Cerafica vs. COMELECG.R. No. 205136 December 2, 2014

Doctrine: Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. However, COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due course to COCs. The Court emphasized that the duty of the COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.

Note: A verification with the COMELEC database yielded the finding that Olivia was not among the official candidates for the 2013 Elections and, thus, was not voted for. As such, a ruling on the petition would no longer be of practical use or value. Even if the Court were to resolve the petition for the purpose of determining Olivia’s legal status as a legitimate and qualified candidate for public office, such purpose has been rendered inconsequential as a result of the proclamation of the winning councilors for the 2013 elections. Be that as it may, the Court deemed it opportune to address the merits of the case, if only to caution the COMELEC against the precipitate cancellation of COCs. In short the case is moot and academic already at the time the case was decided, but the Court still chose to look into it as a way to chastise the COMELEC of said practice.

Facts: Kimberly Cerafica filed her COC for Councilor for the City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 29, 1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the elections, in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least 23 years old on the day of the elections as set out in Sec. 9C of R.A. No. 8487 (Charter of the City of Taguig). As such, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification.

Instead of attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously, Olivia Cerafica filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these events, the clarificatory hearing no longer pushed through.

In a Memorandum dated December 18, 2012, Director Amora-Ladra of the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and consequently, the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. Relying on COMELEC Resolution No. 9551, Director Amora-Ladra opined that it is as if no COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be substituted. In a Special En Banc Meeting of the COMELEC on January 3, 2013, the COMELEC adopted the recommendation of Director Amora-Ladra, cancelled Kimberly’s COC, and denied the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect of the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC.

Issue: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolution resulting in the cancellation of the COC of Kimberly and the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect of the cancellation of the COC of Kimberly?

Held: Yes

Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. In Cipriano v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due course to COCs. It had been emphasized that the duty of the COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.

Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the procedure of substitution of candidates. Under the express provision of Sec. 77, not just any person, but only "an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be substituted. In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party; thus, she can be validly substituted. Court held that Olivia complied with all of the requirements for a valid substitution. First, there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last day for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election day.

Moreover, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora-Ladra in cancelling Kimberly’s COC and denying the latter’s substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court founf that the COMELEC once more gravely abused its discretion. The Court reminded the COMELEC that, in the exercise of it adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc. Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi judicial functions of the COMELEC, the COMELEC in Division should have first decided this case.

The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. The Court cautioned the COMELEC against its practice of impetuous cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the recommendations of its Law Department when the situation properly calls for the case's referral to a Division for summary hearing.

Balajonda vs. COMELECG.R. No. 166032. February 28, 2005

Doctrine: Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory

character and effect. The judgments which may be executed pending appeal need not be only those rendered by the trial court, but by the COMELEC as well. Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 allowing execution pending appeal in the discretion of the court applies in a suppletory manner to election cases, including those involving city and provincial officials.

Facts: On July 16, 2002 Elenita Balajonda was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman having won the office in the barangay elections held the previous day. Her margin of victory Maricel Francisco was 420 votes. Francisco duly filed a petition for election protest, within ten (10) days from the date of proclamation, lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

In answer to the protest, Balajonda alleged that Francisco’s petition stated no cause of action and that the allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities were baseless and mere figments of the latter’s imagination. She also stressed on the fact that although the grounds relied upon by Francisco were violations of election laws, not a single person had been prosecuted for violation of the same.

After the issues were joined, the MeTC ordered the revision of ballots in 69 ballot boxes, and eventually, the ballots in 39 precincts were revised. After trial, MeTC dismissed the protest with its finding that Balajonda still led Francisco by 418 votes. Francisco appealed the decision to the COMELEC. In a Resolution promulgated on February 2, 2004, the COMELEC First Division reversed the MeTC, finding that Francisco won over Balajonda by 111 votes. The COMELEC First Division thus annulled the proclamation of Balajonda, and declared in her stead Francisco as the duly elected Barangay Chairman.

Balajonda seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution. In the meantime, Francisco filed a Motion for Execution dated February 5,2004, praying for a writ of execution in accordance with Section 2(a) of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court [Sec. 2(a), Rule 39], which allows discretionary execution of judgment upon good reasons to be stated in the order.

Balajonda duly opposed the Motion for Execution, arguing in the main that under Sec. 2(a), Rule 39, only the judgment or final order of a trial court may be the subject of discretionary execution pending appeal. However, in its Order dated 26 November 2004, the COMELEC First Division after due hearing granted the motion and directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution, ordering Balajonda to cease and desist from discharging her functions as Barangay Chairman and relinquish said office to Francisco.

Issue: Whether COMELEC has power to order the immediate execution of its judgment or final order involving a disputed barangay chairmanship?

Held: Yes

The Court in Batul v. Bayron, affirmed a similar order of the COMELEC First Division directing the immediate execution of its own judgment. Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that

absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.

Batul also clearly shows that the judgments which may be executed pending appeal need not be only those rendered by the trial court, but by the COMELEC as well. Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 allowing execution pending appeal in the discretion of the court applies in a suppletory manner to election cases, including those involving city and provincial officials.

Allthough Batul is different from the present case in that in Batul the decision subject of the order of immediate execution was rendered by the poll body in the exercise of its original jurisdiction while the decision in this case was promulgated in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Still, there is no reason to dispose of this petition in a manner different from Batul. The public policy underlying the suppletory application of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 is to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as determined by either the courts or the COMELEC. Towards that end, the Court have consistently employed liberal construction of procedural rules in election cases to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Balajonda’s argument is anchored on a simplistic, literalist reading of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 that barely makes sense, especially in the light of the COMELECs specialized and expansive role in relation to election cases.