and service ratio is 6.3%. Housing ratio is 44.17% includingkacha and pakka116.

Key politicians in Kohistan during 1990s were Aurangzeb, Malik Said Ahmad, Molvi

Mohammad Amin, Maulana Abdul Baqi, Sarangzeb, Mian Noor, Malik Moon,

Aurangzeb, Mohammad Taus Khan, Muhammad Asmatullah, Qadam Khan, Farmas

Khan, Sikandar Malik and Umar Khan.117

Table 6.15: Party’s position in Kohistan District.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) IJI1 JUI-F1 IND1 IND1PA (3) IND2, IJI1 IND2, JUI-F1 PML-N1, IND2,

MDM1IND3

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

Haripur: Haripur is one of NWFP’s most developed and literate district. The district

borders Islamabad, with the Khanpur Dam here supplying water to the federal capital.

The famous Jaulian Buddhist monastery overlooking Taxila is also located here. It is

also home to Hattar, NWFP’s largest industrial area, and the Telephone Industry of

Pakistan. Haripur has produced Field Marshal Ayub Khan (Pakistan’s first military

ruler) and his son Gohar Ayub (a regular member of the National Assembly and also

its former speaker). Haripur District has one National Assembly and three Provincial

Assembly seats. During 1990s the electoral contest seems between the families of

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Ayub Khan and Sikandar Zaman. Major clans in this district are Tareen, Dilzak,

Tarkheli, Mishwani, Ghakkar, Jadoon, Tanooli and Turk.118

Total polupation of Haripur is 8.59 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 69.70%

and 51.39% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 32.18% and electricity is 76.33%.

In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 29.4% and service ratio is 13.3%. Housing

ratio is 15.21% including kacha and pakka119. Key political players in Haripur District

during 1990s were Gohar Ayub, Raja Sikanadar Zaman, Umar Asghar Khan, Syed

Mohammad Sabir Shah and Akhtar Nawaz Khan.120

Table 6.16: Party’s Position in Haripur district during 1988-1997:Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) - - PML-N(1) PML-N(1)PA IND(1), IJI(1) IJI(2) PML-N(1), IND(1) PML-N(2)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

SOCIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL EXPLANATIONS: The greatest

popularity of Muslim League lies mainly in the fact that when Qayyum was the Chief

Minister of NWFP in the beginning of 1950s, he introduced revolutionary revenue

reforms. He introduced the twenty years tenure during which time no tenant could be

ejected without valid reason. In Hazara all land is in the hands of the big Jagirdars,

who previously could eject tenants on little or no pretext. In 1970s Qayyum’s

popularity rested on the fact that that he was not only domiciled in Hazara but

considered himself a Hazarite. The fact that he was not a Pathan did not carry much

weight with the electorate also because Hazara is the residence of mixed races, and

not all of them are Pathans. This fact is itself encouraged a less parochial view of

Politics. During 1988-1997, Nawaz issued tickets to influential candidates who had

strong biradari affiliations. On the basis of biradari affiliations Nawaz candidates win

the elections from Hazara.

6.2.3 NORTHERN NWFP: Northern NWFP consists of seven Districts, i.e. Swat,

Malakand, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Shangla, Buner and Chitral. In 1970s Northern

NWFP comprised of three major areas, i.e. Swat, Dir and Chitral. During 1988-1997

electoral contests, IJI/PML-N got majority seats both from National and Provincial

Assembly. The second largest parties were PPP and ANP and third one was

Religious Party/Alliance.121 During 1988-1999, the situation for National Assembly

from northern NWFP is shown in Table 6.27.

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Table 6.17: National Assembly’s situation in Northern NWFP: Constituencies=6Elections ANP

% votes/ seats won

PPP/PDA% votes/ seats won

PML-N/IJI% votes/ seats won

Religious% votes/ seats won

Others% votes/ seats won

Independents% votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won

1988 14.26/4 34.37 31.15/2 10.56 0.32 6.96/91990 1.69 30.45/3 37.79/2 14.46 0.30 15.39/13/11993 4.73/1 18.46 19.94/1 36.57/2 8.80/1 9.34/91997 12.95/1 21.71 35.16/5 4.65 11.60 10.48/13Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: GovernmentPrinting Press, 1997).During 1988-1999, the party positions for provincial assembly and vote percentage

from Northern NWFP is given in table 6.28.

Table 6.18: Provincial Assembly’s situation in Northern NWFP: Constituencies=18Elections ANP

% votes/ seats won

PPP/PDA% votes/ seats won

PML-N/IJI% votes/ seats won

Religious% votes/ seats won

Others% votes/ seats won

Independents% votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won

1988 15.17/1 24.90/7 28.18/9 5.43 1.03 23.07/48/11990 7.70/2 25.57/2 33.34/12 5.76 0.94 25.26/61/21993 15.26/3 31.38/10 19.55/1 20.60/4 0.75 10.9/371997 20.63/5 18.10/3 29.91/8 2.69 12.44 13.27/43/2Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

SWAT: Swat was a princely state till its dissolution in 1969. Swat’s Malam Jabba ski

resort was once popular with foreign tourists as were the Gandharan civilisation sites.

The capital of Swat is Saidu Sharief, but the main town in the Swat valley is Mingora.

Major clans are Yusafzai Pathan, Mian, Kohistani, Gujjar and Piracha122. Swat was

represented by two National Assembly and five Provincial Assembly seats. In 1970s

elections, Swat was divided into two National Assembly constituencies and four

Provincial Assembly constituencies. In both elections, QML emerged as the strongest

party. The National Assembly results are as follows:-

NA QML NAP JUI PPP

Swat 1 18761 16885 6881 18481

Swat 2 35538 2376 21549 9530

Total 54299 40161 28430 28011

Two things stand out in the National Assembly elections of Swat. Firstly, QML won

both seats. Secondly if we consider the total vote polled, QML emerges as the

strongest party followed by NAP. In the Provincial Assembly elections, QML won

two seats; NAP won one and an independent one seat. The total vote polled infavour

of QML were 48291votes, NAP had 39406 votes, JUI 8607 votes and PPP won 13833

votes. It will be obvious that the QML lead over NAP was equal to 8885 votes. If the

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researcher adds to the above result, the result of the Swat-cum Dir constituency

(where QML won), than QML had 52419 votes, NAP got 42019 votes, JUI got 10610

votes and PPP had 16703 votes. It will be obvious that by combining the result, the

QML lead increases to 10400. Furthermore, JUI fared worse than PPP in the

provincial elections because JUI contested only in three of the four PA constituencies.

Total polupation of Swat is 1.75 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 48.05% and

25.53% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 33.23% and electricity is 67.84%. In

employment sector, agriculture ratio is 48.16% and service ratio is 17%. Housing

ratio is 23.27% including kacha and pakka123. Key political players in Swat District

during 1990s were Mohammad Karim, Nadar Khan, Sarzamin Khan, Muhammad

Karim, Bakht Jehan, Said Rahim, Malik Fida Mohammad Khan, Wajid Ali Khan, Dr.

Mehbub-ur-Rehman, Mian Gul Asfandyar Amir Zeb, Syed Mohammad Ali Shah

Bacha Lala, Qaimoos Khan, Syed Allauddin, Feteh Mohammad Khan, Dost

Mohammad Khan, Malik Hazrat Ali, Mohammad Didar Khan, Badi-uz-Zaman,

Muhammad Zahir Shah Khan and Pir Muhammad Khan.124

Table 6.19: Party’s Position in Swat District:Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (2) PPP(2) IJI(1), PDA(1) PML-N(1),

PKQP(1)PML-N(2)

PA (5) PPP(2), IJI(2), IND(1)

IJI(2), PDA(2), ANP(1)

PPP(3), ANP(1), PML-N(1)

PML-N(4), ANP(1)

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS: Swatis are not all Yusafzai, and there are a

sizeable number of Kohistani Pathans whose language is not Pushto and who reside

mainly in the hills. Before Yahya changed the political status of Swat, Nawab Wali of

Swat was not only popular with the people but was also the spiritual leader of Swat.

Furthermore, he was related to Pir Saidu Sharief who had a large following. The fact

that Prince Aurangzeb Khan, son of the Wali, won the election from Swat, indicates

the value of his father’s popularity and of his religious connections. It was possible

that because Prince Mian Gul Aurangzeb contested on a PML-N ticket in 1993 and

1997125 and other PML-N candidates derived some of the benefit. Yet another reason

for the ML success could be the mixed racial complexion of the population (Kohistani

and Yusufzai).

DIR: Dir is included in the northern part of NWFP having two districts, Upper Dir

and Lower Dir. In 1970s Elections Dir was divided into one National Assembly

constituency and two Provincial Assembly constituencies. In the National Assembly

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constituency JI got 14187 votes, JUI got 5882 votes, PPP obtained 6250 votes, QML

won 12728 votes and NAP share in voting was 8681.126 In 1970s, the Provincial

Assembly elections, the results were as follows:-

JI JUI PPP QML NAP

Dir 1 5404 1498 1638 1235 3687

Dir 2 5249 1478 2023 6249 1545

Total 10653 2976 3661 7484 5232

It will be noted that in the NA elections, Jamaat-e-Islami polled the largest number of

votes followed by QML. In the PA elections, JI got one seat and QML the other. Here

too JI polled the highest number of votes followed by QML.

UPPER DIR: Upper Dir is famous for its high mountain peaks and waterfalls.

Timergara is the district headquarters, with the majority of its people from the

Yousufzai tribe. The district’s transportation and communication facilities are in need

of repair, with only one motor road connecting it with Chitral. The population of the

region is mostly rural and scattered over more than 1,200 villages situated in the

plains of Adenzai and Munda. The annual rainfall in Upper Dir is over 1,000 mm.

Much of the area is covered by forest. The main crops grown here are maize and

potato. The expansion and diversification of agriculture has raised living standards to

some extent over the years. Major clans are Kohistani, Yusafzai, Kalani, Roghani and

Swati. 127 During 1990s Upper Dir consist of two Provincial and one National

Assembly seat.

Total polupation of Upper Dir is 7.59 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 41.05%

and 20.34% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 71.67% and electricity is 38.46%.

In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 61.8% and service ratio is 16%. Housing

ratio is 15.28% includingkacha and pakka128 . Key Political players in Upper Dir

during 1990s were Inayat Khan, Sahibzada Fatehullah, Najmuddin, Haji Amanullah

Khan, Sherzada, Hamidullah, Inayatul Haq, Muhammad Anwar and Abdul Hamid

Khan.129

Table 6.20: Party’s Position in Upper Dir District:Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) IJI(1) PDA(1) PIF(1) PML-N(1)PA (2) IJI(2) IJI(1), IND(1) PPP(1), PIF(1) PPP(2)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

LOWER DIR: Lower Dir is situated in the north-west of NWFP, bounded by a long

chain of the Koh-e-Hindu Kush. This is a hilly and green area and has many tourism

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attracting valleys. From an agricultural point of view, the most important and

productive valleys are the Talash, Jandool and Maidan. The only famous river –

Panjkora – sweeps through the bases of all the mountains in a zigzag line and irrigates

the cultivable areas of the district. Forestry and agriculture are an important source of

production and economy for a large segment of the population. It has four Provincial

Assembly constituencies. Major clans are Mashwani, Sadat, Shakhel, Mastkhel,

Shinwari, Yusafzai and Umerkhel.130 Total polupation of Lower Dir is 1 million.

Urban and rural literacy ratio is 43.51% and 28.97% respectively. In utilities water

ratio is 16.25% and electricity is 72.07%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is

43.2% and service ratio is 25%. Housing ratio is 21.65% includingkacha and pakka131.

Key Political Players in Lower Dir during 1990s were Mohammad Hassan Khan,

Muhammad Yaqub Khan, Syed Sardar Alam Bacha, Bahadar Khan, Mohammad Shah

Haroon, Behram Khan, Malik Jehnzeb, Muzzafar Khan, Zakirullah Khan, Bakht

Baidar, Mohammad Hashim Khan.

Table 6.21: Party’s Position in Lower Dir District:Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA - - - -PA (4) IJI(3), PPP(1) IJI(4) PIF(2), ANP(1),

PPP(1)PPP(1), ANP(1), PML-N(2)

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS: Dir was ruled by Nawab Shah Jehan who was a

cruel man and therefore not popular. Ayub Khan removed him and seated his son as

ruler of Dir. Subsequently Yahya Khan altered its political status and included it

under the government of NWFP. The people of Dir are mainly Yusafzai, but perhaps

because Dir was a princedom, they remained out of the mainstream of ANP influence

which might have eroded the control of the ruler. In Dir the religious factor played an

important part since the people are deeply religious.

CHITRAL: A landlocked northern district of the Frontier province, Chitral is cut off

from the rest of the country for four to five months during winter. In the intervening

period, its sole link is the whimsical PIA. The rugged terrain of the district has many

strategically important mountain passes. Inhabited chiefly by the Chitralis, it has some

Pakhtuns in the south but more importantly it is home to the Kalash people. Part of

the Hazara division, this former princely state’s inhabitants are deeply religious and

the area served as a base for the mujahideen during the Soviet occupation. It has one

National Assembly and one Provincial Assembly seat. Major clans are Adamzada,

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Arbabzada, and Fakir Miskeen. 132 In 1970s elections, Chitral was a composite

National Assembly seat of Chitral-cum Dir-cum Swat constituency. For purposes of

the Provincial elections, Chitral comprised the Provincial Assembly constituency.133

The results of National and Provincial Assembly elections are as follows:-

QML JUI PPP NAP INDNA 6418 5835 4302 3192 ---PA 5462 --- 1905 3106 5644Total 11880 5835 6207 6298 5644It will be noticed that whereas the QML won in the National Assembly elections, an

independent candidate, Qadir Nawaz, won in the Provincial Assembly elections.

By consider the total vote polled, it will be realised that the total vote polled by QML

is the largest and that by NAP the second largest.

Total polupation of Chitral is 4.08 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 56.65%

and 38.40% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 7.56% and electricity is 29.37%. In

employment sector, agriculture ratio is 25% and service ratio is 30%. Housing ratio is

67.12% including kacha and pakka134. Key Political Players in Chitral District during

the 1990s were Shazada Mohi-ud-Din, Maulana Abdur Rahim, Said Ahmad Khan,

Zain-ul-Abidin, Maulana Ghulam Mohammad and Muhammad Wali Khan.135

Table 6.22: Party’s Position in Chitral DistrictConstituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) PPP(1) IJI(1) PIF(1) PML-N(1)PA (1) PPP(1) IJI(1) PIF(1) PML-N(1)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION: Chitralis are not Pathans, and they have

unique language of their own. Some of them are Muslims and the others are kafir.

(Kafiristan is a part of Chitral). It was ruled by Mahtri Chitral (Mehtr means Nawab).

The factor of religion is also seen during 1990s. In 1993, Religious Alliance PIF won

both National and Provincial Assembly seats. It has been noticed from the above table

that Chitral had no space for ANP.

SHANGLA: The isolated district of Shangla with its beautiful valleys has the lowest

human development index in the entire province. This is unfortunate as the district is

rich in natural resources and has potential for hydel power generation even though

only one such project is underway at the moment. Agriculture provides the main

source of income for the inhabitants. Shangla has one National Assembly and Two

Provincial Assembly seats. Major clans are Afgan, Gujjar (Ajar), Syed, Mian and

Qureshi.136 Total polupation of Shangla is 1.99 million. Literacy ratio is 14.73%. In

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utilities water ratio is 41.59% and electricity is 15.22%. In employment sector,

agriculture ratio is 58% and service ratio is 23.1%. Housing ratio is 22.69% including

kacha and pakka137. Key political players in Shangla District during 1990s were

Abdul Mateen Khan, Pir Mohammad khan and Mohammad Zahir Shah Khan.

Table 6.23: Party position in Shangla District.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) IJI1 IND1 ANP1 ANP1PA (2) PPP1, IJI1 IJI2 ANP1, PPP1 PML-N1, IND1Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

MALAKAND: Malakand is a small district encompassing an area of 952 square

kilometers. Formerly known as Malakand Agency or Malakand Protected Area, it was

given the status of a district in 2001. Politically, no clear vote bank exists there for

any political party, be it the PPP or ANP.The Malakand Pass is an essential

communication link for the districts of Swat, Dir, Bajaur, Buner, Shangla and Chitral

along with other parts of the country. Chromite, iron, china clay and fuller’s earth are

mined here, with mineral extraction still an untapped resource for the economy. The

district was also affected by the recent wave of militancy in the Frontier province.138

In 1997, when this constituency fell within the NA-26 Malakand (Protected Area-

cum-Lower Dir) al-Haaj Mohammad Khan of the PMLN won this seat while

Mohammad Humayun Khan of the PPP garnered the second highest number of votes.

In the earlier election of 1993, the PPP-backed PDA’s Ahmed Hasan won the seat

while IJI’s Maulana Gauhar Rahman was the runner-up. In 1988, the seat was won by

PPP’s Mohammad Hanif Khan while the ANP’s Abdur Rahman Khan stood second.

In fact, this area has remained the monopoly of the PPP. During 1990s, this area

represented two Provincial and one National Assembly seat.139 Total polupation of

Malakand is 0.62 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 39.29% and 39.52%

respectively. In utilities water ratio is 52.38% and electricity is 82.02%. In

employment sector, agriculture ratio is 31% and service ratio is 33%. Housing ratio is

39.10% including kacha and pakka140. Key political players in this area during 1990s

were Al Haj Mohammad Khan, Muzaffar Khan, Ahmad Hassan, Hanif Khan, Nek

Alam Khan and Jehingir Khan.

Table 6.24: Party’s Position in Malakand.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) PPP(1) PDA(1) PDA(1) PML-N(1)PA (2) PPP(2) ANP(1), IJI(1) PPP(2) ANP(2)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

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BUNER: Part of the Malakand division till 2000, Buner is surrounded by high hills

densely covered by pine and other trees. This scenic district is also known for a

number of great saints. Though the majority of the district’s population is descended

from the Yousufzai tribes, Buner is also home to other ethnic groups as well as

religious minorities, including Sikhs and Hindus. Agriculture provides the main

source of livelihood and wheat, maize and tobacco are the main crops grown here. A

significant number of the younger generation works abroad. Unlike a number of its

neighbouring districts, Buner is known for its peaceful atmosphere. Before NA-28

was carved out in 2002, Buner was part of NA-23 Buner-cum-Shangla seat in 1997

and fell into NA-23 Buner-cum-Swat in 1993. And Mateen Khan had won the NA-23

seats in both 1993 and 1997. Buner has two Provincial and one National Assembly

seat. Major clans are Yusafzai, Mandar, Syed, Gujjar and Sikh.141 Total polupation of

Buner is 0.7 million. Literacy ratio is 22.62%. In utilities water ratio is 32.05% and

electricity is 51.15%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 72.7% and service

ratio is 8.4%. Housing ratio is 21.65% including kacha and pakka142. Key political

players in this District during 1990s were Fanoos Gujjar, Maulana Abul Rehman,

Mohammad Karim, Nadar Khan, Sarzamin Khan, Said Rahim, Abdur Rashid.

6.25: Party’s Position in Buner 1988-1997.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) IJI1 IND1 ANP1 ANP1PA (2) ANP1, IJI1 IJI1, PDA1 PPP1, ANP1 ANP2Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

6.2.4 SOUTHERN NWFP: Southern NWFP consists of Kohat, Bannu, DI.

Khan, Hangu, Karak, Lakki Marwat and Tank Districts. Southern NWFP is divided

into five National Assembly constituencies. IJI/PML-N and JUI-F (Religious Party)

had strong hold in southern NWFP during 1990s. The detailed breakup for the

National Assembly contests is given in following table. During 1888-1999, the

National Assembly situation is as:

Table 6.26: Party position on National Assembly seats (Constituencies=5)Elections ANP

% votes/ seats won

PPP/PDA% votes/ seats won

PML-N/IJI% votes/ seats won

Religious% votes/ seats won

Others% votes/ seats won

Independents% votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won

1988 5.84 4.49 32.03/2 36.15/3 3.24 16.40/261990 0 23.88/2 23.90/1 33.30/1 4.32 13.54/14/11993 0 3.45 34.90/3 31.71/2 2.76 25.61/231997 4.76/1 0 40.99/4 17.66 11.60 22.38/28

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

For Provincial Assembly southern NWFP is divided into sixteen constituencies.

Provincial Assembly results from the following table shows the heterogeneous nature

of southern part of NWFP. Following table shows the religious, ethnic, PPP and

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PML-N clusters of voters. During 1988-1999, the provincial election detail from

southern NWFP is as:

Table 6.27: Party’s position on Provincial Assembly seats : (Constituencies=16)Elections ANP

% votes/ seats won

PPP/PDA% votes/ seats won

PML-N/IJI% votes/ seats won

Religious% votes/ seats won

Others% votes/ seats won

Independents% votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won

1988 8.31/1 9.45/1 30.22/6 14.80/2 0.91 34.90/102/61990 4.87/2 5.16/2 26.29/7 0.07/1 0.09 46.43/74/41993 5.91/1 6.99/1 26.02/4 9.74/1 14.64/3 35.34/74/61997 2.31/3 28.61 10.41/6 7.38/1 12.49/2 36.40/104/4Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

KOHAT: Kohat is a district of southern NWFP and is famous for the traditional

Khattak dance; the area is home to the Bangash and Khattak tribes. Kohat city is a

military town, containing the main headquarters of the Signal corps in the army and

an air force base. It is also notorious for being the second busiest smuggling route

between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The district has been done proud by poet Ahmed

Faraz. Kohat represented three Provincial and one National Assembly seat. Major

clans are Bangash and Khattak.143 In 1970 elections Kohat comprise one National

Assembly constituency and three Provincial constituencies. In the National Assembly

elections, JUI won, with the second highest vote going to PMLC. (Convention

Muslim League). JUI got 35817 votes, PMLC got 15014 votes, QML had 14433 votes,

JI obtained 10563 votes and NAP got 10426 votes.144 In the Provincial Assembly

Elections, NAP, QML, JUI and PPP contested in all three constituencies, whereas

PMLC contested in only two. Of the three seats, JUI and PMLC won one each, and

the third seat went to an independent, Mohammad Aslam Khan Khattak.

Total polupation of Kohat is 7.74 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio was 67.02%

and 34.52% respectively. In utilities water ratio was 85.5% and electricity is 6.17%.

In employment sector, agriculture ratio was 60% and service ratio is 26.6%. Housing

ratio is 21.65% including kacha and pakka145. Key political players during 1990s were

Hidayatullah Khan, Nawabzada Mohabbat Ali Zafar, Syed Sanaullah Shah,

Mohammad Aurangzeb Khan, Saith Saifullah Shah Bangash, Syed Masud Kauser,

Iftikhar-ud-Din, Shad Mohammad Khan, Ghani-ur-Rehman, and Muhammad Farid

Muffakar.

Table 6.28: Party’s Position in Kohat:Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA IJI(1) PDA(1) PML-N(1) PML-N(1)PA JUI-F(1), IND(1),

PPP(1)IJI(1), PDA(1), ANP(1)

PML-J(1), ANP(1) PML-N(2), ANP(1)

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

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SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS: The Pathan residents in Kohat are in the

great majority Kirlani. They are simple, backward, religious and hospitable. These

Pathans are largely anti-ANP and anti-Afghan. Religious considerations were the

deciding factors in Kohat. For instance, in the National Assembly elections, Maulana

Nehmat-Ullah Khan won with the slogan of an Islamic constitution for Pakistan in

1970 elections. In 1970s Provincial Assembly elections, the PMLC candidate

Nawabzada Azmat Ali Kahn won because of his reputation as a very good man. Also

the Shias were not in sufficient number in this constituency to put up their own

candidate. In PF 25, JUI candidate, Maulana Habib Gul won also because in this

constituency, the majorities were Sunni. The Shias put up their own candidate who

lost. In PF 26 Aslam Khattak won because of personal popularity. During 1988-1997,

voting behaviour has changed due to development indicators and political

developments. During 1990s, IJI/PML-N and PPP were the major leading parties in

Kohat district.

BANNU: Bannu is mainly a rural district of southern NWFP, though its urban centres

are well-populated and date centuries back in history. The old city of Bannu is walled

and can be entered through one of its many gates. The land in the district is fertile and

known for producing high quality vegetables, fruits and spices. From 1988-1997,

Bannu was represented three Provincial and one National Assembly seat. Major

clans are Banochi, Wazir, Marwat, Bhittanai, Syed and Awan.146

In 1970 elections, Bannu was divided into one National Assembly constituency and

two Provincial Assembly constituencies. In the National Assembly elections JUI got

60511 votes, QML got 14896 votes, NAP had 5362 votes and PPP had 1891 votes.147

In the Provincial Assembly elections as in the National Assembly elections, JUI

candidates swept the polls. JUI got 34070 votes, QML had 18557 votes, NAP

obtained 4018 votes and PPP had 1904 votes.

Total polupation of Bannu is 8.93 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio was 60.47%

and 29.65% respectively. In utilities water ratio was 31.19% and electricity was

94.06%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio was 39% and service ratio was

23.7%. Housing ratio was 73.94% including kacha and pakka148. Key political players

during 1990s were Malik Nasir Khan, Syed Abbas Shah, Molvi Ali Akbar,

Mohammad Kabir Khan, Anwar Saifullah, Mr. Akram Khan Durrani, Attaullah Jan,

Baz Mohammad Khan, Naser Khan, Syed Munir Shah, Naqibullah, Syed Munir Shah,

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Anwar Kamal Khan, Khan Mashal Khan, Humayun Saifullah and Saleem

Saifullah.149

Table 6.29: Party position in Bannu District 1988-1999.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) JUI-F(1) JUI-F(1) PML-N(1) PML-N(1)PA (3) IJI(1), ANP(1),

IND(1)JUI-F(1), ANP(1), IJI(1)

PML-J(1), PML-N(1), IND(1)

JUI-F(1), ANP(1), IND(1)

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION: In Bannu, majorities of Pathans are Kirlani

and comprise of three main tribes, Banochi, Marwat and Wazir. The Bannu Pathans

are more backward, more religious, and more traditional compared to all the other

areas of NWFP. Bannu was previously the stronghold of QML candidate, Malik

Hamidullah Khan. The slogan of JUI candidate was “vote Hamidulla ko duo ge ho ya

Khuda-wan-t-Allah ko duo ge” (whether you vote for Hamidullah or Allah i.e. God).

A similar slogan was employed by another JUI candidate in PF 31 against the NAP

candidate Abdul Majeed. “Vote Abdul Majeed ko do ge ya Quran Majeed ko do ge”,

(whether you vote for Abdul Majeed or Quran Majeed i.e. holy book). On the basis of

these religious slogans the JUI candidates won from these constituencies. Above table

shows that JUI-F had strong hold in this district during 1990s. PML-N/IJI is second

largest party in this area from 1988-1997.

DI. KHAN: Dera Ismail Khan takes its name from Ismail Khan, a Baloch chief who

settled here after migrating from Sri Lanka in AD 1469. The present day city is

situated four miles away from Indus River. Its population is a mix of ethnic Baloch

and Pakhtuns, with a significant Urdu-speaking migrant population. D.I. Khan lies in

the Seraiki belt and is linked via roads to Bhakkar and Mianwali in the Punjab. It is

also connected to Afghanistan through the Gomal Pass. From 1988-1997, D.I. Khan

has two National Assembly seats, one of which (NA-25) it shares with Tank. DI Khan

represented four provincial and one National assembly seat. Major clans are Mootani

Pathan, Baluch, Rajput and Jat.150

In 1970 elections, D.I Khan was divided into one National Assembly constituency and

two provincial assembly constituencies. On National Assembly seats, JUI got 45978

votes, QML got 7416 votes, PPP got 33267 votes and NAP got 1372 votes.151

Although JUI won the National Assembly seat, yet it lost both provincial assembly

seats. The provincial assembly results were as follows:-

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Const: JUI PPP QML NAP MLC INDPF 27 7265 5001 4368 382 -- 9249PF 28 80151 9900 12905 904 13764 ---___Total 17416 14901 17273 1286 13764 9249It will be noted that in the above two constituencies and independent, Sardar Inayat

Ullah Khan, and an MLC candidate, Makhdoom Atta-ur-Rehman won. However, if

we consider the total vote polled, it will be seen that JUI polled the most votes. If to

the above total we combine the results of the e combined provincial assembly

constituency of DI khan-cum-Banu (PF 29), JUI still polls the largest number of votes.

This is obvious from the following:-

JUI PPP QML NAP MLC17416 14901 17273 1286 13764

PF29 12411 425 9495 6296 1425129827 15126 26768 7582 28015

Also, if we combine PF 29 with PF 27 and PF 28, than QML loses its position as the

second strongest party to MLC. Total polupation of DI. Khan is 0.11 million. Urban

and rural literacy ratio is 65.17% and 24.40% respectively. In utilities water ratio is

33.88% and electricity is 73.17%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 40% and

service ratio is 28%. Housing ratio is 78.24% including kacha and pakka152.

Key political players from this district during 1990s were Fazal Karim Khan Kundi,

Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, Umar Farooq Khan, Mussarat Shaheen, Abdul Halim

Khan Qasuria, Bin Yameen Khan, Abdul Khai Mufti Abdul Quddus, Fetehullah Khan,

Haji Sardar Inayatullah Khan, Sardar Umar Farooq Khan, Javed Akbar Khan,

Makhdumzada Murid Kazim Shah, Javed Akbar Khan, Habibullah Khan Kundi and

Amanullah Khan.153

Table 6.30: Party’sPosition in DI. Khan.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) JUI(1) PDA(1) IJM(1) PML-N(1)PA (4) JUI-F(1), IJI(2),

IND(1)PDA(1), IND(3) IJM(1), PPP(1),

IND(1), PML-N(1)PML-N(4)

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS: In D.I Khan, people are religious and many

madrassas are located here with the aid of Saudi Arabia under the supervision of

Deobandi cleric and JUI-F leader Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman. The majority are Sunnis.

The Kirlani Pathans are in majority. There are number of Baluchis and Punjabis

settlers. Religion played a major role in elections. In 1970s National Assembly

elections, Maulana Mufti Mehmood of JUI defeated Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of PPP. The

grounds for the JUI victory were religious. The slogan was “Socialism Kufar Hai”.

(Socialism is un-Islamic). In PF 28, CML candidate Makhdoom Atta-ur-Rehman, Pir

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of Shias, won largely because the Sunni vote got split between QML, CML, PPP, and

NAP. In PF 29, CML candidate Humayun Saif Ullah Khan won largely due to Pir

Sahib Zakori Sharif appeal to his followers to cast their vote in favour of Saifullah. In

PF 28, the independent candidate, Sardar Inayatullah Khan, Nawab of Gandapur, won

on the family and personality basis. From 1988-1997, religious Party JUI-F played a

dominant role in electoral politics of DI. Khan. A religious alliance IJM got one

National Assembly and one Provincial Assembly seats from DI. Khan as shown in

above mentioned table.

TANK: Tank is the district of southern NWFP and represented one Provincial

Assembly from 1988-1997. The primary profession of its Pakhtun population is

agriculture, with many of those who have moved to urban centres employed as menial

labour. Spread over 1,679 square kilometres, Tank shares its borders with Lakki

Marwat in the north, Mianwali in the east, Dera Ghazi Khan in the south and South

Waziristan Agency in the west. In fact, it also serves as the administrative

headquarters of the Waziristan-Mahsud territory. Tank city is inhabited by the Bittani,

Marwat, Jat, Kundi, Mahsud and Burki tribes. The last two are natives of the

neighbouring South Waziristan agency but have now settled here. 154

Table 6.31: Party’s Position in Tank:

Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA - - - -PA (1) IND(1) IJI(1) IND(1) IND(1)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

Total polupation of Tank was 3.23 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio was 43.14%

and 23.15% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 80.42% and electricity is 92.35%.

In employment sector, agriculture ratio was 49.2% and service ratio was 15.8%.

Housing ratio was 83.57% including kacha and pakka155. Key political players were

Habibullah Khan Kundi, Humayun Saifullah, Muhammad Iftikhar Zaffar, Nisar

Ahmad and Molvi Feteh Khan.156

HANGU: Hangu was represented by one Provincial Assembly seat during 1988-1997.

The district takes its name from the town of Hangu. The name Hangu may also

sometimes be applied to the Miranzai Valley which is partly within the district,

bordering the Samana Range. Hangu was separated from the district of Kohat in 1998.

Its area starts from a village named Khawaja Khizer (Jawzara) which is the boundary

between Kohat and Hangu Districts. Hingu is famous for its scenic hills, rivers and

ancient forts, and is under the sectarian influence of Sunni and Shia sects. It shares

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this characteristic with the adjoining Kurram Agency where similar sectarian clashes

prevail. Moreover, being at the receiving end of the ill effects of the long-running

strife in Afghanistan, Hangu is awash with drugs and arms. On the bright side, the

people of the district are known for their hard work and tough survival instincts. In

search of livelihood, they can be found in any corner of the country and beyond.

Major clans are Bangash, Orakzai, Khattak, Shinwari and Afridi.157

Total polupation of Hangu is 4.3 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 45.90% and

26.23% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 73.09% and electricity is 91.40%. In

employment sector, agriculture ratio is 46% and service ratio is 10.1%. Housing ratio

is 33.29% including kacha and pakka158. Key political players during 1990s were

Ghani-ur-Rehman, Malik Nawab Khan Bangash, Muhammad Farid Muffakkar, Syed

Haider Ali Shah.159

Table 6.32: Party’s Position in Hangu.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) IJI(1) PDA(1) PML-N(1) PML-N(1)PA (1) IND(1) IJI(1) PML-N(1) IND(1)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

KARAK: Karak is a district of the North-West Frontier Province having two

Provincial and one National Assembly seat. It is situated to the south of Kohat District

and on the north side of Bannu and Lakki Marwat districts on the main Indus

Highway between Peshawar and Karachi. Due to a rising literacy rate, Karak

produces the bulk of bureaucrats and generals coming from the Frontier. Because of

the alkaline soil and low rainfall, most of the land falling in this district is unsuitable

for cultivation. In the absence of agriculture people rely on the public and private

sectors for their livelihood. For this obvious reason the district is a hotbed for

recruitment for the military as well as other government departments. Major clans are

Barak sub tribe of Khattak. 160 Over the past few decades, Karak has been a

battleground for the ANP and politico-religious outfits. However, the individuals who

met with electoral success nearly always had the establishment’s blessings. The

district, which is mostly inhabited by the Khattak tribe, was previously under the

sway of the family of the late Nawabzada Ali Quli Khan, which loosened its grip after

the Nawabzada’s two sons developed differences with each other. Now his grandson

Ayub Khattak is in the arena to try to revive his family’s fortunes. Afrasiyab Khattak,

human rights campaigner and ANP leader, had also stood from this seat in the 1990

elections.

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Table 6.33: Party’s Position in Karak.Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997NA (1) JUID(1) IND(1) MDM(1) ANP(1)PA (2) IND(1), IJI(1) ANP(1), IJI(1) IND(2) IND(1), ANP(1)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party.

Total polupation of Karak is 0.5 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 53.84% and

41.07% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 43.04% and electricity is 81.20%. In

employment sector, agriculture ratio is 39% and service ratio is 21.8%. Housing ratio

is 46.38% including kacha and pakka161.Key political players from Karak during

1990s were Mr. Shamsur Rehman, Maulana Shaheed Ahmed, Aslam Khan Khattak,

Fareed Khan Toofan, Abdul Haleem Khattak, Sher Nawaz, Nawab Zada Mohsin Ali

Khan and Malik Zaffar Azam.162

6.3 CONCLUSIONS

There were different factors affecting party politics and their electoral strategies in

NWFP. These factors go a long way towards explaining the important reversal

whereby the PML-N coalition party ANP replaced the PPP in its former stronghold in

urban NWFP. No list, however, will comprehensively explain this complex issue.

Furthermore, as this role reversal proves, the political situation in urban NWFP is not

static. Political preferences and voting behaviour changes over time, and change is

more rapidly in urban than in rural areas. The urban voters, who voted for the PPP in

1988 and for the ANP in 1993 and 1997, may well change their voting behaviour once

again.

1 http://www.pildat.org retrieved on 13 March 20102 http://www.pildat.org retrieved on 13 March 20103 Wusatullah Khan, Pakistan Political Parties, BBC Report, 22 August 2009.4 See Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1994), pp. 157-695 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977 (New York St. Martin's Press, 1980) , pp. 221-396 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)7 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power (New York: Oxford University Press) pp. 520-18 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977, pp. 108-419 Zaman Khan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Faisalabad, 22 March 190510 Sharafat Ali Mubarak, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 14 September 200911 Talat Aslam, ‘The Year of Living Dangerously’, Herald, December 1989, pp. 31-4212 Haroon-ur-Rasheed, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 14 September 200613 http://www.khyber.org/people/pol/AftabAhmadKhanSherpao.shtml retrieved on 25 March 201014 For more details see Jones, ‘The Pakistan People’s Party’, pp. 399-43615 Name withheld, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, September 200516 Haq Nawaz, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 16 December 200617 Haneef Ramey, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 19 September 2005.

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18 Tariq Lateef, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 6 September 2005. 19 Afrasiyab Khattak, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 12 May 2006.20 Shahid Javed Burki, op.cit., p.21021 For historical account of local government, see Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma (Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House, 1954).22 Abdullah Qureshi, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Swat, 6 September 200623 Adnan Adil, Local Bodies polls, 1991’, Newsline (Karachi), January 1992.24 Cutting the Head off National Politics’, Daily The News, 30 September 1994, p. 1025 M.A. Niazi, ‘Local Bodies: The History’, The News on Friday, 30 September 1994, p. 1026 Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, Interview by Author, Lahore, 12 march 200527 Nawaz Sharief was known on occasion to Punjabi chauvinist sentiments during election speeches by raising such slogans as, ‘Jag Punjabi Jag, Tera pug nu lug geya dagh’ (Wake up Punjabi! Your turban has been stained)-an unsubtle allusion to the fact that Punjabis were being governed by a Sindhi Prime Minister.28 Niaz Pasha Jadoon, Interview by author, Tape recording, Abbottabad, 16 November 200729 Mohammad Waseem, ‘The Brave New Punjab’, The Herald (Karachi), February 1991, pp. 106-10930 S. Akbar Zaidi’s description of this ‘revolution’ ‘the Hidden Revolution’, Herald Election Special 1993, November-December 1993, pp. 54-5831 Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Pakistan Economy under Zia’, Pakistan Under the Military, p. 107.32 Ibid., p. 9033 Zaidi, ‘The Hidden revolution’, p. 56.34 I.A Rehman, Interview by Author, Tape recording, Lahore, 8 September 200535 Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Polls, 1990’, Gallup Political weather report, Special Issue (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), p. 43.36 Arbab Muhammad Jehangir Khan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, p.17 April 200537 Abdullah Qureshi, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 38 For the history of business community’s involvement in politics, see Stanley A. Kochanek, Interest Groups and Development: Business and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1983). See also Gustave F. Papanek, Pakistan’s development: Social Goals and Private incentives (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967)39 For a description of business versus government conflict, see M. Ziauddin, ‘Benazir vs the Bazaar’, The News, 21 October 1994; Syed Talat Hussain, ‘Politics of Business Strike’, The News, 26 March 1995; and the Special Report, ‘Government vs. Business Community’, The News on Friday, 31 March 1995.40 Riaz Arshad, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 14 January 200941 In contrast, it was more than year after coming to power in 1993 that Benazir Bhutto finally agreed to a meeting with the President of Pakistan’s premier business association, the Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (FPCCI)42 Rahimullah Yousafzai, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 14 September 200543 Akmal Hussain, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 25 September 200644 IA Rehman, interview by author, tape recording, Islamabad, Islamabad, 15 March 2006.45 Abdullah Qureshi, Interview by author, tape recording, Islamabad, 16 March 2006.46 Ibid.47 Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party, pp. 418-2448 Abdullah Qureshi, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad49 The Director of Lahore Goethe Institute, Dr. Mubarak Ali, pointed out that a similar localization or ‘depoliticisation’ took place with student politics:This is why during Zia’s period there was no student demonstration for democracy, no student demonstration for human rights, no demonstrations over national issues. There has been the process of de-politicization of students. The students are now confined to their campuses and there are rivalries between the different groups and they are fighting each other over local campus issues-they don’t like a teacher, they don’t like the Vice Chancellor, these are the issues they are fighting over. At this is why Zia-ul-Haq remained in power in peace, without any trouble.Mubarak Ali, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Lahore, 12 September 200550 www.anp.org.pk51 Raja Zulfikar, ‘ANP quits govt. after talks fail’, Daily Dawn (Karachi), 28 February 1998 52 Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and Pakistan Movement: The Growth of Muslim League in North West and North East India, 1937-1947 (London: Oxford University Press, 1988).53 Charles H.Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1987)

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54 Tahir Amin, Ethno-national movements of Pakistan: domestic and international factors (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1998)55 Ibid.56 Supreme Court judgment on dissolution of NAP, government of Pakistan, 1975, p. 2757 Omar Noman, The political Economy of Pakistan 1947-1985 (London: KPI Limited, 1988)58 Christophe Jaffrelot, Nationalism without a Nation: Pakistan Searching for it identity, Ed. Christophe Jaffrelot, Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation (New Dehli: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2002)59 Tahir Amin, Ethno-national movements of Pakistan: domestic and international factors.60 Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: space book Publishers, 1970)61 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the movement for the establishment of Pakistan and the first Governor-General, talked of combing the notions of modern state and democracy with Islamic principles. He said that Pakistan would be a democratic state but “with Islam as its underlying ethical principle.” See Sharif al Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981), pp.143-144.62 For a review of the factors and political conditions that undermined democracy in Pakistan, see Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.146-199; Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, 1994), pp. 88-131.63 Wusatullah Khan, BBC Urdu Service Broadcast Report, 20 April 2004.64 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Islamic Parties and Power Politics.” Dawn (Karachi), 14 August 2004.65 The data released by the government of Pakistan in October 2006 showed that up to 1,549,242 students were enrolled in 12,153 Islamic seminaries in Pakistan. In addition to 12,153 Islamic seminaries, 826 other seminaries did not provide information about their students. There could be some more Islamic seminaries functioning without the knowledge of the government. See Daily Times(Lahore), 7 October 2006.66 Some religious leaders and organizations openly talk of establishing a Caliphate system in the Muslim world on the lines of the Islamic Caliphate of the earliest period of Islamic history. They maintain that this would promote internal consolidation amongst the Muslims and enable them to withstand external pressures. An Islamic-militant organization, Hizb ut Tharir, banned in Pakistan and Great Britain, distribute pamphlets or sends e-mail messages in Pakistan in favour of establishing the Caliphate system in place of democracy in the Muslim world, including Pakistan.67 Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.160-184.68 For a discussion of the issue of relationship between Islam and the state, see Inamur Rehman, Public Opinion and Political Development in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 3-40.69 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973), Article 2.70 See Shaukat Ali, Pakistan: A Religio-Political Study (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, 1997), pp.195-285.71 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2005), pp.170-172.72 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p.275.73 For a detailed study of relationship between the Pakistan state, especially the Army, and the Islamic extremist and militant groups, see Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment, 2005), pp.159-197, 261-309; see also Amir Mir, The True Face of Jehadis (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004, pp.19-25. 74 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “The Terrorism Debate,” Daily Times, 31 July 200575 S.V.R. Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed), Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation? (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp.85-114.76 Mariam Abou Zahab, “The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan,” in Christofer Jaffrelot, op.cit. pp.115-128.77 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp178-216.78 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistic Division, 2000)79 Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)80 Ibid.

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81 Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)82 Ibid.83 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Peshawar (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)84 Ibid.85 Government of Pakistan, Report on General elections 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)86 Data Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)87 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)88 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Mardan (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)89

Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)90 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)91 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Charsada (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)92 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)93 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)94 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Nowshera (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)95 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)96 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).97 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Swabi (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)98 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)99 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)100 Government of Pakistan, NWFP Census Report, 1998 (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, 1998)101 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)102 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Abbottabad (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)103 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)104 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)105 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Mansehra (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)106 SDPI Research & News bulletin, Vol. 9, No-2, Islamabad: March-April-2002. P.2 107 Ibid.108 Ibid.

272

109 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)110 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)111 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Battagram (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)112 Ibid.113

Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)114 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Kohistan (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)115 Daily Shammal (Local News Paper of Hazara in Urdu), Abbottabad, 13 March 1996.116 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)117 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)118 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Haripur (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)119 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)120 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)121 See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)122 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Swat (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000), P. 8123 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)124 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)125 Ibid.126 Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)127 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Upper Dir (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)128 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)129 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)130 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Lower Dir (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)131 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)132 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Chitral (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)133 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)134 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)

273

135 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)136 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Shangla (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)137 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)138 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Malakand (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)139 See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)140 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)141 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Buner (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)142 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)143 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Kohat (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)144 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)145

Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)146 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Bannu (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)147 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)148 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)149 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)150 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of DI. Khan (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistic Division, 2000)151 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)152 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)153 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)154 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Tank (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)155

Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)156 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)157 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Hangu (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)158 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)159 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)160 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Karak (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000)

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161 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002)162 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997(Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)

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CHAPTER-7

URBAN-RURAL DIVISION OF ELECTORAL POLITICS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter shifts attention from the regional differences in voting behaviour to an

analysis of urban and rural differences. It shows how the rural landed elites have been

dominating NWFP politics ever since the colonial period. Despite the growing

economic clout of urban NWFP, it has generally been politically under-represented.

The fact that Pakistan has one of the highest urbanization rates in south Asia1,

however, ensures that the political importance of urban NWFP will grow over time.

The chapter analyzes constituency returns for the 1970, 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997

elections, and polling station returns for the 1988 to 1997 elections, and highlights the

changes that have taken place between the voting behaviour of urban and rural

NWFP. Rural and urban population of NWFP is shown in following table.

Table 7.1: Urban and Rural population in NWFP. (In Millions)

Year Total Urban Rural1951 4557 505 40521961 5731 759 49721972 8389 1196 71931981 11061 1666 93961988 17736 2994 14742

Source: Government of Pakistan, Hand book of Population and Housing Census NWFP (Islamabad: Population

Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2002)

The least urbanised province with only 17 percent of provincial population living in

urban areas was NWFP. The shares of urban population in total population of Punjab

and Balochistan were respectively 31 and 23 percent. In 1998 Sindh was the most

urbanised province with 49 percent of total provincial population living in urban

areas.2

7.2: URBAN-RURAL DIVISION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVESThe political divide between urban and rural NWFP is not a recent development.

Indeed, the structure of imperial rule established by the British in NWFP was

premised on this divide. The operating assumption of the colonial administrators who

followed ‘the NWFP tradition’ was that political stability was best ensured by

securing the support of the countryside rather than the cities, and therefore priority

should be given to co-opting and strengthening rural rather than urban elites.3 British

occupied Frontier region in 1849 after Anglo-Sikh War and had brought these regions

under the administrative setup of Punjab. In 9th November, 1901 Lord Curzon formed

the province of NWFP by separating five districts (Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Dera

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Ismail Khan and Bannu). These districts were put under the charge of a Deputy

Commissioner assisted by the Assistant Commissioners in the tehsils.4 The uprising

of 1857 in particular, when many of the landed elites of NWFP proved their loyalty

by helping to suppress the uprising, strengthened the belief of British administrators

that future stability lay in the support of rural NWFP. The British then set about

identifying ‘natural leaders’ and established then a loyal class of ‘hereditary landed

gentry’ by awarding pensions, titles, and land grants in the rural areas. In return, the

elites who benefited from this policy-mostly traditional tribe chieve, heads of

biradaris (clans), and sajjada nashins (hereditary custodians of Sufi sharines)-

maintained law and order and defended colonial interest in their respective

jurisdictions. To a remarkable degree, the symbiotic relationship between the

government and the rural landed elite continues to be one of the fundamental bases for

ruling NWFP.5

During the late nineteenth century a new urban political class began to emerge in

NWFP’s cities from the ranks of the small but growing middle classes. As the

Hindus/Sikhs dominated trade and commercial activities, the growth of a Muslim

middle class was fuelled primarily by the needs of the expanding colonial government

that required civil servants for its bureaucracy, lawyers for its courts, physicians for

its hospitals, engineers for its public works programmes, and teachers for its schools

and colleges. Along with the growth of this new class came the expectations of

greater political influence. However, there was little room for these upward mobile

urban professionals within the existing traditional hierarchical social and political

structures. It was their search for new social, cultural, and political identities and new

structure through which they could exert influence that led to the development of the

first modern Muslim organizations in the cities of NWFP.6 In 1906 the All India

Muslim League was founded and in 1912 its branch was established in NWFP which

provided the first distinctly political platform from which this new Muslim middle

class could articulate its demands. The first organizers of the Frontier Muslim League

were young western educated Muslims (Mian Abdul Aziz, Qazi Abdul Wali Khan,

Syed Ali Abbas Bokhari, Qazi Mir Ahmad and Hakim Muhammad Amin from the

urban areas of NWFP)7. But while a new political class was emerging and organizing

in the cities, the rural elites, patronized by the colonial administrators, continued their

overwhelming domination of frontier politics. The political significance of the cities

was that they became centers of political opposition to the government, and became

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the launching ground for opposition movements. Most of the movements were over

communal issues, and for the Muslim community were spearheaded by the urban

based ulema.8 While the urban areas agitated, however, rural areas ruled-a pattern that

persists to this day.

Following the Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919, and until the elections of 1946,

NWFP politics were controlled by the Khudai Khidmatgars from semi urban and rural

areas of NWFP. The NWFP Muslim League, whose members and leaders like Sardar

Abdur Rab Nishtar were mostly drawn from the urban middle class, played a

distinctly peripheral role in provincial politics. This fact was highlighted in the 1937

elections for the 50 members Legislative Assembly seats in the NWFP; Muslim

League did not nominate any candidate in NWFP. The main contesters were the

Congress Party, Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party and the Independents. Jinnah

recognized that power in the NWFP rested in the hands of the rural notables, and that

there was little future for an urban based party like the League. Jinnah’s political

calculation was proved correct in the elections of 1946, when the League won 17 of

50 Muslim Seats. The League’s overwhelming victory among Muslim voters in these

elections in the NWFP by securing 147133 votes while congress secured 15922

votes,9 did not reflect any major social or political change, but rather that the former

urban-based Muslim League, had successfully been taken over by the rural elites.

7.3 THE JAGIRDARS VERSUS THE BUREAUCRATS 1947-1958

Having led the Pakistan Movement, the leadership of the Muslim League inherited

power in Pakistan after independence. At the national level it was the predominantly

urban-based Muslim League leaders from the minority provinces who took control. In

the League’s Working Committee following Independence, 17 of the 28 members

were from the urban professional classes.10 This resulted in a reversal, albeit

temporary, of the colonial policy that favoured the rural political elite.11 In addition to

the urban bias of the central leadership, there was a strong refugee influence when the

first post-Independence session of the All-India Muslim League was held in

December 1947, 160 of 300 participating councilors were from regions that became

part of India.12 As they had left their constituencies behind in India, the refugee

politicians had to find a new base of political support in Pakistan. The first

constituency to which they turned was their fellow refugees from India who had

migrated in large numbers to Karachi, and to lesser extent to other cities of Sindh and

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the Punjab.13 They also looked for support from the Gujrati-speaking trading and

entrepreneurial families based in Karachi.14 Numerically, however, this

predominantly urban-based constituency was weak. This was one of the major factors

contributing to the reluctance of the League leadership to hold elections that would

inevitably have led to their replacement at the national level by the indigenous rural

elite of the NWFP and other provinces.

To strengthen their position, the League’s refugee politicians allied themselves with

the powerful civil administrators who also considered the rural landed elite as their

only serious political rivals. It did not take long for the balance of power to shift from

the politicians to the bureaucrats. The assassination of Prime Minister Liaqat Ali

Khan in 1951 symbolized the end of the dominance of national politics by

politicians.15 As the position of the urban politicians at the national level grew

weaker, so did their political utility for the bureaucracy, and over time the colonial

model of bureaucratic rule with the support of the rural notables was restored. In

NWFP provincial politics, in contrast with national politics, it was the rural rather

than the urban politicians who inherited power after independence. The few urban,

progressive League leaders, such as Abdul Qayum Khan, either left or were forced

out of the party. In 1951 provincial assembly elections, majority of politicians came

from rural NWFP.

The widespread anti-Ahmadiya disturbances in 1953 in Punjab, which forced the

government to ask for the military’s assistance in restoring law and order, helped shift

the balance of power from the politicians firmly back in favour of the bureaucracy.16

The quick and efficient handling of the situation by the army, in stark contrast to the

vacillating and irresponsible behaviour of the politicians, weakened the credibility and

legitimacy of the politicians. The rural notables, now organized under the banner of

the Republican Party, were again reduced to their traditional role as junior partners in

the ruling alliance. From 1953 to 1958, the colonial model of bureaucratic rule

supported by the landed elite prevailed. In 1951, NWFP’s first Provincial Assembly’s

elections were held. Elections would have strengthened and legitimized the position

of the politicians in general and rural politicians in particular, at the expense of the

bureaucracy.

7.4 AYUB ERA 1958-1969: Ayub Khan a person from NWFP continued the

colonial pattern of developing a rural support base for his regime. He was from a rural

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background of village Rehana from Haripur District. Rather than relying on the rural

elite, he turned instead to the rural middle classes for political support.17 Ayub

adopted several measures which strengthen the rural middle classes, often at the

expense of the traditional rural elite. In 1958 he promulgated the Elective Bodies

Disqualification Order (EBDO) that barred anyone from holding office who was

found guilty of misconduct. The order barred approximately 40 percent of all the big

landlord politicians from holding office, which provided an opportunity for many

from the rural middle classes to enter politics.18 Ayub also struck the crux of rural

elite power by introducing ceilings on land ownership. Although the reforms were

modest in scope, they were Pakistan’s first successful attempt to implement land

reforms. Ayub’s system of basic democracies, which provided a mechanism for the

rural middle classes to enter politics at the local governmental level, also challenged

the rural elite’s monopoly for power. Furthermore, at the same time the rural middle

classes were gaining politically, ‘Green Revolution’ technology was strengthening

them economically. Ayub could do without the support of the rural notables as long as

martial law was in force. But when martial law ended in 1962, and Ayub was

confronted with the prospect of elections in 1964-5, he felt the need to broaden his

base of support. Ayub turned away from the middle classes and back to the landed

elite for political support. This shift is reflected in the changing fortunes in the

Assemblies of the rural elite and the rural middle classes from NWFP. In National

Assembly, the percentage of large ‘Ashrafi’ landlord-politicians from the NWFP went

from 57.2 percent in 1955 down to 21.3 percent in 1962 and than up to 27.6 percent in

1965. The number of representatives from the ‘middle’ and ‘gentry’ landholders in

the National Assembly went from 9.5 percent in 1955, up to 44.7 percent in 1962, and

than back down to 29.8 percent in 1965.19 The decline of the rural middle classes’

newfound political power coincided with a downturn in their economic fortunes

following droughts in the mid-60s and the 1965 Indo-Pak war. This led to growing

disenchantment with Ayub which Bhutto was able to use to his political advantage.20

In urban areas Ayub’s martial law regime was initially welcomed by a population

tired of corruption, black marketeering, a deteriorating law and order situation, and

the irresponsible behaviour of the politicians. It soon became clear, however, that

Ayub, like the British administrators, distrusted the urban political classes. The big

industrialists were the only important urban group that Ayub cultivated and

patronized. He adopted deliberate measures to weaken other politically influential

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urban groups, which included the censorship and seizure of the ani-government

Progressive Papers Limited (PPL) which further curtailed the freedom of the press;

martial law which reduced the scope for litigation and hence the economic well-being

and political clout of the legal community; the University Ordinance which limited

the autonomy of universities; the Industrial Dispute Ordinance which curtailed the

rights of organized labour; and the creation of the Auqaf Department which reduced

the economic and political independence of the religious establishment.21 Not

surprisingly, it was these politicized urban social groups,22 supported by many from

the rural middle classes that led the movement which brought down Ayub’s

government in 1969.

Jones noted that the anti-Ayub movement represented the … late political ‘coming of

age’. ‘It was the breakthrough of the mass public into the political sphere, and it

signaled a fundamental and ultimately irreversible alteration in the relationship

between rulers and ruled.’23 In particular, it represented the political awakening of

urban NWFP. For the first time in Pakistan’s history, a primarily urban-based political

movement brought down the national government which was backed by the powerful

bureaucracy and the traditional landed elite. Furthermore, unlike previous urban

agitation movement like the anti-Ahmadiyya disturbances of 1953, this was a secular

movement making secular political and economic demands.

7.5 ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO 1970-1977

During the period between Ayub’s downfall in 1969 and 1970 elections, Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto and the recently founded Pakistan People’s Party succeeded in winning the

support of the bulk of the Anti-Ayub constituency. The PPP’s strongest support

initially came from urban left group such as students and organized labour, but also

from middle class professionals such as lawyers and the intelligentsia. Bhutto

realized, however, that urban support alone was not sufficient to win elections in an

overwhelming rural country. In organizing the PPP and campaigning for the 1970

elections, therefore, he was careful to sell the PPP as an ‘inclusionist’ and broad-

based party so as not to alienate influential social groups such as the rural elite.24 Thus

while the urban left strongly opposed the entry of ‘feudals’ into the PPP, Bhutto did

not, and instead actively sought their support. In his speeches Bhutto, who himself

came from a rural elite background, rarely mentioned ‘feudalism’ as a national

problem. Instead he focused his criticism on the bureaucrats and capitalists whose

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numbers in terms of voting power were relatively insignificant.25 In Sindh, Bhutto’s

home province, the PPP was dominated by the landed elite. The case in NWFP was

different, which reflected the miscalculation of the rural notables as to who would win

the election rather than the PPP’s unwillingness to accept them into the fold.26 Their

setback was temporary, for soon after the elections the majority switched their

loyalties to the wining side.27 The NAP (National Awami Party) strong urban support

in the NWFP was reflected in the results of the 1970 elections, Pakistan’s first

national elections based on universal suffrage. The following Table reflects the detail

of the 1970 elections in NWFP.

Table 7.2 Name and party affiliation of winning candidates (National Assembly) in 1970 elections.Name of Constituency Winners Party

Peshawar NW1 Khan Abdul Qayum Khan QML

NW2 Ghulam Faooq Khan NAP

NW3 Abdul Wali Khan NAP

NW4 Maulana Abdul Haq Sahib JUI

Hazara NW5 Maulvi Abdul Hakeem JUI

NW6 Maulana Ghulam Ghous JUI

NW7 Sardar Inayaut-ur-Rehman QML

NW8 Khan Qayum Khan QML

Mardan NW9 Abdul Khaliq Khan PPP

NW10 Pirzada Khan NAP

NW11 Khan Abdul Qayum Khan QML

Kohat NW12 Maulvi Niamatullah JUI

DI. Khan NW13 Mufti Mehmood JUI

Bannu NW14 Maulana Sardar-ul-Shahid JUI

Chitral cum Dir cum Swat

NW15

Ataliq Jafar Ali Shah QML

Swat NW16 Rahim Shah QML

NW17 Prince Aurangzeb Khan QML

Dir NW18 Safi-ullah Saheb QML

Party Position: QML(08), NAP (02), JUI (06), JI (01), PPP (01)

Total: 18

Source: Datta compiled from 1970 General Election Report. Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)Above table shows that NAP (National Awami Party) won National Assembly seats

from urban centre while QML (Qayyum Muslim League) and JUI (Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-

Islam) won seats from rural NWFP. This argument also reflects from the results of

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NWFP provincial assembly results of 1970 as indicated in table 7.3. In 1970 elections,

it is clear from the table that JUI had strong vote bank in rural areas.

Table 7.3: Winning candidates (Provincial Assembly) in 1970 elections:

Name of Constituency Winners PartyPeshawar PF:1 Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao PPPPF:2 Arbab Muhammad Jehangir NAPPF:3 Arbab Sikandar Khan NAPPF:4 Arbab Saif-ur-Rehman NAPPF:5 Abdul Wali Khan NAPPF:6 Muhammad Akram Khan NAPPF:7 Haji Taj Muhammad Khan NAPPF:8 Wali Muhammad Khan NAPHazara PF:9 Saadullah Khan INDPF:10 Muhammad Zareen Khan NAPPF:11 Haq Nawaz Khan JUIPF:12 Muhammad Haroon Khan Badshah QMLPF:13 Syed Muzamil Shah QMLPF:14 Muhammad Iqbal Khan Jadoon QMLPF:15 Sardar Gul Zaman QMLPF:16 Raja George Sikandar Zaman Khan QMLPF:17 Muhammad Nawaz Khan QMLMardan PF:18 Abdul Samad Khan PPPPF:19 Muhammad Ikram Khan NAPPF:20 Amirzada Khan NAPPF:21 Mian Ghulam Jilani (Maj. Gen. Retd.) NAPPF:22 Muhammad Firdus Khan NAPMardan-cum Hazara PF:23 Abdul Mastan Khan QMLKohat PF:24 Nawabzada Azmat Ali Khan PMLCPF:25 Maulvi Habib Gul JUIPF:26 Muhammad Aslam Khan Khattak INDDI. Khan PF:27 Sardar Inayat Ullah Khan INDPF:28 Makhdoom Atta-ur-Rehman PMLCDI. Khan cum Bannu PF:29 Humayun Khan Saifullah PMLCBannu PF:30 Molvi Muhammad Yaqub JUIPF:31 Abdul Samad JUIChitral PF:32 Qadir Nawaz INDMalookni (Protected Area) PF:33 Muhammad Hanif Khan PPPSwat: PF:34 Abdul Rauf Khan QMLPF:35 Abdul Baqi INDPF:36 Muhammad Afzal Khan NAPPF:37 Haji Muhammad Rehman QMLSwat cum Dir PF:38 Rehman-ullah Saheb JIDir PF:39 Dr. Muhammad Yaqub Khan JIPF:40 Amanullah Khan QML

Party Position: PPP (3), NAP (13), IND (05), JUI (04), JI (02), QML (10), PMLC (03), Total: 40

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972)

The NAP won all 12 seats from the major cities of the NWFP, and PPP won three

seats from urban centres. JUI, JI (Jamat-i-Islami) and QML have their influence in

rural areas of NWFP. Like all the previous governments, the Bhutto regime was to

turn away from its urban constituency and to look instead towards the NWFP’s rural

elite for political support. From 1972 to 1974, members of the PPP’s urban left such

as Hayat Sherpao, Abdul Samad Khan, and Muhammad Hanif Khan were influential

in shaping the government’s policies. Shaid Javed Burki has shown how PPP policies

benefited the urban left’s constituencies (i.e. Industrial labour and urban poor), but

283

hurt many from the urban middle classes who had also supported the PPP in 1970.28

Nationalization of both large and small scale industries, labour reforms that harmed

small businesses, and nationalization of private educational institutions were just

some of PPP’s policies that alienated the urban middle classes. Furthermore, in

addition to being effected economically, the rural and urban middle classes were hurt

politically when Bhutto failed to introduced a local government system to replace the

Basic Democracies system.

By the time Bhutto decided to go to the polls in 1977, it was clear that while the PPP

had retained the support of industrial labour and the urban poor, it had lost the support

of the urban middle classes. Like all his predecessors, Bhutto turned to the NWFP’s

rural notables for political support the PPP’s slate of 1977 elections candidates read

like a, ‘whose who’, list of the NWFP’s landed elite-the Hayats of Peshawar; Samad,

and Malik of Mardan and Malokani. While the PPP’s 1970 manifesto promised ‘to

destroy the power of the feudal land owners’, the 1977 elections manifesto stated that

the PPP’s policies had ‘brought an end to feudalism in Pakistan’, employing that there

was no further need for land reforms.29 Much to Bhutto’s surprise, the entire

spectrum of anti-PPP forces, from left to right, succeeded in cobbling together the

Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) to contest the 1977 elections against the PPP. The

PNA movements brought under one banner all those social groups, and in particular

the middle classes, which had been negatively affected by the policies of the PPP

government.30 Following the PPP’s suspiciously impressive election victory, the PNA

launched an agitation movement to protest the rigging that had taken place. Unlike the

anti-Ayub agitation which had involved a cross-section of urban social classes, the

PNA movement was more specifically a middle class movement which in many ways

marked the political ‘coming of age’ of the urban middle classes. It also marked the

beginning of an unusually resilient (by Pakistani standards) anti-PPP vote-bank in

urban NWFP that appears to have grown over time. While weak in terms of the

number of votes, the concentration of the middle classes in urban areas that are the

economic, political, and communications hubs of the country gives them a

disproportionate amount of political influence. The PNA movement demonstrated the

growing political clout of the urban middle classes, a development that the usually

astute Bhutto apparently failed to understand. Shahid Javed Burki noted the

following about Bhutto:

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[H]e was a rural aristocrat who had developed a deep empathy for the poor. He was at home

in two very different worlds: the world occupied by Pakistan’s elite and the world in which

lived million of Pakistanis under-privileged groups. But he was not at home with the ground

that lay in-between: the growing space occupied by the middle classes. He did not understand

their value system, did not appreciate their economic interest, and did not comprehend the

power they had begun to wield. He abandoned them and they allowed him to go to the

gallows.31

7.6 GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ 1977-1988

The PNA agitation movement eventually forced Bhutto to call in the military to help

quell the civil unrest. On 5th July 1977, the chief of army staff, General Zia-ul-Haq

removed Bhutto in a coup d’etat, declared martial law, and ruled Pakistan for the

following eleven years. Not surprisingly, General Zia-ul-Haq turned to the

conservative urban middle classes for political support, and combined this with the

standard practice of co-opting the NWFP’s rural elite. Much more remarkable,

however, was Zia’s success in maintaining the support of the urban middle classes

throughout his eleven years of power. By providing them with patronage, introducing

a limited Islamisation programme, repealing some of the PPP’s socialist economic

policies, and of course receiving the backing of the military, Zia was able to maintain

the support of the urban middle classes.

7.7 URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE IN ELECTORAL POLITICS (1988-1999)

The urban rural divide is not a recent phenomenon in NWFP. What give this divide

growing importance, however, is Pakistan’s extremely high urbanization rates.

Pakistan’s urban population is estimated to be growing at 50 per cent every decade,

compared to the rural population growth of 25 per cent.32 The percentage of the

NWFP’s population living in urban areas has increased from 21.4 per cent in 196133

to an estimated 34.2 per cent by 1993.34 The political importance of urban NWFP will

therefore undoubtedly increase over time. The urban-rural divide has always been

visible in the NWFP’s election results. For example, when the 1946 elections for

Provincial Legislative Assemblies were held, the Muslim League won 17 of 50 seats

but only 2 of 3 urban seats.35 In the 1964 Presidential elections the rural areas voted

for Ayub and the major urban areas generally voted for Fatima Jinnah.36 In the 1970

elections in NWFP the PPP won 57.4 per cent of the vote in the urban constituencies

and only 40.5 per cent in the rural.

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As the discussion on the history of the urban-rural divide has illustrated not only has

the divide been visible in election results, but the electoral process has contributed to

deepening the divide. As Jones points out that the gradual extension of representation

and the franchise, reforms demanded by urban politicians, have really benefited the

conservative landholding elite. From 1937 onward NWFP Legislature was dominated

by the rural elites, and if, in 1946, the elites moved aside to make room for the rural

gentry, and was squeezed even further aside by the entry of the middling zamindariat

(landlords) into the Assemblies of the Ayub years, ruralist interests continued to

dominate NWFP politics and to act as a brake on the progressive schemes of urban

politicians.

Table 7.4: PPP/PDA Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results of National Assembly Seats.

Region (s)Urban Urban/Rural Rural Total

%age seats %age Seats %age seats %age Seats1988 Elections

North 40.4 2/2 36.7 0 40.2 2 34.37 4/6Central 43.3 2/2 41.2 2/2 31.3 0 33.24 4/8South 4.1 0 5.6 0 6.2 0 4.49 0/5

Hazara 10.2 0 13.4 0 12.1 0 14.46 0/7Total/Avg 24.5 4 24.23 2 22.45 2 21.64 8/26

1990 ElectionsNorth 35.1 2/2 39.5 1/1 34.8 0 30.45 3/6

Central 25.4 0 27.1 0 28.2 0 21.41 0/8South 28.4 1/1 28.1 1/1 26.2 0 23.88 2/5

Hazara 9.5 0 8.7 0 7.6 0 7.50 0/7Total/Avg 24.6 3 25.85 2 24.2 0 20.81 5/26

1993 ElectionsNorth 20.1 0 28.5 1/1 21.8 0 18.46 1/6

Central 48.4 3 39.6 2/2 31.8 0 36.10 5/8South 2.8 0 3.9 0 4.2 0 3.45 0/5

Hazara 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/7Total/Avg 17.83 3 18 3 14.45 0 14.5 6/26

1997 ElectionsNorth 27.1 0 25.4 0 26.2 0 21.71 0/6

Central 19.1 0 18.2 0 91.1 0 16.76 0/8South 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/5

Hazara 3.2 0 2.6 0 2.8 0 2.34 0/7Total/Avg 12.35 0 11.55 0 30.03 0 10.2 0/26

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).The cities have thus far been the incubators of political ferment and demands for

change in NWFP, but even those ruling groups that have ridden to power on

movements spreading outward from the cities have finally always looked to the

countryside for the stability of their rule.37 What is the most interesting about the

1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 election results, therefore, is not that an urban-rural divide

is visible, but the dramatic increase in support for the ANP/PML(N) in urban areas at

the expense of the PPP. Indeed, perhaps the single most significant development of

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the 1997 elections in the NWFP was the role reversal that took place whereby the

Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz PML(N)/ANP (Awami National Party) replaced the

PPP as the party of urban NWFP. For the urban-rural division of electoral politics, in

this study only National Assembly elections will be analysed from 1988-1997. There

were four major voting groups in electoral politics of NWFP, i.e. Mainstream voters

PPP/PDA (Pakistan People’s Party/Pkistan Democratic Alliance) and PML-N/IJI

(Islami Jamuri Itehad), Religious and regional/ethnic (ANP). In following sections

these four categories are to be analysed. In 1988 National Assembly Elections, PPP

won four National Assembly seats from NA 21 (Swat-1), NA 23 (Swat-III), NA 24

(Chitral) and NA 26 (Malakand Protected Area cum Dir). In NA-21, Shazada Amani

Room won the National Assembly seat on PPP ticket obtaining 28730 votes. The

runner up was Mr. Obaidur Rehman of JUI-F (Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam-Fazal-ur-

Rehman) having 21748 votes. Mian Gul Aurangzeb, the prince of Swat with IJI

(Islami Jamuri Itehad) ticket got third position having 19061 votes. PPP vote bank is

largely in rural and urban areas. In NA 23, swat-III, Mr. Mehboob-ur-Rehman (PPP)

won elections with 23613 votes having close contest with ANP candidate, Mr.

Muhammad Afzal Khan who got 22597 votes. Begum Nusrat Bhutto, the wife of

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto won PPP seat from NA-24 (Chitral) having 32819 votes, the

runner-up was local prince Shazada Muhayud Din (IJI) having 23405 votes.

Muhammad Hanif Khan won NA seat on PPP ticket from Malakand protected area

cum Dir (NA 26) with 39174 votes. The major PPP vote bank was in urban and

urban/rural areas of Chitral and Malakand Protected area cum Dir. In central NWFP

PPP won National Assembly seats from NA 1,2,3,4 (Peshawar-1,2,3,4), where strong

PPP candidates were contesting elections. In NA 1, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao

(PPP) won elections having 44658 votes. The runner up was Ghulam Ahmad Bilour

(ANP) with 35947 votes. In NA 2, Khan Bahadur Khan (PPP) won elections with

24444 votes. Arbab Saif-ur-Rehman from ANP was runner up with 19402 votes. In

NA3 there was close contest between ANP and PPP. From NA3, PPP candidate

Sardar Ali Khan won the election with 28408 votes, while ANP candidate Abdul

Lateef got 24727 votes. The much close contest had been reported in NA 4 between

ANP and PPP candidates. Mian Muzaffar Shah, a PPP candidate got 27902 votes with

only 92 votes lead over ANP candidate and Mr. Ahrar Khatak (ANP) got 27817 votes.

PPP vote bank was in Urban and Urban/Rural areas in central NWFP. PPP put only

one candidate, Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani from southern part of NWFP (Kohat),

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obtained second position with 19049 votes. Majority vote bank was reported in Urban

areas of Kohat. In Hazara region PPP put five candidates in elections but could not

win any seat. From NA-11 Abbottabad-1, Syed Sultan Ali (PPP) got third position

with 13845 votes out of total 91627 votes. From NA-12 Abbottabad-II, Mr.

Muhammad Aslam Khan (PPP) placed on fourth position with 10760 votes out of

total 83201 vote caste. In NA-13 (Abbottabad-III), PPP candidate Begum Bilqis

Nasrum Minallah got second position having 25066 votes with huge difference of

Raja Sikandar Zaman (IJI), who got 60128 votes. In NA-14 Mansehra-1, Gen (R)

Muhammad Mumtaz Khan (PPP) got 8211 votes and obtained fourth position. From

NA 16 (Mansehra-III), Sardar Muhammad Yousaf (PPP) got 9198 votes from the

rural areas of this constituency only for the biradri votes. In 1988 Ms. Benazir

Bhutto returned to National politics after a gap of 11 years of Zia rule. The national

politics had impacted the politics of NWFP.

In 1990 elections, PPP led coalition PDA, won five National Assembly seats out of 26

from NWFP. PDA won three National Assembly seats from the Northern NWFP and

two National Assembly seats from the southern NWFP. From southern NWFP, Syed

Iftikhar Hussain Gillani (PPP) candidate from NA-9 Kohat and Fazal Karim Khan

Kundi from NA-18 D.I. Khan won elections. In southern part, the PPP vote bank was

in urban and urban/rural areas. From the Northern NWFP, Mr. Muhammad Afzal

Khan (PDA) got 32515 votes, Mr. Najmud Din (PDA) got 28533 votes and Mr.

Ahmad Hassan (PDA) got 31331 votes. All three candidates won from their

respective constituencies due to personal reputations and tribal affiliations. PPP vote

bank was also in urban and urban/Rural areas. From central NWFP and Hazara, no

PPP candidate could win the election, however in some urban and urban/rural areas

the competition was tough. PDA put their candidates in all six constituencies of

National Assembly in Central NWFP. Benazir Bhutto, the leader of PDA, her self

contested on NA-1 (Peshawar-1) and defeated by ANP leader Ghulam Ahmad Bilour,

got second position with 38951 votes. The other prominent leader of PDA, Aftab

Ahmad Khan sherpao from NA-2 (Peshawar-II) was also defeated by Arbab

Mohammad Jehangir Khan (ANP). Aftab was runner-up with 19137 votes. Only three

candidates contested election on PDA ticket from Hazara, Sardar Inayat-ur-Rehman

(NA-12 Abbottabad-II), Mr. Omar Asghar Khan (NA13 Abbottabad-III), and Mr.

Sajid Mumtaz Khan (NA-14 Mansehra-1) but could not win any seat.

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In 1993, PPP won six seats from NWFP, five from Central NWFP and one from

northern NWFP. From Northern NWFP constituency NA-26 Malakand Protected

Area cum Dir, Muzaffar Khan with close contest of Maulana Gohar Rehman (PIF-

Pakistan Islamic Front) won the election. Other PPP candidates, Mr. Najmuddin (NA-

25 Dir), Zauja Mohammad Suleman Khan (Na-24 Chitral could not win election but

have close contest. From Central NWFP, Syed Zafar Ali Shah (NA-1 Peshawar-1),

Arbab Muhammad Jehangir Khan (NA-2 Peshawar-II), Maj. Gen. (R) Naseerullah

Khan Babar (NA-4 Nowshera) and Mr. Khanzada Khan (NA-6 Mardan-1) won

elections mostly from urban and urban/rural areas. In southern region of NWFP, PPP

put one candidate, Masood Kausar from NA-9 Kohat but defeated by Syed Iftikhar

Hussain Gillani, an old PPP politician who had change their political affiliations and

joined PML-N. PPP could not issue ticket to any candidate from Hazara due to their

weak political bases.

In 1997 elections, PPP contested 17 National Assembly seats out of 26 from NWFP,

six from central NWFP, one from southern NWFP, four from Hazara and six from

northern NWFP. PPP could not win any single seat from NWFP during 1997 elections

however their vote bank was seen in urban and urban/rural areas. Qamar Abbass, a

PPP candidate from NA-1 Peshawar-1, Sardar Ali Khan from NA-3 Peshawar cum

Nowshera, Maj. Gen. (R) Naseerullah Babar from NA-4 Nowshera, Haji Muhammad

Yaqoob from NA-6 Mardan-1 were the runner-up in 1997 elections.

In Hazara region of NWFP, PPP candidates were Muhammad Gulzar Abbasi (NA-11

Abbottabad cum Haripur-old Abbottabad-I), Mr. Abdul Lateef Abbasi (NA-12

Abbottabad cum Haripur-II-Old Abbottabad-II), Mr. Muhammad Tahir Qureshi (NA-

13 Haripur) and Mr. Guldad (NA-17 Kohistan). All these candidates could not win in

their respective constituencies. These candidates had only biradaris and personal

votes instead of party votes. In 1988 elections, IJI won eight National Assembly seats

out of total twenty six seats, two seats from Northern NWFP, two from Southern and

four from Hazara. IJI put four candidates from central NWFP but could not win any

seat. From southern part of NWFP, IJI contested five seats but only two seats could

win. These were from Maulvi Niamatullah (NA-9 Kohat) and Anwar Saifullah (NA-

20 Bannu-II). In Northern NWFP, IJI put six candidates for elections but only two

could win election. The winning candidates were Haji Fazal-i-Raziq (NA-22 Swat-II)

and Mr. Fathullah (NA-25 Dir). In Hazara region of NWFP, JUI won four seats.

These were of Sardar Haji Gul Khitab Khan (NA12- Abbottabad-II), Raja Sikanadr

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Zaman Khan (NA-13 Abbottabad-III), Haji Muhammad Ayub Khan (NA-16

Mansehra-III) and Fazal-e-Haq (NA-17 Kohistan). The majority vote bank was in

rural areas, while urban and urban/rural areas have same ration as indicated in above

table. In 1990 elections, IJI got eight National Assembly seats, two from northern

NWFP, one from central NWFP, and one from southern NWFP and four from Hazara.

In Central NWFP, IJI put one candidate Khan Mir Afzal Khan (NA-7 Mardan II) with

the electoral seat adjustment coalition with ANP and Khan won election with 37452

votes.

Table 7.5: IJI/PML-N Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on National Assembly seats.

Urban Urban/Rural Rural Total%age Seats %age Seats %age seats %age Seats

1988 ElectionsNorth 34.7 0 38.2 1/1 40.2 1/1 31.15 2/6

Central 20.1 0 22.7 0 24.8 0 18.41 0/8South 35.1 0 39.8 1/1 38.6 1/1 32.03 2/5

Hazara 34.6 1/1 35.7 1/1 46.2 2/2 30.23 4/7Total/Avg 31.13 1 34.1 3 37.45 4 27.96 8/26

1990 ElectionsNorth 34.8 0 37.2 1/1 38.6 1 35.79 2/6

Central 10.4 0 12.1 0 13.6 0 12.60 1/8South 23.1 0 32.1 1 20.2 0 23.90 1/5

Hazara 40.8 1/1 43.2 1/1 57.2 2/2 43.43 4/7Total/Avg 27.28 1 31.15 2 32.4 3 28.93 8/26

1993 ElectionsNorth 21.4 0 25.4 1/1 20.2 0 19.94 1/6

Central 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/8South 39.2 1/1 37.2 1/1 35.1 1/1 34.90 3/5

Hazara 60.1 2/2 61.3 2/2 65.6 2/2 58.31 6/7Total/Avg 30.18 3 30.98 4 30.23 3 28.29 10/26

1997 ElectionsNorth 34.8 1/1 42.5 2/2 45.1 2/2 35.16 5/6

Central 7.1 0 4.8 0 4.6 0 6.30 0/8South 40.1 1/1 52.5 2/2 39.8 1/1 40.99 4/5

Hazara 60.2 2/2 65.8 2/2 69.6 2/2 58.26 6/7Total/Avg 35.55 4 41.4 6 39.78 5 35.18 15/26

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).On other seats of central NWFP, IJI supported ANP to defeat the PPP candidates. In

southern NWFP IJI put five candidates and won only one seat from NA-20 Bannu-II

with close margin of JUI-F (Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam Fazal-ur-Rehman Group)

candidate.. ANP supported IJI candidates in southern NWFP during these elections. In

Hazara, IJI put six candidates but could win four seats from NA-11 Abbottabad-1,

NA12-Abbottabad-II, NA-13 Abbottabad-III and NA-15 Mansehra-II. In northern

NWFP, IJI put six candidates but only two could win from NA-21 Swat-1, and NA-24

Chitral. In 1993 elections, IJI had majority of voters in rural, rural/urban

constituencies as indicated in table 7.5.

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In 1993 elections, IJI split coalition PML-N got ten seats out of twenty six National

Assembly seats. In central NWFP PML-N did not contest election due to the electoral

coalition with ANP. In southern NWFP, it could win three seats from NA-9 Kohat,

NA-19 Bannu and NA-21 Lakki Marwat cum Bannu out of five contested seats. In

northern NWFP, PML-N candidate Mian Gul Aurangzeb (NA-21 Swat-1) won

elections. PML-N got one seat out of five contested seats. In Hazara region of NWFP,

PML-N won six seats out of seven contested seats. Majority of vote bank during 1993

elections lies in rural, rural/urban parts of NWFP.

In 1997 elections, Nawaz Shrif was the Prime Minsiter, that is why Pakistan Muslim

League (Nawaz) PML-N did so well in NWFP. PML-N got fifteen seats with average

votes of 35.18 per cent. In Northern NWFP, it won all five contested seats from NA-

21 Swat-I, NA-22 Swat-II, NA-24 Chitral, NA-25 Upper Dir cum Lower Dir, NA-26

Malakand Protected Area cum Lower Dir. In NA-23 Bunair-cum-Shangla (Old Swat-

II), PML-N supported ANP candidate Abdul Matin Khan under seat adjustment

policy in this constituency. In Central NWFP, PML-N contested only one seat from

NA-8 Swabi but defeated by ANP candidate. In southern NWFP, PML-N contested

five seats and won four seats from NA-9 Kohat cum Hangu, NA-18 D.I Khan cum

Tank-Kulachi (Old D.I Khan), NA-19 Bannu (Old Bannu-I) and NA-20 Lakki

Marwat cum Bannu. PML-N candidate was defeated by ANP candidate from NA-10

Karak during 1997 election. PML-N contested seven seats from Hazara region and

won six seats from NA-11 Abbottabad cum Haripur (old Abbottabad-1), NA-12

Abbottabad cum Haripur-II (Old Abbottabad-II), NA-13 Haripur, NA-14 Mansehra-1,

NA15 Mansehra cum Haripur (Old Mansehra-II), NA-16 Battagram cum Mansehra

(Old Mansehra-III). PML-N defeated constituency was NA-17, where Mr. Aurangzeb

Khan, an independent candidate defeated PML-N candidate Maulana Abdul Baqi. IJI

voters were from rural and rural/urban localities of NWFP as indicated in above table

7.5.

In 1988 elections, the ANP won only two seats out of the total of eight seats it

contested from NWFP. The constituencies where it won elections were from central

NWFP, i.e. NA-5 Charsada, where Khan Abdul Wali Khan won with majority of

votes and NA-8 where Abdul Khaliq Khan won ANP seat. In southern NWFP ANP

contested four seats from NA-9 Kohat, NA-10 Karak, NA-19 Bannu-I and NA- 20

Bannu-II, with average votes of 5.84 per cent but could not win any seat. In Hazara

region, ANP candidate Mr. Muhammad Siraj contested election from rural

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background constituency NA-17 Kohistan and could not win seat. ANP three

candidates contested elections from rural/urban constituencies of NA-22 Swat-II, NA-

23 Swat-III and NA-25 Dir with average of 14.26 per cent of votes but could not win

any seat. In the 1990 elections, ANP won six seats, and all six were from central

NWFP. The constituencies of central NWFP where it won seats were NA-1

Peshawar-I, NA-2 Peshawar-II, NA-3 Peshawar cum Nowshera, NA-4 Nowshera,

NA-6 Mardan-I and NA-8 Swabi.

Table 7.6: ANP Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on National Assembly seats:Urban Urban/Rural Rural Total

%age seats %age seats %age seats %age Seats1988 Elections

North 12.4 0 13.6 0 18.6 0 14.26 0/6Central 41.8 1/1 40.5 1/1 32.2 0 37.47 2/8South 4.6 0 8.2 0 7.4 0 5.84 0/5Hazara 0.72 0 0.93 0 1.5 0 0.82 0/7

Total/Avg 14.88 1 15.81 1 14.93 0 14.6 2/261990 Elections

North 1.2 0 1.6 0 0.9 0 1.69 0/6Central 45.7 2/2 46.1 2/2 48.1 2/2 40.55 6/8South 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/5Hazara 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/7

Total/Avg 11.73 2 11.93 2 12.25 2 10.56 6/261993 Elections

North 3.8 0 5.9 0 10.2 1/1 4.73 1/6Central 45.2 1/1 48.3 1/1 40.1 0 39.52 2/8South 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/5Hazara 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/7

Total/Avg 12.25 1 13.55 1 12.58 1 11.06 3/261997 Elections

North 15.3 0 14.8 0 20.4 1 12.95 1/6Central 45.8 2/2 46.7 2/2 61.8 4/4 51.71 8/8South 7.8 0 10.8 1/1 6.3 0 4.76 1/5Hazara 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/7

Total/Avg 17.23 2 18.08 3 22.13 5 17.36 10/26Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

From Hazara and southern NWFP, it could not contest elections due to weak political

support, however from the northern NWFP, ANP contested only one seat from NA-23

Swat-III and defeated by PDA candidate. In 1993 elections, ANP got only three seats

from whole of NWFP, one from northern NWFP and two from central NWFP. ANP

contested seven constituencies but won only two, i.e. NA-3 Peshawar cum Nowshera

(Arbab Muhammad Zahir) and NA-5 Charsada (Asfandyar Wali Khan). In northern

NWFP, ANP contested one seat from NA-23 Buner cum Swat and won it. ANP won

these seats from rural, urban/rural areas. From southern and Hazara region, ANP put

no candidate for electoral contest. In 1997 elections, ANP won ten seats, all eight

from central NWFP and one from southern and one from northern NWFP. In these

elections ANP won urban and rural constituencies from central NWFP, while rural

constituency of northern NWFP. i.e. NA-23 Buner cum Shangla. The urban/rural

constituency of southern NWFP, where ANP won seat is NA-10 Karak. In 1988

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elections, JUI-F, a leading religious party won four seats, one from central NWFP and

three from their base camps of southern NWFP. In central NWFP, JUI-F contested on

one seat from NA-7 Mardan-II and its candidate Haji Muhammad Ahmad won the

elections.

Table 7.7: JUI-F/Religious Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on National Assembly seats.

Urban Urban/Rural Rural Total%age seats %age seats %age seats %age Seats

1988 ElectionsNorth 12.1 0 13.5 0 16.1 0 10.56 0/6

Central 4.2 0 6.8 0 16.3 1 3.95 1/8South 31.4 0 35.2 1 37.1 2 32.46 3/5

Hazara 5.5 0 6.9 0 8.8 0 5.34 0/7Total/Avg 13.3 0 15.6 1 19.58 3 13.08 4/26

1990 ElectionsNorth 18.4 0 20.2 0 22.1 0 14.43 0/6

Central 13.2 0 15.8 0 38.1 1 19.83 1/8South 8.8 0 12.2 0 42.4 1 32.78 1/5

Hazara 5.8 0 8.2 1 41.4 1 8.53 2/7Total/Avg 11.55 0 14.1 1 36 3 18.89 4/26

1993 ElectionsNorth 37.4 0 43.2 1 45.4 1 36.54 PIF2/6

Central 20.1 0 16.5 0 42.1 1 19.77 IJM-1/8South 16.2.2 0 30.1 1 40.1 1 21.71 2/5

Hazara 12.1 0 17.2 0 20.6 0 13.61 0/7Total/Avg 21.5 0 26.75 2 37.05 3 22.91 5/26

1997 ElectionsNorth 8.5 0 10.1 0 12.4 0 4.65 0/6

Central 9.1 0 12.4 0 15.2 0 8.11 0/8South 22.8 0 28.9 0 30.2 0 17.66 0/5

Hazara 10.2 0 12.6 0 15.3 0 7.05 0/7Total/Avg 12.65 0 16 0 18.28 0 9.37 0/26

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

In southern NWFP, JUI-F contested four seats from NA-10 Karak, NA-18 D.I. Khan,

NA-19 Bannu-I, NA20 Bannu-II and won all except NA-20 Bannu-II. In Hazara

region JUI-F contested on NA-14 Mansehra-I, NA-15 Mansehra-II, NA-16 Mansehra-

III and NA-17 Kohistan but could not win any seat. From northern NWFP, JUI-F

contested on NA-21 Swat-I, NA 22 Swat-II, NA-23 Swat-III and NA-26 Malakand

Protected area cum Dir having average votes 10.56 percent but could not win any

seat. In 1990 elections, JUI-F won four seats, one from central NWFP, one from

southern and two from Hazara region of NWFP. JUI-F contested from central NWFP

on NA-2 Peshawar-II, NA-3 Peshwar cum Nowshera, NA-4 Nowshera, NA-5

Charsada, Na-6 Mardan-I, NA-7 Mardan-II, NA-8 Swabi. JUI-F candidate From NA-

5 Charsada, Molvi Hassan Jan defeated Wali Khan (ANP) and won the elections.

In southern NWFP, JUI-F contested five seats from NA-9 Kohat, NA-10 Karak, NA-

18 D.I Khan, NA-19 Bannu-I, NA-20 Bannu-II and won only one seat from NA-19

Bannu-I where Moulvi Ali Akbar won the seat. In northern NWFP, JUI-F contested

all six seats from NA 21 Swat-I, NA 22 Swat-II, NA 23 Swat-III, NA 24 Chitral, NA

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25 Dir and NA-26 Malakand protected area cum Dir with 14.43 per cent of votes in

rural and urban/rural areas but could not win any seat. In Hazara region, JUI-F

contested five seats from NA-13 Abbottabad-III, NA-14 Mansehra-I, NA-15

Mansehra-II, NA-16 Mansehra-III and NA-17 Kohistan and won two seats from NA-

16 and NA-17 where JUI-F candidates Alam Zeb Khan and Molvi Muhammad Amin

won election respectively. In 1993, Religious Parties Alliance PIF and MDM

contested elections. Here in this study another religious party IJM is also included in

same category to analyse the religious vote in 1993 elections. Religious parties won

five seats during 1993 elections, two from north, one from centre and two from south.

In northern NWFP, religious parties contested from NA-21 Swat-I, NA-22 Swat-II,

NA-23 Buner cum Swat, NA-24 Chitral, NA-25 Dir and NA-26 Malakand Protected

Area cum Dir and won two seats from NA-24 Chitral where Maulana Abdul Rahim

won election and NA-25 Dir where Sahibzada Fathullah won elections. In central

NWFP, religious parties contested all seven seats but could win one from NA-8 Swabi

where Qazi Maulana Fazlullah won elections. From southern NWFP, Religious

parties contested five seats and won two seats from NA-10 Karak and NA-18 DI.

Khan cum Tank. In Hazara region, Religious parties contested five seats and could

not win any seat. Majority of vote bank of religious parties were in rural/urban areas

of NWFP. In 1997 religious parties could not win any seat from NWFP; however its

candidates contested for four seats from Hazara, five seats from south and four seats

from northern NWFP. The average votes of religious parties during 1997 elections

were 9.37 per cent mostly in rural areas where local imam Masjids and Madaras were

the supporters of religious parties.

7.8 ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUENCY RESULTS IN URBAN-RURAL NWFP

7.8.1 URBAN CONSTITUENCY RESULTS: There are fifty five urban localities

in NWFP, including five in northern NWFP, seventeen in southern NWFP, twenty

three in central NWFP and ten in Hazara.38 Central NWFP is the most urbanized

region of NWFP. Table 3, illustrates the precipitous decline in support for the PPP in

its former political stronghold in the urban constituencies of the NWFP i.e. from

Peshawar and Mardan. In 1970, the PPP swept the polls in urban constituencies of

Mardan and Peshawar winning one provincial and one National assembly seat. PPP

won one provincial assembly seat from rural constituency of Malakand area in 1970

elections. By 1988-97, its urban support had dropped to 24.5 per cent in 1988 to 12.3

percent in 1997. The winning seats were also decreased in Urban and rural areas of

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NWFP during 1988-1997. It further decline to 10.2 per cent of the vote in 1997

proved disastrous for the PPP as it was unable to win a single NA seat from urban

areas and rural areas of NWFP. In 1990 and 1993, the PPP did better in the urban

areas of central NWFP than in the other regions of the province, although its

percentage of the vote fell in each successive election. Between 1988 and 1993 the

PPP’s support declined in the urban northern NWFP. In 1993, the PPP-PML (J)

received its satisfactory urban results in southern NWFP, which was the only urban

region to show an improvement over the PPP’s 1990 result. Even more striking than

the PPP’s decline in urban NWFP has been the rise in support for the PML (N) and

ANP alliance. In 1997, Nawaz Sharif was in power, therefore his seats in NWFP had

better results.The PML (N) made a clean sweep in Northern, southern and Hazara

region of NWFP and ANP won all National Assembly seats from central NWFP

including major cities of Peshawar, Mardan, Charsada, Swabi and Nowshera. Table-4

illustrates how the PML (N)’s support in urban constituencies increased from 27.16

per cent in 1988, to 35.18 per cent in 1997. The 1993 result was even better than the

IJI’s result in the 1990 elections which were widely believed to have been rigged.

From 1988 to 1997 the PML (N) increased its share of the urban seats it won from

one to four. In 1988 and 1990 it got one urban seat while in 1993 and 1997, it won

three and four urban seats respectively. Table 7.5 also reveals regional variations in

urban support for the PML (N). The party’s best result has consistently been in

Hazara region of NWFP, reflecting the strong electoral support for the party as well as

for its Haripur, Abbottabad and Mansehra city candidates. In both northern and

southern NWFP urban support for the PML (N) increased between 1988 to 1997.

Table 7.6 illustrates the strength of ANP in urban areas of NWFP. ANP urban vote

strength fluctuated during 1988-1997. In 1988, ANP got 14.88 percent votes from

urban NWFP and in 1990 it decreased to 11.73 percent but in 1993 it gradually raised

high from 12.25 percent to 17.23 percent in 1997. Table-6 illustrates the Religious

Parties strength in different constituencies of NWFP. Religious parties votes

tremendously fluctuated from 1988-1997 Religious parties’ strength in urban parts of

NWFP were not good. In 1988, Religious parties got 13.3 percent votes and in 1993

their vote’s percentage decreased to 11.55 percent. In 1993 elections, their vote’s

percentage in urban areas went up to 21.5 percent and then again decreased to 12.65

percent in 1997 elections.

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7.8.2 URBAN-RURAL CONSTITUENCY RESULTS: Ten constituencies were

categories as ‘urban-rural’ in this study, in which approximately 25 to 50 percent of

the votes were from the urban areas and the remaining from rural. These include the

cities with a population of between 100,000 and 300,000 at the time of the 1998

census. The PPP-PML (J) and the PML (N)-ANP won approximately the same

percentage of votes in these mixed constituencies in 1993, although the former won

ten seats and the latter only six. In 1997, the PML-N-ANP did better than the PPP had

in previous elections, winning 43.2 percent of the vote. It did particularly well in

central NWFP where it won all urban/rural constituencies. Although the percentage

did increase from 34.1 per cent in 1988 to 41.4 in 1997, the ANP also increased its

support from 15.81 per cent in 1988 to 18.08 per cent in 1997. This was still more

than 6 per cent greater support than PML-N received in the urban constituencies. The

weaker PPP and the stronger PML-N-ANP performance in the mixed rather than the

urban constituencies is explained by the fact that in most cases the rural votes out

numbered the urban votes, in thus the PML(N)’s urban advantage was partially

neutralized where ANP got maximum votes.

7.8.3 RURAL CONSTITUENCY RESULT: In NWFP total rural localities in 1988

were 7335, in which 2610 were in Northern NWFP, 1164 in southern NWFP, 916 in

central NWFP and 2645 in Hazara. The most ruralised area is Hazara.39 In 1997, the

contest for urban NWFP was decisively won by the ANP. Rural NWFP, where 15 of

the NWFP’s 26 National Assembly constituencies were it stake, was more closely

contested and won by PML-N. The PPP could not win any seat from rural NWFP.

Furthermore, between 1988 and 1997, the PPP consistently lost support in the rural

constituencies and gained support in the rural constituencies. The PML (N), on other

hand, consistently gained in both categories. In rural constituencies of southern

NWFP and Hazara, electoral positions of Religious parties were strong as indicated in

above tables.

7.9 CONCLUSIONS

In electoral politics of NWFP there are considerable regional differences in the rural

results. The region where an urban-rural divide is clear is in Hazara, Northern and

southern NWFP where the PML-N had lead over the PPP in the rural areas in 1988-

97. Electoral democracy in NWFP largely depends on rural areas and rural

stakeholders dominated political structure. The urban middle classes have generally

prospered under electocratic governments for whom maintaining stability in urban

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areas is of prime importance. Democratic governments, seeking to win elections from

NWFP, must turn for support to rural elites who can influence the voting behaviour of

the majority of voters living in rural areas. But socio-economic and demographic

trends ensure that the importance of urban areas will continue to grow relative to rural

areas.40

1 Shahid Javed Burki, Urbanisation: dangers ahead, Daily Dawn (Karachi), 17 July 20072 G. M. Arif and Sabiha Ibrahim, ‘The Process of Urbanisation in Pakistan, 1951–81’, The Pakistan Development Review 37 : 4 Part II (Winter 1998) pp. 37:4, 507–5223 P.H.M van den Dungen, The Punjab tradition: Influence and authority in Nineteenth Century India(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1972)4 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, Muslim League in NWFP (Karachi: Royal Bok Agency, 1992), pp.3-45 David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and Making of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp.11-386 Philip E Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press), pp. 87-1217 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, Muslim League in NWFP, p.20.8 Ibid, pp. 103-59 Abdul Waheed Qureshi, Tarikhi Faisala (Urdu) (Karachi: National Book Foundation, 1976), p. 126.10 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), p.19.11 Ibid., pp.17-2112 Muhammad Rafiq Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan Vol-I, 1947-1958 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998) ,pp.36-713 Muhammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp.106-11514 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, p.14415 Ibid, p. 14716 Government of Pakistan, Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire in to the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore: Superintendent, Government Printing, 1954)17 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, pp.180-22218 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977, p.2919 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, p.21920 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977, p.45-4821 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, p.200-422 Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Social and Economic Determinants of Political violence: A Case study of the Punjab’, The Middle East Journal 25 (Autumn 1971): pp.465-023 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, pp. 307-824 Ibid., 380-125 Ibid., p.428.26 Ibid., p.47427 Craig Baxter, ‘The People’s Party vs. the Punjab “Feudalist”, Journal of Asian and African Studies 8 (July and October, 1973): pp. 166-89.28 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, pp.108-170.29 Pakistan People’s Party, The Election Manifesto (Lahore: Pakistan People’s Party, 1970), p.13.30 Ibid., p.184.31 Ibid., p.21732 John Adams, ‘Population and Urbanization’, James, William E., and Subroto Roy, eds., Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.241.33 Richard W. Helbock, ‘Urban Population Growth in Pakistan: 1961-72’, The Pakistan Development Review 14 (Autumn 1975): p.316.34Government of NWFP, NWFP Development Statistics (Peshawar: Statistics Division, 2002), pp.333-353.

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35 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 22-336 Sharif al-Mujahid, ‘Pakistan’s First Presidential Election’, Asian Survey 6 (June 1965): pp. 280-9437 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, p.10638 Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Housing Census NWFP, 1988 (Islamabad: Population Census Organistaion, Statistic Division, 2002), pp.4-639 Ibid. p.740 Andrew R. Wilder, Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Noting Behaviour in the Punjab(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 89.

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CHAPTER-8

SOCIOLGICAL DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL POLITICS IN NWFP

8. INTRODUCTION

It is a popular perception that voting behaviour in NWFP, especially in rural areas, is

determined more by social than political factors. Traditional group loyalties of family,

factions or biradri (clan) are thought to influence voting decisions to a much greater

extent than more modern or political factors, such as party loyalty, patronage, or issue

orientation. This chapter will focus its attention on the social factors that influence the

voting decisions beginning with our detailed analysis of polling stations to compare

gender and class differences in voting behaviour. Exit poll survey data will then be

examined to see what affects age, literacy, and educational levels have on voting

behaviour. Finally, information collected in interviews will cost light on the role

played by the religion and group loyalties of faction and biradri in electoral politics.

8.1 GENDER

Two common perceptions have prevailed about the voting behaviour of women in

NWFP. The first is that the more women vote for the PPP than the PML/ANP.

Because the former was lead by a women and was thus viewed to be more

sympathetic to the rights of women and minorities. The second perception which is

stronger then the first, is that women vote as instructed by their male family members

and do not vote independently. Neither view, however, is supported by the data, in

both the 1988 and 1993 elections, women in the central NWFP, especially in urban

areas, voted in higher percentages than men for the ANP, and lower percentages than

men for the PPP, Similarly in Northern, Southern and Northeastern NWFP the

majority of women in urban centers voted PML-N which indicates that many voted

independently of their male family members. It is possible to determine gender

differences in voting behaviour because in most of the NWFP’s urban constituencies

separate male and female polling stations were established. Rural polling stations

were much less likely to be segregated since rural constituencies cover a larger area

and would require too many stations to provide separate facilities. Table 8.1 provides

a breakdown of the vote by gender in all of the NWFP’s cities, nearly half its towns,

and approximately half its rural areas. The table clearly shows the PML (N)’s

consistent advantage with female voters in all categories, although its lead diminished

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while moving from the cities to the towns to the rural areas. The difference between

female votes for PML(N) and PPP candidates in urban areas was 18.3%, whereas for

male voters it was only 10%. The PML(N) candidate received 4% more of the total

female votes than the total male votes, while the PPP-PML(J) received 4.3% more of

the male votes than the female votes. In rural areas, the preference of female voters

for the PML(N) was still visible but not as strong as in urban areas. The vast majority

of rural polling stations were not segregated by sex as the villages were insufficiently

large to warrant having two polling stations. Thus the results probably reflect voting

behavior in large villages. In the 26 urban constituencies examined, 193308 rural

votes identified as being cast in segregated polling stations, PML(N) candidates

received 2% votes more of the female than male votes, whereas PPP-PML(J)

candidates received 3% more of male. The PPP-PML(J) had a 10.7% lead over the

PML(N) with male voters but only a 5.7% lead with female voters. The narrower

margin in rural areas is an indication that predominantly illiterate rural women are

less likely to vote independently than more educated urban counterparts.

Table 8.1: Summary of 1993 Urban and Rural Results by Gender (In %age)

PML –N PPP-PML-J ANP OthersMale Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total

Large Cities

52.3 56.3 53.8 42.8 38.7 41.3 3.6 2.8 3.3 1.3 2.2 1.6

Mid 53.0 57.5 54.2 41.3 36.7 40.1 2.4 1.9 2.4 3.2 3.9 3.3Small 53.1 57.3 53.1 41.1 36.5 41.6 1.4 1.2 1.3 4.5 4.9 4Large towns

48.8 52.1 50.2 44.1 40.4 43.9 3.7 3.5 2.8 3.5 4 3.1

Small Towns

53.8 56.1 52.6 40.5 37.9 43.3 1.6 1.4 1.4 4.1 4.5 2.8

Urban 52.4 56.4 53.4 42.4 38.1 41.4 3.1 2.4 2.7 2.2 3.0 2.5Rural 41.7 43.7 42.5 52.4 49.4 49.7 2.5 2.7 2 3.4 4.2 5.8Source: Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, Form XVII, result of the count’ (Polling Station results), for 26

NWFP National Assembly Constituencies.

At the time of the 1998 census, the population of the large cities ranged from 1460100

to 2026851; Mid-sized cities from 1022364 to 1257602, small cities from 238216 to

880666; large towns from 10000 to 19000. The male and female percentage reflected

the total number of votes cast in polling station identified as being segregated by

gender. In urban NWFP 87 percent of the vote, and in rural NWFP 3.7 percent of the

votes, were so identified. The total percentage includes the results of the polling

stations not identified by gender.

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Table 8.2: Large City Election Results (NA) by Gender (In %age)

City IJI/PML-N PPP/PDA and PPP-PML-J ANP

M F T M F T M F TPeshawar

1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 70.5 28.2 49.531997 0 0 0 28.7 10.2 19.94 85.2 37.8 62.19Gain/Loss 0 0 0 28.7 10.2 19.94 14.7 9.6 12.66

Mardan1988 28.2 13.2 21.73 34.4 25.3 31.00 28.3 12.1 20.82

1997 0 0 0 30.4 14.1 22.94 60.1 37.2 48.01Gain/Loss -28.2 -13.2 -21.73 -4 -13.11 -8.06 40.2 14.1 27.19Kohat1988 38.3 21.1 29.72 37.2 24.2 31.24 0 0 0

1997 85.3 38.8 63.73 0 0 0 0 0 0Gain/Loss 47 17.7 34.01 -37.2 -24.2 -31.24 0 0 0

Abbottabad1988 70.2 42.3 56.71 0 0 0 0 0 0

1997 80.7 46.1 67.58 4.2 2.5 3.76 0 0 0

Gain/Loss 10.5 10.87 4.2 2.5 3.76 0 0 0

DI. Khan1988 12.4 4.3 8.58 0 0 0 0 0 0

1997 65.3 19.1 42.62 0 0 0 0 0 0

Gain/Loss 52.9 14.8 34.04 0 0 0 0 0 0

Swabi1988 70.2 28.1 49.83 0 0 0 68.2 20.2 44.66

1997 48.2 18.2 33.45 16.2 6.4 11.23 55.4 16.3 36.41

Gain/Loss -22 -9.9 -16.38 16.2 6.4 11.23 12.8 3.9 -8.25

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

Table 8.2 reveals that in NWFP’s large cities the preference of female voters for ANP

over PML(N) and PPP was also evident in 1988, but not to the same extent as in

19931. Between 1988 and 1997 the ANP increased its support among female voters in

the large cities by 12.6%, and along male voters by 9.8%. Conversely, the PPP lost

8.1% of the female vote between 1988 and 1993, and 5.9% of the male vote.

8.2 WOMEN IN ELECTORAL POLITICS OF NWFP

NWFP has traditionally been a male dominated society like other parts of the country

in which women have been widely discriminated against and form the most oppressed

social class, facing lack of education and discrimination in many areas. throughout the

NWFP only 18.8 percent of female were literate in 1998 the ratio in rural areas were

14.7 and urban areas were 39.1 percent respectively. Although the status of women is

better in literate and urban areas of NWFP, than in the rural areas even so they too

face a variety of problems. Underdevelopment of the society in general, the agrarian

economy and feudal social relations add to discrimination against them. Laws ending

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institutionalized discrimination against women and the protection of their

fundamental rights are the responsibility of the state. The empowerment of women is

one of the central objectives of the feminist movement in NWFP and in other

societies. But this objective cannot be realized without political equality and

participation of women in the political process. Voters in NWFP cast their vote in

blocks that are formed on the basis of castes, sub-castes, tribes and extended families.

Even the male members of a community seldom cast their vote on the bases of

individual preferences.

Voting is a group decision, and unfortunately women in large sections of the rural

population in NWFP are excluded from that process. A few women from the elite

landowning families have contested elections, and in some cases have defeated their

male opponents. Begum Nasim Wali contested elections in 1997 and 1993 from the

plate form of ANP and won the provincial assembly seat by defeating her male

opponents, similarly Begum Nusrat Bhutto from the PPP ticket contested national

assembly elections in 1988 from NA-24 Chitral and won the seat. The following

table shows the breakdown of female contestants in the Provincial Assembly of

NWFP during 1998-1997. Out of eighty Povincial Assembly seats, two female

candidates contested elections in the 1993 and 1997 elections and three women

candidates contested elections in 1990. In the 1998 elections, no single female

candidate contested elections.

No women candidate contested election in 1988 elections. Nasim Wali Khan won

provincial assembly elections in 1993 and 1997 from PF-15 Charsada-III being a

major leader of Awami National Party. Nasim Wali Khan got married to Khan Abdul

Wali Khan in 1954 and she is the mother of Sangeen Wali Khan (late) and the step

mother of Asfandyar Wali Khan.

Table 8.3: Female candidates for NWFP Provincial Assembly1997 1993 1990

PF Name Vote %age

PF Name Vote %age

PF Name Vote %age

15 Begum Nasim Wali (ANP)

47.86 2 Nafeesa Akhtar (IND)

0.15 10 Ms. Nasreen Khilji(IND)

1.65

19 Begum Perveen (IND)

0.39 15 Begum Nasim Wali (ANP)

37.09 32 Ms. Bakht Bibi (IND)

0.29

39 Ms. Tahira Baidar (IND)

0.33

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Alphabets in () represent parties. ANP means Awami National Party, IND means Independents.

NWFP’s 26 National Assembly seats, four female candidates contested elections in

1988, one in 1993 and three in 1997 elections. During 1990 elections, no single

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female candidate contested elections. Percentage of votes and the names of female

candidates along with their party affiliations are shown in table 8.4.

Table 8.4: Female candidates for National Assembly in NWFP:1997 1993 1988NA Name Vote

%agePF Name Vote

%ageNA Name Vote

%age11 Ms.Rashida

Batool (PPP-SB)47.86 1 Ms. Zakira Aslam

(HPG)0.09 10 Ms. Bakht Bibi

(IND)1.23

18 Ms. Mussarrat Shaheen (IND)

0.39 13 Begum Bilqis Minhallah (PPP)

25.37

19 Ms. Noor Jehan Begum (PPP-SB)

0.53 24 Begum Sher Wali(IND)

2.36

24 Begum Nusrat Bhutto (PPP)

54.49

Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Alphabets in () represents parties. PPP-SB means Pakistan People’s Pary (Shaheed Bhutto Group). HPG means Haq Parast Group.

No women candidate contested election in 1990 elections. The political parties

devised affirmative action for female representation by fixing 20 seats for women in

parliament for twenty years in the 1973 constitution. But the respective provincial

assemblies forming an electoral college elected them. The Legal Framework Order

(LFO) issued by General Pervez Musharaf introduced a set of amendments in the

constitution, which have been sanctioned by the 17th amendment. Under these

changes the seats in National Assembly have been raised to 60 with same proportion

in the provincial assemblies. Eight seats reserved for women in National Assembly

and twenty two seats for provincial assembly in NWFP. This was a major change, but

the seats had to be filled on the basis of proportional representation according to the

list provided by the parties. This does get women in to the assemblies but leaves them

out of the electoral contest. The decision as to which women will represent the party

in the assemblies rest with the party bosses who, with very few exceptions, invariably

choose their own daughters, wives, sisters and other close relatives2. In effect, party

list appear to be the best instrument for balancing gender representation. This is

certain to the extent that electoral behaviour is not determined by gender. At the day

when women vote for women, there will be no need to fix political representation of

women in legislation or within party list. But we are presently far from that situation.

With the rare exceptions of women becoming leaders of their parties and being

elected by the whole electorate, in general, the single member district does not favour

female candidates in NWFP. Men are more likely to be adopted as candidates and to

win the constituency.

Responses by the interviewees to the question why women chose to vote in higher

percentages for PML(N) candidates then men from north eastern and southern part of

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NWFP ranged from female jealousy of Benazir Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif’s good looks.

Others cited more plausibly explanations such as the failure of the PPP government

between 1988 and 1990 to take any concrete steps to improve the status of women in

NWFP. This, however, was also clearly an inadequate explanation. This trend was

also visible in 1988 elections.

8.3 RIGGING IN FEMALE POLLING STATIONS

Rigging refers to all activities that violate the laws of a country and constitutional

provisions in the holding of elections to determine the will of the voters to form a

government of their Choice. Rigging takes place on three levels of the electoral

process (Pre-poll, polling day and post-poll). Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gillani highlighted the

intensity of rigging.3

Table 8.5: Detail of rigging at Female Polling stations:Elections Pre-poll Rigging Polling Day Rigging Post Poll Rigging1988 High Low Moderate1990 High Low Moderate1993 High Low Low1997 High Low LowSource: Syed Ijaz Shafi Gillani, A Dispassionate Analysis of Electoral Rigging in Pakistan 1970-2002 (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2008).

The above mentioned intensity of electoral rigging was also reflected by respondents

in interviews. In interviews with PPP supporters the explanation cited for female

voters, preference for the PML(N) was the allegation that most rigging takes place in

female polling booths. For cultural reasons, photographs of women do not appear on

their national identification cards as on men’s, which makes it difficult to verify a

female voter’s identity at the time of polling. The PPP alleged that between 1990 and

1993 the IJI added the names of thousands of bogus female voters to the electoral

rolls in urban areas and manufactured fake identity cards to match these names. On

election day teams of their female supporters were transported around the polling

stations where they used these fake identity cards to vote repeatedly.4

The PPP interpretation of its decline in urban NWFP and with female voters is clearly

stated in an article written by the former PPP information secretary, Senator Shafqat

Mahmood. He explains how a concentrated drive was launched to register bogus

women votes in the urban areas during the local elections in 19925. He describes how

this exercise was concentrated in the urban areas, and arrives at the following

conclusion. “It is no surprise that the PML(N) which was ruling the NWFP in 1992

did so well in the cities. It’s a real strength was the bogus voter lists which included a

large percentage of the women votes”6. It got more women votes because these were

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bogus votes.7 The PPP’s explanation that the registrations of the bogus votes, and in

particular female voters, took place in urban but not rural NWFP is refuted by an

examination of voter registration data which revealed that approximately the same

number of new voters per constituency were registered in rural as in urban areas.8

Furthermore, as table 8.6 reveals between 1990 and 1993 a disproportionately high

percentage of males and not females were registered-60% of the new voters registered

during this period were males and only 40% females. Thus, the charges that the IJI

registered a large number of bogus female voters in urban constituencies, does not

bear close scrutiny. In a political environment where the stakes are high and a large

amount of money was spent to secure elections, it would be surprising if some vote

rigging did not occur. The more important question was the extent to which this took

place. It is highly doubtful that it occurred on a scale that could adequately explain the

disparity between male and female voting behaviour.

Table 8.6: Increase in registered voters in NWFP 1990 and 1993.Elections Registered

Male%age Registered

Female%age Total %age

1990 3387427 37.26 2584839 29.86 5972266 33.651993 3688513 40.58 2680012 30.96 6368525 35.89+/- 301086 3.32 95173 1.1 396259 2.24Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

The consistency of trend lends its credibility-not one city was found where it was

contradicted. Furthermore, within constituencies the trend was visible in the results of

the vast majority of the polling stations while rigging may have occurred, it is highly

unlikely that only PML(N) candidates engaged in it, and that they could all have been

so well organized as to have arranged rigging in virtually every female polling station

in every constituency.

8.5 CONSERVATISM OF FEMALE VOTERS

Two explanations seem more plausible in explaining the advantage that the PML(N)

enjoyed with female voters. The first is that women in NWFP tend to be more

traditional in their values than men, or at least, in this conservative society, must

appear to support traditional values. This finding should not come as a surprise since

women in many countries where democratic elections are held tend to vote more

conservatively than men.9 The PML (N)’s advantage with female voters is

considerably higher in middle and upper class neighborhoods than in lower class

neighborhood. It is in the more conservative urban middle class localities that women

appear particularly reluctant to earn the reputation of being PPP supporters. In an

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interview, a PPP female party worker from Peshawar recounted that while she was

campaigning for the 1993 elections, conservative middle class women would ask her

why they should vote for the ‘Kanjar’ (prostitute) party.10 For the conservative urban

middle classes the PPP’s image of being liberal often translates into being secular and

immoral and its concept of being ‘the party of the poor’ translates into a party that

attracts goondas (thugs) and rough elements of the society.

8.6 PML (N) ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

The second explanation for the PML (N)’s success with female voters is that PML(N)

candidates, particularly in urban/rural constituencies, were generally better organized,

better financed, and ran more effective campaigns than PPP candidates. Most

important was the fact that PML (N) candidates were better organized on Election

Day and provided more transport facilities for women than PPP candidates. The

director of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), which organized the

most extensive monitoring of the polls on Election Day, made the following

observation. It was observed that there was a more disciplined distribution of

immobilizers to vehicles on the part of the Muslim League. They knew where to go,

where to get the voters from. They had in the cities, at least better resources also….

[I]t was an aspect of their better mobilization that they were able to bring their voters

to the polling stations earlier, so in the mornings they had a head start at the polling

stations11.

Another important factor was that PML (N) candidates had a large number of

educated female polling agents assisting women voters. In light of the importance of

the educating and assisting illiterate voters on Election Day, the PML (N)’s edge in

this area is significant. In interviews, several PPP candidates complained that they

could not find enough literate women to serve as polling agents12. For example

Maj(R) Mukhtar Ahmad, a PPP candidate for MNA from Charsada in 1993, made the

following observation:

[A]ll my female polling agents were illiterate. I could not find any educated females willing to be PPP polling agents, so my agents did not understand, what was going on. The MuslimLeague girls were well educated and well paid and understood what was going on.13

8.7 GENDER RELATED FINDINGS8.7.1 IMPACT OF CANDIDATE’S GENDER ON VOTING BEHAVIOURThe result of the only two NWFP constituencies where female candidates contested

and won seats in 1993 suggest that both male and female voters were not overly

influenced by a candidate’s gender. The first, PF- 15 located in Charsada district, is

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primarily rural and most of its polling stations were not segregated. In the town of

Charsada, however, twenty polling stations with a combined total of 15,863 votes

were segregated by sex. In these polling stations 65.8% of female voters voted for the

female ANP candidate, Begum Nasim Wali Khan supported by PML-N in 1993 and

1997 elections (using seat adjustment strategy), compared to 61.6% of male voters.

The male PPP candidate in 1993 (Mr. Jahangir Khan) received 15% of female vote

and 20.1% of male vote. These results were consistent with the result elsewhere,

indicating a higher percentage of female than male support for ANP/PML(N)

[Coalition partners] , but also indicating that there did not appear to be any reluctance

on the part of women to vote for another women if she belonged to PML(N) and not

the PPP.14

The second constituency NA-24 in Chitral district, was primarily a rural constituency,

in which 58,373 out of total 116,400 votes were cast in polling stations during 1988,

identified as segregated. In these the female PPP candidate Begum Nusrat Bhutto,

won 52.9% of total male votes but only 49.4% of the total female votes. The male

PML(N) coalition party IJI candidate Shahzada Muhayud Din won 40.3% of the total

male votes and 42.9% of the female votes. As these statistics were consistent with the

others, it would seem that it was Begum Nusrat’s Bhutto’s PPP affiliation rather than

her gender that influenced women voters to vote in higher percentages for the

PML(N).15

8.7.2 GENDER DIFFERENCES (SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS PARTIES)

Male and female voters also differed in their level of support for Islamic parties. Data

showed that women were less likely than men to vote for JUI-F, Jamat-e-islami

Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) candidates.

Table 8.7: Status of religious parties (NWFP in National Assembly):Religious PartyContested/ winner

1988 1990 1993 1997

JUI-F 12/03 22/02 X 11/0JUI-D 03/1 X X XTNFJ 01/00 X X XJUP-N X 01/00 X XPIF X X 15/01 XJUI-S X X X 03/0IJM X X 09/02 XSource: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). X means no candidate contested. JUI-F means Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman Group), JUI-D means Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (Darkhasti Group), TNFJ means Tehriq-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqa Jaffiriya, JUP-N means Jamiat-i-Ulem-e-Pakistan, PIF means Pakistan Islamic Front, JUI-S means Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam Sammiullah Group and IJM means Islamai Jamuri Itehad.

In Dera Ismail Khan, JUI-F, did better with female (58.3%) than with male voters

(53.9%) during 1988 and 1993 elections. The electoral positions of religious party

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were not satisfactory during 1988-1997 elections. Table 8.7 shows the status of

religious parties in National Assembly elections.16

8.7.3 FEMALE VOTER EDUCATION

Another finding was that women were much more likely to vote, usually, erroneously,

for other candidates who were not serious contenders. Many candidates have covering

candidates in the race to step in for them in case they are forced to withdraw.

Although covering candidates should not receive votes, they invariably do, indicating

confusion on the part of the voters17. Often candidates will adopt tactics to

deliberately confuse voters. In NWFP where the majority of voters are illiterate,

political party symbols that appear on ballot papers along with their candidate’s

names take on added significance. A candidate will often deliberately give his or her

covering candidate an election symbol that resembles the opponent’s symbol in order

to trick illiterate voters. One of the allegations made by the PPP following the 1990

elections was that dummy candidates were put up by the anti-PPP establishment and

given the symbol of the pencil in order to steal votes away from PPP candidates

whose symbol, an arrow closely resembled a pencil on ballot papers. In 1993, many

PML-N candidates complained that voters confused their tiger symbol on the ballot

with symbols of goat, cows and horses used by PPP candidates to confuse voters. The

majority of these votes(often by a ratio of more then 21) are cast by women, despite

the fact that fewer women were voting than men. The number of erroneous votes

being cast indicates the need for voter education, and in particular assistance for

illiterate voters, most of whom were women. A PPP campaign worker from a rural

constituency gave the following description of some of the problems faced by the

female voter on Election Day.

In rural areas women are not educated. We train them, but at the time of voting they get confused. Women usually never meet people outside of their family and their village, so they feel shy in intimidated when confronted by the polling station staff. In every election women waste a lot of votes by not marking the ballet properly, and candidates deliberately pick symbols for covering candidates to confuse the voters, especially the women voters. Interestingly, not as many women made the mistake of stamping the similar electoral signs. The Muslim League female polling station workers are better educated and better trained to instruct and pressurize women to vote for the Nawaz Sharif candidate. Their polling station workers are trained to recognize confused voters, stand next to them and accompany them all the way to the voting booth, instructing them how to vote. The simple women get confused by everyone telling them to stamp the arrow or stamp the tiger, stamp the arrow stamp the tiger, and they just want to get over with…. Its very common after the election for the men to tell jokes about how their women folk became confused and voted for the wrong candidate18.

In an interview with female voters from NA-14 Mansehra in 1997 elections, some of

the female voters pointed that she stamped on electoral symbol, ‘cup of tea’ as she

like to take tea.19 While interviewing to a researcher one female activist highlighted

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that some of the females in urban and rural areas of NWFP considered polling day

just like a festival.20 The main conclusion to be drawn was that candidates and the

political parties could no longer afford to ignore female voters. The data reveals that a

significant number of women, especially in urban areas, were voting independently of

their male family members. In close contests, of which there were usually many, the

votes of these women could well determine who wins a seat. Recognition of their

power to affect the outcome of electoral contest should encourage women to organize

more effectively, educate female voters, and be more vocal in their demands21.

During the 1993 election campaigns, The Aurat Foundation, a Pakistani non-

governmental organization that serves as an information and advisory service for

women, launched a ‘campaign for putting women on the political agenda of

Pakistan’. In this first non-partisan campaign of its kind, posters, pamphlets, stickers,

and broadcast material were prepared, and media support messages were aired to

educate voters on issues of concern for women and to encourage women to vote.

Political parties were asked to include women’s issues in their manifestos and

candidates were asked to state their positions on these issues. Although it is not

possible to assess the impact of this campaign, the data of this study certainly

indicates the need for female voter education.

8.8 CLASS

The findings of the case study of voting behaviour represented, supports the popular

perception that the PPP is the party of the poor, and the PML(N) is the party of middle

and upper class industrialists22. It revealed that while levels of support had changed,

the pattern of class support had remained remarkably consistent since the 1970s

election. The following section uses polling station data, postal ballet results, and the

returns from the capital city, Islamabad, to further illustrate the important role that

class plays in determining voting behaviour in urban NWFP.

In chapter five, ward-level data were used as the basic unit to analyse class voting

patterns. The data presented in this section are more precise as they are based on an

analysis of the 1988 returns from polling stations categorized by class23. By

expanding the scope of our analysis to include NWFP’s three largest cities-Peshawar,

Mardan, and Nowshera-it becomes clear that the class voting patterns observed in

Peshawar were not unique. Table 8.8 revealed that in all three cities the PPP

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consistently did better in the polling stations located in poorer neighbourhoods and the

ANP/PML(N) in middle and upper-class neighborhoods.24

Table 8.8: Table showing the Lower and Middle/Upper Class Neighbourhood Voting Patterns (Provincial Assembly) in NWFP cities.City Lower Class Middle/Upper Class Total

Male % Female % Total % Male % Female % Total % Male % Female % Total %PeshawarIJI-88 10.2 8.7 10.6 20.3 8.20 14.2 18.2 6.1 12.0PML-N- 97 10.4 6.2 8.4 18.2 6.7 12.5 12.2 8.4 10.31+/- 0.2 -2.5 -2.2 -2.1 -2.5 -2.3 -6.0 2.3 -1.69PPP- 88 60.5 39.8 50.04 35.01 15.8 25.03 20.4 54.4 37.04PPP- 97 36.10 14.5 25.80 17.6 5.23 11.4 10.7 26.4 18.55+/- -24.5 -25.2 -25.75 -17.41 -10.57 -13.63 -10.3 -32.0 -18.49ANP 88 23.5 33.8 28.4 25.5 12.2 18.8 21.4 25.1 23.68ANP 97 80.5 50.4 65.8 47.8 10.6 28.5 41.2 51.4 46.68+/- 57 16.6 37.4 22.3 -2.4 10.3 20.2 26.3 23AbbottabadIJI-88 38.3 26.8 32.8 30.2 20.5 25.5 23.2 31.3 27.41PML-N- 97 78.8 36.8 57.0 70.4 60.8 67.8 54.2 70.3 62.04+/- 40.5 10 24.2 40.2 40.3 42.3 31 39 34.63PPP- 88 10.8 6.1 8.3 30.2 10.4 20.8 10.2 18.3 14.91PPP- 97 1.5 1.7 1.8 3.1 1.5 2.8 1.3 3.2 2.93+/- -9.3 -4.4 -6.5 -27.1 -8.9 -18 -8.9 -15.1 -11.98ANP 88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0ANP 97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0+/- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Swat

IJI-88 23.4 13.4 18.8 40.3 16.3 28.8 30.2 16.1 23.84

PML-N- 97 42.4 18.3 30.5 60 30.6 45.8 40.5 36.2 38.24

+/- 18.8 4.9 11.7 19.7 14.3 17 10.3 20.1 14.4

PPP- 88 13.09 21.5 17.8 17.2 33.6 25.6 15.2 29.2 21.88

PPP- 97 6.2 10.4 8.5 13.5 19.6 16.4 3.4 8.9 6.23

+/- -6.89 -11.1 -9.3 -3.7 -14 -9.2 -11.8 -20.3 -15.65

ANP 88 18.7 14.7 16 35.2 17.8 26.2 23.4 21.4 21.58

ANP 97 14.3 18.8 11.2 29.8 15.4 21.5 15.4 17.2 16.68+/- -4.4 -4.1 -4.8 -5.4 -2.4 -4.7 -8 -4.2 -4.9DI KhanIJI-88 20.8 15.9 23 45.6 15.2 31.3 34.5 20.4 27.69PML-N- 97 49.8 21.3 35.2 78.2 42.4 60.4 68.2 28.7 48.83+/- 29 5.4 12.2 32.6 27.2 29.1 33.7 8.3 21.14PPP- 88 10.4 13.8 12.8 13.2 27.3 20.5 13 19.4 16.14PPP- 97 0.1 1.3 1.24 2.1 4.6 3.2 1.8 3.2 2.05+/- -10.3 -12.5 -11.56 -11.1 -22.7 -17.3 -11.2 -16.2 -14.09ANP 88 0.3 0.4 0.82 0.3 0.8 1.00 0.23 0.51 0.72ANP 97 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.01 0.03 0.04+/- -0.1 -0.1 -0.32 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.22 -0.48 -0.68Source: Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, ‘Form XVII, Result of the count’ (Polling Station results)

In 1993, the PPP-PML(J) won 47.4, 48.5, and 48.1% of the vote in the lower class

neighbourhoods of Peshawar, Mardan, and Nowshera respectively, and only 36.2,

35.1, and 39.4 percent in the middle and upper class neighbourhoods of these cities.

The PML(N) won about the same percentage (48, 48, and 45 percent respectively) as

the PPP-PML(J) in the lower class neighourhoods of these cities, but won 58.5, 61.4

and 54.7 percent of the vote in the middle and upper class neighbourhoods of

Abbottabad, Kohat, and Swat. The table indicates that the PML(N)’s strongest

supporters are women living in middle and upper class neighbourhoods while the men

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living in lower class neighbourhoods are the PPP’s staunchest the followers. While

these figures might confirm the popular perception that the PPP is the party of the

poor, comparing the 1988 and 1993 polling station results reveals the more significant

finding that the PPP is the party of a smaller number of the poor then it used to be.25

In Peshawar, Mardan, and Nowshera the PPP lost 9.4, 6.5, and 7.9% of the vote in

the lower class neighbourhoods which were traditionally its vote bank. The PPP’s 15

to 20% edge over the PML(N) in these areas in the 1988 elections had been all but

been eliminated by the 1993 elections26. The PPP trailed behind the IJI in middle and

upper class neighbourhood in 1988. By 1993, however, the PPP had lost an additional

7.6, 6.0 and 6.5% of the vote in the middle and upper class neighbourhoods of

Peshawar, Mardan, and Nowshera, giving the PML(N) an impressive lead of 22.3,

26.3 and 15.3%. although not shown in table seven PIF received a higher percentage

of the vote (4.6 and 3.0%) in the middle and the upper class neighbourhoods of

Peshawar and Mardan than in the lower class neighbourhoods (3.0 and 2.6%),

although in Nowshera it did slightly better (4.92, 4.7%) in the lower class

neighbourhoods. PIF did better with male voters than with the female voters. Its

strongest support came from men living in middle and upper class areas (4.9, 3.1 and

5.2%) and its weakest support living in lower class areas (2.7, 2.3 and 3.9%).

8.9 POSTAL BALLOTS: The following section seeks to identify the voting

behaviour of one important component of the middle class-civil and military

government employees. While it is not possible to completely isolate the vote of

government employees, an examination of postal ballot results as well as polling

station data from Islamabad allows one to make some educated guesses.27 In Pakistan,

unlike the United States or UK where any eligible voter can use an absentee ballot,

only the following categories of voters are eligible to vote by postal ballots: (i) civil

and military employees of the government who are posted somewhere other than

where they are registered as voters; (ii) their eligible accompanying family members;

(iii) polling staff on duty at polling stations; and (iv) prisoners.28 In Interviews with

people who counted postal ballot results it was reported that government employees

accounted for the vast majority of those who voted by post. The postal ballots results

summarized in table 5 indicate that those voting by postal ballots preferred the

PML(N) over the PPP-PML(J) coalition by a margin of nearly 25 per cent. These

results could reflect the better organization of the PML(N) election campaign,

although most candidates claimed that little effort was made to get people to vote by

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postal ballot because the number of votes involved was limited. It is likely, therefore,

that the results reflected the strong preference of government employees for the

PML(N) over the PPP. This would help explain the strong showing of PML(N) in

northern NWFP where 17.8 per cent of the labor force in 1981 were government

employees, more than double the number in any other region of the NWFP. The PIF

percentage of postal ballot votes was nearly twice the percentage of regular ballots it

won, reflecting its greater support from predominantly middle class government

employees than from the rest of NWFP society. PIF did considerably better in

northern and central NWFP than in southern and Northeastern NWFP, although much

of this can be attributed to contesting from more seats in the former regions than the

latter. Independent candidates and the Islamic parties other than the PIF did especially

well in western NWFP, much as they had in the regular balloting.

Table 8.9: Postal Ballot Results in NWFP: 1997 (In %age)NWFP Region PML-N PPP ANP Religious Others Independent

Central 14.7 18.6 39.8 0.15 3.76 14.1South 28.6 2.3 10.4 7.38 3.08 35.4

North-East 48.8 1.1 3.6 1.60 0.62 37.2North 29.9 18.1 20.6 2.69 2.24 13.3

Total/Average 30.5 10.0 18.6 3.0 2.4 25.9Source: Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, ‘Form XVII, Result of the count’ (Polling Station and Postal Ballot results), for NA-1 through NA-26.

Although complete postal ballot results from the 1988 elections are unavailable, an

examination of the results from 26 constituencies reveals an even greater reluctance

on the part of postal ballot voters to vote for PPP than in 1993. In the constituencies

examined, the IJI won 65.7 per cent of the vote in 1988 and 58 per cent in 1993,

whereas the PPP won 24.5 per cent in 1988 and 31 per cent in 1993.The PPP’s poorer

performance with postal ballot voters than with regular voters was a pattern that was

also visible in the 1970 elections, although to a much lesser extent. In contrast to the

twelve NWFP districts where the PPP won the most votes in the general balloting, the

PPP won the most postal ballots in only five districts. Six of the remaining districts

were won by the Council Muslim League, six by the main religious parties (JI, JUP,

JUI), and one each by the Pakistan Democratic party and independents.29 According

to Jones, ‘The postal ballot data reveals elites that were far more ambivalent about the

PPP, than were the broader public’.30

8.10 ISLAMABAD RESULTS

The polling station results from the nation’s capital, Islamabad, provided another

good indication of the voting behaviour of the middle class and government

employees. Islamabad is a new city that was built in a rural area outside of

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Rawalpinidi following Ayub Khan’s decision to shift Pakistan’s capital from Karachi

in the 1960s. As such, it has no historic roots and no traditional elites. It also has little

in the way of industry, and other than those employed by the services sector of the

economy, foreign embassies and international organizations, the majority of its

population is employed by the government. As housing is scarce and therefore

expensive, with the exception of a few katchi abadis (shanty towns) and lower middle

class housing colonies, the lower classes tend to live in nearby Rawalpindi and

commute to work. Islamabad is therefore unlike most Pakistani cities since a much

higher percentage of its population belong to the middle and upper classes, and a

disproportionately high number of it population work for the government.

As with the postal ballot results, Islamabad’s polling station results supported the

conclusion that the large majority of the government employees favored the PML(N)

over the PPP. In the polling stations located in the city , 59.3 per cent favoured the

PML(N) candidate and only 28.6 per cent voted for PPP. Less than half of

Islamabad’s city polling stations were identified as being segregated by gender. In

those that were, 64.9 per cent of women and 56.6 per cent of men supported PML (N),

while 25.2 per cent of women and 30.6 per cent of men supported PPP. In the rural

areas of Islamabad constituency, which accounted for two thirds of the total

constituency votes, the PPP candidate won 47.1 per cent of the votes and the PML(N)

candidate only 44.6 per cent. The PML (N) candidate won the seat due to the

overwhelming support of the predominantly middle and upper class voters of

Islamabad, many of whom were current or former government employees. The PIF

also did better with Islamabad’s voters than in most other constituencies of the

NWFP. In Islamabad it won 9.7 per cent of the city vote (11 per cent of the identified

male vote and 7.4 per cent of the female vote) and 5.5 per cent of the rural vote. In

1970 elections, the PPP did relatively well in Islamabad, indicating that it had

considerable support in bureaucratic circles. Nevertheless, the Islamabad results

revealed that the bureaucracy was clearly polarized and that a substantial number

remained opposed to PPP. Jones pointed out the ideological divide that existed. Apart

from the popularity of Awami League-doubtless among resident Bengali civil

servants-the 1970 elections in Islamabad were clearly a contest between the PPP and

the Jamaat-i-Islami. If we extract the Awami League votes, the PPP-JI polarization is

even more evident, the PPP taking 49.2 per cent and the JI 37.1 per cent. The

Islamabad figures point to a marked political polarization of the civil service elites

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between the two major ideological parties in Pakistan, each, in its own way,

supporting systematic change.31

This analysis indicates that class is still an important determinant of voting behaviour

in urban NWFP. The conclusion was further supported by the findings of the case

study of voting behaviour in Peshawar. In both cases the data reveal that there is a

distinct class division between the PPP and the anti-PPP (or ANP- IJI/PML) that has

been visible since 1970. It supports the popular perception that the PPP draws its

strongest urban support from the lower strata of society, and that the core of the anti-

PPP vote is formed by the conservative urban middle classes. The 1993 election

results, however, show a strong upsurge in support of the anti-PPP forces led by

Nawaz Sharif. While the patterns of class support are still very visible, the PML-N

clearly made inroads into the PPP’s former strongholds in lower and lower-middle

class neighbourhoods.

Table 8.10: Effect of Age, Literacy, and Education on Voting Behaviour.Demography 1988

1990 1993 1997

PPP IJI PDA IJI PPP PML-N PPP PML-N

Age: Under 30 38% 29% 36% 28% 33% 37% x xOver 30 37 34 31 37 36 35 x xLiteracy: illiterate 44 28 34 29 38 33 x xLiterate 34 34 33 35 33 37 x xEducation: Primary 32 33 39 29 x X x xMiddle 35 40 29 37 x X x xMatric (Grade 10) 34 37 32 37 x X x xIntermediate(Grade 12) 38 28 29 39 x X x xGraduate or above 35 28 33 35 x X x x

x means that Gallup Pakistan not recorded data.Source: Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Polls, 1990’, and 1993 exit poll survey results.

8.11 AGE: Survey analysis is the most accurate way to identify determinants of

voting behavior. The only serious electoral surveys in Pakistan have been the exit poll

surveys of male voters conducted by Gallup Pakistan.32 These surveys were

conducted throughout the country and the figures given are for Pakistan and not just

for the NWFP. The above Table summarizes some of the findings of these surveys

for the 1988, 1990 and 1993 elections, and indicates the role that age, literacy, and

education play in influencing the voting behaviour for Pakistan’s male voters.33 The

PPP has traditionally been perceived to be more popular among youth than other

parties, which is why the party has traditionally supported lowering the voting age

from 21 to 18. The survey data confirm that in 1998 and 1990 the PPP did indeed

have considerable more support from male voters under 30 than the IJI. A very

significant development in 1993, however, was the increase in support by under-30

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male voters for the PML-N from 29 and 28 percent in 1998 and 1990 respectively, to

37 percent in 1993. This is especially significant because exit poll results suggest that

voter turnout is highest among voters in the 21-30 age group.34 The PML-N’s support

among over-30 male voters actually decreased from 37 percent in 1990 to 35 percent

in 1993. In 1993, for the first time, the PPP had less support from under-30 than from

over-30 male voters. The data indicate that a considerable percentage of the increase

in support for the PML-N between 1990 and 1993 could be attributed to the increase

in support it received from younger voters. Not surprisingly, since the 1993 election

the PPP has made no mention of lowering the voting age.

There are several explanations for the apparent increase in support for the PML-N by

younger voters in the 1993 elections. The first was the interesting reversal that took

place in 1993 where by the PPP replaced the PML-N as the party perceived to be the

favourite of the civil-military establishment. Since the late 1960s, the PPP was viewed

as the anti-establishment party, or at least as the party opposed by the establishment.

This earned the PPP the support of many younger voters who were disillusioned with

how the generals and bureaucrats had governed the country, and who wanted to

change the status-quo. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s dismissal of Nawaz Sharif’s

government in the spring of 1993, however, transformed perceptions of him from

being a member of the establishment into an underdog fighting it. This new personna

was further strengthened when in July the military pressured both him and President

to resign, appointed a care-taker government, and called for elections in October. For

the first time in its history the PPP was perceived to be the favorites of the

establishment. If indeed younger voters in Pakistan are more inclined to support anti-

establishment parties this would help explain why they switched their support to the

PML-N in 1993.35

Another explanation for the increase in their support for the PML-N was Nawaz

Sharif’s image as the ‘Development’ Prime Minister, and his success in addressing

voter concerns on the issue of unemployment. Interviews conducted with voters and

candidates before and after the 1993 elections, especially of young voters highlight

this. Respondents in Gallup Pakistan’s exit poll surveys also identified unemployment

as the most important problem facing the country.36 During the 1993 campaign,

Nawaz Sharif’s media manager addressed this concern directly by developing his

image as the industrial Prime Minister who was committed to economic development

and preparing Pakistan for the 21st century. Newspaper advertisements reminded

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voters of his privatization policy and politically popular (but economically disastrous)

projects such as the massive Lahore to Islamabad Motorway Project and the ‘Yellow

Cab Scheme’.37 Yellow cabs worth US$700 million had been imported, and another

US$ 750nmillion planned, when the caretaker government came to power and

discontinued the programme. The PML-N election manifesto promised to expand the

programme to include schemes for yellow bicycles, yellow tractors and ‘yellow gold

cards’ to provide free higher education to all students securing top marks in degree

level courses.38 The Yellow Cab scheme, which provided soft-term loans to cover 90

percent of the cost of purchasing a yellow cab, was one of the government’s ‘Self-

Employment Schemes’ to address the unemployment problem. By the time of the

1993 elections, 54,000 yellow cabs were operating on the streets of Pakistan’s cities

and towns, which served as a visible advertisement of Nawaz Sharif’s policies to help

alleviate unemployment. 39 Referring to a loss of PPP among younger generation,

Shahid Afridi, a journalist from Peshawar, gave the following explanation as one

factor:

[T]he new generation…has acquired the vote that has never voted for the PPP in the past….This is the generation that must have been eight, nine or ten years old when Ziaul Haq came on the scene. They were too young to understand what Bhutto was all about. They were too young to have any empathy for Bhutto when he was assassinated or executed. But they were not young enough during the time Ziaul Haq stayed in this country, so they imbibed a lot of that culture and they did not bring any baggage with time. That’s the generation that now has the vote. And that generation has no empathy for Benazir Bhutto. In fact that generation has grown up to be a very conservative generation.40

Referring to the PPP’s loss of support among younger voters, another political

observer commented:

We have a term ‘pukki pakai’-ready-made. The PPP’s politics is ready-made. It was made by Bhutto and still depends on those who saw Bhutto. As long as those who saw Bhutto are alive, Bhutto is alive and the PPP is alive. When they die, Bhutto will die and the PPP will die.41

8.12 LITERACY (LEVELS OF EDUCATION)

There is a strong correlation between literacy rates and class; therefore, it is not

surprising that their effects on voting behaviour are very similar. The exit Poll results

given in the above table indicate that the PPP gets more support from illiterate male

voters and the IJI/PML-N from literate male voters. Between 1998 and 1993, the PPP

lost more support among the illiterate (Six percent) than literate (one percent) male

voters. Exit Poll data indicates that voters’ turnout among literate male voters is

approximately double that of illiterate male voters, which is a big disadvantage for the

PPP.42 Thus, the PML-N’s lead among literate voters becomes more significant than

the PPP’s lead among illiterate voters. The PML-N’s apparent advantage with literate

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voters helps explain why the party’s strongest regional result was in northern NWFP,

the province’s most literate region.43

Exit poll data on the impact of levels of education on voting behaviour were not

available for the 1993 elections. A comparison of the PPP and IJI data for the 1988

elections indicate that the PPP tended to do better with better educated male voters,

and the IJI with those who had received only a little education. The PPP received the

most support from male voters who had been educated only up to the primary level,

and the IJI from the better-educated voters.

8.13 MINORITIES IN ELECTORAL POLITICS OF NWFP

From the beginning, the post partition leaders of West Pakistan Demanded separate

electorates for the minorities, which meant that minority representation in the

National and Provincial Legislatures would be fixed in proportion to their population

and only the minorities would vote for their candidates.

The 1956 constitution that was aborted by Ayub Khan’s martial law in October 1958

had left the issue unsettled but had referred the matter to the National Assembly

which allowed West Pakistan to apply separate electorates for the minorities.

However, East Pakistan which had more minorities had rejected the idea. The 1962

and 1973 Constitutions adopted the joint electorate system. Under the military rule of

Zia-ul-Haq, who had political interest in cultivating the religious constituency, the

Constitution was amended in 1973 establishing separate electorates. Although

separate electorates guaranteed the election of 10 representatives of the minorities, in

reality this system excluded 3.8 percent of the population from voting. The religious

minorities namely Christians, Sikhs, Buddhist and Qadianis are scattered all over

NWFP without any major concentration.

Five elections, beginning in 1985 to 1997, were held under separate electorates in

which religious minorities did not vote for the mainstream candidates. Their votes in

well contested constituencies could have tipped the balance in favour of one candidate

or another. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Civil Society

Groups (CSGs) and the associations representing minorities demanded a repeal of

separate electorates, but the mainstream political parties fearing political attacks from

religious parties did not respond with the abolition of separate electorates. However,

they had little or no representation in the assemblies with the ending of special seats

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for them. One suggestion that has been circulated in this regard is that special seats

allocated to the minorities in the assemblies be restored.

Table 8.11: Results of elections to the seats reserved for minority communities in the provincial assembly of NWFP: seat reserved for Sikh, Budhist, Parsi and Non- Muslim communities (1 seat).

1997 1993 1990 1988Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation

Votes polled

Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation

Votes polled

Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation

Votes polled

Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation

Votes polled

1.Engineer Gayan (IND)

809 1. Engineer Gayan (IND)

616 1. Dr. Singar Singh (IND)

495 1. Mr. Behari Lal (IND)

563

2. Mr. Bahari Lal (IND)

447 2. Mr. Behari Lal 654 2. Mr. J.R Gill (IND) 444 2. Mr. J.R Gill (IND)

416

3. Mr. Jesvenat Das (IND)

41 3. Mr. J.R Gill (IND) 371 3. Mr. Behari Lal (IND)

408 3. Mr. Hakim Bhag Chand (IND)

169

4. Dr. Singar Singh (PMI)

112 4. Mr. Singar Singh (IND)

353 4. Mr. Noor Shahideen (IND)

280 4. Mr. Singar Singh (IND)

439

5. Mr. Sajan Bishandas Choan (IND)

300 5. Mr. Raja Amar Nath (IND)

164 5. Mr. Amar Jeet (IND)

249 5. Mr. Saifullah Jan (IND)

293

6. Mr. Sherzada (IND)

735 6. Mr. Sherzada (IND)

409 6. Mr. Bashara Khan (IND)

243 6. Mr. Abdul Khaliq (IND)

323

7. Ganga Veshan (IND)

254 7. Mr. Wazir (IND) 168 7. Mr. Raja Amir Nath (IND)

213

8. Mr. Hakim Bhag Chand (IND)

105

9. Mr. Gul Darshan (IND)

77

10. Mr. Abdul Khaliq (IND)

06

Source: Data compiled from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988,

1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

Their participation rate in electoral politics of the province is illustrated in table 8.11.

During the Musharraf period (1997-208), minorities re-entered mainstream politics

The minorities have great interest in voting. Their voting percentage is comparatively

high as compared to other communities. Qadianis, one of the other minority groups

also contested elections, except 1988 elections. The detailed results of this community

are shown in table 8.13. Table 8.12 shows that voter turnout rate is much lower in this

minority community as compared to other minority communities. Pakistan’s 1973

constitution provided for a ‘joint electorates’ system allowing religious minorities to

vote for the same candidates as Muslim voters. However, the 8th amendment to the

constitution, pushed through the National Assembly by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1986,

instituted a system of ‘separate electorates’. Under this system minorities could only

vote for candidate for 10 minority seats in the National Assembly, and 23 minority

seats in Pakistan’s four provincial Assemblies.

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Table 8.12: Detailed results of elections to the seats reserved for minority communities in the provincial assembly of NWFP: seat reserved for persons belonging to the Quadianis group or Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis) (1 seat)

1997 1993 1990 1988Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation

Votes polled

Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation

Votes polled

Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation

Votes polled

Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation

Votes polled

1. Mr. Tahir Aftab (IND)

15 1. Mr. Rana Ghuyur Ahmad (IND)

7 1. Malik Qaseemuddin Khan (IND)

29 No Candidate filed nomination papers, consequently this seat remained funfiled.2. Malik

Qaseemuddin (IND)

48 2. Mr. Muhammad Anwar (IND)

4 2. Mrs. Khaudeeja Khanum (IND)

01

1. Malik Qaseemuddin (IND)

81

Source: Data compiled from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).

While this ensured that they would be represented in the assemblies, it cut them off

from the political mainstream as candidates from the major political parties no longer

needed to seek their votes. At the time of 1981 census, minorities constituted 2.2

percent of NWFP’s population and 3.7 per cent in the seat-rich districts of central

NWFP.44 In Peshawar, Kohat, and DI. Khan, the number exceeded five percent and in

Battagram and Mardan, more than four percent.

8.14: RELIGIOUS DETERMINANTS: Without more complete survey data, it

is impossible to provide a detailed explanation of the role that religion or religious

views play in determining voting behaviour. The data presented in this study,

however, have provided some indications of which social groups are most supportive

of Pakistan’s most organized and best known Islamic party, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI).45

In 1993 contesting under the Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) banner, JI did better with

urban than with rural voters, with lower-middle and middle-class voters than with

lower-and upper-class voters, and with male than with female voters. Overall,

however, JI as well as Pakistan’s other Islamic parties never fared well in electoral

politics until 2002. As table 3-2 illustrates, their best result before 2002 was in the

1970 elections when all the Islamic parties combined won 20.5 per cent of the vote

but only 5 of 82 seats. In 1993 they received only 3.9 per cent of the vote and only

one seat.

Both western and Pakistani political experts are fond of interpreting this as an

indication of the lack of popular support for Islamic political parties.46 It is a mistake,

however, to equate lack of electoral support with lack of popular support. Islamic

parties suffer from the same electoral problems that nearly all third parties have with a

‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system47. Few voters are willing to waste their votes on a

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losing candidate, especially in a political system that is heavily based on patronage.

JI’s leader, Munawar Hassan, pointed out the dilemma confronting his party on 6

September 1994.

At present, people might be disinterested with the politics of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir, but its not true that they

would not vote for them. If elections were held tomorrow, they would call them bad names and would say that they

are disintegrating the country, an that they have bad people and bad budgets and bad policies. But they will vote for

them again because they feel they do not have any options. We shall have to prove our worth and that we really are an

option, an alternative. Not theoretically that they are bad and so we are good. People do say that we are good people

and are very well knit and organized, but they do not think we can be a substitute or alternative in this type of

politics.48

In the 1993 elections, many voters sympathetic to the JI, including card carrying

members, refused to waste their votes on JUI-F candidates. One JUI-F candidate, a

well respected religious figure in Mansehra, described his experience:

[P]eople really apologized and said, ‘You are the best candidate we have ever had in this city since partition. But we are sorry to say that you will not succeed so we will be wasting our vote….’ [E]very one came to me and said, ‘…everything you say is one hundred percent right. We sincerely believe that you are a man that will not tell a lie, and that if you come to power you will not distinguish between rich and poor, between Christians and Muslims, or between parties. You will be true to your call. The only thing is that you will not win.’49

The electoral history of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, the leader of JUI-F’s is a good

example of why political popularity should not be judged solely by the number of

votes won in an election. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, won DI. Khan NA-18 in 1988

contesting as JUI-F candidate, narrowly lost in 1990 and 1997 as the JUI-F candidate,

and than won in 1993 an IJM candidate. This indicates that voters did not hesitate to

vote for a ‘fundamentalist’ as long as they thought the candidate had a chance of

winning. It was only as a PIF candidate in 1993 that he came in a distant third behind

the two major party candidates.

8.15 SECTARIANISM

One disturbing development in the 1993 elections was the growing influence that

sectarianism played in determining voting behaviour. In the past, Sunni-Sh’ite

tensions have played a role in electoral profiles, but this was usually confined to a few

areas such as Kohat and Hangu, which had a long history of sectarian strife. The last

few years, however, have witnessed the spread of sectarian politics throughout the

province and the country, along with a dramatic increase in the number of acts of

violence. Many of these were linked to sectarian parties that have emerged during the

last ten years such as the virulently anti-shi’ite organization, Anjuman-e-Sipah-i-

Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP).50 While these parties did not fare well in the elections,51

several politicians commented during interviews on the new role that sectarianism

was playing in the politics of their constituencies. In listing the factors effecting

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voting behaviour in this constituency, one PML(N) National Assembly candidate

observed:

A new thing has developed which is playing havoc in politics, and which is not a happy trend. That is religious sectarianism, whose adherents whether one asks them for a vote or not, vote according to whatever decision is taken by their high command. This does not mean religious political parties such as Jamaat-i-Islami. It means an altogether different thing….For example, the PPP had an alliance with the Fiqh Jafria [a Shi’ite party], so all Shi’ites in my village gave their votes to the PPP because of their religious beliefs. They have gone out of my influence.52

The common perception in NWFP is that Shi’ites who fear any further attempt to

introduce Islamic laws in accordance with Sunni Schools of Islamic thought, favour

the more secular PPP over the PML(N).53 One political observer pointed out an

electoral dilemma at the PPP faces, ‘If Shi’ite are with PPP, anti Shi’ite vote against

the PPP. But if Shi’ite are with the PML, anti Shi’ite religious voters still vote for the

PML. The PPP loses both ways’.54 In NWFP there are two major Sunni Schools of

thought, the Deobandis55 and the Barelvis. Jamiat-i-Islami (JUI) is the party of the

more orthodox Deobandis and Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP)56 the party of the more

heterodox and populist Barelvis. On election day, for the same reason the majority of

their supporters are unlikely to ‘waste’ their votes on the JUI and JUP. According to

one observer they are likely to vote as follows:

Sunni Barelvis tend to be more liberal and vote for the PPP…. If someone converts from Barelvi to Wahabi, than immediately they become anti-PPP. Political affiliation is closely linked with religious affiliation in the popular mind. If someone becomes a Wahabi the question does not even arise that they had vote for the PPP.57

8.16 MAULVIS, PIRS, AND SAJJADA NASHINS

One of the problems faced by the religious parties seeking to increase their influence

in rural NWFP is that the local religious leaders, the village maulvis (or mullahs),58

are held in much lower esteem than their urban counterparts.59 As maulvis in rural

areas are often dependent on the handouts of the village Malik/Sardar (chief) their

status is often no better than that of the other sipis (low status caste-like artisans and

service groups).60 According to Rahimullah Yousafzai, a senior journalist from

Peshawar:

….The concept of maulvi or the mullah is that he’s only fit for [performing] religious rituals. He is not fit to rule, this is the concept here in this society. They do not regard mullah as a respectable person. This is especially true in rural areas [where] this concept is very strong. There is a mosque and a madrassa, so the image of the maulvi is to lead the prayer and to teach in the school. Even socially he’s is not equal to landlord. So this is their drawback. They are not viewed as competent enough, or well educated enough, or modern enough to rule the country.61

In rural NWFP, therefore, the political influence of the village maulvi is limited. The

better educated maulvis in urban areas command greater respect and undoubtedly play

a more important political role. It is still doubtful, however, that they have much

influence in determining the voting behaviour. The consistently poor performance of

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religious parties would be one indication that secular concerns motivate the voters

more than the religious ones. While village and urban maulvis may not wield much

political influence, it was clear that religious leaders such as pirs (spiritual guides) and

Sajjada nashins (hereditary custodians of Sufi sharines) often do.62 This was

especially true of southern NWFP where in every election a large number of

makhdooms, syeds, and pirs contest.63 In 1993, for example, in Multan and Khanewal

districts alone, the PPP and PML(N) gave tickets to eight MNA and eight MPA

candidates who had religious titles. Many of these pirs and sajjada nashines do wield

considerable influence, but it was not clear whether this was due to their religious

powers or more secular factors. Hamza Alavi argued forcefully that their control

stems more from their secular powers as landlords and their access to patronage

networks than from their religious powers as pirs and sajjada nashins.64 This

argument is supported by Mian Gul Aurangzeb, a former PML-N, MNA from Swat,

who is from one of the most prominent religio-political families of Northern NWFP.

Not only is he the sajjada nashin of an important shrine (Saidu Baba) near Swat, but

his father Mian Gul Jahan Zeb (Wali-e-Swat) had a respectable position in NWFP.

According to him, however, his family background will no longer get him elected as

what counts in today’s electoral politics is ‘delivery’. Every weekend he was free he

therefore travels home to his constituency to ‘deliver’. People are more conscious.

People are more aware. We have had successive quick elections and that had effected

the voting behaviour of people. People are more demanding and are more conscious

of their rights. And that thing that you come from such and such family, or are the son

of so and so-that is gone to a great extent. I do not think that, though I am from a

traditional family, a respected family in the areas because of my ancestors who also

were missionaries and religious people…yet I do not think that I can just get elected

on the basis of that any more. people want a candidate who can deliver. And delivery

has become increasingly important and it will become more and more important as

time goes by.65

8.17 FACTIONALISM IN NWFP

Virtually every NWFP village is split into two or more dharas, of factions.66 The

bitter enmities that often existed between factions frequently resulted in factions

playing a more important role in determining voting behaviour than biradari rivalries,

or class divisions between the landed and the landless. Paul Brass has defined a

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faction as ‘a vertical structure of power which cross cuts caste and class divisions.’67

Inayatullah has defined it as ‘a secondary group, super-imposed on the other primary

groups [of family, kinship, and caste]. Sometimes it runs parallel and sometimes

across, but always seeking cohesion in order to ascertain power or to meet a challenge

from another group.68 According to Inayatullah, the need for factional affiliation

arises due to the tension within the village, ignorance of the law and legal procedures

of the villagers and arbitrary powers of the police. In all these situations, a family

needed the help of a person who had influence with police, knows the law and legal

procedures, and has effective friendship all around….[T]hese ‘leaders’ try to align

themselves with another leader on a higher level of influence and gradually the link

touches the political party in power. Thus factional affiliations ultimately connect the

village to one or more political parties….The factional affiliations are growing

gradually, especially as isolation and social and economic self-sufficiency of village is

breaking down.69

The result of factionalism at election time is that if faction A lends its support to

candidate A, the rival faction B will be compelled to endorse candidate B, regardless

of the candidate’s reputation, biradri, or party affiliation. The following example of

factional politics in a village in the Batagram constituency of NA-16, was a case in

point. Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Khan was a completely alaiwal village from NWFP.

No other alaiwal lived in other parts of this constituency. But Nawaz Khan [a

alaiwal] won purely due to local party bazi [another term for factionalism]. There

were two groups, a murder took place-this is jor-tor [make and break] politics. One

faction supported Mr. Alamzeb Khan [a swati] so the other faction had to support

Nawaz Khan. Biradri is not a factor. Development is not a factor. Its purely a matter

of two factions in the village. These traditional rivalries in NWFP have a big effect on

elections.70

This may help explain why only a few candidates, especially in central and northern

NWFP, win overwhelming victories in rural constituencies.71 An MNA candidate

from a rural constituency of DI. Khan-cum-Tank-Kulachi (old DI. Khan) explained

the influence of factions on electoral politics as follows:

Normally people do not shift their alliances in villages; why they do not shift is because normally every village is divided into different factions or dharas. If I belong to the Muslim League then your faction, if you are opposing me, will go and join the other party to seek protection and refuge. And these personal feuds lead people to seek refuge through politics. Every village is divided which is why no party can win 100 percent of the votes in any village, except in those villages that are religiously effected. There are three villages in my constituency which are Shi’ite where I cannot get a single vote. Or where a lot of development work has been done nobody can get single vote. All dharas disappear if I have given them

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the favour of electricity or roads. All the dharas are there for local feuds but if I have done a lot of development everyone will vote for me.72

In his opinion, while factionalism was viewed as a significant determinant of voting

behaviour. Sectarianism and development seemed to be even more important. The

theme that development and patronage have increasingly become the most important

determinants of voting behaviour was one that was heard repeatedly during the course

of this study.

8.18 BIRADARI (CLANS) AS A SOCIAL DETERMINANT

It is commonly argued that ‘primordial’ group identities such as family, kinship and

caste, or membership in a village faction, played a more important role in determining

voting behaviour in the subcontinent, than individual political preferences. In village

life in Northern India, Oscar Lewis wrote: “The theoretical assumption behind a

democratic system based on voting is that the individual is an independent, thinking

being capable and ready to make his own decision. However, in a kinship organized

society…it is the large extended family which is the basic unit for most decision-

making. At, best, voting becomes an extended family process”.73

In NWFP, this argument was commonly heard referring to the important role that

biradari played in the politics of the NWFP, especially at election time. Biradari

(literally ‘brotherhood’) was important kinship system operating in NWFP. Zekiye

Eglar has defined it as a patrilineage whereby ‘all men who can trace their

relationship to a common ancestor, no matter how remote, belong to the same

biradri.74 However, both Eglar and Hamza Alvi have pointed out that the term was

not very precise as it can also be used to describe other relationships and groupings75

In rural NWFP, for example, the term can be used to refer to the paterilineal kinship

groups of the zamindars, or landowners, but also signified the different occupational

groups of landless seipis.76 Furthermore, there can be numerous ‘microbiradaries’ (i.e

Awans, Gujjars, Parachas) within a macro biradaries, (i.e Jat). The term ‘biradari’

was often used interchangeably with words as ‘qaum’ (tribe or nation) and ‘zat’

(caste). Biradari has played an important role in Muslim politics in NWFP throughout

twentieth century. Some of the first modern Muslim organizations in the subcontinent

were founded near the turn of the century on the basis of biradari. Gilmartin pointed

out the importance of biradari in the pre-partition urban politics of the NWFP.77

Colonial policies that distinguished and discriminated along the basis of caste and

biradari, such as the Land Alienation Act of 1900, served to reinforce their political

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importance. Biradari considerations were also taken into account by colonial

administrators while drawing district and sub-district administrative boundaries.78

These were often designed to create local strongholds for landed elites and tribal and

biradari leaders who were co-opted to maintain political stability in their areas of

control. A single member constituency electoral system was subsequently grafted

onto these pre-existing administrative boundaries. As Waseem has pointed out that the

idea was to keep the local power structures intact in which the locally dominant elite

could mobilize their traditional support base in terms of ethno-linguistic ties, tribal

loyalties, caste/biradari identity and factional grouping for the purposes of election.

In this way, the prevalent patronage structures in the locality found an expression in

the emergent democratic framework.79

In the colonial era voting rights were limited because of property and education

qualifications which further bolstered the role of the traditional elites. In India there

has been considerable scholarly attention given to the role of ‘primordial’ identities,

caste in particular, in determining voting behaviour.80 The initial tendency was to treat

caste as the primary determinant of voting behaviour. Subsequent studies, however,

highlighted that caste was only one of several determinants, and that it should be

treated as a dynamic variable. Increasing emphasis was also given to the politicization

of caste, and how politics affected caste and not just how caste impacted on politics81.

Other observations were that caste was a more important factor in local than in

national politics, and in rural than in urban areas.82 On the subject of caste as a

determinant of voting behaviour in India, Norman Palmer sums up as follows:

A broad conclusion for which considerable support can be found is that increasingly caste has become only one of many determinants of voting behaviour, and that at least in state and national elections it is seldom if never the most decisive factor.83

In NWFP, the role of kinship and biradari as a determinant of voting behaviour had

received much less scholarly attention. This was especially true of the period since

electoral politics was restored in 1985. Several village studies conducted at national

level in the late 1950s and 1960s did examine the role played by traditional rural

social structures in provincial and local government elections.84 Inayatullah’s study of

the attitudes and beliefs of Punjabi villagers in Gujranwala district in the 1950s and

1960s emphasized the primacy of the group over the individual. The first important

fact about the village life is that it is an aggregate of individuals. In fact, the real

individual in the sense of Western urban society does not exist in the village. He is an

inalienable part of multiple groups which completely overshadow his individuality.

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The various decisions in different fields of life are made by groups for him and he felt

the need to challenge them. The first and most important group for the individual was

the family which made for him the major decisions in life. The eldest [male] in the

family decides, in the light of custom and tradition, what profession one adopted, how

much education one should receive, whom one should marry and what type of inter-

personal relations one should maintain. Next to the family comes the biradari group.85

First it was biradari as a whole which was contacted and when it was realized that

there were some families who were loosely integrated to the larger units then pressure

was shifted to the family.86 Saghir Ahmad argued from a Marxist perspective ‘that

class relations of South Asian villages are more fundamental for most of their life

experience…than is their membership in qaums or caste like status groups.87 Hamza

Alvi qualified this by pointing out that the importance of kinship and caste on voting

behaviour will differ depending on whether someone is economically dependent or

independent. Hamza Alavi notes that where the voter is an economic dependent of a

landlord or other figure, his ‘vertical’ alignment to this figure is likey to take

precedence over his’horizontal, alignments of kinship or caste were determining his

vote. The horizontal alignment of voters, as in instances of lineage solidarity, was by

contrast strongest among voters who had some economic independence.88 To the

surprise of nearly every one, in the 1970 national elections that swept the PPP into

power, class defeated kinship and caste in determining his vote. The horizontal

alignment of voters, as in instances of lineage solidarity, was by contrast strongest

among voters who had some economic independence. To the surprise of nearly

everyone, in the 1970 national elections that swept the PPP into power, class defeated

kinship ad caste in determining voting behaviour. The only detailed analysis of the

role of biradari in this election is included in Philip Jones’ study of the PPP and the

1970 elections, in which he concluded:

PPP leaders…claimed to have finally ‘shattered’ the biradari system, at least insofar as its customary political functions are concerned. This claim was premature, since biradari considerations became a factor in by-elections as early as 1973 and were a major element in the national elections of 1977. nevertheless, the 1970 elections did show strong ‘horizontal’ patterns of ‘party voting’ that broke through ‘verticle’ biradari identities.89

In the rural areas of western and southern NWFP traditional vertical ‘feudal’, tribal,

and religious identities proved stronger on election day than modern horizontal

identities. However, in the rural areas of central and northern NWFP, where biradari

identities are strongest, horizontal identities usually won over vertical. Party support

patterns in rural areas were generally divided along class lines between landowners

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and the landless rather than on biradari lines. Since Jones’s study on the 1970

elections there has been little research on the relationship between biradari and voting

behaviour. However , that biradari is once again viewed as one of the most important

determinants of voting behaviour was made abundantly clear during elections when

virtually all central and northern NWFP constituency analyse that appear in the press

make it a central consideration. The 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections in NA-14

Mansehra-1, there were a straight battle between two leading biradaris, the Gujjars

and the Syeds. The Syeds in numbers were few people but are politically strong. The

PML-N awarded national assembly party ticket to Sardar Muhammad Yousaf (Gujjar

biradari) and for provincial seats awarded ticket to Muhammad Tariq Khan Swati,

(swatis family) to win the support in elections. These arrangement were taken to get

the support of important biradaris in Mansehra. Moreover the electoral contest of

Baber Nasim Khan (an MPA in 1988 election on IJI ticket), turned the electoral

environment in favour of PML-N to break the votes of Awans and Qureshi biradaries

in this constituencies.90 A common argument heard in NWFP is that biradari regained

its importance as a powerful political force during the Zia years when national level

politics was banned.91 From 1979 until 1985, only Local Body elections were held,

and in 1985. As the candidates were disassociated from national parties and issues

they appealed to local issues and traditional identities such as biradari to win votes.

Rasul Buksh Rais presented this argument that partyless nature of elections and the

ban on traditional means of electioneering (through public rallies and speeches)

prevented debate on national issues. And, of course, the elections restricted to only

independent candidates would not allow any group either to take formal shape or to

formulate a national programme. The personal influence of the candidates, the ties to

clan, tribe, or biradari and feudal social base, in particular, largely determined the

outcome of elections.92

Using constituency report for the 1990 elections that appeared in the press, Theodore

Wright wrote a short article on ‘biradaris’ in elections’. Based on these press

accounts he found that biradari was a stronger determinant of voting behaviour than

party allegiance, except when the two major candidates were from the same family or

biradari93 (which is often the case). He also found that ‘a good deal of biradari “ticket

balancing” was done between the candidates for National Assembly seat and the

several [sic] provincial assembly constituencies within each.94 The most significant

finding was the ‘new tendency of voters to vote regardless of biradri, against

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incumbents who have neglected their constituents…or made unfulfilled promise in the

last elections’.95 Wright concluded that ‘candidates are still largely selected with their

biradaris in mind and voters are swayed, more often than not by their biradari

membership because it effects their access to state largesse’.96 In interviews with

candidates and political observers, the importance of biradri received a mixed

response. One former MNA from Mansehra, who won in 1988 as independent

candidate and latter became the federal Minster for tourism in PPP government and

latter lost in 1993, attributed his defeat to biradari factor. ‘[w]here I have won I had

syed biradari support. Where Sardar Muhammad Yousaf won he had Gujjar biradari

support. The Gujjar biradari is in the majority so he has won.’97 In the neighbouring

constituency of NA-11, however, the losing PPP candidate, Muhammad Gulzar

Abbasi, a PPP candidate in 1997 elections attributed his defeat to the anti-PPP vote.98

In NWFP, PPP candidates played with strong biradari system.

My biradari is very prominent but still I lost. I would say that more than 60 percent of my biradarivoted against me because of the simple fact that they were ant-PPP’. Another political observer argued that economic classes were more important than biradri: ‘Traders are a biradari, not Abbasi and Jadoons. When an Abbasi becomes a trader he votes like a Jadoon trader. If a Jadoon becomes a zimindar [landlord], he will vote like an Abbassi zimindar’.99 Biradari clearly plays a very important role during the stages leading upto election day as it is one of the factor taken into consideration when constituencies are delimited.100

According to the Election Commission’s report on the 1970 elections, “castes and

‘biradaries’ were not regarded as sacrosanct, following the principle of homogeneity

of population, representation of predominant ‘biradari’ and castes was ensured in

forming the constituencies in the case of Gujars and Awans of Gujrat district”.101 One

Gujjar PML-N, NA candidate, described the faulty biradari strategy adopted by his

party in 1993 to select a PA running mate in a constituency dominated by the Swati102

biradari.

We thought that if we could get a swatti as a Provincial Assembly candidate we would be able to breakup their vote….But because there was Gujjar at the top as the MNA candidate, all the swati voted for their candidates. And because the Awans were the next largest biradri, they felt they should have been given the PA ticket. When the PML-N gave the ticket instead to another Swati, the Awan made sure that they also voted for the PML-N candidates. Furthermore, they felt that if there was Gujjar in both the MNA and MPA slots, this would not be in their interests.103

A detailed analysis of the biradari ties of all the PPP and PML(N) candidates for the

1993 elections concluded that, ‘apart from a few seats in big cities like Haripur and

Mardan, all the candidates represent dominant biradaris of their constituencies’.104

The only statistical data available, Gallup Pakistan’s exit poll surveys, indicated that

biradri is not as important determinant of voting behaviour as is commonly assumed.

In response to the question, ‘would you tell us the most important reasons which led

you to vote for the candidate for whom you have just voted’, 12 percent chose

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biradari/clan in 1998, 7 percent in 1990 and 6 percent in 1993.105 The fact that the

PML(N) won every urban constituency in NWFP, and in some cases with virtually

unknown candidates with little biradri support, indicated that biradari was certainly

not the major determinant in urban NWFP. As the case study of voting behaviour in

North-east NWFP revealed, party (or Nawaz Sharif) loyalty was a much more

important factor.

As is the case with caste in India, however, biradri does play a more important force

in local than in national level elections.106 The prevalence of village factions that often

cut across biradari identities also serve to limit the influence of biradari in the

electoral politics of rural NWFP. As Wright observed, it is also common for both

parties to select candidates from the same biradari, thus partially or fully canceling

out the biradari factor. Furthermore, as the following quote reveals, it is important to

bear in mind that in rural areas members of one biradari never constitute a majority of

the voters in a constituency.

The majority of the people are mazaras [tenants] and kammies and they vote for PML-N. One tenant’s representative, Ishaq Khan from Abbottabad said in an interview that Jadoon landholders supported Amanullah Jadoon because he is a Jadoon. But their tenants supported him because he was the candidate of the PML-N. Only when they feel intimidated do they vote according to how their landholders tell them. If Jadoon had been running on a PPP ticket, he would have lost even in his own village.107

CONCLUSIONS

There is ample evidence to suggest that candidates are increasingly being judged on

the basis of their performance as deliverers of patronage and development.

Increasingly, in order to win elections candidate will have to add ‘development votes’

to their ‘biradari votes’. This study’s conclusion differs from the one reached by

Wright in 1990 that ‘voters are swayed, more often than not by their biradari

membership because it effects their access to state largesse’.108 In the 1993 elections,

biradari still seemed to be a more important determinant of voting behaviour than in

the 1970 elections, but a less important determinant than was commonly believed. In

general, the importance of biradari is greater in central and northern NWFP than in

southern and western NWFP, in rural than in urban constituencies, and in local than in

national elections. Its importance is reduced by biradari and factional rivalries within

constituencies, by class tensions between the haves and have-nots, and by the fact that

both parties take biradari factor into consideration when awarding tickets. The

evidence indicates that party loyalty in urban areas and the performance of candidates

in providing patronage and development to their constituents in rural areas play an

important role in determining voting behaviour. This supports the overall conclusion

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of this study that political factors are growing in importance relative to social factors

in determining the behaviour of the voters in the NWFP.

1 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 535-539.2 Daily Dawn (Karachi), 28 March 1999.3 Syed Ijaz Shafi Gillani, A Dispassionate Analysis of Electoral Rigging in Pakistan 1970-2002(Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2008), p.iv.4 Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 12 April 1994.5 Daily Jang (Rawalpindi), 23 June 1993. (Urdu Newspaper)6 Ibid.7 Shafqat Mahmood, ‘who Got more Votes Debate’, The News, 3 August 1995, 8 For detail see, Andrew R. Wilder, ‘Changing Patterns of Punjab Politics in Pakistan: National Assembly Election Results, 1988-1993’, Asian Survey 35 (April 1995).9 Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience (Darham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), p.29610 Name withheld, Interview by author, Peshawar, February 03, 200611 I.A Rehman, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 8 September 2005.12 Name withheld, interview by author, Peshawar, February 03, 200613 Maj (R) Mukhtar Ahmad, Interview by author, tape recording, Charsada, 17 April 2006.14 Daily Dawn (Karachi), 24 October 1993.15 Daily Pakistan Observer, 13 December 1993.16 Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). X means no candidate contested. 17 Zahid Hussain, Interview by author, tape recording, Batagram, 28 April 2006.18 Zauja Muhammad Suleman, Interview by author, Tape recording, Chitral, 17 June 2006.19 Zakia Khatoon, Interview with Author, Mansehra, 13 January 2007.20 Saiqa Jabeen, Interview with author, Mansehra, 13 October 200921 Aurat Foundation (Quarterly Newsletter), Arat 5, Nos. 2-3, 1993.22 Daily Jang (Rawalpindi), 15 March 199523 Through interviews with candidates, campaign staff and journalist, polling stations were classified as being either in lower class neighbourhoods on the one hand, or in lower-middle, middle or upper class neighbourhoods on the other. A more precise classification system would have been desirable, as there is clearly a considerable degree of subjectivity involved in classifying neighbourhoods and in defining what is ‘lower class’ or ‘middle class’. Informants sometimes disagreed as to whether a neighbourhood was lower or lower middle class. Furthermore, on occasion a polling station served both an elite residential neighbourhood as well as katchi abadi (shanty town) located within or next to upper class neighbourhoods. Despite these difficulties, in the majority of cases polling stations could easily be classified. 24 It is important to recall the ‘ecological fallacy’ using aggregate electoral data to draw conclusions regarding the voting behaviour of individuals. The data in this section can inform us about the voting behaviour of lower class neighbourhoods, on the one hand, or lower middle, middle and upper class neighbourhoods, on the other, but not how lower class, and lower-middle, middle and upper class voters vote. However, a study with an analysis on the small and relatively homogeneous unit of the polling station, is much less likely to suffer from the ecological fallacy, than a study basing its assumption on the characteristic of much larger and more heterogeneous unit, such as constituency. 25 Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, ‘Form XVII, Result of the count’ (Polling Station results)26 Ibid.27 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, pp.505-10.28 Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on the General Elections, 1990, Vol. 1, 134.29 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, pp.507-830 Ibid., 50731 Ibid., 50932 Gilani, Pakistan at the Polls: Campaign Candidates and Voters; Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Poll’, November 1988; and Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Polls’, 1990. 33 Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Polls, 1990’, and 1993 exit poll survey results.

330

34 Exit poll data indicate the following national (not just NWFP) male voter turnout figures by age group.Year 21-30 31-40 41-60 60 and above1988 35% 26 32 71990 38 30 27 41988 results are from Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Polls’, 22. the 1990 results were given to the author by Dr. Ijaz Gillani of Gallup Pakistan.35 Daily The Frontier Post (Peshawar), 29 August 1994.36 Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Polls’, 1990, p. 69.37 Javed A. Malik, ‘What to do with 16000 Yellow Cabs?’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 10 September 1993.38 Pakistan Muslim League, Election Manifesto 1993 (Islamabad: Central Secretariat, 1993)39 The political benefits of the yellow cab scheme clearly outweighed the economic benefits, and the programme was much more effective in promoting Nawaz Sharief than in reducing unemployment. There wee widespread allegation of fraud, numerous cases were reported of people painting their yellow cabs another colour and using them as personal vehicles, or of political cronies buying fleets of Yellow cabs which were than rented out on a daily basis.40 Shahid Afridi, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, September 24, 200641 Rahimullah Yousafzai, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, September 24, 200642 Gallup Pakistan, Pakistan at the Poll, 1990, 4043 Northern NWFP’s literacy rate at the time of 1997 census was 35.4 per cent, compared to 37.58 per cent in central NWFP., 33.7 per cent in southern NWFP, and 28.14 per cent in Northern NWFP and 35.2 in North-Eastern part of NWFP.44 Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Census Data, NWFP, 17-2245 Reza Nasr, ‘Democracy and Islamic Revivalism’, Political Science Quarterly 110 (Summer 1995): 261-8546 Hassan N. Gardezi, ‘Politics of Religion in Pakistan’s Elections: An Assessment’, South Asia Bulletin, Vol. XIV No.1 (1994)47 For detail see Dieter Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems 2nd edition Dehli: MacMillan India Limited, 1996)48 Munawar Hassan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Lahore, 6 September 1994.49 Ghulam Nabi Shah, Interview by author, Tape recording, Mansehra, September 29, 200650 Aamer Ahmad Khan, ‘The Rise of Sectarian Mafia’, Herald, June 199451 ASSP did win the DI. Khan city seat with JUI-F.52 Piracha, Interview by author, Tape recording, Kohat, 1 September 2006.53 Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections, p.16854 Rahimullah Yousafzai, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 7 March 2006.55 Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982),56 Mujeeb Ahmad, Jam’iyyat ‘Ulama-i-Pakistan, 1948-1979 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1993)57 Rahimullah Yousafzai, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 7 March 2006.58 The term ‘maulvi’ is a more respectful title than the term ‘mullah’.59 Richard Kurin, ‘Islamization: A View from the Countryside’, in Anita M. Weiss, ed., Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987), pp.115-2860 Seipis (also commonly referred to by the pejorative term ‘kammi’) include following occupational groups: Mochis (cobblers), Qasias (butchers), Dhobis (washermen), Darzis (tailors), Julahas(weavers), Nais ( hair dressers) 61 Mubarak Ali, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 12 September 2005.62 Katherine Ewing, ‘The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan’, Journal of Asian Studies 42 (Februrary 1983): 151-67.63 In 1993, for example, in four districts of Swat, Mansehra, DI. Khan, and Kohat, the following pirs and sajjada nashins were elected as MNA: Mian Gul Aurangzeb, Sardar Muammad Yousaf (Mian Wali-ur-Rehman), Syed Iftikhar Gillani, Fazalur Rehman, 64 Fred Halliday and Hanza Alavi, eds., State and Idealogy in the Middle East and Pakistan (London: MacMillan Education, 1988), 84-665 Mian Gul Aurangzeb, Interview by author, tape recording, Islamabad, 6 September 2005.

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66 For detail see, Hamza Alavi, ‘The Politics of Dependency: A Village in West Punjab’, South Asian Review 4 (January 1971). 67 Paul Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p.23668 Inayatullah, ‘Perspective in the Rural Power Structure in West Pakistan’, People and Society Series(Karachi: Development Research and Evolution Group, USAID, 1963), p.1069 Ibid., 53-470 Niaz Pasha Jadoon, Interview by author, Tape recording, Abbottabad, 7 March 2006.71 In 1993, 2188327 voters were cast for 26 NA seats. Of these, only 12 were ‘landslide victories’ won by more than 20,000 votes, only three of which were in central and northern NWFP.72 Sardar Umar Farooq Khan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Tank, 7 March 2006.73 Oscar Lewis, Village Life in Northern India (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p.14974 Zekiya Eglar, A Punjabi Village in Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p.7575 Hamza Alavi, ‘Kinship in West Punjab Village’, In T.N. Madan, ed., Muslim Communities of South Asia (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1976), pp. 1-2776Inayatullah, ‘Perspective in the Rural Power Structure in West Pakistan’, People and Society Series(Karachi: Development Research and Evolution Group, USAID, 1963), p.51 77 David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp.82-9578 See I. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj 1949-1947 (NewDelhi: Manohar, 1988)79 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.18.80 Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience, pp.276-9381 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967)82 Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience, pp.287-983 Ibid., p.290.84 Saghir Ahnad, Class and Power in Punjabi Village (Lahore: Punjab Adabi Markaz, 1977), pp. 92-12685 Inayatullah, ‘Perspective in the Rural Power Structure in West Pakistan’, People and Society Series(Karachi: Development Research and Evolution Group, USAID, 1963), pp. 50-186 Ibid., p. 9087 Kathleen Gough, ‘Introduction’, in Saghir Ahmad, Class and Power in Punjabi Village (Lahore: Punjab Adabi MArkaz, 1977), p.9.88 Ibid., p.11-289 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, p.52090 Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 5 October 1993.91 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003).92 Rasul B. Rais, ‘Elections in Pakistan: Is Democracy Winning?, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 12(Fall 1985), p.47.93 Theodore P. Wright, Jr., ‘Biradaris in Punjab Elections’, The Journal of Political Science (Lahore) 14, Nos. 1& 2 (1991): pp.81-294 Ibid., p.8295 Ibid., p.8496 Ibid., p.8497 Nisar Akbar, Interview with author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 27 June 2006.98 Gulzar Abbassi, Interview by author, Tape recording, Abbottabad, 27 March 2006.99 Matiullah Jan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Abbottabad, 17 March 2006.100 Swati’s: the respectable landowning biradari of Mansehra; equally respected like Syeds. 101 Government of Pakistan, Report on General elections, Pakistan 1970-71, Vol. 1, p. 40.102 The electoral clash between Swati and Syeds leads towards the winning of Gujjar’s (peasant tribes) candidate.103 Tariq Khan Swati, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 22 March 2006.104 In the electoral politics of the NWFP, the Bilour and Sherpao biradaris tend to dominate urban politics, while the sardar and swatis, kundi, Gillani biradaris in rural politics. Other politically important biradaris are the syeds (who claim decent from the Prophet Muhammad), Awans (who are one of the dominant biradaris in north-eastern NWFP), Jadoon, also return a number of candidates in every election.. See elections’, The Friday Times, 16-22 September 1993, 5-8

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105 Gallop Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Poll 1990’, Gallup Political weather Report, Special Issue 1990(Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), p.29106 Rahimullah Yousafzai, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 7 March 2006.107 Ishaq Khan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Abbottabad, 13 March 2006.108 Theodore P. Wright, Jr., ‘Biradaris in Punjab Elections’, The Journal of Political Science (Lahore) 14, Nos. 1& 2 (1991): p.84

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CHAPTER-9

POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL POLITICS IN NWFP

9. INTRODUCTION

From 1988 to 1997, voters in NWFP had the opportunity to vote in four National

Assembly elections and in four Provincial Assembly elections. Eight campaigns

followed by four elections brought the NWFP voter into contact with political parties,

candidates, and campaign issues to an extent never before witnessed in the province.1

This chapter presents major conclusion of this study, which is that for these

increasingly experienced and politicized voters, political determinants of voting

behaviour are more important than social determinants. This chapter will examine the

importance of three political determinants of voting behaviour: (i) Party or Party

leader2 identification; (ii) patronage orientation; and (iii) national issue orientation.

9.1 PARTY LEADER IDENTIFICATION

This study has provided sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that

identification with (or against) a political party or party leader was now the most

important determinant of voting behaviour in urban NWFP. In central NWFP, ANP

possesses a strong vote bank and captured more seats than other political parties.

Following table shows the detail of parties contested provincial assembly elections in

urban NWFP.3

Table 9.1: Political Parties (Provincial Assembly Elections in Urban NWFP)Election (PA) 1988 1990 1993 1997ANP 11 18 16 21PPP* 13 02 10 01 PML-N** 02 06 0 04 Religious Parties 0 0 0 0Source: Data compiled from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)*PPP contested elections 1990 on the platform of PDA and in 1993 contested elections as coalition partner with PML-J. **PML-N contested election on the platform of IJI in 1988 and 1990.

ANP had majority of urban seats, except 1988 elections. In 1988 and 1990 elections

IJI led by Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) contested elections and PDA (PPP as major

coalition Party) contested 1990 elections. In National Assembly elections ANP and

PPP both were the leading parties in urban NWFP. Following table shows the detail

of National assembly elections in urban NWFP. In 1997 National Assembly elections,

the ANP won every urban seat. Analysis of polling station data revealed that the size

of an urban area had little bearing on its voting behaviour, ANP consistently

maintained its lead over the PPP and PML-N in the small and large towns and cities

of the urban NWFP.

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Table 9.2: National Assembly Elections in urban NWFP:Election (NA) 1988 1990 1993 1997ANP 02 06 02 08PPP* 04 0 05 0 PML-N** 0 01 0 0 Religious Parties 01 01 0 0Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)*PPP contested elections 1990 on the platform of PDA and in 1993 contested elections as coalition partner with PML-J. **PML-N contested election on the platform of IJI in 1988 and 1990.

The data also indicated that there was little regional variation in support levels, and

that the ANP maintained its lead over the PPP and PML-N in the urban areas of

Central NWFP. In northern, North Eastern (Hazara), and southern NWFP National

Parties including PPP and PML-N had a significant majority than ANP due to its semi

and non Pakhtun locality.

In 1988 Mr. Aftab Ahmd Khan Sherpao a candidate of PPP won the National

Assembly seat from NA-1 and Syed Zaffar Ali Shah a candidate of PPP won from

NA-1 in 1993 shows that these are Pakhtuns and they also highlighted Pakhtun

sentiments in their electoral campaigns for getting votes.4 Once again, the only

conclusion that can be reached is that the majority of voters from urban areas of

central NWFP were voting either for the Pakhtuns or ANP.

Party identification was not as strong in rural constituencies as it is in urban ones.

This was especially true of southern NWFP and Northeastern (Hazara), where

traditional tribal and semi feudal social structures still exert a strong influence. To a

much greater extent than elsewhere in the province, votes are cast for tribal or landed

elites rather than for parties, which is why southern and North eastern NWFP are the

regions where independent candidates have survived. Following table shows the

status of independent candidates’ percentage of votes and seats won in Provincial and

National Assembly Elections in NWFP.

Table 9.3: Voting status of independent candidates for Provincial Assembly (In %age)NWFP (Regions) 1988 1990 1993 1997North 5.55 (01) 11.11 (02) 5.55 (01) 11.11 (02)Central 3.70 (01) 3.70 (01) 3.70 (01) 3.70 (01)South 37.5 (06) 25.00 (04) 37.5 (06) 25.00 (04)North East 47.36 (09) 52.63 (10) 26.31 (05) 0

Total 21.25 (17) 21.25 (17) 15.00 (13) 13.75 (11)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)Note: Figures shown in brackets indicates the number of independent winning candidates.

Even the two thirds of the votes won by PPP and PML (N) in southern and North

Eastern NWFP are misleading as the majority of these votes were also probably not

cast for the parties, but for the influential candidates who were given tickets by the

parties. In the other parts of rural NWFP, the importance of party identification is

greater, and is increasingly becoming a major determinant of voting behaviour. This is

335

reflected in the movement towards a strong two-party system, and by the decreasing

number of votes won by independent candidates.

Table 9.4: Voting status of independent candidates for National Assembly (In %age))NWFP (Regions) 1988 1990 1993 1997North 0 16.66 (01) 0 0Central 12.5 (01) 0 0 0South 0 20.00 (01) 0 0North East 42.85 (03) 14.28 (01) 14.28 (01) 14.28 (01)

Total 15.38 (04) 11.53 (03) 3.84 (01) 3.84 (01)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics ForGeneral elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)Note: Figures shown in brackets indicates the number of independent winning candidates.

In rural constituencies, the selection of candidates were much more important than in

urban constituencies where voting behaviour is influenced more by party

identification. Political parties carefully weigh the relative strength and weaknesses of

candidates seeking tickets, including the strength of their biradaris (clans),the

functional support they will receive, their record in providing patronage and

development, and the amount of money they will be able to spend of their campaign.

It is difficult to determine what percentage of a candidate’s votes arise from their

personal influence, what percentage belong to a political party, and what percentage

are cast as a result of factional rivalries What was clear is that candidates who used to

consider contesting as independents are now fighting harder than before to win major

party tickets. Thus, while parties must select strong candidates to win in rural

constituencies, candidates also require strong parties to win. There was evidence

suggesting that even in rural NWFP party votes exceed candidate votes, which

contradicts the conventional wisdom.5 The importance of a major party (i.e PPP or

IJI/PML-N) tickets are illustrated in table 9.2, which compares the results of all

candidates from northern, central, and southern NWFP who contested elections in

1990 as IJI or PPP candidates, but in 1993 as religious party candidates or as

independents. In only one constituency (NA-15) in Mansehra district, which socially

and politically resembles southern NWFP, did a ‘feudal’ candidate manage to win a

respectable number of votes in 1988 without a party ticket. The reason for a few of

the unsatisfactory 1988 results could be because candidates filled nomination papers

to contest, but then decided not to contest when they were not awarded party tickets.6

This was clearly not the case with the Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) candidates who

campaigned hard, but did not come close to winning the number of votes they had

won in 1990 as IJI candidates. The evidence therefore suggests that, with the

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exception of Northern NWFP, possessing a major party ticket was a virtual

prerequisite for a candidate to win in the 1993 election.

The results of Gallup Pakistan’s exit poll survey of male voters, support the popular

perception that party identification was a more important determinant of voting

behaviour for PPP, than IJI/PML(N) candidates. In 1990, 32% of respondents who

voted for the PPP gave party identification as their reason for doing so, compared to

only 23% for the IJI. Between 1990 and 1993, party identification declined in

importance for PPP male voters to 28% and increased in importance for PML(N)

male voters to 25%. The 1990 survey revealed that party affiliation was a much more

important determinant for the middle and upper class than for the poor, and for the

educated then the un-educated. Only 17% of ‘poor’ respondents listed party affiliation

as the most important attribute of a candidate compared to 28% for ‘middle’ and 31%

for ‘upper middle and above’; similarly, only 20% of ‘illiterate/primary’ voter

selected it in comparison to 23% of middle/matric (grade 10) and 36% of ‘above’

matric.7

9.2 VOTING FOR DELIVERY

There is a common perception in NWFP that candidates votes for party votes in rural

constituency and that the former are determined primarily by traditional, social ties of

family, kinship, and faction.8

In 1993 one of the factors was the perception that Nawaz Sharif was not removed for

nothing…and that he would not become prime minister again. Voters would tell me,

‘if we vote for you, we will be voting for losing man at the top, even if you do

become an MNA.’9 As John’s pointed out:

To a significant extent, successful vote getters in NWFP have been men who have been able ‘ to deliver

‘- an ability that is itself a source of power. This did not change in 1970.What changed was the

perception on the part of the non-privileged that what they wanted would better be brought through

party connections, than by way of the old parochial influence networks.10

Table 9.5 indicate the status of religious parties11 in National and Provincial

Assembly elections.

Table 9.5: Religious parties for NWFP Provincial Assembly electionsNWFP (Regions) 1988 1990 1993 1997North 0 0 22.22% (04) 0Central 0 0 0 0South 12.5 % (02) 06.25% (01) 0 6.25% (01)North East 0 5.26% (01) 0 0

Total 2.5% (02) 2.5% (02) 5.0% (04) 1.25% (01)Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)

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Table 9.6: Religious parties for NWFP National Assembly electionsNWFP (Regions) 1988 1990 1993 1997North 0 0 33.33% (02) 0Central 12.5% (1) 12.5% (01) 0 0South 0 20.0% (01) 0 0North East 42.85% (03) 14.28% (01) 0 0

Total 15.38% (04) 11.53% (03) 7.69% (02) 0Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)

Table 9.7 gives the results from Gallup Pakistan’s 1990 and 1993 exit poll survey

question: ‘would you tell us the most important reason which led you to vote for the

candidate.’12 The results indicated that for the male voters interviewed, the most

important attribute of candidate was they be ‘helpful in personal needs and

community development’, or in other words, effective in providing patronage and

development.

Table 9.7: Voters perception about the candidate: (In %age)Candidate Attributes

PPP IJI/PML (N) Others Total1990 1993 1990 1993 1990 1993 1990 1993

Helpful in Personal needs and community development*

26 29 26 31 21 28 25 30

Party candidate

32 28 23 25 20 12 25 23

Religious and honest

9 12 22 14 20 26 17 17

Competent in national affairs

13 11 12 15 15 14 13 13

Biradari/Clan choice

8 7 7 5 8 7 7 6

Better than competitor

3 2 5 2 4 1 4 2

Source: Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Poll’, and 1993 exit poll survey results.*In the Gallup Survey there were two separate categories: ‘helpful in personal needs’ and ‘helpful in community development’.These have been combined in this study to represent the overall category of ‘patronage and development’.

The results also indicate that patronage and development are growing in importance

as determinants of voting behaviour. In 1990, party affiliation and patronage and

development were ranked equally at 25 per cent by respondents. By 1993, 30 per cent

ranked patronage and development as the most important attribute of a candidate,

compared to only 23 percent for party affiliation. In 1993, patronage and development

was a more important determinant for IJI/PML(N) than for PPP voters, which might

reflect the emphasis placed on the development theme in Nawaz Sharif’s 1993

election campaign. Although data were not available for 1993, the 1990 survey also

gave a breakdown of these determinants of voting behviour based on levels of income

and education, and urban and rural differences. Among ‘poor’ voters, 30 percent

listed the patronage and development categories as the most important, compared to

only 23 percent for ‘middle class’ and 21 percent for ‘upper middle and above’. The

greater emphasis placed on this factor by poor and illiterate voters helps explain the

338

inroads Nawaz Sharif made into the PPP’s vote bank of poor voters in the 1993

elections. Finally, the survey results support the perception that patronage and

development are more important determinants of voting behaviour for rural (28

percent) than for urban (22 percent) voters.13

Mr. Goher Ayub Khan, a PML-N MNA from Haripur (NA-13) from 1990 to 1997,

and Mr. Qammar Abbas from Peshawar (PF-2) an unsuccessful PPP MPA candidate

in 1997 observed:

…. People now think that the job of an MNA and MPA is to fix their gutters, get their children enrolled in a school, arrange for job transfers. These small petty tasks are what consume your whole day so that you cannot concentrate on any social welfare, you cannot concentrate on any plans, and there is no time to legislate. The whole day your problem is: ‘we need a sui gas connection, get me an electricity connection, my gutter is closed, we need street lights….’ In this campaign, we did not talk at all about international or even national issues.14

According to Begum Nasim Wali MPA (PF-13) from Charsada-1 from 1988 to 1990

observed as:

In the last election it was jobs, that was the big issue, and the more you lied, and the more jobs you promised, the more votes you got. One of the reasons I lost the lost election, was that people were haranguing me for making promises on jobs. And I said no, we are in bad economic situation, it’s going to be around for a while and there are going to be no government jobs….My rival on the other hand was promising a thanedar [local police officer] and tehsildar [local revenue officer] post to every house hold….So in the last election unemployment was number one because there wasn’t much inflation during the last government. I don’t doubt at all, however, that in the next election the main issue will be inflation.15

Mr. Fareed Khan Toofan, a ANP MPA from PF-32 (Karak-1) in 1990 and 1997 and

an unsuccessful candidate in 1988 and 1993 said:

If I don’t do any development, or if my Chief Minister doesn’t involve me in development, than I am almost out of my area. People will say, ‘what type of representative is this? He cannot deliver the goods. He cannot get the jobs. He cannot give us development….’ All dharas [factions] disappear if I have given them the favor of electricity or roads. All the dharas are there for local feuds but if I have done a lot of development everyone will vote for me.16

These thoughts were echoed by Pir Muhammad Khan from Shangla/Swat (PF-71), a

former IJI MPA elected in 1988 and 1990:

I had been elected an MPA, and people had seen me work from 1988-97. I was elected from same constituency as independent candidate in 1997 and in 1993 on PIF ticket and people had seen me work there from 1988-1997. So one slogan was that my work speaks for itself. Look at the work I have done. Compare my performance with the performance of all other candidates elected from this constituency since 1947.17

Arbab Muhammad Ayub Jan PF-VI (Peshawar-VI) a PPP, MPA in 1988-1993 and

ANP MPA in 1997, noted:

….They consider me a councilor of the local government-not only from one ward but from all wards of my constituency. They treat me like a councilor: ‘what about my street, what about our street lights, what about my naili [gutter] and gulli [alley]’, and all the time, ‘what about the job for my son’. They are only interested in this.18

Sadar Mehtab Ahmad Khan, a PML-N/IJI, MPA from PF-35 (Abbottabad II) in

1988-1997 emphasized voters’ focus on performance19.

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9.3 DEMOCRATIZATION OF PATRONAGE POLITICS

A visit to a politician’s office (and often residence) or khuli katcheri (open courts)

vividly illustrates the strong system of patronage politics. Crowds of applicants wait

outside to see the politician or a personal assistant in order to get the all important

‘chit’ of paper that orders the concerned individual or authority ‘to do the needful’. In

a scene reminiscent of the Mughal darbar (royal courts)-more than one hundred

supplicants crowded inside and outside the office waiting for an audience. According

to the Political Secretary, he dealt with an average of 150-200 requests a day.20 The

majorities of the requests were for jobs or were related to thana-katcheri (police

stations and court house) politics such as getting criminal charges and resolving land

disputes. The researcher witnessed the Political Secretary deal with cases related to

requests for government jobs, job transfers, job promotions, admission to

schools/colleges and universities, admissions to government hospitals, free medical

treatment, phone connections, natural gas connections, lease and land, a request for

funds for a sports club, and a request by a women to get her son out of a police station

where he had been held for several days without any charges being filed. The fact that

the Political secretary to the Chief Minister of the NWFP was taking time to get

people phone connections illustrates that politicians recognize that their legitimacy in

the eyes of voters is increasingly being determined by their effectiveness as patrons.

Since the time of the Mughals patronage has served as an important basis for state

formation. The British colonialists distributed patronage in the form of land and titles

in exchange for the support of local leaders and their followers. Similar policies were

followed by all of Pakistan’s post-Independence rulers. What is a recent development,

however, is the extent to which patronage has been ‘democratized’. With the

crumbling of traditional hierarchical social structures in much of the NWFP, the hold

of group leaders over their followers is decreasing.

In many ways, the growth of patronage politics in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s

parallels similar developments in India in the 1950s and 1960s as India’s voters

became familiar with elections, local leaders and issues increasingly began to

dominate electoral politics.

The dramatic increase in the magnitude and reach of patronage was one of the

legacies of General Ziaul Haq. Zia banned national level politics and instead

promoted local government by establishing local bodies. To strengthen and legitimize

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them, he gave them more authority to raise and spend money than had Ayub’s system

of basic democracies. In the words of one politician, this was Zia’s way of ‘giving

opium to the people’.21

In addition to development funds, patronage was generously distributed ( or pocketed)

in the form of zakat and Baitul Mall welfare funds22, local body development fund,23

discretionary funds’24, government jobs,25 bank loans,26 tax breaks,27 medical

expenses28, Yello Cabs29, and plots of land30. The massive scale of this patronage was

vividly illustrated after the collapse of Nawaz Sharif government in 1993, when the

PPP acquired thousands of pages of computerized data in which the patronage

distributed by his government had been carefully registered.31

For every National Assembly constituency spent IJI’s MNA and MPA candidates.32

Another press account cited the example of Nawaz Sharif loyalist, Sardar Mehtab

Ahmad Khan, who won both MPA and MNA seats during 1988,1990, 1993 and 1997

election from Abbottabad-II. Interestingly, in the seven weeks prior to the 1990

elections, Mr. Mehtab Ahmad was awarded 50 plots of land and Rs. 43 million. This

was presumably to finance his election campaign and to buy political support.

Apparently, it was a successful strategy as he won the seat for the first time.33

In 1993, PML(N) campaign focused more on emphasizing Nawaz Sharif’s

development record. This change in emphasis could explain why large number of

younger voters apparently switched their support from PPP to PML(N) in 1993. The

PML(N)’s message of progress, development, and employment was much more

inspiring for younger voters than the IJI’s slogans against a Prime Minister most of

them could not remember.

As a result of its origin as a patronage party, the PML(N) recognized. While the PPP’s

1993 campaign themes were vague concepts of ‘public-private partnership’, and ‘new

social contracts’, the PML(N)’s central campaign theme was Nawaz Sharif’s

commitment to development. Nawaz Sharif’s development record presented him as a

‘doer’ who delivers.34 Muhammad Waseem emphasized the same point in his book on

the 1993 elections:

He was able to focus public attention on developmentalism as the most significant

aspect of his 30-month rule….What the caretaker and the PPP considered to be the

Nawaz Sharif government’s weakest point, namely his economic policy, was billed as

his strongest point by the PML(N) leaders and workers.35

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The emergence of a classic system of ‘machine politics’, fuelled by access to

patronage has had both positive and negative consequences. The most important

aspect of patronage politics is corruption. While imparting patronage, politicians

misuse of public office through bureaucracy for private ends. Weak political culture

and patronage trends in electoral politics, increases the concepts of corruption in

administrative, political, business and religious fields.

9.4 PATRONAGE AND LEGISLATURE

Perhaps the most serious consequence of the dominant role of patronage politics is

that while the representative function of MNAs and MPAs has improved, their

legislative function has virtually ceased to exist. MNAs are spending more time in

their constituencies than before since they know that they will be judged by voters

according to what they have done in their constituencies and not for what they have

done in the federal capital Islamabad and provincial capital Peshawar. One

perspective observer of NWFP politics related a conversation he once had with a

NWFP MNA which sums up the problem.

My skill is that laws don’t mean anything to me, and that I can cut right across them and help people whether they are in the right or in the wrong. If somebody’s son is first class, he’s not coming to me to get him a job. If some body has merit they very rarely come to me-occasionally they come to me. But it’s the real wrongdoers who come to me.36

Lawbreakers, rather than lawmakers, are therefore what many voters are looking for

when casting their ballots. As a result, patronage rather than policy is the substance of

government. While this has resulted in the majority of voters being better represented

and having greater access to MNAs and PMAs than ever before, it has also led to the

Provincial and National Assemblies becoming increasingly irrelevant to the politics of

the NWFP and Pakistan. With the exception of government ministries, almost the

only functions of MNAs in Islamabad and MPAs in Peshawar was to verbally (and

sometime physically) attack political opponents. Taking one’s role as a legislator

seriously, or being appointed a government minister which requires spending more

time in Islamabad or Peshawar than in one’s constituency, can today be a recipe for

electoral suicide. Of the 27 ministers who were members of Nawaz Sharif’s cabinet at

the time his government was dismissed and who contested the 1993 elections, only

nine were successful.37 Similarly in 1997 NWFP Provincial Assembly elections no

Cabinet member of the then Chief Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao (April 24,

1994-November 12, 1996) could win the elections. Syed Qasim Shah an Independent

MPA from Mansehra in 1990 elections, explained the problem as follows:

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In the urban areas, people can appreciate your role and they knew what you have done. But in the rural areas, especially the remote rural areas, they are not in the main stream of media….Radio is controlled by the government, and TV is controlled by the government, so people never hear what you as a legislator are doing in Islamabad or in provincial capital Peshawar. Although I visited my constituency a fair amount, and visited 9-10 villages a day, people’s expectations were not met. And I think this is a disservice that has been done post-85 that the legislators have become patrons rather than lawmakers.38

9.5 COMMERCIALIZATION OF POLITICS

Many candidates commented on the dramatic increase in the amount of money spent

on election campaigns.39 First, as one PML(N) MNA candidate pointed out, this is the

cost for many candidates to buy votes:40

Several candidates mentioned a growing class of very poor voters in urban

constituencies who sell their votes. Even if voters do not demand money, they often

expect to be provided transport on Election Day. In rural constituencies, voters often

refused to go to the polling stations if they were not provided transport. As one

PML(N) MNA candidate explained, ‘it is increasingly becoming the case that the

candidate with the most vehicles can secure the most votes’.41 Same was the

technique used in 1937 and 1946 election campaigns as discussed in chapter three.It is

not only voters, who are expecting tangible rewards for their support, but party

workers as well. Gone are the heady days of 1970, when ideologically motivated

activists and party workers campaigned on a voluntary basis. The politics changed.42

Similarly, I.A.Rehman noted that, in commercialization of politics the culture of the

grassroots worker has changed. There are no volunteers now. Everything is paid.

People who attend meetings are paid. People who join processions are also paid. They

have to be provided transport, and food, and daily allowances. This has become a type

of commercial tamasha [spectacle]. In this situation, one quite cynically feels that the

basis of party mobilization was not there.43 According to one PPP MNA candidate

who won in 1988 but lost in 1993, his campaign failed because ‘everyone started

asking for money, both the voters and our workers. I had not seen that before. Not in

’88, not in the ‘70s, not before. But this time everyone was asking money.’44 If even

party workers have to be paid to campaign, it is clear that candidates who are not

extremely wealthy stand little chance of being successful in electoral politics. Money

is increasingly becoming the basis for political power in the NWFP. Politics, which

was often used to preserve wealth, is increasingly being used to generate wealth.

More and more money is replacing traditional factors such as family background and

biradari support as the basis for power. One of the disturbing consequences of this

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development was the increasing importance of drug barons and drug money in

politics. Several well-known drug/ timber smugglers from NWFP are members of the

National/Provincial Assembly, and many other legislators are rumoured to be

financially backed by drug money45. In NWFP, one frequently hears the observation

that wealth was respected regardless of how it was made. As one observer noted,

‘NWFP is like a rich candidate. They think he had been blessed by God. The poor

would rather vote for a rich and powerful candidate than for another poor candidate.46

9.6 POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The spread of patronage politics has contributed to the instability that has afflicted

NWFP politics. First, in a political system where access to patronages was the key to

success and often survival, the cost of being in opposition was often unaffordable. On

the one hand, this had led to ‘horse-trading’ and floor-crossing that at times has

reached embarrassing and politically destabilizing proportions.47 On the other hand, it

has encouraged the opposition to go to any length to try to bring down the

government. The IJI fought a non-holds barred campaign that contributed to the

downfall of PPPs first government in 1990. The PPP fought a similar campaign that

helped bring down PML-N in 1993. From 1993, the PML(N) has launched several

agitation movements against the PPP government. These were designed to cause a

sufficient degree of political instability to provide the military and the President a

pretext to intervene and call fresh elections.48

A second way in which patronage politics has contributed to political instability is

that it encourages politicization and corruption in the bureaucracy. Providing

patronage often means bending and breaking rules, so politicians must have the

support of accommodating and compliant bureaucrats. As the tenure of bureaucrats is

not secure, many look for political patrons to protect their interests. A symbiotic

relationship often develops between politicians and bureaucrats, where the former

help the latter get lucrative postings and out-of-order promotions, and the latter help

the former bend and break rules.49 Bureaucrats who are not sufficiently compliant, or

who are suspected of having sympathies with the opposition, are ‘OSDed’ (put ‘On

Special Duty’)50 or khuday-lined (side-lined). The extent to which the bureaucracy has

been politicized was clear every time there was a change of government and hundreds

of bureaucrats are immediately transferred to accommodate political favorites.51 The

more patronage politics contributes to politicizing and corrupting bureaucratic

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institutions, the less effective these institutions will be in implementing policies and

development (or patronage) schemes that would strengthen the legitimacy of the

government. Patronage politics also contribute to instability because there are

insufficient resources for any government to satisfy the demands and expectations of

the majority of voters. Not only will those who receive nothing be unhappy, but many

who do receive something will also be unhappy because they did not receive more. It

is therefore unwise for a government to rely too heavily on its patronage and

development record for political support and to ignore broader issues of policy and

governance. This will become even more true when the privatization of state-run

industries and IMF-imposed austerity measures reduce the amount of patronage at the

disposal of the government. Similarly, only a few candidates can provide a sufficient

amount of patronage and implement a sufficient number of development schemes to

keep their constituents happy. This is one of the factors that contributes to the very

high candidate turnover rate in elections (and possibly to the high government

turnover rate as well). Unlike the situation in most electoral democracies, incumbents

appear to be at a political disadvantage in NWFP. This belies the popular perception

that it is the same old political elite that have been ruling since independence. There

are only 13 out of 207 MNAs who were successful in the 1985, 1988, 1990, and 1993

and 1997 elections. Only ten more (i.e., a total of 23) were successful in 1988, 1990

and 1993. In 1997, of the 202 Muslim seats contested, 90 were won by newcomers.

Of the 26 NWFP NA seats, 10 were won by the newcomers.52 Patronage politics and

corruption paved way towards militarization in Pakistan. Democracy means

corruption as portrayed by the leaders of every coups d'etat in Pakistan. Corruption

begets bad politics, but bad politics begets further corruption. No democracy was free

of corruption53, and some authoritarian regimes (notably Singapore and Chile) have

low levels.

9.7 NATIONAL/PROVINCIAL ISSUE ORIENTATION

The conventional wisdom in NWFP, as in most parts of the world where democratic

elections were held.54 Before elections, the major parties dutifully prepare manifestos

that make grandiose promises and outline the major economic, social, and foreign

policies the party intends to follow once in power.55 These manifestos are generally

not taken seriously by the public, and it is highly unlikely that they play a significant

role in determining voting behaviour. Furthermore, in recent years the PPP and

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IJI/PML(N) manifestos have been very similar since there were very few substantive

differences in their official positions on major foreign policy issues such as Pakistan’s

nuclear policy and stand on Kashmir, or on domestic policy issues such as

privatization of the economy.

However, politics is not static, and the fact that politics was ‘localized’ by Zia, and

national issues have not been the major determinants of voting behaviour, does not

mean that the situation will always remain this way. It is instructive in this regard to

remember the events of 1969-70 in Pakistan, when Ayub Khan’s similar decade-long

attempt to localize politics was reversed in a matter of months. A small-scale protest

movement was soon transformed into a national movement that eventually forced his

resignation. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then succeeded in nationalizing politics even further.

At a time when patronage politics dominated Indian politics, Indira Gandhi, like

Bhutto, was able to win an impressive electoral victory by nationalizing politics.

Myron Weiner described that it was widely assumed that factors other than national

issues or the appeal of a national leader would affect electorate behaviour. The first

assumption was that most Indian voters and local influential were more concerned

with the administration of policies and programmes than with policy itself. By

nationalizing banks, disinheriting the princes, proposing ceilings on rural land

holdings and urban property, and publicly challenging big business, she sought to

move the electorate toward issues and away from politics of patronage…. The defeat

of prominent members of the old guard in the 1967 elections, the loss of many seats,

and the declining position of the Congress in parliament meant that that the Congress

party could no longer win if it continued to operate as it had in the past. Mrs. Gandhi

recognized this, while most members of the old guard did not.56

While local issues dominated electoral politics in recent years, there was evidence to

suggest that national issues played a more important role than was generally assumed.

Gallup Pakistan’s 1990 exit poll survey indicated that 26 percent of the male

respondents who voted for PPP in Pakistan (and 34 per cent of Pukhtoon speakers)

did so because of the party’s reputation of being ‘pro-poor’. Similarly, 50 percent of

those who voted for IJI said they did so because of its ‘Islamic stance’.57 Thus, a high

percentage of ‘party loyalist’ votes could also be votes determined by national issues,

such as the PPP’s perceived pro-poor policies, and the IJI’s perceived stronger Islamic

orientation. This was true of the ideologically motivated voters who would like to see

a more orthodox Islamic state established in Pakistan.

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Gallup Pakistan’s 1990 and 1993 exit poll surveys indicated that 15 percent of voters

in 1990, and 14 percent of voters in 1993, voted for a candidate because they were

‘competent in national affairs’. This was a surprisingly high figure, given the popular

perception that national issues play only a minor role in determining voting

behaviour. There are other indications that also suggest that national issues play a

significant, and possibly growing, role in influencing voting behaviour. In 1993

elections, for example, the perception that PPP would adopt more agriculture-friendly

policies than the industrialist-led PML(N) could help explain the PPP’s strong

performance in the rural areas of NWFP. The PML (N)’s perceived commitment to

developing and industrializing the country, and to tackling the problem of

unemployment, were national issues that appear to have won Nawaz Sharif the

support of many voters. Muhammad Waseem has also argued that the perception of

PML(N) being tougher on national security issues and more hawkish in its stance on

India won it support in the more security conscious districts and constituencies

bordering India.58 As one ANP, MPA in 1997 elections pointed out:

Party politics are…more issue oriented and are increasingly being passed on socio-economic divisions such as urban versus rural. This is positive trend away from sectarian and ethnic politics, and towards political divisions along economic lines.59

In addition to party politics, the communication revolution was also contributed to the

nationalization of politics. According to a recent survey, 74.8 per cent of urban

households have television sets.60 Those who do not, often have easy access to TVs

those are located in tea stalls, restaurants, or in the homes of friends or relatives.

Popular TV dramas directly address national social issues such as the problems of

literacy, inadequate education and health facilities, environmental pollution, high

population growth rates, increasing crime rates, women’s rights, the tyranny of feudal

lords, and economic problems such as unemployment and inflation. Satellite dishes,

which can now be found on roof tops and even the remotest regions of the province,

are exposing viewers to everything from BBC news, to soap operas and ‘Baywatch’,

to VTV (the Star Satellite equivalent of MTV). Thus both national and international

issues are finding their way into homes and conversations were formally in isolated

regions of NWFP. Physical isolation was reduced through the construction of more

farm-to-market roads and the explosive growth in the number of Suzuki mini-vans

and Ford wagons, which can be found transporting people and goods to and from the

remotest regions of the country. Farmers whose fathers rarely got beyond the local

mandi (market) town can now easily make day trips to their district headquarters, or

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even to the provincial capital of Peshawar. The effects of economic policies adopted

in Islamabad are being felt throughout the province much more quickly than before.

This was especially apparent on the day the national budget is presented, when the

country comes to a virtual standstill to hear the budget speech presented by the

finance minister. The details that are presented whether they pertain to taxation

policies or the price of fuel oil, fertilizer or utilities, have an almost immediate impact

on the livelihoods of the majority of households in Pakistan. As a result, voters are

becoming increasingly sensitized to national economic issues. The most sensitive

economic issues are unemployment and inflation. Gallup Pakistan’s 1990 Exit Poll

survey included the following question: ‘what is the most important problem faced by

the country at this time? Thirty percent of the respondents indicated unemployment

and another 17 percent indicated inflation.61 Several politicians who were interviewed

for this study indicated that they believe that national issues in general, and economic

issues in particular, are going to grow in importance as determinants of voting

behaviour.62

9.9 CONCLUSIONS

During the analysis of political determinants of voting behavior, it has been found that

political determinants are more powerful than social determinants. It has been also

found that local bodies have localized electoral politics and local issues seems much

important than national issues. This has been the affect of local government elections

and impact of non-party campaigns on local issues. During the period under study it

has been found that unemployment and inflation are becoming increasingly important

and throughout the electoral race during 1990s it has an important factor in

determining peoples voting behavior.

1 Daily Frontier Post (Peshawar), 14 March 19972 Political parties in Pakistan, with the exception of Jamaat-i-Islami, are usually centralized, personalized, and leader oriented to such an extent that in many cases the leader virtually is the party. Thus, votes for the PML(N) are likely to be votes for Nawaz Sharief or against Benazir Bhutto, and votes for the PPP are likely to be votes for Benazir Bhutto or against Nawaz Sharief. 3 Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997)4 Syed Zaffar Ali Shah, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 25 March 2007.5 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1994), p.1076 It is also possible, although unlikely, that some of the 1993 candidates were ‘covering’ or back-up candidates, and did not intend to contest seriously.7 Gallop Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Poll 1990’, Gallup Political weather Report, Special Issue 1990(Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), p.52.8 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.939 Al-Haj Sardar Umar Farooq Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, DI. Khan, 25 May 2005

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10 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.57611 Religious parties won NWFP elections in 2002 due to the continuity of conservatism in 1990s and 9/11 incident. MMA, a coalition of religious parties emerge on electoral scene in 2002.12 Gallop Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Poll 1990’, Gallup Political weather Report, Special Issue 1990(Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), p.52.13 Ibid.14 Mr. Goher Ayub Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Haripur, 1 April 200515 Begum Nasim Wali Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Charsada, 10 May 200516 Mr. Fareed Khan Toofan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Karak, 20, May 200517 Pir Muhammad Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Shangla (Swat), 08 August 200518 Arbab Muhammad Ayub Jan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 13 December 2005.19 Sardar Mehtab Ahmad Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Abbottabad, 05 September 200520 Nasir Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar 12 March 200621 Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Charsada, 25 March 200622 M.I Lashkar, ‘Funds Earmarked for Baitul Maal Scheme Go Missing’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 26 July 1993.23 M.A.K Lodhi, ‘IJI Legislators Make a Killing Through Local Bodies’, The Friday Times, 22-28 April 1993, 624 Adnan Adil, ‘The Discretionary Charm’, The Friday Times, 23-29 September 1993, 9.25 ‘PDF MNAs to get share in Recruitments’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi) 21 July 1994.26 Idrees Bukhtiar, ‘Scandal’, Herald, April 1994, 24-32.27 Zahid Husain, ‘The Great Tax Scandal’, Newsline, October 1995, 22-3628 Nasir Iqbal, ‘Nawaz Govt. Paid Rs. 16m as medical expenses: Senate Told’, Daily The News(Rawalpindi), 20 August 1993.29 Javed A. Malik, ‘What to do with 16000 Yellow Cabs?’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 10 September 1993.30 Navaid Saeed, ‘The Great Land Game’, Newsline (Karachi), June 1995, pp.87-9631 This data was exhibited in ‘The Hall of Shame’ at the PPP’s Central Secretariat in Islamabad in September 1993.32 Amjad Warriach, ‘The Politics of Development’, Daily The News, 9 December 1994.33 Mariana Baber, ‘PPP’s anti-Patronage Campaign Reveals Pindi’s “Plot, Cheque Boys”’, Daily The News, 29 September 1993.34 Asfandyar Wali Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Charsada, 03 April 2006.35 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.162.36 Nawabzada Salauddin Saeed, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Mansehra, 28 April 200637 Hasan Iqbal Jafri, ‘Yes Minister, No Minister’, Herald, special Issue, Election ’93 Vital statistics, November-December 1993, p.41.38 Syed Qasim Shah, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Mansehra, 04, June 200639 Mustafa Haroon, ‘The Clash of Cash’, Newsline (Karachi), October 1993, pp. 42-3.40 Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Interview by author, Tape Recording, 14 February, 2006.41 Sardar Mehtab Ahmad Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Abbottabad, 08 June 200642 Gul Badshah, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 01 May 200643 I.A Rehman, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Islamabad, 20 May 200644 Mr. Sardar Ali Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 10 August 200645 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.6646 Mr. Jan Muhammad Khattak, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Karak, 20 September, 2006.47 Jhon Stakehouse, “Island of Carnal Desire” at Centre of Islamabad’, Daily The News, 8 August 1993.48 For detail see, Charlas H. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987) 49 Ibid. 50 Jeved Jaidi, “Today’s Blue-eyed Boys, Tomorrow’s Black Sheep: OSDs’, The News on Friday, 13 Januarury 1995, p.10.51 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, pp.62-352 Hasan Iqbal Jafri, ‘Strangers in the House’, Herald (Karachi), Special Issue, November-December 1993, pp.38-45.53 Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Kohat, 28 September 2006

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54 Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience (Darham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), p.273.55 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, pp.116-2456 Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics, ed. Ashotosh Varshney (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), pp. 225-757 Gallop Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Poll 1990’, Gallup Political weather Report, Special Issue 1990(Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), pp.44-9 58 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.16859 Haji Muhammad Adeel, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 20 November 2006.60 Ministry of Population Welfare and Population council, Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence Survey 1994-95: Basic Findings (Islamabad: n.p., 1995), p. 45.61 Gallop Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Poll 1990’, Gallup Political weather Report, Special Issue 1990(Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), p. 69.62 Haji Muhammad Adeel, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 20 November 2006

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CONCLUSIONS

This research work consists of theories and case studies including political and social

aspects of electoral politics in NWFP to find the answer of basic research question,

who is voting for whom and why? Which is the increasing determinant of voting

behaviour? In order to build up an analytical framework, contemporary theoretical

approaches are used. Political parties in NWFP generally operate in the form of public

meetings, alliance building activity, dissemination of propaganda and projection of

leadership profiles. They lacked mass contact at the doorsteps. There were few local

mobilizers who would make a point to knock at the door and deliver an oral or a

written message from the party. This was so because the basic electoral unit in NWFP

society is not the individual citizen but the leader or spokesman of the local

community. The electoral candidates operating from the platforms of political parties

contacted not men and women in their homes but the local ‘big man’ who would

deliver votes in hundreds or even thousands. Not surprisingly, parties have

increasingly become coalitions of sub-organisational groups and communities. In the

absence of a potent and intrusive role for parties in the locality, the understanding

between factional groupings became crucial for the electoral activity at the local level.

Elections in 1990s made it clear that political parties operating at the national level

and particularly in NWFP were essentially representation oriented not movement

oriented. They were less cadre oriented and more leader oriented. Their electoral

strategy was more candidates oriented than issue oriented. Electoral politics gradually

emerged as a competitive exercise for access to patronage. In the political system,

policies are not fully implemented. There was a widespread feeling among the voters

that they failed to influence policy. Therefore they made good with patronage.

Elections in NWFP have resulted in mobilizing the under privileged masses to seek

instant patronage from the local or national leaders.

During the study of electoral politics in NWFP (1988-1999) four major categories

were found. First, there was a civic voter. This voter tended to be a party voter, even

an ideologue but more generally the holder of a partisan opinion on public issues.

Secondly, there was the client voter. Typically, he belonged to feudal areas where his

economic dependence on the local landlord-politician was complete. Thirdly, there

was a maverick voter. He was a typical patronage seeker, who was not prepared to

wait till after the elections. His demand could be either individualistic or even

351

community oriented. Finally there is a primary voter. He voted for either ethnic

identity or sectarian identity. Electoral politics in NWFP revolved around the

characteristics represented in these categories of voters in a varying degree. Voter was

bound by considerations of local power structure in terms of caste, biradri and tribe,

tempered by instant patronage in the form of development funds or money. In

electoral politics of NWFP voter was ultimately bound by a political culture based on

choice not between issues and policies but between leaders and candidates. Khel

(social groups within biradari) and biradari still have greater influence in the social

structure of NWFP region. Family reputation and helping the people in distress,

leaves a lasting impact on the recipients who in turn, for favouring the contestant, go

for voting him as a measure to return the favour. Local issues have a close concern in

the electoral politics of NWFP. National and provincial issues seemed less urgent to

voters in NWFP. Therefore they wanted assurance from the contestants to resolve

their immediate problems of local nature. Thus the focus on the issues of rural

development has sharpened in NWFP.

To test the research question, who is voting for whom and why, and hypothesis this

study is divided in to two parts. Part-1 provided the theoretical and historical

framework for the study. In terms of understanding the context within which voting

decisions are made, the most important aspect was the power imbalance that exists

between the non-elected and elected institutions. Electoral politics in NWFP cannot

be understood without reference to this imbalance, and electoral strategies adopted by

ruling elites to try to ensure that elections legitimize but do not alter the status quo.

Chapter one based on theoretical framework of electoral politics. Rational choice

theory and Michigan Model seemed to much close with electoral politics in NWFP.

Chapter two outlined the NWFP’s electoral geography and highlighted the differences

in voting behaviour between central, northern, southern, and north-eastern NWFP. It

was shown that the key to electoral success- is central NWFP, which had one third of

the Provincial Assembly seats. It was the most densely populated, urbanized and

industrialized of the NWFP’s four regions, and hence politically the most volatile.

The PPP’s strongest regional support in 1988-1997 came from northern and central

NWFP, the region most dependent on agriculture, whose political elites resented the

decline in their influence relative to the politicians of north-eastern NWFP (Hazara)

and southern NWFP. The PML(N)’s strongest performance was in Hazara region of

NWFP. The region that was dependent on agriculture and the most dependent on

352

employment in the civil and military branches of government. For historical reasons,

north-eastern NWFP (Hazara) experienced the least socio-economic and political

change, and traditional social determinants of the tribe, ‘feudal’ tenurial relations, and

religion therefore overwhelmed political determinants of voting behaviour. Chapter

three is focused on historical background of electoral politics in NWFP. Chapter four

is based on empirical study of voting trends in NWFP. This chapter focused on

demographic and other factors on voting behaviour. Chapter five examined in detail

voting behaviour in the NWFP’s largest city, Peshawar. An analysis of polling

stations results from the 1988-1997 elections revealed that while levels of support for

the PPP and the IJI/PML and ANP have changed over time, patterns of class support

have remained consistent. The PPP continued to do better in the poorer urban-rural

periphery polling stations and in the polling areas with large concentrations of

industrial labour. The IJI/PML and ANP consistently received its strongest support

from the middle and upper class wards. Therefore class remained an important

determinant of voting behaviour, and the PPP’s reputation as ‘the party of the poor’

continues to be warranted. Class, however, seems to be losing ground to party and/or

party leader loyalty. Chapter six focused on party politics in NWFP. It discussed how

the legacies of ANP, PPP and General Zia-ul- Haq had helped, create and consolidate

a strong ‘anti-PPP’ party based in urban NWFP. It examined how organizational

weakness and factional politics within the PPP contributed to its decline, while the

patronage at the disposal of Nawaz Sharif contributed To the PML(N)’s rise. Another

important factor contributed to the reversal in urban NWFP was the effect that the

prosperity of 1990s had on the ‘party of the poor’. Related to this prosperity was the

economic and political rise of middle class traders and businessmen who formed the

core of the ‘anti-PPP’ party and the decline of groups, such as organized labour, who

were the strongest urban supporters of PPP. Chapter seven traced the history of the

urban-rural political and electoral divide in the NWFP and showed how the

countryside has traditionally dominated the cities. It then highlighted the important

change that took place in the 1990s elections when the PML(N) electoral alliance with

ANP replaced the PPP as the strongest party in urban NWFP. From small towns to

large cities in all four regions of the province, the PML(N) and ANP consistently

outperformed the PPP. This indicates that party and party leader identification played

a major role in determining the voting behaviour of urban voters. The PPP, did better

than PML(N) in the far more numerous rural constituencies and therefore ended up

353

winning more seats. As the majority of the province’s population live in rural areas,

elections have reinforced the political dominance of rural NWFP and rural politicians.

However, in a country that has one of the highest urbanization rates in the world, and

with the communications revolution rapidly narrowing the distance between cities and

countryside, it is clear that the cities are gaining political ground at the expense of the

countryside. If economic interests increasingly become articulated along urban versus

rural lines, which seems likely, the urban-rural cleavage will become even more

important in determining party alignments and voter behaviour. Chapter eight turned

its attention to the social determinants of voting behaviour. It examined the role of

gender in influencing voting decisions and showed that women in urban NWFP

favoured PML(N) and ANP over PPP. Next, an analysis of polling stations’ results in

the Punjab’s three largest cities indicated that a distinct class division existed between

the neighbouhoods and wards supporting PPP and those supporting the PML(N). This

confirmed the earlier assessment of the continuing relevance of class as a determinant

of voting behaviour in urban NWFP. Exit poll survey data revealed that a significant

percentage of younger voters, who traditionally had supported the PPP, shifted their

support to the ANP/PML(N) in 1990s. The effects that literacy and education had on

voting behaviour closely approximated to those of class, with illiterate voters

preferring the PPP and literate voters the ANP/PML(N) . The Chapter then looked at

the role of religion in determining voting behaviour. The poor performance of

religious parties in elections illustrated that it was not a major factor, although

sectarianism and the influence of traditional religious leaders do effect the voting

decisions of some voters. Overall, voters decided not to ‘waste’ their votes on

religious parties which were not expected to win, and which would therefore not be in

a position to provide patronage. The chapter ended by looking at the influence of

faction and biradari, which are viewed by many to be the most important

determinants of voting behaviour in the NWFP. The conclusion reached, however,

was that while important in selecting candidates, their importance in determining how

votes are cast on Election Day is exaggerated.

Finally chapter nine discussed the growing importance of political determinants such

as party and party leader identification, patronage orientation, and national issue

orientation. Party identification was the most important determinant of voting

behaviour in urban NWFP, but even in rural Punjab it was much more important than

was assumed. While parties still needed strong candidates in rural constituencies,

354

strong candidates increasingly need strong parties to win. The chapter than

emphasized the growing importance of patronage and development in determining

voting behaviour. Voters, especially in rural areas, are therefore casting their ballots

for the candidates and parties they perceive will be the most effective conduits for

delivering patronage. The chapter concluded by arguing that national issues, while not

major determinant of voter behaviour in the past (other than the 1970 elections), were

likely to become more important when the next elections are held. Concerns over the

economic issues of inflation and unemployment could divert attention away from

local issues to national issues.

It is important to remember that voting behaviour is not static, and with time new

divisions may emerge or old ones becomes less salient. Generational change may lead

to political re-alignments. Rapid urbanization and industrialization may increase the

political relevance of the urban-rural divide and industry versus agriculture cleavages,

and decrease those based on kinship or faction. Furthermore, new cross-cutting issues

such as inflation or environmental concerns may emerge that do not immediately lend

themselves to existing categories but could lead instead to ‘issue-oriented’ voting.

355

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WEB SOURCES:http://www.anp.org.pkhttp://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/commonwealth-lb-elections.pdf http://www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=45http://www.khyber.org/people/pol/AftabAhmadKhanSherpao.shtmlhttp://www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/SBNP_Local_Govt_Ordinance_2001.pdf.http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_03nov07/pco_1_2007.htmlhttp://www.pildat.org/CGEP/Publications/PDF/Electoral_Reforms_2007.pdf.http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articlete...

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APPENDIX-I: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIREVOTING TRENDS IN NWFP

For item non-response, following codes are used:444 don’t know/don’t remember, 111 no opinion, 555 refused,333 irrelevant / skipped, 222 other

Q1: What is your gender: 1. Male 2. Female Q2: What is your marital status? 1. Married. 2. Unmarried/engaged. 3. Divorced. 4. Widowed Q3: What is your approximate age in years? Q4: Where did you spend most of your childhood? City______. Region_______. Country________. Q5: For how many years have you lived in your current residence?Q6: What is the total number of family members living in the household? 1. Adults. 2. Children.Q7: Who owns your current residence?1. Respondent 2. Close relative 3. Distant relative 4. Landlord 5. Employer 222 Other.Q8: What language is your mother tongue? 1 Urdu 2 English 3 Punjabi 4 Service 5. Hondko 6. Pashto 7. Sindhi 8. Bloch 222 OTHER:Q9: Can you speak, read, and/or write your mother tongue or any other languages?

Language 9.1 Speak 9.2 Read 9.3 Write

a. UrduYes Yes YesNo No No

b. EnglishYes Yes YesNo No No

c. PunjabiYes Yes YesNo No No

d. SeraikiYes Yes YesNo No No

e. HindkoYes Yes YesNo No No

f. PashtoYes Yes YesNo No No

g. SindhiYes Yes YesNo No No

h. BalochiYes Yes YesNo No No

i. OthersYes Yes YesNo No No

Q10: What is your current employment status? 1. Full time 2. Part-time 3. Seeking work 4. Retired 5.Homemaker 6. Student 222 OtherQ11: What is your primary occupation (or anticipated occupation if student)?1. Self-employed shopkeeper 11. University staff or professor2. Self-employed business or trade (except shop keeping) 12. Engineer3. Government servant 13. NGO Staff4. Private sector employee 14. International Agency5. Industrial Manual labour 15.Primary/secondary teacher6. Farm/rural manual labor 16. Religious teacher / mosque7. Small or medium sized farmer 17. Army/military/security8. Large farmer / landowner 18. Housewife/domestic9. Medical professional 222. Other10. Lawyer/Judge/Legal 444. Don’t KnowQ12: What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 1. None 2. Madrasa/Religious School 3. Some Primary 4. Finished Primary School 5. Middle School 6. Matric 7. F.A/F.Sc (Intermediate) 8. B.A./B.Sc 9. M.A or a professional degree 10. Doctorate or post-doctorate 444 Don’t Know Q13: For statistical purposes, we would like to know which of the following incomegroups your household falls into, approximately: 1. Up to Rs. 1,000 2. Rs. 1,001 – Rs. 2,000 3. Rs. 2,001 – Rs. 3,0004. Rs. 3,001 – Rs. 4,000 5. Rs. 4,001 – Rs. 5,000, 6. Rs. 5,001 – Rs. 10,0007. Rs. 10,001 – Rs. 15,000 8. Rs. 15,001 and above 444. Don’t Know Q14: With which religion/sect are you affiliated most closely? 1. Sunni Islam 2. Shia Islam 3. Christian 4.Hinduism 222.Other, 444.Don ‘t Know: MEDIA USE & PREFERENCES:Q15: Can you tell me about how often you use each of following media resources?

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Media A. Daily B. Frequently C. Once a week E. Nevera. TVb. Radioc. Newspapersd. Web

Q16: Please name the two specific sources you use most often to find out informationabout politics and government (names of stations or newspapers)? 1 _______________. 2.____________.Q 17: I am going to describe several ways that voters might be able to get informationabout elections in their communities. you’d like you to tell me, if the election wereheld this weekend and you had to attend two events, which two would you choose? 1. Live drama or comedy about elections. a. Yes________. b. No_________2. Workshop by an international. a. Yes________. b. No_________3. A meeting about elections in someone’s home. a. Yes________. b. No_________4. A party rally or meeting. a. Yes________. b. No_________

5. A short film or movie. a. Yes________. b. No_________6. Special meeting for women. a. Yes________. b. No_________7. I would not attend any of these events. a. Yes________. b. No_________222. Other: 333 Irrelevant/Skipped 444 Don’t Know 555 Refused 111 No Opinion

Q18: I am going to describe several ways that voters might be able to get informationabout elections from the media. I’d like you to tell me, if the election were held this weekend and you had to spend one hour learning more about the election, which two types of sources would you choose for your time?1. Radio drama or comedy about the election process.a. Yes________. b. No_________

2. Watching a TV program. a. Yes________. b. No_________3. Looking at illustrations or posters in the community. a. Yes________. b. No_________4. Reading newspapers or the internet. a. Yes________. b. No_________5. Watching candidates or parties debate on television. a. Yes________. b. No_________222. Other: 111. No Opinion 333. Irrelevant/Skipped 444. Don’t Know 555. RefusedPOLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, ENGAGEMENT, EFFICACY AND KNOWLEDGE OF ELECTORAL PROCESSQ19: Looking at the problems in your area and the way they affect families like you, for your relatives or friends, who would you suggest to go to in order to resolve these problems (District administration official like EDO, DCO, MO)?Responses Likelihood of Suggesting

Likely to Suggest Unlikely to Suggest Would never suggest

a. Feudal Leadersb. Religious Leadersc. Biradari Eldersd. NGOse. Political Party OfficeMNA or MPALocal Officials like Nazims or councillors District Administration like EDOs, DCOs etcQ20 How interested would you say you are in politics?1. Very Interested 2. Some what interested. 3. Not very interested 4. Not at all interested 444 Don’t KnowQ21: I’m going describe some political activities that people engage in. I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done each of these things, whether you are likely to do it, whether you might do it, or would never do it.Responses Have

DoneLikely to Do

Might Do Would Never Do

a. Discuss elections with friends/familyb. Boycott an electionc. Attend demonstrations or ralliesd. Attend a party or election meetinge. Tell friends, family, or co-workers to

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vote for a particular candidatef. Get into an argument about electiong. Visit a local representative’s officeQ22: Since you have been eligible to vote in elections, how often have you voted in elections? 1. Never 2. Once 3.Two or three times. 4. Most elections. 5. Every election 444. Don’t Know Q23: Did you vote in the General Elections in 1988? 1 Yes 2 No 444 Don’t Know Q24: Did you vote in the General elections in 1997?1 Yes 2 No 444 Don’t Know Q25: REASONS FOR NOT VOTING: I’m going to read you a list of reasons why people do not vote. For each, tell about the reason.

Very Important

Somewhat Important

Not Very Important

Not at all Important

a. I intended to vote but circumstances on the day prevented meb. The polling station is hard to reachc. I wasn’t able to registerd. I went but I didn’t have IDe. I didn’t know where to gof. My vote makes no differenceg. The elections are not free & fairh. I did not like the candidatesi. I was too busy with work to votej. I received some money or a giftk. I was afraid of violence and unrestl. A religious figure told me not tom. My name was not on the voter listn. I was stopped by my familyOTHER REASONS MENTIONED:

Q26: REASONS FOR VOTING: I’m going to read you a list of reasons why people vote. For each one, please tell me about the reason, when you voted in past elections.

Very Important

Somewhat Important

Not Very Important

Not at all Important

a. It is the duty of every citizenb. I felt strongly about a party/candidatec. My vote makes a differenced. My relatives & friends convinced mee. My employer asked me to votef. A political party agent made me voteg. I received some money or a gifth. I was afraid I would be in dangeri. A religious figure told me to votej. I want to change things in countryk. I was afraid of losing my job or landOTHER REASONS MENTIONEDQ27: Have you heard when the next elections will be held? 1 Yes 2 No 444 DK Q28: Approximately what date to you think the elections will be held?1. Gives any date from Nov 2007 to Feb 20082. Gives answer other than these dates 444 DK Q29: How likely is it that you will vote in the next National Assembly election?a.Very Likely b. Somewhat Likely c. Somewhat unlikely d. Very unlikely e. Don't Know YetQ30: Do you think that if you vote in the upcoming general elections that your vote will make a big difference, some difference, little difference, or no difference?1. Big difference 2. Some difference 3. Little difference 4. No differenceQ31: For the following two statements, tell me whether you agree more with statement A or statement B. A. The government in Islamabad has taken positive steps to ensure that elections are free and fair. B. It doesn’t matter what the government in Islamabad does to ensure a fair election, because the local and provincial politicians corrupt the process.Q32: If you compare the upcoming elections with the previous elections in NWFP would you say that compared to earlier elections, the next elections will be much more, somewhat more, about the same, somewhat less, or much less free & fair?1. Much more free 2. Somewhat more free 3. About the same 4.Somewhat less 5.Much less free6. Don’t Know

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Q33: Now I would like your opinion on various institutions and organizations working in NWFP. Tell me how much trust you have in these institutions--A great deal of trust, some trust, very little trust, or no trust at all.Responses Great deal of

TrustSome trust No trust at all

a. National governmentb. Judiciaryc. Policed. Pakistani Armye. National & Provincial Assemblyf. Election Commission of Pakistang. Provincial governmenth. The pressi. Local government elected officials like Nazims andUnion Councillors.Q34: Thinking about the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have offices in your community, do you think that overall, they make a positive contribution, or are they wasting money and resources that should go somewhere else?1 Positive Contribution 2 Waste of resources, 3. Don’t Know Q35: Can you name two or three NGOs respected by you and people in your community, or do people have negative views of all of them?35a_______________, 35b_______________, 35c________________, 4. No, People have negative views of all of them: Q36: Are you aware that all citizens must register again if they want to vote in the upcoming election, even if they already registered to vote in the past?1. Yes 2. No 444. Don’t Know Q37: Has anyone come to your home in the past 12 months asking you or someone in your household to fill out a form to register on a new voters’ list?1. Yes 2. No 444. Don’t Know Q38: Did you or someone in your household register to vote by filling out the formwhen someone came to your home in the past 12 months?1. Yes 2. No 444. Don’t Know Q39: Are you aware that the provisional voters’ registration list will be displayed in May and June and that registered voters can check the list to see if your name is correctly listed? 1. Yes 2. No 444. Don’t Know Q 40: How likely is it that you will check your name on the provisional voters’ list?1.Very Likely 2.Somewhat Likely 3.Somewhat unlikely 4.Very unlikely5.Don’t Know Q 41 If you did not fill out a form in the last 12 months, have you made plans to register to vote in order to get your name on the electoral list in your area beforethe next election? 1. Yes 2. No 444. Don’t KnowQ 42: Have you heard that there will be a special registration period in May/June for all citizens of voting age who did not register during the past 12 months?1 Yes 2 No 444. Don’t Know Q 43: Looking at that whether other eligible voters have registered in your area, howconfident are you that most people in your community of voting age will be registered on the electoral list in time for the election--very confident, somewhat confident, or not at all confident? 1.Very Confident 2. Somewhat confident 3. Not at all confident 444. Don’t Know/Can’t SayQ 44: How confident are you that the electoral list in your area will be accurate andcomplete in time for the election--very confident, somewhat confident, or not atall confident? 1.Very Confident 2.Somewhat confident 3.Not at all confident 444. Don’t Know/Can’t SayQ 45: If someone asked you where they could register to vote, what would you tellthem? ____________________________________________________1. District Election Commission (EC) office 2. Union Council Office (UC)3. Tehsil Office 222. Others 444. Don’t Know

Q 46: How far away is the closest election commission office from your home -- veryfar away, a significant distance away, or close (in your town or village)?1. Very far away 2. A significant distance away. 3. Close (in your town or village). 444. Don’t Know Q 47: If it’s necessary to go to the election commission office to register, how likelyare you to go and register – very likely, likely, not very likely, very un likely?1. Very likely 2. Likely 3. Very unlikely 444. Don’t KnowQ 48: Please tell me which forms of identification you have. I’ll read each one, and just tell me yes if you have it,and no if you don’t.

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Responses Yes Noa. New Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC)b. National ID Cards for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP) or Pakistan Origin Card (POC)c. Old National Identity Card (NIC)

d. Birth Certificate

Q 49: If you don’t have either an old NIC or a new CNIC, why don’t you have eitherform of identification? ____________________________________________1. I don’t know how or where to get an ID card. 2. The cost to get an ID card is too high or not worth it. 3. I don’tknow anything about ID cards. 4. I don’t want an ID card. 222. Other.Q 50: Have you heard that the Election Commission of Pakistan has decided to acceptthe old national identity card (NIC) for voter registration and elections?1 Yes 2 No 444. Don’t Know CORRUPTION, ELECTORAL VIOLENCE, AND FRAUDQ 51: Compare your expectations for the upcoming elections with other elections. Would you say that compared to earlier elections, there will be more, about the same, or less violence, unrest, and intimidation than in the past? 1. More Violence/Unrest 2. About the same 3. Less Violence/Unrest 444. Don’t KnowQ 52: Now I will read out some opinions about how politics sometimes works inNWFP. I’d like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them?Responses LEVEL OF AGREEMENT

Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree

a. Public services like road repair and waterare delivered, improved, or repaired in thisarea for the purposes of influencing elections.b. Employment depends on friends andrelatives in government.c. Political parties reward people for supporting them by helping those who voted for them after electionsQ 53: I’d like to know how you feel about corruption in the local, provincial, and national governments, as well as NGOs. For each of these, can you tell me about your response mentioned on each category?Responses

PERCEIVED LEVEL OF CORRUPTION

Not at allSomewhatCommon

Very common,Not Problem

Very, Common,Big Problem

a. National governmentb. Provincial governmentc. Local governmentd. NGOse. Political parties

Q 54: Now I’m going to mention some other things that can happen during elections.For each one, tell me how likely you think each will occur in the next election.Responses: LIKELIHOOD OF HAPPENING

Verylikely

SomewhatLikely

SomewhatUnlikely

Veryunlikely

a. Certain candidates prevented from running for officeb. Authorities knowing how I votedc. Names not on the electoral roll at the polling stationd. People prevented from registering or votinge. Officials or parties stuffing ballot boxesf. People voting more than onceg. Cheating in counting the ballotsh. Employers getting employees to vote together as a groupi. Landlords getting their tenants to vote together as a group.j. Officials changing the results afterthe ballots have been countedQ 55: Based on your experience or what you’ve heard about past elections in NWFP, do you think that in the upcoming elections the level of cheating and fraud will be more, about the same, or less than in the past?1. More cheating & fraud 2. About the same

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3. Less cheating & fraud 444. DKQ56: In your opinion, which is a more serious threat to free and fair elections in NWFP, election violence/intimidation, election malpractices/fraud, or is the election process generally free and fair?1. Violence / intimidation 2. Malpractices / fraud 3. Process is generally free and fair Q57: During elections, people talk about “rigging”. When you hear talk about cheating or rigging in NWFP, which of the following three statements best describes what happens, or is it something else? 1. Rigging is something controlled by the central government 2. The central government works with certain parties and officials to rig results in different places around the country 3. Local politicians rig elections to benefit themselves, even if the central government tries to stop it. 222.Something else 444. Don’t Know, Don’t RememberQ 58: In your opinion, which types of people are most likely to be victimized byviolence or intimidation in elections in your area, or will no one be victimized?1. Candidates 2. Voters 3. Female candidate 4. Female Voters 5. Election workers 6.NGO Workers 7. Security Officials 8. People with low income 9. Polling Officials 10. Political party supporters 11. No one 444. Don’t know Q 59: Some people are talking about different ways that the fraud and corruption could be prevented in the election process. I’ll list a few of the suggestions we’ve been hearing and some that have already been implemented. I’d like you to tell me whether each measure would give you much more confidence, somewhat more confidence, have no effect, or give you less confidence in the election process.Responses LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE

MuchMore

Somewhatmore

NoEffect

Less

a. A procedure for ordinary citizens to complain about fraudb. Trained observers from the local area to monitor the whole election processc. A simple procedure to make voter registration easierd. If every voter checked the voters’ registration lists to make sure the lists are accuratee. If political parties agreed to a code of conduct and the code was enforcedf. If local government was dissolved during the election periodg. If election commission officials were better trainedDEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCEQ 60: In your opinion, how much power does the parliament (national and provincial) have in determining the course of political development in NWFP?Responses Great deal of

PowerSome power

Little power

No power at all

1. National Assembly & SenateDon’t Know2. Provincial AssemblyDon’t KnowQ61 Now I will read out some statements about politics in NWFP, and I would like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them?Responses LEVEL OF AGREEMENT

StronglyAgree

Agree Disagree StronglyDisagree

a. NWFP’s citizens have the power to influence the policies and actions of the governmentb. People are free to criticize the government without fearc. People can join any political party or organization they wishQ 62: People often differ in their views on what factors are essential for democracy. If you have to choose only one thing, what would be the most important, and what would be the second most important?1. Changing governments through elections. Yes_________. No.__________.2. Little difference in income between rich and poor. Yes_________. No.________3. Freedom to criticize government. Yes_________. No.__________.4. Absence of any violence. Yes_________. No.__________.5. Basic necessities like food & shelter for everyone. Yes_________. No._______6. No influence of religious ideas or leaders in politics. Yes_________. No.______222. Other: Yes_________. No.__________. 111. No Opinion. Yes___. No.___ 333. Skipped. Yes_________. No.____. 555. Refused. Yes_________. No.____.

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GENDERQ 63: Now I would like to know your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behaviourand situation of women in our society. I will read out some statements and I would like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them?Responses LEVEL OF AGREEMENT

StronglyAgree

Agree Disagree StronglyDisagree

a. Women can run for political officeb. A woman can be president or primeminister of a Muslim countryc. Men are more suited for politicsthan womend. A university education is moreimportant for a boy than for a girl

e. Women should dress modestly, butchador is not obligatory

Don’t Know