Elections and Stability inWest Africa: The Way Forward

MAY 2012

Introduction

Two decades ago, autocratic regimes were the rule in West Africa. Today,multiparty elections are relatively routine in the region, illustrated by the largenumber of elections conducted in West African countries in recent years.These elections provide insights into some of the strengths and weaknesses ofthe electoral process. Successful transfers of power in countries such asSenegal, Guinea, and Niger—the latter two following authoritarian rule andmilitary coups—have resulted in significant progress toward peace andstability in the region. However, despite positive trends, observers havereported irregularities in a number of recent elections in the region. Indeed,West Africa has also seen election-related crises, and election-related violenceremains a concern. Coups d’état took place just before scheduled elections inMali and Guinea-Bissau in March and April of 2012, and earlier high-profilecases of election violence in Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria served as reminders ofhow elections can trigger violence, with serious implications for national andregional stability.Periodic and genuine elections are seen as a key component for enhancing

the legitimacy of a government and strengthening the social contract betweencitizens and their governments.1 However, while critical to building democra-cies, elections are only one component of the democratic and legitimizationprocess. And in the absence of other structural, institutional, and normativedemocratic conditions to absorb and resolve tensions that might arise duringand after the electoral process, elections can present windows of vulnerabilitythat introduce a real risk of violence. Given their competitive nature, in certaincircumstances elections can increase the salience of ethnic, religious, and othersocietal differences, allowing actors to mobilize them for partisan purposes,triggering violence. Since election-related violence can in turn undermine democracy by

eroding people’s faith in the democratic process, electoral-assistance providershave started to make peaceful, credible, and sustainable elections a priority. Abroad consensus is emerging around the idea that, in order to prevent violence,elections should be viewed as a process rather than an event. In other words,an election cannot be viewed as an end in itself, but must be part of a largerand longer-term process of democratization.In Africa, approximately 19 to 25 percent of all electoral processes experi-

ence mid to high levels of violence according to some studies.2 In many West

On September 26, 2011, theInternational Peace Institute (IPI)hosted a seminar entitled “Electionsand Stability in West Africa: TheWay Forward,” organized in partner-ship with the United NationsElectoral Assistance Division (EAD).This roundtable discussion followedthe May 2011 regional conference onelections and stability in WestAfrica, which took place in Praia,Cape Verde.

While disseminating the conclusionsof the Praia conference to theinternational community in NewYork, the September roundtablealso elaborated on the challenges oforganizing peaceful and credibleelections and examined the implica-tions of the Praia Declaration forinternational electoral assistance.

The meeting was attended by overfifty participants, including officialsfrom the United Nations SecurityCouncil, the UN Secretariat, andpermanent missions to the UN;representatives from UNOWA andECOWAS; and academics and civilsociety organizations with expertisein elections.

This meeting note was drafted byKendra Collins, a consultant for UNEAD, with the support of AnnWright, a research assistant at IPI. Itreflects the rapporteurs’ interpreta-tion of the discussion at the meetingand does not necessarily representthe view of all other participants. 1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Article 21, para. 3.

2 Dorina Bekoe, “Trends in Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Peace Brief 13, United Nations Institute ofPeace, March 2010.

2 MEETING NOTE

African states with structural and institutionalweaknesses, especially those emerging from yearsof conflict, increasing attention is being paid tocreating conditions conducive to holding elections.Ensuring that these conditions are in place whenelections are conducted was the purpose of the May2011 regional conference on elections and stabilityin West Africa, which took place in Praia, CapeVerde. It was organized by the United NationsOffice in West Africa (UNOWA), in close collabo-ration with the Economic Community of WestAfrican States (ECOWAS) and with the support ofthe International Peace Institute (IPI). The Praiaconference provided the first international platformfor member states and practitioners to considerbest practices in the conduct of elections in WestAfrica, as a means of facilitating more stable anddemocratic societies. The resultant outcomedocument, the Praia Declaration on Elections andStability in West Africa (henceforth, the PraiaDeclaration), offers a comprehensive package ofconclusions and action-oriented recommendationsfor strengthening the conduct of elections andelectoral-assistance regimes. To follow up on the Praia conference, IPI

partnered with the United Nations ElectoralAssistance Division (EAD) to organize a roundtablediscussion on September 26, 2011, entitled“Elections and Stability in West Africa: The WayForward.” The meeting sought to elaborate on thechallenges of organizing peaceful and credibleelections and the pivotal role played by govern-ments, regional organizations, the internationalcommunity, and nonstate actors in strengtheningelectoral processes. Specifically, the New Yorkroundtable provided a platform (a) to present anddisseminate the conclusions and key recommenda-tions of the Praia conference to the internationalcommunity, focusing on those aspects dealing withelections as a tool for democratization, conflictprevention, and peacebuilding; and (b) to assess theimplications of these findings and recommenda-tions for international electoral assistance. The roundtable discussion was organized into

three sessions, which successively highlighted therecommendations from the Praia conference;

examined the potential for elections to consolidatepeace as well as to trigger violence; and identifiedsome best practices for conducting elections inorder to strengthen the paradigm of electoralassistance.

The Praia Declaration onElections and Stability inWest Africa

In the months preceding the regional conferenceconvened in May 2011 in Praia, Cape Verde,presidential and legislative elections were held inBenin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, and Nigeria.These electoral processes provided valuable lessonsto better prepare for elections that transpired inCôte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, and Liberia betweenOctober and December 2011, as well as electionsplanned in the region for 2012, including those inBurkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali,Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The Praia conference provided important

insights into electoral processes in the region with aview to improving electoral assistance andstrengthening national and regional stability.Adopted at the end of the conference, the PraiaDeclaration offers practical recommendations toensure the conduct of free, fair, and peacefulelections in the region.3 These recommendationsfall into the following five categories:1. Elections and Crisis Prevention

A conflict-prevention approach to electoralassistance is at the heart of the Praia Declaration.The declaration emphasizes the need to integratepolitical considerations into electoral-assistanceefforts, alongside the fairly well establishedtechnical assistance components—a pointdiscussed extensively at the New York roundtable.This includes the use of mediation and good officesto prevent violence. In addition, the PraiaDeclaration identifies the need to addressgrievances in order to ensure the best possiblepolitical environment for elections to take place.Greater collaboration and coordination betweenthe UN, ECOWAS, and the AU, as well as between

3 “Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa,” adopted by the Regional Conference on Elections and Stability in Praia, Cape Verde, May18-20, 2011.The full text of the Praia Declaration please is available at http://unowa.unmissions.org/Portals/UNOWA/PRAIA%20DECL_ANG.pdf .

international partners and contact groups, is alsohighlighted as an area for increased efforts. 2. Electoral Assistance

Holding elections is the responsibility of stateauthorities, and therefore international electoralassistance should focus on long-term sustain-ability.4 According to the Praia Declaration,electoral assistance should be designed to meetspecific country requirements and needs. Ensuringthat elections are sustainable requires nationalownership of the electoral process. The cost ofcarrying out elections plays a significant role increating ownership of the process and should becarefully considered when determining the electionsystem. In addition, building the capacity ofnational stakeholders and institutions is key tosuccessful elections. 3. Norms and Principles of ElectoralProcesses

Regional organizations play an important role indeveloping the normative and legal framework forfree, fair, and regular elections, and for promotinggood governance. Many of the concepts laid out inthe Praia Declaration are embodied in the existingnormative frameworks for the conduct of free, fair,and peaceful elections in West Africa. For instance,the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and GoodGovernance, adopted in December 2001, is animportant agreement among West African states toensure credible and regular elections in the region.The protocol is a regional commitment to addressthe growing challenge of election-related violencein West Africa. In addition, the adoption of theECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)in 2008 offers a regional conflict-prevention andpeacebuilding strategy, which elaborates on theconduct of elections while also providing guidelinesand entry points for relevant actors to engage inprevention initiatives. However, the inability of theECOWAS protocol to effectively sanction noncom-pliant members was mentioned by some partici-pants as one of its serious limitations. Some partic-ipants highlighted the failure of ECOWASmembers to pressure former President LaurentGbagbo of Côte d'Ivoire to peacefully step downafter losing the November 2010 presidential

election and recommended reviewing the existingregional frameworks, namely the ECPF, to reducethe gap between agreed norms and their actualimplementation. 4. Electoral Administration

Elections that are administered in a transparent,consistent, and fair manner are more likely to besuccessful. Therefore, the recommendations of thePraia Declaration include building the capacity ofelectoral management bodies (EMBs) to supporteffective elections and set up appropriate conflict-resolution mechanisms,5 establishing confidence inthe electoral process among the public andstakeholders, and encouraging a broad nationalconsensus.5. Cross-Cutting Issues

Human Rights and Gender. Respect for andadherence to human rights norms during theelectoral process, including freedom of speech,assembly, association, and equality, provides thebasis for free and fair elections. And the inclusion ofwomen in the political process, both as voters andcandidates, plays an important role in ensuring thatelections are democratic, inclusive, and evenpeaceful. Women in West Africa have proven to bea powerful force in demanding democracy andaccountability while advocating nonviolence. ThePraia Declaration calls for empowering women inthe conduct of elections and taking appropriatemeasures to enhance women’s participation inelections. The declaration also calls for the protec-tion of all voters and candidates, especially women.Implementation of the relevant UN SecurityCouncil resolutions, including 1325 and 1820, ishighlighted. Security Forces. The neutrality of the security

forces is a key precondition for peaceful elections.In elections, security forces play a critical role inestablishing security as well as enforcing law andorder. When security forces are held accountable,are given proper oversight, and are impartial actorsin the election process, their role is a positive one.However, when security forces are used to intimi-date segments of the population or injectthemselves politically into the elections and back acertain candidate, their role can be extremely

ELECTIONS AND STABILITY IN WEST AFRICA 3

4 For a more comprehensive summary of electoral assistance, please see the section on electoral assistance below. 5 Recommendation 18 of the Praia Declaration. For more on electoral management bodies, see the section on EMBs below.

4 MEETING NOTE

dangerous. For this reason, the Praia Declarationarticulates a range of recommendations, includingstrengthening the national legal frameworksregulating the security forces, establishing an adhoc election security force, and teaching securityforces about respect for international norms andstandards for public order in advance of elections. The Media. Freedom of expression is a

fundamental right. Upholding freedom of expres-sion is critical during the electoral process. Themedia plays a key role in generating and dissemi-nating information about the candidates as well asoverseeing the electoral process. Therefore, thePraia Declaration recommends training the mediaand developing media support strategies in advanceof elections. Yet, in countries where elections havetriggered violence, the role of the media in incitingviolence at times has become a cause for concern.For this reason, the Praia Declaration recommendscodes of conduct for state-owned and privatemedia, as well as legislation against discriminationand incitement to violence in order to hold themedia accountable.

Risk Factors for Election-Related Violence in WestAfrica

The Secretary-General’s August 2011 report onstrengthening United Nations electoral assistancenotes that election-related violence can be triggeredby electoral shortcomings, such as severely flawedvoter lists, the misuse of incumbency, a lack oftransparency, or the actual or perceived bias ofelection officials, which can result in real orperceived fraud. However, technical shortcomingsare usually not the fundamental cause of violence orviolent conflict, but merely the spark that ignitesdeeper-rooted social, economic, or politicaltensions.6 Thus, if the political environment is notconducive to building confidence amongstakeholders, or if one candidate refuses to acceptcredible election results, elections can be a triggerfor violence and instability. These factors forelectoral violence were discussed by participants at

the New York roundtable, building on research thathas been undertaken to produce risk-assessmentguides exploring the underlying drivers of violenceand instability during elections.7

Every context is unique, so it is often difficult todraw broad conclusions as to why some electionsare held peacefully while others tend to increasetensions and trigger violence. Further complicatingthe analysis of electoral violence is the fact thatpolitical violence often occurs in areas alreadyaffected by other forms of violence. In environ-ments where criminal and political activitiesintersect, it can be hard to determine whether aviolent incident is related to the electoral process oris simply a criminal act. Thus, while wary ofgeneralizing, the participants discussed recurrentthemes and features in countries that have experi-enced electoral violence, which provide insight intosome of the causes of election-related violence inWest Africa. Current literature on election-related violence

tends to focus on several distinct environments:countries that have experienced transitions fromauthoritarian or single-party rule to multipartypolitics; postwar societies undergoing a transitionto democracy in which elections are seen as acritical turning point; and referendums conductedto ratify peace agreements.8 In these precariousenvironments, participants noted that “winner-takes-all” politics could increase the potential forviolence since the stakes are high, particularly whenthe margin of victory is tight. While electoral violence is sometimes sponta-

neous, politicians can also purposefully inciteviolence or play up societal divisions—therebyincreasing the chances of conflict—if it serves theirinterest. For example, politicians might attempt tosuppress voter turnout by employing or threateningviolence, which is shown to disproportionatelyprevent women’s participation in elections.Consequently, greater attention has been paid tothe mitigating role of political party leaders, whocan discourage their followers from engaging inviolence and instead promote peaceful elections. Inthe 2007 presidential runoff in Sierra Leone, for

6 United Nations Secretary-General, Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections andthe Promotion of Democratization, UN Doc. A/66/314, August 19, 2011, para. 36.

7 See, for example, Timothy D. Sisk, “Evaluating Election-Related Violence in Africa: Nigeria and Sudan in Comparative Perspective,” in Dorina Bekoe, ed., ElectoralViolence in Africa (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, forthcoming 2012).

8 United Nations Development Programme, “Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming,” 2007.

example, the leaders of the two major politicalparties signed a peace communiqué in the weekprior to the elections in an effort to calm risingtensions ahead of the vote. The communiqué sent aclear message to both parties’ members that theywere committed to nonviolence, which is thoughtto have had a positive influence on the largelypeaceful elections that followed. Although election-related violence is often

framed in terms of the incumbent versus theopposition, participants observed that suchviolence can also arise from within political parties,including within the ruling party. This has at timesmanifested itself as a contest between hardlinersand moderates belonging to the same party. Thistype of intraparty violence is often overlooked bythe international community and was highlightedas an area for increased attention in conflict-prevention strategies. Participants also discussed the various motiva-

tions for engaging in electoral violence. Twooverarching motivations, among others, wereidentified to explain the reasons individuals partic-ipate in election-related violence: greed andgrievance. “Greed” as a motivator of election-related violence is shorthand for economic interestsor the payoff for participating in violence. Winningan election gives a candidate access to the powerand the resources of the state. Acts of “grievance”are motivated by real or perceived injustices, whichare thought to stem from intergroup hatred,political exclusion and economic discrimination,and vengeance.9 An intersection of greed andgrievance—an overlap of economic interests anddivisive social cleavages—was considered a highrisk factor for electoral violence.In conditions of scarcity, studies of election-

related violence often highlight the presence ofpatronage politics, where politicians at the nationaland local levels use their access to state resources toreward individuals for their political support.However, patronage politics alone is an insufficientexplanation for election-related violence, since thistactic is common in many countries that do notexperience electoral violence. Participants observedthat patronage politics must be looked at together

with issues of identity, such as religion andethnicity, which often become political cleavagesand form the basis of many political parties in WestAfrica. Thus, in countries with strong andpotentially divisive social identities, and in theabsence of the necessary structural conditions tomollify tensions, participants stressed the need forsustained dialogue to promote stability and reducethe potential for violence before, during, and afterelections.Factors related to a country's social structure also

help to predict the risk of violence. It was noted thatrapidly growing urban areas, which often have largeand heterogeneous populations living in poorconditions and close quarters, can contribute to thelikelihood of electoral violence in some circum-stances. Other social factors, such as demographics,can also significantly influence the potential forelection-related violence. The role of the youth washighlighted in particular, with research showingthat risks of electoral violence increase in countrieswith a large youth population, especially whenyoung males are unemployed and not enrolled insecondary school, as this demographic tends to bemore susceptible to incitement to violence bypolitical actors and other groups.10 For this reason,the Praia Declaration recommends increasedefforts to address the grievances of youth beforeholding elections. Several participants at the roundtable observed

that signs that violence might occur during electionscan at times be detected as early as two years beforean election actually takes place. Therefore, it isimportant to monitor early indicators, such as theremoval of independent judges several monthsbefore the election or the promotion of discord inthe media, in order to prevent an escalation intoviolence. Increasingly, local citizens are empoweredto monitor rising tensions and early signs ofpotential violence. Not only are these citizensfrequently more in tune with local dynamics thantheir international counterparts, they have alreadybeen playing a role in early detection for variouselectoral competitions by monitoring discussions onsocial media and statements made by the media andpolitical participants.

ELECTIONS AND STABILITY IN WEST AFRICA 5

9 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2355, May 2000. See also Karen Ballentineand Jake Sherman (eds.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

10 Compare this to the notion of a “demographic dividend,” which describes situations where a large youth population drives socioeconomic development, particu-larly following investment in education and jobs.

Challenges to Elections inPostconflict and FragileStates

Holding transparent and credible elections is acritical component of the democratization process.Genuine elections enhance the legitimacy of thegovernment and increase trust between the govern-ment and its people. Elections can also serve as achannel to express differences through debate.However, in fragile states, elections often representwindows of vulnerability, and the risk factors forelectoral violence should be carefully analyzed,monitored, and addressed. This is especially true inpostconflict contexts, in the absence of stronginstitutions that can effectively respond to conflictsbefore they become crises. Although many West African countries do not

have active conflicts, some lessons learned fromproviding electoral assistance in postconflictenvironments could be applicable to countries inthe region at risk of election-related violence.Participants pointed out that in postconflict statesand in states transitioning from authoritarian tocivilian rule, there are often no institutionalizedpolitical parties, and building a network of politicalparties before elections can be a challenging task.Nonetheless, over time opposition parties may findchances to organize better, alter the balance ofpower, and even take office, if they have the space tooperate and compete with the ruling party. Participants also pointed out that electoral

assistance in postconflict countries, and interna-tional assistance more broadly, tends to focuslargely on immediate postconflict priorities,including the first elections. As a result, the firstelections in the immediate aftermath of conflictoften attract a significant amount of internationalsupport and financial and technical assistance.Participants agreed that the internationalcommunity should view electoral assistance as aprocess that will require sustained attention beyondthe first elections in the postconflict period. Inparticular, this attention should be aimed atgenuine efforts to build sustainable national capaci-ties so that the concerned country will be able to

organize its own elections in a credible and peacefulmanner.

Enhancing ElectoralProcesses

ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIESAND THE JUDICIARY

The potential for elections to trigger violencehighlights the need for robust and transparentmechanisms to manage the electoral process and itsoutcome. The important role played by electoralmanagement bodies (EMBs) to ensure nationalconsensus as well as public and stakeholderconfidence in the electoral process was stressed byall participants at the roundtable. Crucial to theeffectiveness of EMBs is their credibility. Therefore,ensuring that the individuals managing the electionare considered honest and capable by the voters andcandidates should be paramount. Indeed, if thepopulation and political actors have faith in theintegrity of the people and institutions managingthe election, they are more likely to accept theelection outcome.Participants highlighted the importance of

autonomous electoral commissions in thesubregion that manage their own budgets andoperate independently of the executive branch.They also stressed that EMBs are more susceptibleto pressure if their funding is contingent upongovernment allocations and their members areselected by the ruling party. In Ghana, theindependence of the electoral commission isguaranteed by the Ghanaian constitution. Thechairman and two deputy chairmen of the electoralcommission are given the same terms andconditions as those of superior courts’ justices,including permanent tenure.11 National ownershipof the electoral process, as highlighted in the PraiaDeclaration, is another critical component forensuring the sustainability of elections. For thisreason, it is especially important that EMBs befostered as national institutions, representing thenational interest rather than the interests of foreignpowers. Participants specifically pointed out thesensitivity of foreign funding of these bodies, whichcan lead to the perception that they are more

6 MEETING NOTE

11 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992, Chapter 7, Article 44.

accountable to foreign donors than to the localpopulation. In addition, to ensure the continuity ofthe regular elections, a number of participants atthe New York roundtable observed that electionbudgets should be included in the normal adminis-trative state budget.At a regional level, ECOWAS has encouraged the

use of consultative bodies that incorporate theparticipation of representatives from the EMBs,political parties, civil society groups, and the media,as a means of troubleshooting emerging issues inthe preparation of elections. Recommendationeleven of the Praia Declaration endorses thisapproach, advocating for the establishment of“mechanisms for regular consultation amongnational stakeholders.” Additionally, in order tobuild the capacity of EMBs, participants discussedthe possibility of developing a regional network ofEMBs in West Africa. This could include opportu-nities for EMB leadership to convene as peers anddiscuss best practices in managing electoralprocesses. It might also provide the opportunity tosend EMB leadership to observe election prepara-tion and electoral management in other countriesin the region. Though EMBs play a critical role in carrying out

the electoral process and mediating any disagree-ment over the results, an independent and neutraljudicial system to adjudicate the election outcome,if necessary, is also critical to ensuring that electionoutcomes are fair, and perceived by voters that way.Judicial institutions also play a role in protectingindividuals’ political rights to participate inelections as either candidates or voters, whilepreserving freedom of speech and acting as a legalcheck over the government. SECURITY FORCES

Security forces are an important actor duringelectoral processes in West Africa and across thecontinent. Charged with establishing a safeenvironment where candidates and citizens canexpress themselves and vote without fear of retribu-tion, security forces play a critical role in theconduct of peaceful and credible elections.Achieving this goal requires that security forcesremain neutral throughout the election process.The politicization of the military in West Africa,however, has often proven to be at odds with thisprecondition for free and fair elections. This was

illustrated in recent military coups in Mali andGuinea-Bissau, and during the election standoff inCôte d’Ivoire, when former president LaurentGbagbo refused to give up power despite his defeatin the 2010 presidential election. Despite the mitigating influence of international

pressure, military interventions in Guinea andNiger in 2009 and 2010 also raised concerns aboutundemocratic rule. To address situations where aneutral security force does not exist, the PraiaDeclaration recommends the establishment of anad hoc electoral security force to address fragileinstitutional contexts under the supervision of anintegrated and impartial electoral-security coordi-nating body. The Praia Declaration alsorecommends teaching, promoting, and respectingthe international norms and standards for publicorder during electoral periods, including humanrights norms. Such training of security forces ininternational human rights standards could be anentry point for regional organizations, NGOs, andother governments to assist with security reform. CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society has had a long history of pushing forpeace and democratic reforms in West Africa.Women’s groups, media organizations, laborunions, and human rights groups can play animportant role in strengthening the electoralprocess by monitoring the elections and ensuringtheir credibility. In the 2010 presidential electionsin Guinea for example, civil society, and women’sgroups in particular, multiplied efforts to educatethe electorate about the democratic process and tofacilitate women’s participation in the electionsafter decades of authoritarian rule. In othercountries, civil society has also been pivotal infostering democratic, tolerant societies that are lesssusceptible to recruitment for violent actions bycandidates or other groups during the electionprocess. Conversely, however, civil society can alsobe divided by ethnic, religious, or other socialcleavages, which can play a role in mobilizinggroups and fomenting violence. Consequently,some participants were of the view that assistanceto build the capacity of civil society, asrecommended in the Praia Declaration, shouldinclude assurances that it will not inadvertentlyempower groups that will exacerbate tensions andencourage violence.

ELECTIONS AND STABILITY IN WEST AFRICA 7

GENDER AS A CROSS-CUTTING ISSUEIN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

Participants at the meeting discussed the impact ofgender-based violence on women’s participation inelectoral processes, both as candidates and voters.As outlined in the Praia Declaration, there wasagreement on the need for greater inclusion ofwomen in the political process, both as voters andas potential office holders. Specifically, the partici-pation of women in EMBs was considered a usefultool to ensure an inclusive electoral process.

Electoral Assistance,Conflict Prevention, andPeacebuilding

The UN General Assembly has stated on numerousoccasions, including in its most recent resolutionon UN electoral assistance,12 that there is no singlerecipe for democracy. In the same vein, thereshould be no single recipe for electoral assistance.Any support provided for elections should bedesigned to meet specific requirements andcontexts, and based on a careful and comprehensiveneeds assessment as opposed to the “one-size-fits-all” approach. National ownership, sustainability,and cost effectiveness are of key importance in theprovision of international assistance to electoralprocesses. As articulated in the Praia Declaration and

underlined in biennial resolutions on elections bythe UN General Assembly, elections are the respon-sibility of national governments. The involvementof international actors in the electoral process,particularly former colonial powers, can be asensitive issue. Although in some cases interna-tional funding and assistance to carry out theelectoral process are critical, participants stressedthat the long-term goal of international actorsshould be to ensure that elections can be sustainedby national governments without outsideassistance. As such, electoral support should aim atbuilding capacities at the national and regional leveland should be designed and delivered in a way thatempowers domestic actors and institutions. The best way to deal with an electoral problem is

not always to throw technical fixes at it—including

expensive and sometimes inappropriate high-techsolutions. In many cases, the problem can be betteraddressed by ensuring that elections are conductedin a way that engenders trust and confidenceamong contestants and voters, and so that theresults reflect the people’s will, despite possibleshortcomings or controversies. In order to buildnational consensus, societies should be consultedon the procedures and key decisions during theprocess. Thus, a permanent dialogue with nationaland local bodies must be established, allowing forthe empowerment of civil society and strengthenedpartnerships, and creating a better environment forstability.Furthermore, electoral assistance should be cost-

effective. Of particular concern in working towardthis goal is the fact that some of the poorestcountries in the world, many of which are farbehind in reaching their Millennium DevelopmentGoals (MDGs), have chosen some of the mostexpensive electoral systems. According to theroundtable participants, high election costs couldbe reduced by sharing of electoral materials acrossthe region, such as sharing ballot boxes or vehicles.Further attention should also be given to thetechnical solutions being promoted as essential forthe conduct of credible and transparent elections.In comparison with several African countries,where emphasis is put on costly technical aspects ofthe electoral process, one participant noted that insome of the world’s most developed countries thetechnical expectations are lower and simpler. Forinstance, in some developed countries, photo IDsare not required of the voters. The coordination challenges posed by the

multiplicity of actors involved in providing interna-tional electoral assistance was considered to beanother important matter requiring attention. Itwas noted that despite the progress made inaddressing this issue, in many cases a lack ofadequate coordination among different interna-tional assistance providers still risks duplicatingefforts and adversely affecting the effectiveness ofassistance. Participants in the discussion reiteratedthe need for reinforced coordination among theinternational organizations involved in providingelectoral assistance to avoid inconsistency, andnoted that in many cases the UN can lead coordina-

8 MEETING NOTE

12 UN General Assembly Resolution 66/163 (December 19, 2011), UN Doc. A/RES/66/163.

tion of all assistance providers’ efforts and thus helpensure consistency and coherence. The need forbetter coordination within the UN system was alsohighlighted in the discussions, and the leading roleof the UN focal point for electoral-assistance activi-ties was seen as essential to ensuring system-widecoordination, consistency, and coherence in thedelivery of electoral assistance by all actors in theUnited Nations. Participants also suggested the need for greater

collaboration between the UN and regional organi-zations such as the African Union and ECOWAS, aswell as among these regional groupings.Specifically, the relationship between internationalassistance providers should seek to maximizerespective comparative advantages. While the UNmay be best suited to provide long-term supportand overall coordination of electoral assistance,regional and subregional organizations may bemore appropriate for immediate interventions. TheUnited Nations Office in West Africa, for examplehas a strong record of deploying good offices with afocus on election-related crises. In Guinea,UNOWA partnered with the AU, ECOWAS, andthe appointed mediator, President Blaise Compaoréof Burkina Faso, and multiplied efforts to preventviolence by building consensus and ensuring thecoordination of the international contact group.Regional organizations such as the AU andsubregional organizations such as ECOWAS alsoplay an important role in developing the normativeand legal framework for free, fair, and regularelections, and in promoting good governance. Asdiscussed above, ECOWAS has adopted a protocolon democracy and good governance. In addition,AU member states have adopted the AfricanCharter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,though this remains to be ratified by a number ofWest African countries.While elections can be a means of consolidating

democracy and improving governance, electionsalone do not constitute democracy. Thus, increasedattention should be paid to other areas, such asbuilding government institutions and strength-ening EMBs, civil society, and the media. This callsfor developing greater synergies between thevarious policy frameworks from the peace anddevelopment fields, including peacebuilding,

statebuilding, and democracy building, which oftenwork independently but toward similar goals.Increasingly, the UN, including UNOWA andsubregional organizations such as ECOWAS, havetaken a more holistic view of elections within thebroader democracy-building process. Advancing an agenda that looks at the connec-

tions between different policy areas, cuts across thevarious institutional mandates, and is capable ofbridging gaps between norms and practice can alsobe done by bringing together different communi-ties of practice. For example, the UN could deployelectoral experts in the country conductingelections as well as specialists in security, develop-ment, conflict prevention, and human rights duringelection processes in conflict-prone situations. Sucha strategy is promoted by the Secretary-General’s2011 report on preventive diplomacy, whichdescribes the UN’s “broader approach to preventingelection-related violence, by working with regionalorganizations and other partners to preventelection violence through a combination ofmediation, good offices and electoral assistanceexpertise.”13 Efforts to integrate conflict-preventionstrategies in electoral-assistance regimes, asespoused in the Praia Declaration, represent asignificant development for the electoral-assistanceparadigm. However, participants pointed out thestill greater need for political expertise in electoralassistance in order to carry out effective conflictand needs assessments. In addition, mechanismsfor monitoring indicators of election violence couldbe strengthened.The roundtable participants reiterated the

importance of viewing elections as a critical part ofthe democratization process, rather than its mainevent. This would ensure that elections are, ineffect, a tool for peace and democracy buildingrather than a trigger for violence. Some participantsnoted that long-term observation can help buildconsensus and confidence in the electoral process.It was mentioned in this regard that early observa-tion missions can help to ensure the transparencyof the entire electoral process, from constituencydemarcation and the establishment of electoral listsprior to the election to monitoring the conduct ofthe election and the announcement and acceptanceof the results. Joint observer missions fielded by

ELECTIONS AND STABILITY IN WEST AFRICA 9

13 United Nations Secretary-General, Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results, UN Doc. S/2011/552, August 26, 2011.

regional and subregional organizations such asECOWAS and the AU would help optimize theavailable resources.

Conclusion

There are positive trends, both normatively and inpractice, toward improving the conduct of electionsand addressing the various challenges to strength-ening elections as a means of consolidatingdemocracy in West Africa. A great deal of lessonshave been learned from elections in West Africaand elsewhere, and a new paradigm may beemerging for electoral assistance—one thatintegrates conflict-prevention strategies, givesincreased attention to the political aspects of theelectoral process (in addition to the technical), andviews elections as one component in a longer-termcommitment to building democracy. Increasingly, these themes are articulated by the

electoral-assistance regime and policymakers whounderstand the significant opportunities electionsoffer to bring about more democratic societies, butalso the risks posed for violence and a regressioninto authoritarian or military rule if favorableconditions are not in place when elections are held.In West Africa, where elections have for the mostpart become routine, there has been increasedfocus on strengthening the institutions that supportelectoral processes, including the judiciary, securityforces, and election management bodies. The PraiaDeclaration notes the important role also played bythe media, as well as by civil society and women,

and these too are becoming a more significantfocus for electoral-assistance providers. Whileprogress is noteworthy, these efforts must beincreased and improved. The Praia Declaration offers a strong entry point

for ensuring that elections promote stability in thesubregion. Among its recommendations, partici-pants stressed above all the need for the interna-tional community and regional bodies to continueto improve electoral assistance by enhancingnational ownership and building nationalconsensus on the election process, as well asexpanding and building conflict-prevention strate-gies as a critical component of electoral assistance.As a number of participants pointed out, the risk ofviolence is far too costly for a nation’s developmentand the international community not to invest inand cultivate the most effective crisis-preventiontechniques. Building political expertise to carry outconflict mapping and risk assessments is critical. Inaddition, observer missions and good offices haveproven to be effective in building confidence andhelping mitigate the potential for violence. Despite the strength of its recommendations and

the support it has received from states in the region,the Praia Declaration risks remaining a meredeclaration of intent. To prevent this, nationalgovernments, subregional organizations, interna-tional institutions, and civil society actors—all ofwhich have been instrumental in advocating forand raising awareness of the Praia Declaration—need to remain committed to its implementation.

10 MEETING NOTE

Agenda

Elections and Stability in West Africa: The Way Forward

September 26, 2011

09:00–09:30 WelcomeAmbassador John Hirsch, Senior Adviser, IPI

Opening RemarksMr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs

09:30–10:30 Session 1: Highlights from the Praia Conference on Elections and Stability in WestAfricaWhat are the key lessons learned from recent electoral processes in West Africa? Whatpositive practices can be shared regarding elections as a tool for democratization, conflictprevention, and peacebuilding? What strategies are contemplated or have been developed toimplement the recommendations adopted by the Praia Conference, including the role ofgovernments, nonstate actors, and regional and international institutions and partners?

Chair Ambassador Said Djinnit, United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-Generalfor West Africa and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)

Speaker Dr. Abdel Fatau Musah, Director of External Relations, Economic Community of WestAfrican States (ECOWAS)

10:30–11:30 Session 2: Elections in West Africa: Potential for Peace and Democracy and Risks ofViolence and InstabilityWhat are the main causes of election-related violence in West Africa? What lessons can theinternational community draw from the post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire? To what extentcan the prevention of election-related disputes take into account the underlying political,social, and economic grievances that tend to find expression during elections? Which institu-tions and practices could be strengthened before, during and after electoral processes in WestAfrica, with a view to making them more credible and peaceful?

Chair Ambassador John Hirsch, Senior Adviser, IPI

Speakers Professor Timothy Sisk, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of DenverMs. Mariama Bayard-Gamatié, Former Minister, Former Presidential Candidate,Consultant, Niger

11:30–11:45 Coffee Break

11

11:45–12:45 Session 3: Electoral Assistance and Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: PoliticalImplications, Challenges, and OpportunitiesIs there a need for a new paradigm of electoral assistance in light of the above discussionsand the outcome of the Praia roundtable? What synergies can be further developed betweenelectoral assistance and preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding?

Chair Mr. Craig Jenness, Director, Electoral Assistance Division, United Nations Department ofPolitical Affairs

Speakers Dr. Christiana Thorpe, Chairperson of the Sierra Leone National Electoral CommissionDr. Massimo Tommasoli, Permanent Observer to the United Nations, InternationalInstitute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)Mr. Tadjoudine Ali-Diabacte, Deputy Director, Electoral Assistance Division, UnitedNations Department of Political Affairs

12:45–13:00 Closing RemarksMr. Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser, IPI

12 AGENDA

13

Ms. Heba AbdellatifUnited Nations Department of Political Affairs

Dr. Mireille Affa’a MindzieInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Tadjoudine Ali-DiabacteUnited Nations Department of Political Affairs

H.E. Prof. Nassirou Bako-ArifariMinister of Foreign Affairs, Benin

Ms. Olivia CaeymaexUnited Nations Peacebuilding Support Office

Ms. Kendra CollinsConsultant

Ms. Elizabeth De Leon-JonesUnited Nations Development Programme

Mr. Abdouramane DialloColumbia University

Ambassador Said DjinnitUnited Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)

Mr. Joseph Cornelius DonnellyCaritas Internationalis

Ms. Melissa DraperUN Women

Ms. Mariama Bayard-GamatieGovernment of Niger

Mr. Steen Malthe HansenPermanent Mission of Denmark to theUnited Nations

Ms. Fabienne HaraInternational Crisis Group

Mr. John L. HirschInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Craig JennessUnited Nations Department of Political Affairs

Ms. Ana JiménezPermanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations

Mr. Frederick LamyUnited Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)

Col. Sergio LarrainPermanent Mission of Chile to the United Nations

Mr. Falmata LimanUnited Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)

Ms. Elisabeth LindenmayerColumbia University

Ms. Michela LowryPermanent Mission of the Republic of Rwandato the United Nations

Mr. Youssef MahmoudInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Siphosami MalungaUnited Nations Development Programme

Mr. Francesco ManciniInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Armando Martínez ValdésUnited Nations Electoral Assistance Division

Ms. Henrietta Mensa-BonsuUNMIL

Dr. Filon Morar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania

Dr. Abdel Fatau MusahEconomic Community of West African States(ECOWAS)

Mr. Jyrki NissiläPermanent Mission of Finland to theUnited Nations

Participants

Ms. Gloria NtegeyeUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Mr. Augustine Ugochukwu NwosaPermanent Mission of Nigeria to the UnitedNations

Mr. Sunday Abogonye OchocheUnited Nations Development Programme

Ms. Marie O’ReillyInternational Peace Institute

Ms. Sukai Prom-JacksonUnited Nations Development Programme

Mr. Mansour SadeghiUnited Nations Department of Political Affairs

Mr. Jago SalmonUnited Nations Development Programme

Mr. Samba SaneUnited Nations Department of Political Affairs

Mr. Jascha ScheeleUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Mr. Alain SecklerUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Dr. Hideaki ShinodaHiroshima Peacebuilders Center

Dr. Timothy D. SiskUniversity of Denver

Ms. Christiana ThorpeNational Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone

Mr. Andrew TomlinsonQuaker United Nations Office

Mr. Massimo TommasoliInternational Institute for Democracy andElectoral Assistance

Mr. Patrick TraversPermanent Mission of Canada to the UnitedNations

Ms. Pim ValdreInternational Peace Institute

Ms. Harriette WilliamsFemmes Africa Solidarité

Ms. Ann WrightInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Xu NanfengPermanent Mission of the People's Republic ofChina to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Jean-Francis Régis ZinsouPermanent Mission of the Republic of Benin to theUnited Nations

14 PARTICIPANTS

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