Elections and economic crisis in Southern Europe · PDF fileElections and economic crisis in Southern Europe ... Elections and economic crisis in Southern Europe: ... to surpass the

Elections and economic crisis in Southern Europe

The EU at the ballot box?

Working paper to be presented at the 5th ECPR Graduate Student Conference in Innsbruck

IRENE SANCHEZ VITORES Universidad Autonoma de Madrid [email protected]

Abstract

In the current context of economic crisis, the EU has stepped up and tried to play a major role in the design of the policies that tackle the economic crisis. This has highlighted the impact of multilevel governance and how it is a strain for democracy. When governments are not the only ones making decisions, who is to be accounted for in an election when outcomes are not what citizens expected? If European Parliament Elections are not used to evaluate European institutions (Hix and Marsh, 2007), could citizens express their views through their vote in general elections? This work attempts to give a tentative answer to the question. The countries selected, Southern European countries, are the worst hit by the economic crisis and where the role of the EU has been most salient. Therefore, it would be plausible for these citizens to be the first ones to express their concern. In these countries, survey data point to a deep change in attitudes towards the European Union. That party choice voiced these attitudes seems plausible. Analysis performed using post-electoral surveys from Greece (May 2012), Italy (February 2013), Portugal (June 2011) and Spain (November 2011) show a certain relevance of the EU in citizens’ voting decision. KEY WORDS: voting behaviour, party choice, European Union, Southern Europe, economic crisis.

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Elections and economic crisis in Southern Europe: the EU at

the ballot box?

1. Four pictures to compose a landscape.

In 2010, the Financial Times popularized the term PIGS. Although the financial press had

been using it since the 1990s, it was since this moment that it became of common use

(Krouse, 2012). But what did this acronym stand for? It was a quick way of naming

Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain. Apart from being Southern European countries, they

share a similar economic structure and, therefore, react in a similar way to the ups and

downs of the economic cycles. At the beginning of the economic crisis, the governments

of these countries were probably aware that hard times were coming. What seems hardly

foreseeable is what actually came. A preliminary look at the results points to phenomena

that need to be explained, however before going into the results it deems necessary to

draw a picture of the context in which these elections were held.

The international economic crisis that began in 2010 deeply affected the countries of the

Eurozone and it later developed into a sovereign debt crisis that hit the hardest in Southern

European countries, precisely those included in the PIGS club. Although this countries

share many features in terms of economic, social and political structure, the crisis did not

hit them all to the same extent and the elections did not take place always at the same

[2]

stage (Bosco and Verney, 2012). Insofar as the consequences of the economic crisis had

different nuances from one country to another, it seems plausible that there are variations

in terms of the political consequences.

Greece is probably the country where the economic downturn has materialized in the most

dramatic consequences. For instance, it was in this country where the sovereign debt crisis

set off. In a very short period, unemployment rates went from a 7.7 percent in 2008 to

over 24 percent in 2012, the year when elections were held1. Unemployment would still

rise in 2013, to surpass the 25 percent mark for the general population. Amongst young

people the statistics were even more worrying: youth unemployment was over 55 percent.

In addition, to the depressed economic situation, the government was forced to cut public

spending (over 2 billion € in the period 2010-2012) and accept two bailout packages to

avoid defaulting. For over three years, Greek sovereign debt was out of the international

markets due to the incredibly high borrowing costs they had to agree to. As a

consequence, the standards of living of the Greek collapsed and the political system also

suffered. The set back of the welfare state in Greece has been replaced by citizen

solidarity and family support in most cases. However, it has also created a window of

opportunity for the extreme right to cultivate a base of supporters as it had not been seen

before (Dinas and Lamprini, 2012).

The Troika, name given to the three institutions that intervened the Greek economy,

namely the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission, also forced the PASOK

government to resign and a new Grand Coalition government came to office. In this

shaken context, the election held in May 2012 was an earthquake for the party system:

Nea Democratia (ND) won the election closely followed by the radical left party

1 All the statistics on unemployment and public spending quoted in this section have been obtained from

EUROSTAT.

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SYRIZA, the extreme right Golden Dawn (XA) performed extremely well and the

socialist PASOK collapsed. The result was so inconclusive that new elections had to be

held a month later and a government led by the conservative Antoni Samaras (ND) was

appointed. Given that this second election consolidated what happened on the first, only

the May election will be taken into account in this paper.

Figure 1. Greek turnout for May and June 2012 elections.

Source: Greek Ministry of Interior.

Although Italy was not formally bailed out, the economic crisis had no less impact over

the Italian political system. In a short period of time, the PdL had many open fronts. The

combination of the economic downturn and the sovereign debt crisis caused Italy to

borrow money at historically high prices, compromising the capacity of the Italian

government to respond to its obligations. The crisis deepened when allegations of

corruption and improper behavior on behalf of Berlusconi appeared on the media and

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25

30

35

June 2012 may-12

New Democracy (ND) Coalition of the Radical Left – Unitary Social Movement (SYRIZA)

Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Independent Greeks (ANEL)

Communist Party of Greece (KKE) Golden Dawn (XA)

Democratic Left (DIMAR) Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)

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travelled around the world. The situation worsened when Berlusconi’s government

openly rejected to put in place the policies and spending cuts proposed by the European

Commission. International pressure increased and the Berlusconi government went to

Parliament for support in the form of a vote of confidence. However, Parliament was

unwilling to back Berlusconi against the EU and even some members of the PdL left the

party. To avoid the alleged instability that an election would bring, a technocratic

government led by Mario Monti and full of experts in various fields was appointed. This

new cabinet was expected to wade through the economic toughness, run the country and

prepare it for the election. PdL and PD supported this government in Parliament while

they harshly criticized its measures in the media (Vegetti et al., 2013). Unemployment

climbing to an unseen 13% led to the development of widespread public dissatisfaction

amongst the general public and numerous demonstrations while unemployment grew and

living conditions worsened.

The February 2013 General Election attracted everyone’s attention due to not only the

shaken context but also because they were to be held under new rules (Segatti, 2014). The

results showed that no matter the cautions, voters still have the last say. The PD won the

election by a couple of votes but they were so closely followed by the Movimento Cinque

Stelle and the PdL that the majority price awarded to the party with the most votes did

not configure a majority big enough to decide the government. After several rounds of

talks, Paolo Bersani from the PD managed to get appointed to form a government

although his support was weak.

[5]

Figure 2. Turnout for Italian 2013 election.

Source: Italian Ministry of Interior.

Amongst the four countries considered, Portugal was the other one that suffered the worst

economic situation, to the extent that they also required a joint IMF/ECB bailout package.

As a result of the economic hardship, public spending was cut over a 25%, privatizations

were accelerated and salaries and public benefits were cut at the same time that taxation

increased. Unemployment rose to an unseen 14% amongst the general population and a

35% amongst young people. As described by Magalhaes (2012), public contestation to

austerity measures became widespread in crowded demonstrations and numerous strikes.

In the 2011 election that took place just after the signatures of the Memorandum by the

three main parties and the rejection of the fourth austerity package proposed by the

Portuguese government. In contrast to their Italian and Greek neighbors, the turmoil in

the Portuguese political arena did not manifest in a complete change of the party system.

The incumbent PS party fell to historically low results while his main competitor, the

0,0

5,0

10,0

15,0

20,0

25,0

30,0

PD Di Pietro Italia dei valori

Sinistra e liberta Centro democratico

SVP* PdL

LN Fratelli d'Italia

Movimento per l'autonomia All. Per il Sud Movimento 5 Stelle

Centro Scelta civica per Monti

Unione di Centro Futuro e Libertà

Movimento association italiani a'll Estero Autonomie, Liberté Democracie

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PSD, comfortably won the elections. As a result of this election a new government led by

Pedro Passos Coelho was appointed in Portugal.

Figure 3. Turnout for the Portuguese 2011 election.

Source: Portuguese Ministry of Interior.

As the countries previously described, Spain has been harshly hit by the economic crisis.

The bursting of the housing bubble that had supported economic growth in the previous

years, combined with the high price at which the Spanish government was borrowing

money in the international markets were the main manifestations of the economic

downturn. As a result, not only did public spending experience cuts, but also

unemployment reached historically high rates, getting close to 25% amongst the general

population and over 50% amongst young people. Living standards did not fall as much

as in Greece, but the situation became tough for many families. Demonstrations and

strikes increased as a response to the worsening situation. In this troubled context, the

PSOE government advanced a couple of months the elections (Anduiza et al., 2013;

Muñoz et al., 2014). The election was held in November 2011 and the results, if it were

to be compared to the previously described countries, was more similar to the Portuguese

than the Italian or the Greek. Volatility increased in comparison to previous elections and

0,0

5,0

10,0

15,0

20,0

25,0

30,0

35,0

40,0

45,0

Social Democratic Socialist People's Party

Democratic Unity Coalition* Left Bloc Invalid votes

Blank votes

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the incumbent had bad results but the party system stayed more or less the same. The

collapse of the PSOE allowed for PP not only to win the election but also to obtain an

absolute majority in Parliament. Small parties gained more votes due to discontent,

although it was not enough to produce a realignment of the party system (Martín and

Urquizu-Sancho, 2012). As a result of the election, Mariano Rajoy was appointed Prime

Minister and asked to form government.

Figure 4. Turnout for the Spanish 2011 election.

Source: Spanish Ministry of Interior.

All four countries considered went, and still are going, through economic hardship. This

is not a new situation by itself. Governments have resigned due to bad economic results,

people have demonstrated against unwanted policies, and still there is something new to

this context. The degree of intertwining of the economic and political systems has resulted

in a stage that demands for a different way of understanding politics (Bardi et al., 2014:

244). The common currency and the EU institutions have resulted in a very complex

decision-making process that forces governments to design policies coordinating with

other member states (Fabbrini, 2013: 1004). This system, although slow, worked in the

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25

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35

40

45

50

Partido Popular Partido Socialista Obrero Español Izquierda Unida

Convergencia i Unió Partido Nacionalista Vasco Unión Progreso y Democracia

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya

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preceding years because prosperity masked differences between countries (Ayala, 2012:

46–48). However, when the hard times have come to test this institutional configuration,

the problems have surfaced and the inequalities between countries have deepened

(Laffan, 2014). In addition, the proposed solutions have not been very democratic, the

relevant actors have preferred solutions articulated over technocracy and public spending

cuts. As a result, the democratic deficit has reappeared as more than a merely theoretical

problem as different authors had expected in previous years (Majone, 1998; Tillman,

2004: 603): the EU is having actual impact over the welfare states of citizens. Is it possible

that this makes the EU a relevant issue for voters in national elections?

1. Making the EU matter for voters… or not.

EU issue voting can be defined as the process through which attitudes towards the

European Union shape a citizen’s voting decision (de Vries, 2007). Traditionally, the

European Union has been pictured as a technical issue, distant from citizens’ everyday

lives and worries and therefore distant from the voting decision. The EU has a complex

institutional design and decision-making process that have contributed to the idea that

this is a technical issue were governments are the only ones with the knowledge to make

decisions (Carrubba, 2001; Henderson and Sitter, 2008). Despite the fact that the EU had

competences over matters close to the everyday concerns of citizens such as safety rules

in the working environment or food labelling regulations, they are not salient issues (Díez

Medrano, 2003: 22). EU regulations shape a good number of the laws passed in member

countries but they usually do not get credit for political decisions. However, this situation

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changed after 2011. The outbreak of the economic crisis has come accompanied by a

change in the role given to the EU. The institution which had brought democracy and

prosperity to Southern Europe is now promoting cuts in public expenditure, bailouts and

other sorts of economic sacrifices. At the same time, the EU has tried to have a more

predominant role in the design of economic policies in the EMU member States. This

increase in prominence has not brought better evaluations of the EU, instead it has

highlighted the lack of accountability and how it is an actual issue of concern for citizens

(Loveless, 2010: 1084; Schwarzer, 2012).

Despite the fact that Peter Mair (2000) in one of his works rejected the europeanization

of the national political systems of member States, the truth is that the EU is playing an

increasingly relevant role. The EU has developed into a peculiar international institution

whose peculiarities have been enhanced after the passing of the Treaty of Lisbon and has

taken integration into a further stage (Bickerton, 2013). This has meant that, compared to

previous economic crisis, mainly due to the cession of monetary policies, the EU has had

a more dominant role in the political arena (Fabbrini, 2013: 1008).

Up until now, support for the EU has been built not only over ideological beliefs but also

highlighting the benefits of membership as the key to economic development and a

guarantor of democracy (Jackson et al., 2011). Even though its functioning was not

strictly democratic, decisions where perceived as positive and there was consensus on

what EU membership meant (Carrubba, 2001: 142). From 2011 onwards, citizens’

attitudes towards the EU start to show a change towards criticism and discontent with the

decisions that were being made (Verney, 2011). The EU limiting the repertoires of

governments is not a new phenomenon (Haughton, 2014: 82; Shu, 2009), however, after

the beginning of the crisis it has taken a new face, demanding important sacrifices from

the population.

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This discontent could affect the way in which partisan competition takes place,

introducing the EU issue where it used to be excluded (Eijk and Franklin, 2004).

Nonetheless, for any given issue to acquire relevance it is not enough for citizens to be

willing to express an opinion additionally some other elements are needed (Carmines and

Stimson, 1986: 902; de Vries, 2007). First, an issue needs to be presented as a contested

issue. Three can be the possible ways in which this can be done: because parties are

willing to introduce it into the public debate, because an actor may be interested on getting

an issue under the public eye or because a focusing event takes place, centering the

attention of the general public (Birkland, 2005: 100–102). Second, it is not enough to

present any given issue as contentious, citizens need to perceive that there is a defined

problem affecting them in some way (Fossati, 2013; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000: 15–

17). This would mean that citizens would pay more attention to the EU and its decision

when its proposed policies impact social benefits and public services. The combination

of the economic crisis, austerity in public spending and the consequences of it both over

citizens all across Europe, and particularly in Southern countries seems to have opened a

window of opportunity for the issue to gain relevance (Tillman, 2004: 592–593). Yet,

political parties are always careful when they position themselves in this debate

(Pennings, 2006), and they are not under the same incentive system, depending on the

role they assume in the political system: whether they are government-seeking or

minoritarian parties (Nanou and Dorussen, 2013).

The European Union is a project of the political centre of the political centre, of the

government-seeking parties across Europe (Kriesi et al., 2006; Marks, 2006). These

parties, when they shape their electoral manifestos they are more constrained than non-

government-seekers. These parties need to elaborate their manifestos keeping in mind the

obligations that come from governing: internationally-agreed obligations, shared

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competences with other institutions, etc. In other words, their proposals have to be

flexible enough to adapt to the contingencies that may come up during the legislature but

they also need to be able to incorporate decisions that have a different ideological

inspiration such as policies coming from the EU (Nanou and Dorussen, 2013: 76–77;

Neumayer, 2008: 155). In this parties it is essential to keep a coherent ideological

discourse because their solvency as office-seekers builds precisely along this idea of

being the best available manager of State affairs, in spite of all the existing constraints

(Sánchez-Cuenca, 2008: 20–22). Therefore, the competition between these government-

seeking parties is limited and avoids criticizing certain policies under the warning that the

other competing parties may be forced to undertake similar moves, betraying to some

extent their ideological integrity to respond to the challenges of governance.

Minoritarian parties, that is, parties who only aim to achieve seats in Parliament or, at

best, to be coalition partners of other parties, have more flexibility when positioning

themselves over difficult issues because they do not expect to be held by the constraints

of governing (Taggart, 1998: 384). Credibility in these parties is not based in the

fulfillment of electoral promises and the achievement of defined goals, instead it is more

important for them to keep ideological integrity and loyalty to fundamental principles,

allowing them to criticize the shadows of European integration. Moreover, this will not

compromise their electoral results, rather it reinforces them, increasing their vote share

(Nanou and Dorussen, 2013: 77–78). This flexibility and loyalty to principles allows these

parties to exploit the weaknesses of the project, voicing those critical and discontent

member of the electorate who do not feel represented by mainstream parties (De Vries,

2010; Verney, 2011).

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How should the context described be relevant for general elections when the EU has its

own parliamentary elections? There are several considerations to be made before going

further.

The complex situation here described has developed in an environment of deep economic

crisis. This Great Recession has been marked by an attempt of the EU to become the main

institution when solving the economic difficulties. The reasoning behind was not very

elaborate: the international origin of the Recession required and international response

(Laffan, 2014). It is not the aim of this paper to address the effectiveness of the solutions

adopted. What does come our as relevant is that this way of decision-making diffuses

responsibility and it makes it harder for citizens to identify and evaluate institutions for

the policy outcomes (Bingham Powell Jr and Whitten, 1993; de Vries, 2010).

A very sophisticated citizens should be expected to use each election to analyze each

institution’s performance separately. However, the literature points precisely in the

opposite direction (Bechtel, 2012; Weber, 2011). The national arena tends to concentrate

most of the attention, no matter which institution is going to be appointed as a result of

the election (Johns, 2010). This effect should be less intense when the outcome of the

election is the direct appointment of a government (Henderson and McEwen, 2010).

Furthermore, it could be expected that the decision is made taking into account all the

institutions intervening.

The literature on European Parliament elections has contributed to the idea that the EU

could be materially unaccountable (Hix and Marsh, 2007; Reif and Schmitt, 1980). The

literature has repeatedly found that European Parliament elections are resolved in terms

of national politics, not in terms of EU politics (Hix and Marsh, 2011). In a context where

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the EU is more relevant in national politics, it could be expected that the EU was taken

into consideration by citizens when deciding who to vote for in general elections.

3. Methodology

3.1 Hypothesis

Assuming that citizens took into account the EU when deciding who to vote for in the last

general election, to what extent did it influence the voting decision? This is the question

I attempt to answer in this paper and there are different hypotheses to which the literature

points as plausible.

Hypothesis 1. Blaming the EU for the poor management of the economic crisis has no

relation to the voting decision.

When deciding their vote, citizens take into account the economic context and how

governments have managed it (Duch and Stevenson, 2006). Their evaluation is not

completely rational because few citizens have enough knowledge to understand

autonomously the economic situation (Fraile, 2002, 2007). Therefore, they rely on cues

and heuristics such as ideology or what their trusted media says to make this judgment

(Lau and Redlawsk, 2006). The electoral campaign that preceded the elections here

considered was practically monopolized by the bad economic situation and the poor

governmental performance (Magalhães et al., 2012). However, there was such degree of

agreement that the perception of the economic situation was no variable to explain the

voting decision (Fraile and Lewis-Beck, 2013). Authors like Mariano Torcal (2014) have

attempted alternative strategies although they are deeply complex and loose parsimony.

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On the other hand, using a variable of attribution of responsibility, a proxy could be

created to measure how citizens perceived the outcome of governmental activity and who

is to blame for the bad situation. This first hypothesis focuses on the idea that, despite all

intervening institutions, the government is the one with the final say over what is to be

done in terms of economic policy. The turnout results would reflect not only citizens’

punishment for the poor economic situation but also the party in government’s

incapability to formulate feasible plans of future to tackle the economic crisis (Maravall

and Przeworski, 1999).

Hypothesis 2. Controlling for partisanship, those citizens who blamed the European

Union for the management of the economic crisis will probably behave differently to those

who blamed the government.

Systems of multilevel governance distribute decision-making amongst a wide variety of

political actors which diffuse the responsibility that each assumes towards voters, blurring

demands for accountability (De Vries et al., 2011; Hellwig, 2007; Parker-Stephen, 2013).

This hypothesis explores how citizens are sensible to this complexity (Aguilar and

Sánchez-Cuenca, 2005), while the following two subhypotheses propose the sense in

which this influence would go.

Hypothesis 2.1. Citizens feeling less close to the party in government and who

blame more intensely the EU than their national governments, have a higher

probability of voting for parties critical towards the European Union.

Political parties carefully position themselves towards the EU issue, foreseeing that

Brussels can limit their capacity of executing their manifesto. Alternatively, minoritarian

political forces interpret coherence otherwise. This allows them to campaign shedding a

light on the shadows of the integration project, an asset that should increase the

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probability of getting votes from discontent citizens (Gramacho and Llamazares, 2007;

Nanou and Dorussen, 2013).

Hypothesis 2.2. Citizens feeling close to the party in government and blaming

the EU for the poor management of the economic situation more than they blame

their national government, should have a higher probability of exonerating the

incumbent, voting for this party.

Voters feeling sympathetic for the incumbent party should be more sensible to the cues

provided by the government to interpret reality (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006). Thus they

would more willingly accept the message proposed by governments that the hardships

and sacrifices and the decisions that enacted them come as direct demands from the

European institutions (Menéndez, 2012; Stokes, 2001). This blame out argument would

allow citizens to put behind them the cognitive dissonance that blaming the incumbent

and voting for him would mean. In other words, convincing themselves that the decisions

came from somewhere else allow these citizens to keep voting for the party they feel close

to.

3.2 Case selection

As it was states in a previous section, European Parliament elections should be the ones

where it was measured at best what citizens think about the EU’s management, not only

of economic issues, but also of the different areas of competence. However, and still

reiterating what has already been said, the literature on these elections has found that they

were discussed in national terms (Hix and Marsh, 2007, 2011). The last European

Parliament elections have been held so recently (May 2014) that it is too soon to make

any reasonable affirmation of what this turnout means for the theory. The fact that the

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European Parliament elections do not serve this purpose does not necessarily mean that

citizens do not evaluate the EU’s political outcome in some way. In this sense, it would

be likely to think that they used national or general elections to voice their concerns over

the way in which the EU is managing issues, given that they perceive a direct consequence

over their everyday life (Marks, 2006).

The role of the European Union in this crisis has been highlighted by governments across

Europe. Ideally, and future developments will do it, this study should cover every

European country. In one way or another, every country has been affected by the crisis

so there is no reason to reject any country. However, this piece of research is at an

explanatory stage, constrained by formal issues such as time and extension. As a

consequence, in this study only Southern European countries have been included, namely

Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. I am aware that some may criticize this choice because

it introduces a bias. Anyways, this bias is intentional insofar as the presence of the EU in

national elections is a topic for which there is a limited amount of literature. If the EU

were to be a relevant issue in general elections of any country, it is reasonable to think

that where the economic crisis has hit the worst it would be more visible. That is to say,

Southern European countries should be the first countries where the presence of the EU

as a relevant issue in national elections could be observed.

After the beginning of the crisis, the compromises that are a result of EU membership

have become heavier and Brussels is no longer just a source of wealth and prosperity

(Fabbrini, 2013: 1010–1012). This change has been particularly intense towards Southern

Europe. These countries were in particularly bad shape when it came to facing the

economic crisis and, as a consequence, the results have been especially salient (Serricchio

et al., 2013: 58). Socially, conditions have worsened to a bigger extent. But also,

politically, these countries have suffered the consequences of giving up their sovereignty.

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Governments have had their hands tied by the compromises voluntarily attained.

Additionally, these governments have been constrained and their sovereignty weakened

because of their poor economic situation (Laffan, 2014). All in all, the differences

between countries inside the EU have increased, hurting the existing consensus over EU

issues and turning it into a matter over which parties could compete (Bosco and Verney,

2012; Verney, 2011).

It could also be argued that an EU with strong claims over what any given policy of a

country should be is not as new as it could be thought of. If the scope of analysis widened

from economic policies to other sorts of political decisions in which the EU imperatively

demands for precise policies should also be taken into account. In this sense, the

“democratic conditionality”, that is, the exigencies the EU negotiates with countries that

are applying for membership on topics such as the protection of human rights or frontier

relations with neighboring countries little has to do with mere advice (F Schimmelfennig

et al., 2003: 495–496). It could be likely that these countries would have experienced

similar phenomena. In spite of this, I have decided to exclude these countries from my

analysis. On the one hand, democratic conditionality refers to delicate issues, intimately

linked with parts of sovereignty that countries usually do not share willingly. On the other

hand, party systems do not align in the same way when the country is a member State

than when it is an applicant. Before joining the club, positioning over this issue is just

another way of stating their world view (Jackson et al., 2011; Marks et al., 2006). Whereas

once they become members of the club things change. Membership is seen as a one-way

trip and exit means a political cost that no actor is willing to assume (Haughton, 2014).

Countries inside this group can again be grouped into two categories: those countries who

joined the EU in the last enlargement (Central and Eastern Europe) and applicant

members of the Mediterranean arch (Turkey and Cyprus).

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In the case of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe, even if this grouping

simplifies a very rich reality, the issue of EU membership has been very relevant to the

political arena. Moreover, this issue has been crucial to party competition whereas it has

not been so competed in the selected countries. In these countries the issue presents itself

as a choice: either they joined the EU or they continued under the sphere of influence of

the Russian Federation. In these countries, the EU has been presented with the most

intensity as a source of economic development and democracy (Marks et al., 2006). In

addition. There are government-seeking parties with a negative perception of the EU

membership, willing to support a close collaboration with the Russians (Taggart and

Szczerbiak, 2013). Besides, the differences in party’s configuration and the economic

situation, these States have recently entered the EU and their status is still peculiar.

Cyprus and Turkey, the parties included in the second group, could be more easily

compared to Southern European countries. Even if many differences separate them, there

are also many similarities that would allow a viable comparison. Even there is no regional

power altering what membership means, as it did happen in the previous group of

countries. Previous studies include strategies to compare all of these countries (Bellucci

et al., 2012; Verney, 2011). In the first stages of the design, there was an attempt to

consider them, they have finally been discarded because membership is far more relevant

for these countries and negotiations have been stagnated for so long that in both cases it

does not seem that membership is going to be granted any time soon. In the case of

Cyprus, some of their mainstream parties have positioned themselves not only critically

towards EU membership but also plainly against its entry (Christophorou, 2007). In

Turkey, parties place themselves in a similar way with an addition: negotiations for the

application procedure started over ten years ago and they have remained stagnated to an

extent that the Turkish political parties have the feeling that they will remain candidates

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forever (Frank Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). As a consequence, the way in which they

agitate the issue in elections or how they position, even amongst mainstream parties (AKP

and CHP) are inconsistent and they change with each party’s leadership (Baris Gulmez,

2013). In the last couple of years the leaders of the main parties appear to favor the entry

in the EU, even if the agenda of the Erdogan government seems to evade from truly

fulfilling the goals set for them in the entry negotiations as part of the democratic

conditionality. By contrast, the immediate predecessors of Erdogan at the head of the

AKP were openly Eurosceptic.

3.3 Variables

This section will present the variables used in this paper to elaborate the multinomial

logistical regressions used to test the hypotheses, further descriptions can be found in the

Figure 5 in the Annex.

The dependent variable here chosen captures for citizens’ voting decision. Not only so,

accountability is also to be operationalized in order to look into how citizens administered

punishments and rewards for the governmental outcome. To achieve both aims the

variable has been operationalized taking into account the voters that voted for the

incumbent or one of his main competitors. Operationalizing party choice is not a decision

without consequences, particularly for the selected set of elections. All four cases have in

common multiparty systems that have suffered a profound shock in the last election. In

Spain and Portugal, incumbents have been intensely punished and the effective number

of parties has increased. By contrast, the Italian and Greek party systems have suffered

an earthquake that may or may not remain in coming elections. As a consequence,

choosing the three best performing parties in these elections will, on the one hand exclude

[20]

a significant number of voters, and, on the other hand, reduce the reliability of results. In

figure 6 (see Annex) the scheme of party competition considered.

Two are the independent variables considered: the responsibility attributed to the EU

against the responsibility attributed to governments and closeness or sympathy for a given

political party.

The first variable considered confronts the responsibility attributed to national

governments against the responsibility attributed to the EU for the management of the

economic crisis. There are several reasons to choose this variable configuration rather

that other possible coding. First of all, an ipsative question, that would something such as

“Who do you think is the main responsible for the economic crisis?” or some equivalent

wording would not suit the purposes here aimed for several reasons. Technical issues

would impede comparison. Even if the question is coded in different ways in the surveys

considered, respondents are only asked to choose one institution as the main responsible

for the economic crisis in the Spanish and Portuguese questionnaires. Furthermore, other

institutions such as the banking system and the international economic situation are

included amongst the options. As a result, most of the respondents choose financial

institutions such as banks or international markets rather than political ones

(governments, etc.). This should work against the relevance of this piece, however, I think

that the picture drawn would be too simplistic and it deserves to look into it in depth. In

all four questionnaires, respondents are asked to evaluate how much to blame are a

number of institutions (banking systems, government, EU, citizens, etc.) for the economic

crisis. The hypothesis aim to look into how the game of responsibilities has played and it

was not enough to include the variables corresponding to how much each political

institution is accountable. This is the reason behind including an index, a more complex

variable. In this index, the responsibility attributed to the EU is subtracted to the

[21]

responsibility attributed to the government. The resulting variable permits to order

respondents according to the differential of responsibility attributed to the two main

institutions involved in decision-making during the economic crisis. In other words, this

allows a measure of whether blaming more the EU than the national government for the

poor economic situation has an impact on voting behavior.

The second variable included is party identification or closeness to a political party.

Although it is not the main explanatory variable, it is relevant to the hypothesis because

it is a way of capturing those voters that could be more sensible to cues by the party in

governments and, thus, to use the EU as a fall guy for the poor performance of their party

while in government. At some point, it could play as a means to justify why they keep

voting for their preferred party. Whereas those who don’t have this party identification

but still feel that the EU is responsible for what is going on should be more prone to vote

for eurocritical or Eurosceptic parties.

The control variables here chosen are the ones that the literature on voting behavior

usually choses as controls (Fraile, 2002): gender, age and education. These studies also

introduce usually ideology as a control, however the lack of this variable in the Portuguese

questionnaire has prevented me from introducing. However, this is not an issue because

ideology was just a complementary control to partisanship. That is, that citizens would

put the blames of the economic crisis according to their ideological self-placement rather

than to partisan cues. This could be it but since the relationship between ideology and

party identification is complex and the latter has been said to be the main component of

the first. Therefore, the absence of ideology in the model should not cause relevant

changes in terms of the results to be observed.

[22]

4. A look at the results: scapegoats and party competition.

The first hypotheses proposes that, despite the complexities of modern governance,

citizens expect their government to exercise the power they supposedly have (Artes,

2011). No matter their knowledge of the actors involved, these citizens are aware that the

final decision is made by governments. Therefore they would expect their governments

to include in their political calculations all possible constraints to get done what needs to

be done. Many difficulties may arise, but governments should count on them when they

decide which course of action to take. As a result, the logical consequence would be that

only governments are to be accounted for when the outcome is not satisfactory. The

results of the multivariate analysis reject this hypothesis in the four countries considered.

The fact that the index of responsibility attributed is a significant variable is in itself

meaningful.

Authors such as Fraile and Lewis-Beck (2013) have pointed towards the paradox of the

relevance of the economy in the last set of elections and its lack of explicative value as

an independent variable for vote choice. Maybe the answer to this paradox is simpler: the

economy is very important but politics still matter more. Citizens have historically low

levels of trust in political institutions but they still expect these institutions to be the ones

who find a way out of the crisis. The economy has undoubtedly been salient in these

elections, but politics or political beliefs are still the key to whom citizens choose to trust

with governmental responsibilities.

[23]

Figure 7. GREECE – General election, May 2012 (outcome based on PASOK)

ND SYRIZA

Gender a 0.54 (0.63) 0.34 (0.48)

Age -0.05 (0.03)* -0.04 (0.02)

Education b

Elementary and basic secondary -15.42 (1077.71) 9.50 (1192.98)

Advanced secondary and vocational

training -15.06 (1077.71) 9.63 (1192.98)

University -15.49 (1077.71) 9.47 (1192.98)

Responsibility -0.34 (0.27) -0.56 (0.24)*

Party identification

ND 33.5 (2466.61) 3.62 (1.44)*

Other party identification 29.04 (2466.61) 5.15 (1.07)***

Constant -10.81 (2218.73)

(n) = 276

Pseudo r2 = 0.61

Notes: *** Statistically significant for a la level of trust of 0,00; ** statistically significant for a level of trust under

0,010; * statistically significant to a level of trust under 0,050. Standard errors have been included between

parentheses. a Reference category: Female. b Reference category: without studies.

Source: ELNES 2012 post-electoral survey.

Figure 8. ITALY – General election, February 2013 (outcome based on PdL)

Monti per l’Italia PD

Movimento Cinque

Stelle

Gender a -0.73 (0.52) -0.54 (0.49) -0.98 (0.49)*

Age 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)

Education b

Elementary and basic secondary 17.26 (3704.79) 5.1 (1.82)** 1.91 (1.81)

Advanced secondary and

vocational training 17.93 (3704.79) 6.09 (1.86)** 2.23 (1.84)

University 19.37 (3704.79) 7.00 (2.02)** 3.31 (2.00)

Responsibility -0.52 (0.16)** -0.55 (0.15)*** -0.35 (0.15)*


PD 19.98 (1417.02) 9.79 (1.45)*** 6.56 (1.29)***

Movimento 5 Stelle 18.12 (1859.62) 19.29 (640.41) 21.72 (640.41)

Other party identification 20.10 (1417.02) 5.39 (1.08)*** 4.81 (0.82)***

Constant -36.41 (3966.53) -9.57 (2.51)*** -3.70 (2.32)

(n) = 705

Pseudo r2 = 0.62



parentheses. a Reference category: Female. b Reference category: without studies. Source: ITANES 2013 post-electoral survey.

[24]

Figure 9. ITALY – General election, February 2013 (outcome based on PD)

PdL Monti per l’Italia

Movimento Cinque

Stelle

Gender a 0.60 (0.48) -0.18 (0.35) -0.45 (0.31)

Age -0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01)***

Education b

Elementary and basic secondary -5.03 (1.75)** 12.13 (4741.49) -3.18 (1.47)*


vocational training -6.28 (1.79)*** 11.97 (4741.49) -3.88 (1.48)**

University -7.17 (1.96)*** 12.44 (4741.49) -3.70 (1.52)*

Responsibility -0.23 (0.16) 0.46 (0.14)** -0.04 (0.11)


PD -10.70 (1.46)*** 10.79 (1798.63) -3.59 (1.28)**

Movimento 5 Stelle -20.82 (888.39) -1.05 (2188.57) 2.10 (1.31)

Other party identification -6.05 (1.08)*** 15.36 (1798.63) -0.94 (1.26)

Constant 13.23 (2.53)*** -29.88 (5071.17) 7.06 (2.13)**

(n) = 708

Pseudo r2 = 0.62



parentheses. a Reference category: Female. b Reference category: without studies. Source: ITANES 2013 post-electoral survey.

Figure 10. PORTUGAL – General election, June 2011 (outcome based on PS)

PPD-PSD CDU (PCP-PEV)

Gender a 0.07 (0.32) 0.44 (0.41)

Age 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)

Education b

Elementary and basic secondary 0.16 (0.64) 0.40 (0.93)


vocational training -0.03 (0.72) 0.92 (1.01)

University 0.26 (0.14) 0.20 (1.21)

Responsibility -0.28 (0.14)* -0.28 (0.17)


PPD-PSD 6.89 (1.07)*** -9.10 (743.09)

Other party identification 3.18 (0.40)*** 4.39 (1.03)***

Constant -1.41 (1.25) -4.68 (1.90)*

(n) = 438

Pseudo r2 = 0.38



parentheses. a Reference category: Female. b Reference category: without studies. Source: TNS-ICS 2011 post-electoral survey.

[25]

Figure 11. SPAIN – General election, November 2011 (outcome based on PSOE)

PP IU

Gender a 0.22 (0.12) 0.41 (0.15)**

Age 0.01 (0.004)* 0.00 (0.01)

Education b

Elementary and basic secondary 0.69 (0.28)* 0.68 (0.47)


vocational training 0.83 (0.32)** 1.51 (0.50)**

University 0.70 (0.30)* 1.79 (0.48)***

Responsibility -0.79 (0.07)*** 0.002 (0.07)


PP 7.78 (0.45)*** 2.32 (1.12)*

Other party identification 3.68 (0.19)*** 3.90 (0.30)***

Constant -0.99 (0.49)* -5.58 (0.73)***

(n) = 3334

Pseudo r2 = 0.46



parentheses. a Reference category: Female. b Reference category: without studies. Source: TNS-ICS 2011 post-electoral survey.

The different regression models shown in Figures 7 to 11 treasure more information to be

taken into account. Indeed, the role of governments and the EU are relevant to citizens’

voting decision. However, which way did these considerations take?

Citizens that blame more the EU than their government for the poor economic situation

were expected to behave differently than citizens that blame the government. Those who

blame the government are expected to punish the incumbent parties to a larger extent.

However, amongst those who blame the EU, behavior is not expected to be homogeneous

either. Incumbent parties have repeated in their speeches that unpopular decisions are a

demand from Brussels to grant the needed help to escape default. Bad management of

previous administrations has become almost a taboo, while they repeated as a mantra that

Brussels came to help after years of wasting the wealth of prosperous years and spending

above everyone’s possibilities. However, citizens do not feel strongly this sense of shared

responsibility, so here party identification seems relevant. Those who feel close to the

[26]

incumbent party are said to be more sensible to its cues, while those who do not have this

sympathy would be eager to search amongst the available party supply for other options.

To make it clearer, I will propose an example of how a voter would behave if these

hypotheses were to be true. Feeling disappointed with how the EU has managed the

economic crisis, a Greek citizen that sympathized with PASOK, in May would have a

higher probability to vote for this party than another voter that put the blame more

intensely on the Papadopoulos government. On the other hand, if this same citizen did

not have sympathy of any kind for PASOK, he would be more prone to have looked for

a party critical with how the EU is being managed, or even Eurosceptic, which should

result in an increase of his chances of voting for SYRIZA.

Before going into a further description of the results, it is remarkable how party supply is

unequal in the countries considered. While in Italy and Greece there are openly critical

parties with the EU such as Movimento Cinque Stelle (Beppe Grillo’s Five Star

Movement) or SYRIZA, even hard eurosceptics such as Golden Dawn (XA). Portuguese

and Spanish parties have remained quite silent over the topic and although some voices

have publicly criticized the path taken by EU’s decision, they have remained shy to say

the least, fearing traditionally pro-European societies (Ares Castro-Conde, 2013; Nanou

and Dorussen, 2013).

The results of the four models show a consistent trend across the four countries, which

seems a finding in itself. Citizens of the countries worst hit by the economic crisis have

behaved in an equivalent way. Controlling for partisanship, citizens that blame the EU

more than their national government for the bad economic situation have a higher chance

of voting for the incumbent than its main competitors. However, the first subhypothesis

is not confirmed under the light of the results obtained.

[27]

All in all, in these countries the EU seems to be the scapegoat for the incumbent parties.

But before going into the concluding remarks, I would like to detain over the Spanish

survey. With over 5000 respondents, against the 1000-1500 that the other surveys have,

this survey has the advantage that it allows for more sophisticated analyses to be

performed. In particular, it permits the construction of a term of interaction with the

differential attribution of responsibility and partisanship. To allow for the results to be

statistically significant, the variable of differential attribution of responsibility has been

simplified into three coding categories: 1.- those who blame to a larger extent their

government than the EU, 2.- those who blame both institutions to the same extent and 3.-

those who blame the EU to a larger extent than their national government. This allows

for a stronger control: it allows testing for what happens when both conditions take place

at the same time and it allows for a precise picture of precisely how party sympathizers

behave.

Figure 12. Graph for the interaction between differential attribution of responsibility

and party identification. Spain, 2011.

Source: CIS 2011 post-electoral survey.

0.2

.4.6

.81

Pr(

Pppsoe)

Government Both EUDifferential attribution of responsibili

PSOE PP

Other

Vote for PP vs. PSOE

0.2

.4.6

.81

Pr(

Iupsoe)

Government Both EUDifferential attribution of responsibili

PSOE IU

Else

Vote for IU vs. PSOE

[28]

The results can be seen in figure 12 (figure 13 in the annex shows the model reuslts)

which includes the results vote for the incumbent against its two main competitors, the

PP on the right and IU on the left side of the figure. The results on the vote for PP against

PSOE support the blame out argument: those critical with the EU have a higher chance

of voting for PSOE than PP. Even amongst those who sympathize with PSOE the

probabilities vary in over fifteen points. The graph on the left side of the figure, the one

where the probability of vote for PSOE against the probability of vote for IU has been

depicted, would support both subhypotheses. But the results are inconclusive to make any

statement in this sense.

5. Concluding remarks

As this papers comes to an end, there are a couple of remarks that may answer the research

question but also offer new questions for further research. First of all, although it is not

definitive, the results support the conclusion of Magalhaes (2012) for the Portuguese

election. The economic situation has undoubtedly been deeply discussed during the

campaign, but political factors are still the most relevant when explaining the voting

decision. Voters still turn to ideology, partisanship, etc. to decide which party can make

it right in government, even in those countries where the party system has been turned

upside down.

At the beginning of this paper I asked if the EU had been a relevant actor in the

explanation of voter behavior in this set of elections. Given that the EU had become a

[29]

recurring presence in the media of this four countries and the speeches of the parties in

government as the actor directly demanding sacrifices, changing its usual stance towards

these countries, it was possible to think that voters would have had something to say. If

the institution that had brought democracy and prosperity to their countries switched to

demanding economic austerity and budget cuts, one could reasonably expect that citizens

may change their attitudes towards the EU. Furthermore, they could change their voting

behavior to choose a government that would act differently from the previous ones and

defend their preferences before the EU. This was the behavior that hypothesis 2.1 tried to

capture. Besides, incumbent parties could benefit from this blame shifting. If the

unpopular decisions were being made as a result of a mandate from Brussels, they could

present themselves as another victim of a complex governance system, where they just

acted as executors of the obligations derived from EU membership (hypothesis 2.2).

What it turns out from the analysis performed, although it is not what was expected, looks

promising. The EU has been taken into account but more as a scapegoat for those who

voted again for the incumbents than as an issue that fully justified the voting decision. It

is true that there are many limitations to the analysis performed to be able to affirm that

something could have escaped the multivariate analysis. For instance, bivariate

preliminary analysis pointed towards both subhypothesis fulfilling but in the end only the

second one could be fully verified. It looks like those who for years have tried to voice

the discontent of the harmed by European integration have lost an opportunity. Now that

these harmed had become a majority in Southern European countries, they have not been

able to channel them in their electoral benefit.

Last but not least, there are also theoretical implications of these work that other pieces

should reflect about. The fact that the European Union directly meddled in national

politics poses questions about how democracy will be in Europe in the next years. For

[30]

instance, having decisions made in an arena where citizens have such difficulties to

demand accountability questions one of the pillars of democracy as it has been known

traditionally. But how elections are held has also been affected. Technocratic

governments were appointed in two of the countries, because governments fell and calling

an elections was too unstable for the confidence of international markets. In all four

countries, autonomy in decision-making was reduced, to say the least (Laffan, 2014).

What will be the consequence of putting international markets before democratic

elections?

[31]

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[37]

ANNEX

Figure 5.- Description of the variables used in the models

Greece Italy Portugal Spain

Dependent variable

Vote

1 PASOK

2 ND

3 SYRIZA

1 PdL

2 Monti per

l’Italia

3 PD

4 Movimento 5

Stelle

1 PS

2 PPD-PSD

3 CDU

(PCP/PEV)

1 PSOE

2 PP

3 IU

Control variables

Gender 0 Female

1 Male

Age 18 - 99

Education

1 Without studies

2 Elementary studies and basic secondary

3 Advanced secondary and vocational training

4 University

Independent variables

Responsibility

index

Continuous variable ranging 0 through to 8

0 The government is mostly responsible for the economic crisis

8 The EU is mostly responsible for the economic crisis

Party

identification

1 PASOK

2 ND

3 Other id

1 PdL

2 PD

3 Movimento 5

Stelle

4 Other id

1 PS

2 PPD-PSD

3 Other id

1 PSOE

2 PP

3 Other id

Source: ELNES 2012 post-electoral survey (Greece), ITANES 2013 post-electoral survey (Italy), TNS-ICS 2011 post-

electoral survey (Portugal), CIS 2011 post-electoral survey (questionnaires 2915 and 2920, Spain).

[38]

Figure 6.- Party competition in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain according to the

ideological placement given to these parties by surveyed citizens.

Greece

Italy

Portugal

Spain

Note: The incumbent has always been positioned as reference point for party competition, positions do not show exact

position, they rather show the spatiality (who is competing on the right or the left). This party systems are multiparty

systems, therefore only the ones included in the models have been considered.

Source: ELNES 2012 post-electoral survey (Greece), ITANES 2013 post-electoral survey (Italy), TNS-ICS 2011 post-

electoral survey (Portugal), CIS 2011 post-electoral survey (questionnaires 2915 and 2920, Spain).

PASOK NDSYRIZA

Pd

Scelta Civica

PD

Mov 5 Stelle

PSCDU (PCP-PEV)

PPD-PSD

PSOEIU PP

[39]

Figure 13. Regression model with term of interaction. Spain, 2011

Model PP-PSOE Model IU-PSOE

Gender a 0.24 (0.12)* Gender a 0.17 (0.19)

Age 0.01 (0.00) Age 0.00 (0.01)

Education b Education b

Elementary and

basic secondary 0.70 (0.28) *

Elementary and

basic secondary 0.62 (0.58)

Advanced secondary

and vocational

training

0.82 (0.32)**

Advanced secondary

and vocational

training

1.45 (0.61)*

University 0.67 (0.31)* University 1.77 (0.59)**

Responsibility c Responsibility c

Government mainly 1.34 (0.38)*** Government mainly -1.19 (0.75)

EU mainly -1.14 (0.40)** EU mainly 0.65 (0.66)

Party identification d Party identification d

PP 7.77 (0.50)*** IU 7.39 (0.76)***

Other sympathy 3.54 (0.54)*** Other sympathy 4.78 (1.23)***

Interaction 0.04 (0.13) Interaction -0.38 (0.24)

Constant -4.18 (0.52)*** Constant -4.75 (0.83)***

(n) = 3004 (n) = 1513

Pseudo r2 = 0.56 Pseudo r2 = 0.50 Notes: *** Statistically significant for a la level of trust of 0,00; ** statistically significant for a level of trust under


parentheses. a Reference category: female. b Reference category: without studies. c Reference category: Both the EU and the national government are equally responsible. d Reference category: PSOE.

Source: CIS 2011 post-electoral survey.

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