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[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001] ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents. DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen." [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. [if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads: Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: xxx (4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present: (a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or (b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x. Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. [if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. [if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. [if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds: 1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part. 2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship. 3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status. [if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship. Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

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[G.R.No.142840.May7,2001]ANTONIOBENGSONIII,petitioner,vs.HOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVESELECTORALTRIBUNALandTEODOROC.CRUZ,respondents.DECISIONKAPUNAN,J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "nopersonshallbeaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesunlessheisanatural-borncitizen."[if!supportFootnotes][1][endif]

RespondentCruzwasanatural-borncitizenof thePhilippines.Hewasborn inSanClemente,Tarlac,onApril27,1960,ofFilipinoparents.Thefundamentallawthenapplicablewasthe1935Constitution.[if!supportFootnotes][2][endif]

OnNovember5,1985,however,respondentCruzenlistedintheUnitedStatesMarineCorpsand,withouttheconsentoftheRepublicof thePhilippines, tookanoathof allegiance to theUnitedStates.Asa consequence,he losthisFilipino citizenship forunderCommonwealthActNo.63,Section1(4),aFilipinocitizenmaylosehiscitizenshipby,amongothers,"renderingservicetooracceptingcommissioninthearmedforcesofaforeigncountry."Saidprovisionoflawreads:Section1.Howcitizenshipmaybelost.--AFilipinocitizenmaylosehiscitizenshipinanyofthefollowingwaysand/orevents:

xxx(4)Byrenderingservicesto,oracceptingcommissionin,thearmedforcesofaforeigncountry:Provided,Thattherenderingofserviceto,ortheacceptanceofsuchcommissionin,thearmedforcesofaforeigncountry,andthetakingofanoathofallegianceincidentthereto,withtheconsentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,shallnotdivestaFilipinoofhisPhilippinecitizenshipifeitherofthefollowingcircumstancesispresent:(a)TheRepublicofthePhilippineshasadefensiveand/oroffensivepactofalliancewithsaidforeigncountry;or(b)ThesaidforeigncountrymaintainsarmedforcesonPhilippineterritorywiththeconsentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines:Provided,ThattheFilipinocitizenconcerned,atthetimeofrenderingsaidservice,oracceptanceofsaidcommission,andtakingtheoathofallegianceincidentthereto,statesthathedoessoonlyinconnectionwithhisservicetosaidforeigncountry;Andprovided,finally,ThatanyFilipinocitizenwhoisrenderingserviceto,oriscommissionedin,thearmedforcesofaforeigncountryunderanyofthecircumstancesmentionedinparagraph(a)or(b),shallnotbepermittedtoparticipatenorvoteinanyelectionoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesduringtheperiodofhisserviceto,orcommissionin,thearmedforcesofsaidcountry.Uponhisdischargefromtheserviceofthesaidforeigncountry,heshallbeautomaticallyentitledtothefullenjoymentofhiscivilandpoliticalrightsasaFilipinocitizenxxx.

WhateverdoubtthatremainedregardinghislossofPhilippinecitizenshipwaserasedbyhisnaturalizationasaU.S.citizenonJune5,1990,inconnectionwithhisserviceintheU.S.MarineCorps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.2630.[if!supportFootnotes][3][endif]He ran for andwaselectedas theRepresentativeof theSecondDistrictofPangasinan in theMay11,1998 elections.Hewonby a convincingmargin of 26,671 votes over petitionerAntonioBengson III,whowas then running forreelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case forQuoWarrantoAdCautelam with respondent House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal(HRET)claimingthatrespondentCruzwasnotqualifiedtobecomeamemberoftheHouseofRepresentativessinceheisnotanatural-borncitizenasrequiredunderArticleVI,Section6oftheConstitution.[if!supportFootnotes][4][endif]

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] dismissing the petition for quo warranto anddeclaring respondent Cruz the duly electedRepresentative of the SecondDistrict of Pangasinan in theMay 1998 elections. TheHRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.[if!supportFootnotes][6][endif]

PetitionerthusfiledthepresentpetitionforcertiorariassailingtheHRET'sdecisiononthefollowinggrounds:1.TheHRETcommittedseriouserrorsandgraveabuseofdiscretion,amountingtoexcessofjurisdiction,whenitruledthatprivaterespondentisanatural-borncitizenofthePhilippinesdespitethefactthathehadceasedbeingsuchinviewofthelossandrenunciationofsuchcitizenshiponhispart.2.TheHRETcommittedseriouserrorsandgraveabuseofdiscretion,amountingtoexcessofjurisdiction,whenitconsideredprivaterespondentasacitizenofthePhilippinesdespitethefactthathedidnotvalidlyacquirehisPhilippinecitizenship.3.Assumingthatprivaterespondent'sacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipwasinvalid,theHRETcommittedseriouserrorsandgraveabuseofdiscretion,amountingtoexcessofjurisdiction,whenitdismissedthepetitiondespitethefactthatsuchreacquisitioncouldnotlegallyandconstitutionallyrestorehisnatural-bornstatus.[if!supportFootnotes][7][endif]

TheissuenowbeforeusiswhetherrespondentCruz,anatural-bornFilipinowhobecameanAmericancitizen,canstillbeconsideredanatural-bornFilipinouponhisreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruzmay no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his PhilippinecitizenshipwhenhesworeallegiancetotheUnitedStates in1995,andhadtoreacquirethesamebyrepatriation.HeinsiststhatArticle IV,Section2of theConstitutionexpresslystates thatnatural-borncitizensare thosewhoarecitizens frombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfectsuchcitizenship.

Respondentontheotherhandcontendsthathereacquiredhisstatusasanatural-borncitizenwhenhewasrepatriatedsincethe phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-borncitizen.

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Thepetitioniswithoutmerit.The1987ConstitutionenumerateswhoareFilipinocitizensasfollows:

(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution;(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines;(3)ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority,and(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.[if!supportFootnotes][8][endif]

There are twoways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. Theseways of acquiring citizenshipcorrespondtothetwokindsofcitizens:thenatural-borncitizen,andthenaturalizedcitizen.Apersonwhoatthetimeofhisbirthisacitizenofaparticularcountry,isanatural-borncitizenthereof.[if!supportFootnotes][9][endif]

AsdefinedinthesameConstitution,natural-borncitizens"arethosecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecthisPhilippinecitizenship."[if!supportFootnotes][10][endif]

Ontheotherhand,naturalizedcitizensarethosewhohavebecomeFilipinocitizensthroughnaturalization,generallyunderCommonwealthActNo.473,otherwiseknownas theRevisedNaturalizationLaw,whichrepealedthe formerNaturalizationLaw(ActNo.2927),andbyRepublicActNo.530.[if!supportFootnotes][11][endif]Tobenaturalized,anapplicanthastoprovethathepossessesallthequalifications[if!supportFootnotes][12][endif]andnoneofthedisqualifications[if!supportFootnotes][13][endif]providedbylawtobecomeaFilipinocitizen.ThedecisiongrantingPhilippinecitizenshipbecomesexecutoryonlyafter two(2)years fromitspromulgationwhenthecourt is satisfied thatduring the interveningperiod, theapplicanthas (1)not left thePhilippines; (2)hasdedicatedhimself toalawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)committedanyactprejudicialtotheinterestofthenationorcontrarytoanyGovernmentannouncedpolicies.[if!supportFootnotes][14][endif]

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the threemodes bywhich Philippine citizenshipmay be reacquired by aformercitizen:(1)bynaturalization,(2)byrepatriation,and(3)bydirectactofCongress.[if!supportFootnotes][15][endif]

Naturalization is amode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As amode of initially acquiringPhilippinecitizenship,naturalizationisgovernedbyCommonwealthActNo.473,asamended.Ontheotherhand,naturalizationasamode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by CommonwealthActNo. 63.[if!supportFootnotes][16][endif] Under this law, aformerFilipinocitizenwhowishestoreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipmustpossesscertainqualifications[if!supportFootnotes][17][endif]andnoneofthedisqualificationsmentionedinSection4ofC.A.473.[if!supportFootnotes][18][endif]

Repatriation,ontheotherhand,maybehadundervariousstatutesbythosewholosttheircitizenshipdueto:(1)desertionofthearmedforces;[if!supportFootnotes][19][endif](2)serviceinthearmedforcesofthealliedforcesinWorldWarII;[if!supportFootnotes][20][endif](3)serviceintheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStatesatanyothertime;[if!supportFootnotes][21][endif](4)marriageofaFilipinowomantoanalien;[if!supportFootnotes][22][endif]and(5)politicalandeconomicnecessity.[if!supportFootnotes][23][endif]

Asdistinguishedfromthelengthyprocessofnaturalization,repatriationsimplyconsistsofthetakingofanoathofallegianceto theRepublic of thePhilippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the placewhere the person concernedresidesorlastresided.

InAngatv.Republic,[if!supportFootnotes][24][endif]weheld:xxx.Parenthetically,underthesestatutes[referringtoRANos.965and2630],thepersondesiringtoreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipwouldnotevenberequiredtofileapetitionincourt,andallthathehadtodowastotakeanoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtoregisterthatfactwiththecivilregistryintheplaceofhisresidenceorwherehehadlastresidedinthePhilippines.[Italicsintheoriginal.][if!supportFootnotes][25][endif]

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] This means that anaturalizedFilipinowholosthiscitizenshipwillberestoredtohispriorstatusasanaturalizedFilipinocitizen.Ontheotherhand,ifhewasoriginallyanatural-borncitizenbeforehelosthisPhilippinecitizenship,hewillberestoredtohisformerstatusasanatural-bornFilipino.

InrespondentCruz'scase,helosthisFilipinocitizenshipwhenherenderedserviceintheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates.However,hesubsequentlyreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipunderR.A.No.2630,whichprovides:Section1.AnypersonwhohadlosthisPhilippinecitizenshipbyrenderingserviceto,oracceptingcommissionin,theArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates,orafterseparationfromtheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates,acquiredUnitedStatescitizenship,mayreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipbytakinganoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesandregisteringthesamewithLocalCivilRegistryintheplacewhereheresidesorlastresidedinthePhilippines.Thesaidoathofallegianceshallcontainarenunciationofanyothercitizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to theRepublic andhaving registered the same in theCivil Registry ofMagantarem,Pangasinan inaccordancewith theaforecitedprovision, respondentCruz isdeemed tohave recoveredhisoriginalstatus as anatural-born citizen, a statuswhichhe acquired at birth as the sonof a Filipino father.[if!supportFootnotes][27][endif] It bearsstressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original statusbefore he lost his Philippinecitizenship.

Petitioner'scontentionthatrespondentCruzisnolongeranatural-borncitizensincehehadtoperformanacttoregainhiscitizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by theHRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen"was first defined inArticleIII,Section4ofthe1973Constitutionasfollows:Sec.4.Anatural-borncitizenisonewhoisacitizenofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireor

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perfecthisPhilippinecitizenship.Tworequisitesmustconcurforapersontobeconsideredassuch:(1)apersonmustbeaFilipinocitizenfrombirthand(2)

hedoesnothavetoperformanyacttoobtainorperfecthisPhilippinecitizenship.Under the1973Constitutiondefinition, therewere twocategoriesofFilipinocitizenswhichwerenotconsiderednatural-

born:(1)thosewhowerenaturalizedand(2)thosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973,[if!supportFootnotes][28][endif]ofFilipinomotherswho,upon reaching the ageofmajority, electedPhilippine citizenship.Those "naturalized citizens"werenot considerednatural-bornobviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born ofFilipinomothersbeforetheeffectivityofthe1973Constitutionwerelikewisenotconsiderednatural-bornbecausetheyalsohadtoperformanacttoperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973ConstitutionandwhoelectedPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingthemajorityageasnatural-born.Afterdefiningwhoarenatural-borncitizens, Section2ofArticle IVaddsa sentence: "ThosewhoelectPhilippine citizenship inaccordancewithparagraph (3),Section1hereofshallbedeemednatural-borncitizens."Consequently,onlynaturalizedFilipinosareconsiderednotnatural-borncitizens.ItisapparentfromtheenumerationofwhoarecitizensunderthepresentConstitutionthatthereareonlytwoclassesofcitizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not anaturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is anatural-bornFilipino.Noteworthyistheabsenceinsaidenumerationofaseparatecategoryforpersonswho,afterlosingPhilippinecitizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born ornaturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for thereacquisitionthereof.AsrespondentCruzwasnotrequiredbylawtogothroughnaturalizationproceedingsinordertoreacquirehiscitizenship,heisperforceanatural-bornFilipino.Assuch,hepossessedallthenecessaryqualificationstobeelectedasmemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives.

Afinalpoint.TheHREThasbeenempoweredbytheConstitutiontobethe"solejudge"ofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthemembersoftheHouse.[if!supportFootnotes][29][endif]TheCourt'sjurisdictionovertheHRETismerelytocheck"whetherornot therehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamounting to lackorexcessof jurisdiction"on thepartof thelatter.[if!supportFootnotes][30][endif]Intheabsencethereof,thereisnooccasionfortheCourttoexerciseitscorrectivepowerandannulthedecisionoftheHRETnortosubstitutetheCourt'sjudgmentforthatofthelatterforthesimplereasonthatitisnottheofficeofapetition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.[if!supportFootnotes][31][endif] There is no such showing ofgraveabuseofdiscretioninthiscase.WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyDISMISSED.

[G.R.No.135083.May26,1999]ERNESTOS.MERCADO,petitioner,vs.EDUARDOBARRIOSMANZANOandtheCOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,respondents.DECISIONMENDOZA,J.:

PetitionerErnestoS.Mercadoandprivate respondentEduardoB.Manzanowere candidates for vicemayorof theCityofMakatiintheMay11,1998elections.TheotheronewasGabrielV.DazaIII.Theresultsoftheelectionwereasfollows:EduardoB.Manzano103,853ErnestoS.Mercado100,894GabrielV.DazaIII54,275[if!supportFootnotes][1][endif]

TheproclamationofprivaterespondentwassuspendedinviewofapendingpetitionfordisqualificationfiledbyacertainErnestoMamarilwhoallegedthatprivaterespondentwasnotacitizenofthePhilippinesbutoftheUnitedStates.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition ofMamarilandorderedthecancellationofthecertificateofcandidacyofprivaterespondentonthegroundthatheisadualcitizenand, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any electiveposition.TheCOMELECsSecondDivisionsaid:WhatispresentedbeforetheCommissionisapetitionfordisqualificationofEduardoBarriosManzanoascandidatefortheofficeofVice-MayorofMakatiCityintheMay11,1998elections.ThepetitionisbasedonthegroundthattherespondentisanAmericancitizenbasedontherecordoftheBureauofImmigrationandmisrepresentedhimselfasanatural-bornFilipinocitizen.InhisanswertothepetitionfiledonApril27,1998,therespondentadmittedthatheisregisteredasaforeignerwiththeBureauofImmigrationunderAlienCertificateofRegistrationNo.B-31632andallegedthatheisaFilipinocitizenbecausehewasbornin1955ofaFilipinofatherandaFilipinomother.HewasbornintheUnitedStates,SanFrancisco,California,onSeptember14,1955,andisconsideredanAmericancitizenunderUSLaws.ButnotwithstandinghisregistrationasanAmericancitizen,hedidnotlosehisFilipinocitizenship.Judgingfromtheforegoingfacts,itwouldappearthatrespondentManzanoisbothaFilipinoandaUScitizen.Inotherwords,heholdsdualcitizenship.Thequestionpresentediswhetherunderourlaws,heisdisqualifiedfromthepositionforwhichhefiledhiscertificateof

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candidacy.Isheeligiblefortheofficeheseekstobeelected?UnderSection40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode,thoseholdingdualcitizenshiparedisqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition.WHEREFORE,theCommissionherebydeclarestherespondentEduardoBarriosManzanoDISQUALIFIEDascandidateforVice-MayorofMakatiCity.

OnMay8,1998,privaterespondent filedamotionforreconsideration.[if!supportFootnotes][3][endif]ThemotionremainedpendingevenuntilaftertheelectionheldonMay11,1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvasserstabulatedthevotescastforvicemayorofMakatiCitybutsuspendedtheproclamationofthewinner.

OnMay19,1998,petitionersoughttointerveneinthecasefordisqualification.[if!supportFootnotes][4][endif]Petitionersmotionwasopposedbyprivaterespondent.

Themotionwasnotresolved.Instead,onAugust31,1998,theCOMELECenbancrendereditsresolution.Voting4to1,withone commissionerabstaining, theCOMELECenbanc reversed the rulingof its SecondDivisionanddeclaredprivate respondentqualifiedtorunforvicemayoroftheCityofMakatiintheMay11,1998elections.[if!supportFootnotes][5][endif]ThepertinentportionsoftheresolutionoftheCOMELECenbancread:Asaforesaid,respondentEduardoBarriosManzanowasborninSanFrancisco,California,U.S.A.HeacquiredUScitizenshipbyoperationoftheUnitedStatesConstitutionandlawsundertheprincipleofjussoli.HewasalsoanaturalbornFilipinocitizenbyoperationofthe1935PhilippineConstitution,ashisfatherandmotherwereFilipinosatthetimeofhisbirth.Attheageofsix(6),hisparentsbroughthimtothePhilippinesusinganAmericanpassportastraveldocument.HisparentsalsoregisteredhimasanalienwiththePhilippineBureauofImmigration.Hewasissuedanaliencertificateofregistration.This,however,didnotresultinthelossofhisPhilippinecitizenship,ashedidnotrenouncePhilippinecitizenshipanddidnottakeanoathofallegiancetotheUnitedStates.Itisanundisputedfactthatwhenrespondentattainedtheageofmajority,heregisteredhimselfasavoter,andvotedintheelectionsof1992,1995and1998,whicheffectivelyrenouncedhisUScitizenshipunderAmericanlaw.UnderPhilippinelaw,henolongerhadU.S.citizenship.AtthetimeoftheMay11,1998elections,theresolutionoftheSecondDivision,adoptedonMay7,1998,wasnotyetfinal.RespondentManzanoobtainedthehighestnumberofvotesamongthecandidatesforvice-mayorofMakatiCity,garneringonehundredthreethousandeighthundredfiftythree(103,853)votesoverhisclosestrival,ErnestoS.Mercado,whoobtainedonehundredthousandeighthundredninetyfour(100,894)votes,oramarginoftwothousandninehundredfiftynine(2,959)votes.GabrielDazaIIIobtainedthirdplacewithfiftyfourthousandtwohundredseventyfive(54,275)votes.Inapplyingelectionlaws,itwouldbefarbettertoerrinfavorofthepopularchoicethanbeembroiledincomplexlegalissuesinvolvingprivateinternationallawwhichmaywellbesettledbeforethehighestcourt(Cf.Frivaldovs.CommissiononElections,257SCRA727).WHEREFORE,theCommissionenbancherebyREVERSEStheresolutionoftheSecondDivision,adoptedonMay7,1998,orderingthecancellationoftherespondentscertificateofcandidacy.WedeclarerespondentEduardoLuisBarriosManzanotobeQUALIFIEDasacandidateforthepositionofvice-mayorofMakatiCityintheMay11,1998,elections.ACCORDINGLY,theCommissiondirectstheMakatiCityBoardofCanvassers,uponpropernoticetotheparties,toreconveneandproclaimtherespondentEduardoLuisBarriosManzanoasthewinningcandidateforvice-mayorofMakatiCity.

PursuanttotheresolutionoftheCOMELECenbanc,theboardofcanvassers,ontheeveningofAugust31,1998,proclaimedprivaterespondentasvicemayoroftheCityofMakati.

ThisisapetitionforcertiorariseekingtosetasidetheaforesaidresolutionoftheCOMELECenbancandtodeclareprivaterespondentdisqualifiedtoholdtheofficeofvicemayorofMakatiCity.Petitionercontendsthat[T]heCOMELECenbancERREDinholdingthat:A.UnderPhilippinelaw,ManzanowasnolongeraU.S.citizenwhenhe:1.HerenouncedhisU.S.citizenshipwhenheattainedtheageofmajoritywhenhewasalready37yearsold;and,2.HerenouncedhisU.S.citizenshipwhenhe(merely)registeredhimselfasavoterandvotedintheelectionsof1992,1995and1998.B.ManzanoisqualifiedtorunforandorholdtheelectiveofficeofVice-MayoroftheCityofMakati;C.AtthetimeoftheMay11,1998elections,theresolutionoftheSecondDivisionadoptedon7May1998wasnotyetfinalsothat,effectively,petitionermaynotbedeclaredthewinnerevenassumingthatManzanoisdisqualifiedtorunforandholdtheelectiveofficeofVice-MayoroftheCityofMakati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondentManzanowhether petitionerMercado haspersonalitytobringthissuitconsideringthathewasnotanoriginalpartyinthecasefordisqualificationfiledbyErnestoMamarilnorwaspetitionersmotionforleavetointervenegranted.I.PETITIONER'SRIGHTTOBRINGTHISSUIT

PrivaterespondentcitesthefollowingprovisionsofRule8oftheRulesofProcedureoftheCOMELECinsupportofhisclaimthat petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion forintervention:Section1.Whenproperandwhenmaybepermittedtointervene.Anypersonallowedtoinitiateanactionorproceedingmay,before

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orduringthetrialofanactionorproceeding,bepermittedbytheCommission,initsdiscretiontointerveneinsuchactionorproceeding,ifhehaslegalinterestinthematterinlitigation,orinthesuccessofeitheroftheparties,oraninterestagainstboth,orwhenheissosituatedastobeadverselyaffectedbysuchactionorproceeding.....Section3.DiscretionofCommission.Inallowingordisallowingamotionforintervention,theCommissionortheDivision,intheexerciseofitsdiscretion,shallconsiderwhetherornottheinterventionwillundulydelayorprejudicetheadjudicationoftherightsoftheoriginalpartiesandwhetherornottheintervenorsrightsmaybefullyprotectedinaseparateactionorproceeding.Privaterespondentarguesthatpetitionerhasneitherlegalinterestinthematterinlitigationnoraninteresttoprotectbecauseheisadefeatedcandidateforthevice-mayoraltypostofMakatiCity[who]cannotbeproclaimedastheVice-MayorofMakatiCityeveniftheprivaterespondentbeultimatelydisqualifiedbyfinalandexecutoryjudgment.

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before theCOMELEC,therehadalreadybeenaproclamationoftheresultsoftheelectionforthevicemayoraltycontestforMakatiCity,onthebasisofwhichpetitionercameoutonlysecondtoprivaterespondent.Thefact,however,isthattherehadbeennoproclamationatthattime.Certainly,petitionerhad,andstillhas,aninterest inoustingprivaterespondentfromtheraceatthetimehesoughttointervene.TheruleinLabov.COMELEC,[if!supportFootnotes][6][endif]reiteratedinseveralcases,[if!supportFootnotes][7][endif]onlyappliestocasesinwhichtheelectionoftherespondentiscontested,andthequestioniswhetheronewhoplacedsecondtothedisqualifiedcandidatemaybedeclaredthewinner.Inthepresentcase,atthetimepetitionerfiledaMotionforLeavetoFileInterventiononMay20,1998,therehadbeennoproclamationofthewinner,andpetitionerspurposewaspreciselytohaveprivaterespondentdisqualifiedfromrunning for [an] elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted thedisqualificationproceedings),aregisteredvoterofMakatiCity,wascompetenttobringtheaction,sowaspetitionersincethelatterwasarivalcandidateforvicemayorofMakatiCity.

NorispetitionersinterestinthematterinlitigationanylessbecausehefiledamotionforinterventiononlyonMay20,1998,afterprivaterespondenthadbeenshowntohavegarneredthehighestnumberofvotesamongthecandidatesforvicemayor.Thatpetitionerhadarighttointerveneatthatstageoftheproceedingsforthedisqualificationagainstprivaterespondentisclearfrom6ofR.A.No.6646,otherwiseknownastheElectoralReformsLawof1987,whichprovides:Anycandidatewhohasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmenttobedisqualifiedshallnotbevotedfor,andthevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.Ifforanyreasonacandidateisnotdeclaredbyfinaljudgmentbeforeanelectiontobedisqualifiedandheisvotedforandreceivesthewinningnumberofvotesinsuchelection,theCourtorCommissionshallcontinuewiththetrialandhearingoftheaction,inquiry,orprotestand,uponmotionofthecomplainantoranyintervenor,mayduringthependencythereoforderthesuspensionoftheproclamationofsuchcandidatewhenevertheevidenceofguiltisstrong.

Underthisprovision,interventionmaybeallowedinproceedingsfordisqualificationevenafterelectioniftherehasyetbeennofinaljudgmentrendered.

ThefailureoftheCOMELECenbanctoresolvepetitionersmotionforinterventionwastantamounttoadenialofthemotion,justifyingpetitionerinfilingtheinstantpetitionforcertiorari.AstheCOMELECenbancinsteaddecidedthemeritsofthecase,thepresentpetitionproperlydealsnotonlywiththedenialofpetitionersmotionforinterventionbutalsowiththesubstantiveissuesrespectingprivaterespondentsallegeddisqualificationonthegroundofdualcitizenship.

This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so,whetherheisdisqualifiedfrombeingacandidateforvicemayorofMakatiCity.II.DUALCITIZENSHIPASAGROUNDFORDISQUALIFICATION

ThedisqualificationofprivaterespondentManzanoisbeingsoughtunder40oftheLocalGovernmentCodeof1991(R.A.No.7160),whichdeclaresasdisqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition:...(d)Thosewithdualcitizenship.ThisprovisionisincorporatedintheCharteroftheCityofMakati.[if!supportFootnotes][8][endif]

Invokingthemaximduralexsedlex,petitioner,aswellastheSolicitorGeneral,whosideswithhiminthiscase,contendsthatthrough40(d)of theLocalGovernmentCode,Congresshascommand[ed] inexplicit termsthe ineligibilityofpersonspossessingdualallegiancetoholdlocalelectiveoffice.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrentapplication of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.[if!supportFootnotes][9][endif]Forinstance,suchasituationmayarisewhenapersonwhoseparentsarecitizensofastatewhichadherestothe principle of jus sanguinis is born in a statewhich follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto andwithout anyvoluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of ourConstitution,itispossibleforthefollowingclassesofcitizensofthePhilippinestopossessdualcitizenship:

(1)ThosebornofFilipinofathersand/ormothersinforeigncountrieswhichfollowtheprincipleofjussoli;(2)ThoseborninthePhilippinesofFilipinomothersandalienfathersifbythelawsoftheirfatherscountrysuchchildren

arecitizensofthatcountry;(3)Thosewhomarryaliens ifby the lawsof the latterscountry the formerareconsideredcitizens,unlessby theiractor

omissiontheyaredeemedtohaverenouncedPhilippinecitizenship.Theremay be other situations inwhich a citizen of the Philippinesmay,without performing any act, be also a citizen of

anotherstate;buttheabovecasesareclearlypossiblegiventheconstitutionalprovisionsoncitizenship.Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation inwhich a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,

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loyaltytotwoormorestates.Whiledualcitizenshipisinvoluntary,dualallegianceistheresultofanindividualsvolition.Withrespecttodualallegiance,ArticleIV,5oftheConstitutionprovides:Dualallegianceofcitizensisinimicaltothenational

interestandshallbedealtwithbylaw.Thisprovisionwasincludedinthe1987ConstitutionattheinstanceofCommissionerBlasF.Oplewhoexplaineditsnecessityasfollows:[if!supportFootnotes][10][endif]...Iwanttodrawattentiontothefactthatdualallegianceisnotdualcitizenship.IhavecirculatedamemorandumtotheBernasCommitteeaccordingtowhichadualallegiance-andIreiterateadualallegiance-islargerandmorethreateningthanthatofmeredoublecitizenshipwhichisseldomintentionaland,perhaps,neverinsidious.Thatisoftenafunctionoftheaccidentofmixedmarriagesorofbirthonforeignsoil.Andso,Idonotquestiondoublecitizenshipatall.WhatwewouldliketheCommitteetoconsideristotakeconstitutionalcognizanceoftheproblemofdualallegiance.Forexample,weallknowwhathappensinthetriennialelectionsoftheFederationofFilipino-ChineseChambersofCommercewhichconsistsofabout600chaptersalloverthecountry.ThereisaPekingticket,aswellasaTaipeiticket.NotwidelyknownisthefactthattheFilipino-ChinesecommunityisrepresentedintheLegislativeYuanoftheRepublicofChinainTaiwan.Anduntilrecently,thesponsormightrecall,inMainlandChinainthePeoplesRepublicofChina,theyhavetheAssociatedLegislativeCouncilforoverseasChinesewhereinallofSoutheastAsiaincludingsomeEuropeanandLatincountrieswererepresented,whichwasdissolvedafterseveralyearsbecauseofdiplomaticfriction.Atthattime,theFilipino-ChinesewerealsorepresentedinthatOverseasCouncil.WhenIspeakofdoubleallegiance,therefore,IspeakofthisunsettledkindofallegianceofFilipinos,ofcitizenswhoarealreadyFilipinosbutwho,bytheiracts,maybesaidtobeboundbyasecondallegiance,eithertoPekingorTaiwan.IalsotookclosenoteoftheconcernexpressedbysomeCommissionersyesterday,includingCommissionerVillacorta,whowereconcernedaboutthelackofguaranteesofthoroughassimilation,andespeciallyCommissionerConcepcionwhohasalwaysbeenworriedaboutminorityclaimsonournaturalresources.DualallegiancecanactuallysiphonscarcenationalcapitaltoTaiwan,Singapore,ChinaorMalaysia,andthisisalreadyhappening.SomeofthegreatcommercialplacesindowntownTaipeiareFilipino-owned,ownedbyFilipino-ChineseitisofcommonknowledgeinManila.Itcanmeanatragiccapitaloutflowwhenwehavetoendureacapitalfaminewhichalsomeanseconomicstagnation,worseningunemploymentandsocialunrest.Andso,thisisexactlywhatweaskthattheCommitteekindlyconsiderincorporatinganewsection,probablySection5,inthearticleonCitizenshipwhichwillreadasfollows:DUALALLEGIANCEISINIMICALTOCITIZENSHIPANDSHALLBEDEALTWITHACCORDINGTOLAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus:[if!supportFootnotes][11][endif]...AsignificantnumberofCommissionersexpressedtheirconcernaboutdualcitizenshipinthesensethatitimpliesadoubleallegianceunderadoublesovereigntywhichsomeofuswhospoketheninafreewheelingdebatethoughtwouldberepugnanttothesovereigntywhichpervadestheConstitutionandtocitizenshipitselfwhichimpliesauniquenessandwhichelsewhereintheConstitutionisdefinedintermsofrightsandobligationsexclusivetothatcitizenshipincluding,ofcourse,theobligationtorisetothedefenseoftheStatewhenitisthreatened,andbackofthis,CommissionerBernas,is,ofcourse,theconcernfornationalsecurity.Inthecourseofthosedebates,IthinksomenotedthefactthatasaresultofthewaveofnaturalizationssincethedecisiontoestablishdiplomaticrelationswiththePeoplesRepublicofChinawasmadein1975,agoodnumberofthesenaturalizedFilipinosstillroutinelygotoTaipeieveryOctober10;anditisassertedthatsomeofthemdorenewtheiroathofallegiancetoaforeigngovernmentmaybejusttoenterintothespiritoftheoccasionwhentheanniversaryoftheSunYat-SenRepubliciscommemorated.Andso,Ihavedetectedagenuineanddeepconcernaboutdoublecitizenship,withitsattendantriskofdoubleallegiancewhichisrepugnanttooursovereigntyandnationalsecurity.IappreciatewhattheCommitteesaidthatthiscouldbelefttothedeterminationofafuturelegislature.Butconsideringthescaleoftheproblem,therealimpactonthesecurityofthiscountry,arisingfrom,letussay,potentiallygreatnumbersofdoublecitizensprofessingdoubleallegiance,willtheCommitteeentertainaproposedamendmentatthepropertimethatwillprohibit,ineffect,orregulatedoublecitizenship?

Clearly, inincluding5inArticleIVoncitizenship,theconcernoftheConstitutionalCommissionwasnotwithdualcitizenspersebutwithnaturalizedcitizenswhomaintaintheirallegiancetotheircountriesoforiginevenaftertheirnaturalization.Hence,thephrasedual citizenship inR.A.No. 7160,40(d) and inR.A.No. 7854,20mustbeunderstoodas referring todual allegiance.Consequently, personswithmere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike thosewith dual allegiance,whomust,therefore,besubjecttostrictprocesswithrespecttotheterminationoftheirstatus,forcandidateswithdualcitizenship,itshould suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status aspersonswithdualcitizenshipconsideringthattheirconditionistheunavoidableconsequenceofconflictinglawsofdifferentstates.AsJoaquinG.Bernas,oneofthemostperceptivemembersoftheConstitutionalCommission,pointedout:[D]ualcitizenshipisjustarealityimposedonusbecausewehavenocontrolofthelawsoncitizenshipofothercountries.WerecognizeachildofaFilipinomother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control.[if!supportFootnotes][12][endif]

ByelectingPhilippinecitizenship,suchcandidatesatthesametimeforswearallegiancetotheothercountryofwhichtheyarealsocitizensandtherebyterminatetheirstatusasdualcitizens.Itmaybethat,fromthepointofviewoftheforeignstateandofitslaws,suchanindividualhasnoteffectivelyrenouncedhisforeigncitizenship.Thatisofnomomentasthefollowingdiscussionon40(d)betweenSenatorsEnrileandPimentelclearlyshows:[if!supportFootnotes][13][endif]SENATORENRILE.Mr.President,Iwouldliketoaskclarificationofline41,page17:Anypersonwithdualcitizenshipisdisqualified

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torunforanyelectivelocalposition.UnderthepresentConstitution,Mr.President,someonewhosemotherisacitizenofthePhilippinesbuthisfatherisaforeignerisanatural-borncitizenoftheRepublic.Thereisnorequirementthatsuchanaturalborncitizen,uponreachingtheageofmajority,mustelectorgiveupPhilippinecitizenship.Ontheassumptionthatthispersonwouldcarrytwopassports,onebelongingtothecountryofhisorherfatherandonebelongingtotheRepublicofthePhilippines,maysuchasituationdisqualifythepersontorunforalocalgovernmentposition?SENATORPIMENTEL.Tomymind,Mr.President,itonlymeansthatatthemomentwhenhewouldwanttorunforpublicoffice,hehastorepudiateoneofhiscitizenships.SENATORENRILE.SupposehecarriesonlyaPhilippinepassportbutthecountryoforiginorthecountryofthefatherclaimsthatperson,nevertheless,asacitizen?Noonecanrenounce.Therearesuchcountriesintheworld.SENATORPIMENTEL.Well,theveryfactthatheisrunningforpublicofficewould,ineffect,beanelectionforhimofhisdesiretobeconsideredasaFilipinocitizen.SENATORENRILE.But,precisely,Mr.President,theConstitutiondoesnotrequireanelection.UndertheConstitution,apersonwhosemotherisacitizenofthePhilippinesis,atbirth,acitizenwithoutanyovertacttoclaimthecitizenship.SENATORPIMENTEL.Yes.Whatwearesaying,Mr.President,is:UndertheGentlemansexample,ifhedoesnotrenouncehisothercitizenship,thenheisopeninghimselftoquestion.So,ifheisreallyinterestedtorun,thefirstthingheshoulddoistosayintheCertificateofCandidacythat:IamaFilipinocitizen,andIhaveonlyonecitizenship.SENATORENRILE.ButwearetalkingfromtheviewpointofPhilippinelaw,Mr.President.Hewillalwayshaveonecitizenship,andthatisthecitizenshipinvesteduponhimorherintheConstitutionoftheRepublic.SENATORPIMENTEL.Thatistrue,Mr.President.Butifheexercisesactsthatwillprovethathealsoacknowledgesothercitizenships,thenhewillprobablyfallunderthisdisqualification.

Thisissimilartotherequirementthatanapplicantfornaturalizationmustrenounceallallegianceandfidelitytoanyforeignprince,potentate,state,orsovereignty[if!supportFootnotes][14][endif]ofwhichatthetimeheisasubjectorcitizenbeforehecanbeissuedacertificateofnaturalizationasacitizenofthePhilippines.InParadov.Republic,[if!supportFootnotes][15][endif]itwasheld:[W]henapersonapplyingforcitizenshipbynaturalizationtakesanoaththatherenounceshisloyaltytoanyothercountryorgovernmentandsolemnlydeclaresthatheoweshisallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippines,theconditionimposedbylawissatisfiedandcompliedwith.ThedeterminationwhethersuchrenunciationisvalidorfullycomplieswiththeprovisionsofourNaturalizationLawlieswithintheprovinceandisanexclusiveprerogativeofourcourts.ThelattershouldapplythelawdulyenactedbythelegislativedepartmentoftheRepublic.Noforeignlawmayorshouldinterferewithitsoperationandapplication.IftherequirementoftheChineseLawofNationalityweretobereadintoourNaturalizationLaw,wewouldbeapplyingnotwhatourlegislativedepartmenthasdeemeditwisetorequire,butwhataforeigngovernmenthasthoughtorintendedtoexact.That,ofcourse,isabsurd.Itmustberesistedbyallmeansandatallcost.ItwouldbeabrazenencroachmentuponthesovereignwillandpowerofthepeopleofthisRepublic.III.PETITIONER'SELECTIONOFPHILIPPINECITIZENSHIP

TherecordshowsthatprivaterespondentwasborninSanFrancisco,CaliforniaonSeptember4,1955,ofFilipinoparents.Since thePhilippinesadheres to theprincipleof jussanguinis,while theUnitedStates follows thedoctrineof jussoli, thepartiesagreethat,atbirthatleast,hewasanationalbothofthePhilippinesandoftheUnitedStates.However,theCOMELECenbancheldthat,byparticipatinginPhilippineelectionsin1992,1995,and1998,privaterespondenteffectivelyrenouncedhisU.S.citizenshipunderAmericanlaw,sothatnowheissolelyaPhilippinenational.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence ofrenunciationandthat,inanyevent,astheallegedrenunciationwasmadewhenprivaterespondentwasalready37yearsold,itwasineffectiveasitshouldhavebeenmadewhenhereachedtheageofmajority.

InholdingthatbyvotinginPhilippineelectionsprivaterespondentrenouncedhisAmericancitizenship,theCOMELECmusthaveinmind349oftheImmigrationandNationalityActoftheUnitedStates,whichprovidedthatApersonwhoisanationaloftheUnitedStates,whetherbybirthornaturalization,shalllosehisnationalityby:...(e)Votinginapoliticalelectioninaforeignstateor participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision wasdeclaredunconstitutionalbytheU.S.SupremeCourtinAfroyimv.Rusk[if!supportFootnotes][16][endif]asbeyondthepowergiventotheU.S.Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, privaterespondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondents certificate ofcandidacy,filedonMarch27,1998,containedthefollowingstatementsmadeunderoath:6.IAMAFILIPINOCITIZEN(STATEIFNATURAL-BORNORNATURALIZED)NATURAL-BORN....10.IAMAREGISTEREDVOTEROFPRECINCTNO.747-A,BARANGAYSANLORENZO,CITY/MUNICIPALITYOFMAKATI,PROVINCEOFNCR.11.IAMNOTAPERMANENTRESIDENTOF,ORIMMIGRANTTO,AFOREIGNCOUNTRY.12.IAMELIGIBLEFORTHEOFFICEISEEKTOBEELECTED.IWILLSUPPORTANDDEFENDTHECONSTITUTIONOFTHEPHILIPPINESANDWILLMAINTAINTRUEFAITHANDALLEGIANCETHERETO;THATIWILLOBEYTHELAWS,LEGALORDERSANDDECREESPROMULGATEDBYTHEDULYCONSTITUTEDAUTHORITIESOFTHEREPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES;ANDTHATIIMPOSETHISOBLIGATIONUPONMYSELFVOLUNTARILY,WITHOUTMENTALRESERVATIONORPURPOSEOFEVASION.IHEREBYCERTIFYTHATTHEFACTSSTATEDHEREINARETRUEANDCORRECTOFMYOWNPERSONALKNOWLEDGE.

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The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing anydisqualificationhemighthaveasadualcitizen.Thus,inFrivaldov.COMELECitwasheld:[if!supportFootnotes][17][endif]ItisnotdisputedthatonJanuary20,1983FrivaldobecameanAmerican.Wouldtheretroactivityofhisrepatriationnoteffectivelygivehimdualcitizenship,whichunderSec.40oftheLocalGovernmentCodewoulddisqualifyhimfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition?Weanswerthisquestioninthenegative,asthereiscogentreasontoholdthatFrivaldowasreallySTATELESSatthetimehetooksaidoathofallegianceandevenbeforethat,whenheranforgovernorin1988.InhisComment,FrivaldowrotethathehadlongrenouncedandhadlongabandonedhisAmericancitizenship-longbeforeMay8,1995.Atbest,Frivaldowasstatelessintheinterim-whenheabandonedandrenouncedhisUScitizenshipbutbeforehewasrepatriatedtohisFilipinocitizenship.Onthispoint,wequotefromtheassailedResolutiondatedDecember19,1995:BythelawsoftheUnitedStates,petitionerFrivaldolosthisAmericancitizenshipwhenhetookhisoathofallegiancetothePhilippineGovernmentwhenheranforGovernorin1988,in1992,andin1995.EverycertificateofcandidacycontainsanoathofallegiancetothePhilippineGovernment.ThesefactualfindingsthatFrivaldohaslosthisforeignnationalitylongbeforetheelectionsof1995havenotbeeneffectivelyrebuttedbyLee.Furthermore,itisbasicthatsuchfindingsoftheCommissionareconclusiveuponthisCourt,absentanyshowingofcapriciousnessorarbitrarinessorabuse.

Thereis,therefore,nomeritinpetitionerscontentionthattheoathofallegiancecontainedinprivaterespondentscertificateofcandidacyis insufficienttoconstituterenunciationofhisAmericancitizenship.Equallywithoutmerit ispetitionerscontentionthat,tobeeffective,suchrenunciationshouldhavebeenmadeuponprivaterespondentreachingtheageofmajoritysincenolawrequirestheelectionofPhilippinecitizenshiptobemadeuponmajorityage.

Finally,muchismadeofthefactthatprivaterespondentadmittedthatheisregisteredasanAmericancitizenintheBureauof ImmigrationandDeportationand thatheholdsanAmericanpassportwhichheused inhis last travel to theUnitedStatesonApril22,1997.Thereisnomeritinthis.UntilthefilingofhiscertificateofcandidacyonMarch21,1998,hehaddualcitizenship.The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of hisAmerican citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] applies mutatis mutandis to privaterespondentinthecaseatbar:...ConsideringthefactthatadmittedlyOsmeawasbothaFilipinoandanAmerican,themerefactthathehasaCertificatestatingheisanAmericandoesnotmeanthatheisnotstillaFilipino....[T]heCertificationthatheisanAmericandoesnotmeanthatheisnotstillaFilipino,possessedasheis,ofbothnationalitiesorcitizenships.Indeed,thereisnoexpressrenunciationhereofPhilippinecitizenship;truthtotell,thereisevennoimpliedrenunciationofsaidcitizenship.WhenWeconsiderthattherenunciationneededtolosePhilippinecitizenshipmustbeexpress,itstandstoreasonthattherecanbenosuchlossofPhilippinecitizenshipwhenthereisnorenunciation,eitherexpressorimplied.

Torecapitulate,bydeclaringinhiscertificateofcandidacythatheisaFilipinocitizen;thatheisnotapermanentresidentorimmigrantofanothercountry;thathewilldefendandsupporttheConstitutionofthePhilippinesandbeartruefaithandallegiancetheretoandthathedoessowithoutmentalreservation,privaterespondenthas,asfarasthelawsofthiscountryareconcerned,effectivelyrepudiatedhisAmericancitizenshipandanythingwhichhemayhavesaidbeforeasadualcitizen.

Ontheotherhand,privaterespondentsoathofallegiancetothePhilippines,whenconsideredwiththefactthathehasspenthis youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in thiscountry,leavesnodoubtofhiselectionofPhilippinecitizenship.

Hisdeclarationswillbetakenuponthefaiththathewillfulfillhisundertakingmadeunderoath.Shouldhebetraythattrust,thereareenoughsanctionsfordeclaringthelossofhisPhilippinecitizenshipthroughexpatriationinappropriateproceedings.InYuv.Defensor-Santiago,[if!supportFootnotes][19][endif]we sustained thedenial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,after takinghis oath as anaturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of hisPortuguesepassport anddeclared in commercialdocumentsexecutedabroad thathewasaPortuguesenational.Asimilarsanctioncanbe takenagainstanyonewho, inelectingPhilippinecitizenship,renounceshisforeignnationality,butsubsequentlydoessomeactconstitutingrenunciationofhisPhilippinecitizenship.WHEREFORE,thepetitionforcertiorariisDISMISSEDforlackofmerit.G.R.No.195649July2,2013CASANMACODEMACQUILING,PETITIONER,vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,ROMMELARNADOYCAGOCO,ANDLINOGG.BALUA.RESPONDENTS.RESOLUTIONSERENO,J.:ThisResolutionresolvestheMotionforReconsiderationfiledbyrespondentonMay10,2013andtheSupplementalMotionforReconsiderationfiledonMay20,2013.WearenotunawarethatthetermofofficeofthelocalofficialselectedintheMay2010electionshasalreadyendedonJune30,

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2010.Arnado,therefore,hassuccessfullyfinishedhistermofoffice.Whilethereliefsoughtcannolongerbegranted,rulingonthemotionforreconsiderationisimportantasitwilleitheraffirmthevalidityofArnado’selectionoraffirmthatArnadoneverqualifiedtorunforpublicoffice.RespondentfailedtoadvanceanyargumenttosupporthispleaforthereversalofthisCourt’sDecisiondatedApril16,2013.Instead,hepresentedhisaccomplishmentsastheMayorofKauswagan,LanaodelNorteandreiteratedthathehastakentheOathofAllegiancenotonlytwicebutsixtimes.Itmustbestressed,however,thattherelevantquestionistheefficacyofhisrenunciationofhisforeigncitizenshipandnotthetakingoftheOathofAllegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippines.NeitherdohisaccomplishmentsasmayoraffectthequestionbeforethisCourt.RespondentcitesSection349oftheImmigrationandNaturalizationActoftheUnitedStatesashavingtheeffectofexpatriationwhenheexecutedhisAffidavitofRenunciationofAmericanCitizenshiponApril3,2009andthusclaimsthathewasdivestedofhisAmericancitizenship.Ifindeed,respondentwasdivestedofalltherightsofanAmericancitizen,thefactthathewasstillabletousehisUSpassportafterexecutinghisAffidavitofRenunciationrepudiatesthisclaim.TheCourtcannottakejudicialnoticeofforeignlaws,1whichmustbepresentedaspublicdocuments2ofaforeigncountryandmustbe"evidencedbyanofficialpublicationthereof."3Merereferencetoaforeignlawinapleadingdoesnotsufficeforittobeconsideredindecidingacase.RespondentlikewisecontendsthatthisCourtfailedtociteanylawoftheUnitedStates"providingthatapersonwhoisdivestedofAmericancitizenshipthruanAffidavitofRenunciationwillre-acquiresuchAmericancitizenshipbyusingaUSPassportissuedpriortoexpatriation."4Americanlawdoesnotgoverninthisjurisdiction.Instead,Section40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCodecallsforapplicationinthecasebeforeus,giventhefactthatatthetimeArnadofiledhiscertificateofcandidacy,hewasnotonlyaFilipinocitizenbut,byhisowndeclaration,alsoanAmericancitizen.ItistheapplicationofthislawandnotofanyforeignlawthatservesasthebasisforArnado’sdisqualificationtorunforanylocalelectiveposition.Withallduerespecttothedissent,thedeclaredpolicyofRepublicActNo.(RA)9225isthat"allPhilippinecitizenswhobecomecitizensofanothercountryshallbedeemednottohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipundertheconditionsofthisAct."5ThispolicypertainstothereacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.Section5(2)6requiresthosewhohavere-acquiredPhilippinecitizenshipandwhoseekelectivepublicoffice,torenounceanyandallforeigncitizenship.Thisrequirementofrenunciationofanyandallforeigncitizenship,whenreadtogetherwithSection40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode7whichdisqualifiesthosewithdualcitizenshipfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition,indicatesapolicythatanyonewhoseekstorunforpublicofficemustbesolelyandexclusivelyaFilipinocitizen.ToallowaformerFilipinowhoreacquiresPhilippinecitizenshiptocontinueusingaforeignpassport–whichindicatestherecognitionofaforeignstateoftheindividualasitsnational–evenaftertheFilipinohasrenouncedhisforeigncitizenship,istoallowacompletedisregardofthispolicy.Further,werespectfullydisagreethatthemajoritydecisionrulesonasituationofdoubt.Indeed,thereisnodoubtthatSection40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCodedisqualifiesthosewithdualcitizenshipfromrunningforlocalelectivepositions.Thereislikewisenodoubtthattheuseofapassportisapositivedeclarationthatoneisacitizenofthecountrywhichissuedthepassport,orthatapassportprovesthatthecountrywhichissueditrecognizesthepersonnamedthereinasitsnational.ItisunquestionedthatArnadoisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen,orthatheacquiredAmericancitizenshipbynaturalization.ThereisnodoubtthathereacquiredhisFilipinocitizenshipbytakinghisOathofAllegiancetothePhilippinesandthatherenouncedhisAmericancitizenship.ItisalsoindubitablethatafterrenouncinghisAmericancitizenship,ArnadousedhisU.S.passportatleastsixtimes.Ifthereisanyremainingdoubt,itisregardingtheefficacyofArnado’srenunciationofhisAmericancitizenshipwhenhesubsequentlyusedhisU.S.passport.Therenunciationofforeigncitizenshipmustbecompleteandunequivocal.Therequirementthattherenunciationmustbemadethroughanoathemphasizesthesolemndutyoftheonemakingtheoathofrenunciationtoremaintruetowhathehasswornto.Allowingthesubsequentuseofaforeignpassportbecauseitisconvenientforthepersontodosoisrenderingtheoathahollowact.Itdevaluestheactoftakingofanoath,reducingittoamereceremonialformality.ThedissentstatesthattheCourthaseffectivelyleftArnado"amanwithoutacountry".1âwphi1Onthecontrary,thisCourthas,infact,foundArnadotohavemorethanone.NowhereinthedecisiondoesitsaythatArnadoisnotaFilipinocitizen.Whatthedecisionmerelypointsoutisthathealsopossessedanothercitizenshipatthetimehefiledhiscertificateofcandidacy.Well-settledistherulethatfindingsoffactofadministrativebodieswillnotbeinterferedwithbythecourtsintheabsenceofgraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartofsaidagencies,orunlesstheaforementionedfindingsarenotsupportedbysubstantialevidence.8Theyareaccordednotonlygreatrespectbutevenfinality,andarebindinguponthisCourt,unlessitisshownthattheadministrativebodyhadarbitrarilydisregardedormisapprehendedevidencebeforeittosuchanextentastocompelacontraryconclusionhadsuchevidencebeenproperlyappreciated.9Nevertheless,itmustbeemphasizedthatCOMELECFirstDivisionfoundthatArnadousedhisU.S.PassportatleastsixtimesafterherenouncedhisAmericancitizenship.ThiswasdebunkedbytheCOMELECEnBanc,whichfoundthatArnadoonlyusedhisU.S.passportfourtimes,andwhichagreedwithArnado’sclaimthatheonlyusedhisU.S.passportonthoseoccasionsbecausehisPhilippinepassportwasnotyetissued.TheCOMELECEnBancarguedthatArnadowasabletoprovethatheusedhisPhilippinepassportforhistravelsonthefollowingdates:12January2010,31January2010,31March2010,16April2010,20May2010,and4June2010.

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NoneofthesedatescoincidewiththetwootherdatesindicatedinthecertificationissuedbytheBureauofImmigrationshowingthaton21January2010andon23March2010,ArnadoarrivedinthePhilippinesusinghisU.S.PassportNo.057782700whichalsoindicatedthereinthathisnationalityisUSA-American.AddingthesetwotraveldatestothetravelrecordprovidedbytheBureauofImmigrationshowingthatArnadoalsopresentedhisU.S.passportfourtimes(upondepartureon14April2009,uponarrivalon25June2009,upondepartureon29July2009anduponarrivalon24November2009),theseincidentssumuptosix.TheCOMELECEnBancconcludedthat"theuseoftheUSpassportwasbecausetohisknowledge,hisPhilippinepassportwasnotyetissuedtohimforhisuse."10Thisconclusion,however,isnotsupportedbythefacts.ArnadoclaimsthathisPhilippinepassportwasissuedon18June2009.TherecordsshowthathecontinuedtousehisU.S.passportevenafterhealreadyreceivedhisPhilippinepassport.Arnado’stravelrecordsshowthathepresentedhisU.S.passporton24November2009,on21January2010,andon23March2010.ThesefactswereneverrefutedbyArnado.Thus,therulingoftheCOMELECEnBancisbasedonamisapprehensionofthefactsthattheuseoftheU.S.passportwasdiscontinuedwhenArnadoobtainedhisPhilippinepassport.Arnado’scontinueduseofhisU.S.passportcannotbeconsideredasisolatedactscontrarytowhatthedissentwantsustobelieve.ItmustbestressedthatwhatisatstakehereistheprinciplethatonlythosewhoareexclusivelyFilipinosarequalifiedtorunforpublicoffice.Ifweallowdualcitizenswhowishtorunforpublicofficetorenouncetheirforeigncitizenshipandafterwardscontinueusingtheirforeignpassports,wearecreatingaspecialprivilegeforthesedualcitizens,therebyeffectivelyjunkingtheprohibitioninSection40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode.WHEREFORE,theMotionforReconsiderationandtheSupplementalMotionforReconsiderationareherebyDENIEDwithfinality.SOORDERED.

[G.R.No.136351.July28,1999]JOELG.MIRANDA,petitioner,vs.ANTONIOM.ABAYAandtheCOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,respondents.DECISIONMELO,J.:

Beforeusisapetitionforcertiorariwithprayerfortheissuanceofatemporaryrestrainingorderand/orwritofpreliminaryinjunctionquestioningtheresolutionoftheComelecEnBancdatedDecember8,1998inSPACaseNo.98-288whichdisposed:

ACCORDINGLY,judgmentisherebyrenderedto:1.AMENDandRECTIFYthedispositiveportionoftheResolutionoftheCommission(FirstDivision)inSPANo.98-019promulgatedonMay5,1998,toreadasfollows:WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,theCommission(FirstDivision)GRANTSthePetition.RespondentJOSEPEMPEMIRANDAscertificateofcandidacyforthepositionofmayorofSantiagoCityintheMay11,1998nationalandlocalelectionsisherebyDENIEDDUECOURSEAND/ORCANCELLED.SOORDERED.2.ANNULtheelectionandproclamationofrespondentJOELG.MIRANDAasmayorofSantiagoCityintheMay11,1998electionandCANCELtheCertificateofCanvassandProclamation(C.E.form25)issuedtherefor;3.DIRECTTHECityboardofCanvassersofSantiagoCitytoRECONVENE,PREPAREanewcertificateofcanvass&proclamationandPROCLAIMthewinningcandidateamongthosevoteduponasthedulyelectedmayorofSantiagoCityintheMay11,1998election;and4.DIRECTtheClerkofCourtoftheCommissiontofurnishcopiesofthisDecisiontotheOfficeofthePresidentofthePhilippines;theDepartmentofInteriorandLocalGovernment;theDepartmentofFinance,andtheSecretaryoftheSangguniangPanglunsodofSantiagoCity.SOORDERED.(pp.90-91,Rollo.)

TheaforementionedresolutiondatedDecember8,1998reversedandsetasidetheearlierresolutionoftheFirstDivisionoftheComelecdatedMay16, 1998, dismissingprivate respondentspetition todeclare the substitutionof JosePempeMirandabypetitionerascandidatefortheCityofSantiagosmayoraltypostvoid.

Briefly,thepertinentfactualbackdropissummarizedasfollows:OnMarch24,1998,JosePempeMiranda,thenincumbentmayorofSantiagoCity,Isabela,filedhiscertificateofcandidacyfor

thesamemayoraltypostforthesynchronizedMay11,1998elections.OnMarch27,1998,privaterespondentAntonioM.AbayafiledaPetitiontoDenyDueCoursetoand/orCancelCertificateof

Candidacy(pp.26-33,Rollo),whichwasdocketedasSPANo.98-019.ThepetitionwasGRANTEDbytheComelecinitsresolutiondatedMay5,1998(pp.36-43,Rollo).TheComelecfurtherruledtoDISQUALIFYJosePempeMiranda.

OnMay6,1998,waybeyondthedeadlineforfilingacertificateofcandidacy,petitionerJoelG.Mirandafiledhiscertificateofcandidacyforthemayoraltypost,supposedlyasasubstituteforhisfather,JosePempeMiranda.

DuringtheMay11,1998elections,petitionerandprivaterespondentviedforthemayoraltyseat,withpetitionergarnering22,002votes,1,666morevotesthanprivaterespondentwhogotonly20,336votes.

OnMay13,1998,privaterespondentfiledaPetitiontoDeclareNullandVoidSubstitutionwithPrayerforIssuanceofWritofPreliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the

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nullification of petitioners certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose PempeMiranda,whompetitionerwassupposedtosubstitute,hadalreadybeencancelledanddeniedduecourse.

OnMay 16, 1998, Comelecs First Division dismissed SPANo. 98-288motuproprio (pp. 57-61,Rollo). Private respondentmoved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72, Rollo). On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered the assailed decisionaforequoted,resolvingtoGRANTthemotionforreconsideration,thusnullifyingthesubstitutionbypetitionerJoelG.MirandaofhisfatherascandidateforthemayoraltypostofSantiagoCity.

OnDecember9,1998,petitionersoughtthisCourtsintercessionviaapetitionforcertiorari,withprayerfortheissuanceofatemporaryrestrainingorderand/orwritofpreliminaryinjunction.OnDecember11,1998,theCourtresolvedtoissueatemporaryrestraining order and to require respondents to comment on the petition. On December 14, 1998, private respondent filed hisComment(pp.140-187and188-234,Rollo)andonFebruary16,1999,theComelec,throughitscounsel,theSolicitorGeneral,filedits Comment (pp. 254-265, Rollo). The Court required petitioner to file a consolidated reply within 10 days from notice, butpetitionertwiceaskedforanextensionoftheperiod.Withoutgrantingthemotionsforextensionoftimetofileconsolidatedreply,theCourtdecidedtoresolvethecontroversyinfavorofpetitioner.

Tersely,theissuesinthepresentcasemaybesummarizedasfollows:1.Whethertheannulmentofpetitionerssubstitutionandproclamationwasissuedwithoutjurisdictionand/orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdiction;and2.WhethertheorderoftheComelecdirectingtheproclamationoftheprivaterespondentwasissuedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdiction.

TheCourt findsneither lack of jurisdictionnor grave abuse of discretion attended the annulment of the substitution andproclamationofpetitioner.

On thematterof jurisdiction, there isnoquestion that thecaseathand iswithin theexclusiveoriginal jurisdictionof theComelec.AsearlyasinHerreravs.Baretto(25Phil.245[1913]),thisCourthadoccasiontoapplythefollowingprinciples:Jurisdictionistheauthoritytohearanddetermineacausetherighttoactinacase.Sinceitisthepowertohearanddetermine,itdoesnotdependeitherupontheregularityoftheexerciseofthatpowerorupontherightfulnessofthedecisionmade.Jurisdictionshouldthereforebedistinguishedfromtheexerciseofjurisdiction.Theauthoritytodecideacauseatall,andnotthedecisionrenderedtherein,iswhatmakesupjurisdiction.Wherethereisjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter,aswehavesaidbefore,thedecisionofallotherquestionsarisinginthecaseisbutanexerciseofthatjurisdiction.(p.251)

On the issue of soundness of the disposition in SPA No. 98-288, the Court finds that the Comelecs action nullifying thesubstitutionbyandproclamationofpetitionerforthemayoraltypostofSantiagoCity,Isabelaisproperandlegallysound.

PetitionerinsiststhatthesubstitutionatbarisallowedunderSection77oftheOmnibusElectionCodewhichprovides:SEC.77.Candidatesincaseofdeath,disqualificationorwithdrawal.Ifafterthelastdayforthefilingofcertificatesofcandidacy,anofficialcandidateofaregisteredoraccreditedpoliticalpartydies,withdrawsorisdisqualifiedforanycause,onlyapersonbelongingto,andcertifiedby,thesamepoliticalpartymayfileacertificateofcandidacytoreplacethecandidatewhodied,withdreworwasdisqualified.Thesubstitutecandidatenominatedbythepoliticalpartyconcernedmayfilehiscertificateofcandidacyfortheofficeaffectedinaccordancewiththeprecedingsectionsnotlaterthanmid-dayofthedayoftheelection.Ifthedeath,withdrawalordisqualificationshouldoccurbetweenthedaybeforetheelectionandmid-dayofelectionday,saidcertificatemaybefiledwithanyboardofelectioninspectorsinthepoliticalsubdivisionwhereheisacandidate,or,inthecaseofcandidatestobevotedforbytheentireelectorateofthecountry,withtheCommission.

PetitionercapitalizesonthefactthattheComelecruledtodisqualifyJosePempeMirandaintheMay5,1998resolutionandheheavilyreliesupontheabove-quotedprovisionallowingsubstitutionofacandidatewhohasbeendisqualifiedforanycause.

Whilethere isnodisputeastowhetherornotanomineeofaregisteredoraccreditedpoliticalpartymaysubstitute foracandidate of the samepartywhohadbeendisqualified for any cause, this does not include those caseswhere the certificateofcandidacyofthepersontobesubstitutedhadbeendeniedduecourseandcancelledunderSection78oftheCode.Expressiouniusestexclusioalterius.Whilethelawenumeratedtheoccasionswhereacandidatemaybevalidlysubstituted,thereisnomentionofthecasewhereacandidateisexcludednotonlybydisqualificationbutalsobydenialandcancellationofhiscertificateofcandidacy.Undertheforegoingrule,therecanbenovalidsubstitutionforthelattercase,muchinthesamewaythatanuisancecandidatewhosecertificateofcandidacyisdeniedduecourseand/orcancelledmaynotbesubstituted.Iftheintentofthelawmakerswereotherwise,theycouldhavesoeasilyandconvenientlyincludedthosepersonswhosecertificatesofcandidacyhavebeendeniedduecourseand/orcancelledundertheprovisionsofSection78oftheCode.

Moreimportantly,undertheexpressprovisionsofSection77oftheCode,notjustanyperson,butonlyanofficialcandidateofaregisteredoraccreditedpoliticalpartymaybesubstituted.InBautistavs.Comelec(G.R.No.133840,November13,1998)thisCourtexplicitlyruledthatacancelledcertificatedoesnotgiverisetoavalidcandidacy(p.13).

Apersonwithoutavalidcertificateofcandidacycannotbeconsideredacandidateinmuchthesamewayasanypersonwhohasnotfiledanycertificateofcandidacyatallcannot,byanystretchoftheimagination,beacandidateatall.

Thelawclearlyprovides:SEC.73.CertificateofcandidacyNopersonshallbeeligibleforanyelectivepublicofficeunlesshefilesasworncertificateofcandidacywithintheperiodfixedherein.Byitsexpresslanguage,theforegoingprovisionoflawisabsolutelymandatory.Itisbutlogicaltosaythatanypersonwhoattempts

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torunforanelectiveofficebutdoesnotfileacertificateofcandidacy,isnotacandidateatall.Noamountofvoteswouldcatapulthimintooffice.InGadorvs.Comelec(95SCRA431[1980]),theCourtheldthatacertificateofcandidacyfiledbeyondtheperiodfixedbylawisvoid,andthepersonwhofileditisnot,inlaw,acandidate.Muchinthesamemannerasapersonwhofilednocertificateofcandidacyatallandapersonwhofileditoutoftime,apersonwhosecertificateofcandidacyiscancelledordeniedduecourseisnocandidateatall.Noamountofvotesshouldentitlehimtotheelectiveofficeaspiredfor.

Theevidentpurposesofthelawinrequiringthefilingofcertificatesofcandidacyandinfixingthetimelimitthereforare:(a)to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election, the candidates amongwhom they are tomake thechoice,and(b)toavoidconfusionandinconvenienceinthetabulationofthevotescast.Forifthelawdidnotconfinethechoiceorelectionbythevoterstothedulyregisteredcandidates, theremightbeasmanypersonsvotedforastherearevoters,andvotesmightbecastevenforunknownorfictitiouspersonsasamarktoidentifythevotesinfavorofacandidateforanotherofficeinthesameelection.(Monsalevs.Nico,83Phil.758[1949])

It isatonceevidentthattheimportanceofavalidcertificateofcandidacyrestsattheverycoreoftheelectoralprocess.Itcannotbetakenlightly,lesttherebeanarchyandchaos.Verily,thisexplainswhythelawprovidesforgroundsforthecancellationanddenialofduecoursetocertificatesofcandidacy.

Afterhavingconsideredtheimportanceofacertificateofcandidacy,itcanbereadilyunderstoodwhyinBautistaweruledthatapersonwithacancelledcertificateisnocandidateatall.ApplyingthisprincipletothecaseatbarandconsideringthatSection77oftheCodeisclearandunequivocalthatonlyanofficialcandidateofaregisteredoraccreditedpartymaybesubstituted,theredemonstrablycannotbeanypossiblesubstitutionofapersonwhosecertificateof candidacyhasbeencancelledanddeniedduecourse.

Also,underejusdemgenerisrule,whereageneralwordorphrase(suchasdisqualificationforanycauseinthiscase)followsanenumerationofparticularandspecificwordsof thesameclass(suchasthewordsdiesandwithdraws inthe instantcase)orwherethelatterfollowtheformer,thegeneralwordorphraseistobeconstruedtoinclude,ortoberestrictedtopersons,thingsorcasesakinto,resembling,orofthesamekindorclassasthosespecificallymentioned(see:Veravs.Cuevas,90SCRA379[1979]).Adeceasedcandidateisrequiredtohavedulyfiledavalidcertificateofcandidacy,otherwisehispoliticalpartywouldnotbeallowedtofieldasubstitutecandidateinhissteadunderSection77oftheCode.Inthecaseofwithdrawalofcandidacy,thewithdrawingcandidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy in order to allow his political party to field a substitutecandidateinhisstead.Mostreasonableitisthen,undertheforegoingrule,toholdthatavalidcertificateofcandidacyislikewiseanindispensablerequisiteinthecaseofasubstitutionofadisqualifiedcandidateundertheprovisionsofSection77oftheCode,justasitisinthetwopreviousinstances.

Furthermore,interpretatiotalisinambiguissemperfreindaest,uteviaturinconveniensetabsurdum,meaning,wherethereisambiguity,suchinterpretationaswillavoidinconvenienceandabsurdityshallinallcasesbeadopted.Toincludethosedisqualifiedcandidates whose certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and/or cancelled among those who may besubstitutedunderSection77oftheOmnibusElectionCode,leadstotheabsurditywhereasubstituteisallowedtotaketheplaceofsomebody who had not been a candidate in the first placea person who did not have a valid certificate of candidacy prior tosubstitution.Nemodatquodnonhabet.Whatrightcananon-candidatepassontohissubstitute?Clearly,thereisnonebecausenoonecangivewhathedoesnothave.

Evenonthemostbasicandfundamentalprinciples,itisreadilyunderstoodthattheconceptofasubstitutepresupposestheexistenceofthepersontobesubstituted,forhowcanapersontaketheplaceofsomebodywhodoesnotexistorwhoneverwas.The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of theOmnibus Election code, theexistenceofavalidcertificateofcandidacyseasonablyfiledisarequisitesinequanon.

Alltold,adisqualifiedcandidatemayonlybesubstitutedifhehadavalidcertificateofcandidacyinthefirstplacebecause,ifthedisqualifiedcandidatedidnothaveavalidandseasonablyfiledcertificateofcandidacy,heisandwasnotacandidateatall.Ifapersonwas not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if wewere to allow the so-calledsubstitutetofileanewandoriginalcertificateofcandidacybeyondtheperiodforthefilingthereof,itwouldbeacrystallinecaseofunequalprotectionofthelaw,anactabhorredbyourConstitution.

Fromtheforegoingdiscussionitisevidentthatthecontroversyathandisnotasimplecaseofhair-splitting.Acandidatemaynot be qualified to run for election butmay have filed a valid certificate of candidacy. Another candidatemay likewise be notqualified and at the same time not have a valid certificate of candidacy, for which reason, said certificate of candidacy is alsocancelled and/or denied due course. Or, a third candidatemay be qualified but, his certificate of candidacymay be denied duecourse and/or cancelled. This is possible because the grounds for disqualification (see: Omnibus Election Code, Section 68Disqualifications)aretotallyseparateanddistinctfromthegroundsforcancellationand/ordenyingduecoursetoacertificateofcandidacy (Ibid., Section69nuisancecandidates; andSection78materialmisrepresentation).Only thecandidatewhohadavalidcertificateofcandidacymaybesubstituted.

ThequestiontosettlenextiswhetherornotasidefromJoelPempeMirandabeingdisqualifiedbytheComelecinitsMay5,1998resolution,hiscertificateofcandidacyhadlikewisebeendeniedduecourseandcancelled.

TheCourtrulesthatitwas.PrivaterespondentspetitioninSPANo.98-019specificallyprayedforthefollowing:

WHEREFORE,itisrespectfullyprayedthattheCertificateofCandidacyfiledbyrespondentforthepositionofMayorfortheCityofSantiagobenotgivenduecourseand/orcancelled.

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Otherreliefsjustandequitableinthepremisesarelikewiseprayedfor.(Rollo,p.31;Emphasisours.)

In resolving thepetition filedbyprivate respondentspecifyingaveryparticular relief, theComelec ruled favorably in thefollowingmanner:WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,theCommission(FIRSTDIVISION)GRANTSthePetition.RespondentJOSEPempeMIRANDAisherebyDISQUALIFIEDfromrunningforthepositionofmayorofSantiagoCity,Isabela,intheMay11,1998nationalandlocalelections.SOORDERED.(p.43,Rollo;Emphasisours.)

FromaplainreadingofthedispositiveportionoftheComelecresolutionofMay5,1998inSPANo.98-019,itissufficientlyclearthattheprayerspecificallyandparticularlysoughtinthepetitionwasGRANTED,therebeingnoqualificationonthematterwhatsoever.Thedisqualificationwassimplyruledoverandabovethegrantingofthespecificprayerfordenialofduecourseandcancellation of the certificate of candidacy. Itmay be stressed at this instance that the legal consequences of thisMay 5, 1998resolutionareindependentoftheissueofwhetherornottheComelecwascorrectinrevivingSPANo.98-019byconsolidatingitwithSPANo.98-288initsDecember8,1998resolution.

Asregardstheproceduralmatterinthepresentpetitionforcertiorari,thefollowingconsiderationsarealsoinpoint:ItmayberelevantlystressedthatthereviewpowersoftheSupremeCourtoverdecisionsoftheConstitutionalCommissions,

ingeneral,andtheCommissiononElections,inparticular,wereratherparticularlydefinedandlimitedbythe1987Constitution,astheywerealsocircumscribedinthe1973Constitution,toapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule65.InDariovs.Mison(176SCRA84[1989]),theCourtheld:...WeaffirmtheteachingofAratucvs.CommissionofElections,88SCRA251[1979])asregardsrecoursetothisCourtwithrespecttorulingsoftheCivilServiceCommissionwhichisthatjudgmentsoftheCommissionmaybebroughttotheSupremeCourtthroughcertiorarialone,underRule65oftheRulesofCourt.InAratuc,wedeclared:ItisatonceevidentfromtheseconstitutionalandstatutorymodificationsthatthereisadefinitetendencytoenhanceandinvigoratetheroleoftheCommissiononElectionsastheindependentconstitutionalbodychargedwiththesafeguardingoffree,peacefulandhonestelections.TheframersofthenewConstitutionmustbepresumedtohavedefiniteknowledgeofwhatitmeanstomakethedecisions,ordersandrulingsoftheCommissionsubjecttoreviewbytheSupremeCourt.Andsinceinsteadofmaintainingthatprovisionintact,itordainedthattheCommissionsactuationsbeinsteadbroughttotheSupremeCourtoncertiorari,Wecannotinsistthattherewasnointenttochangethenatureoftheremedy,consideringthatthelimitedscopeofcertiorari,comparedtoareview,iswellknowninremediallaw.

xxxItshouldalsobenotedthatunderthenewConstitution,asunderthe1973Charter,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebroughttotheSupremeCourtoncertiorari,which,asAratuctellsus,technicallyconnotessomethinglessthansayingthatthesameshallbesubjecttoreviewbytheSupremeCourt,whichinturnsuggestsanappealbyreviewbypetitionforreviewunderRule45.Therefore,ourjurisdictionovercasesemanatingfromtheCivilServiceCommissionislimitedtocomplaintsoflackorexcessofjurisdictionorgraveabuseofdiscretiontantamounttolackorexcessofjurisdiction,complaintsthatjustifycertiorariunderRule65.(pp.111-112)

Toemphasizethisproceduralpoint, thenCommissioner, latertobecomeadistinguishedMemberofthisCourt,Mr. JusticeFlorenzRegaladorespondedtoCommissionerBernasqueryduringthedeliberationsofthe1987Constitutionthusly:FR.BERNAS.So,forpurposesoftherecord,now,whatistheintentionoftheCommittee?Whatarethegroundsforcertiorari?MR.REGALADO.TheCommitteerefersspecificallytoatechnicaltermofreviewbycertiorariwouldberelyingontheprovisionofRuleXLV[ShouldbeLXV]oftheRulesofCourtthatlaiddownthethreegrounds.(IRECORDOFTHECONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION,p.539,ascitedinBernas,S.J,The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines:ACommentary,1996Edition,p.903.)

Thus,wehavetobeguidedbyjurisprudencerelatingtoreviewbycertiorariunderRule65.Generally,certiorarilieswhereacourthasactedwithoutorinexcessofjurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.

Withoutjurisdictionreferstoanabsolutewantofjurisdiction;excessofjurisdictionreferstothecasewherethecourthasjurisdiction,butittranscendedthesameoractedwithoutanystatutoryauthority;graveabuseofdiscretionimpliessuchcapriciousandwhimsicalexerciseofjudgmentasisequivalenttolackofjurisdiction.

EvenassumingforthesakeofargumentthattheComeleccommittedanerrorintheexerciseofitsjurisdictioninthepresentcase,suchisnotwithintheprovinceofcertiorari,asaremedialmeasure,tocorrect.TheonlyissuethatmaybetakencognizanceofinthepresentcaseiswhetherornottheComeleccommittedgraveabuseofdiscretioninrenderingtheassaileddecision.

It iswell-settled thatanactofacourtor tribunalmayonlybeconsidered tohavebeendone ingraveabuseofdiscretionwhen thesamewasperformed inacapriciousorwhimsicalexerciseof judgmentwhich isequivalent to lackof jurisdiction.Theabuseofdiscretionmustbesopatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasionofpositivedutyortoavirtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,aswherethepowerisexercisedinanarbitraryanddespoticmannerbyreasonofpassionorpersonalhostility(IntestateEstateofCarmendeLunavs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,170SCRA246[1989];LittonMills

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vs.GalleonTraders,163SCRA489[1988];ButuanBayExportCo.vs.CourtofAppeals,97SCRA297[1980]).Anerrorof judgmentcommitted intheexerciseof its legitimate jurisdiction isnot thesameasgraveabuseofdiscretion.Anabuseofdiscretion isnotsufficientbyitselftojustifytheissuanceofawritofcertiorari.Theabusemustbegraveandpatent,anditmustbeshownthatthediscretionwasexercisedarbitrarilyanddespotically(Sorianovs.Atienza,171SCRA284[1989]).

Petitioner posits that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled the substitution by andproclamation of petitioner, who under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, was allowed to substitute for disqualified thecandidateJosePempeMiranda.PetitioneralsocontendsthatitwasanactofgraveabuseofdiscretionfortheComelectodirecttheproclamationofprivaterespondentasthewinningcandidateintheMay11,1998election.

PetitionerfurtherfaultstheComelecforamendingthedispositiveportionofitsresolutioninSPANo.98-019,whichwasnotelevatedtoitonreview,thesamehavingalreadyattainedfinalitybythen.

While itmaybeconcededthattheComelecsteppedoverboardandactedinexcessof its jurisdictionwhenitmotupropriotookcognizanceofSPANo.98-019,thedecisioninwhichwasbythenalreadyfinal,itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthattheComelecalso committed grave abuseof discretion in resolving to grantprivate respondentsmotion for reconsiderationbynullifying thesubstitutionofpetitionerJoelG.Miranda.Evidently,whatisunderreviewbeforeusinthiscertiorariproceedingsisSPANo.98-288,andnotSPANo.98-019.

The question to answer is: will the Comelecs act which may constitute an excess of jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-019 betantamount to an act of grave abuse of discretion in its judgment in the separate and distinct case of SPANo. 98-288 aswell?Clearly,nonsequitur.SPANo.98-288shouldbejudgedonitsownaccord,andnotundertheshadowofSPANo.98-019.

Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private respondent. As earlierpointedout,theresultinthedispositiveportionoftheDecember8,1998resolutionpertainingtotheissuesinvolvedinSPANo.98-288iscorrectinsofarasitannulledtheelectionandproclamationofJoelG.Miranda.Butevenassumingforthesakeofargumentthat it isnot, still, this supposederrordoesnot constitutegraveabuseofdiscretionwhichmaybeannulledandreversed in thepresentpetitionforcertiorari.

Asearlierelucidatedtoo,thecruxoftheComelecsdispositioninSPANo.98-288isthefactthatformercandidateJosePempeMirandascertificateofcandidacywasdeniedduecourseandcancelled.ThereisnodisputethatthecomplaintorpetitionfiledbyprivaterespondentinSPANo.98-019isonetodenyduecourseandtocancelthecertificateofcandidacyofJosePempeMiranda(Rollo, pp.26-31).There is likewisenoquestion that the saidpetitionwasGRANTEDwithoutanyqualificationwhatsoever. It isratherclear,therefore,thatwhetherornottheComelecgrantedanyfurtherreliefinSPANo.98-019bydisqualifyingthecandidate,thefactremainsthatthesaidpetitionwasgrantedandthatthecertificateofcandidacyofJosePempeMirandawasdeniedduecourseandcancelled.Infact,itwasnotevennecessaryfortheComelectoreiteratethisinitsDecember8,1998resolution.Atbest, the Comelecsmotu proprio act of resurrecting SPA No. 98-019 should be treated as amere surplusage. The fact that thecertificateofcandidacyofJoelPempeMirandawasdeniedduecourseandcancelleddidnotdependontheenbancresolutiondatedDecember8,1998oftheComelec.ItstemsfromthefactthattheMay5,1998resolutionGRANTEDprivaterespondentsPetitiontoDenyDueCoursetoand/orCancelCertificateofCandidacy.

Verily,thereisclearbasistofindthatthereindeedwasablatantmisrepresentationintheinstantcaseandthatitwasavalidgroundforthegrantingofthepetitioninSPANo.98-019.Also,thereappearstobesoundbasistorulethatacertificateofcandidacywhichhasbeendeniedduecourseonaccountofmisrepresentationis,ineverylegalcontemplation,nocertificateatall.Ergo,thereisnothingtosubstitute.Ifthisjudgment,renderedintheComelecsrightfulexerciseofitsjurisdictioninSPANo.98-288may,atall,beconsideredflawed,thisblemishwouldonlyconstituteanerrorofjudgmentanddefinitelynotgraveabuseofdiscretion.And,ofcourse,errorsofjudgmentmaynotbecorrectedbycertiorari.

ItmaybenotedthatCommissionerFloresraisedthissupposederrorinherdissentingopinion(pp.93-99,Rollo).However,herlegalopinionfailedtoconvincethemajorityofthecollegiatebodyandwasnotadoptedbytheCommissionenbanc.ThisCourtinthepresentcertiorariproceedingscannotsubstituteitsjudgmentforthatoftheComelecwithoutviolatingtheConstitutionandtheRulesofCourtonthematter.TheComelecsdecisionisnotsubjecttoappealtothisCourt.WemayonlystrikeoutaComelecdecision if it was rendered without jurisdiction, in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack ofjurisdiction.

The Court cannot accede to the reasoning that this Court should now acquiesce and submit to the sovereignwill of theelectorate,asexpressedbytheirvotes.Weshouldalwaysberemindedthatoursisagovernmentoflawsnotofmen.IfthisCourtshouldfolditsarmsandrefusetoapplythelawateveryclamorofthemajorityofthesupposedconstituency,whereshallorderandjusticelie?Withouttheleastintentiontodegrade,whereshallpeoplepowerend,andwhereshalllawandjusticebegin?WouldtheapparentresultsofthecanvassingofvotesjustifythisCourtinrefusingtoapplythelawinstead?Theanswerstotheforegoingareobvious.TheCourtcannotchooseotherwisebuttoexerciseitssacreddutytoupholdtheConstitutionandthelawsoftheRepublicforandunderwhichitexists.Besides,onlyhistorywilldiscernwhetherJosePempeMirandasfilingofacertificateofcandidacyfora4thtermandtheintendedsubstitutionbyhissonwasaploytoperpetratetheMirandasinpowerbywayofapoliticaldynastydisdainedandabhorredbyourConstitutionwhichdeclared:SEC.26.TheStateshallguaranteeequalaccesstoopportunitiesforpublicservice,andprohibitpoliticaldynastiesasmaybedefinedbylaw.(ArticleII,1987Constitution)

TheinvalidationofpetitionerssupposedsubstitutionofJosePempeMirandabringsaboutthedisqualificationofpetitionerin

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themayoraltyrace.Inthisregard,whatwassaidinNolascovs.CommissiononElections(275SCRA763[1997])mayberecalled:Ourcaselawisnowsettledthatinamayoraltyelection,thecandidatewhoobtainedthesecondhighestnumberofvotes,inthiscaseAlarilla,cannotbeproclaimedwinnerincasethewinningcandidateisdisqualified.Thus,wereiteratedtheruleinthefairlyrecentcaseofReyesv.Comelec(254SCRA514[1996]),viz.:

xxxxxxxxxWelikewisefindnograveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheComelecindenyingpetitionerJuliusO.GarciaspetitiontobeproclaimedmayorinviewofthedisqualificationofRenatoU.Reyes.Thatthecandidatewhoobtainsthesecondhighestnumberofvotesmaynotbeproclaimedwinnerincasethewinningcandidateisdisqualifiedisnowsettled.Thedoctrinalinstabilitycausedbysee-sawingrulingshassincebeenremoved.Inthelatestrulingonthequestion,thisCourtsaid:Tosimplisticallyassumethatthesecondplacerwouldhavereceivedtheothervoteswouldbetosubstituteourjudgmentforthemindofthevoter.Thesecondplacerisjustthat,asecondplacer.Helosttheelections.Hewasrepudiatedbyeitheramajorityorpluralityofvoters.Hecouldnotbeconsideredthefirstamongqualifiedcandidatesbecauseinafieldwhichexcludesthedisqualifiedcandidate,theconditionswouldhavesubstantiallychanged.Wearenotpreparedtoextrapolatetheresultsunderthecircumstances.GarciaspleathatthevotescaseforReyesbeinvalidatediswithoutmerit.ThevotescastforReyesarepresumedtohavebeencastinthebeliefthatReyeswasqualifiedandforthatreasoncanbetreatedasstray,voidandmeaningless.Thesubsequentfindingthatheisdisqualifiedcannotretroacttothedateoftheelectionsastoinvalidatethevotescastforhim.Consequently,respondentComeleccommittedgraveabuseofdiscretioninsofarasitfailedtofollowtheabovedoctrine,adescendantofourrulinginLabov.Comelec(176SCRA1[1989]).(pp.782-783)

Thus, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above-cited settled rulingconsistentlyappliedbythisCourtsincethecaseofLabovs.Comelec(176SCRA1[1989]),Aquinovs.Comelec,248SCRA400[1995],Reyesvs.Comelec(254SCRA514[1996]);andNolascovs.Comelec(275SCRA763[1997]).

EvenastheCourtcannotaccedetothecontentionthat,inviewoftheelectionresultspointingtopetitionerastheelectorschoiceforthemayoraltypost,weshouldnowcloseoureyestothepertinentprovisionsoftheOmnibusElectionCodeonthematter,nevertheless,theCourtdulynotesthatthesaidelectionresultspointtothefactthatprivaterespondentwasnotthenthechoiceofthepeopleofSantiagoCity,Isabela.ThisCourthasnoauthorityunderanylawtoimposeuponandcompelthepeopleofSantiagoCitytoacceptprivaterespondentastheirmayor.Thelawonsuccessionundersection44ofRepublicAct7160,otherwiseknownastheLocalGovernmentCode,wouldthenapply.Saidprovisionrelevantlystates:SEC.44.PermanentVacanciesintheOfficesoftheGovernor,Vice-Governor,Mayor,andViceMayor.(a)Ifapermanentvacancyoccursintheofficeofthegovernorormayor,thevice-governororvice-mayorconcernedshallbecomethegovernorormayor.Ifapermanentvacancyoccursintheofficesofthegovernor,vicegovernor,mayor,orvicemayor,thehighestrankingsanggunianmember,or,incaseofhispermanentdisability,thesecondhighestrankingsanggunianmember,shallbecomegovernor,vicegovernor,mayororvicemayor,asthecasemaybe.Subsequentvacanciesinthesaidofficeshallbefilledautomaticallybytheothersanggunianmembersaccordingtotheirrankingasdefinedherein.

xxx.ForpurposesofthisChapter,apermanentvacancyariseswhenanelectivelocalofficialfillsahighervacantoffice,refusestoassumeoffice,failstoqualify,dies,isremovedfromoffice,voluntarilyresigns,orisotherwisepermanentlyincapacitatedtodischargethefunctionsofhisoffice.ForpurposesofsuccessionasprovidedinthisChapter,rankinginthesanggunianshallbedeterminedonthebasisoftheproportionofvotesobtainedbyeachwinningcandidatetothetotalnumberofregisteredvotersineachdistrictintheimmediatelyprecedinglocalelection.WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebypartlyDENIED,insofarastheComelecrulingtoANNULtheelectionandproclamationofpetitionerisbeingAFFIRMED.Thepetitionis,however,herebyGRANTEDsoastoMODIFYtheresolutionoftheComelecinSPANo.98-288byDELETINGtheportiondirectingthecityboardofcanvasserstoreconveneandproclaimthewinningcandidatefromamongthosevoteduponduringtheMay11,1998elections.Thelawonsuccessionshouldbeenforced.Accordingly,therestrainingorderissuedinthiscaseisforthwithLIFTED.SOORDERED.[G.R.No.161434.March3,2004]MARIAJEANETTEC.TECSONandFELIXB.DESIDERIO,JR.,petitioners,vs.TheCOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,RONALDALLANKELLYPOE(a.k.a.FERNANDOPOE,JR.)andVICTORINOX.FORNIER,respondents.

[G.R.No.161634.March3,2004]ZOILOANTONIOVELEZ,petitioner,vs.RONALDALLANKELLEYPOE,a.k.a.FERNANDOPOE,JR.,respondent.

[G.R.No.161824.March3,2004]VICTORINOX.FORNIER,petitioner,vs.HON.COMMISSIONONELECTIONSandRONALDALLANKELLEYPOE,ALSOKNOWNASFERNANDOPOEJR.,respondents.

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DECISIONVITUG,J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferredon thosewhom the statebelieves aredeservingof theprivilege. It is apreciousheritage,aswellasaninestimableacquisition,[if!supportFootnotes][1][endif]thatcannotbetakenlightlybyanyone-eitherbythosewhoenjoyitorbythosewhodisputeit.

BeforetheCourtarethreeconsolidatedcases,allofwhichraiseasinglequestionofprofoundimportancetothenation.Theissueofcitizenshipisbroughtuptochallengethequalificationsofapresidentialcandidatetoholdthehighestofficeoftheland.OurpeoplearewaitingforthejudgmentoftheCourtwithbatedbreath.IsFernandoPoe,Jr.,theheroofsilverscreen,andnowoneofthemaincontendersforthepresidency,anatural-bornFilipinoorishenot?

Themoment of introspection takes us face to facewith Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the richheritageofcivillawandcommonlawtraditions,thefusionresultinginahybridoflawsandjurisprudencethatcouldbenolessthandistinctlyFilipino.AntecedentCaseSettingsOn31December2003,respondentRonaldAllanKellyPoe,alsoknownasFernandoPoe,Jr.(hereinafter"FPJ"),filedhiscertificateofcandidacyforthepositionofPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesundertheKoalisyonngNagkakaisangPilipino(KNP)Party,intheforthcomingnationalelections.Inhiscertificateofcandidacy,FPJ,representinghimselftobeanatural-borncitizenofthePhilippines,statedhisnametobe"FernandoJr.,"or"RonaldAllan"Poe,hisdateofbirthtobe20August1939andhisplaceofbirthtobeManila.VictorinoX.Fornier,petitionerinG.R.No.161824,entitled"VictorinoX.Fornier,Petitioner,versusHon.CommissiononElectionsandRonaldAllanKelleyPoe,alsoknownasFernandoPoe,Jr.,Respondents,"initiated,on09January2004,apetitiondocketedSPANo.04-003beforetheCommissiononElections("COMELEC")todisqualifyFPJandtodenyduecourseortocancelhiscertificateofcandidacyuponthethesisthatFPJmadeamaterialmisrepresentationinhiscertificateofcandidacybyclaimingtobeanatural-bornFilipinocitizenwhenintruth,accordingtoFornier,hisparentswereforeigners;hismother,BessieKelleyPoe,wasanAmerican,andhisfather,AllanPoe,wasaSpanishnational,beingthesonofLorenzoPou,aSpanishsubject.Granting,petitionerasseverated,thatAllanF.PoewasaFilipinocitizen,hecouldnothavetransmittedhisFilipinocitizenshiptoFPJ,thelatterbeinganillegitimatechildofanalienmother.Petitionerbasedtheallegationoftheillegitimatebirthofrespondentontwoassertions-first,AllanF.PoecontractedapriormarriagetoacertainPaulitaGomezbeforehismarriagetoBessieKelleyand,second,evenifnosuchpriormarriagehadexisted,AllanF.Poe,marriedBessieKellyonlyayearafterthebirthofrespondent.InthehearingbeforetheThirdDivisionoftheCOMELECon19January2004,petitioner,insupportofhisclaim,presentedseveraldocumentaryexhibits-1)acopyofthecertificateofbirthofFPJ,2)acertifiedphotocopyofanaffidavitexecutedinSpanishbyPaulitaPoeyGomezattestingtoherhavingfiledacaseforbigamyandconcubinageagainstthefatherofrespondent,AllanF.Poe,afterdiscoveringhisbigamousrelationshipwithBessieKelley,3)anEnglishtranslationoftheaffidavitaforesaid,4)acertifiedphotocopyofthecertificateofbirthofAllanF.Poe,5)acertificationissuedbytheDirectoroftheRecordsManagementandArchivesOffice,attestingtothefactthattherewasnorecordintheNationalArchivesthataLorenzoPoeorLorenzoPouresidedorenteredthePhilippinesbefore1907,and6)acertificationfromtheOfficer-In-ChargeoftheArchivesDivisionoftheNationalArchivestotheeffectthatnoavailableinformationcouldbefoundinthefilesoftheNationalArchivesregardingthebirthofAllanF.Poe.Onhispart,respondent,presentedtwenty-twodocumentarypiecesofevidence,themoresignificantonesbeing-a)acertificationissuedbyEstrellaM.DomingooftheArchivesDivisionoftheNationalArchivesthatthereappearedtobenoavailableinformationregardingthebirthofAllanF.PoeintheregistryofbirthsforSanCarlos,Pangasinan,b)acertificationissuedbytheOfficer-In-ChargeoftheArchivesDivisionoftheNationalArchivesthatnoavailableinformationaboutthemarriageofAllanF.PoeandPaulitaGomezcouldbefound,c)acertificateofbirthofRonaldAllanPoe,d)OriginalCertificateofTitleNo.P-2247oftheRegistryofDeedsfortheProvinceofPangasinan,inthenameofLorenzoPou,e)copiesofTaxDeclarationNo.20844,No.20643,No.23477andNo.23478inthenameofLorenzoPou,f)acopyofthecertificateofdeathofLorenzoPou,g)acopyofthepurportedmarriagecontractbetweenFernandoPouandBessieKelley,andh)acertificationissuedbytheCityCivilRegistrarofSanCarlosCity,Pangasinan,statingthattherecordsofbirthinthesaidofficeduringtheperiodoffrom1900untilMay1946weretotallydestroyedduringWorldWarII.On23January2004,theCOMELECdismissedSPANo.04-003forlackofmerit.Threedayslater,oron26January2004,Fornierfiledhismotionforreconsideration.Themotionwasdeniedon06February2004bytheCOMELECenbanc.On10February2004,petitionerassailedthedecisionoftheCOMELECbeforethisCourtconformablywithRule64,inrelationtoRule65,oftheRevisedRulesofCivilProcedure.Thepetition,docketedG.R.No.161824,likewiseprayedforatemporaryrestrainingorder,awritofpreliminaryinjunctionoranyotherresolutionthatwouldstaythefinalityand/orexecutionoftheCOMELECresolutions.Theotherpetitions,laterconsolidatedwithG.R.No.161824,wouldincludeG.R.No.161434,entitled"MariaJeanetteC.Tecson,andFelixB.Desiderio,Jr.,vs.TheCommissiononElections,RonaldAllanKelleyPoe(a.k.a.FernandoPoe,Jr.),andVictorinoX.Fornier,"andtheother,docketedG.R.No.161634,entitled"ZoiloAntonioG.Velez,vs.RonaldAllanKelleyPoe,a.k.a.FernandoPoe,Jr.,"bothchallengingthejurisdictionoftheCOMELECandassertingthat,underArticleVII,Section4,paragraph7,ofthe1987Constitution,onlytheSupremeCourthadoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontoresolvethebasicissueonthecase.JurisdictionoftheCourt

InG.R.No.161824

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InseekingthedisqualificationofthecandidacyofFPJandtohavetheCOMELECdenyduecoursetoorcancelFPJscertificateof candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC,petitionerFornierinvokedSection78oftheOmnibusElectionCodeSection78.Petitiontodenyduecoursetoorcancelacertificateofcandidacy.---AverifiedpetitionseekingtodenyduecourseortocancelacertificateofcandidacymaybefiledbyanypersonexclusivelyonthegroundthatanymaterialrepresentationcontainedthereinasrequiredunderSection74hereofisfalseinconsonancewiththegeneralpowersofCOMELECexpressedinSection52oftheOmnibusElectionCode-Section52.PowersandfunctionsoftheCommissiononElections.InadditiontothepowersandfunctionsconferreduponitbytheConstitution,theCommissionshallhaveexclusivechargeoftheenforcementandadministrationofalllawsrelativetotheconductofelectionsforthepurposeofensuringfree,orderlyandhonestelections-andinrelationtoArticle69oftheOmnibusElectionCodewhichwouldauthorize"anyinterestedparty"tofileaverifiedpetitiontodenyorcancelthecertificateofcandidacyofanynuisancecandidate.DecisionsoftheCOMELECondisqualificationcasesmaybereviewedbytheSupremeCourtperRule64[if!supportFootnotes][2][endif]inanactionforcertiorariunderRule65[if!supportFootnotes][3][endif]oftheRevisedRulesofCivilProcedure.Section7,ArticleIX,ofthe1987Constitutionalsoreads"EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseormatterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.Acaseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,ormemorandum,requiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself.UnlessotherwiseprovidedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebroughttotheSupremeCourtoncertioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromreceiptofacopythereof."Additionally,Section1,ArticleVIII,ofthesameConstitutionprovidesthatjudicialpowerisvestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylawwhichpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.ItissufficientlyclearthatthepetitionbroughtupinG.R.No.161824wasaptlyelevatedto,andcouldwellbetakencognizanceofby,thisCourt.Acontraryviewcouldbeagrossdenialtoourpeopleoftheirfundamentalrighttobefullyinformed,andtomakeaproperchoice,onwhocouldorshouldbeelectedtooccupythehighestgovernmentpostintheland.

InG.R.No.161434andG.R.No.161634PetitionersTecson,etal.,inG.R.No.161434,andVelez,inG.R.No.161634,invoketheprovisionsofArticleVII,Section4,

paragraph7,ofthe1987ConstitutioninassailingthejurisdictionoftheCOMELECwhenittookcognizanceofSPANo.04-003andinurgingtheSupremeCourttoinsteadtakeonthepetitionstheydirectlyinstitutedbeforeit.TheConstitutionalprovisioncitedreads:"TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVice-President,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose."Theprovisionisaninnovationofthe1987Constitution.Theomissioninthe1935andthe1973Constitutiontodesignateanytribunaltobethesolejudgeofpresidentialandvice-presidentialcontests,hasconstrainedthisCourttodeclare,inLopezvs.Roxas,[if!supportFootnotes][4][endif]asnot(being)justiciablecontroversiesordisputesinvolvingcontestsontheelections,returnsandqualificationsofthePresidentorVice-President.TheconstitutionallapsepromptedCongress,on21June1957,toenactRepublicActNo.1793,"AnActConstitutinganIndependentPresidentialElectoralTribunaltoTry,HearandDecideProtestsContestingtheElectionofthePresident-ElectandtheVice-President-ElectofthePhilippinesandProvidingfortheMannerofHearingtheSame."RepublicAct1793designatedtheChiefJusticeandtheAssociateJusticesoftheSupremeCourttobethemembersofthetribunal.Althoughthesubsequentadoptionoftheparliamentaryformofgovernmentunderthe1973ConstitutionmighthaveimplicitlyaffectedRepublicActNo.1793,thestatutoryset-up,nonetheless,wouldnowbedeemedrevivedunderthepresentSection4,paragraph7,ofthe1987Constitution.Ordinaryusagewouldcharacterizea"contest"inreferencetoapost-electionscenario.Electioncontestsconsistofeitheranelectionprotestoraquowarrantowhich,althoughtwodistinctremedies,wouldhaveoneobjectiveinview,i.e.,todislodgethewinningcandidatefromoffice.AperusalofthephraseologyinRule12,Rule13,andRule14ofthe"RulesofthePresidentialElectoralTribunal,"promulgatedbytheSupremeCourtenbancon18April1992,wouldsupportthispremise-Rule12.Jurisdiction.-TheTribunalshallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVice-PresidentofthePhilippines.Rule13.HowInitiated.-AnelectioncontestisinitiatedbythefilingofanelectionprotestorapetitionforquowarrantoagainstthePresidentorVice-President.Anelectionprotestshallnotincludeapetitionforquowarranto.Apetitionforquowarrantoshallnotincludeanelectionprotest.Rule14.ElectionProtest.-OnlytheregisteredcandidateforPresidentorforVice-PresidentofthePhilippineswhoreceivedthesecondorthirdhighestnumberofvotesmaycontesttheelectionofthePresidentortheVice-President,asthecasemaybe,byfilingaverifiedpetitionwiththeClerkofthePresidentialElectoralTribunalwithinthirty(30)daysaftertheproclamationofthewinner.Therulescategoricallyspeakofthejurisdictionofthetribunalovercontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsofthe"President"or"Vice-President",ofthePhilippines,andnotof"candidates"forPresidentorVice-President.Aquowarrantoproceedingisgenerallydefinedasbeinganactionagainstapersonwhousurps,intrudesinto,orunlawfullyholdsorexercisesapublicoffice.[if!supportFootnotes][5][endif]Insuchcontext,theelectioncontestcanonlycontemplateapost-electionscenario.InRule14,

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onlyaregisteredcandidatewhowouldhavereceivedeitherthesecondorthirdhighestnumberofvotescouldfileanelectionprotest.Thisruleagainpresupposesapost-electionscenario.ItisfairtoconcludethatthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt,definedbySection4,paragraph7,ofthe1987Constitution,wouldnotincludecasesdirectlybroughtbeforeit,questioningthequalificationsofacandidateforthepresidencyorvice-presidencybeforetheelectionsareheld.Accordingly,G.R.No.161434,entitled"MariaJeanetteC.Tecson,etal.,vs.CommissiononElectionsetal.,"andG.R.No.161634,entitled"ZoiloAntonioVelezvs.RonaldAllanKelleyPoea.k.a.FernandoPoe,Jr."wouldhavetobedismissedforwantofjurisdiction.

TheCitizenshipIssueNow,tothebasicissue;itshouldbehelpfultofirstgiveabriefhistoricalbackgroundontheconceptofcitizenship.Perhaps,theearliestunderstandingofcitizenshipwasthatgivenbyAristotle,who,sometimein384to322B.C.,described

the "citizen" to refer to amanwho shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]Aristotle saw its significance ifonly todetermine theconstituencyof the "State,"whichhedescribedasbeingcomposedof suchpersonswhowouldbeadequateinnumbertoachieveaself-sufficientexistence.[if!supportFootnotes][7][endif]Theconceptgrewtoincludeonewhowould both govern and be governed, forwhich qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected.Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.[if!supportFootnotes][8][endif]Initsidealsetting,acitizenwasactiveinpubliclifeandfundamentallywillingtosubmithisprivateintereststothegeneralinterestofsociety.

Theconceptofcitizenshiphadundergonechangesoverthecenturies.Inthe18thcentury,theconceptwaslimited,byandlarge,tocivilcitizenship,whichestablishedtherightsnecessaryforindividualfreedom,suchasrightstoproperty,personallibertyandjustice.[if!supportFootnotes][9][endif]Itsmeaningexpandedduringthe19thcenturytoincludepoliticalcitizenship,whichencompassedthe right to participate in the exercise of political power.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] The 20th century saw the next stage of thedevelopment of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.[if!supportFootnotes][11][endif]TheideaofcitizenshiphasgainedexpressioninthemodernwelfarestateasitsodevelopedinWesternEurope.An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be theinternationalizationofcitizenship.[if!supportFootnotes][12][endif]TheLocalSetting-fromSpanishTimestothePresentTherewasnosuchtermas"Philippinecitizens"duringtheSpanishregimebut"subjectsofSpain"or"Spanishsubjects."[if!supportFootnotes][13][endif]Inchurchrecords,thenativeswerecalled'indios',denotingalowregardfortheinhabitantsofthearchipelago.Spanishlawsoncitizenshipbecamehighlycodifiedduringthe19thcenturybuttheirsheernumbermadeitdifficulttopointtoonecomprehensivelaw.NotallofthesecitizenshiplawsofSpainhowever,weremadetoapplytothePhilippineIslandsexceptforthoseexplicitlyextendedbyRoyalDecrees.[if!supportFootnotes][14][endif]SpanishlawsoncitizenshipweretracedbacktotheNovisimaRecopilacion,promulgatedinSpainon16July1805butastowhetherthelawwasextendedtothePhilippinesremainedtobethesubjectofdifferingviewsamongexperts;[if!supportFootnotes][15][endif]however,threeroyaldecreeswereundisputablymadeapplicabletoSpaniardsinthePhilippines-theOrderdelaRegenciaof14August1841,[if!supportFootnotes][16][endif]theRoyalDecreeof23August1868specificallydefiningthepoliticalstatusofchildrenborninthePhilippineIslands,[if!supportFootnotes][17][endif]andfinally,theLeyExtranjeradeUltramarof04July1870,whichwasexpresslymadeapplicabletothePhilippinesbytheRoyalDecreeof13July1870.[if!supportFootnotes][18][endif]TheSpanishConstitutionof1876wasneverextendedtothePhilippineIslandsbecauseoftheexpressmandateofitsArticle89,accordingtowhichtheprovisionsoftheUltramaramongwhichthiscountrywasincluded,wouldbegovernedbyspeciallaws.[if!supportFootnotes][19][endif]ItwasonlytheCivilCodeofSpain,madeeffectiveinthisjurisdictionon18December1889,whichcameoutwiththefirstcategoricalenumerationofwhowereSpanishcitizens.-(a)PersonsborninSpanishterritory,(b)ChildrenofaSpanishfatherormother,eveniftheywerebornoutsideofSpain,(c)Foreignerswhohaveobtainednaturalizationpapers,(d)Thosewho,withoutsuchpapers,mayhavebecomedomiciledinhabitantsofanytownoftheMonarchy.[if!supportFootnotes][20][endif]Theyear1898wasanotherturningpointinPhilippinehistory.Alreadyinthestateofdeclineasasuperpower,SpainwasforcedtosocedehersolecolonyintheEasttoanupcomingworldpower,theUnitedStates.Anacceptedprincipleofinternationallawdictatedthatachangeinsovereignty,whileresultinginanabrogationofallpoliticallawstheninforce,wouldhavenoeffectoncivillaws,whichwouldremainvirtuallyintact.TheTreatyofPariswasenteredintoon10December1898betweenSpainandtheUnitedStates.[if!supportFootnotes][21][endif]UnderArticleIXofthetreaty,thecivilrightsandpoliticalstatusofthenativeinhabitantsoftheterritoriescededtotheUnitedStateswouldbedeterminedbyitsCongress-"Spanishsubjects,nativesofthePeninsula,residingintheterritoryoverwhichSpainbythepresenttreatyrelinquishesorcedeshersovereigntymayremaininsuchterritoryormayremovetherefrom,retainingineithereventalltheirrightsofproperty,includingtherighttosellordisposeofsuchpropertyorofitsproceeds;andtheyshallalsohavetherighttocarryontheirindustry,commerce,andprofessions,beingsubjectinrespectthereoftosuchlawsasareapplicabletoforeigners.Incasetheyremaininthe

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territorytheymaypreservetheirallegiancetotheCrownofSpainbymaking,beforeacourtofrecord,withinayearfromthedateoftheexchangeofratificationsofthistreaty,adeclarationoftheirdecisiontopreservesuchallegiance;indefaultofwhichdeclarationtheyshallbeheldtohaverenounceditandtohaveadoptedthenationalityoftheterritoryinwhichtheyreside.Thus"ThecivilrightsandpoliticalstatusofthenativeinhabitantsoftheterritoriesherebycededtotheUnitedStatesshallbedeterminedbytheCongress."[if!supportFootnotes][22][endif]Upontheratificationofthetreaty,andpendinglegislationbytheUnitedStatesCongressonthesubject,thenativeinhabitantsofthePhilippinesceasedtobeSpanishsubjects.AlthoughtheydidnotbecomeAmericancitizens,they,however,alsoceasedtobe"aliens"underAmericanlawsandwerethusissuedpassportsdescribingthemtobecitizensofthePhilippinesentitledtotheprotectionoftheUnitedStates.Theterm"citizensofthePhilippineIslands"appearedforthefirsttimeinthePhilippineBillof1902,alsocommonlyreferredtoasthePhilippineOrganicActof1902,thefirstcomprehensivelegislationoftheCongressoftheUnitedStatesonthePhilippines-"....thatallinhabitantsofthePhilippineIslandscontinuingtoresidetherein,whowereSpanishsubjectsonthe11thdayofApril,1891,andthenresidedinsaidIslands,andtheirchildrenbornsubsequentthereto,shallbedeemedandheldtobecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsandassuchentitledtotheprotectionoftheUnitedStates,exceptsuchasshallhaveelectedtopreservetheirallegiancetotheCrownofSpaininaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthetreatyofpeacebetweentheUnitedStatesandSpain,signedatParis,Decembertentheighteenhundredandninetyeight."[if!supportFootnotes][23][endif]Undertheorganicact,acitizenofthePhilippineswasonewhowasaninhabitantofthePhilippines,andaSpanishsubjectonthe11thdayofApril1899.Theterminhabitantwastakentoinclude1)anative-borninhabitant,2)aninhabitantwhowasanativeofPeninsularSpain,and3)aninhabitantwhoobtainedSpanishpapersonorbefore11April1899.[if!supportFootnotes][24][endif]ControversyaroseontothestatusofchildrenborninthePhilippinesfrom11April1899to01July1902,duringwhichperiodnocitizenshiplawwasextantinthePhilippines.Weightwasgiventotheview,articulatedinjurisprudentialwritingatthetime,thatthecommonlawprincipleofjussoli,otherwisealsoknownastheprincipleofterritoriality,operativeintheUnitedStatesandEngland,governedthoseborninthePhilippineArchipelagowithinthatperiod.[if!supportFootnotes][25][endif]Moreaboutthislater.In23March1912,theCongressoftheUnitedStatesmadethefollowingamendmenttothePhilippineBillof1902-"Provided,ThatthePhilippineLegislatureisherebyauthorizedtoprovidebylawfortheacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipbythosenativesofthePhilippineIslandswhodonotcomewithintheforegoingprovisions,thenativesofotherinsularpossessionoftheUnitedStates,andsuchotherpersonsresidinginthePhilippineIslandswhowouldbecomecitizensoftheUnitedStates,underthelawsoftheUnitedStates,ifresidingtherein."[if!supportFootnotes][26][endif]WiththeadoptionofthePhilippineBillof1902,theconceptof"Philippinecitizens"hadforthefirsttimecrystallized.Theword"Filipino"wasusedbyWilliamH.Taft,thefirstCivilGovernorGeneralinthePhilippineswhenheinitiallymadementionofitinhisslogan,"ThePhilippinesfortheFilipinos."In1916,thePhilippineAutonomyAct,alsoknownastheJonesLawrestatedvirtuallytheprovisionsofthePhilippineBillof1902,assoamendedbytheActofCongressin1912-ThatallinhabitantsofthePhilippineIslandswhowereSpanishsubjectsontheeleventhdayofApril,eighteenhundredandninety-nine,andthenresidedinsaidIslands,andtheirchildrenbornsubsequentlythereto,shallbedeemedandheldtobecitizensofthePhilippineIslands,exceptsuchasshallhaveelectedtopreservetheirallegiancetotheCrownofSpaininaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthetreatyofpeacebetweentheUnitedStatesandSpain,signedatParisDecembertenth,eighteenhundredandninety-eightandexceptsuchothersashavesincebecomecitizensofsomeothercountry;Provided,ThatthePhilippineLegislature,hereinprovidedfor,isherebyauthorizedtoprovidefortheacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipbythosenativesofthePhilippineIslandswhodonotcomewithintheforegoingprovisions,thenativesoftheinsularpossessionsoftheUnitedStates,andsuchotherpersonsresidinginthePhilippineIslandswhoarecitizensoftheUnitedStates,orwhocouldbecomecitizensoftheUnitedStatesunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates,ifresidingtherein."UndertheJonesLaw,anative-borninhabitantofthePhilippineswasdeemedtobeacitizenofthePhilippinesasof11April1899ifhewas1)asubjectofSpainon11April1899,2)residinginthePhilippinesonsaiddate,and,3)sincethatdate,notacitizenofsomeothercountry.Whiletherewas,atonebrieftime,divergentviewsonwhetherornotjussoliwasamodeofacquiringcitizenship,the1935Constitutionbroughttoanendtoanysuchlinkwithcommonlaw,byadopting,onceandforall,jussanguinisorbloodrelationshipasbeingthebasisofFilipinocitizenship-Section1,ArticleIII,1935Constitution.ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines-(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippineIslandsatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution(2)ThoseborninthePhilippinesIslandsofforeignparentswho,beforetheadoptionofthisConstitution,hadbeenelectedtopublicofficeinthePhilippineIslands.(3)ThosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.(4)ThosewhosemothersarecitizensofthePhilippinesanduponreachingtheageofmajority,electPhilippinecitizenship.(5)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.Subsection(4),ArticleIII,ofthe1935Constitution,takentogetherwithexistingcivillawprovisionsatthetime,whichprovidedthatwomenwouldautomaticallylosetheirFilipinocitizenshipandacquirethatoftheirforeignhusbands,resultedindiscriminatorysituationsthateffectivelyincapacitatedthewomenfromtransmittingtheirFilipinocitizenshiptotheirlegitimatechildrenandrequiredillegitimatechildrenofFilipinomotherstostillelectFilipinocitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority.Seekingto

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correctthisanomaly,aswellasfullycognizantofthenewlyfoundstatusofFilipinowomenasequalstomen,theframersofthe1973ConstitutioncraftedtheprovisionsofthenewConstitutiononcitizenshiptoreflectsuchconcerns-Section1,ArticleIII,1973Constitution-ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.(3)ThosewhoelectPhilippinecitizenshippursuanttotheprovisionsoftheConstitutionofnineteenhundredandthirty-five.(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.Forgoodmeasure,Section2ofthesamearticlealsofurtherprovidedthat"AfemalecitizenofthePhilippineswhomarriesanalienretainsherPhilippinecitizenship,unlessbyheractoromissionsheisdeemed,underthelawtohaverenouncedhercitizenship."The1987Constitutiongenerallyadoptedtheprovisionsofthe1973Constitution,exceptforsubsection(3)thereofthataimedtocorrecttheirregularsituationgeneratedbythequestionableprovisointhe1935Constitution.SectionI,ArticleIV,1987Constitutionnowprovides:ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:(1)ThosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution.(2)ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines.(3)ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973ofFilipinomothers,whoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority;and(4)Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.TheCaseOfFPJSection2,ArticleVII,ofthe1987Constitutionexpresses:"NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanatural-borncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoreadandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection."Theterm"natural-borncitizens,"isdefinedtoinclude"thosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship."[if!supportFootnotes][27][endif]Thedate,monthandyearofbirthofFPJappearedtobe20August1939duringtheregimeofthe1935Constitution.Throughitshistory,fourmodesofacquiringcitizenship-naturalization,jussoli,resjudicataandjussanguinis[if!supportFootnotes][28][endif]hadbeeninvogue.Onlytwo,i.e.,jussoliandjussanguinis,couldqualifyapersontobeinganatural-borncitizenofthePhilippines.Jussoli,perRoavs.CollectorofCustoms[if!supportFootnotes][29][endif](1912),didnotlastlong.Withtheadoptionofthe1935ConstitutionandthereversalofRoainTanChongvs.SecretaryofLabor[if!supportFootnotes][30][endif](1947),jussanguinisorbloodrelationshipwouldnowbecometheprimarybasisofcitizenshipbybirth.DocumentaryevidenceadducedbypetitionerwouldtendtoindicatethattheearliestestablisheddirectascendantofFPJwashispaternalgrandfatherLorenzoPou,marriedtoMartaReyes,thefatherofAllanF.Poe.WhiletherecordofbirthofLorenzoPouhadnotbeenpresentedinevidence,hisdeathcertificate,however,identifiedhimtobeaFilipino,aresidentofSanCarlos,Pangasinan,and84yearsoldatthetimeofhisdeathon11September1954.ThecertificateofbirthofthefatherofFPJ,AllanF.Poe,showedthathewasbornon17May1915toanEspaolfather,LorenzoPou,andamestizaEspaolmother,MartaReyes.IntroducedbypetitionerwasanuncertifiedcopyofasupposedcertificateoftheallegedmarriageofAllanF.PoeandPaulitaGomezon05July1936.ThemarriagecertificateofAllanF.PoeandBessieKelleyreflectedthedateoftheirmarriagetobeon16September1940.Inthesamecertificate,AllanF.Poewasstatedtobetwenty-fiveyearsold,unmarried,andaFilipinocitizen,andBessieKelleytobetwenty-twoyearsold,unmarried,andanAmericancitizen.ThebirthcertificateofFPJ,woulddisclosethathewasbornon20August1939toAllanF.Poe,aFilipino,twenty-fouryearsold,marriedtoBessieKelly,anAmericancitizen,twenty-oneyearsoldandmarried.Consideringthereservationsmadebythepartiesontheveracityofsomeoftheentriesonthebirthcertificateofrespondentandthemarriagecertificateofhisparents,theonlyconclusionsthatcouldbedrawnwithsomedegreeofcertaintyfromthedocumentswouldbethat-1.TheparentsofFPJwereAllanF.PoeandBessieKelley;2.FPJwasborntothemon20August1939;3.AllanF.PoeandBessieKelleyweremarriedtoeachotheron16September,1940;4.ThefatherofAllanF.PoewasLorenzoPoe;and5.Atthetimeofhisdeathon11September1954,LorenzoPoewas84yearsold.WouldtheabovefactsbesufficientorinsufficienttoestablishthefactthatFPJisanatural-bornFilipinocitizen?ThemarriagecertificateofAllanF.PoeandBessieKelley,thebirthcertificateofFPJ,andthedeathcertificateofLorenzoPouaredocumentsofpublicrecordinthecustodyofapublicofficer.ThedocumentshavebeensubmittedinevidencebybothcontendingpartiesduringtheproceedingsbeforetheCOMELEC.ThebirthcertificateofFPJwasmarkedExhibit"A"forpetitionerandExhibit"3"forrespondent.ThemarriagecertificateofAllanF.PoetoBessieKelleywassubmittedasExhibit"21"forrespondent.ThedeathcertificateofLorenzoPouwassubmittedbyrespondentashisExhibit"5."Whilethelasttwodocumentsweresubmittedinevidenceforrespondent,theadmissibilitythereof,particularlyinreferencetothefactswhichtheypurportedtoshow,i.e.,themarriagecertificateinrelationtothedateofmarriageofAllanF.PoetoBessieKelleyandthedeathcertificaterelativetothedeathofLorenzoPouon11September1954inSanCarlos,

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Pangasinan,werealladmittedbypetitioner,whohadutilizedthosematerialstatementsinhisargument.Allthreedocumentswerecertifiedtruecopiesoftheoriginals.Section3,Rule130,RulesofCourtstatesthat-Originaldocumentmustbeproduced;exceptions.-Whenthesubjectofinquiryisthecontentsofadocument,noevidenceshallbeadmissibleotherthantheoriginaldocumentitself,exceptinthefollowingcases:xxxxxxxxx(d)Whentheoriginalisapublicrecordinthecustodyofapublicofficeorisrecordedinapublicoffice.Beingpublicdocuments,thedeathcertificateofLorenzoPou,themarriagecertificateofAllanF.PoeandBessieKelly,andthebirthcertificateofFPJ,constituteprimafacieproofoftheircontents.Section44,Rule130,oftheRulesofCourtprovides:Entriesinofficialrecords.EntriesinofficialrecordsmadeintheperformanceofhisdutybyapublicofficerofthePhilippines,orbyapersonintheperformanceofadutyspeciallyenjoinedbylaw,areprimafacieevidenceofthefactsthereinstated.Thetrustworthinessofpublicdocumentsandthevaluegiventotheentriesmadethereincouldbegroundedon1)thesenseofofficialdutyinthepreparationofthestatementmade,2)thepenaltywhichisusuallyaffixedtoabreachofthatduty,3)theroutineanddisinterestedoriginofmostsuchstatements,and4)thepublicityofrecordwhichmakesmorelikelythepriorexposureofsucherrorsasmighthaveoccurred.[if!supportFootnotes][31][endif]ThedeathcertificateofLorenzoPouwouldindicatethathediedon11September1954,attheageof84years,inSanCarlos,Pangasinan.ItcouldthusbeassumedthatLorenzoPouwasbornsometimeintheyear1870whenthePhilippineswasstillacolonyofSpain.PetitionerwouldarguethatLorenzoPouwasnotinthePhilippinesduringthecrucialperiodoffrom1898to1902consideringthattherewasnoexistingrecordaboutsuchfactintheRecordsManagementandArchivesOffice.Petitioner,however,likewisefailedtoshowthatLorenzoPouwasatanyotherplaceduringthesameperiod.Inhisdeathcertificate,theresidenceofLorenzoPouwasstatedtobeSanCarlos,Pangasinan.Intheabsenceofanyevidencetothecontrary,itshouldbesoundtoconclude,oratleasttopresume,thattheplaceofresidenceofapersonatthetimeofhisdeathwasalsohisresidencebeforedeath.ItwouldbeextremelydoubtfuliftheRecordsManagementandArchivesOfficewouldhavehadcompleterecordsofallresidentsofthePhilippinesfrom1898to1902.ProofofPaternityandFiliationUnderCivilLaw.Petitionersubmits,inanycase,thatinestablishingfiliation(relationshiporcivilstatusofthechildtothefather[ormother])orpaternity(relationshiporcivilstatusofthefathertothechild)ofanillegitimatechild,FPJevidentlybeinganillegitimatesonaccordingtopetitioner,themandatoryrulesundercivillawmustbeused.UndertheCivilCodeofSpain,whichwasinforceinthePhilippinesfrom08December1889upuntilthedaypriorto30August1950whentheCivilCodeofthePhilippinestookeffect,acknowledgmentwasrequiredtoestablishfiliationorpaternity.Acknowledgmentwaseitherjudicial(compulsory)orvoluntary.Judicialorcompulsoryacknowledgmentwaspossibleonlyifdoneduringthelifetimeoftheputativeparent;voluntaryacknowledgmentcouldonlybehadinarecordofbirth,awill,orapublicdocument.[if!supportFootnotes][32][endif]ComplementarytothenewcodewasActNo.3753ortheCivilRegistryLawexpressinginSection5thereof,that-Incaseofanillegitimatechild,thebirthcertificateshallbesignedandsworntojointlybytheparentsoftheinfantoronlybythemotherifthefatherrefuses.Inthelattercase,itshallnotbepermissibletostateorrevealinthedocumentthenameofthefatherwhorefusestoacknowledgethechild,ortogivethereinanyinformationbywhichsuchfathercouldbeidentified.Inorderthatthebirthcertificatecouldthenbeutilizedtoprovevoluntaryacknowledgmentoffiliationorpaternity,thecertificatewasrequiredtobesignedorsworntobythefather.Thefailureofsuchrequirementrenderedthesameuselessasbeinganauthoritativedocumentofrecognition.[if!supportFootnotes][33][endif]InMendozavs.Mella,[if!supportFootnotes][34][endif]theCourtruled-"SinceRodolfowasbornin1935,aftertheregistrylawwasenacted,thequestionherereallyiswhetherornothisbirthcertificate(Exhibit1),whichismerelyacertifiedcopyoftheregistryrecord,mayberelieduponassufficientproofofhishavingbeenvoluntarilyrecognized.Nosuchreliance,inourjudgment,maybeplaceduponit.Whileitcontainsthenamesofbothparents,thereisnoshowingthattheysignedtheoriginal,letalonesworetoitscontentsasrequiredinSection5ofActNo.3753.Forallthatmighthavehappened,itwasnoteventheyoreitherofthemwhofurnishedthedatatobeenteredinthecivilregister.Petitionerssaythatinanyeventthebirthcertificateisinthenatureofapublicdocumentwhereinvoluntaryrecognitionofanaturalchildmayalsobemade,accordingtothesameArticle131.Trueenough,butinsuchacase,theremustbeaclearstatementinthedocumentthattheparentrecognizesthechildashisorherown."InthebirthcertificateofrespondentFPJ,presentedbybothparties,nowhereinthedocumentwasthesignatureofAllanF.Poefound.Therebeingnowillapparentlyexecuted,oratleastshowntohavebeenexecuted,bydecedentAllanF.Poe,theonlyotherproofofvoluntaryrecognitionremainedtobe"someotherpublicdocument."InParejavs.Pareja,[if!supportFootnotes][35][endif]thisCourtdefinedwhatcouldconstitutesuchadocumentasproofofvoluntaryacknowledgment:"UndertheSpanishCivilCodetherearetwoclassesofpublicdocuments,thoseexecutedbyprivateindividualswhichmustbeauthenticatedbynotaries,andthoseissuedbycompetentpublicofficialsbyreasonoftheiroffice.ThepublicdocumentpointedoutinArticle131asoneofthemeansbywhichrecognitionmaybemadebelongstothefirstclass."Letusleaveitatthatforthemoment.The1950CivilCodecategorizedtheacknowledgmentorrecognitionofillegitimatechildrenintovoluntary,legalorcompulsory.Voluntaryrecognitionwasrequiredtobeexpressedlymadeinarecordofbirth,awill,astatementbeforeacourtofrecordorinany

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authenticwriting.Legalacknowledgmenttookplaceinfavoroffullbloodbrothersandsistersofanillegitimatechildwhowasrecognizedorjudiciallydeclaredasnatural.Compulsoryacknowledgmentcouldbedemandedgenerallyincaseswhenthechildhadinhisfavoranyevidencetoprovefiliation.Unlikeanactiontoclaimlegitimacywhichwouldlastduringthelifetimeofthechild,andmightpassexceptionallytotheheirsofthechild,anactiontoclaimacknowledgment,however,couldonlybebroughtduringthelifetimeofthepresumedparent.

AmicusCuriaeRubenF.Balanedefined,during theoralargument, "authenticwriting,"soas tobeanauthenticwriting forpurposesofvoluntaryrecognition,simplyasbeingagenuineorindubitablewritingofthefather.Thetermwouldincludeapublicinstrument(onedulyacknowledgedbeforeanotarypublicorothercompetentofficial)oraprivatewritingadmittedbythefathertobehis.

TheFamilyCodehasfurtherliberalizedtherules;Article172,Article173,andArticle175provide:Art.172.Thefiliationoflegitimatechildrenisestablishedbyanyofthefollowing:(1)Therecordofbirthappearinginthecivilregisterorafinaljudgment;or(2)Anadmissionoflegitimatefiliationinapublicdocumentoraprivatehandwritteninstrumentandsignedbytheparentconcerned.Intheabsenceoftheforegoingevidence,thelegitimatefiliationshallbeprovedby:(1)Theopenandcontinuouspossessionofthestatusofalegitimatechild;or(2)AnyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourtandspeciallaws.Art.173.Theactiontoclaimlegitimacymaybebroughtbythechildduringhisorherlifetimeandshallbetransmittedtotheheirsshouldthechilddieduringminorityorinastateofinsanity.Inthesecases,theheirsshallhaveaperiodoffiveyearswithinwhichtoinstitutetheaction.Theactionalreadycommencedbythechildshallsurvivenotwithstandingthedeathofeitherorbothoftheparties.xxxxxxxxx.Art.175.Illegitimatechildrenmayestablishtheirillegitimatefiliationinthesamewayandonthesame,evidenceaslegitimatechildren.TheactionmustbebroughtwithinthesameperiodspecifiedinArticle173,exceptwhentheactionisbasedonthesecondparagraphofArticle172,inwhichcasetheactionmaybebroughtduringthelifetimeoftheallegedparent.TheprovisionsoftheFamilyCodeareretroactivelyapplied;Article256ofthecodereads:"Art.256.ThisCodeshallhaveretroactiveeffectinsofarasitdoesnotprejudiceorimpairvestedoracquiredrightsinaccordancewiththeCivilCodeorotherlaws.Thus,inVda.deSy-Quiavs.CourtofAppeals,[if!supportFootnotes][36][endif]theCourthasruled:"WeholdthatwhetherJosewasavoluntarilyrecognizednaturalchildshouldbedecidedunderArticle278oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippines.Article2260ofthatCodeprovidesthat'thevoluntaryrecognitionofanaturalchildshalltakeplaceaccordingtothisCode,evenifthechildwasbornbeforetheeffectivityofthisbodyoflaws'orbeforeAugust30,1950.Hence,Article278maybegivenretroactiveeffect."Itshouldbeapparentthatthegrowingtrendtoliberalizetheacknowledgmentorrecognitionofillegitimatechildrenisanattempttobreakawayfromthetraditionalideaofkeepingwellapartlegitimateandnon-legitimaterelationshipswithinthefamilyinfavorofthegreaterinterestandwelfareofthechild.Theprovisionsareintendedtomerelygoverntheprivateandpersonalaffairsofthefamily.Thereislittle,ifany,toindicatethatthelegitimateorillegitimatecivilstatusoftheindividualwouldalsoaffecthispoliticalrightsor,ingeneral,hisrelationshiptotheState.While,indeed,provisionson"citizenship"couldbefoundintheCivilCode,suchprovisionsmustbetakeninthecontextofprivaterelations,thedomainofcivillaw;particularly-"CivilLawisthatbranchoflawwhichhasforitsdoublepurposetheorganizationofthefamilyandtheregulationofproperty.Ithasthus[been]definedasthemassofpreceptswhichdetermineandregulatetherelationsofassistance,authorityandobedienceamongmembersofafamily,andthosewhichexistamongmembersofasocietyfortheprotectionofprivateinterests."[if!supportFootnotes][37][endif]InYaezdeBarnuevovs.Fuster,[if!supportFootnotes][38][endif]theCourthasheld:"InaccordancewithArticle9oftheCivilCodeofSpain,xxxthelawsrelatingtofamilyrightsandduties,ortothestatus,conditionandlegalcapacityofpersons,governSpaniardsalthoughtheyresideinaforeigncountry;that,inconsequence,'allquestionsofacivilnature,suchasthosedealingwiththevalidityornullityofthematrimonialbond,thedomicileofthehusbandandwife,theirsupport,asbetweenthem,theseparationoftheirproperties,therulesgoverningproperty,maritalauthority,divisionofconjugalproperty,theclassificationoftheirproperty,legalcausesfordivorce,theextentofthelatter,theauthoritytodecreeit,and,ingeneral,thecivileffectsofmarriageanddivorceuponthepersonsandpropertiesofthespouses,arequestionsthataregovernedexclusivelybythenationallawofthehusbandandwife."Therelevanceof"citizenship"or"nationality"toCivilLawisbestexemplifiedinArticle15oftheCivilCode,statingthat-"Lawsrelatingtofamilyrightsandduties,ortothestatus,conditionandlegalcapacityofpersonsarebindinguponcitizensofthePhilippines,eventhoughlivingabroad"-thatexplainstheneedtoincorporateinthecodeareiterationoftheConstitutionalprovisionsoncitizenship.Similarly,citizenshipissignificantincivilrelationshipsfoundindifferentpartsoftheCivilCode,[if!supportFootnotes][39][endif]suchasonsuccessionalrightsandfamilyrelations.[if!supportFootnotes][40][endif]Inadoption,forinstance,anadoptedchildwouldbeconsideredthechildofhisadoptiveparentsandaccordedthesamerightsastheirlegitimatechildbutsuchlegalfictionextendedonlytodefinehisrightsundercivil

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law[if!supportFootnotes][41][endif]andnothispoliticalstatus.Civillawprovisionspointtoanobviousbiasagainstillegitimacy.ThisdiscriminatoryattitudemaybetracedtotheSpanishfamilyandpropertylaws,which,whiledefiningproprietaryandsuccessionalrightsofmembersofthefamily,provideddistinctionsintherightsoflegitimateandillegitimatechildren.Inthemonarchialset-upofoldSpain,thedistributionandinheritanceoftitlesandwealthwerestrictlyaccordingtobloodlinesandtheconcerntokeepthesebloodlinesuncontaminatedbyforeignbloodwasparamount.ThesedistinctionsbetweenlegitimacyandillegitimacywerecodifiedintheSpanishCivilCode,andtheinvidiousdiscriminationsurvivedwhentheSpanishCivilCodebecametheprimarysourceofourownCivilCode.Suchdistinction,however,remainsandshouldremainonlyinthesphereofcivillawandnotundulyimpedeorimpingeonthedomainofpoliticallaw.Theproofoffiliationorpaternityforpurposesofdetermininghiscitizenshipstatusshouldthusbedeemedindependentfromandnotinextricablytiedupwiththatprescribedforcivillawpurposes.TheCivilCodeorFamilyCodeprovisionsonproofoffiliationorpaternity,althoughgoodlaw,donothavepreclusiveeffectsonmattersalientopersonalandfamilyrelations.Theordinaryrulesonevidencecouldwellandshouldgovern.Forinstance,thematteraboutpedigreeisnotnecessarilyprecludedfrombeingapplicablebytheCivilCodeorFamilyCodeprovisions.Section39,Rule130,oftheRulesofCourtprovides-ActorDeclarationaboutpedigree.Theactordeclarationofapersondeceased,orunabletotestify,inrespecttothepedigreeofanotherpersonrelatedtohimbybirthormarriage,maybereceivedinevidencewhereitoccurredbeforethecontroversy,andtherelationshipbetweenthetwopersonsisshownbyevidenceotherthansuchactordeclaration.Theword`pedigreeincludesrelationship,familygenealogy,birth,marriage,death,thedateswhenandtheplaceswherethesefactsoccurred,andthenamesoftherelatives.Itembracesalsofactsoffamilyhistoryintimatelyconnectedwithpedigree.Fortheaboveruletoapply,itwouldbenecessarythat(a)thedeclarantisalreadydeadorunabletotestify,(b)thepedigreeofapersonmustbeatissue,(c)thedeclarantmustbearelativeofthepersonwhosepedigreeisinquestion,(d)declarationmustbemadebeforethecontroversyhasoccurred,and(e)therelationshipbetweenthedeclarantandthepersonwhosepedigreeisinquestionmustbeshownbyevidenceotherthansuchactordeclaration.Thus,thedulynotarizeddeclarationmadebyRubyKelleyMangahas,sisterofBessieKelleyPoesubmittedasExhibit20beforetheCOMELEC,mightbeacceptedtoprovetheactsofAllanF.Poe,recognizinghisownpaternalrelationshipwithFPJ,i.e,livingtogetherwithBessieKelleyandhischildren(includingrespondentFPJ)inonehouse,andasonefamily-"I,RubyKelleyMangahas,oflegalageandsoundmind,presentlyresidinginStockton,California,U.S.A.,afterbeingsworninaccordancewithlawdoherebydeclarethat:1.IamthesisterofthelateBessieKelleyPoe.2.BessieKelleyPoewasthewifeofFernandoPoe,Sr.3.FernandoandBessiePoehadasonbythenameofRonaldAllanPoe,morepopularlyknowninthePhilippinesas`FernandoPoe,Jr.,or`FPJ.4.RonaldAllanPoe`FPJwasbornonAugust20,1939atSt.Luke'sHospital,MagdalenaStreet,Manila.xxxxxxxxx7.FernandoPoeSr.,andmysisterBessie,metandbecameengagedwhiletheywerestudentsattheUniversityofthePhilippinesin1936.IwasalsointroducedtoFernandoPoe,Sr.,bymysisterthatsameyear.8.FernandoPoe,Sr.,andmysisterBessiehadtheirfirstchildin1938.9.FernandoPoe,Sr.,mysisterBessieandtheirfirstthreechildren,Elizabeth,Ronald,AllanandFernandoII,andmyselflivedtogetherwithourmotheratourfamily'shouseonDakotaSt.(nowJorgeBocoboSt.),MalateuntiltheliberationofManilain1945,exceptforsomemonthsbetween1943-1944.10.FernandoPoe,Sr.,andmysister,Bessie,wereblessedwithfour(4)morechildrenafterRonaldAllanPoe.xxxxxxxxx18.IamexecutingthisDeclarationtoattesttothefactthatmynephew,RonaldAllanPoeisanaturalbornFilipino,andthatheisthelegitimatechildofFernandoPoe,Sr.DoneinCityofStockton,California,U.S.A.,this12thdayofJanuary2004.RubyKelleyMangahasDeclarantDNATestingIncaseproofoffiliationorpaternitywouldbeunlikelytosatisfactorilyestablishorwouldbedifficulttoobtain,DNAtesting,whichexaminesgeneticcodesobtainedfrombodycellsoftheillegitimatechildandanyphysicalresidueofthelongdeadparentcouldberesortedto.Apositivematchwouldclearupfiliationorpaternity.InTijingvs.CourtofAppeals,[if!supportFootnotes][42][endif]thisCourthasacknowledgedthestrongweightofDNAtesting-"Parentagewillstillberesolvedusingconventionalmethodsunlessweadoptthemodernandscientificwaysavailable.Fortunately,wehavenowthefacilityandexpertiseinusingDNAtestforidentificationandparentagetesting.TheUniversityofthePhilippinesNaturalScienceResearchInstitute(UP-NSRI)DNAAnalysisLaboratoryhasnowthecapabilitytoconductDNAtypingusingshorttandemrepeat(STR)analysis.TheanalysisisbasedonthefactthattheDNAofachild/personhastwo(2)copies,onecopyfromthemotherandtheotherfromthefather.TheDNAfromthemother,theallegedfatherandthechildareanalyzedtoestablishparentage.Ofcourse,beinganovelscientifictechnique,theuseofDNAtestasevidenceisstillopentochallenge.Eventually,asthe

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appropriatecasecomes,courtsshouldnothesitatetoruleontheadmissibilityofDNAevidence.Foritwassaid,thatcourtsshouldapplytheresultsofsciencewhencompetentlyobtainedinaidofsituationspresented,sincetorejectsaidresultistodenyprogress."PetitionersArgumentForJurisprudentialConclusivenessPetitionerwouldhaveitthatevenifAllanF.PoewereaFilipinocitizen,hecouldnothavetransmittedhiscitizenshiptorespondentFPJ,thelatterbeinganillegitimatechild.Accordingtopetitioner,priortohismarriagetoBessieKelley,AllanF.Poe,onJuly5,1936,contractedmarriagewithacertainPaulitaGomez,makinghissubsequentmarriagetoBessieKelleybigamousandrespondentFPJanillegitimatechild.TheveracityofthesupposedcertificateofmarriagebetweenAllanF.PoeandPaulitaGomezcouldbemostdoubtfulatbest.Butthedocumentaryevidenceintroducedbynolessthanrespondenthimself,consistingofabirthcertificateofrespondentandamarriagecertificateofhisparentsshowedthatFPJwasbornon20August1939toaFilipinofatherandanAmericanmotherwhoweremarriedtoeachotherayearlater,oron16September1940.BirthtounmarriedparentswouldmakeFPJanillegitimatechild.Petitionercontendedthatasanillegitimatechild,FPJsofollowedthecitizenshipofhismother,BessieKelley,anAmericancitizen,basinghisstandontherulingofthisCourtinMoranovs.Vivo,[if!supportFootnotes][43][endif]citingChiongbianvs.deLeon[if!supportFootnotes][44][endif]andSerravs.Republic.[if!supportFootnotes][45][endif]Ontheabovescore,thedisquisitionmadebyamicuscuriaeJoaquinG.Bernas,SJ,ismostconvincing;hestates-"Wemustanalyzethesecasesandaskwhatthelismotawasineachofthem.IfthepronouncementoftheCourtonjussanguiniswasonthelismota,thepronouncementwouldbeadecisionconstitutingdoctrineundertheruleofstaredecisis.Butifthepronouncementwasirrelevanttothelismota,thepronouncementwouldnotbeadecisionbutamereobiterdictumwhichdidnotestablishdoctrine.IthereforeinvitetheCourttolookcloselyintothesecases.First,Moranovs.Vivo.ThecasewasnotaboutanillegitimatechildofaFilipinofather.ItwasaboutastepsonofaFilipino,astepsonwhowasthechildofaChinesemotherandaChinesefather.Theissuewaswhetherthestepsonfollowedthenaturalizationofthestepfather.Nothingaboutjussanguinisthere.Thestepsondidnothavethebloodofthenaturalizedstepfather.Second,Chiongbianvs.deLeon.ThiscasewasnotabouttheillegitimatesonofaFilipinofather.ItwasaboutalegitimatesonofafatherwhohadbecomeFilipinobyelectiontopublicofficebeforethe1935ConstitutionpursuanttoArticleIV,Section1(2)ofthe1935Constitution.Noonewasillegitimatehere.Third,Serravs.Republic.ThecasewasnotabouttheillegitimatesonofaFilipinofather.SerrawasanillegitimatechildofaChinesefatherandaFilipinomother.TheissuewaswhetheronewhowasalreadyaFilipinobecauseofhismotherwhostillneededtobenaturalized.Thereisnothingthereaboutinvidiousjussanguinis.Finally,Paavs.Chan.[if!supportFootnotes][46][endif]Thisisamorecomplicatedcase.ThecasewasaboutthecitizenshipofQuintinChanwhowasthesonofLeoncioChan.QuintinChanclaimedthathisfather,Leoncio,wastheillegitimatesonofaChinesefatherandaFilipinomother.QuintinthereforearguedthathegothiscitizenshipfromLeoncio,hisfather.ButtheSupremeCourtsaidthattherewasnovalidproofthatLeonciowasinfactthesonofaFilipinamother.TheCourtthereforeconcludedthatLeonciowasnotFilipino.IfLeonciowasnotFilipino,neitherwashissonQuintin.Quintinthereforewasnotonlynotanatural-bornFilipinobutwasnotevenaFilipino.TheCourtshouldhavestoppedthere.Butinsteaditfollowedwithanobiterdictum.TheCourtsaidobiterthatevenifLeoncio,Quintin'sfather,wereFilipino,QuintinwouldnotbeFilipinobecauseQuintinwasillegitimate.ThisstatementaboutQuintin,basedonacontrarytofactassumption,wasabsolutelyunnecessaryforthecase.xxxItwasobiterdictum,pureandsimple,simplyrepeatingtheobiterdictuminMoranovs.Vivo.xxxxxxxxx"AsidefromthefactthatsuchapronouncementwouldhavenotextualfoundationintheConstitution,itwouldalsoviolatetheequalprotectionclauseoftheConstitutionnotoncebuttwice.First,itwouldmakeanillegitimatedistinctionbetweenalegitimatechildandanillegitimatechild,andsecond,itwouldmakeanillegitimatedistinctionbetweentheillegitimatechildofaFilipinofatherandtheillegitimatechildofaFilipinomother.ThedoctrineonconstitutionallyallowabledistinctionswasestablishedlongagobyPeoplevs.Cayat.[if!supportFootnotes][47][endif]Iwouldgrantthatthedistinctionbetweenlegitimatechildrenandillegitimatechildrenrestsonrealdifferences.xxxButrealdifferencesalonedonotjustifyinvidiousdistinction.Realdifferencesmayjustifydistinctionforonepurposebutnotforanotherpurpose.xxxWhatistherelevanceoflegitimacyorillegitimacytoelectivepublicservice?Whatpossiblestateinterestcantherebefordisqualifyinganillegitimatechildfrombecomingapublicofficer.Itwasnotthefaultofthechildthathisparentshadillicitliaison.Whydeprivethechildofthefullnessofpoliticalrightsfornofaultofhisown?Todisqualifyanillegitimatechildfromholdinganimportantpublicofficeistopunishhimfortheindiscretionofhisparents.Thereisneitherjusticenorrationalityinthat.Andifthereisneitherjusticenorrationalityinthedistinction,thenthedistinctiontransgressestheequalprotectionclauseandmustbereprobated.Theotheramicicuriae,Mr.JusticeVicenteMendoza(aformermemberofthisCourt),ProfessorRubenBalaneandDeanMartinMagallona,atbottom,haveexpressedsimilarviews.Thethesisofpetitioner,unfortunatelyhingingsolelyonpureobiterdicta,shouldindeedfail.Wherejurisprudenceregardedanillegitimatechildastakingafterthecitizenshipofitsmother,itdidsoforthebenefitthechild.ItwastoensureaFilipinonationalityfortheillegitimatechildofanalienfatherinlinewiththeassumptionthatthemotherhadcustody,wouldexerciseparentalauthorityandhadthedutytosupportherillegitimatechild.Itwastohelpthechild,notto

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prejudiceordiscriminateagainsthim.Thefactofthematterperhapsthemostsignificantconsiderationisthatthe1935Constitution,thefundamentallawprevailingontheday,monthandyearofbirthofrespondentFPJ,canneverbemoreexplicitthanitis.Providingneitherconditionsnordistinctions,theConstitutionstatesthatamongthecitizensofthePhilippinesarethosewhosefathersarecitizensofthePhilippines.Thereutterlyisnocogentjustificationtoprescribeconditionsordistinctionswherethereclearlyarenoneprovided.InSum(1)TheCourt,intheexerciseofitspowerofjudicialreview,possessesjurisdictionoverthepetitioninG.R.No.161824,filedunderRule64,inrelationtoRule65,oftheRevisedRulesofCivilProcedure.G.R.No.161824assailstheresolutionoftheCOMELECforallegedgraveabuseofdiscretionindismissing,forlackofmerit,thepetitioninSPANo.04-003whichhasprayedforthedisqualificationofrespondentFPJfromrunningforthepositionofPresidentinthe10thMay2004nationalelectionsonthecontentionthatFPJhascommittedmaterialrepresentationinhiscertificateofcandidacybyrepresentinghimselftobeanatural-borncitizenofthePhilippines.(2)TheCourtmustdismiss,forlackofjurisdictionandprematurity,thepetitionsinG.R.No.161434andNo.161634bothhavingbeendirectlyelevatedtothisCourtinthelatterscapacityastheonlytribunaltoresolveapresidentialandvice-presidentialelectioncontestundertheConstitution.Evidently,theprimaryjurisdictionoftheCourtcandirectlybeinvokedonlyafter,notbefore,theelectionsareheld.(3)Inascertaining,inG.R.No.161824,whethergraveabuseofdiscretionhasbeencommittedbytheCOMELEC,itisnecessarytotakeonthematterofwhetherornotrespondentFPJisanatural-borncitizen,which,inturn,dependedonwhetherornotthefatherofrespondent,AllanF.Poe,wouldhavehimselfbeenaFilipinocitizenand,intheaffirmative,whetherornottheallegedillegitimacyofrespondentpreventshimfromtakingaftertheFilipinocitizenshipofhisputativefather.AnyconclusionontheFilipinocitizenshipofLorenzoPoucouldonlybedrawnfromthepresumptionthathavingdiedin1954at84yearsold,Lorenzowouldhavebeenbornsometimeintheyear1870,whenthePhilippineswasunderSpanishrule,andthatSanCarlos,Pangasinan,hisplaceofresidenceuponhisdeathin1954,intheabsenceofanyotherevidence,couldhavewellbeenhisplaceofresidencebeforedeath,suchthatLorenzoPouwouldhavebenefitedfromtheenmasseFilipinizationthatthePhilippineBillhadeffectedin1902.Thatcitizenship(ofLorenzoPou),ifacquired,wouldtherebyextendtohisson,AllanF.Poe,fatherofrespondentFPJ.The1935Constitution,duringwhichregimerespondentFPJhasseenfirstlight,conferscitizenshiptoallpersonswhosefathersareFilipinocitizensregardlessofwhethersuchchildrenarelegitimateorillegitimate.(4)ButwhilethetotalityoftheevidencemaynotestablishconclusivelythatrespondentFPJisanatural-borncitizenofthePhilippines,theevidenceonhandstillwouldpreponderateinhisfavorenoughtoholdthathecannotbeheldguiltyofhavingmadeamaterialmisrepresentationinhiscertificateofcandidacyinviolationofSection78,inrelationtoSection74,oftheOmnibusElectionCode.PetitionerhasutterlyfailedtosubstantiatehiscasebeforetheCourt,notwithstandingtheampleopportunitygiventothepartiestopresenttheirpositionandevidence,andtoprovewhetherornottherehasbeenmaterialmisrepresentation,which,assoruledinRomualdez-Marcosvs.COMELEC,[if!supportFootnotes][48][endif]mustnotonlybematerial,butalsodeliberateandwillful.

WHEREFORE,theCourtRESOLVEStoDISMISS1.G.R.No.161434,entitled"MariaJeanetteC.TecsonandFelixB.Desiderio,Jr.,Petitioners,versusCommissiononElections,

RonaldAllanKelleyPoe (a.k.a. "FernandoPoe, Jr.,) andVictorinoX. Fornier,Respondents," andG.R.No.161634, entitled "ZoiloAntonioVelez,Petitioner,versusRonaldAllanKelleyPoe,a.k.a.FernandoPoe,Jr.,Respondent,"forwantofjurisdiction.

2.G.R.No.161824,entitledVictorinoX.Fornier,Petitioner,versusHon.CommissiononElectionsandRonaldAllanKelleyPoe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission onElectionsindismissingthepetitioninSPANo.04-003.

NoCosts.SOORDERED.G.R.No.86564August1,1989RAMONL.LABO,JR.,petitioner,vs.THECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS(COMELEC)ENBANCANDLUISL.LARDIZABAL,respondentsEstelitoP.Mendozaforpetitioner.RilleraandQuintanaforprivaterespondent.CRUZ,J.:ThepetitionerasksthisCourttorestraintheCommissiononElectionsfromlookingintothequestionofhiscitizenshipasaqualificationforhisofficeasMayorofBaguioCity.Theallegationthatheisaforeigner,hesays,isnottheissue.Theissueiswhetherornotthepublicrespondenthasjurisdictiontoconductanyinquiryintothismatter,consideringthatthepetitionforquowarrantoagainsthimwasnotfiledontime.Itisnoteworthythatthisargumentisbasedontheallegedtardinessnotofthepetitionitselfbutofthepaymentofthefilingfee,whichthepetitionercontendswasanindispensablerequirement.Thefeeis,curiouslyenough,allofP300.00only.Thisbringsto

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mindthepopularversethatforwantofahorsethekingdomwaslost.Still,ifitisshownthatthepetitionwasindeedfiledbeyondthereglementaryperiod,thereisnoquestionthatthispetitionmustbegrantedandthechallengeabated.Thepetitioner'spositionissimple.Hewasproclaimedmayor-electofBaguioCity,onJanuary20,1988.ThepetitionforquowarrantowasfiledbytheprivaterespondentonJanuary26,1988,butnofilingfeewaspaidonthatdate.ThisfeewasfinallypaidonFebruary10,1988,ortwenty-onedaysafterhisproclamation.Asthepetitionbyitselfalonewasineffectualwithoutthefilingfee,itshouldbedeemedfiledonlywhenthefeewaspaid.ThiswasdonebeyondthereglementaryperiodprovidedforunderSection253oftheOmnibusElectionCodereadingasfollows:SEC.253.Petitionforquowarranto.—AnyvotercontestingtheelectionofaMemberoftheBatasangPambansa,regional,provincial,orcityofficeronthegroundofineligibilityorofdisloyaltytotheRepublicofthePhilippinesshallfileaswornpetitionforquowarrantowiththeCommissionwithintendaysaftertheproclamationoftheresultoftheelection.ThepetitioneraddsthatthepaymentofthefilingfeeisrequiredunderRule36,Section5,oftheProceduralRulesoftheCOMELECprovidingthat—Sec.5.NopetitionforquowarrantoshallbegivenduecoursewithoutthepaymentofafilingfeeintheamountofThreeHundredPesos(P300.00)andthelegalresearchfeeasrequiredbylaw.andstressesthatthereisabundantjurisprudenceholdingthatthepaymentofthefilingfeeisessentialtothetimelinessofthefillingofthepetitionitself.HecitesmanyrulingsoftheCourttothiseffect,specificallyManchesterv.CourtofAppeals.1Forhispart,theprivaterespondentdeniesthatthefilingfeewaspaidoutoftime.Infacthesays,itwasfliedaheadoftime.Hispointisthatwhenhefiledhis"PetitionforQuoWarrantowithPrayerforImmediateAnnulmentofProclamationandRestrainingOrderorInjunction"onJanuary26,1988,theCOMELECtreateditasapre-proclamationcontroversyanddocketeditasSPCCaseNo.88-288.Nodocketfeewascollectedalthoughitwasoffered.ItwasonlyonFebruary8,1988,thattheCOMELECdecidedtotreathispetitionassolelyforquowarrantoandre-docketeditasEPCCaseNo.88-19,servinghimnoticeonFebruary10,1988.Heimmediatelypaidthefilingfeeonthatdate.TheprivaterespondentarguesfurtherthatduringtheperiodwhentheCOMELECregardedhispetitionasapre-proclamationcontroversy,thetimeforfilinganelectionprotestorquowarrantoproceedingwasdeemedsuspendedunderSection248oftheOmnibusElectionCode.2Atanyrate,hesays,Rule36,Section5,oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedurecitedbythepetitioner,becameeffectiveonlyonNovember15,1988,sevendaysafterpublicationofthesaidRulesintheOfficialGazettepursuanttoSection4,Rule44thereof.3TheserulescouldnotretroacttoJanuary26,1988,whenhefiledhispetitionwiththeCOMELEC.InhisReply,thepetitionerarguesthateveniftheOmnibusElectionCodedidnotrequireit,thepaymentoffilingfeeswasstillnecessaryunderRes.No.1996and,beforethat,Res.No.1450oftherespondentCOMELEC,promulgatedonJanuary12,1988,andFebruary26,1980,respectively.Tothis,theprivaterespondentcountersthatthelatterresolutionwasintendedforthelocalelectionsheldonJanuary30,1980,anddidnotapplytothe1988localelections,whichweresupposedtobegovernedbythefirst-mentionedresolution.However,Res.No.1996tookeffectonlyonMarch3,1988,followingthelapseofsevendaysafteritspublicationasrequiredbyRANo.6646,otherwiseknownastheElectoralReformLawof1987,whichbecameeffectiveonJanuary5,1988.ItsSection30providesinpart:Sec.30.EffectivityofRegulationsandOrdersoftheCommission.—TherulesandregulationspromulgatedbytheCommissionshalltakeeffectontheseventhdayaftertheirpublicationintheOfficialGazetteorinatleast(2)dailynewspapersofgeneralcirculationinthePhilippines.TheCourthasconsideredtheargumentsofthepartiesandholdsthatthepetitionforquowarrantowasfiledontime.Weagreewiththerespondentsthatthefeewaspaidduringtheten-dayperiodasextendedbythependencyofthepetitionwhenitwastreatedbytheCOMELECasapre-proclamationproceedingwhichdidnotrequirethepaymentofafilingfee.Atthat,wereachthisconclusiononlyontheassumptionthattherequirementforthepaymentofthefeesinquowarrantoproceedingswasalreadyeffective.ThereisnorecordthatRes.No.1450wasevenpublished;andasforRes.No.1996,thistookeffectonlyonMarch3,1988,sevendaysafteritspublicationintheFebruary25,1988issuesoftheManilaChronicleandthePhilippineDailyInquirer,orafterthepetitionwasfiled.ThepetitionerforgetsTañ;adav.Tuvera4whenhearguesthattheresolutionsbecameeffective"immediatelyuponapproval"simplybecauseitwassoprovidedtherein.Weheldinthatcasethatpublicationwasstillnecessaryunderthedueprocessclausedespitesucheffectivityclause.Inanyevent,whatisimportantisthatthefilingfeewaspaid,andwhateverdelaytheremayhavebeenisnotimputabletotheprivaterespondent'sfaultorneglect.ItistruethatintheManchesterCase,werequiredthetimelypaymentofthefilingfeeasapreconditionforthetimelinessofthefilingofthecaseitself.InSunInsuranceOffice,Ltd.v.Asuncion,5howeverthisCourt,takingintoaccountthespecialcircumstancesofthatcase,declared:ThisCourtreiteratestherulethatthetrialcourtacquiresjurisdictionoveracaseonlyuponthepaymentoftheprescribedfilingfee.However,thecourtmayallowthepaymentofthesaidfeewithinareasonabletime.Intheeventofnon-compliancetherewith,thecaseshallbedismissed.ThesameideaisexpressedinRule42,Section18,oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedureadoptedonJune20,1988,thus:Sec.18.Non-paymentofprescribedfees.—Ifthefeesaboveprescribedarenotpaid,theCommissionmayrefusetotakeactionthereonuntiltheyarepaidandmaydismisstheactionortheproceeding.(Emphasissupplied.)TheCourtnotesthatwhilearguingthetechnicalpointthatthepetitionforquowarrantoshouldbedismissedforfailuretopaythefilingfeeontime,thepetitionerwouldatthesametimeminimizehisallegedlackofcitizenshipas"afutiletechnicality,"Itis

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regrettable,tosaytheleast,thattherequirementofcitizenshipasaqualificationforpublicofficecanbesodemeaned.Whatisworseisthatitisregardedasanevenlessimportantconsiderationthanthereglementaryperiodthepetitionerinsistsupon.Thismattershouldnormallyendhereasthesoleissueoriginallyraisedbythepetitioneristhetimelinessofthequowarrantoproceedingsagainsthim.However,ashiscitizenshipisthesubjectofthatproceeding,andconsideringthenecessityforanearlyresolutionofthatmoreimportantquestionclearlyandurgentlyaffectingthepublicinterest,weshalldirectlyaddressitnowinthissameaction.TheCourthassimilarlyactedinanotablenumberofcases,thus:Fromtheforegoingbriefstatementofthenatureoftheinstantcase,itwouldappearthatoursolefunctioninthisproceedingshouldbetoresolvethesingleissueofwhetherornottheCourtofAppealserredinrulingthatthemotionfornewtrialoftheGSISinquestionshouldindeedbedeemedproforma.Butgoingovertheextendedpleadingsofbothparties,theCourtisimmediatelyimpressedthatsubstantialjusticemaynotbetimelyachieved,ifweshoulddecidethiscaseuponsuchatechnicalgroundalone.Wehavecarefullyreadalltheallegationsandargumentsoftheparties,veryablyandcomprehensivelyexpoundedbyevidentlyknowledgeableandunusuallycompetentcounsel,andwefeelwecanbetterservetheinterestsofjusticebybroadeningthescopeofourinquiry,forastherecordbeforeusstands,weseethatthereisenoughbasisforustoendthebasiccontroversybetweenthepartieshereandnow,dispensing,however,withproceduralstepswhichwouldnotanywayaffectsubstantiallythemeritsoftheirrespectiveclaims.6xxxWhileitisthefaultofthepetitionerforappealingtothewrongcourtandtherebyallowingtheperiodforappealtolapse,themorecorrect procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to the proper court which was the Court of Appeals forappropriateaction.Considering,however,thelengthoftimethatthiscasehasbeenpending,weapplytheruleinthecaseofDelCastillov.Jaymalin,(112SCRA629)andfollowtheprincipleenunciatedinAlgerElectric,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,(135SCRA37)whichstates:...itisacherishedruleofprocedureforthisCourttoalwaysstrivetosettletheentirecontroversyinasingleproceedingleavingnorootorbranchtobeartheseedsoffuturelitigation.NousefulpurposewillbeservedifthiscaseisremandedtothetrialcourtonlytohaveitsdecisionraisedagaintotheIntermediateAppellateCourtandfromtheretothisCourt.(p.43)OnlyrecentlyinthecaseofBeautifont,Inc.,etal.v.CourtofAppeals,etal.(G.R.No.50141,January29,1988),westatedthat:...ButallthoserelevantfactsarenowbeforethisCourt.Andthosefactsdictatetherenditionofaverdictinthepetitioner'sfavor.ThereisthereforenopointinreferringthecasebacktotheCourtofAppeals.Thefactsandthelegalpropositionsinvolvedwillnotchange,norshouldtheultimatejudgment.Considerabletimehasalreadyelapsedand,toservetheendsofjustice,itistimethatthecontroversyisfinallylaidtorest.(SeeSottov.Samson,5SCRA733;Republicv.Paredes,108Phil.57;LiangaLumberCo.v.LiangaTimber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v.Mabilangan, 105Phil. 162).lâwphî1.ñètSoundpractice seeks to accommodate the theorywhich avoidswaste of time, effort andexpense,bothtothepartiesandthegovernment,nottospeakofdelayinthedisposalofthecase(cf.Fernandezv.Garcia,92Phil.592,597).Amarkedcharacteristicofourjudicialset-upisthatwherethedictatesofjusticesodemand...theSupremeCourtshouldact,andactwithfinality.'(LiSiuLiatv.Republic,21SCRA1039,1046,citingSamalv.CA,99Phil.230andU.S.v.Gimenez,34Phil.74).Inthiscase,thedictatesofjusticedodemandthatthisCourtact,andactwithfinality.7xxxRemandofthecasetothelowercourtforfurtherreceptionofevidenceisnotnecessarywherethecourtisinapositiontoresolvethedisputebasedontherecordsbeforeit.Onmanyoccasions,theCourt,inthepublicinterestandtheexpeditiousadministrationofjustice,hasresolvedactionsonthemeritsinsteadofremandingthemtothetrialcourtforfurtherproceedings,suchaswheretheendsofjusticewouldnotbesubservedbytheremandofthecaseorwhenpublicinterestdemandsanearlydispositionofthecaseorwherethetrialcourthadalreadyreceivedalltheevidenceoftheparties.8Thiscourseofactionbecomesallthemorejustifiedinthepresentcasewhere,torepeatforstress,itisclaimedthataforeignerisholdingapublicoffice.WealsonoteinhisReply,thepetitionersays:In adoptingprivate respondent's comment, respondentCOMELEC implicitly adopted as "its own"private respondent's repeatedassertionthatpetitionerisnolongeraFilipinocitizen.Insodoing,hasnotrespondentCOMELECeffectivelydisqualifieditself,byreasonofprejudgment,fromresolvingthepetitionforquowarrantofiledbyprivaterespondentstillpendingbeforeit?9ThisisstillanotherreasonwhytheCourthasseenfittoruledirectlyonthemeritsofthiscase.Goingovertherecord,wefindthattherearetwoadministrativedecisionsonthequestionofthepetitioner'scitizenship.ThefirstwasrenderedbytheCommissiononElectionsonMay12,1982,andfoundthepetitionertobeacitizenofthePhilippines.10ThesecondwasrenderedbytheCommissiononImmigrationandDeportationonSeptember13,1988,andheldthatthepetitionerwasnotacitizenofthePhilippines.11ThefirstdecisionwaspennedbythenCOMELECChigas,VicenteSantiago,Jr.,withCommissionersPabalateSavellanoandOpinionconcurring in full andCommissionerBacungan concurring in thedismissal of thepetition "withoutprejudice to the issueof therespondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while CommissionerFelipewasfordeferringdecisionuntilrepresentationsshallhavebeenmadewiththeAustralianEmbassyforofficialverificationofthepetitioner'sallegednaturalizationasanAustralian.TheseconddecisionwasunanimouslyrenderedbyChairmanMiriamDefensor-SantiagoandCommissionersAlanoandGeraldezof

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theCommissiononImmigrationandDeportation.ItisimportanttoobservethatintheproceedingbeforetheCOMELEC,therewasno direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which waseventuallyrejected,wasmerelyinferredfromthefactthathehadmarriedanAustraliancitizen,obtainedanAustralianpassport,andregisteredasanalienwiththeCIDuponhisreturntothiscountryin1980.Ontheotherhand,thedecisionoftheCIDtookintoaccounttheofficialstatementoftheAustralianGovernmentdatedAugust12,1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of hisnaturalizationin1976.Thatstatement12isreproducedinfullasfollows:I,GRAHAMCOLINWEST,ConsulofAustraliainthePhilippines,byvirtueofacertificateofappointmentsignedandsealedbytheAustralianMinisterofStateforForeignAffairson19October1983,andrecognizedassuchbyLetterofPatentsignedandsealedbythePhilippinesActingMinisterofForeignAffairson23November1983,doherebyprovidethefollowingstatementinresponsetothesubpoenaTestificandumdated9April1984inregardtothePetitionfordisqualificationagainstRAMONLABO,JR.YLOZANO(SPCNo.84-73),anddoherebycertifythatthestatementistrueandcorrect.STATEMENTA)RAMONLABO, JR.YLOZANO,dateofbirth23December1934,wasmarried inthePhilippinestoanAustraliancitizen.Asthespouse of anAustralian citizen, hewas not required tomeet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship andwas grantedAustraliancitizenshipbySydneyon28July1976.B)Anypersonovertheageof16yearswhoisgrantedAustraliancitizenshipmusttakeanoathofallegianceormakeanaffirmationofallegiance.Thewordingoftheoathofaffirmationis:"I ...,renouncingallotherallegiance..."etc.Thisneednotnecessarilyhaveanyeffectonhisformernationalityasthiswoulddependonthecitizenshiplawsofhisformercountry.C)ThemarriagewasdeclaredvoidintheAustralianFederalCourtinSydneyon27June1980onthegroundthatthemarriagehadbeenbigamous.D)AccordingtoourrecordsLABOisstillanAustraliancitizen.E) Should he return toAustralia, LABOmay face court action in respect of Section50 ofAustralianCitizenshipAct 1948whichrelatestothegivingoffalseormisleadinginformationofamaterialnatureinrespectofanapplicationforAustraliancitizenship.Ifsuchaprosecutionwassuccessful,hecouldbedeprivedofAustraliancitizenshipunderSection21oftheAct.F)TherearetwofurtherwaysinwhichLABOcoulddivesthimselfofAustraliancitizenship:(i)HecouldmakeadeclarationofRenunciationofAustraliancitizenshipunderSection18oftheAustralianCitizenshipAct,or(ii) If heacquiredanothernationality, (for example, Filipino)bya formal andvoluntaryactother thanmarriage, thenhewouldautomaticallyloseasAustraliancitizenshipunderSection17oftheAct.INWITNESSWHEREOF,IHAVEHEREUNTOSETMAYHANDANDSEALOFTHEAUSTRALIANEMBASSY,MANILA,THIS12thDAYOFAPRIL1984.DONEATMANILAINTHEPHILIPPINES.(Signed)GRAHAMC.WESTConsulThiswasaffirmedlaterbytheletterofFebruary1,1988,addressedtotheprivaterespondentbytheDepartmentofForeignAffairsreadingasfollows:13Sir:With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquirymadewith the Australian GovernmentthroughtheEmbassyofthePhilippinesinCanberrahaselicitedthefollowinginformation:1)ThatMr.RamonL.Labo,Jr.acquiredAustraliancitizenshipon28July1976.2)Thatpriorto17July1986,acandidateforAustraliancitizenshiphadtoeitherswearanoathofallegianceormakeanaffirmationofallegiancewhichcarriesarenunciationof"allotherallegiance.Verytrulyyours,FortheSecretaryofForeignAffairs:(SGD)RODOLFOSEVERINO,JR.AssistantSecretaryThedecisionalsonotedtheoathofallegiancetakenbyeverynaturalizedAustralianreadingasfollows:OATHOFALLEGIANCEI,A.B.,renouncingallotherallegiance,swearbyAlmightyGodthatIwillbefaithfulandbeartrueallegiancetoHerMajestyElizabeththeSecond,QueenofAustralia,Herheirsandsuccessorsaccordingtolaw,andthatIwillfaithfullyobservethelawsofAustraliaandfulfillmydutiesasanAustraliancitizen.14andtheAffirmationofAllegiance,whichdeclares:AFFIRMATIONOFALLEGIANCEI,A.B.,renouncingallotherallegiance,solemnlyandsincerelypromiseanddeclarethatIwillbefaithfulandbeartrueallegiancetoHerMajestyElizabeththeSecond,QueenofAustralia,Herheirsandsuccessorsaccordingtolaw,andthatIwillfaithfullyobservetheLawsofAustraliaandfulfillmydutiesasanAustraliancitizen.15Thepetitionerdoesnotquestiontheauthenticityoftheaboveevidence.NeitherdoeshedenythatheobtainedAustralianPassportNo.754705,whichheusedincomingbacktothePhilippinesin1980,whenhedeclaredbeforetheimmigrationauthoritiesthathewasanalienandregisteredassuchunderAlienCertificateofRegistrationNo.B-323985.16He laterasked for thechangeofhisstatusfromimmigranttoareturningformerPhilippinecitizenandwasgrantedImmigrantCertificateofResidenceNo.223809.17HealsocategoricallydeclaredthathewasacitizenofAustraliainanumberofswornstatementsvoluntarilymadebyhimand.evensoughttoavoidthejurisdictionofthebarangaycourtonthegroundthathewasaforeigner.18The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of hiscitizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all themembers joined in this finding.We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The

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petitionerisnotanunletteredpersonwhowasnotawareoftheconsequencesofhisacts,letalonethefactthathewasassistedbycounselwhenheperformedtheseacts.TheprivaterespondentquestionsthemotivesoftheCOMELECatthattimeandstressesLabo'spoliticalaffiliationwiththepartyinpowerthen,butweneednotgointothatnow.There is also the claim that thedecision canno longerbe reversedbecauseof thedoctrineof res judicata, but this toomustbedismissed.Thisdoctrinedoesnotapplytoquestionsofcitizenship,astheCourthasruledinseveralcases.19Moreover,itdoesnotappearthatitwasproperlyandseasonablypleaded,inamotiontodismissorintheanswer,havingbeeninvokedonlywhenthepetitioner filedhis reply20 to theprivate respondent's comment.Besides,oneof therequisitesofresjudicata, towit, identityofparties,isnotpresentinthiscase.The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippinecitizenship is irrelevant. There is no claimor finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of thatmarriage.Hebecame a citizen of Australia because hewas naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his casebecausehewasmarried to anAustralian citizen.As a condition for suchnaturalization, he formally took theOathofAllegianceand/ormadetheAffirmationofAllegiance,bothquotedabove.Renouncingallotherallegiance,heswore"tobefaithfulandbeartrueallegiancetoHerMajestyElizabeththeSecond,QueenofAustralia..."andtofulfillhisduties"asanAustraliancitizen."ThepetitionernowclaimsthathisnaturalizationinAustraliamadehimatworstonlyadualnationalanddidnotdivesthimofhisPhilippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CANo. 63,which enumerates themodes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) expressrenunciationofcitizenship;and(3)subscribingtoanoathofallegiancetosupporttheConstitutionorlawsofaforeigncountry,allofwhich are applicable to the petitioner. It is alsoworthmentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of thepresentConstitution,"Dualallegianceofcitizensisinimicaltothenationalinterestandshallbedealtwithbylaw."Evenifitbeassumedthat,asthepetitionerasserts,hisnaturalizationinAustraliawasannulledafteritwasfoundthathismarriageto the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. HisdivestitureofAustralian citizenshipdoesnot concernushere.That is amatterbetweenhimandhis adopted country.Whatwemustconsider is the fact thathevoluntarilyandfreelyrejectedPhilippinecitizenshipandwillinglyandknowinglyembracedthecitizenshipofa foreigncountry.ThepossibilitythathemayhavebeensubsequentlyrejectedbyAustralia,asheclaims,doesnotmeanthathehasbeenautomaticallyreinstatedasacitizenofthePhilippines.UnderCANo.63asamendedbyPDNo.725,PhilippinecitizenshipmaybereacquiredbydirectactofCongress,bynaturalization,orbyrepatriation.Itdoesnotappearintherecord,nordoesthepetitionerclaim,thathehasreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipbyanyof these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippinecitizenshipuponhim.NeitherhasheshownthathehascompliedwithPDNo.725,providingthat:...(2)natural-bornFilipinoswhohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipmayreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipthroughrepatriationbyapplying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications areapproved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to havereacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate ofregistration.(Emphasissupplied.)ThatiswhytheCommissiononImmigrationandDeportationrejectedhisapplicationforthecancellationofhisaliencertificateofregistration.AndthatisalsothereasonwemustdenyhispresentclaimforrecognitionasacitizenofthePhilippines.Thepetitionerisnotnow,norwasheonthedayofthelocalelectionsonJanuary18,1988,acitizenofthePhilippines.Infact,hewasnotevenaqualifiedvoterundertheConstitutionitselfbecauseofhisalienage.21HewasthereforeineligibleasacandidateformayorofBaguioCity,underSection42oftheLocalGovernmentCodeprovidinginmaterialpartasfollows:Sec.42.Qualifications.—AnelectivelocalofficialmustbeacitizenofthePhilippines,atleasttwenty-threeyearsofageonelectionday,aqualifiedvoterregisteredassuchinthebarangay,municipality,cityorprovincewhereheproposestobeelected,aresidentthereinforatleastoneyearatthetimeofthefilingofhiscertificateofcandidacy,andabletoreadandwriteEnglish,Filipino,oranyotherlocallanguageordialect.Thepetitionerarguesthathisallegedlackofcitizenshipisa"futiletechnicality"thatshouldnotfrustratethewilloftheelectorateofBaguioCity,whoelectedhimbya"resonantandthunderousmajority."Tobeaccurate,itwasnotasloudasallthat,forhisleadoverthesecond-placerwasonlyabout2,100votes.Inanyevent,thepeopleofthatlocalitycouldnothave,evenunanimously,changedtherequirementsoftheLocalGovernmentCodeandtheConstitution.TheelectoratehadnopowertopermitaforeignerowinghistotalallegiancetotheQueenofAustralia,oratleastastatelessindividualowingnoallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippines,topresideoverthemasmayoroftheircity.OnlycitizensofthePhilippineshavethatprivilegeovertheircountrymen.The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified onlystrengthens theconclusion that the resultsof theelectioncannotnullify thequalifications for theofficenowheldbyhim.Thesequalificationsarecontinuingrequirements;onceanyofthemislostduringincumbency,titletotheofficeitselfisdeemedforfeited.Inthecaseatbar,thecitizenshipandvotingrequirementswerenotsubsequentlylostbutwerenotpossessedatallinthefirstplaceon thedayof the election.Thepetitionerwasdisqualified fromrunningasmayor and, althoughelected, isnotnowqualified toserveassuch.Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace thepetitionerasmayor.Hecannot.Thesimplereasonisthatasheobtainedonlythesecondhighestnumberofvotesintheelection,he

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wasobviouslynotthechoiceofthepeopleofBaguiocity.ThelatestrulingoftheCourtonthisissueisSantosv.CommissiononElections22decidedin1985.Inthatcase,thecandidatewhoplacedsecondwasproclaimedelectedafter thevotes forhiswinningrival,whowasdisqualifiedasa turncoatandconsideredanon-candidate,were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placerwon by default. That decisionwas supported by eightmembersoftheCourtthen23withthreedissenting24andanothertworeservingtheirvote.25Onewasonofficialleave.26Re-examiningthatdecision,theCourtfinds,andsoholds,thatitshouldbereversedinfavoroftheearliercaseofGeronimov.Ramos,27Which represents themore logical and democratic rule. That case,which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 inTopaciovs.Paredes28wassupportedbytenmembersoftheCourt29withoutanydissent,althoughonereservedhisvote,30anothertooknopart31andtwootherswereonleave.32TheretheCourtheld:...itwouldbeextremelyrepugnanttothebasicconceptoftheconstitutionallyguaranteedrighttosuffrageifacandidatewhohasnot acquired themajority or plurality of votes is proclaimed awinner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, themajorityofwhichhavepositivelydeclaredthroughtheirballotsthattheydonotchoosehim.Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by thosewho have received the highest number of votes cast in theelectionforthatoffice,anditisafundamentalIdeainallrepublicanformsofgovernmentthatnoonecanbedeclaredelectedandnomeasurecanbedeclaredcarriedunlessheoritreceivesamajorityorpluralityofthelegalvotescastintheelection.(20CorpusJuris2nd,S243,p.676.)Thefactthatthecandidatewhoobtainedthehighestnumberofvotesislaterdeclaredtobedisqualifiedornoteligiblefortheofficetowhichhewaselecteddoesnotnecessarilyentitlethecandidatewhoobtainedthesecondhighestnumberofvotestobedeclaredthewinneroftheelectiveoffice.Thevotescastforadead,disqualified,ornon-eligiblepersonmaynotbevalidtovotethewinnerinto office ormaintain him there. However, in the absence of a statutewhich clearly asserts a contrary political and legislativepolicyonthematter,ifthevoteswerecastinthesincerebeliefthatthecandidatewasalive,qualified,oreligible,theyshouldnotbetreatedasstray,voidormeaningless.ItremainstostressthatthecitizenofthePhilippinesmusttakeprideinhisstatusassuchandcherishthispricelessgiftthat,outofmore than a hundred other nationalities, Godhas seen fit to grant him.Having been so endowed, hemust not lightly yield thispreciousadvantage,rejectingitforanotherlandthatmayofferhimmaterialandotherattractionsthathemaynotfindinhisowncountry. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a statewithmoreallurementsforhim.33Buthavingdoneso,hecannotexpecttobewelcomedbackwithopenarmsoncehistasteforhisadoptedcountryturnssourorheishimselfdisownedbyitasanundesirablealien.Philippinecitizenshipisnotacheapcommoditythatcanbeeasilyrecoveredafteritsrenunciation.Itmayberestoredonlyafterthereturningrenegademakesaformalactofre-dedicationtothecountryhehasabjuredandhesolemnlyaffirmsonceagainhistotalandexclusiveloyaltytotheRepublicofthePhilippines.Thismaynotbeaccomplishedbyelectiontopublicoffice.WHEREFORE,petitionerRamonJ.Labo, Jr. isherebydeclaredNOTacitizenofthePhilippinesandthereforeDISQUALIFIEDfromcontinuingtoserveasMayorofBaguioCity.HeisorderedtoVACATEhisofficeandsurrenderthesametotheVice-MayorofBaguioCity,oncethisdecisionbecomesfinalandexecutory.ThetemporaryrestrainingorderdatedJanuary31,1989,isLIFTED.Fernan, (C.J.),Narvasa,Melencio-Herrera,Paras,Feliciano,Gancayco,Padilla,Bidin,Sarmiento,Cortes,Griñ;o-AquinoMedialdeaandRegalado,JJ.,concur.SeparateOpinionsGUTTIERREZ,JR.,J.,concurring:As in the case of Frivaldo v. CommissiononElections (G. R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989) and inspire of whatwould otherwise beinsuperableproceduralobstacles, I amconstrained toconcur in theCourt'sdecisionso forcefullyand felicitouslywrittenbyMr.JusticeIsaganiA.Cruz.IdosobecauseIcannotseehowtheCourtcancountenanceacitizenofaforeigncountryoronewhohasrenouncedFilipinocitizenshipsittingasthemayorofoneofthemostimportantcitiesinthePhilippines.Whatwas raised to the Courtwas only the issue of the COMELEC's jurisdiction to inquire into the citizenship of the petitioner.Ordinarily,wewould have limited ourselves to sustaining the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the case for furtherproceedings and the rendition of a decision. Under Section 7, Article IXA of the Constitution, a decision, order, or ruling of theCOMELECmay be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved partywithin thirty day from receipt of a copythereof.Nodecisiononthepetitioner'scitizenshiphasbeenrenderedandnodecisioncan,asyet,beelevatedtousforreview.I,therefore,reiteratemystatementinFrivaldothatmyconcurrenceislimitedonlytocasesinvolvingcitizenshipanddisloyaltybutnottoanyofthemanyothergroundsfordisqualificationcitedinmyconcurringopinion.OurdecisiontodisqualifythepetitionerisparticularlydistressingtomebecauseIamimpressedbythesingularachievementsinthebeautificationofBaguioCity,inthepeaceandordersituation,andintheresurgenceofcivicpridesovisibletoanyonewhohasgoneuptoBaguiosinceMr.Laboassumedthemayorship.However,Iseenootherwaythiscasecanberesolvedexceptbyadoptingapragmaticapproach.Itisbeyonddisputethatanon-citizencannotbethemayorofBaguioCity.IjointherestoftheCourt.Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griñ;o-AquinoMedialdea andRegalado,JJ.,concur.

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SeparateOpinionsGUTTIERREZ,JR.,J.,concurring:AsinthecaseofFrivaldov.CommissiononElections(G.R.No.87193,June23,1989)andinspireofwhatwouldotherwisebeinsuperableproceduralobstacles,IamconstrainedtoconcurintheCourt'sdecisionsoforcefullyandfelicitouslywrittenbyMr.JusticeIsaganiA.Cruz.IdosobecauseIcannotseehowtheCourtcancountenanceacitizenofaforeigncountryoronewhohasrenouncedFilipinocitizenshipsittingasthemayorofoneofthemostimportantcitiesinthePhilippines.WhatwasraisedtotheCourtwasonlytheissueoftheCOMELEC'sjurisdictiontoinquireintothecitizenshipofthepetitioner.Ordinarily,wewouldhavelimitedourselvestosustainingthejurisdictionoftheCOMELECandremandingthecaseforfurtherproceedingsandtherenditionofadecision.UnderSection7,ArticleIXAoftheConstitution,adecision,order,orrulingoftheCOMELECmaybebroughttotheSupremeCourtoncertioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydayfromreceiptofacopythereof.Nodecisiononthepetitioner'scitizenshiphasbeenrenderedandnodecisioncan,asyet,beelevatedtousforreview.I,therefore,reiteratemystatementinFrivaldothatmyconcurrenceislimitedonlytocasesinvolvingcitizenshipanddisloyaltybutnottoanyofthemanyothergroundsfordisqualificationcitedinmyconcurringopinion.OurdecisiontodisqualifythepetitionerisparticularlydistressingtomebecauseIamimpressedbythesingularachievementsinthebeautificationofBaguioCity,inthepeaceandordersituation,andintheresurgenceofcivicpridesovisibletoanyonewhohasgoneuptoBaguiosinceMr.Laboassumedthemayorship.However,Iseenootherwaythiscasecanberesolvedexceptbyadoptingapragmaticapproach.Itisbeyonddisputethatanon-citizencannotbethemayorofBaguioCity.IjointherestoftheCourt.G.R.No.181613November25,2009ROSALINDAA.PENERA,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONSandEDGART.ANDANAR,Respondents.

RESOLUTIONCARPIO,J.:WegrantRosalindaA.Penera’s(Penera)motionforreconsiderationofthisCourt’sDecisionof11September2009(Decision).TheassailedDecisiondismissedPenera’spetitionandaffirmedtheResolutiondated30July2008oftheCOMELECEnBancaswellastheResolutiondated24July2007oftheCOMELECSecondDivision.TheDecisiondisqualifiedPenerafromrunningfortheofficeofMayorinSta.Monica,SurigaodelNorteanddeclaredthattheVice-MayorshouldsucceedPenera.Insupportofhermotionforreconsideration,Penerasubmitsthefollowingarguments:1.PenerawasnotyetacandidateatthetimeoftheincidentunderSection11ofRA8436asamendedbySection13ofRA9369.2.ThepetitionfordisqualificationfailedtosubmitconvincingandsubstantialevidenceagainstPeneraforviolationofSection80oftheOmnibusElectionCode.3.Peneraneveradmittedtheallegationsofthepetitionfordisqualificationandhasconsistentlydisputedthechargeofprematurecampaigning.4.TheadmissionthatPeneraparticipatedinamotorcadeisnotthesameasadmittingsheengagedinprematureelectioncampaigning.Section79(a)oftheOmnibusElectionCodedefinesa"candidate"as"anypersonaspiringfororseekinganelectivepublicoffice,whohasfiledacertificateofcandidacyxxx."Thesecondsentence,thirdparagraph,Section15ofRA8436,asamendedbySection13ofRA9369,providesthat"[a]nypersonwhofileshiscertificateofcandidacywithin[theperiodforfiling]shallonlybeconsideredasacandidateatthestartofthecampaignperiodforwhichhefiledhiscertificateofcandidacy."Theimmediatelysucceedingprovisointhesamethirdparagraphstatesthat"unlawfulactsoromissionsapplicabletoacandidateshalltakeeffectonlyuponthestartoftheaforesaidcampaignperiod."Thesetwoprovisionsdeterminetheresolutionofthiscase.TheDecisionstatesthat"[w]henthecampaignperiodstartsand[thepersonwhofiledhiscertificateofcandidacy]proceedswithhis/hercandidacy,his/herintentturningintoactuality,wecanalreadyconsiderhis/heracts,afterthefilingofhis/herCOCandpriortothecampaignperiod,asthepromotionofhis/herelectionasacandidate,hence,constitutingprematurecampaigning,forwhichhe/shemaybedisqualified."1UndertheDecision,acandidatemayalreadybeliableforprematurecampaigningafterthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacybutevenbeforethestartofthecampaignperiod.Fromthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacy,evenlongbeforethestartofthecampaignperiod,theDecisionconsidersthepartisanpoliticalactsofapersonsofilingacertificateofcandidacy"asthepromotionofhis/herelectionasacandidate."Thus,suchpersoncanbedisqualifiedforprematurecampaigningforactsdonebeforethestartofthecampaignperiod.Inshort,theDecisionconsidersapersonwhofilesacertificateofcandidacyalreadya"candidate"evenbeforethestartofthecampaignperiod.lawphilTheassailedDecisioniscontrarytotheclearintentandletterofthelaw.TheDecisionreversesLanotv.COMELEC,2whichheldthatapersonwhofilesacertificateofcandidacyisnotacandidateuntilthestartofthecampaignperiod.InLanot,thisCourtexplained:Thus,theessentialelementsforviolationofSection80oftheOmnibusElectionCodeare:(1)apersonengagesinanelectioncampaignorpartisanpoliticalactivity;(2)theactisdesignedtopromotetheelectionordefeatofaparticularcandidateorcandidates;(3)theactisdoneoutsidethecampaignperiod.

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Thesecondelementrequirestheexistenceofa"candidate."UnderSection79(a),acandidateisonewho"hasfiledacertificateofcandidacy"toanelectivepublicoffice.Unlessonehasfiledhiscertificateofcandidacy,heisnota"candidate."Thethirdelementrequiresthatthecampaignperiodhasnotstartedwhentheelectioncampaignorpartisanpoliticalactivityiscommitted.Assumingthatallcandidatestoapublicofficefiletheircertificatesofcandidacyonthelastday,whichunderSection75oftheOmnibusElectionCodeisthedaybeforethestartofthecampaignperiod,thennoonecanbeprosecutedforviolationofSection80foractsdonepriortosuchlastday.Beforesuchlastday,thereisno"particularcandidateorcandidates"tocampaignfororagainst.Onthedayimmediatelyafterthelastdayoffiling,thecampaignperiodstartsandSection80ceasestoapplysinceSection80coversonlyactsdone"outside"thecampaignperiod.Thus,ifallcandidatesfiletheircertificatesofcandidacyonthelastday,Section80mayonlyapplytoactsdoneonsuchlastday,whichisbeforethestartofthecampaignperiodandafteratleastonecandidatehasfiledhiscertificateofcandidacy.Thisisperhapsthereasonwhythoserunningforelectivepublicofficeusuallyfiletheircertificatesofcandidacyonthelastdayorclosetothelastday.ThereisnodisputethatEusebio’sactsofelectioncampaigningorpartisanpoliticalactivitieswerecommittedoutsideofthecampaignperiod.TheonlyquestioniswhetherEusebio,whofiledhiscertificateofcandidacyon29December2003,wasa"candidate"whenhecommittedthoseactsbeforethestartofthecampaignperiodon24March2004.Section11ofRepublicActNo.8436("RA8436")movedthedeadlineforthefilingofcertificatesofcandidacyto120daysbeforeelectionday.Thus,theoriginaldeadlinewasmovedfrom23March2004to2January2004,or81daysearlier.Thecrucialquestionis:didthischangeinthedeadlineforfilingthecertificateofcandidacymakeonewhofiledhiscertificateofcandidacybefore2January2004immediatelyliableforviolationofSection80ifheengagedinelectioncampaignorpartisanpoliticalactivitiespriortothestartofthecampaignperiodon24March2004?Section11ofRA8436provides:SECTION11.OfficialBallot.–TheCommissionshallprescribethesizeandformoftheofficialballotwhichshallcontainthetitlesofthepositionstobefilledand/orthepropositionstobevoteduponinaninitiative,referendumorplebiscite.Undereachposition,thenamesofcandidatesshallbearrangedalphabeticallybysurnameanduniformlyprintedusingthesametypesize.AfixedspacewherethechairmanoftheBoardofElectionInspectorsshallaffixhis/hersignaturetoauthenticatetheofficialballotshallbeprovided.Bothsidesoftheballotsmaybeusedwhennecessary.Forthispurpose,thedeadlineforthefilingofcertificateofcandidacy/petitionforregistration/manifestationtoparticipateintheelectionshallnotbelaterthanonehundredtwenty(120)daysbeforetheelections:Provided,That,anyelectiveofficial,whethernationalorlocal,runningforanyofficeotherthantheonewhichhe/sheisholdinginapermanentcapacity,exceptforpresidentandvice-president,shallbedeemedresignedonlyuponthestartofthecampaignperiodcorrespondingtothepositionforwhichhe/sheisrunning:Provided,further,That,unlawfulactsoromissionsapplicabletoacandidateshalltakeeffectuponthestartoftheaforesaidcampaignperiod:Provided,finally,That,forpurposesoftheMay11,1998elections,thedeadlineforfilingofthecertificateofcandidacyforthepositionsofPresident,Vice-President,Senatorsandcandidatesundertheparty-listsystemaswellaspetitionsforregistrationand/ormanifestationtoparticipateintheparty-listsystemshallbeonFebruary9,1998whilethedeadlineforthefilingofcertificateofcandidacyforotherpositionsshallbeonMarch27,1998.TheofficialballotsshallbeprintedbytheNationalPrintingOfficeand/ortheBangkoSentralngPilipinasatthepricecomparablewiththatofprivateprintersunderpropersecuritymeasureswhichtheCommissionshalladopt.TheCommissionmaycontracttheservicesofprivateprintersuponcertificationbytheNationalPrintingOffice/BangkoSentralngPilipinasthatitcannotmeettheprintingrequirements.Accreditedpoliticalpartiesanddeputizedcitizens’armsoftheCommissionmayassignwatchersintheprinting,storageanddistributionofofficialballots.Topreventtheuseoffakeballots,theCommissionthroughtheCommitteeshallensurethattheserialnumberontheballotstubshallbeprintedinmagneticinkthatshallbeeasilydetectablebyinexpensivehardwareandshallbeimpossibletoreproduceonaphotocopyingmachine,andthatidentificationmarks,magneticstrips,barcodesandothertechnicalandsecuritymarkings,areprovidedontheballot.Theofficialballotsshallbeprintedanddistributedtoeachcity/municipalityattherateofone(1)ballotforeveryregisteredvoterwithaprovisionofadditionalfour(4)ballotsperprecinct.UnderSection11ofRA8436,theonlypurposefortheearlyfilingofcertificatesofcandidacyistogiveampletimefortheprintingofofficialballots.ThisisclearfromthefollowingdeliberationsoftheBicameralConferenceCommittee:SENATORGONZALES.Okay.Then,howaboutthecampaignperiod,woulditbethesame[,]uniformforlocalandnationalofficials?THECHAIRMAN(REP.TANJUATCO).Personally,Iwouldagreetoretainingitatthepresentperiods.SENATORGONZALES.Butthemomentonefilesacertificateofcandidacy,he’salreadyacandidate,andtherearemanyprohibitedactsonthepartofcandidate.THECHAIRMAN(REP.TANJUATCO).Unlesswe....SENATORGONZALES.Andyoucannotsaythatthecampaignperiodhasnotyetbegan(sic).THECHAIRMAN(REP.TANJUATCO).Ifwedon’tprovidethatthefilingofthecertificatewillnotbringaboutone’sbeingacandidate.SENATORGONZALES.Ifthat’safact,thelawcannotchangeafact.THECHAIRMAN(REP.TANJUATCO).No,butifwecanprovidethatthefilingofthecertificateofcandidacywillnotresultinthatofficialvacatinghisposition,wecanalsoprovidethatinsofarheisconcerned,electionperiodorhisbeingacandidatewillnotyet

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commence.Becausehere,thereasonwhywearedoinganearlyfilingistoaffordenoughtimetopreparethismachinereadableballots.So,withthemanifestationsfromtheCommissiononElections,Mr.Chairman,theHousePanelwillwithdrawitsproposalandwillagreetothe120-dayperiodprovidedintheSenateversion.THECHAIRMAN(SENATORFERNAN).Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.xxxxSENATORGONZALES.Howaboutprohibitionagainstcampaigningordoingpartisanactswhichapplyimmediatelyuponbeingacandidate?THECHAIRMAN(REP.TANJUATCO).Again,sincetheintentionofthisprovisionisjusttoaffordtheComelecenoughtimetoprinttheballots,thisprovisiondoesnotintendtochangethecampaignperiodsaspresently,orratherelectionperiodsaspresentlyfixedbyexistinglaw.THEACTINGCHAIRMAN(SEN.FERNAN).So,itshouldbesubjecttotheotherprohibition.THECHAIRMAN(REP.TANJUATCO).That’sright.THEACTINGCHAIRMAN(SEN.FERNAN).Okay.THECHAIRMAN(REP.TANJUATCO).Inotherwords,actually,therewouldbenoconflictanymorebecausewearetalkingaboutthe120-dayperiodbeforeelectionasthelastdayoffilingacertificateofcandidacy,electionperiodstarts120daysalso.Sothatiselectionperiodalready.Buthewillstillnotbeconsideredasacandidate.Thus,becauseoftheearlydeadlineof2January2004forpurposesofprintingofofficialballots,Eusebiofiledhiscertificateofcandidacyon29December2003.Congress,however,neverintendedthefilingofacertificateofcandidacybefore2January2004tomakethepersonfilingtobecomeimmediatelya"candidate"forpurposesotherthantheprintingofballots.ThislegislativeintentpreventstheimmediateapplicationofSection80oftheOmnibusElectionCodetothosefilingtomeettheearlydeadline.TheclearintentionofCongresswastopreservethe"electionperiodsasxxxfixedbyexistinglaw"priortoRA8436andthatonewhofilestomeettheearlydeadline"willstillnotbeconsideredasacandidate."3(Emphasisintheoriginal)Lanotwasdecidedonthegroundthatonewhofilesacertificateofcandidacyisnotacandidateuntilthestartofthecampaignperiod.ThisgroundwasbasedonthedeliberationsofthelegislatorswhoexplainedtheintentoftheprovisionsofRA8436,whichlaidthelegalframeworkforanautomatedelectionsystem.TherewasnoexpressprovisionintheoriginalRA8436statingthatonewhofilesacertificateofcandidacyisnotacandidateuntilthestartofthecampaignperiod.WhenCongressamendedRA8436,CongressdecidedtoexpresslyincorporatetheLanotdoctrineintolaw,realizingthatLanotmerelyreliedonthedeliberationsofCongressinholdingthat—TheclearintentionofCongresswastopreservethe"electionperiodsasxxxfixedbyexistinglaw"priortoRA8436andthatonewhofilestomeettheearlydeadline"willstillnotbeconsideredasacandidate."4(Emphasissupplied)Congresswantedtoinsurethatnopersonfilingacertificateofcandidacyundertheearlydeadlinerequiredbytheautomatedelectionsystemwouldbedisqualifiedorpenalizedforanypartisanpoliticalactdonebeforethestartofthecampaignperiod.Thus,inenactingRA9369,CongressexpresslywrotetheLanotdoctrineintothesecondsentence,thirdparagraphoftheamendedSection15ofRA8436,thus:xxxForthispurpose,theCommissionshallsetthedeadlineforthefilingofcertificateofcandidacy/petitionforregistration/manifestationtoparticipateintheelection.Anypersonwhofileshiscertificateofcandidacywithinthisperiodshallonlybeconsideredasacandidateatthestartofthecampaignperiodforwhichhefiledhiscertificateofcandidacy:Provided,That,unlawfulactsoromissionsapplicabletoacandidateshalltakeeffectonlyuponthestartoftheaforesaidcampaignperiod:Provided,finally,Thatanypersonholdingapublicappointiveofficeorposition,includingactivemembersofthearmedforces,andofficersandemployeesingovernment-ownedor-controlledcorporations,shallbeconsideredipsofactoresignedfromhis/herofficeandmustvacatethesameatthestartofthedayofthefilingofhis/hercertificateofcandidacy.(Boldfacingandunderliningsupplied)CongresselevatedtheLanotdoctrineintoastatutebyspecificallyinsertingitasthesecondsentenceofthethirdparagraphoftheamendedSection15ofRA8436,whichcannotbeannulledbythisCourtexceptonthesolegroundofitsunconstitutionality.TheDecisioncannotreverseLanotwithoutrepealingthissecondsentence,becausetoreverseLanotwouldmeanrepealingthissecondsentence.TheassailedDecision,however,inreversingLanotdoesnotclaimthatthissecondsentenceoranyportionofSection15ofRA8436,asamendedbyRA9369,isunconstitutional.Infact,theDecisionconsiderstheentireSection15goodlaw.Thus,theDecisionisself-contradictory—reversingLanotbutmaintainingtheconstitutionalityofthesecondsentence,whichembodiestheLanotdoctrine.Insodoing,theDecisionisirreconcilablyinconflictwiththeclearintentandletterofthesecondsentence,thirdparagraph,Section15ofRA8436,asamendedbyRA9369.InenactingRA9369,CongressevenfurtherclarifiedthefirstprovisointhethirdparagraphofSection15ofRA8436.TheoriginalprovisioninRA8436states—xxxProvided,further,That,unlawfulactsoromissionsapplicabletoacandidateshalltakeeffectuponthestartoftheaforesaidcampaignperiod,xxx.InRA9369,Congressinsertedtheword"only"sothatthefirstprovisonowreads—xxxProvided,That,unlawfulactsoromissionsapplicabletoacandidateshalltakeeffectonlyuponthestartoftheaforesaidcampaignperiodxxx.(Emphasissupplied)

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Thus,Congressnotonlyreiteratedbutalsostrengtheneditsmandatorydirectivethatelectionoffensescanbecommittedbyacandidate"only"uponthestartofthecampaignperiod.Thisclearlymeansthatbeforethestartofthecampaignperiod,suchelectionoffensescannotbesocommitted.WhentheapplicableprovisionsofRA8436,asamendedbyRA9369,arereadtogether,theseprovisionsoflawdonotconsiderPeneraacandidateforpurposesotherthantheprintingofballots,untilthestartofthecampaignperiod.Thereisabsolutelynoroomforanyotherinterpretation.WequotewithapprovaltheDissentingOpinionofJusticeAntonioT.Carpio:xxxThedefinitionofa"candidate"inSection79(a)oftheOmnibusElectionCodeshouldbereadtogetherwiththeamendedSection15ofRA8436.A"‘candidate’referstoanypersonaspiringfororseekinganelectivepublicoffice,whohasfiledacertificateofcandidacybyhimselforthroughanaccreditedpoliticalparty,aggroupmentorcoalitionofparties."However,itisnolongerenoughtomerelyfileacertificateofcandidacyforapersontobeconsideredacandidatebecause"anypersonwhofileshiscertificateofcandidacywithin[thefiling]periodshallonlybeconsideredacandidateatthestartofthecampaignperiodforwhichhefiledhiscertificateofcandidacy."Anypersonmaythusfileacertificateofcandidacyonanydaywithintheprescribedperiodforfilingacertificateofcandidacyyetthatpersonshallbeconsideredacandidate,forpurposesofdeterminingone’spossibleviolationsofelectionlaws,onlyduringthecampaignperiod.Indeed,thereisno"electioncampaign"or"partisanpoliticalactivity"designedtopromotetheelectionordefeatofaparticularcandidateorcandidatestopublicofficesimplybecausethereisno"candidate"tospeakofpriortothestartofthecampaignperiod.Therefore,despitethefilingofhercertificateofcandidacy,thelawdoesnotconsiderPeneraacandidateatthetimeofthequestionedmotorcadewhichwasconductedadaybeforethestartofthecampaignperiod.xxxThecampaignperiodforlocalofficialsbeganon30March2007andendedon12May2007.Penerafiledhercertificateofcandidacyon29March2007.Penerawasthusacandidateon29March2009onlyforpurposesofprintingtheballots.On29March2007,thelawstilldidnotconsiderPeneraacandidateforpurposesotherthantheprintingofballots.ActscommittedbyPenerapriorto30March2007,thedatewhenshebecamea"candidate,"evenifconstitutingelectioncampaigningorpartisanpoliticalactivities,arenotpunishableunderSection80oftheOmnibusElectionCode.Suchactsarewithintherealmofacitizen’sprotectedfreedomofexpression.ActscommittedbyPenerawithinthecampaignperiodarenotcoveredbySection80asSection80punishesonlyactsoutsidethecampaignperiod.5TheassailedDecisiongivesaspeciousreasoninexplainingawaythefirstprovisointhethirdparagraph,theamendedSection15ofRA8436thatelectionoffensesapplicabletocandidatestakeeffectonlyuponthestartofthecampaignperiod.TheDecisionstatesthat:xxx[T]helineinSection15ofRepublicActNo.8436,asamended,whichprovidesthat"anyunlawfulactoromissionapplicabletoacandidateshalltakeeffectonlyuponthestartofthecampaignperiod,"doesnotmeanthattheactsconstitutingprematurecampaigningcanonlybecommitted,forwhichtheoffendermaybedisqualified,duringthecampaignperiod.Contrarytothepronouncementinthedissent,nowhereinsaidprovisowasitstatedthatcampaigningbeforethestartofthecampaignperiodislawful,suchthattheoffendermayfreelycarryoutthesamewithimpunity.Aspreviouslyestablished,aperson,afterfilinghis/herCOCbutpriortohis/herbecomingacandidate(thus,priortothestartofthecampaignperiod),canalreadycommittheactsdescribedunderSection79(b)oftheOmnibusElectionCodeaselectioncampaignorpartisanpoliticalactivity,However,onlyaftersaidpersonofficiallybecomesacandidate,atthebeginningofthecampaignperiod,cansaidactsbegiveneffectasprematurecampaigningunderSection80oftheOmnibusElectionCode.Onlyaftersaidpersonofficiallybecomesacandidate,atthestartofthecampaignperiod,canhis/herdisqualificationbesoughtforactsconstitutingprematurecampaigning.Obviously,itisonlyatthestartofthecampaignperiod,whenthepersonofficiallybecomesacandidate,thattheundueandiniquitousadvantagesofhis/herprioracts,constitutingprematurecampaigning,shallaccruetohis/herbenefit.Comparedtotheothercandidateswhoareonlyabouttobegintheirelectioncampaign,acandidatewhohadpreviouslyengagedinprematurecampaigningalreadyenjoysanunfairheadstartinpromotinghis/hercandidacy.6(Emphasissupplied)Itisabasicprincipleoflawthatanyactislawfulunlessexpresslydeclaredunlawfulbylaw.Thisisspeciallytruetoexpressionorspeech,whichCongresscannotoutlawexceptonverynarrowgroundsinvolvingclear,presentandimminentdangertotheState.Themerefactthatthelawdoesnotdeclareanactunlawfulipsofactomeansthattheactislawful.Thus,thereisnoneedforCongresstodeclareinSection15ofRA8436,asamendedbyRA9369,thatpoliticalpartisanactivitiesbeforethestartofthecampaignperiodarelawful.ItissufficientforCongresstostatethat"anyunlawfulactoromissionapplicabletoacandidateshalltakeeffectonlyuponthestartofthecampaignperiod."Theonlyinescapableandlogicalresultisthatthesameacts,ifdonebeforethestartofthecampaignperiod,arelawful.Inlayman’slanguage,thismeansthatacandidateisliableforanelectionoffenseonlyforactsdoneduringthecampaignperiod,notbefore.Thelawisclearasdaylight—anyelectionoffensethatmaybecommittedbyacandidateunderanyelectionlawcannotbecommittedbeforethestartofthecampaignperiod.InrulingthatPeneraisliableforprematurecampaigningforpartisanpoliticalactsbeforethestartofthecampaigning,theassailedDecisionignorestheclearandexpressprovisionofthelaw.TheDecisionrationalizesthatacandidatewhocommitsprematurecampaigningcanbedisqualifiedorprosecutedonlyafterthestartofthecampaignperiod.Thisisnotwhatthelawsays.Whatthelawsaysis"anyunlawfulactoromissionapplicabletoacandidateshalltakeeffectonlyuponthestartofthecampaignperiod."Theplainmeaningofthisprovisionisthattheeffectivedatewhenpartisanpoliticalactsbecomeunlawfulastoacandidateiswhenthecampaignperiodstarts.Beforethestartofthecampaignperiod,thesamepartisanpoliticalactsarelawful.

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Thelawdoesnotstate,astheassailedDecisionasserts,thatpartisanpoliticalactsdonebyacandidatebeforethecampaignperiodareunlawful,butmaybeprosecutedonlyuponthestartofthecampaignperiod.Neitherdoesthelawstatethatpartisanpoliticalactsdonebyacandidatebeforethecampaignperiodaretemporarilylawful,butbecomesunlawfuluponthestartofthecampaignperiod.Thisisclearlynotthelanguageofthelaw.Besides,suchalawasenvisionedintheDecision,whichdefinesacriminalactandcurtailsfreedomofexpressionandspeech,wouldbevoidforvagueness.Congresshaslaiddownthelaw—acandidateisliableforelectionoffensesonlyuponthestartofthecampaignperiod.ThisCourthasnopowertoignoretheclearandexpressmandateofthelawthat"anypersonwhofileshiscertificateofcandidacywithin[thefiling]periodshallonlybeconsideredacandidateatthestartofthecampaignperiodforwhichhefiledhiscertificateofcandidacy."NeithercanthisCourtturnablindeyetotheexpressandclearlanguageofthelawthat"anyunlawfulactoromissionapplicabletoacandidateshalltakeeffectonlyuponthestartofthecampaignperiod."Theforumforexaminingthewisdomofthelaw,andenactingremedialmeasures,isnotthisCourtbuttheLegislature.ThisCourthasnorecoursebuttoapplyalawthatisasclear,conciseandexpressasthesecondsentence,anditsimmediatelysucceedingproviso,aswritteninthethirdparagraphofSection15ofRA8436,asamendedbyRA9369.WHEREFORE,weGRANTpetitionerRosalindaA.Penera’sMotionforReconsideration.WeSETASIDEtheDecisionofthisCourtinG.R.No.181613promulgatedon11September2009,aswellastheResolutionsdated24July2007and30January2008oftheCOMELECSecondDivisionandtheCOMELECEnBanc,respectively,inSPANo.07-224.RosalindaA.PenerashallcontinueasMayorofSta.Monica,SurigaodelNorte.SOORDERED.G.R.No.147589June26,2001ANGBAGONGBAYANI-OFWLABORPARTY(undertheacronymOFW),representedhereinbyitssecretary-general,MOHAMMADOMARFAJARDO,petitioner,vs.ANGBAGONGBAYANI-OFWLABORPARTYGO!GO!PHILIPPINES;THETRUEMARCOSLOYALISTASSOCIATIONOFTHEPHILIPPINES;PHILIPPINELOCALAUTONOMY;CITIZENSMOVEMENTFORJUSTICE,ECONOMY,ENVIRONMENTANDPEACE;CHAMBEROFREALESTATEBUILDERSASSOCIATION;SPORTS&HEALTHADVANCEMENTFOUNDATION,INC.;ANGLAKASNGOVERSEASCONTRACTWORKERS(OCW);BAGONGBAYANIORGANIZATIONandothersunder"Organizations/Coalitions"ofOmnibusResolutionNo.3785;PARTIDONGMASANGPILIPINO;LAKASNUCD-UMDP;NATIONALISTPEOPLE'SCOALITION;LABANNGDEMOKRATIKONGPILIPINO;AKSYONDEMOKRATIKO;PDP-LABAN;LIBERALPARTY;NACIONALISTAPARTY;ANGBUHAYHAYAANGYUMABONG;andothersunder"PoliticalParties"ofOmnibusResolutionNo.3785.respondents.x---------------------------------------------------------xG.R.No.147613June26,2001BAYANMUNA,petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS;NATIONALISTPEOPLE'SCOALITION(NPC);LABANNGDEMOKRATIKONGPILIPINO(LDP);PARTIDONGMASANGPILIPINO(PMP);LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP;LIBERALPARTY;MAMAMAYANGAYAWSADROGA;CREBA;NATIONALFEDERATIONOFSUGARCANEPLANTERS;JEEP;andBAGONGBAYANIORGANIZATION,respondents.PANGANIBAN,J.:Theparty-listsystemisasocialjusticetooldesignednotonlytogivemorelawtothegreatmassesofourpeoplewhohavelessinlife,butalsotoenablethemtobecomeveritablelawmakersthemselves,empoweredtoparticipatedirectlyintheenactmentoflawsdesignedtobenefitthem.ItintendstomakethemarginalizedandtheunderrepresentednotmerelypassiverecipientsoftheState'sbenevolence, but active participants in themainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups,including thosewhichnowdominatedistrict elections, tohave the sameopportunity toparticipate inparty-list electionswoulddesecratethisloftyobjectiveandmongrelizethesocialjusticemechanismintoanatrociousveneerfortraditionalpolitics.TheCaseBefore us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by theCommission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations andparties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of privaterespondents, arguingmainly that the party-list systemwas intended to benefit themarginalized andunderrepresented; not themainstreampoliticalparties,thenon-marginalizedoroverrepresented.TheFactualAntecedentsWiththeonsetofthe2001elections,theComelecreceivedseveralPetitionsforregistrationfiledbysectoralparties,organizationsand political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties andorganizationsandhearingswerescheduleddayandnightuntilthelastpartyw[as]heard.Withthenumberofthesepetitionsandtheobservanceofthelegalandproceduralrequirements,reviewofthesepetitionsaswellasdeliberationstakesalongerprocessinorder to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individualresolutiononpoliticalparties.Thesenumerouspetitionsandprocessesobservedinthedispositionofthesepetition[s]hinderthe

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earlyreleaseoftheOmnibusResolutionsoftheDivisionswhichwerepromulgatedonlyon10February2001."2Thereafter,beforetheFebruary12,2001deadlineprescribedunderComelecResolutionNo.3426datedDecember22,2000,theregistered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-listelections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions forReconsideration,togetherwithManifestationsoftheirintenttoparticipateintheparty-listelections.StillotherregisteredpartiesfiledtheirManifestationsbeyondthedeadline.TheComelecgaveduecourseorapprovedtheManifestations(oraccreditations)of154partiesandorganizations,butdeniedthoseofseveralothersinitsassailedMarch26,2001OmnibusResolutionNo.3785,whichwequote:"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme willencouragemulti-partisan[sic]andenhancetheinabilityofsmall,neworsectoralpartiesororganizationtodirectlyparticipateinthiselectoralwindow."It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election ofrepresentativestotheHouseofRepresentativesfromnational,regional,andsectoralpartiesororganizationsorcoalitionsthereofregisteredwiththeCommissiononElections."However,inthecourseofourreviewofthemattersatbar,wemustrecognizethefactthatthereisaneedtokeepthenumberofsectoralparties,organizationsandcoalitions,downtoamanageable level,keepingonlythosewhosubstantiallycomplywiththerulesandregulationsandmoreimportantlythesufficiencyoftheManifestationsorevidenceontheMotionsforReconsiderationsorOppositions."3OnApril10,2001,AkbayanCitizensActionParty filedbefore theComelecaPetitionpraying that "thenamesof [someofhereinrespondents]bedeleted fromthe 'CertifiedListofPoliticalParties/SectoralParties/Organizations/CoalitionsParticipating in theParty List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as analternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not beproclaimed.4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration andNominationagainstsomeofhereinrespondents.5OnApril18,2001,theComelecrequiredtherespondentsinthetwodisqualificationcasestofileCommentswithinthreedaysfromnotice.ItalsosetthedateforhearingonApril26,2001,6butsubsequentlyresetittoMay3,2001.7Duringthehearing,however,CommissionerRalphC.Lantionmerelydirectedthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivememoranda.8Meanwhile,dissatisfiedwiththepaceof theComelec,AngBagongBayani-OFWLaborParty filedaPetition9beforethisCourtonApril16,2001.ThisPetition,docketedasGRNo.147589,assailedComelecOmnibusResolutionNo.3785.InitsResolutiondatedApril 17, 2001,10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petitionwithin a non-extendible period of five days fromnotice.11OnApril 17, 2001,PetitionerBayanMunaalso filedbefore thisCourt aPetition,12 docketed asGRNo. 147613, also challengingComelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution datedMay 9, 2001,13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the twoPetitionsbeforeit;directedrespondentsnamedinthesecondPetitiontofiletheirrespectiveCommentsonorbeforenoonofMay15,2001;andcalledthepartiestoanOralArgumentonMay17,2001.ItaddedthattheComelecmayproceedwiththecountingandcanvassingofvotescastfortheparty-listelections,butbarredtheproclamationofanywinnertherein,untilfurtherordersoftheCourt.Thereafter,Comments14onthesecondPetitionwerereceivedbytheCourtand,onMay17,2001,theOralArgumentwasconductedas scheduled. In anOrder given in open court, the partieswere directed to submit their respectiveMemoranda simultaneouslywithinanon-extendibleperiodoffivedays.15Issues:DuringthehearingonMay17,2001,theCourtdirectedthepartiestoaddressthefollowingissues:"1.Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy oradequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflaw?"2.Whetherornotpoliticalpartiesmayparticipateintheparty-listelections."3.Whetherornottheparty-listsystemisexclusiveto'marginalizedandunderrepresented'sectorsandorganizations."4.WhetherornottheComeleccommittedgraveabuseofdiscretioninpromulgatingOmnibusResolutionNo.3785."16TheCourt'sRulingThe Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summaryevidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy therequirementsoftheConstitutionandRA7941,asspecifiedinthisDecision.FirstIssue:RecourseUnderRule65Respondentscontendthat therecourseofbothpetitionersunderRule65 is improperbecause thereareotherplain,speedyandadequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.17 TheOffice of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filedbeforetheComelecapetitioneitherfordisqualificationorforcancellationofregistration,pursuanttoSections19,20,21and22ofComelecResolutionNo.3307-A18datedNovember9,2000.19We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of ComelecOmnibusResolution 3785 for having been issuedwith graveabuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the

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Constitution20andtheRulesofCourt,suchchallengemaybebroughtbeforethisCourt inaverifiedpetition forcertiorariunderRule65.Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion forreconsiderationwaspossible,itbeingaprohibitedpleadingunderSection1(d),Rule13oftheComelecRulesofProcedure.21The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration andNominationagainstsomeofhereinrespondents.22TheComelec,however,didnotactonthatPetition.Inviewofthependencyofthe elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time.Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved thePetitionbeforeit.ButaresolutionmayjustbeaformalitybecausetheComelec,throughtheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,hasmadeitspositiononthematterquiteclear.Inanyevent,thiscasepresentsanexceptiontotherulethatcertiorarishalllieonlyintheabsenceofanyotherplain,speedyandadequateremedy.23Ithasbeenheldthatcertiorariisavailable,notwithstandingthepresenceofotherremedies,"wheretheissueraised is one purely of law,where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency."24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitablyimbuedwithpublic interestandwithextremeurgency, for itpotentially involves the compositionof20percentof theHouseofRepresentatives.Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on theparty-list system,which this Courtmust urgently resolve,consistentwithitsdutyto"formulateguidingandcontrollingconstitutionalprinciples,precepts,doctrines,orrules."25Finally,proceduralrequirements"maybeglossedovertopreventamiscarriageofjustice,whentheissueinvolvestheprincipleofsocialjusticexxxwhenthedecisionsoughttobesetasideisanullity,orwhentheneedforreliefisextremelyurgentandcertiorariistheonlyadequateandspeedyremedyavailable."26SecondIssue:ParticipationofPoliticalPartiesInitsPetition,AngBagongBayani-OFWLaborPartycontendsthat"theinclusionofpoliticalpartiesintheparty-listsystemisthemost objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution."27 For its part, Petitioner BayanMuna objects to the participation of"majorpoliticalparties."28Ontheotherhand,theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral, liketheimpleadedpoliticalparties,submitsthattheConstitutionandRANo.7941allowpoliticalpartiestoparticipateintheparty-listelections.Itarguesthattheparty-listsystemis,infact,opentoall"registerednational,regionalandsectoralpartiesororganizations."29We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution andRA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-listelections,merelyonthegroundthattheyarepoliticalparties.Section5,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionprovidesthatmembersoftheHouse of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties ororganizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political partiesmay be registered under the party-listsystem."Sec. 7.Novotes cast in favorof a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registeredunder theparty-listsystemasprovidedinthisConstitution."Sec.8.Politicalparties,ororganizationsorcoalitionsregisteredundertheparty-listsystem,shallnotberepresentedinthevoters'registrationboards,boardsofelectioninspectors,boardsofcanvassers,orothersimilarbodies.However,theyshallbeentitledtoappointpollwatchersinaccordancewithlaw."30During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.Monsod pointed out that the participants in theparty-listsystemmay"bearegionalparty,asectoralparty,anationalparty,UNIDO,31Magsasaka,oraregionalpartyinMindanao."32ThiswasalsoclearfromthefollowingexchangebetweenComms.JaimeTadeoandBlasOple:33"MR.TADEO.Naniniwalabakayonaangpartylistaypwedengpaghati-hatianngUNIDO,PDP-Laban,PNP,LiberalatNacionalista?MR.OPLE.Maaariyansapagkatbukasangpartylistsystemsalahatngmgapartido."Indeed, CommissionerMonsod stated that thepurposeof theparty-list provisionwas toopenup the system, in order to give achancetopartiesthatconsistentlyplacethirdorfourthincongressionaldistrictelectionstowinaseatinCongress.34Heexplained:"Thepurposeofthisistoopenthesystem.Inthepastelections,wefoundoutthattherewerecertaingroupsorpartiesthat,ifwecounttheirvotesnationwide,haveabout1,000,000or1,500,000votes.Buttheywerealwaysthirdorfourthplaceineachofthedistricts.So,theyhavenovoiceintheAssembly.Butthisway,theywouldhavefiveorsixrepresentativesintheAssemblyeveniftheywouldnotwinindividuallyinlegislativedistricts.So,thatisessentiallythemechanics,thepurposeandobjectivesoftheparty-listsystem."For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties ororganizationsorcoalitionsthereof,xxx."Section3expresslystatesthata"party"is"eitherapoliticalpartyorasectoralpartyoracoalitionofparties."Moretothepoint,thelawdefines"politicalparty"as"anorganizedgroupofcitizensadvocatinganideologyorplatform,principlesandpoliciesforthegeneralconductofgovernmentandwhich,asthemostimmediatemeansofsecuringtheiradoption,regularlynominatesandsupportscertainofitsleadersandmembersascandidatesforpublicoffice."Furthermore,Section11ofRA7941leavesnodoubtastotheparticipationofpoliticalpartiesintheparty-listsystem.Wequotethepertinentprovisionbelow:"xxx"ForpurposesoftheMay1998elections,thefirstfive(5)majorpoliticalpartiesonthebasisofpartyrepresentationintheHouseof

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RepresentativesatthestartoftheTenthCongressofthePhilippinesshallnotbeentitledtoparticipateintheparty-listsystem.xxx"Indubitably,therefore,politicalparties–eventhemajorones--mayparticipateintheparty-listelections.ThirdIssue:MarginalizedandUnderrepresentedThat political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or anyorganizationorgroupforthatmatter--maydoso.Therequisitecharacterofthesepartiesororganizationsmustbeconsistentwiththepurposeoftheparty-listsystem,aslaiddownintheConstitutionandRA7941.Section5,ArticleVIoftheConstitution,providesasfollows:"(1)TheHouseofRepresentativesshallbecomposedofnotmorethantwohundredandfiftymembers,unlessotherwisefixedbylaw,whoshallbeelected from legislativedistrictsapportionedamong theprovinces, cities, and theMetropolitanManilaarea inaccordancewiththenumberoftheirrespectiveinhabitants,andonthebasisofauniformandprogressiveratio,andthosewho,asprovidedbylaw,shallbeelectedthroughaparty-listsystemofregisterednational,regional,andsectoralpartiesororganizations.(2)Theparty-listrepresentativesshallconstitutetwentypercentumofthetotalnumberofrepresentativesincludingthoseunderthe party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-listrepresentativesshallbefilled,asprovidedbylaw,byselectionorelectionfromthelabor,peasant,urbanpoor,indigenousculturalcommunities,women,youth,andsuchothersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector."(Emphasissupplied.)Notwithstandingthesparselanguageoftheprovision,adistinguishedmemberoftheConstitutionalCommissiondeclaredthatthepurpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision wasdiscussed,heexultantlyannounced:"OnthisfirstdayofAugust1986,weshall,hopefully,usherinanewchaptertoournationalhistory,bygivinggenuinepowertoourpeopleinthelegislature."35The foregoingprovisionontheparty-listsystemisnotself-executory. It is, in fact, interspersedwithphrases like"inaccordancewith law"or "asmaybeprovidedby law"; itwas thusup toCongress tosculpt ingranite the loftyobjectiveof theConstitution.Hence,RA7941wasenacted.Itlaidoutthestatutorypolicyinthiswise:"SEC.2.DeclarationofPolicy.--TheStateshallpromoteproportionalrepresentationintheelectionofrepresentativestotheHouseofRepresentatives throughaparty-list systemof registerednational, regionalandsectoralpartiesororganizationsor coalitionsthereof,whichwillenableFilipinocitizensbelongingtomarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectors,organizationsandparties,andwholackwell-definedpoliticalconstituenciesbutwhocouldcontributetotheformulationandenactmentofappropriatelegislationthatwill benefit the nation as awhole, to becomemembers of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shalldevelopandguaranteeafull,freeandopenpartysysteminordertoattainthebroadestpossiblerepresentationofparty,sectoralorgroupinterestsintheHouseofRepresentativesbyenhancingtheirchancestocompeteforandwinseatsinthelegislature,andshallprovidethesimplestschemepossible."TheMarginalizedandUnderrepresentedtoBecomeLawmakersThemselvesTheforegoingprovisionmandatesastatepolicyofpromotingproportionalrepresentationbymeansoftheFilipino-styleparty-listsystem,whichwill"enable"theelectiontotheHouseofRepresentativesofFilipinocitizens,1.whobelongtomarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectors,organizationsandparties;and2.wholackwell-definedconstituencies;but3.whocouldcontributetotheformulationandenactmentofappropriatelegislationthatwillbenefitthenationasawhole.The keywords in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack of well-definedconstituencies.""Proportionalrepresentation"heredoesnotrefertothenumberofpeopleinaparticulardistrict,becausetheparty-listelectionisnational in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to therepresentation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,"labor,peasant, fisherfolk,urbanpoor, indigenouscultural communities,elderly,handicapped,women,youth,veterans,overseasworkers,andprofessionals."However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, becauserepresentationiseasytoclaimandtofeign.Theparty-listorganizationorpartymustfactuallyandtrulyrepresentthemarginalizedandunderrepresentedconstituenciesmentionedinSection5.36Concurrently, thepersonsnominatedbytheparty-listcandidate-organizationmustbe"Filipinocitizensbelongingtomarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectors,organizationsandparties."Finally, "lackofwell-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absenceof a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like votersof acongressionaldistrictorterritorialunitofgovernment.Rather,itpointsagaintothosewithdisparateinterestsidentifiedwiththe"marginalizedorunderrepresented."Intheend, theroleof theComelec is toseeto it thatonlythoseFilipinoswhoare"marginalizedandunderrepresented"becomemembersofCongressundertheparty-listsystem,Filipino-style.TheintentoftheConstitutionisclear:togivegenuinepowertothepeople,notonlybygivingmorelawtothosewhohavelessinlife, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of theimplementinglaw,werepeat,islikewiseclear:"toenableFilipinocitizensbelongingtomarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectors,organizationsandparties,xxx, tobecomemembersof theHouseofRepresentatives."Where the languageof the law isclear, itmustbeappliedaccordingtoitsexpressterms.37

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Themarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectorstoberepresentedundertheparty-listsystemareenumeratedinSection5ofRA7941,whichstates:"SEC.5.Registration.--Anyorganizedgroupofpersonsmayregisterasaparty,organizationorcoalitionforpurposesoftheparty-list systemby filingwith theCOMELECnot later thanninety (90)daysbefore theelectionapetitionverifiedby itspresidentorsecretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or acoalitionof suchparties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platformorprogramof government, list ofofficers,coalitionagreementandotherrelevantinformationastheCOMELECmayrequire:Provided,thatthesectorshall includelabor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,women, youth, veterans, overseasworkers,andprofessionals."Whiletheenumerationofmarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectorsisnotexclusive, itdemonstratestheclearintentofthe lawthat not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction thatwordsemployedinastatuteareinterpretedinconnectionwith,andtheirmeaningisascertainedbyreferenceto,thewordsandthephraseswithwhichtheyareassociatedorrelated.Thus,themeaningofaterminastatutemaybelimited,qualifiedorspecializedbythoseinimmediateassociation.38TheParty-ListSystemDesecratedbytheOSGContentionsNotwithstandingtheunmistakablestatutorypolicy,theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralsubmitsthatRANo.7941"doesnotlimittheparticipationintheparty-listsystemtothemarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectorsofsociety."39Infact, itcontendsthatanypartyorgroupthatisnotdisqualifiedunderSection640ofRA7941mayparticipateintheelections.Hence,itadmittedduringtheOralArgumentthatevenanorganizationrepresentingthesuperrichofForbesParkorDasmariñasVillagecouldparticipateintheparty-listelections.41ThedeclaredpolicyofRA7941contravenesthepositionoftheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG).Westressthattheparty-listsystem seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,organizationsandparties–tobeelectedtotheHouseofRepresentatives.TheassertionoftheOSGthattheparty-listsystemisnotexclusive to themarginalizedandunderrepresenteddisregards the clear statutorypolicy. Its claim that even the super-richandoverrepresentedcanparticipatedesecratesthespiritoftheparty-listsystem.Indeed, the lawcrafted toaddress thepeculiardisadvantagesofPayatashoveldwellers cannotbeappropriatedby themansionownersofForbesPark.Theinterestsofthesetwosectorsaremanifestlydisparate;hence,theOSG'spositiontotreatthemsimilarlydefiesreasonandcommonsense.Incontrast,andwithadmirablecandor,Atty.LornaPatajo-Kapunan42admittedduringtheOralArgumentthatagroupofbankers,industrialistsandsugarplanterscouldnotjointheparty-listsystemasrepresentativesoftheirrespectivesectors.43While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized norunderrepresented,forthestarkrealityisthattheireconomiccloutengenderspoliticalpowermoreawesomethantheirnumericallimitation.Traditionally,politicalpowerdoesnotnecessarilyemanatefromthesizeofone'sconstituency;indeed,itislikelytoarisemoredirectlyfromthenumberandamountofone'sbankaccounts.Itisironic,therefore,thatthemarginalizedandunderrepresentedinourmidstarethemajoritywhowallowinpoverty,destitutionandinfirmity.Itwasforthemthattheparty-listsystemwasenacted--togivethemnotonlygenuinehope,butgenuinepower;togivethemtheopportunitytobeelectedandtorepresentthespecificconcernsof theirconstituencies;andsimplytogivethemadirectvoiceinCongressandinthelargeraffairsoftheState.Initsnoblestsense,theparty-listsystemtrulyempowersthemassesandushersanewhopeforgenuinechange.Verily,itinvitesthosemarginalizedandunderrepresentedinthepast–thefarmhands,thefisherfolk,theurbanpoor,eventhoseintheundergroundmovement–tocomeoutandparticipate,as indeedmanyofthemcame out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling anddesecratingthissocialjusticevehicle.Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normallydominatedbytraditionalpoliticiansandvestedgroups,20percentoftheseatsintheHouseofRepresentativesweresetasideforthe party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House couldparticipateintheparty-listelectionsfortheremaining20percent,theOSGandtheComelecdisregardthefundamentaldifferencebetweenthecongressionaldistrictelectionsandtheparty-listelections.Asearliernoted, thepurposeof theparty-listprovisionwastoopenupthesystem,44 inorder toenhancethechanceofsectoralgroups andorganizations to gain representation in theHouseofRepresentatives through the simplest schemepossible.45 Logicshowsthatthesystemhasbeenopenedtothosewhohavenevergottenafootholdwithinit--thosewhocannototherwisewininregular elections andwho therefore need the "simplest schemepossible" to do so. Conversely, itwould be illogical to open thesystem to those who have long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional districtelections.The importof theopenparty-listsystemmaybemorevividlyunderstoodwhencomparedtoastudentdormitory"openhouse,"whichbyitsnatureallowsoutsiderstoenterthefacilities.Obviously,the"openhouse"isforthebenefitofoutsidersonly,notthedormersthemselveswhocanenterthedormitoryevenwithoutsuchspecialprivilege.Inthesamevein,theopenparty-listsystemis only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized oroverrepresentedwhoalreadyfilltheranksofCongress.Verily, allowing thenon-marginalizedandoverrepresented tovie for the remaining seatsunder theparty-list systemwouldnot

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onlydilute,butalsoprejudicethechanceofthemarginalizedandunderrepresented,contrarytotheintentionofthelawtoenhanceit.Theparty-listsystemisatoolforthebenefitoftheunderprivileged;thelawcouldnothavegiventhesametooltoothers,totheprejudiceoftheintendedbeneficiaries.ThisCourt, therefore,cannotallowtheparty-listsystemtobesulliedandprostitutedbythosewhoareneithermarginalizednorunderrepresented. It cannot let that flickerofhopebesnuffedout.Theclear statepolicymustpermeateeverydiscussionof thequalificationofpoliticalpartiesandotherorganizationsundertheparty-listsystem.

RefutationoftheSeparateOpinionsTheSeparateOpinionsofourdistinguishedcolleagues,JusticesJoseC.VitugandVicenteV.Mendoza,areanchoredmainlyonthe

supposedintentoftheframersoftheConstitutionasculledfromtheirdeliberations.Thefundamentalprincipleinconstitutionalconstruction,however,isthattheprimarysourcefromwhichtoascertainconstitutionalintentorpurposeisthelanguageoftheprovisionitself.Thepresumptionisthatthewordsinwhichthe

constitutionalprovisionsarecouchedexpresstheobjectivesoughttobeattained.46Inotherwords,verbalegisstillprevails.Onlywhenthemeaningofthewordsusedisunclearandequivocalshouldresortbemadetoextraneousaidsofconstructionand

interpretation,suchastheproceedingsoftheConstitutionalCommissionorConvention,inordertoshedlightonandascertainthetrueintentorpurposeoftheprovisionbeingconstrued.47

Indeed,ascitedintheSeparateOpinionofJusticeMendoza,thisCourtstatedinCivilLibertiesUnionv.ExecutiveSecretary48that"thedebatesandproceedingsoftheconstitutionalconvention[maybeconsulted]inordertoarriveatthereasonandpurposeoftheresultingConstitutionxxxonlywhenotherguidesfailassaidproceedingsarepowerlesstovarythetermsoftheConstitutionwhenthemeaningisclear.Debatesintheconstitutionalconvention'areofvalueasshowingtheviewsoftheindividualmembers,andasindicatingthereasonfortheirvotes,buttheygiveusnolightastotheviewsofthelargemajoritywhodidnottalk,muchlessofthemassorourfellowcitizenswhosevotesatthepollsgavethatinstrumenttheforceoffundamentallaw.Wethinkitsafertoconstruetheconstitutionfromwhatappearsuponitsface.'Theproperinterpretationthereforedependsmoreonhowitwas

understoodbythepeopleadoptingitthanintheframers'understandingthereof."Section5,ArticleVIoftheConstitution,relativetotheparty-listsystem,iscouchedinclearterms:themechanicsofthesystemshallbeprovidedbylaw.Pursuantthereto,CongressenactedRA7941.Inunderstandingandimplementingparty-listrepresentation,weshouldthereforelookatthelawfirst.Onlywhenwefinditsprovisionsambiguousshouldtheuseofextraneousaidsofconstruction

beresortedto.But,asdiscussedearlier,theintentofthelawisobviousandclearfromitsplainwords.Section2thereofunequivocallystatesthattheparty-listsystemofelectingcongressionalrepresentativeswasdesignedto"enableunderrepresentedsectors,organizationsandparties,andwholackwell-definedpoliticalconstituenciesbutwhocouldcontributetotheformulationandenactmentof

appropriatelegislationthatwillbenefitthenationasawholexxx."Thecriteriaforparticipationiswelldefined.Thus,thereisnoneedforrecoursetoconstitutionaldeliberations,noteventotheproceedingsofCongress.Inanyevent,theframers'deliberationsmerelyexpresstheirindividualopinionsandare,atbest,onlypersuasiveinconstruingthemeaningandpurposeoftheconstitution

orstatute.BeitrememberedthattheconstitutionalityorvalidityofSections2and5ofRA7941isnotanissuehere.Hence,theyremainparts

ofthelaw,whichmustbeappliedplainlyandsimply.FourthIssue:GraveAbuseofDiscretionFromitsassailedOmnibusResolution,it ismanifestthattheComelecfailedtoappreciatefullytheclearpolicyofthelawandtheConstitution.Onthecontrary, itseemstohave ignoredthe facetof theparty-listsystemdiscussedabove.TheOSGas itscounseladmittedbeforetheCourtthatanygroup,eventhenon-marginalizedandoverrepresented,couldfieldcandidatesintheparty-listelections.Whenalowercourt,oraquasi-judicialagencyliketheCommissiononElections,violatesorignorestheConstitutionorthelaw,itsactioncanbestruckdownbythisCourtonthegroundofgraveabuseofdiscretion.49Indeed,thefunctionofalljudicialandquasi-judicialinstrumentalitiesistoapplythelawastheyfindit,nottoreinventorsecond-guessit.50In itsMemorandum, Petitioner BayanMuna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of themajor political parties –Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP – on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have beenaccreditedasthefive(six,includingPDP-Laban)majorpoliticalpartiesintheMay14,2001elections.Itarguesthatbecauseofthis,theyhave the "advantageofgettingofficialComelecElectionReturns,CertificatesofCanvass,preferredpollwatchersxxx."Wenote, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of districtrepresentativesforthepurposeofdeterminingwhichpartieswouldbeentitledtowatchersunderSection26ofRepublicActNo.7166.Whatisneededunderthepresentcircumstances,however,isafactualdeterminationofwhetherrespondentshereinand,forthatmatter,allthe154previouslyapprovedgroups,havethenecessaryqualificationstoparticipateintheparty-listelections,pursuanttotheConstitutionandthelaw.BayanMunaalsourgesus to immediately ruleoutRespondentMamamayanAyawsaDroga (MAD),because "it is agovernmententity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts.51 It is not equipped to receiveevidenceanddeterminethetruthofsuchfactualallegations.Basicrudimentsofdueprocessrequirethatrespondentsshouldfirstbegivenanopportunitytoshowthattheyqualifyunderthe

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guidelinespromulgatedinthisDecision,beforetheycanbedeprivedoftheirrighttoparticipateinandbeelectedundertheparty-listsystem.GuidelinesforScreeningParty-ListParticipantsTheCourt, therefore,deems itproper to remand the case to theComelec for the latter todetermine, after summaryevidentiaryhearings,whetherthe154partiesandorganizationsallowedtoparticipateintheparty-listelectionscomplywiththerequirementsofthelaw.Inthislight,theCourtfindsitappropriatetolaydownthefollowingguidelines,culledfromthelawandtheConstitution,toassisttheComelecinitswork.First,thepoliticalparty,sector,organizationorcoalitionmustrepresentthemarginalizedandunderrepresentedgroupsidentifiedinSection5ofRA7941.Inotherwords,itmustshow--throughitsconstitution,articlesofincorporation,bylaws,history,platformofgovernmentandtrackrecord--thatitrepresentsandseekstoupliftmarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectors.Verily,majorityofitsmembershipshouldbelongtothemarginalizedandunderrepresented.Anditmustdemonstratethatinaconflictofinterests,ithaschosenorislikelytochoosetheinterestofsuchsectors.Second,whileevenmajorpoliticalpartiesareexpresslyallowedbyRA7941and theConstitution toparticipate in theparty-listsystem, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In otherwords, while they are not disqualifiedmerelyonthegroundthattheyarepoliticalparties,theymustshow,however,thattheyrepresenttheinterestsofthemarginalizedandunderrepresented.ThecounselofAksyonDemokratikoandothersimilarlysituatedpoliticalpartiesadmittedasmuchduringtheOralArgument,asthefollowingquoteshows:"JUSTICEPANGANIBAN:Iamnotdisputingthatinmyquestion.AllIamsayingis,thepoliticalpartymustclaimtorepresentthemarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectors?ATTY.KAPUNAN:Yes,YourHonor,theanswerisyes."52Third,inviewoftheobjections53directedagainsttheregistrationofAngBuhayHayaangYumabong,whichisallegedlyareligiousgroup,theCourtnotestheexpressconstitutionalprovisionthatthereligioussectormaynotberepresentedintheparty-listsystem.The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of theConstitutionalCommission:"MR.OPLE.xxxIntheeventthatacertainreligioussectwithnationwideandeveninternationalnetworksofmembersandsupporters,inordertocircumventthisprohibition,decidestoformitsownpoliticalpartyinemulationofthosepartiesIhadmentionedearlierasderivingtheirinspirationandphilosophiesfromwell-establishedreligiousfaiths,willthatalsonotfallwithinthisprohibition?MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can piercethroughthelegalfiction."54Thefollowingdiscussionisalsopertinent:"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests,imamsorpastorswhomaybeelectedby,say,theindigenouscommunitysectortorepresenttheirgroup.REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybodywho represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the ProtestantChurchetcetera."55Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."56 The prohibitionwasexplained by a member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious organizationregisteringasapoliticalparty.Idonotseeanyprohibitionhereagainstapriestrunningasacandidate.Thatisnotprohibitedhere;itistheregistrationofareligioussectasapoliticalparty."58Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds fordisqualificationasfollows:"(1)Itisareligioussectordenomination,organizationorassociationorganizedforreligiouspurposes;(2)Itadvocatesviolenceorunlawfulmeanstoseekitsgoal;(3)Itisaforeignpartyororganization;(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly orthroughanyofitsofficersormembersorindirectlythroughthirdpartiesforpartisanelectionpurposes;(5)Itviolatesorfailstocomplywithlaws,rulesorregulationsrelatingtoelections;(6)Itdeclaresuntruthfulstatementsinitspetition;(7)Ithasceasedtoexistforatleastone(1)year;or(8) It fails toparticipate in the last two (2)precedingelectionsor fails toobtainat least twoper centum(2%)of thevotes castundertheparty-listsysteminthetwo(2)precedingelectionsfortheconstituencyinwhichithasregistered."59Noteshouldbetakenofparagraph5,whichdisqualifiesapartyorgroupforviolationoforfailuretocomplywithelectionlawsandregulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizensbelonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to becomemembers of the House ofRepresentatives."Apartyoranorganization,therefore,thatdoesnotcomplywiththispolicymustbedisqualified.Fifth,thepartyororganizationmustnotbeanadjunctof,oraprojectorganizedoranentityfundedorassistedby,thegovernment.Bytheverynatureoftheparty-listsystem,thepartyororganizationmustbeagroupofcitizens,organizedbycitizensandoperatedbycitizens.Itmustbeindependentofthegovernment.Theparticipationofthegovernmentoritsofficialsintheaffairsofaparty-

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list candidate is not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizensbelongingtomarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectorsandorganizationstobeelectedtotheHouseofRepresentatives.Sixth, thepartymustnotonlycomplywith therequirementsof the law; itsnomineesmust likewisedoso.Section9ofRA7941readsasfollows:"SEC.9.QualificationsofParty-ListNominees.–Nopersonshallbenominatedasparty-listrepresentativeunlesshe isanatural-borncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,aresidentofthePhilippinesforaperiodofnotlessthanone(1)yearimmediatelypreceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fidemember of the party or organization which he seeks torepresentforatleastninety(90)daysprecedingthedayoftheelection,andisatleasttwenty-five(25)yearsofageonthedayoftheelection.Incaseofanomineeoftheyouthsector,hemustatleastbetwenty-five(25)butnotmorethanthirty(30)yearsofageonthedayoftheelection.Anyyouthsectoralrepresentativewhoattainstheageof thirty(30)duringhis termshallbeallowedtocontinue inofficeuntiltheexpirationofhisterm."Seventh,notonlythecandidatepartyororganizationmustrepresentmarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectors;soalsomustitsnominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized andunderrepresentedsectors,organizationsandparties."Surely, the interestsof theyouthcannotbe fully representedbya retiree;neithercanthoseoftheurbanpoorortheworkingclass,byanindustrialist.ToallowotherwiseistobetraytheStatepolicytogivegenuinerepresentationtothemarginalizedandunderrepresented.Eighth,aspreviouslydiscussed,whilelackingawell-definedpoliticalconstituency,thenomineemustlikewisebeabletocontributeto the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation thatwill benefit the nation as awhole. Senator Jose Lina explainedduringthebicameralcommitteeproceedingsthat"thenomineeofaparty,nationalorregional,isnotgoingtorepresentaparticulardistrictxxx."61

EpilogueThelinchpinofthiscaseistheclearandplainpolicyofthelaw:"toenableFilipinocitizensbelongingtomarginalizedand

underrepresentedsectors,organizationsandparties,andwholackwell-definedpoliticalconstituenciesbutwhocouldcontributetotheformulationandenactmentofappropriatelegislationthatwillbenefitthenationasawhole,tobecomemembersoftheHouseof

Representatives."Crucialtotheresolutionofthiscaseisthefundamentalsocialjusticeprinciplethatthosewhohavelessinlifeshouldhavemoreinlaw.Theparty-listsystemisonesuchtoolintendedtobenefitthosewhohavelessinlife.Itgivesthegreatmassesofourpeoplegenuinehopeandgenuinepower.Itisamessagetothedestituteandtheprejudiced,andeventothoseintheunderground,that

changeispossible.Itisaninvitationforthemtocomeoutoftheirlimboandseizetheopportunity.Clearly,therefore,theCourtcannotacceptthesubmissionsoftheComelecandtheotherrespondentsthattheparty-listsystemis,

withoutanyqualification,opentoall.Suchpositiondoesnotonlyweakentheelectoralchancesofthemarginalizedandunderrepresented;italsoprejudicesthem.Itwouldgutthesubstanceoftheparty-listsystem.Insteadofgeneratinghope,itwould

createamirage.Insteadofenablingthemarginalized,itwouldfurtherweakenthemandaggravatetheirmarginalization.Ineffect,theComelecwouldhaveusbelievethattheparty-listprovisionsoftheConstitutionandRA7941arenothingmorethanaplayondubiouswords,amockeryofnobleintentions,andanemptyofferingonthealtarofpeopleempowerment.Surely,thiscould

nothavebeentheintentionoftheframersoftheConstitutionandthemakersofRA7941.WHEREFORE,thiscaseisREMANDEDtotheComelec,whichisherebyDIRECTEDtoimmediatelyconductsummaryevidentiary

hearingsonthequalificationsoftheparty-listparticipantsinthelightoftheguidelinesenunciatedinthisDecision.Consideringtheextremeurgencyofdeterminingthewinnersinthelastparty-listelections,theComelecisdirectedtobeginitshearingsforthe

partiesandorganizationsthatappeartohavegarneredsuchnumberofvotesastoqualifyforseatsintheHouseofRepresentatives.TheComelecisfurtherDIRECTEDtosubmittothisCourtitscompliancereportwithin30daysfromnoticehereof.1âwphi1.nêtTheResolutionofthisCourtdatedMay9,2001,directingtheComelec"torefrainfromproclaiminganywinner"duringthelastparty-listelection,shallremaininforceuntilaftertheComelecitselfwillhavecompliedandreporteditscompliancewiththe

foregoingdisposition.ThisDecisionisimmediatelyexecutoryupontheCommissiononElections'receiptthereof.Nopronouncementastocosts.

SOORDERED.G.R.No.106270-73February10,1994SULTANMOHAMADL.MITMUG,petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,MUNICIPALBOARDOFCANVASSERSOFLUMBA-BAYABAO,LANAODELSUR,andDATUGAMBAIDAGALANGIT,respondents.Pimentel,Apostol,Layosa&SibayanLawOfficeforpetitioner.Brillantes,Nachura,Navarro&Arcillaforprivaterespondent.BELLOSILLO,J.:Theturnoutofvotersduringthe11May1992electioninLumba-Bayabao,LanaodelSur,wasabnormallylow.Asaresult,several

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petitionswerefiledseekingthedeclarationoffailureofelectioninprecinctswherelessthan25%oftheelectoratemanagedtocasttheir votes. But a special election was ordered in precincts where no voting actually took place. The Commission on Elections(COMELEC)ruledthat foras longastheprecincts functionedandconductedactualvotingduringelectionday, lowvoterturnoutwouldnotjustifyadeclarationoffailureofelection.Wearenowcalledupontoreviewthisruling.PetitionerSULTANMOHAMADL.MITMUGandprivaterespondentDATUGAMBAIDAGALANGITwereamongthecandidatesforthemayoraltypositionofLumba-Bayabaoduringthe11may1992election.Thereweresixty-seven(67)precinctsinthemunicipality.Aswasheretoforestated,voterturnoutwasratherlow,particularlyinforty-nine(49)precinctswheretheaveragevoterturnoutwas22.26%,i.e.,only2,330outof9,830registeredvotersthereincasttheirvotes.Five(5)oftheseprecinctsdidnotconductactualvotingatall.1Consequently,COMELECorderedtheholdingofaspecialelectionon30May1992inthefive(5)precinctswhichfailedtofunctionduringelectionday.On30July1992anotherspecialelectionwasheldforasixthprecinct.2Intheinterim,petitionerfiledapetitionseekingtheannulmentofthespecialelectionconductedon30May1992allegingvariousirregularitiessuchasthealteration,tamperingandsubstitutionofballots.Buton13July1992,COMELECconsideredthepetitionmootsincethevotesinthesubjectprecinctswerealreadycounted.3Other petitions seeking the declaration of failure of election in some or all precincts of Lumba-Bayabao were also filed withCOMELECbyothermayoraltycandidates,towit:1.SPANo.92-324:On6June1992,privaterespondentDatuGambaDagalangitfiledanurgentpetitionprayingfortheholdingofaspecialelectioninPrecinctNo.22-Aallegingthereinthatwhentheballotboxwasopened,ballotswerealreadytorntopieces.On14July1992,thepetitionwasgrantedandaspecialelectionforPrecinctNo.22-Awassetfor25July1992.42. SPCNo. 92-336: On 16 June 19992, Datu Elias Abdusalam, anothermayoralty candidate, filed a petition to declare failure ofelection in twenty-nine (29)moreprecincts as a resultof alleged tamperingofballots5 andclusteringofprecincts.6On16 July1992,thepetitionwasdismissed.COMELECruledthattheremustbeasituationwherethereisabsoluteinabilitytovotebeforeafailure of election can be declared. 7 Since votingwas actually conducted in the contested precincts, therewas no basis for thepetition.3.SPANo92-368:On20June1992,privaterespondent filedanotherpetition, thistimeseekingtoexcludefromthecountingtheballotscastinsix(6)precinctsonthegroundthattheintegrityoftheballotboxesthereinwasviolated.8Again,on14July1992,COMELECconsideredthepetitionmoot,astheissueraisedthereinwasrelatedtothatofSPANo.92-311whichon9July1992wasalreadysetasideasmoot.94.SPANo.92-347:On1July1992,DatuBagatoKhalidLonta,afourthmayoraltycandidate,filedapetitionwhichinthemainsoughtthedeclarationoffailureofelectioninallsixty-seven(67)precinctsofLumba-Bayabao,LanaodelSur,onthegroundofmassivedisenfranchisementofvoters.10On9July1992,COMELECdismissedthepetition,rulingthattheallegationsthereindidnotsupportacaseoffailureofelection.11On8July1992,petitionerfiledamotiontointerveneinthesefour(4)petitions.12ButCOMELECtreatedthesameasamotionforreconsiderationandpromptlydenieditconsideringthatundertheCOMELECRulesofProceduresuchmotionwasaprohibitedpleading.13Thereafter,anewboardofElectionInspectorswasformedtoconductthespecialelectionsetfor25July1992.PetitionerimpugnedthecreationofthisBoard.Nevertheless,on30July1992,thenewBoardconvenedandbeganthecanvassingofvotes.Finally,on31July1992,privaterespondentwasproclaimedthedulyelectedMayorofLumba-Bayabao,LanaodelSur.On3August1992,petitionerinstitutedtheinstantproceedingsseekingthedeclarationoffailureofelectioninforty-nine(49)precinctswherelessthanaquarteroftheelectoratewereabletocasttheirvotes.Healsoprayedfortheissuanceofatemporaryrestrainingordertoenjoinprivaterespondentfromassumingoffice.On10August1992,petitionerlodgedanelectionprotestwiththeRegionaltrialCourtofLanaodelSurdisputingtheresultnotonlyofsomebutalltheprecinctsofLumba-Bayabao,delSur.14Respondents,ontheotherhand,assertthatwiththefilingofanelectionprotest,petitionerisalreadydeemedtohaveabandonedtheinstantpetition.ItmaybenotedthatwhenpetitionerfiledhiselectionprotestwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofLanaodelSur,heinformedthetrialcourtofthependencyoftheseproceedings.Paragraph3ofhisproteststates"[T]hatonAugust3,1992,yourprotestantfiledaPetitionforCertiorariwiththeSupremeCourt...docketedasG.R.No.106270assailingthevalidityoftheproclamationofthehereinprotestee...."15Evidently,petitionerdidnotintendtoabandonhisrecoursewiththisCourt.Onthecontrary,heintendedtopursueit.Whereonlyanelectionprotestexabundanteadcautelaisfiled,theCourtretainsjurisdictiontohearthepetitionseekingtoannulanelection.16ThemainissueiswhetherrespondentCOMELECactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdictionindenyingmotuproprioandwithoutduenoticeandhearingthepetitionsseekingtodeclareafailureofelectioninsomeoralloftheprecinctsinLumba-Bayabao,LanaodelSur.Afterall,petitionerargues,hehasmeritoriousgroundsinsupportthereto,viz.,themassivedisenfranchisementofvotersduetoallegedterrorismandunlawfulclusteringofprecincts,whichCOMELECshouldhaveatleastheardbeforerenderingitsjudgment.Incidentally,apetitiontoannulanelectionisnotapre-proclamationcontroversy.Consequently,theproclamationofawinningcandidatetogetherwithhissubsequentassumptionofofficeisnotanimpedimenttotheprosecutionofthecasetoitslogicalconclusion.17

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UndertheCOMELECRulesofProcedure,withintwenty-four(24)hoursfromthefilingofaverifiedpetitiontodeclareafailuretoelect,noticestoallinterestedpartiesindicatingthereinthedateofhearingshouldbeservedthroughthefastestmeansavailable.18Thehearingofthecasewillalsobesummaryinnature.19Basedontheforegoing,theclearintentofthelawisthatapetitionofthisnaturemustbeacteduponwithdispatchonlyafterhearingthereonshallhavebeenconducted.SinceCOMELECdeniedtheotherpetitions20whichsoughttoincludeforty-three(43)moreprecinctsinaspecialelectionwithoutconductinganyhearing,itwouldappearthenthatthereindeedmighthavebeengraveabuseofdiscretionindenyingthepetitions.However,acloserexaminationoftheCOMELECRulesofProcedure,particularlySec.2,Rule26,thereofwhichwasliftedfromSec.6,B.P.881,otherwiseknownastheOmnibusElectionCodeofthePhilippines,indicatesotherwise.Itreads—Sec.2.Failureofelection.—If,onaccountofforcemajeure,violence,terrorism,fraudorotheranalogouscausestheelectioninanyprecincthasnotbeenheldonthedatefixed,orhadbeensuspendedbeforethehourfixedbylawfortheclosingofthevoting,orafterthevotingandduringthepreparationandthetransmissionoftheelectionreturnsorinthecustodyofcanvassthereof,suchelectionresultsinafailuretoelect,andinanyofsuchcasesthefailureorsuspensionofelectionwouldaffecttheresultoftheelection,theCommissionshall,onthebasisofaverifiedpetitionbyanyinterestedpartyandafterduenoticeandhearing,callfortheholdingorcontinuationoftheelectionnotheld,suspendedorwhichresultedinafailuretoelectonadatereasonablyclosetothedateoftheelectionnotheld,suspendedorwhichresultedinafailuretoelectbutnotlaterthanthirty(30)daysafterthecessationofthecauseofsuchpostponementorsuspensionoftheelectionorfailuretoelect.BeforeCOMELECcanactonaverifiedpetitionseekingtodeclareafailureofelection,two(2)conditionsmustconcur:first,novotinghastakenplaceintheprecinctorprecinctsonthedatefixedbylawor,eveniftherewasvoting,theelectionneverthelessresultsinfailuretoelect;and,second,thevotesnotcastwouldaffecttheresultoftheelection.21Inthecasebeforeus,itisindubitablethatthevotesnotcastwilldefinitelyaffecttheoutcomeoftheelection.But,thefirstrequisiteismissing,i.e.,thatnoactualvotingtookplace,orevenifthereis,theresultsthereonwillbetantamounttoafailuretoelect.Sinceactualvotingandelectionbytheregisteredvotersinthequestionedprecinctshavetakenplace,theresultsthereofcannotbedisregardedandexcluded.22COMELECthereforedidnotcommitanyabuseofdiscretion,muchlessgrave,indenyingthepetitionsoutright.Therewasnobasisforthepetitionssincethefactsallegedthereindidnotconstitutesufficientgroundstowarrantthereliefsought.For,thelanguageofthelawexpresslyrequirestheconcurrenceoftheseconditionstojustifythecallingofaspecialelection.23Indeed,thefactthataverifiedpetitionisfileddoesnotautomaticallymeanthatahearingonthecasewillbeheldbeforeCOMELECwillactonit.Theverifiedpetitionmuststillshowonitsfacethattheconditionstodeclareafailuretoelectarepresent.Intheabsencethereof,thepetitionmustbedeniedoutright.Consideringthatthereisnoconcurrenceofthetwo(2)conditionsinthepetitionsseekingtodeclarefailureofelectioninforty-three(43)more,precincts,thereisnomoreneedtoreceiveevidenceonallegedelectionirregularities.Instead,thequestionofwhethertherehavebeenterrorismandotherirregularitiesisbetterventilatedinanelectioncontest.Theseirregularitiesmaynotasarulebeinvokedtodeclareafailureofelectionandtodisenfranchisetheelectoratethroughthemisdeedsofarelativefew.24Otherwise,electionswillneverbecarriedoutwiththeresultantdisenfranchisementofinnocentvotersasloserswillalwayscryfraudandterrorism.Therecanbefailureofelectioninapoliticalunitonlyifthewillofthemajorityhasbeendefiledandcannotbeascertained.But,ifitcanbedetermined,itmustbeaccordedrespect.Afterall,thereisnoprovisioninourelectionlawswhichrequiresthatamajorityofregisteredvotersmustcasttheirvotes.Allthelawrequiresisthatawinningcandidatemustbeelectedbyapluralityofvalidvotes,regardlessoftheactualnumberofballotscast.25Thus,eveniflessthan25%oftheelectorateinthequestionedprecinctscasttheirvotes,thesamemuststillberespected.Thereisprimafacieshowingthatprivaterespondentwaselectedthroughapluralityofvalidvotesofavalidconstituency.WHEREFORE,therebeingnograveabuseofdiscretion,thePetitionforCertiorariisDISMISSED.SOORDERED.KABATAANPARTY-LISTREPRESENTATIVERAYMONDV.PALATINO,ALVINA.PETERS,PRESIDENTOFTHENATIONALUNIONOFSTUDENTSOFTHEPHILIPPINES(NUSP),MA.CRISTINAANGELAGUEVARRA,CHAIRPERSONOFTHESTUDENTCHRISTIANMOVEMENTOFTHEPHILIPPINES(SCMP),VENCERMARIE.CRISOSTOMO,SECRETARYGENERALOFKABATAANPARTY-LIST,VIJAEO.ALQUISOLA,PRESIDENTOFTHECOLLEGEEDITORSGUILDOFTHEPHILIPPINES(CEGP),DIANNEKRISTELM.ASUELO,SECRETARYGENERALOFTHEKABATAANGARTISTAPARASATUNAYNAKALAYAAN(KARATULA),KENNETHCARLISLEEARLEUGENIO,ANAKATRINAV.TEJERO,VICTORLOUISE.CRISOSTOMO,JACQUELINEALEXISS.MERCED,andJADECHARMANEROSEJ.VALENZUELA,Petitioners,-versus-

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COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,Respondent.DECISIONCARPIOMORALES,J.:AtthethresholdonceagainistherightofsuffrageofthesovereignFilipinopeoplethefoundationofPhilippinedemocracy.AsthecountrypreparestoelectitsnextsetofleadersonMay10,2010,theCourtupholdsthisprimordialright.

On November 12, 2008, respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 8514[if!supportFootnotes][1][endif] which, among other things, set December 2, 2008 to December 15, 2009 as the period of continuing voterregistration using the biometrics process in all areas nationwide, except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.Subsequently,theCOMELECissuedResolutionNo.8585[if!supportFootnotes][2][endif]onFebruary12,2009adjustingthedeadlineofvoterregistrationfortheMay10,2010nationalandlocalelectionstoOctober31,2009,insteadofDecember15,2009aspreviouslyfixedbyResolutionNo.8514.

TheintensepublicclamorforanextensionoftheOctober31,2009deadlinenotwithstanding,theCOMELECstoodfirmin its decisionnot to extend it, arguingmainly that it needs ample time toprepare for the automated elections.Via thepresentPetitionforCertiorariandMandamusfiledonOctober30,2009,[if!supportFootnotes][3][endif]petitionerschallengethevalidityofCOMELECResolutionNo.8585andseekadeclarationofitsnullity.

PetitionerRaymondV.Palatino,ayouthsectoralrepresentativeundertheKabataanParty-list,suesasamemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesandaconcernedcitizen,whiletherestofpetitionerssueasconcernedcitizens.

Petitioners contend that the serious questions involved in this case and potential disenfranchisement of millions ofFilipino voters justify resort to this Court in the first instance, claiming that based onNational Statistics Office (NSO) data, theprojectedvotingpopulationfortheMay10,2010electionsis3,758,964fortheagegroup18-19and8,756,981fortheagegroup20-24,oratotalof12,515,945.

PetitionersfurthercontendthatCOMELECResolutionNo.8585isanunconstitutionalencroachmentonthelegislativepowerofCongressas itamendsthesystemofcontinuingvoterregistrationunderSection8ofRepublicActNo.8189(RA8189),otherwiseknownasTheVotersRegistrationActof1996,reading:

Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application ofregistrationofvotersshallbeconducteddailyintheofficeoftheElectionOfficerduringregularofficehours.No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) daysbeforearegularelectionandninety(90)daysbeforeaspecialelection.

They thuspray thatCOMELECResolutionNo.8585bedeclarednullandvoid,andthat theCOMELECbeaccordinglyrequiredtoextendthevoterregistrationuntilJanuary9,2010whichisthedaybeforethe120-dayprohibitiveperiodstartingonJanuary10,2010.

TheCOMELECmaintainsinitsCommentfiledonDecember7,2009that,amongotherthings,theConstitutionandtheOmnibusElectionCodeconferuponitthepowertopromulgaterulesandregulationsinordertoensurefree,orderlyandhonestelections; that Section29ofRepublicActNo.6646 (RA6646)[if!supportFootnotes][4][endif] andSection28ofRepublicActNo.8436 (RA8436)[if!supportFootnotes][5][endif]authorizeittofixotherdatesforpre-electionactswhichincludevoterregistration;andthatitsscheduleof pre-election acts shows that the October 31, 2009 deadline of voter registrationwas impelled by operational and pragmaticconsiderations,citingAkbayan-Youthv.COMELEC[if!supportFootnotes][6][endif]whereintheCourtdeniedasimilarprayerforanextensionoftheDecember27,2000deadlineofvoterregistrationfortheMay14,2001elections.

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Thepetitionisimpressedwithmerit.

Therightofsuffrageliesattheheartofourconstitutionaldemocracy.TherightofeveryFilipinotochoosetheleaders

whowillleadthecountryandparticipate,tothefullestextentpossible,ineverynationalandlocalelectionissozealouslyguardedbythefundamentallawthatitdevotedanentirearticlesolelytherefor:

ARTICLEVSUFFRAGE

SECTION1.SuffragemaybeexercisedbyallcitizensofthePhilippinesnototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,whoareatleasteighteenyearsofage,andwhoshallhaveresidedinthePhilippinesforatleastoneyearandintheplacewhereintheyproposetovoteforatleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection.Noliteracy,

propertyorothersubstantiverequirementshallbeimposedontheexerciseofsuffrage.

SECTION2.TheCongressshallprovideasystemofsecuringthesecrecyandsanctityoftheballotaswellasasystemforabsenteevotingbyqualifiedFilipinosabroad.

TheCongressshallalsodesignaprocedureforthedisabledandtheilliteratestovotewithouttheassistanceofotherpersons.Untilthen,theyshallbeallowedtovoteunderexistinglawsandsuchrulesastheCommissiononElectionsmaypromulgatetoprotectthesecrecyoftheballot.

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PreservingthesanctityoftherightofsuffrageensuresthattheStatederivesitspowerfromtheconsentofthegoverned.The paramount importance of this right is also a function of the State policy of people empowerment articulated in theconstitutional declaration that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them,[if!supportFootnotes][7][endif] bolstered by the recognition of the vital role of the youth in nation-building and directive to the State toencouragetheirinvolvementinpublicandcivicaffairs.[if!supportFootnotes][8][endif]

It is against thisbackdrop thatCongressmandateda systemof continuingvoter registration inSection8ofRA8189whichprovides:

Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application ofregistration of voters shall be conducted daily in theofficeof theElectionOfficerduringregularofficehours.No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120)daysbefore a regular election andninety (90)daysbefore a special election. (emphasis andunderscoringsupplied)

Thecleartextofthelawthusdecreesthatvotersbeallowedtoregisterdailyduringregularofficeshours,exceptduringtheperiodstarting120daysbeforearegularelectionand90daysbeforeaspecialelection.

Bytheaboveprovision,Congressitselfhasdeterminedthattheperiodof120daysbeforearegularelectionand90daysbefore a special election is enough time for the COMELEC tomake ALL the necessary preparationswith respect to the comingelections including: (1) completion of project precincts, which is necessary for the proper allocation of official ballots, electionreturns and other election forms and paraphernalia; (2) constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors, including thedeterminationoftheprecinctstowhichtheyshallbeassigned;(3)finalizingtheComputerizedVotersList;(4)supervisionofthecampaign period; and (5) preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of Voters Information Sheet. Such determination ofCongressiswellwithintheambitofitslegislativepower,whichthisCourtisboundtorespect.AndtheCOMELECsrule-makingpowershouldbeexercisedinaccordancewiththeprevailinglaw.[if!supportFootnotes][9][endif]

RespectingtheauthorityoftheCOMELECunderRA6646andRA8436tofixotherdatesforpre-electionacts,thesameisnotinconflictwiththemandateofcontinuingvoterregistrationunderRA8189.ThisCourtsprimarydutyistoharmonizelawsrather than consider one as repealed by the other. The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly,against implied repeal. For Congress is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to enact inconsistent orconflictingstatutes.[if!supportFootnotes][10][endif]

BothR.A.No.6646,Section29andR.A.No.8436,Section28granttheCOMELECthepowertofixotherperiodsanddatesforpre-electionactivitiesonlyifthesamecannotbereasonablyheldwithintheperiodprovidedbylaw.Thisgrantofpower,however,isforthepurposeofenablingthepeopletoexercisetherightofsuffragethecommonunderlyingpolicyofRA8189,RA6646andRA8436.

In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot bereasonablyheldwithintheperiodprovidedbyRA8189,Sec.8dailyduringofficehours,exceptduringtheperiodstarting120daysbeforetheMay10,2010regularelections.There isthusnooccasionfortheCOMELECtoexercise itspowertofixotherdatesordeadlinestherefor.

ThepresentcasedifferssignificantlyfromAkbayan-Youthv.COMELEC.[if!supportFootnotes][11][endif]Insaidcase,theCourtheldthat the COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion in denying the request of the therein petitioners for an extension of theDecember27,2000deadlineofvoterregistrationfortheMay14,2001elections.ForthethereinpetitionersfiledtheirpetitionwiththeCourtwithinthe120-dayprohibitiveperiodfortheconductofvoterregistrationunderSection8ofRA8189,andsoughttheconductofatwo-dayregistrationonFebruary17and18,2001,clearlywithinthe120-dayprohibitiveperiod.TheCourt in fact suggested inAkbayan-Youth that the therein petitioners could have, but hadnot, registeredduring the period

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betweentheDecember27,2000deadlinesetbytheCOMELECandbeforethestartofthe120-dayprohibitiveperiodpriortotheelectiondateorJanuary13,2001,thus:[T]hereisnoallegationinthetwoconsolidatedpetitionsandtherecordsarebereftofanyshowingthatanyoneofhereinpetitionershasfiledanapplicationtoberegisteredasavoterwhichwasdeniedbytheCOMELECnorfiledacomplaintbeforetherespondentCOMELECallegingthatheorsheproceededtotheOfficeoftheElectionOfficertoregisterbetweentheperiodstartingfromDecember28,2000toJanuary13,2001,andthatheorshewasdisallowedorbarredbyrespondentCOMELECfromfilinghisapplicationforregistration.WhileitmaybetruethatrespondentCOMELECsettheregistrationdeadlineonDecember27,2000,thisCourtisofthefirmviewthatpetitionerswerenottotallydeniedtheopportunitytoavailofthecontinuingregistrationunderR.A.8189.[if!supportFootnotes][12][endif](emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)

TheclearimportoftheCourtspronouncementinAkbayan-Youth isthathadthethereinpetitionersfiledtheirpetitionandsoughtanextensiondatethatwasbeforethe120-dayprohibitiveperiod,theirprayerwouldhavebeengrantedpursuanttothemandateofRA8189. In thepresent case, as reflectedearlier, both thedatesof filingof thepetition (October30,2009)and theextension sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior to the 120-day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore, finds no legalimpedimenttotheextensionprayedfor.WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.COMELECResolutionNo.8585isdeclarednullandvoidinsofarasitsetthedeadlineofvoterregistrationfortheMay10,2010electionsonOctober31,2009.TheCOMELECisdirectedtoproceedwithdispatchinreopeningtheregistrationofvotersandholdingthesameuntilJanuary9,2010.ThisDecisionisIMMEDIATELYEXECUTORY.SOORDERED.G.R.No.108886May5,1995AQUILESU.REYES,petitioner,vs.REGIONALTRIALCOURTOFORIENTALMINDORO,BRANCHXXXIX,COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,ADOLFOG.COMIA,ANDTHESANGGUNIANGBAYANOFNAUJAN,ORIENTALMINDORO,respondents.MENDOZA,J.:Thisisapetitionforcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamuswhichseeks(1)theannulmentofthedecision,datedJune23,1992,oftheRegionalTrialCourt(Br.39)ofCalapan,OrientalMindoro,annulingtheproclamationofpetitionerastheeighthmemberoftheSangguniangBayanofNaujan,OrientalMindoro;(2)theannulmentofthedecisionoftheCommissiononElections(COMELEC),datedJanuary22,1993,dismissingpetitioner'sappealfromthetrialcourt'sdecision;(3)theissuanceofawritofmandamustocompelrespondentSangguniangBayantorecognizepetitionerasthedulyelectedmemberthereof;and(4)theissuanceofawritofprohibitionagainstrespondentAdolfoG.Comia,enjoininghimfromcontinuinginofficeasmemberoftheSangguniangBayanofNaujan,OrientalMindoro.Thefactsareasfollows:PetitionerAquilesReyesandprivaterespondentAdolfoComiawerecandidatesforthepositionofmemberoftheSangguniangBayanofNaujan,OrientalMindorointheMay11,1992synchronizedelections.OnMay13,1992,duringtheproceedingsoftheMunicipalBoardofCanvassers,privaterespondentmovedfortheexclusionofcertainelectionreturns,onthegroundofseriousirregularityincountinginfavorofpetitionerAquilesReyesvotescastfor"Reyes"only,consideringthattherewasanothercandidate(EpitacioReyes)bearingthesamesurname.However,withoutresolvinghispetition,theMunicipalBoardofCanvassersproclaimedonthesamedaypetitionerastheeighthwinningcandidatewith7,205votes.OnMay25,1992petitionertookhisoathofoffice.OnJune1,1992,privaterespondentfiledanelectionprotestbeforethetrialcourt.Heallegedthat"avitalmistake[hadbeen]committedbytheBoardofCanvassersinthemathematicalcomputationofthetotalnumberofvotesgarneredbypetitioner[nowprivaterespondent];"Privaterespondentalleged:5.ThatinthesaidStatementofVotesbyCity/MunicipalityorPrecinctorC.E.FormNo.20-A,itisreflectedthereinthatthetotalnumberofvotesgarneredbythepetitionerisonly858votes,wheninfactandintruth,afterreviewingandcorrectingthecomputationoftheactualvotesgarneredbythepetitionerthetotalvotestobecountedinhisfavoris915votes;6.ThattheMunicipalBoardofCanvassersandtheElectionRegistrarofNaujan,OrientalMindoro,afterhavingbeeninformedofthesaiddiscrepancies,manifestedinthepresenceofMunicipalTrialCourtJudgeTOMASC.LEYNES,thatitwasanhonestmistakecommittedinthecomputationandtheadditionofthetotalnumberofvotesappearinginC.E.FormNo.20-A.;7.Thataftercorrectingthetotalnumberofvotesgarneredbythepetitioner,itappearsnowthatthetotalvotescastinhisfavorinallprecinctsis7,233voteswhichismorethan28votesoverthetotalof7,205votesgarneredbyrespondentAquilesU.Reyes,whowasproclaimedasElectedSangguniangBayanMemberofNaujan,OrientalMindorooccupyingthe8thposition.OnJune4,1992,petitionerfiledamotiontodismissprivaterespondent'spetitiononthegroundthatitwasfiledbeyondthe

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reglementaryperiodoftendaysfromproclamation.OnJune15,1992,however,thetrialcourtdeniedhismotion.Ontheotherhand,theMunicipalBoardofCanvassersfileitsanswerinwhichitadmittedthatithadmadeamistakeincreditingprivaterespondentwithonly858voteswhenhewasentitledto915votesintheStatementofVotes(C.E.FormNo.20-A).OnJune23,1992,thetrialcourtrendereditsdecisionannulingtheproclamationofpetitioneranddeclaringprivaterespondentastheeighthwinningcandidateforthepositionofcounciloroftheSangguniangBayanofNaujan,OrientalMindoro.AcopyofthedecisionwasservedonpetitioneronJune26,1992.PetitionerfiledanoticeofappealtotheCOMELEC.Inaddition,hefiledapetitionformandamusandprohibitionintheCourtofAppeals,tocompeltheSangguniangBayantorecognizehimasthedulyproclaimedmemberofthatbodyandprohibititfromfurtherrecognizingprivaterespondent.OnAugust26,1992,theCourtofAppealsdismissedthepetitionbecauseofpetitioner'spendingappealintheCOMELEC.TheappellatecourtcitedSupremeCourtCircular28-91whichprohibitsthefilingofmultiplepetitionsinvolvingthesameissues.Petitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationbuthismotionwasdenied.Theappellatecourt'sdecisionbecamefinalandexecutoryonDecember10,1992.Meanwhile,theSangguniangBayanmetininauguralsessiononJuly3,1992,duringwhichprivaterespondentwasrecognizedastheeighthmemberofthebodyandthereafterallowedtoassumeofficeanddischargeitsfunctions.OnJuly13,1992,itinformedpetitionerthatithadrecognizedtheprivaterespondentasitsmember.Ontheotherhand,theCOMELEC'sFirstDivisiondismissedonJanuary22,1993petitioner'sappealonthegroundthathehadfailedtopaytheappealfeewithintheprescribedperiod.Petitionerthenbroughtthepresentaction.PetitionercontendsthatboththetrialcourtandtheCOMELEC'sFirstDivisioncommittedagraveabuseofdiscretion,thefirst,byassumingjurisdictionovertheelectioncontestfiledbyprivaterespondentdespitethefactthatthecasewasfiledmorethantendaysafterpetitioner'sproclamation,andthesecondi.e.,theCOMELEC'sFirstDivision,bydismissingpetitioner'sappealfromthedecisionofthetrialcourtforlatepaymentoftheappealfee.Wefindthepetitiontobewithoutmerit.First. The SolicitorGeneral, in behalf of theCOMELEC, raises a fundamental question.He contends that the filing of thepresentpetition, without petitioner first filing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX, A, §7 of theConstitution 1 because under this provision only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme Court oncertiorari.This is correct. It is now settled that in providing that the decisions, orders and rulings of COMELEC "may be brought to theSupremeCourtoncertiorari"theConstitutioninitsArt.IX,A,§7meansthespecialcivilactionofcertiorariunderRule65,§1.2Sinceabasicconditionforbringingsuchactionisthatthepetitionerfirst fileamotionforreconsideration,3 it followsthatpetitioner'sfailuretofileamotionforreconsiderationofthedecisionoftheFirstDivisionoftheCOMELECisfataltohispresentaction.Petitionerarguesthatthisrequirementmaybedispensedwithbecausetheonlyquestionraisedinhispetitionisaquestionoflaw.Thisisnotcorrect.Thequestionsraisedbypetitionerinvolvetheinterpretationofconstitutionalandstatutoryprovisionsinlightofthefactsofthiscase.Thequestionstenderedare,therefore,notpurequestionsoflaw.Moreover,thatamotionforreconsiderationbeforetheCOMELECenbancisrequiredforthefilingofapetitionforcertiorariisclearfromthefollowingprovisionsoftheConstitution:Art.IX,C,§2.TheCommissiononElectionsshallexercisethefollowingpowersandfunctions:xxxxxxxxx(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all electiveregional,provincial,andcityofficials,andappellate jurisdictionoverallcontests involvingelectivemunicipalofficialsdecidedbytrialcourtsofgeneraljurisdiction,orinvolvingelectivebarangayofficialsdecidedbytrialcourtsoflimitedjurisdiction.Decisions,finalorders,orrulingsoftheCommissiononelectioncontestsinvolvingelectivemunicipalandbarangayofficesshallbefinal,executory,andnotappealable.Id. §3.TheCommissiononElectionsmaysitenbanc or in twodivisions,andshallpromulgate its rulesofprocedure inorder toexpeditedispositionofelectioncases,includingpre-proclamationcontroversies.Allsuchelectioncasesshallbeheardanddecidedindivision,providedthatmotionsforreconsiderationofdecisionsshallbedecidedbytheCommissionenbanc.ConformablytotheseprovisionsoftheConstitutionallelectioncases, includingpre-proclamationcontroversies,mustbedecidedbytheCOMELECindivision.Shouldapartybedissatisfiedwiththedecision,hemayfileamotionforreconsiderationbeforetheCOMELECenbanc.Itis,therefore,thedecision,orderorrulingoftheCOMELECenbancthat,inaccordancewithArt.IX,A,§7,"maybebroughttotheSupremeCourtoncertiorari."4SecondEvenonthemeritswethinktheFirstDivisionoftheCOMELECproperlydismissedpetitioner'sappealfromthedecisionofthetrialcourtbecauseofhisfailuretopaytheappealfeewithinthetimeforperfectinganappeal.Rule22,§9oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedureexpresslyprovides:Sec. 9. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — The appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of theCommissiononanyofthefollowinggrounds:(a)Failureoftheappellanttopaytheappealfee;...Inaccordancewith§2(b)ofCOMELECResolutionNo.2108-A,theappealfeemustbepaidwithintheperiodtoperfecttheappeal.Thus:Sec.2.Whendocketandotherfeesshallbepaid.—

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xxxxxxxxx(b)Theappealfeesprescribedinsection3ofRule22oftheCOMELECRulesofProceduresshallbepaidwithintheperiodtoperfecttheappeal....Theperiodtoperfecttheappealisunderstoodtobetheperiodwithinwhichtofilethenoticeofappeal.Ontheotherhand,Rule22,§3oftheRulesofProcedureoftheCOMELECprovides:NoticeofAppeal.Withinfive(5)daysafterpromulgationofthedecisionofthecourt,theaggrievedpartymayfilewithsaidcourtanoticeofappeal,andserveacopythereofupontheattorneyofrecordoftheadverseparty.Thisresolution,whichwaspromulgatedonJuly14,1989,supersededCOMELECResolutionNo.14565onwhichpetitionerreliesforhiscontentionthatthefeeistobepaidonlyuponthefilingoftheappealbrief.TherecordsshowthatpetitionerreceivedacopyofthedecisionofthetrialcourtonJune26,1992.However,hepaidtheappealfeeofP1,020.00onlyonAugust6,1992.Inotherwords,petitionerallowedforty(40)daystolapsewhentheappealfeeshouldhavebeenpaidwithinfive(5)daysafterpromulgationofthetrialcourt'sdecision.Petitioner claims that he acted on advice, presumably of COMELEC officials, towait until the records of the appealed casewasreceivedfromtheRegionalTrialCourt,sothatitcouldbedocketedandgivenacasenumberbeforepayingtheappealfee.Butthereisnothingintherecordtoshowthisorthatpetitionerofferedtopaytheappealfeewithintheappealperiod.Hehasnotidentifiedthepersonwhoallegedlygavehimtheerroneousadvice.Petitioneralsopraysthatare-canvassbeconductedinalltheelectoralprecinctsofNaujan,OrientalMindoroinviewofthejoint-affidavitexecutedbythemembersoftheMunicipalBoardofCanvassersonOctober12,1993inwhichtheystated:ThattherespondentBoard,perverificationfromtheComelecrecordsofNaujan,afterreceiptoftheswornletter-complaintofMr.AquilesU.Reyes,asidefromthemattersalreadyalludedtoabovefoundthatthe"40"voteshegarneredinPrecinctNo.37,andthe"31"votesinPrecinct41-Athatshouldhavebeencredited,transcribedorrecordedincomplainant'sfavorintheStatementofVotes(C.E.FormNo.22-A)onthebasisoftheElectionReturns(C.E.FormNo.9),thruhonestmistakewaserroneouslyandinadvertentlytranscribed or recorded in good faith and without malice due to mental and physical fatigue and exhaustion by the Board ofCanvassersanditsstaffinfavorofcandidateJeremiasNacordaofSangguniangBayanMemberoftheMunicipalityofNaujanintheStatementofVotes(C.E.FormNo.22-A)ofsaidprecincts,andwhatshouldhavebeencreditedandreflectedascandidateNacorda'svoteintheStatementofVotes(C.E.FormNo.22-A)onthebasisoftheElectionReturns(C.E.FormNo.9)are"9"votesinPrecinct37 not "40" votes, and "8" votes in PrecinctNo. 41-A and not "31" votes, certification is hereto attached issued by the ElectionOfficerofNaujanthatcandidateNacordaperComelecrecordsshownintheElectionReturns(C.E.FormNo.9)onlygarnered"9"votesinPrecinct37,and"8"votesinPrecinct41-AandmarkedasAnnex"1"andmadeasintegralpartofhisjoint-affidavit.ThisissuewasraisedintheAddendumtoAppellant'sBrief6intheCOMELECCaseEACNo.9-92.WiththedismissalofthatcasebytheCOMELEC'sFirstDivision,thereisnobasisforpetitioner'spresentcontention.Third. Petitioner also assails the decision of the trial court as having been renderedwithout jurisdiction. He contends that theelectionprotestofprivaterespondentwasfiledmorethantendaysafterhis(petitioner's)proclamation.Petitioner is, however, estopped to raise this question now. He did not only appeal from the decision of the trial court to theCOMELECraisingthisquestion,buthealsofiledapetitionformandamusandprohibitionintheCourtofAppeals.Havingdecidedonthiscourseofaction,heshouldnotbeallowedtofilethepresentpetitionjustbecausehelostinthosecases.WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDISMISSEDforlackofmerit.SOORDERED.ATTY.ROMULOB.MACALINTAL,petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,HON.ALBERTOROMULO,inhisofficialcapacityasExecutiveSecretary,andHON.EMILIAT.BONCODIN,SecretaryoftheDepartmentofBudgetandManagement,respondents.DECISIONAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:BeforetheCourtisapetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionfiledbyRomuloB.Macalintal,amemberofthePhilippineBar,seekingadeclarationthatcertainprovisionsofRepublicActNo.9189(TheOverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003)[if!supportFootnotes][1][endif]sufferfromconstitutionalinfirmity.Claimingthathehasactualandmateriallegalinterestinthesubjectmatterofthiscaseinseeingtoitthatpublicfundsareproperlyandlawfullyusedandappropriated,petitionerfiledtheinstantpetitionasataxpayerandasalawyer.TheCourtupholdstherightofpetitionertofilethepresentpetition.R.A.No.9189,entitled,AnActProvidingforASystemofOverseasAbsenteeVotingbyQualifiedCitizensofthePhilippinesAbroad,AppropriatingFundsTherefor,andforOtherPurposes,appropriatesfundsunderSection29thereofwhichprovidesthatasupplementalbudgetontheGeneralAppropriationsActoftheyearofitsenactmentintolawshallprovideforthenecessaryamounttocarryoutitsprovisions.Taxpayers,suchashereinpetitioner,havetherighttorestrainofficialsfromwastingpublicfundsthroughtheenforcementofanunconstitutionalstatute.[if!supportFootnotes][2][endif]TheCourthasheldthattheymayassailthevalidityofalawappropriatingpublicfunds[if!supportFootnotes][3][endif]becauseexpenditureofpublicfundsbyanofficeroftheStateforthepurposeofexecutinganunconstitutionalactconstitutesamisapplicationofsuchfunds.[if!supportFootnotes][4][endif]

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Thechallengedprovisionoflawinvolvesapublicrightthataffectsagreatnumberofcitizens.TheCourthasadoptedthepolicyoftakingjurisdictionovercaseswheneverthepetitionerhasseriouslyandconvincinglypresentedanissueoftranscendentalsignificancetotheFilipinopeople.ThishasbeenexplicitlypronouncedinKapatiranngmgaNaglilingkodsaPamahalaanngPilipinas,Inc.vs.Tan,[if!supportFootnotes][5][endif]wheretheCourtheld:Objectionstotaxpayerssuitforlackofsufficientpersonalitystanding,orinterestare,however,inthemainproceduralmatters.Consideringtheimportancetothepublicofthecasesatbar,andinkeepingwiththeCourtsduty,underthe1987Constitution,todeterminewhetherornottheotherbranchesofgovernmenthavekeptthemselveswithinthelimitsoftheConstitutionandthelawsandthattheyhavenotabusedthediscretiongiventothem,theCourthasbrushedasidetechnicalitiesofprocedureandhastakencognizanceofthesepetitions.[if!supportFootnotes][6][endif]Indeed,inthiscase,theCourtmaysetasideproceduralrulesastheconstitutionalrightofsuffrageofaconsiderablenumberofFilipinosisinvolved.Thequestionofproprietyoftheinstantpetitionwhichmayappeartobevisitedbytheviceofprematurityastherearenoongoingproceedingsinanytribunal,boardorbeforeagovernmentofficialexercisingjudicial,quasi-judicialorministerialfunctionsasrequiredbyRule65oftheRulesofCourt,dimsinlightoftheimportanceoftheconstitutionalissuesraisedbythepetitioner.InTaadavs.Angara,[if!supportFootnotes][7][endif]theCourtheld:InseekingtonullifyanactofthePhilippineSenateonthegroundthatitcontravenestheConstitution,thepetitionnodoubtraisesajusticiablecontroversy.WhereanactionofthelegislativebranchisseriouslyallegedtohaveinfringedtheConstitution,itbecomesnotonlytherightbutinfactthedutyofthejudiciarytosettlethedispute.Thequestionthusposedisjudicialratherthanpolitical.Theduty(toadjudicate)remainstoassurethatthesupremacyoftheConstitutionisupheld.OnceacontroversyastotheapplicationorinterpretationofconstitutionalprovisionisraisedbeforethisCourt(asintheinstantcase),itbecomesalegalissuewhichtheCourtisboundbyconstitutionalmandatetodecide.InanothercaseofparamountimpacttotheFilipinopeople,ithasbeenexpressedthatitisillogicaltoawaittheadverseconsequencesofthelawinordertoconsiderthecontroversyactualandripeforjudicialresolution.[if!supportFootnotes][8][endif]Inyetanothercase,theCourtsaidthat:...despitetheinhibitionspressingupontheCourtwhenconfrontedwithconstitutionalissues,itwillnothesitatetodeclarealaworactinvalidwhenitisconvincedthatthismustbedone.Inarrivingatthisconclusion,itsonlycriterionwillbetheConstitutionandGodasitsconsciencegivesitinthelighttoprobeitsmeaninganddiscoveritspurpose.Personalmotivesandpoliticalconsiderationsareirrelevanciesthatcannotinfluenceitsdecisions.Blandishmentisasineffectualasintimidation,foralltheawesomepoweroftheCongressandExecutive,theCourtwillnothesitatetomakethehammerfallheavily,wheretheactsofthesedepartments,orofanyofficial,betraythepeopleswillasexpressedintheConstitution...[if!supportFootnotes][9][endif]TheneedtoconsidertheconstitutionalissuesraisedbeforetheCourtisfurtherbuttressedbythefactthatitisnowmorethanfifteenyearssincetheratificationofthe1987ConstitutionrequiringCongresstoprovideasystemforabsenteevotingbyqualifiedFilipinosabroad.Thus,strongreasonsofpublicpolicydemandthattheCourtresolvestheinstantpetition[if!supportFootnotes][10][endif]anddeterminewhetherCongresshasactedwithinthelimitsoftheConstitutionorifithadgravelyabusedthediscretionentrustedtoit.[if!supportFootnotes][11][endif]Thepetitionerraisesthreeprincipalquestions:A.DoesSection5(d)ofRep.ActNo.9189allowingtheregistrationofvoterswhoareimmigrantsorpermanentresidentsinothercountriesbytheirmereactofexecutinganaffidavitexpressingtheirintentiontoreturntothePhilippines,violatetheresidencyrequirementinSection1ofArticleVoftheConstitution?B.DoesSection18.5ofthesamelawempoweringtheCOMELECtoproclaimthewinningcandidatesfornationalofficesandpartylistrepresentativesincludingthePresidentandtheVice-PresidentviolatetheconstitutionalmandateunderSection4,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionthatthewinningcandidatesforPresidentandtheVice-PresidentshallbeproclaimedaswinnersbyCongress?C.MayCongress,throughtheJointCongressionalOversightCommitteecreatedinSection25ofRep.ActNo.9189,exercisethepowertoreview,revise,amend,andapprovetheImplementingRulesandRegulationsthattheCommissiononElectionsshallpromulgatewithoutviolatingtheindependenceoftheCOMELECunderSection1,ArticleIX-AoftheConstitution?TheCourtwillresolvethequestionsinseriatim.A.DoesSection5(d)ofRep.ActNo.9189violateSection1,ArticleVofthe1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines?Section5(d)provides:Sec.5.Disqualifications.ThefollowingshallbedisqualifiedfromvotingunderthisAct:.........d)Animmigrantorapermanentresidentwhoisrecognizedassuchinthehostcountry,unlesshe/sheexecutes,uponregistration,anaffidavitpreparedforthepurposebytheCommissiondeclaringthathe/sheshallresumeactualphysicalpermanentresidenceinthePhilippinesnotlaterthanthree(3)yearsfromapprovalofhis/herregistrationunderthisAct.Suchaffidavitshallalsostatethathe/shehasnotappliedforcitizenshipinanothercountry.FailuretoreturnshallbecausefortheremovalofthenameoftheimmigrantorpermanentresidentfromtheNationalRegistryofAbsenteeVotersandhis/herpermanentdisqualificationtovoteinabsentia.PetitionerpositsthatSection5(d)isunconstitutionalbecauseitviolatesSection1,ArticleVofthe1987ConstitutionwhichrequiresthatthevotermustbearesidentinthePhilippinesforatleastoneyearandintheplacewhereheproposestovoteforatleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedinganelection.PetitionercitestherulingoftheCourtinCaasivs.CourtofAppeals[if!supportFootnotes][12][endif]

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tosupporthisclaim.Inthatcase,theCourtheldthatagreencardholderimmigranttotheUnitedStatesisdeemedtohaveabandonedhisdomicileandresidenceinthePhilippines.PetitionerfurtherarguesthatSection1,ArticleVoftheConstitutiondoesnotallowprovisionalregistrationorapromisebyavotertoperformaconditiontobequalifiedtovoteinapoliticalexercise;[if!supportFootnotes][13][endif]thatthelegislatureshouldnotbeallowedtocircumventtherequirementoftheConstitutionontherightofsuffragebyprovidingaconditionthereonwhichineffectamendsoralterstheaforesaidresidencerequirementtoqualifyaFilipinoabroadtovote.[if!supportFootnotes][14][endif]Heclaimsthattherightofsuffrageshouldnotbegrantedtoanyonewho,onthedateoftheelection,doesnotpossessthequalificationsprovidedforbySection1,ArticleVoftheConstitution.RespondentCOMELECrefrainedfromcommentingonthisissue.[if!supportFootnotes][15][endif][if!supportEmptyParas][endif]IncompliancewiththeResolutionoftheCourt,theSolicitorGeneralfiledhiscommentforallpublicrespondents.HecontraposesthattheconstitutionalchallengetoSection5(d)mustfailbecauseoftheabsenceofclearandunmistakableshowingthatsaidprovisionoflawisrepugnanttotheConstitution.Hestresses:Alllawsarepresumedtobeconstitutional;bythedoctrineofseparationofpowers,adepartmentofgovernmentowesabecomingrespectfortheactsoftheothertwodepartments;alllawsarepresumedtohaveadheredtoconstitutionallimitations;thelegislatureintendedtoenactavalid,sensible,andjustlaw.Inaddition,theSolicitorGeneralpointsoutthatSection1,ArticleVoftheConstitutionisaverbatimreproductionofthoseprovidedforinthe1935andthe1973Constitutions.Thus,hecitesCovs.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives[if!supportFootnotes][16][endif]whereintheCourtheldthatthetermresidencehasbeenunderstoodtobesynonymouswithdomicileunderbothConstitutions.Hefurtherarguesthatapersoncanhaveonlyonedomicilebuthecanhavetworesidences,onepermanent(thedomicile)andtheothertemporary;[if!supportFootnotes][17][endif]andthatthedefinitionandmeaninggiventothetermresidencelikewiseappliestoabsenteevoters.InvokingRomualdez-Marcosvs.COMELEC[if!supportFootnotes][18][endif]whichreiteratestheCourtsrulinginFayponvs.Quirino,[if!supportFootnotes][19][endif]theSolicitorGeneralmaintainsthatFilipinoswhoareimmigrantsorpermanentresidentsabroadmayhaveinfactneverabandonedtheirPhilippinedomicile.[if!supportFootnotes][20][endif]TakingissuewiththepetitionerscontentionthatgreencardholdersareconsideredtohaveabandonedtheirPhilippinedomicile,theSolicitorGeneralsuggeststhattheCourtmayhavetodiscarditsrulinginCaasivs.CourtofAppeals[if!supportFootnotes][21][endif]insofarasitrelatestoimmigrantsandpermanentresidentsinforeigncountrieswhohaveexecutedandsubmittedtheiraffidavitsconformablywithSection5(d)ofR.A.No.9189.Hemaintainsthatthroughtheexecutionoftherequisiteaffidavits,theCongressofthePhilippineswiththeconcurrenceofthePresidentoftheRepublichadinfactgiventheseimmigrantsandpermanentresidentstheopportunity,pursuanttoSection2,ArticleVoftheConstitution,tomanifestthattheyhadinfactneverabandonedtheirPhilippinedomicile;thatindubitably,theywouldhaveformallyandcategoricallyexpressedtherequisiteintentions,i.e.,animusmanendiandanimusrevertendi;thatFilipinoimmigrantsandpermanentresidentsabroadpossesstheunquestionablerighttoexercisetherightofsuffrageunderSection1,ArticleVoftheConstitutionuponapprovaloftheirregistration,conformablywithR.A.No.9189.[if!supportFootnotes][22][endif]Theseedofthepresentcontroversyistheinterpretationthatisgiventothephrase,qualifiedcitizensofthePhilippinesabroadasitappearsinR.A.No.9189,towit:SEC.2.DeclarationofPolicy.ItistheprimedutyoftheStatetoprovideasystemofhonestandorderlyoverseasabsenteevotingthatupholdsthesecrecyandsanctityoftheballot.Towardsthisend,theStateensuresequalopportunitytoallqualifiedcitizensofthePhilippinesabroadintheexerciseofthisfundamentalright.SEC.3.DefinitionofTerms.ForpurposesofthisAct:a)AbsenteeVotingreferstotheprocessbywhichqualifiedcitizensofthePhilippinesabroad,exercisetheirrighttovote;...(Emphasissupplied)f)OverseasAbsenteeVoterreferstoacitizenofthePhilippineswhoisqualifiedtoregisterandvoteunderthisAct,nototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,whoisabroadonthedayofelections.(Emphasissupplied)SEC.4.Coverage.AllcitizensofthePhilippinesabroad,whoarenototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,atleasteighteen(18)yearsofageonthedayofelections,mayvoteforpresident,vice-president,senatorsandparty-listrepresentatives.(Emphasissupplied)inrelationtoSections1and2,ArticleVoftheConstitutionwhichread:SEC.1.SuffragemaybeexercisedbyallcitizensofthePhilippinesnototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,whoareatleasteighteenyearsofage,andwhoshallhaveresidedinthePhilippinesforatleastoneyearandintheplacewhereintheyproposetovoteforatleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection.Noliteracy,property,orothersubstantiverequirementshallbeimposedontheexerciseofsuffrage.SEC.2.TheCongressshallprovideasystemforsecuringthesecrecyandsanctityoftheballotaswellasasystemforabsenteevotingbyqualifiedFilipinosabroad..........(Emphasissupplied)Section1,ArticleVoftheConstitutionspecificallyprovidesthatsuffragemaybeexercisedby(1)allcitizensofthePhilippines,(2)nototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,(3)atleasteighteenyearsofage,(4)whoareresidentsinthePhilippinesforatleastoneyearandintheplacewheretheyproposetovoteforatleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection.UnderSection5(d)ofR.A.No.9189,oneofthosedisqualifiedfromvotingisanimmigrantorpermanentresidentwhoisrecognizedassuchinthehostcountryunlesshe/sheexecutesanaffidavitdeclaringthathe/sheshallresumeactualphysicalpermanentresidenceinthePhilippinesnotlaterthanthreeyearsfromapprovalofhis/herregistrationundersaidAct.

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PetitionerquestionstherightnessofthemereactofexecutionofanaffidavittoqualifytheFilipinosabroadwhoareimmigrantsorpermanentresidents,tovote.HefocusessolelyonSection1,ArticleVoftheConstitutioninascribingconstitutionalinfirmitytoSection5(d)ofR.A.No.9189,totallyignoringtheprovisionsofSection2empoweringCongresstoprovideasystemforabsenteevotingbyqualifiedFilipinosabroad.Asimple,cursoryreadingofSection5(d)ofR.A.No.9189mayindeedgivetheimpressionthatitcontravenesSection1,ArticleVoftheConstitution.FilipinoimmigrantsandpermanentresidentsoverseasareperceivedashavingleftandabandonedthePhilippinestolivepermanentlyintheirhostcountriesandtherefore,aprovisioninthelawenfranchisingthosewhodonotpossesstheresidencyrequirementoftheConstitutionbythemereactofexecutinganaffidavitexpressingtheirintenttoreturntothePhilippineswithinagivenperiod,risksadeclarationofunconstitutionality.However,theriskismoreapparentthanreal.TheConstitutionisthefundamentalandparamountlawofthenationtowhichallotherlawsmustconformandinaccordancewithwhichallprivaterightsmustbedeterminedandallpublicauthorityadministered.[if!supportFootnotes][23][endif]LawsthatdonotconformtotheConstitutionshallbestrickendownforbeingunconstitutional.Generally,however,alllawsarepresumedtobeconstitutional.InPeraltavs.COMELEC,theCourtsaid:...Anactofthelegislature,approvedbytheexecutive,ispresumedtobewithinconstitutionallimitations.TheresponsibilityofupholdingtheConstitutionrestsnotonthecourtsalonebutonthelegislatureaswell.Thequestionofthevalidityofeverystatuteisfirstdeterminedbythelegislativedepartmentofthegovernmentitself.[if!supportFootnotes][24][endif]Thus,presumptionofconstitutionalityofalawmustbeovercomeconvincingly:...Todeclarealawunconstitutional,therepugnancyofthatlawtotheConstitutionmustbeclearandunequivocal,forevenifalawisaimedattheattainmentofsomepublicgood,noinfringementofconstitutionalrightsisallowed.Tostrikedownalawtheremustbeaclearshowingthatwhatthefundamentallawcondemnsorprohibits,thestatuteallowsittobedone.[if!supportFootnotes][25][endif]AstheessenceofR.A.No.9189istoenfranchiseoverseasqualifiedFilipinos,itbehoovestheCourttotakeaholisticviewofthepertinentprovisionsofboththeConstitutionandR.A.No.9189.ItisabasicruleinconstitutionalconstructionthattheConstitutionshouldbeconstruedasawhole.InChiongbianvs.DeLeon,[if!supportFootnotes][26][endif]theCourtheldthataconstitutionalprovisionshouldfunctiontothefullextentofitssubstanceanditsterms,notbyitselfalone,butinconjunctionwithallotherprovisionsofthatgreatdocument.Constitutionalprovisionsaremandatoryincharacterunless,eitherbyexpressstatementorbynecessaryimplication,adifferentintentionismanifest.[if!supportFootnotes][27][endif]TheintentoftheConstitutionmaybedrawnprimarilyfromthelanguageofthedocumentitself.Shoulditbeambiguous,theCourtmayconsidertheintentofitsframersthroughtheirdebatesintheconstitutionalconvention.[if!supportFootnotes][28][endif]R.A.No.9189wasenactedinobeisancetothemandateofthefirstparagraphofSection2,ArticleVoftheConstitutionthatCongressshallprovideasystemforvotingbyqualifiedFilipinosabroad.ItmustbestressedthatSection2doesnotprovidefortheparametersoftheexerciseoflegislativeauthorityinenactingsaidlaw.Hence,intheabsenceofrestrictions,CongressispresumedtohavedulyexerciseditsfunctionasdefinedinArticleVI(TheLegislativeDepartment)oftheConstitution.Toputmattersintheirrightperspective,itisnecessarytodwellfirstonthesignificanceofabsenteevoting.Theconceptofabsenteevotingisrelativelynew.Itisviewedthus:Themethodofabsenteevotinghasbeensaidtobecompletelyseparableanddistinctfromtheregularsystemofvoting,andtobeanewanddifferentmannerofvotingfromthatpreviouslyknown,andanexceptiontothecustomaryandusualmannerofvoting.Therightofabsenteeanddisabledvoterstocasttheirballotsatanelectionispurelystatutory;absenteevotingwasunknownto,andnotrecognizedat,thecommonlaw.Absenteevotingisanoutgrowthofmodernsocialandeconomicconditionsdevisedtoaccommodatethoseengagedinmilitaryorcivillifewhosedutiesmakeitimpracticableforthemtoattendtheirpollingplacesonthedayofelection,andtheprivilegeofabsenteevotingmayflowfromconstitutionalprovisionsorbeconferredbystatutes,existinginsomejurisdictions,whichprovideinvaryingtermsforthecastingandreceptionofballotsbysoldiersandsailorsorotherqualifiedvotersabsentonelectiondayfromthedistrictorprecinctoftheirresidence.Suchstatutesareregardedasconferringaprivilegeandnotaright,oranabsoluteright.Whenthelegislaturechoosestogranttherightbystatute,itmustoperatewithequalityamongalltheclasstowhichitisgranted;butstatutesofthisnaturemaybelimitedintheirapplicationtoparticulartypesofelections.Thestatutesshouldbeconstruedinthelightofanyconstitutionalprovisionsaffectingregistrationandelections,andwithdueregardtotheirtextspriortoamendmentandtopredecessorstatutesandthedecisionsthereunder;theyshouldalsobeconstruedinthelightofthecircumstancesunderwhichtheywereenacted;andsoastocarryouttheobjectsthereof,ifthiscanbedonewithoutdoingviolencetotheirprovisionsandmandates.Further,inpassingonstatutesregulatingabsenteevoting,thecourtshouldlooktothewholeandeverypartoftheelectionlaws,theintentoftheentireplan,andreasonsandspiritoftheiradoption,andtrytogiveeffecttoeveryportionthereof.[if!supportFootnotes][29][endif](Emphasissupplied)Ordinarily,anabsenteeisnotaresidentandviceversa;apersoncannotbeatthesametime,botharesidentandanabsentee.[if!supportFootnotes][30][endif]However,underourelectionlawsandthecountlesspronouncementsoftheCourtpertainingtoelections,anabsenteeremainsattachedtohisresidenceinthePhilippinesasresidenceisconsideredsynonymouswithdomicile.InRomualdez-Marcos,[if!supportFootnotes][31][endif]theCourtenunciated:Article50oftheCivilCodedecreesthat[f]ortheexerciseofcivilrightsandthefulfillmentofcivilobligations,thedomicileofnaturalpersonsistheirplaceofhabitualresidence.InOngvs.Republic,thiscourttooktheconceptofdomiciletomeananindividualspermanenthome,aplacetowhich,wheneverabsentforbusinessorforpleasure,oneintendstoreturn,anddependsonfactsand

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circumstancesinthesensethattheydiscloseintent.Basedontheforegoing,domicileincludesthetwinelementsofthefactofresidingorphysicalpresenceinafixedplaceandanimusmanendi,ortheintentionofreturningtherepermanently.Residence,initsordinaryconception,impliesthefactualrelationshipofanindividualtoacertainplace.Itisthephysicalpresenceofapersoninagivenarea,communityorcountry.Theessentialdistinctionbetweenresidenceanddomicileinlawisthatresidenceinvolvestheintenttoleavewhenthepurposeforwhichtheresidenthastakenuphisabodeends.Onemayseekaplaceforpurposessuchaspleasure,business,orhealth.Ifapersonsintentbetoremain,itbecomeshisdomicile;ifhisintentistoleaveassoonashispurposeisestablisheditisresidence.Itisthus,quiteperfectlynormalforanindividualtohavedifferentresidencesinvariousplaces.However,apersoncanonlyhaveasingledomicile,unless,forvariousreasons,hesuccessfullyabandonshisdomicileinfavorofanotherdomicileofchoice.InUytengsuvs.Republic,welaidthisdistinctionquiteclearly:Thereisadifferencebetweendomicileandresidence.Residenceisusedtoindicateaplaceofabode,whetherpermanentortemporary;domiciledenotesafixedpermanentresidencetowhich,whenabsent,onehastheintentionofreturning.Amanmayhavearesidenceinoneplaceandadomicileinanother.Residenceisnotdomicile,butdomicileisresidencecoupledwiththeintentiontoremainforanunlimitedtime.Amancanhavebutonedomicileforthesamepurposeatanytime,buthemayhavenumerousplacesofresidence.Hisplaceofresidenceisgenerallyhisplaceofdomicile,butitisnotbyanymeansnecessarilysosincenolengthofresidencewithoutintentionofremainingwillconstitutedomicile.Forpoliticalpurposestheconceptsofresidenceanddomicilearedictatedbythepeculiarcriteriaofpoliticallaws.Astheseconceptshaveevolvedinourelectionlaw,whathasclearlyandunequivocallyemergedisthefactthatresidenceforelectionpurposesisusedsynonymouslywithdomicile.[if!supportFootnotes][32][endif](Emphasissupplied)AwareofthedomiciliarylegaltiethatlinksanoverseasFilipinotohisresidenceinthiscountry,theframersoftheConstitutionconsideredthecircumstancesthatimpelledthemtorequireCongresstoestablishasystemforoverseasabsenteevoting,thus:MR.OPLE.WithrespecttoSection1,itisnotclearwhethertherightofsuffrage,whichherehasaresidentialrestriction,isnotdeniedtocitizenstemporarilyresidingorworkingabroad.Basedonthestatisticsofseveralgovernmentagencies,thereoughttobeabouttwomillionsuchFilipinosatthistime.CommissionerBernashadearlierpointedoutthattheseprovisionsarereallyliftedfromthetwopreviousConstitutionsof1935and1973,withtheexceptionofthelastparagraph.TheycouldnotthereforehaveforeseenatthattimethephenomenonnowdescribedastheFilipinolaborforceexplosionoverseas.Accordingtogovernmentdata,therearenowabout600,000contractworkersandemployees,andalthoughthemajorportionsoftheseexpatriatecommunitiesofworkersaretobefoundintheMiddleEast,theyarescatteredin177countriesintheworld.InaprevioushearingoftheCommitteeonConstitutionalCommissionsandAgencies,theChairmanoftheCommissiononElections,RamonFelipe,saidthattherewasnoinsuperableobstacletomakingeffectivetherightofsuffrageforFilipinosoverseas.ThosewhohaveadheredtotheirFilipinocitizenshipnotwithstandingstrongtemptationsareexposedtoembraceamoreconvenientforeigncitizenship.Andthosewhoontheirownorunderpressureofeconomicnecessityhere,findthattheyhavetodetachthemselvesfromtheirfamiliestoworkinothercountrieswithdefinitetenuresofemployment.Manyofthemareoncontractemploymentforone,two,orthreeyears.Theyhavenointentionofchangingtheirresidenceonapermanentbasis,butaretechnicallydisqualifiedfromexercisingtherightofsuffrageintheircountriesofdestinationbytheresidentialrequirementinSection1whichsays:SuffrageshallbeexercisedbyallcitizensofthePhilippinesnototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,whoareeighteenyearsofageorover,andwhoshallhaveresidedinthePhilippinesforatleastoneyearandintheplacewhereintheyproposetovoteforatleastsixmonthsprecedingtheelection.I,therefore,asktheCommitteewhetheratthepropertimetheymightentertainanamendmentthatwillmakethisexerciseoftherighttovoteabroadforFilipinocitizensaneffective,ratherthanmerelyanominalrightunderthisproposedConstitution.FR.BERNAS.Certainly,theCommitteewillconsiderthat.Butmorethanjustsayingthat,IwouldliketomakeacommentonthemeaningofresidenceintheConstitutionbecauseIthinkitisaconceptthathasbeendiscussedinvariousdecisionsoftheSupremeCourt,particularlyinthecaseofFayponvs.Quirino,a1954casewhichdealtpreciselywiththemeaningofresidenceintheElectionLaw.Allowmetoquote:Acitizenmayleavetheplaceofhisbirthtolookforgreenerpastures,asthesayinggoes,toimprovehislotandthat,ofcourse,includesstudyinotherplaces,practiceofhisavocation,reengaginginbusiness.Whenanelectionistobeheld,thecitizenwholefthisbirthplacetoimprovehislotmaydecidetoreturntohisnativetown,tocasthisballot,butforprofessionalorbusinessreasons,orforanyotherreason,hemaynotabsenthimselffromtheplaceofhisprofessionalorbusinessactivities.So,theyarehereregisteredasvotersashehasthequalificationstobeone,andisnotwillingtogiveuporlosetheopportunitytochoosetheofficialswhoaretorunthegovernmentespeciallyinnationalelections.Despitesuchregistration,theanimusrevertenditohishome,tohisdomicileorresidenceoforiginhasnotforsakenhim.Thismaybetheexplanationwhytheregistrationofavoterinaplaceotherthanhisresidenceoforiginhasnotbeendeemedsufficienttoconsiderabandonmentorlossofsuchresidenceoforigin.Inotherwords,residenceinthisprovisionreferstotworesidencequalifications:residenceinthePhilippinesandresidenceintheplacewherehewillvote.AsfarasresidenceinthePhilippinesisconcerned,thewordresidencemeansdomicile,butasfarasresidenceintheplacewherehewillactuallycasthisballotisconcerned,themeaningseemstobedifferent.Hecouldhaveadomicilesomewhereelseandyetheisaresidentofaplaceforsixmonthsandheisallowedtovotethere.Sothattheremaybeseriousconstitutionalobstaclestoabsenteevoting,unlessthevoteofthepersonwhoisabsentisavotewhichwillbeconsideredascastintheplaceofhisdomicile.MR.OPLE.Thankyouforcitingthejurisprudence.

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ItgivesmescantcomfortthinkingofabouttwomillionFilipinoswhoshouldenjoytherightofsuffrage,atleastasubstantialsegmentoftheseoverseasFilipinocommunities.TheCommittee,ofcourse,isawarethatwhenthisArticleoftheConstitutionexplicitlyandunequivocallyextendstherightofeffectivesuffragetoFilipinosabroad,thiswillcallforalogisticalexerciseofglobalproportions.Ineffect,thiswillrequirebudgetaryandadministrativecommitmentsonthepartofthePhilippinegovernment,mainlythroughtheCOMELECandtheMinistryofForeignAffairs,andperhaps,amoreextensiveelaborationofthismechanismthatwillbeputinplacetomakeeffectivetherighttovote.Therefore,seekingshelterinsomewisejurisprudenceofthepastmaynotbesufficienttomeetthedemandsoftherightofsuffrageforFilipinosabroadthatIhavementioned.ButIwanttothanktheCommitteeforsayingthatanamendmenttothiseffectmaybeentertainedatthepropertime..........[if!supportFootnotes][33][endif](Emphasissupplied)Thus,theConstitutionalCommissionrecognizedthefactthatwhilemillionsofFilipinosresideabroadprincipallyforeconomicreasonsandhencetheycontributeinnosmallmeasuretotheeconomicupliftofthiscountry,theirvoicesaremarginalinsofarasthechoiceofthiscountrysleadersisconcerned.TheConstitutionalCommissionrealizedthatunderthelawsthenexistingandconsideringthenoveltyofthesystemofabsenteevotinginthisjurisdiction,vestingoverseasFilipinoswiththerighttovotewouldspawnconstitutionalproblemsespeciallybecausetheConstitutionitselfprovidesfortheresidencyrequirementofvoters:MR.REGALADO.BeforeIactonthat,mayIinquirefromCommissionerMonsodifthetermabsenteevotingalsoincludestransientvoting;meaning,thosewhoare,letussay,studyinginManilaneednotgobacktotheirplacesofregistration,forinstance,inMindanao,tocasttheirvotes.MR.MONSOD.IthinkourprovisionisforabsenteevotingbyFilipinosabroad.MR.REGALADO.Howaboutthosepeoplewhocannotgobacktotheplaceswheretheyareregistered?MR.MONSOD.UnderthepresentElectionCode,thereareprovisionsforallowingstudentsandmilitarypeoplewhoaretemporarilyinanotherplacetoregisterandvote.IbelievethatthosesituationscanbecoveredbytheOmnibusElectionCode.ThereasonwewantabsenteevotingtobeintheConstitutionasamandatetothelegislatureisthattherecouldbeinconsistencyontheresidenceruleifitisjustaquestionoflegislationbyCongress.So,byallowingitandsayingthatthisispossible,thenlegislationcantakecareoftherest.[if!supportFootnotes][34][endif](Emphasissupplied)Thus,Section2,ArticleVoftheConstitutioncameintobeingtoremoveanydoubtastotheinapplicabilityoftheresidencyrequirementinSection1.ItispreciselytoavoidanyproblemsthatcouldimpedetheimplementationofitspursuittoenfranchisethelargestnumberofqualifiedFilipinoswhoarenotinthePhilippinesthattheConstitutionalCommissionexplicitlymandatedCongresstoprovideasystemforoverseasabsenteevoting.ThediscussionoftheConstitutionalCommissionontheeffectoftheresidencyrequirementprescribedbySection1,ArticleVoftheConstitutionontheproposedsystemofabsenteevotingforqualifiedFilipinosabroadisenlightening:MR.SUAREZ.MayIjustberecognizedforaclarification.TherearecertainqualificationsfortheexerciseoftherightofsuffragelikehavingresidedinthePhilippinesforatleastoneyearandintheplacewheretheyproposetovoteforatleastsixmonthsprecedingtheelections.WhatistheeffectofthesemandatoryrequirementsonthematteroftheexerciseoftherightofsuffragebytheabsenteevoterslikeFilipinosabroad?THEPRESIDENT.WouldCommissionerMonsodcaretoanswer?MR.MONSOD.IbelievetheanswerwasalreadygivenbyCommissionerBernas,thatthedomicilerequirementsaswellasthequalificationsanddisqualificationswouldbethesame.THEPRESIDENT.Areweleavingittothelegislaturetodevisethesystem?FR.BERNAS.Ithinkthereisaverylegitimateproblemraisedthere.THEPRESIDENT.Yes.MR.BENGZON.IbelieveCommissionerSuarezisclarified.FR.BERNAS.ButIthinkitshouldbefurtherclarifiedwithregardtotheresidencerequirementortheplacewheretheyvoteinpractice;theunderstandingisthatitisflexible.Forinstance,onemightbearesidentofNagaordomiciledtherein,buthesatisfiestherequirementofresidenceinManila,soheisabletovoteinManila.MR.TINGSON.MadamPresident,mayIthensuggesttotheCommitteetochangethewordFilipinostoQUALIFIEDFILIPINOVOTERS.InsteadofVOTINGBYFILIPINOSABROAD,itshouldbeQUALIFIEDFILIPINOVOTERS.IftheCommitteewantsQUALIFIEDVOTERSLIVINGABROAD,wouldthatnotsatisfytherequirement?THEPRESIDENT.WhatdoesCommissionerMonsodsay?MR.MONSOD.MadamPresident,IthinkIwouldacceptthephraseQUALIFIEDFILIPINOSABROADbecauseQUALIFIEDwouldassumethathehasthequalificationsandnoneofthedisqualificationstovote.MR.TINGSON.Thatisright.SodoestheCommitteeaccept?FR.BERNAS.QUALIFIEDFILIPINOSABROAD?THEPRESIDENT.DoestheCommitteeaccepttheamendment?MR.REGALADO.MadamPresident.THEPRESIDENT.CommissionerRegaladoisrecognized.MR.REGALADO.WhenCommissionerBengzonaskedmetoreadmyproposedamendment,IspecificallystatedthattheNationalAssemblyshallprescribeasystemwhichwillenablequalifiedcitizens,temporarilyabsentfromthePhilippines,tovote.AccordingtoCommissionerMonsod,theuseofthephraseabsenteevotingalreadytookthatintoaccountasitsmeaning.Thatisreferringto

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qualifiedFilipinocitizenstemporarilyabroad.MR.MONSOD.Yes,weacceptedthat.Iwouldliketosaythatwithrespecttoregistrationwewillleaveituptothelegislativeassembly,forexample,torequirewheretheregistrationis.Ifitis,say,membersofthediplomaticcorpswhomaybecontinuouslyabroadforalongtime,perhaps,therecanbeasystemofregistrationintheembassies.However,wedonotliketopreemptthelegislativeassembly.THEPRESIDENT.Justtoclarify,CommissionerMonsodsamendmentisonlytoprovideasystem.MR.MONSOD.Yes.THEPRESIDENT.TheCommissionerisnotstatingherethathewantsnewqualificationsfortheseabsenteevoters.MR.MONSOD.Thatisright.Theymusthavethequalificationsandnoneofthedisqualifications.THEPRESIDENT.Itisjusttodeviseasystembywhichtheycanvote.MR.MONSOD.Thatisright,MadamPresident.[if!supportFootnotes][35][endif](Emphasissupplied)Clearlytherefrom,theintentoftheConstitutionalCommissionistoentrusttoCongresstheresponsibilityofdevisingasystemofabsenteevoting.ThequalificationsofvotersasstatedinSection1shallremainexceptfortheresidencyrequirement.ThisisinfactthereasonwhytheConstitutionalCommissionoptedforthetermqualifiedFilipinosabroadwithrespecttothesystemofabsenteevotingthatCongressshoulddrawup.AsstressedbyCommissionerMonsod,bytheuseoftheadjectivequalifiedwithrespecttoFilipinosabroad,theassumptionisthattheyhavethequalificationsandnoneofthedisqualificationstovote.Infine-tuningtheprovisiononabsenteevoting,theConstitutionalCommissiondiscussedhowthesystemshouldwork:MR.SUAREZ.Forclarificationpurposes,wejustwanttostatefortherecordthatinthecaseofqualifiedFilipinocitizensresidingabroadandexercisingtheirrightofsuffrage,theycancasttheirvotesforthecandidatesintheplacewheretheywereregisteredtovoteinthePhilippines.Soastoavoidanycomplications,forexample,iftheyareregisteredinAngelesCity,theycouldnotvoteforamayorinNagaCity.Inotherwords,ifthatqualifiedvoterisregisteredinAngelesCity,thenhecanvoteonlyforthelocalandnationalcandidatesinAngelesCity.Ijustwanttomakethatclearfortherecord.MR.REGALADO.MadamPresident.THEPRESIDENT.WhatdoesCommissionerRegaladosay?MR.REGALADO.IjustwanttomakeanoteonthestatementofCommissionerSuarezthatthisenvisionsFilipinosresidingabroad.TheunderstandingintheamendmentisthattheFilipinoistemporarilyabroad.Hemaynotbeactuallyresidingabroad;hemayjustbethereonabusinesstrip.ItjustsohappensthatthedaybeforetheelectionshehastoflytotheUnitedStates,sohecouldnotcasthisvote.Heistemporarilyabroad,butnotresidingthere.Hestaysinahotelfortwodaysandcomesback.ThisisnotlimitedonlytoFilipinostemporarilyresidingabroad.Butaslongasheistemporarilyabroadonthedateoftheelections,thenhecanfallwithintheprescriptionofCongressinthatsituation.MR.SUAREZ.IthanktheCommissionerforhisfurtherclarification.Precisely,weneedthisclarificationonrecord.MR.MONSOD.MadamPresident,toclarifywhatwemeanbytemporarilyabroad,itneednotbeonveryshorttrips.Onecanbeabroadonatreatytradersvisa.Therefore,whenwetalkaboutregistration,itispossiblethathisresidenceisinAngelesandhewouldbeabletovoteforthecandidatesinAngeles,butCongressortheAssemblymayprovidetheprocedureforregistration,likelistingonesname,inaregistrylistintheembassyabroad.Thatisstillpossibleunderthesystem.FR.BERNAS.MadamPresident,justoneclarificationifCommissionerMonsodagreeswiththis.Supposewehaveasituationofachildofadiplomaticofficerwhoreachesthevotingagewhilelivingabroadandhehasneverregisteredhere.Wherewillheregister?WillhebearegisteredvoterofacertainlocalityinthePhilippines?MR.MONSOD.Yes,itispossiblethatthesystemwillenablethatchildtocomplywiththeregistrationrequirementsinanembassyintheUnitedStatesandhisnameisthenenteredintheofficialregistrationbookinAngelesCity,forinstance.FR.BERNAS.Inotherwords,heisnotaregisteredvoterofLosAngeles,butaregisteredvoterofalocalityhere.MR.MONSOD.Thatisright.HedoesnothavetocomehometothePhilippinestocomplywiththeregistrationprocedurehere.FR.BERNAS.So,hedoesnothavetocomehome.MR.BENGZON.MadamPresident,theFloorLeaderwishestoinquireiftherearemoreclarificationsneededfromthebody.Also,theFloorLeaderishappytoannouncethattherearenomoreregisteredCommissionerstoproposeamendments.SoImovethatweclosetheperiodofamendments.[if!supportFootnotes][36][endif](Emphasissupplied)ItisclearfromthesediscussionsofthemembersoftheConstitutionalCommissionthattheyintendedtoenfranchiseasmuchaspossibleallFilipinocitizensabroadwhohavenotabandonedtheirdomicileoforigin.TheCommissionevenintendedtoextendtoyoungFilipinoswhoreachvotingageabroadwhoseparentsdomicileoforiginisinthePhilippines,andconsiderthemqualifiedasvotersforthefirsttime.ItisinpursuanceofthatintentionthattheCommissionprovidedforSection2immediatelyaftertheresidencyrequirementofSection1.Bythedoctrineofnecessaryimplicationinstatutoryconstruction,whichmaybeappliedinconstruingconstitutionalprovisions,[if!supportFootnotes][37][endif]thestrategiclocationofSection2indicatesthattheConstitutionalCommissionprovidedforanexceptiontotheactualresidencyrequirementofSection1withrespecttoqualifiedFilipinosabroad.ThesameCommissionhasineffectdeclaredthatqualifiedFilipinoswhoarenotinthePhilippinesmaybeallowedtovoteeventhoughtheydonotsatisfytheresidencyrequirementinSection1,ArticleVoftheConstitution.ThatSection2ofArticleVoftheConstitutionisanexceptiontotheresidencyrequirementfoundinSection1ofthesameArticle

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wasinfactthesubjectofdebatewhenSenateBillNo.2104,whichbecameR.A.No.9189,wasdeliberateduponontheSenatefloor,thus:SenatorArroyo.Mr.President,thisbillshouldbelookedintoinrelationtotheconstitutionalprovisions.Ithinkthesponsor

andIwouldagreethattheConstitutionissupremeinanystatutethatwemayenact.

LetmereadSection1,ArticleV,oftheConstitutionentitled,Suffrage.Itsays:Section1.SuffragemaybeexercisedbyallcitizensofthePhilippinesnototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,whoareatleasteighteenyearsofage,andwhoshallhaveresidedinthePhilippinesforatleastoneyearandintheplacewhereintheyproposetovoteforatleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection.Now,Mr.President,theConstitutionsays,whoshallhaveresidedinthePhilippines.Theyarepermanentimmigrants.TheyhavechangedresidencesotheyarebarredundertheConstitution.ThisiswhyIaskedwhetherthiscommitteeamendmentwhichinfactdoesnotaltertheoriginaltextofthebillwillhaveanyeffectonthis?Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the

Constitution.One,theinterpretationhereofresidenceissynonymouswithdomicile.

AsthegentlemanandIknow,Mr.President,domicileistheintenttoreturntooneshome.AndthefactthataFilipinomayhavebeenphysicallyabsentfromthePhilippinesandmaybephysicallyaresidentoftheUnitedStates,forexample,buthasaclear intenttoreturntothePhilippines,willmakehimqualifiedasaresidentof thePhilippinesunderthislaw.

Thisisconsistent,Mr.President,withtheconstitutionalmandatethatwethatCongressmustprovideafranchisetooverseasFilipinos.

IfwereadtheConstitutionandthesuffrageprincipleliterallyasdemandingphysicalpresence,thenthereisnowaywecanprovideforoffshorevotingtoouroffshorekababayan,Mr.President.SenatorArroyo.Mr.President,whentheConstitutionsays,inSection2ofArticleV,itreads:TheCongressshallprovidea

systemforsecuringthesecrecyandsanctityoftheballotaswellasasystemforabsenteevotingbyqualifiedFilipinosabroad.

Thekeytothiswholeexercise,Mr.President,isqualified.Inotherwords,anythingthatwemaydoorsayingrantingourcompatriotsabroadmustbeanchoredonthepropositionthattheyarequalified.Absentthequalification,theycannotvote.Andresidents(sic)isaqualification.Iwilllosevotesherefrompermanentresidentsso-calledgreen-cardholders,buttheConstitutionistheConstitution.Wecannotcompromiseonthis.TheSenatecannotbeapartytosomethingthatwouldaffectorimpairtheConstitution.LookatwhattheConstitutionsaysIntheplacewhereintheyproposetovoteforatleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection.Mr.President,allofusherehaverun(sic)foroffice.IliveinMakati.MyneighborisPateroswhereSenatorCayetanolives.Weareseparatedonlybyacreek.ButonewhovotesinMakaticannotvoteinPaterosunlessheresidesinPaterosforsixmonths.ThatishowrestrictiveourConstitutionis.IamnottalkingevenabouttheElectionCode.IamtalkingabouttheConstitution.AsIhavesaid,ifavoterinMakatiwouldwanttovoteinPateros,yes,hemaydoso.Buthemustdoso,makethetransfersixmonthsbeforetheelection,otherwise,heisnotqualifiedtovote.ThatiswhyIamraisingthispointbecauseIthinkwehaveafundamentaldifferencehere.SenatorAngara. It isagoodpointtoraise,Mr.President.But it isapointalreadywell-debatedevenintheconstitutional

commissionof1986.AndthereasonSection2ofArticleVwasplacedimmediatelyafterthesix-month/one-year residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absenteevoting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr.President,thatonemustremember.

Thesecondreason,Mr.President, isthatunderourjurisprudenceandIthinkthis issowell-entrenchedthatoneneednot

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argueaboutitresidencyhasbeeninterpretedassynonymouswithdomicile.

But the thirdmorepractical reason,Mr. President, is, ifwe follow the interpretationof the gentleman, then it islegally and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do notphysically live inthecountry,whichisquiteridiculousbecausethat isexactlythewholepointof thisexercisetoenfranchisethemandempowerthemtovote.

[if!supportFootnotes][38][endif](Emphasissupplied)Accordingly,Section4ofR.A.No.9189providesforthecoverageoftheabsenteevotingprocess,towit:SEC.4.Coverage.AllcitizensofthePhilippinesabroad,whoarenototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,atleasteighteen(18)yearsofageonthedayofelections,mayvoteforpresident,vice-president,senatorsandparty-listrepresentatives.whichdoesnotrequirephysicalresidencyinthePhilippines;andSection5oftheassailedlawwhichenumeratesthosewhoaredisqualified,towit:SEC.5.Disqualifications.ThefollowingshallbedisqualifiedfromvotingunderthisAct:a)ThosewhohavelosttheirFilipinocitizenshipinaccordancewithPhilippinelaws;b)ThosewhohaveexpresslyrenouncedtheirPhilippinecitizenshipandwhohavepledgedallegiancetoaforeigncountry;c)Thosewhohavecommittedandareconvictedinafinaljudgmentbyacourtortribunalofanoffensepunishablebyimprisonmentofnotlessthanone(1)year,includingthosewhohavecommittedandbeenfoundguiltyofDisloyaltyasdefinedunderArticle137oftheRevisedPenalCode,suchdisabilitynothavingbeenremovedbyplenarypardonoramnesty:Provided,however,Thatanypersondisqualifiedtovoteunderthissubsectionshallautomaticallyacquiretherighttovoteuponexpirationoffive(5)yearsafterserviceofsentence;Provided,further,ThattheCommissionmaytakecognizanceoffinaljudgmentsissuedbyforeigncourtsortribunalsonlyonthebasisofreciprocityandsubjecttotheformalitiesandprocessesprescribedbytheRulesofCourtonexecutionofjudgments;d)Animmigrantorapermanentresidentwhoisrecognizedassuchinthehostcountry,unlesshe/sheexecutes,uponregistration,anaffidavitpreparedforthepurposebytheCommissiondeclaringthathe/sheshallresumeactualphysicalpermanentresidenceinthePhilippinesnotlaterthanthree(3)yearsfromapprovalofhis/herregistrationunderthisAct.Suchaffidavitshallalsostatethathe/shehasnotappliedforcitizenshipinanothercountry.FailuretoreturnshallbecausefortheremovalofthenameoftheimmigrantorpermanentresidentfromtheNationalRegistryofAbsenteeVotersandhis/herpermanentdisqualificationtovoteinabsentia.e)AnycitizenofthePhilippinesabroadpreviouslydeclaredinsaneorincompetentbycompetentauthorityinthePhilippinesorabroad,asverifiedbythePhilippineembassies,consulatesorforeignserviceestablishmentsconcerned,unlesssuchcompetentauthoritysubsequentlycertifiesthatsuchpersonisnolongerinsaneorincompetent.Asfinallyapprovedintolaw,Section5(d)ofR.A.No.9189specificallydisqualifiesanimmigrantorpermanentresidentwhoisrecognizedassuchinthehostcountrybecauseimmigrationorpermanentresidenceinanothercountryimpliesrenunciationofonesresidenceinhiscountryoforigin.However,sameSectionallowsanimmigrantandpermanentresidentabroadtoregisterasvoterforaslongashe/sheexecutesanaffidavittoshowthathe/shehasnotabandonedhisdomicileinpursuanceoftheconstitutionalintentexpressedinSections1and2ofArticleVthatallcitizensofthePhilippinesnototherwisedisqualifiedbylawmustbeentitledtoexercisetherightofsuffrageand,thatCongressmustestablishasystemforabsenteevoting;forotherwise,ifactual,physicalresidenceinthePhilippinesisrequired,thereisnosensefortheframersoftheConstitutiontomandateCongresstoestablishasystemforabsenteevoting.Contrarytotheclaimofpetitioner,theexecutionoftheaffidavititselfisnottheenablingorenfranchisingact.TheaffidavitrequiredinSection5(d)isnotonlyproofoftheintentionoftheimmigrantorpermanentresidenttogobackandresumeresidencyinthePhilippines,butmoresignificantly,itservesasanexplicitexpressionthathehadnotinfactabandonedhisdomicileoforigin.Thus,itisnotcorrecttosaythattheexecutionoftheaffidavitunderSection5(d)violatestheConstitutionthatproscribesprovisionalregistrationorapromisebyavotertoperformaconditiontobequalifiedtovoteinapoliticalexercise.Torepeat,theaffidavitisrequiredofimmigrantsandpermanentresidentsabroadbecausebytheirstatusintheirhostcountries,theyarepresumedtohaverelinquishedtheirintenttoreturntothiscountry;thus,withouttheaffidavit,thepresumptionofabandonmentofPhilippinedomicileshallremain.FurtherperusalofthetranscriptsoftheSenateproceedingsdisclosesanotherreasonwhytheSenaterequiredtheexecutionofsaidaffidavit.Itwantedtheaffianttoexercisetheoptiontoreturnortoexpresshisintentiontoreturntohisdomicileoforiginandnottopreemptthatchoicebylegislation.Thus:SenatorVillar.Yes,wearegoingback.

Itstatesthat:ForFilipinoimmigrantsandthosewhohaveacquiredpermanentresidentstatusabroad,arequirementfortheregistration is the submission of a Sworn Declaration of Intent to Return duly sworn before any Philippine

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embassyorconsulateofficialauthorizedtoadministeroath

Mr.President,mayweknowtherationaleofthisprovision?IsthepurposeofthisSwornDeclarationtoincludeonlythosewho have the intention of returning to be qualified to exercise the right of suffrage? What if the Filipinoimmigranthasnopurposeofreturning?Isheautomaticallydisbarredfromexercisingthisrighttosuffrage?

SenatorAngara.Therationaleforthis,Mr.President, isthatwewanttobeexpansiveandall-inclusiveinthislaw.ThataslongasheisaFilipino,nomatterwhetherheisagreen-cardholderintheU.S.ornot,hewillbeauthorized to vote. But if he is already a green-card holder, that means he has acquired permanentresidencyintheUnitedStates,thenhemustindicateanintentiontoreturn.Thisiswhatmakesforthedefinition of domicile. And to acquire the vote,we thought thatwewould require the immigrants and thegreen-cardholders . . .Mr.President, the threeadministrationsenatorsare leaving,maybewemayask foravote[Laughter].

SenatorVillar.Foramerienda,Mr.President.

SenatorAngara.Mr.President,goingbacktothebusinessathand.Therationalefortherequirementthatanimmigrantoragreen-card holder should file an affidavit that he will go back to the Philippines is that, if he is already animmigrantoragreen-cardholder,thatmeanshemaynotreturntothecountryanymoreandthatcontradictsthedefinitionofdomicileunderthelaw.

Butwhatwearetryingtodohere,Mr.President,isreallyprovidethechoicetothevoter.Thevoter,afterconsultinghislawyerorafterdeliberationwithinthefamily,maydecideNo,IthinkweareriskingourpermanentstatusintheUnitedStatesifwefileanaffidavitthatwewanttogoback.Butwewanttogivehimtheopportunitytomakethatdecision.Wedonotwanttomakethatdecisionforhim.[if!supportFootnotes][39][endif](Emphasissupplied)ThejurisprudentialdeclarationinCaasivs.CourtofAppealsthatgreencardholdersaredisqualifiedtorunforanyelectiveofficefindsnoapplicationtothepresentcasebecausetheCaasicasedidnot,forobviousreasons,considertheabsenteevotingrightsofFilipinoswhoareimmigrantsandpermanentresidentsintheirhostcountries.IntheadventofTheOverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003orR.A.9189,theymaystillbeconsideredasaqualifiedcitizenofthePhilippinesabroaduponfulfillmentoftherequirementsofregistrationunderthenewlawforthepurposeofexercisingtheirrightofsuffrage.ItmustbeemphasizedthatSection5(d)doesnotonlyrequireanaffidavitorapromisetoresumeactualphysicalpermanentresidenceinthePhilippinesnotlaterthanthreeyearsfromapprovalofhis/herregistration,theFilipinosabroadmustalsodeclarethattheyhavenotappliedforcitizenshipinanothercountry.Thus,theymustreturntothePhilippines;otherwise,theirfailuretoreturnshallbecausefortheremovaloftheirnamesfromtheNationalRegistryofAbsenteeVotersandhis/herpermanentdisqualificationtovoteinabsentia.Thus,CongresscraftedaprocessofregistrationbywhichaFilipinovoterpermanentlyresidingabroadwhoisatleasteighteenyearsold,nototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,whohasnotrelinquishedPhilippinecitizenshipandwhohasnotactuallyabandonedhis/herintentionstoreturntohis/herdomicileoforigin,thePhilippines,isallowedtoregisterandvoteinthePhilippineembassy,consulateorotherforeignserviceestablishmentsoftheplacewhichhasjurisdictionoverthecountrywherehe/shehasindicatedhis/heraddressforpurposesoftheelections,whileprovidingforsafeguardstoacleanelection.Thus,Section11ofR.A.No.9189provides:SEC.11.ProcedureforApplicationtoVoteinAbsentia.11.1.EveryqualifiedcitizenofthePhilippinesabroadwhoseapplicationforregistrationhasbeenapproved,includingthosepreviouslyregisteredunderRepublicActNo.8189,shall,ineverynationalelection,filewiththeofficeroftheembassy,consulateorotherforeignserviceestablishmentauthorizedbytheCommission,aswornwrittenapplicationtovoteinaformprescribedbytheCommission.Theauthorizedofficerofsuchembassy,consulateorotherforeignserviceestablishmentshalltransmittotheCommissionthesaidapplicationtovotewithinfive(5)daysfromreceiptthereof.Theapplicationformshallbeaccomplishedintriplicateandsubmittedtogetherwiththephotocopyofhis/heroverseasabsenteevotercertificateofregistration.11.2.Everyapplicationtovoteinabsentiamaybedonepersonallyat,orbymailto,theembassy,consulateorforeignserviceestablishment,whichhasjurisdictionoverthecountrywherehe/shehasindicatedhis/heraddressforpurposesoftheelections.11.3.Consularanddiplomaticservicesrenderedinconnectionwiththeoverseasabsenteevotingprocessesshallbemadeavailable

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atnocosttotheoverseasabsenteevoter.ContrarytopetitionersclaimthatSection5(d)circumventstheConstitution,Congressenactedthelawprescribingasystemofoverseasabsenteevotingincompliancewiththeconstitutionalmandate.SuchmandateexpresslyrequiresthatCongressprovideasystemofabsenteevotingthatnecessarilypresupposesthatthequalifiedcitizenofthePhilippinesabroadisnotphysicallypresentinthecountry.TheprovisionsofSections5(d)and11arecomponentsofthesystemofoverseasabsenteevotingestablishedbyR.A.No.9189.ThequalifiedFilipinoabroadwhoexecutedtheaffidavitisdeemedtohaveretainedhisdomicileinthePhilippines.Heispresumednottohavelosthisdomicilebyhisphysicalabsencefromthiscountry.Hishavingbecomeanimmigrantorpermanentresidentofhishostcountrydoesnotnecessarilyimplyanabandonmentofhisintentiontoreturntohisdomicileoforigin,thePhilippines.Therefore,underthelaw,hemustbegiventheopportunitytoexpressthathehasnotactuallyabandonedhisdomicileinthePhilippinesbyexecutingtheaffidavitrequiredbySections5(d)and8(c)ofthelaw.PetitionersspeculativeapprehensionthattheimplementationofSection5(d)wouldaffectthecredibilityoftheelectionsisinsignificantaswhatisimportantistoensurethatallthosewhopossessthequalificationstovoteonthedateoftheelectionaregiventheopportunityandpermittedtofreelydoso.TheCOMELECandtheDepartmentofForeignAffairshaveenoughresourcesandtalentstoensuretheintegrityandcredibilityofanyelectionconductedpursuanttoR.A.No.9189.AstotheeventualitythattheFilipinoabroadwouldrenegeonhisundertakingtoreturntothePhilippines,thepenaltyofperpetualdisenfranchisementprovidedforbySection5(d)wouldsufficetoserveasdeterrencetonon-compliancewithhis/herundertakingundertheaffidavit.

Petitionerarguesthatshouldasizablenumberofimmigrantsrenegeontheirpromisetoreturn,theresultoftheelectionswouldbeaffectedandcouldevenbeagroundtocontesttheproclamationofthewinningcandidatesandcausefurtherconfusionanddoubtontheintegrityoftheresultsoftheelection.Indeed,theprobabilitythatafteranimmigranthasexercisedtherighttovote,heshallopttoremaininhishostcountrybeyondthethirdyearfromtheexecutionoftheaffidavit,isnotfarfetched.However,itisnotforthisCourttodeterminethewisdomofalegislativeexercise.AsexpressedinTaadavs.Tuvera,[if!supportFootnotes][40][endif]theCourtisnotcalledupontoruleonthewisdomofthelawortorepealitormodifyitifwefinditimpractical.

Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it has addressed the expected problem. Section 5(d) itselfprovidesforadeterrencewhichisthattheFilipinowhofailstoreturnaspromisedstandstolosehisrightofsuffrage.UnderSection9,shouldaregisteredoverseasabsenteevoterfailtovotefortwoconsecutivenationalelections,hisnamemaybeorderedremovedfromtheNationalRegistryofOverseasAbsenteeVoters.

Otherseriouslegalquestionsthatmayberaisedwouldbe:whathappenstothevotescastbythequalifiedvotersabroadwhowerenotabletoreturnwithinthreeyearsaspromised?Whatistheeffectonthevotescastbythenon-returneesinfavorofthewinningcandidates?ThevotescastbyqualifiedFilipinosabroadwhofailedtoreturnwithinthreeyearsshallnotbe invalidatedbecause theywerequalified tovoteon thedateof theelections,but their failure to return shallbe cause for the removalof thenames of the immigrants or permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and their permanentdisqualificationtovoteinabsentia.

In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court does not find Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 asconstitutionallydefective.B.IsSection18.5ofR.A.No.9189inrelationtoSection4ofthesameActincontraventionofSection4,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution?Section4ofR.A.No.9189providesthattheoverseasabsenteevotermayvoteforpresident,vice-president,senatorsandparty-listrepresentatives.Section18.5ofthesameActprovides:SEC.18.On-SiteCountingandCanvassing..........18.5Thecanvassofvotesshallnotcausethedelayoftheproclamationofawinningcandidateiftheoutcomeoftheelectionwillnotbeaffectedbytheresultsthereof.Notwithstandingtheforegoing,theCommissionisempoweredtoordertheproclamationofwinningcandidatesdespitethefactthatthescheduledelectionhasnottakenplaceinaparticularcountryorcountries,iftheholdingofelectionsthereinhasbeenrenderedimpossiblebyevents,factorsandcircumstancespeculiartosuchcountryorcountries,inwhichevents,factorsandcircumstancesarebeyondthecontrolorinfluenceoftheCommission.(Emphasissupplied)PetitionerclaimsthattheprovisionofSection18.5ofR.A.No.9189empoweringtheCOMELECtoordertheproclamationofwinningcandidatesinsofarasitaffectsthecanvassofvotesandproclamationofwinningcandidatesforpresidentandvice-president,isunconstitutionalbecauseitviolatesthefollowingprovisionsofparagraph4,Section4ofArticleVIIoftheConstitution:SEC.4...ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVice-President,dulycertifiedbytheboardofcanvassersofeachprovinceorcity,shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentoftheSenate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirtydaysafterthedayoftheelection,openallthecertificatesinthepresenceoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationoftheauthenticityanddueexecutionthereofinthemannerprovidedbylaw,canvassthevotes.Thepersonhavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoormoreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes,oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythevoteofamajorityofalltheMembersofbothHousesoftheCongress,votingseparately.

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TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates....whichgivestoCongressthedutytocanvassthevotesandproclaimthewinningcandidatesforpresidentandvice-president.TheSolicitorGeneralassertsthatthisprovisionmustbeharmonizedwithparagraph4,Section4,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionandshouldbetakentomeanthatCOMELECcanonlyproclaimthewinningSenatorsandparty-listrepresentativesbutnotthePresidentandVice-President.[if!supportFootnotes][41][endif]RespondentCOMELEChasnocommentonthematter.Indeed,thephrase,proclamationofwinningcandidates,inSection18.5ofR.A.No.9189isfartoosweepingthatitnecessarilyincludestheproclamationofthewinningcandidatesforthepresidencyandthevice-presidency.Section18.5ofR.A.No.9189appearstoberepugnanttoSection4,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutiononlyinsofarassaidSectiontotallydisregardedtheauthoritygiventoCongressbytheConstitutiontoproclaimthewinningcandidatesforthepositionsofpresidentandvice-president.Inaddition,theCourtnotesthatSection18.4ofthelaw,towit:18.4....Immediatelyuponthecompletionofthecanvass,thechairmanoftheSpecialBoardofCanvassersshalltransmitviafacsimile,electronicmail,oranyothermeansoftransmissionequallysafeandreliabletheCertificatesofCanvassandtheStatementsofVotestotheCommission,...[Emphasissupplied]clasheswithparagraph4,Section4,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionwhichprovidesthatthereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVice-PresidentshallbecertifiedbytheboardofcanvasserstoCongress.CongresscouldnothaveallowedtheCOMELECtousurpapowerthatconstitutionallybelongstoitor,asaptlystatedbypetitioner,toencroachonthepowerofCongresstocanvassthevotesforpresidentandvice-presidentandthepowertoproclaimthewinnersforthesaidpositions.TheprovisionsoftheConstitutionasthefundamentallawofthelandshouldbereadaspartofTheOverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003andhence,thecanvassingofthevotesandtheproclamationofthewinningcandidatesforpresidentandvice-presidentfortheentirenationmustremaininthehandsofCongress.C.AreSections19and25ofR.A.No.9189inviolationofSection1,ArticleIX-AoftheConstitution?PetitioneraversthatSections19and25ofR.A.No.9189violateArticleIX-A(CommonProvisions)oftheConstitution,towit:Section1.TheConstitutionalCommissions,whichshallbeindependent,aretheCivilServiceCommission,theCommissiononElections,andtheCommissiononAudit.(Emphasissupplied)HesubmitsthatthecreationoftheJointCongressionalOversightCommitteewiththepowertoreview,revise,amendandapprovetheImplementingRulesandRegulationspromulgatedbytheCOMELEC,R.A.No.9189intrudesintotheindependenceoftheCOMELECwhich,asaconstitutionalbody,isnotunderthecontrolofeithertheexecutiveorlegislativedepartmentsofgovernment;thatonlytheCOMELECitselfcanpromulgaterulesandregulationswhichmaybechangedorrevisedonlybythemajorityofitsmembers;andthatshouldtherulespromulgatedbytheCOMELECviolateanylaw,itistheCourtthathasthepowertoreviewthesameviathepetitionofanyinterestedparty,includingthelegislators.ItisonlyonthisquestionthatrespondentCOMELECsubmitteditsComment.ItagreeswiththepetitionerthatSections19and25ofR.A.No.9189areunconstitutional.Likethepetitioner,respondentCOMELECanchorsitsclaimofunconstitutionalityofsaidSectionsuponSection1,ArticleIX-AoftheConstitutionprovidingfortheindependenceoftheconstitutionalcommissionssuchastheCOMELEC.ItassertsthatitspowertoformulaterulesandregulationshasbeenupheldinGallardovs.Tabamo,Jr.[if!supportFootnotes][42][endif]wherethisCourtheldthatthepoweroftheCOMELECtoformulaterulesandregulationsisimplicitinitspowertoimplementregulationsunderSection2(1)ofArticleIX-C[if!supportFootnotes][43][endif]oftheConstitution.COMELECjoinsthepetitionerinassertingthatasanindependentconstitutionalbody,itmaynotbesubjecttointerferencebyanygovernmentinstrumentalityandthatonlythisCourtmayreviewCOMELECrulesandonlyincasesofgraveabuseofdiscretion.TheCOMELECadds,however,thatanotherprovision,vis--visitsrule-makingpower,towit:SEC.17.VotingbyMail.17.1.FortheMay,2004elections,theCommissionshallauthorizevotingbymailinnotmorethanthree(3)countries,subjecttotheapprovaloftheCongressionalOversightCommittee.Votingbymailmaybeallowedincountriesthatsatisfythefollowingconditions:a)Wherethemailingsystemisfairlywell-developedandsecuretopreventoccasionforfraud;b)Wherethereexistsatechnicallyestablishedidentificationsystemthatwouldprecludemultipleorproxyvoting;andc)Wherethesystemofreceptionandcustodyofmailedballotsintheembassies,consulatesandotherforeignserviceestablishmentsconcernedareadequateandwell-secured.Thereafter,votingbymailinanycountryshallbeallowedonlyuponreviewandapprovaloftheJointCongressionalOversightCommittee..........(Emphasissupplied)islikewiseunconstitutionalasitviolatesSection1,ArticleIX-Amandatingtheindependenceofconstitutionalcommissions.TheSolicitorGeneraltakesexceptiontohisprefatorystatementthattheconstitutionalchallengemustfailandagreeswiththepetitionerthatSections19and25areinvalidandunconstitutionalonthegroundthatthereisnothinginArticleVIoftheConstitutiononLegislativeDepartmentthatwouldasmuchasimplythatCongresshasconcurrentpowertoenforceandadministerelectionlawswiththeCOMELEC;andbytheprinciplesofexclusiouniusestexclusioalteriusandexpressumfacitcessaretacitum,theconstitutionallyenumeratedpowersofCongresscircumscribeitsauthoritytotheexclusionofallothers.

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ThepartiesareunanimousinclaimingthatSections19,25andportionsofSection17.1areunconstitutional.Thus,thereisnoactualissueforgedonthisquestionraisedbypetitioner.However,theCourtfindsitexpedienttoexpoundontheroleofCongressthroughtheJointCongressionalOversightCommittee(JCOC)vis--vistheindependenceoftheCOMELEC,asaconstitutionalbody.R.A.No.9189createdtheJCOC,asfollows:SEC.25.JointCongressionalOversightCommittee.AJointCongressionalOversightCommitteeisherebycreated,composedoftheChairmanoftheSenateCommitteeonConstitutionalAmendments,RevisionofCodesandLaws,andseven(7)otherSenatorsdesignatedbytheSenatePresident,andtheChairmanoftheHouseCommitteeonSuffrageandElectoralReforms,andseven(7)otherMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesdesignatedbytheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives:Provided,That,oftheseven(7)memberstobedesignatedbyeachHouseofCongress,four(4)shouldcomefromthemajorityandtheremainingthree(3)fromtheminority.TheJointCongressionalOversightCommitteeshallhavethepowertomonitorandevaluatetheimplementationofthisAct.Itshallreview,revise,amendandapprovetheImplementingRulesandRegulationspromulgatedbytheCommission.(Emphasissupplied)SEC.19.AuthorityoftheCommissiontoPromulgateRules.TheCommissionshallissuethenecessaryrulesandregulationstoeffectivelyimplementtheprovisionsofthisActwithinsixty(60)daysfromtheeffectivityofthisAct.TheImplementingRulesandRegulationsshallbesubmittedtotheJointCongressionalOversightCommitteecreatedbyvirtueofthisActforpriorapproval.

.........(Emphasissupplied)ComposedofSenatorsandMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,theJointCongressionalOversightCommittee(JCOC)isapurelylegislativebody.ThereisnoquestionthattheauthorityofCongresstomonitorandevaluatetheimplementationofR.A.No.9189isgearedtowardspossibleamendmentsorrevisionofthelawitselfandthus,maybeperformedinaidofitslegislation.However,asidefromitsmonitoringandevaluationfunctions,R.A.No.9189givestotheJCOCthefollowingfunctions:(a)toreview,revise,amendandapprovetheImplementingRulesandRegulations(IRR)promulgatedbytheCOMELEC[Sections25and19];and(b)subjecttotheapprovaloftheJCOC[Section17.1],thevotingbymailinnotmorethanthreecountriesfortheMay2004electionsandinanycountrydeterminedbyCOMELEC.TheambitoflegislativepowerunderArticleVIoftheConstitutioniscircumscribedbyotherconstitutionalprovisions.OnesuchprovisionisSection1ofArticleIX-Aofthe1987ConstitutionordainingthatconstitutionalcommissionssuchastheCOMELECshallbeindependent.InterpretingSection1,ArticleXofthe1935ConstitutionprovidingthatthereshallbeanindependentCOMELEC,theCourthasheldthat[w]hatevermaybethenatureofthefunctionsoftheCommissiononElections,thefactisthattheframersoftheConstitutionwantedittobeindependentfromtheotherdepartmentsoftheGovernment.[if!supportFootnotes][44][endif]Inanearliercase,theCourtelucidated:TheCommissiononElectionsisaconstitutionalbody.Itisintendedtoplayadistinctandimportantpartinourschemeofgovernment.Inthedischargeofitsfunctions,itshouldnotbehamperedwithrestrictionsthatwouldbefullywarrantedinthecaseofalessresponsibleorganization.TheCommissionmayerr,somaythiscourtalso.Itshouldbeallowedconsiderablelatitudeindevisingmeansandmethodsthatwillinsuretheaccomplishmentofthegreatobjectiveforwhichitwascreatedfree,orderlyandhonestelections.Wemaynotagreefullywithitschoiceofmeans,butunlesstheseareclearlyillegalorconstitutegrossabuseofdiscretion,thiscourtshouldnotinterfere.Politicsisapracticalmatter,andpoliticalquestionsmustbedealtwithrealisticallynotfromthestandpointofpuretheory.TheCommissiononElections,becauseofitsfact-findingfacilities,itscontactswithpoliticalstrategists,anditsknowledgederivedfromactualexperienceindealingwithpoliticalcontroversies,isinapeculiarlyadvantageouspositiontodecidecomplexpoliticalquestions.[if!supportFootnotes][45][endif](Emphasissupplied)TheCourthasnogeneralpowersofsupervisionoverCOMELECwhichisanindependentbodyexceptthosespecificallygrantedbytheConstitution,thatis,toreviewitsdecisions,ordersandrulings.[if!supportFootnotes][46][endif]Inthesamevein,itisnotcorrecttoholdthatbecauseofitsrecognizedextensivelegislativepowertoenactelectionlaws,CongressmayintrudeintotheindependenceoftheCOMELECbyexercisingsupervisorypowersoveritsrule-makingauthority.ByvirtueofSection19ofR.A.No.9189,CongresshasempoweredtheCOMELECtoissuethenecessaryrulesandregulationstoeffectivelyimplementtheprovisionsofthisActwithinsixtydaysfromtheeffectivityofthisAct.Thisprovisionoflawfollowstheusualprocedureindraftingrulesandregulationstoimplementalawthelegislaturegrantsanadministrativeagencytheauthoritytocrafttherulesandregulationsimplementingthelawithasenacted,inrecognitionoftheadministrativeexpertiseofthatagencyinitsparticularfieldofoperation.[if!supportFootnotes][47][endif]Oncealawisenactedandapproved,thelegislativefunctionisdeemedaccomplishedandcomplete.ThelegislativefunctionmayspringbacktoCongressrelativetothesamelawonlyifthatbodydeemsitpropertoreview,amendandrevisethelaw,butcertainlynottoapprove,review,reviseandamendtheIRRoftheCOMELEC.Byvestingitselfwiththepowerstoapprove,review,amend,andrevisetheIRRforTheOverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003,Congresswentbeyondthescopeofitsconstitutionalauthority.CongresstrampledupontheconstitutionalmandateofindependenceoftheCOMELEC.Undersuchasituation,theCourtisleftwithnooptionbuttowithdrawfromitsusualreticenceindeclaringaprovisionoflawunconstitutional.ThesecondsentenceofthefirstparagraphofSection19statingthat[t]heImplementingRulesandRegulationsshallbesubmitted

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totheJointCongressionalOversightCommitteecreatedbyvirtueofthisActforpriorapproval,andthesecondsentenceofthesecondparagraphofSection25statingthat[i]tshallreview,revise,amendandapprovetheImplementingRulesandRegulationspromulgatedbytheCommission,wherebyCongress,inbothprovisions,arrogatesuntoitselfafunctionnotspecificallyvestedbytheConstitution,shouldbestrickenoutofthesubjectstatuteforconstitutionalinfirmity.BothprovisionsbrazenlyviolatethemandateontheindependenceoftheCOMELEC.Similarly,thephrase,subjecttotheapprovaloftheCongressionalOversightCommitteeinthefirstsentenceofSection17.1whichempowerstheCommissiontoauthorizevotingbymailinnotmorethanthreecountriesfortheMay,2004elections;andthephrase,onlyuponreviewandapprovaloftheJointCongressionalOversightCommitteefoundinthesecondparagraphofthesamesectionareunconstitutionalastheyrequirereviewandapprovalofvotingbymailinanycountryafterthe2004elections.Congressmaynotconferuponitselftheauthoritytoapproveordisapprovethecountrieswhereinvotingbymailshallbeallowed,asdeterminedbytheCOMELECpursuanttotheconditionsprovidedforinSection17.1ofR.A.No.9189.[if!supportFootnotes][48][endif]Otherwise,CongresswouldoversteptheboundsofitsconstitutionalmandateandintrudeintotheindependenceoftheCOMELEC.Duringthedeliberations,allthemembersoftheCourtagreedtoadopttheseparateopinionofJusticeReynatoS.PunoaspartoftheponenciaontheunconstitutionalityofSections17.1,19and25ofR.A.No.9189insofarastheyrelatetothecreationofandthepowersgiventotheJointCongressionalOversightCommittee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for beingUNCONSTITUTIONAL:a)ThephraseinthefirstsentenceofthefirstparagraphofSection17.1,towit:subjecttotheapprovaloftheJointCongressionalOversightCommittee;b)TheportionofthelastparagraphofSection17.1,towit:onlyuponreviewandapprovaloftheJointCongressionalOversightCommittee;c)ThesecondsentenceofthefirstparagraphofSection19,towit:TheImplementingRulesandRegulationsshallbesubmittedtotheJointCongressionalOversightCommitteecreatedbyvirtueofthisActforpriorapproval;andd)ThesecondsentenceinthesecondparagraphofSection25,towit:Itshallreview,revise,amendandapprovetheImplementingRulesandRegulationspromulgatedbytheCommissionofthesamelaw;forbeingrepugnanttoSection1,ArticleIX-AoftheConstitutionmandatingtheindependenceofconstitutionalcommission,suchasCOMELEC.TheconstitutionalityofSection18.5ofR.A.No.9189isUPHELDwithrespectonlytotheauthoritygiventotheCOMELECtoproclaimthewinningcandidatesfortheSenatorsandparty-listrepresentativesbutnotastothepowertocanvassthevotesandproclaimthewinningcandidatesforPresidentandVice-PresidentwhichislodgedwithCongressunderSection4,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution.TheconstitutionalityofSection5(d)isUPHELD.PursuanttoSection30ofR.A.No.9189,therestoftheprovisionsofsaidlawcontinuestobeinfullforceandeffect.SOORDERED.

[G.R.No.133676.April14,1999]TUPAYT.LOONG,petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONSandABDUSAKURTAN,respondents,YUSOPJIKIRI,intervenor.

DECISIONPUNO,J.:

In a bid to improve our elections, Congress enactedR.A.No. 8436 onDecember 22, 1997 prescribing the adoption of anautomatedelection system.ThenewsystemwasusedintheMay11,1998regularelectionsheldintheAutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanao(ARMM)whichincludestheProvinceofSulu.Atty. JoseTolentino,Jr.headedtheCOMELECTaskForcetohaveadministrativeoversightoftheelectionsinSulu.

The voting in Sulu was relatively peaceful and orderly.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] The problem started during the automatedcountingofvotesforthelocalofficialsofSuluattheSuluStateCollege.Atabout6a.m.ofMay12,1998,someelectioninspectorsand watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoraltycandidates in themunicipality of Pata. Someballotspickedat randombyAtty.Tolentino, Jr. confirmed thatvotes in favorofamayoraltycandidatewerenotreflectedintheprintedelectionreturns.HesuspendedtheautomatedcountingofballotsinPataandimmediatelycommunicatedtheproblemtothetechnicalexpertsofCOMELECandthesuppliersoftheautomatedmachine.Afterconsultations,theexpertstoldhimthattheproblemwascausedbythemisalignmentoftheovalsoppositethenamesofcandidatesinthelocalballots.Theyfoundnothingwrongwiththeautomatedmachines.Theerrorwasintheprintingofthelocalballots,asaconsequenceofwhich,theautomatedmachinesfailedtoreadthemcorrectly.[if!supportFootnotes][2][endif]At12:30p.m.ofthesameday,Atty.Tolentino,Jr.calledforanemergencymeetingofthelocalcandidatesandthemilitary-policeofficialsoverseeingtheSuluelections.Thosewhoattendedwerethevariouscandidatesforgovernor,namely,petitionerTupayLoong,privaterespondentAbdusakurTan,intervenorYusopJikiriandKimarTulawie.AlsoinattendancewereBrig.Gen.EdgardoEspinosa,AFP,Marineforces,SouthernPhilippines,Brig.Gen.PercivalSubala,AFP,3rdMarineBrigade,Supt.CharlemagneAlejandrino,ProvincialDirector,Sulu,PNPCommandandcongressionalcandidateBensandiTulawie.[if!supportFootnotes][3][endif]

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The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack ofagreement.ThosewhorecommendedashifttomanualcountwereBrig.GeneralsEspinosaandSubala,PNPDirectorAlejandrino,gubernatorial candidatesTan andTulawie and congressional candidateBensandiTulawie. Thosewho insistedon an automatedcountwere gubernatorial candidates Loong and Jikiri. In view of their differences in opinion, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. requested thepartiestosubmittheirwrittenpositionpapers.[if!supportFootnotes][4][endif]ReportsthattheautomatedcountingofballotsinothermunicipalitiesinSuluwasnotworkingwellwerereceivedbytheCOMELECTaskForce.Localballotsinfive(5)municipalitieswererejectedbytheautomatedmachines.ThesemunicipalitieswereTalipao,Siasi,Tudanan,TapulandJolo.Theballotswererejectedbecausetheyhadthewrongsequencecode.[if!supportFootnotes][5][endif]

Private respondentTanandAtty.Tolentino, Jr. sent separatecommunications to theCOMELECenbancinManila.Still,onMay 12, 1998, Tan requested for the suspension of the automated counting of ballots throughout the Sulu province.[if!supportFootnotes][6][endif] On the same day, COMELEC issuedMinute ResolutionNo. 98-1747 ordering amanual count but only in themunicipalityofPata.Theresolutionreads:[if!supportFootnotes][7][endif]"xxxxxxxxx"InthematterofthePetitiondatedMay12,1998ofAbdusakurTan,Governor,Sulu,tosuspendorstopcountingofballotsthroughautomation(sic)machinesforthefollowinggrounds,quotedtowit'1..TheElectionReturnsfortheMunicipalityofPata,ProvinceofSulu-DistrictIIdonotreflectorrevealthemandateofthevoters:

'DISCUSSIONS'Thatthewatcherscalledtheattentionofourpoliticalleadersandcandidatesregardingtheirdiscoverythattheelectionreturnsgeneratedafterthelastballotsforaprecinctisscannedrevealedthatsomecandidatesobtainedzerovotes,amongotherstheProvincialBoardMembers,Mayor,Vice-Mayor,andthecouncilorsfortheLAKAS-NUCD-UMDP;'Thatthetopballot,however,revealsthattheballotscontainedvotesforAntonBurahan,candidateforMunicipalMayorwhiletheElectionReturnshowszerovote;'ThatfurtherreviewoftheElectionReturnrevealsthatJohnMasillam,candidateforMayorundertheLAKAS-NUCD-UMDP-MNLFobtains(sic)100%votesofthetotalnumberofvoterswhoactuallyvoted;'Theforegoingdiscrepancieswerelikewisenotedandconfirmedbythechairmen,pollclerksandmembersoftheBoardofElectionInspectors(BEI)suchasRenaJawan,MatankaHajirul,DulbaKadil,TeddyMirajuli,RainerTalcon,MikeJupakal,ArminaAkmad,RomuloRoldanandLermaMarawalitomentionsome;'ThePataincidentcanbeconfirmedbynolessthanAtty.JoseTolentino,Head,TaskForceSulu,whoseattentionwascalledregardingthediscrepancies;'Theforegoingisaclearevidencethattheautomatedmachine(scanner)cannotberelieduponastotrulyreflectthecontentsoftheballots.IfsuchhappenedintheMunicipalityofPata,itisverypossiblethatthesameishappeninginthecountingofvotesintheothermunicipalitiesofthisprovince.Ifthiswillnotbesuspendedorstopped,theuseofautomatedmachineswillserveasavehicletofrustratethewillofthesovereignpeopleofSulu;'Wherefore,theforegoingpremisesconsideredandintheinterestofanhonestandorderlyelection,itisrespectfullyprayedofthisHonorableCommissionthatanOrderbeissuedimmediatelysuspendingorstoppingtheuseoftheautomatedmachine(scanner)inthecountingofvotesforalltheeighteen(18)municipalitiesintheProvinceofSuluandinlieuthereof,toavoiddelay,countingbedonethroughtheusualwayknownandtestedbyus.'"Whilethecommissiondoesnotagreewiththeconclusionsstatedinthepetition,andthefailureofthemachinetoreadthevotesmayhavebeenoccasionedbyotherfactors,amatterthatrequiresimmediateinvestigation,butinthepublicinterest,theCommission,'RESOLVEDtograntthePetitiondatedMay12,1998andtoOrderthatthecountingofvotesshallbedonemanuallyintheMunicipalityofPATA,theonlyplaceinSuluwheretheautomatedmachinefailedtoreadtheballots,subjecttonoticetoallpartiesconcerned."'BeforemidnightofMay12,1998,Atty.Tolentino, Jr.was able to send to theCOMELECenbanchis report and recommendation,urgingtheuseofthemanualcountintheentireProvinceofSulu,viz:[if!supportFootnotes][8][endif]"TheundersignedstoppedthecountinginthemunicipalityofPatasincehediscoveredthatvotesforacandidateformayorwascreditedinfavoroftheothercandidate.VerificationwiththeSuluTechnicalStaff,includingPatSquiresofES&S,revealsthatthecauseoftheerroristhewaytheballotwasprinted.Asidefrommisalignmentoftheovalsanduseofcodesassignedtoanothermunicipality(whichcausedtherejectionofalllocalballotsinoneprecinctinTalipao),errormessagesappearedonthescreenalthoughtheactualconditionoftheballotswouldhaveshownadifferentmessage.Becauseofthese,theundersigneddirectedthatcountingforallballotsinSulubestoppedtoenabletheCommissiontodeterminetheproblemandrectifythesame.ItissubmittedthatstoppingthecountingismoreinconsonancewiththeCommission'smandatethanproceedingwithanautomatedbutinaccuratecount."InviewoftheerrordiscoveredinPataandtheundersigned'sordertosuspendthecounting,thefollowingdocumentsweresubmittedtohim."1.UnsignedletterdatedMay12,1998submittedbyCongressmanTulawieformanualcountingandcanvassing;"2.PetitionofGovernorSakurTanformanualcounting;"3.PositionpaperofTupayLoong,BenjaminLoongandAsaniTamangforautomatedcount;

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"4.MNLFPositionforautomatedcount;and"5.RecommendationofGeneralE.V.Espinosa,GeneralPMSubala,andPDCSAlejandrinoformanualcount;"AdditionalmarineshavebeendeployedattheSSC.Theundersignedisnotsureifitismerelyintendedtotameadisorderlycrowd,insideandoutsideSSC,orashowofforce."Itissubmittedthatsinceanerrorwasdiscoveredinamachinewhichissupposedtohaveanerrorrateof1:1,000,000,notafewpeoplewouldbelievethatthiserrorinPatawouldextendtotheothermunicipalities.Whetherornotthisistrue,itwouldbemoreprudenttostayawayfromalifelessthingthathassowntensionandanxietyamongandbetweenthevotersofSulu.Respectfullysubmitted:12May1998(Sgd.)JOSEM.TOLENTINO,JR."

Thenextday,May13,1998,COMELECissuedResolutionNo.98-1750approvingAtty.Tolentino,Jr.'srecommendationandthe manner of its implementation as suggested by Executive Director Resurreccion Z. Borra. The Resolution reads:[if!supportFootnotes][9][endif]"InthematteroftheMemorandumdated13May1998ofExecutiveDirectorResurreccionZ.Borra,pertinentportionofwhichisquotedasfollows:"InconnectionwithMin.Res.No.98-1747promulgatedMay12,1998whichresolvedtoorderthatthecountingofvotesshallbedonemanuallyinthemunicipalityofPata,theonlyplaceinSuluwheretheautomatedcountingmachinefailedtoreadtheballots,subjecttonoticetoallpartiesconcerned,pleasefindthefollowing:"1.HandwrittenMemoofDirectorJoseM.Tolentino,Jr.,TaskForceHead,Sulu,addressedtotheExecutiveDirectoronthesubjectcountingandcanvassinginthemunicipalityofPataduetotheerrorsofthecountingofvotesbythemachinebroughtaboutbytheerrorintheprintingoftheballot,causingmisalignmentofovalsanduseofcodesassignedtoanothermunicipality.HerecommendedtoreverttothemanualcountingofvotesinthewholeofSulu.HeattachedthestandofCongressmanTulawie,GovernorSakurTanandrecommendationofBrigadierGeneralEdgardoEspinosa,GeneralPercivalSubla,P/Supt.CharlemagneAlejandrinoformanualcounting.ThepositionpaperofformerGovernorTupayLoong,Mr.BenjaminLoongandMr.AsaniS.Tammang,whoarecandidatesforGovernorandCongressmanof1stand2ndDistrictsrespectively,whowantedthecontinuationoftheautomatedcounting."WhiletheforcesofAFParereadytoprovidearm(sic)securitytoourComelecofficials,BEIsandotherdeputies,thepoliticaltensionsandimminentviolenceandbloodshedmaynotbeprevented,asperreportreceived,theMNLFforcesarereadyingtheirforcestosurroundthevenueforautomatedcountingandcanvassinginSuluinorderthattheautomationprocesswillcontinue."DirectorBorrarecommends,thatwhilehesupportsMinuteResolutionNo.98-1747,implementationthereofshallbedoneasfollows:"1.ThatallthecountingmachinesfromJolo,SulubetransportedbackbyC130toManilaandbelocatedattheavailablespaceatPICCforpurposesofbothautomatedandmanualoperations.ThisapproachwillkeeptheCOMELECofficialsawayfromviolenceandbloodshedbetweenthetwocampswhoaredeterminedtoslugeachotherasabovementionedinJolo,Sulu.OnlyauthorizedpoliticalpartyandcandidatewatcherswillbeallowedinPICCwithpropersecurity,bothinsideandoutsidetheperimetersofthevenueatPICC."2.Withthisprocess,therewillbeanobjectiveanalysisandsupervisionoftheautomatedandmanualoperationsbyboththeMISandTechnicalExpertoftheES&Sawayfromthethunderingmortarsandthesoundsofsophisticatedheavyweaponsfrombothsidesofthewarringfactions."3.Lastly,itwillbedirectlyundertheclosesupervisionandcontrolofCommissiononElectionsEnBanc."RESOLVED:"1.TotransportallcountingmachinesfromJolo,SulubyC130toManilaforpurposesofbothautomatedandmanualoperations,withnoticetoallpartiesconcerned;"2.ToauthorizetheofficialtraveloftheboardofcanvassersconcernedfortheconductoftheautomatedandmanualoperationsofthecountingofvotesatPICCundertheclosesupervisionandcontroloftheCommissionEnBanc.Forthispurpose,tomakeavailableadesignatedspaceatthePICC;"3.ToauthorizethepresenceofonlythedulyauthorizedrepresentativeofthepoliticalpartiesconcernedandthecandidateswatchersbothoutsideandinsidetheperimetersofthevenueatPICC."Atty.Tolentino,Jr.furnishedthepartieswithcopiesofMinuteResolutionNo.98-1750andcalledforanothermeetingthenextday,May14,1998,todiscusstheimplementationoftheresolution.[if!supportFootnotes][10][endif]Themeetingwasattendedbytheparties,byLt.Gen.JoselinNazareno,thentheChiefoftheAFPSouthernCommand,theNAMFREL,media,andthepublic.EspeciallydiscussedwasthemanneroftransportingtheballotsandthecountingmachinestothePICCinManila.Theyagreedtoalloweachpoliticalpartytohaveatleastone(1)escort/watcherforeverymunicipalitytoacompanytheflight.TwoC130swereusedforthepurpose.[if!supportFootnotes][11][endif]OnMay15,1998,theCOMELECenbancissuedMinuteResolutionNo.98-1796layingdowntherulesforthemanualcount,viz:[if!supportFootnotes][12][endif]"InthematteroftheMemorandumdated15May1998ofExecutiveDirectorResurreccionZ.Borra,quotedtowit:

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'IntheimplementationofCOMELECMin.ResolutionNo.98-1750promulgated13May1998inthemanualcountingofvotesofPata,Sulu,andinviewofthearrivalofthecountingmachines,ballotboxes,documentsandotherelectionparaphernaliaforthewholeprovinceofSulunowstoredinPICC,aswellasthearrivaloftheMunicipalBoardofCanvassersofsaidMunicipalityinSulu,andafterconferencewithsomemembersoftheSeniorStaffandTechnicalCommitteeofthisCommission,thefollowingareherebyrespectfullyrecommended:'1.ManualcountingofthelocalballotsoftheautomatedelectionsysteminPata,Sulu;'2.AutomatedcountingofthenationalballotsconsideringthattherearenoquestionsraisedontheNationalElectiveOfficialsaspre-printedinthemark-sensedballots;'3.ThecreationofthefollowingSpecialBoardsofInspectorsunderthesupervisionofAtty.JoseM.Tolentino,Jr.,TaskForceHead,Sulu,namely:a)Atty.MamasapunodM.AguamMs.GloriaFernandez

Ms.EsperanzaNicolasb)DirectorEsterL.Villaflor-RoxasMs.CeliaRomero

Ms.RebeccaMacarayac)Atty.ZenaidaS.SorianoMs.JocelynGuiang

Ma.JacelynTand)Atty.ErlindaC.EchaviaMs.TheresaA.Torralba

Ms.Ma.CarmenLlamase)DirectorEstrellaP.deMesaMs.TeresitaVelasco

Ms.NellyJaena'4.AdditionalSpecialBoardofInspectorsmaybecreatedwhennecesary.'5.TheProvincialBoardofCanvasserswhichbystandingResolutionisheadedbytheTaskForceSuluHeadshallconsolidatethemanualandautomatedresultsassubmittedbytheMunicipalBoardsofCanvassersofthewholeprovincewithtwomemberscomposedofDirectorsEstrellaP.deMesaandEsterL.Villaflor-Roxas;'6.ThepoliticalpartiesandthecandidatesinSuluaswellastheParty-ListCandidatesareauthorizedtoappointtheirownwatchersuponapprovaloftheCommission','RESOLVEDtoapprovetheforegoingrecommendationsintheimplementationofMin.ResolutionNo.98-1750promulgatedon13May1998providingforthemanualcountingofvotesinthemunicipalityofPata,Sulu.'RESOLVED,moreover,consideringtherecommendationofComm.ManoloB.Gorospe,Commissioner-In-Charge,ARMM,toconductaparallelmanualcountingonall18municipalitiesofSuluasafinalguidanceofthereliabilityofthecountingmachinewhichwill

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serveasbasisfortheproclamationofthewinningcandidatesandforfuturereferenceontheuseoftheautomatedcountingmachine."'

OnMay18,1998,petitionerfiledhisobjectiontoMinuteResolutionNo.98-1796,viz:[if!supportFootnotes][13][endif]"1.TheminuteresolutionunderagendaNo.98-1796violatestheprovisionsofRepublicActNo.8436providingforanautomatedcountingoftheballotsintheAutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanao.Theautomatedcountingismandatoryandcouldnotbesubstitutedbyamanualcounting.Wherethemachinesareallegedlydefective,theonlyremedyprovidedforbylawistoreplacethemachine.Manualcountingisprohibitedbylaw;"2.TherearestrongindicationsthatinthemunicipalityofPatatheballotsofthesaidmunicipalitywererejectedbythecountingmachinebecausetheballotsweretamperedand/orthetextureoftheballotsfedtothecountingmachinearenottheofficialballotsoftheComelec;"3.TheautomatedcountingmachinesoftheComelechavebeendesignedinsuchawaythatonlygenuineofficialballotscouldbereadandcountedbythemachine;"4.Thecountingmachinesintheothermunicipalitiesareinorder.Infact,theautomatedcountinghasalreadystarted.TheautomatedcountinginthemunicipalitiesofLugusandPanglimaTahilhasbeencompleted.Thereisnolegalbasisforthe'parallelmanualcounting'ordainedinthedisputedminuteresolution."Nonetheless,COMELECstartedthemanualcountonthesamedate,May18,1998.

OnMay25,1998,petitionerfiledwiththisCourtapetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt.Hecontendedthat:(a)COMELECissuedMinuteResolutionNos.98-1747,98-1750,and98-1798withoutpriornoticeandhearingtohim;(b)theorderformanualcountingviolatedR.A.No.8436;(c)manualcountinggave"opportunitytothefollowingelectioncheatings,"namely:"(a)Thecountingbyhumanhandsofthetampered,fakeandcounterfeitballotswhichthecountingmachineshavebeenprogrammedtoreject(Section7,8&9ofRep.Act8436)."(b)TheopportunitytosubstitutetheballotsallstoredatthePICC.Infact,nolessthantheheadoftheCOMELECTaskForceofSulu,Atty.JoseM.Tolentino,Jr.whorecommendedtotheCOMELECtheanomalousmanualcounting,hadapproachedthewatchersofpetitionerstoallowtheretrievaloftheballots,saying"tayo,tayolangmgawatchers,pag-usapannatin,"dearlyindicatingoverturesofpossiblebriberyofthewatchersofpetitioner(ANNEXE)."(c)WiththecreationbytheCOMELECofonly22BoardsofElectionInspectorstomanuallycountthe1,194precincts,themanipulatorsaregivensufficienttimetochangeandtampertheballotstobemanuallycounted."(d)Thereistheopportunityofdelayingtheproclamationofthewinningcandidatesthroughtheusuallydilatorymovesinapre-proclamationcontroversybecausethereturnsandcertificatesofcanvassarealreadyhuman(sic)made.Intheautomatedcountingthereisnoroomforanydilatorypre-proclamationcontroversybecausethereturnsandtheMBCandPBCcertificatesofcanvassaremachinemadeandimmediateproclamationisordainedthereafter."

Petitionerthenprayed:"WHEREFORE,itismostespeciallyprayedoftheHonorableCourtthat:"1.uponfilingofthispetition,atemporaryrestrainingorderbeissuedenjoiningtheCOMELECfromconductingamanualcountingoftheballotsofthe1,194precinctsofthe18municipalitiesoftheProvinceofSulubutinsteadproceedwiththeautomatedcountingoftheballots,preparationoftheelectionreturnsandMBC,PBCcertificatesofcanvassandproclaimthewinningcandidatesonthebasisoftheautomatedcountingandconsolidationofresults;"2.thispetitionbegivenduecourseandtherespondentsberequiredtoanswer;"3.afterduehearing,thequestionedCOMELECEnBancMinuteResolutionsofMay12,13,15,and17,1998bealldeclarednullandvoidabinitioforhavingbeenissuedwithoutjurisdictionand/orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdictionandforbeinginviolationofdueprocessoflaw;"4.thewinningcandidatesoftheProvinceofSulubeproclaimedonthebasisoftheresultsoftheautomatedcounting,automatedelectionreturns,automatedMBCandPBCcertificatesofcanvass;"xxx."OnJune8,1998,privaterespondentTanwasproclaimedgovernor-electofSuluonthebasisofthemanualcount.[if!supportFootnotes][14][endif]Privaterespondentgarnered43,573votes.Petitionerwasthirdwith35,452votesoradifferenceof8,121votes.

On June 23, 1998, this Court required the respondents to file their Comment to the petition and directed the parties "tomaintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition."[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] The vice-governor elect wasallowedtotemporarilydischargethepowersandfunctionsofgovernor.

OnAugust20,1998,YusopJikiri,theLAKAS-NUCD-UMDP-MNLFcandidateforgovernorfiledamotionforinterventionandaMemorandum in Intervention.[if!supportFootnotes][16][endif]Theresultof themanual countshowedhereceived38,993votesandplacedsecond.Similarly,heallegeddenialofdueprocess,lackoffactualbasisoftheCOMELECresolutionsandillegalityofmanualcountinlight of R.A. No. 8436. TheCourt noted his intervention.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] As similar petition for intervention filed byAbdulwahidSahidulla,acandidateforvice-governor,onOctober7,1998wasdeniedasitwasfiledtoolate.

In due time, the parties filed their respective Comments. On September 25, 1998, the Court heard the parties in oralarguments[if!supportFootnotes][18][endif]whichwasfollowedbythesubmissionoftheirwrittenmemoranda.

Theissuesforresolutionarethefollowing:

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1.WhetherornotapetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionunderRule65oftheRulesofCourtistheappropriateremedytoinvalidatethedisputedCOMELECresolutions.

2.Assumingtheappropriatenessoftheremedy,whetherornotCOMELECcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdictioninorderingamanualcount.

2.a.Istherealegalbasisforthemanualcount?

2-b.Areitsfactualbasesreasonable?

2.c.Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELECwhen it ordered amanualcount?

3.Assumingthemanualcountisillegalandthatitsresultisunreliable,whetherornotitispropertocallforaspecialelectionforthepositionofgovernorofSulu.

Weshallresolvetheissuesinseriatim.First.Weholdthatcertiorariistheproperremedyofthepetitioner.Section7,ArticleIX(A)ofthe1987Constitutionstatesthatif"unlessprovidedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,orderorrulingofeachCommissionmaybebroughttotheSupremeCourtoncertioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromreceiptofacopythereof."Wehaveinterpretedthisprovisiontomeanfinalorders,rulingsanddecisionsoftheCOMELECrenderedintheexerciseofitsadjudicatoryorquasi-judicialpowers.[if!supportFootnotes][19][endif]Contrariwise,administrativeordersoftheCOMELECarenot,asageneralrule,fitsubjectsofapetitionforcertiorari.ThemainissueinthecaseatbariswhethertheCOMELECgravelyabuseditsdiscretionwhenitorderedamanualcountofthe1998Sululocalelections.AresolutionoftheissuewillinvolveaninterpretationofR.A.No.8436onautomatedelectioninrelationtothebroadpoweroftheCOMELECunderSection2(1),ArticleIX(C)oftheConstitution"toenforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelectionxxx."Theissueisnotonlylegalbutoneoffirstimpressionandundoubtedlysuffusedwithsignificancetotheentirenation.Itisadjudicatoryoftherightofthepetitioner,theprivaterespondentandtheintervenortothepositionofgovernorofSulu.TheseareenoughconsiderationstocallforanexerciseofthecertiorarijurisdictionofthisCourt.Second.Thebigissue,oneoffirstimpression,iswhethertheCOMELECcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdictionwhenitorderedamanualcountinlightofR.A.No.8436.Thepostelectionrealitiesongroundwillshowthattheorderforamanualcountcannotbecharacterizedasarbitrary,capriciousorwhimsical.a. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata. A

mayoraltycandidate,Mr.AntonBurahan,obtainedzerovotesdespitetherepresentationsoftheChairmanoftheBoardofElectionInspectorsandothersthattheyvotedforhim.Anothercandidategarnered100%ofthevotes.

b.ItislikewiseconcededthattheautomatedmachinesrejectedandwouldnotcountthelocalballotsinthemunicipalitiesofTalipao,Siasi,Indanan,TapalandJolo.

c.TheseflawsintheautomatedcountingoflocalballotsinthemunicipalitiesofPata,Talipao,Siasi,Indanan,TapalandJolowerecarefullyanalyzedbythetechnicalexpertsofCOMELECandthesupplieroftheautomatedmachines.Allofthemfoundnothingwrongwiththeautomatedmachines.TheytracedtheproblemtotheprintingoflocalballotsbytheNationalPrintingOffice.InthecaseofthemunicipalityofPata,itwasdiscoveredthattheovalsofthelocalballots were misaligned and could not be read correctly by the automated machines. In the case of themunicipalitiesofTalipao,Siasi, Indanan,TapalandJolo, it turnedoutthatthelocalballotscontainedthewrongsequencecode.Eachmunicipalitywasassignedasequencecodeasa securitymeasure.Ballotswith thewrongsequencecodewereprogrammedtoberejectedbytheautomatedmachines.

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It is plain that to continuewith the automated count in these five (5)municipalitieswould result in a grossly erroneouscount.Itcannotalsobegainsaidthatthecountinthesefive(5)municipalitieswillaffectthelocalelectionsinSulu.Therewasnoneedformoresamplingoflocalballotsinthesemunicipalitiesastheysufferedfromthesamedefects.AlllocalballotsinPatawithmisalignedovalswillbeerroneouslyreadby theautomatedmachines.Similarly,all localballots inTalipao,Siasi, Indanan,TapalandJolowithwrongsequencecodesarecertaintoberejectedbytheautomatedmachines.Thereisnoshowingintherecordsthatthelocalballotsinthesefive(5)municipalitiesaredissimilarwhichcouldjustifythecallfortheirgreatersampling.Third.ThesefailuresofautomatedcountingcreatedpostelectiontensioninSulu,aprovincewithahistoryofviolentelections.COMELEChadtoactdecisivelyinviewofthefastdeterioratingpeaceandordersituationcausedbythedelayinthecountingofvotes.Theevidenceofthisfragilepeaceandordercannotbedowngraded.InhishandwrittenreporttotheCOMELECdatedMay12,1998,Atty.Tolentino,Jr.stated:"xxx"AdditionalmarineshavebeendeployedattheSSC.TheundersignedisnotsureifitismerelyintendedtotameadisorderlycrowdinsideandoutsideSSC,orashowofforce."Itissubmittedthatsinceanerrorwasdiscoveredinamachinewhichissupposedtohaveanerrorrateof1:1,000,000,notafewpeoplewouldbelievethatthiserrorinPatawouldextendtotheothermunicipalities.Whetherornotthisistrue,itwouldbemoreprudenttostayawayfromalifelessthingthathassowntensionandanxietyamongandbetweenthevotersofSulu."ExecutiveDirector Resurreccion Z. Borra, Task ForceHead, ARMM in hisMay 13,1998Memorandum to the COMELEC likewisestated:"xxx"WhiletheforcesofAFParereadytoprovidearm(sic)securitytoourCOMELECofficials,BEI'sandotherdeputies,thepoliticaltensionsandimminentviolenceandbloodshedmaynotbeprevented,asperreportreceived,theMNLFforcesarereadyingtheirforcestosurroundthevenueforautomatedcountingandcanvassinginSuluinorderthatautomationprocesswillcontinue."Lastbutnotthe least, themilitaryandthepoliceauthoritiesunanimouslyrecommendedmanualcountingtopreservepeaceandorder. Brig. Gen. Edgardo V. Espinosa, Commanding General,Marine Forces Southern Philippines, Brig. Gen. PercivalM. Subala,Commanding General, 3rd Marine Brigade, and Supt. Charlemagne S. Alejandrino, Provincial Director, Sulu PNP Commandexplainedthatit"xxxwillnotonlyservetheinterestofmajorityofthepoliticalpartiesinvolvedintheelectoralprocessbutalsoservetheinterestofthemilitaryandpoliceforcesinmaintainingpeaceandorderthroughouttheprovinceofSulu."

Anautomated countof the local votes in Suluwouldhave resulted in awrong count, a travestyof the sovereigntyof theelectorate.Itsaftermathcouldhavebeenabloodbath.COMELECavoidedthisimminentprobabilitybyorderingamanualcountofthevotes.ItwouldbetheheightofironyiftheCourtcondemnsCOMELECforabortingviolenceintheSuluelections.Fourth.WealsofindthatpetitionerLoongandintervenorJikiriwerenotdenieddueprocess.TheTolentinomemorandumclearlyshowsthattheyweregiveneveryopportunitytoopposethemanualcountofthelocalballotsinSulu.Theywereorallyheard.Theylatersubmittedwrittenpositionpapers.TheirrepresentativesescortedthetransferoftheballotsandtheautomatedmachinesfromSulutoManila.Theirwatchersobservedthemanualcountfrombeginningtoend.WequotetheTolentinomemorandum,viz:"xxx"Onorabout6:00a.m.ofMay12,1998,whileautomatedcountingofalltheballotsfortheprovinceofSuluwasbeingconductedatthecountingcenterlocatedattheSuluStateCollege,theCOMELECSuluTaskForceHead(TFHead)proceededtotheroomwherethecountingmachineassignedtothemunicipalityofPatawasinstalledtoverifythecauseofthecommotiontherein."DuringtheinterviewconductedbytheTFHead,themembersoftheBoardofElectionInspectors(BEI)andwatcherspresentinsaidroomstatedthatthecountingmachineassignedtothemunicipalityofPatadidnotreflectthetrueresultsofthevotingthereat.ThemembersoftheBEIcomplainedthattheirvoteswerenotreflectedintheprintoutoftheelectionreturnssinceperelectionreturnsoftheirprecincts,thecandidatetheyvotedforobtained"zero".Afterverifyingtheprintoutofsomeelectionreturnsasagainsttheofficialballots,theTFHeaddiscoveredthatvotescastinfavorofamayoraltycandidatewerecreditedinfavorofhisopponents."Inhisattempttoremedythesituation,theTFHeadsuspendedthecountingofallballotsforsaidmunicipalitytoenableCOMELECfieldtechnicianstodeterminethecauseofthetechnicalerror,rectifythesame,andthereafterproceedwithautomatedcounting.Inthemeantime,thecountingoftheballotsfortheothermunicipalitiesproceededundertheautomatedsystem."TechnicalexpertsofthesupplierbasedinManilawereinformedoftheproblemandafternumerousconsultationsthroughlongdistancecalls,thetechnicalexpertsconcludedthatthecauseoftheerrorwasinthemannertheballotsforlocalpositionswereprintedbytheNationalPrintingOffice(NPO),namely,thattheovalsoppositethenamesofthecandidateswerenotproperlyaligned.Asregardstheballotsfornationalpositions,noerrorwasfound."Sincetheproblemwasnotmachine-related,itwasobviousthattheuseofcountingmachinesfromothermunicipalitiestocounttheballotsofthemunicipalityofPatawouldstillresultinthesameerroneouscount.Thus,itwasfoundnecessarytodeterminetheextentoftheerrorintheballotprintingprocessbeforeproceedingwiththeautomatedcounting."Toavoidasituationwhereproceedingwithautomationwillresultinanerroneouscount,theTFHead,onorabout11:45a.m.orderedthesuspensionofthecountingofallballotsintheprovincetoenablehimtocallameetingwiththeheadsofthepoliticalpartieswhichfieldedcandidatesintheprovince,informthemofthetechnicalerror,andfindsolutionstotheproblem."Onorabout12:30p.m.,theTFHeadpresidedoveraconferenceatCampGeneralBautista(3rdMarineBrigade)todiscussthe

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processbywhichthewilloftheelectoratecouldbedetermined.Presentduringthemeetingwere:1.Brig.Gen.EdgardoEspinozaMarineForces,SouthernPhilippines2.Brig.Gen.PercivalSubala3rdMarineBrigade3.ProvincialDir.CharlemagneAlejandrinoSuluPNPCommand4.GubernatorialCandidateTupayLoongLAKAS-NUCDLoongWing5.GubernatorialCandidateAbdusakurTanLAKAS-NUCDTanWing6.GubernatorialCandidateYusopJikiriLAKAS-NUCD-MNLFWing7.GubernatorialCandidateKimarTulawieLAMMP8.CongressionalCandidateBensaudiTulawieLAMMP"Duringsaidmeeting,alloftheabovepartiesverballyadvancedtheirrespectivepositions.Thoseinfavorofamanualcountwere:1.Brig.Gen.EdgardoEspinoza2.Brig.Gen.PercivalSubala3.ProvincialDir.CharlemagneAlenjandrino4.GubernatorialCandidateAbdusakurTan5.GubernatorialCandidateKimarTulawie6.CongressionalCandidateBensaudiTulawieandthoseinfavorofanautomatedcountwere:1.GubernatorialCandidateTupayLoong2.GubernatorialCandidateYusopJikiri"SaidpartieswerethenrequestedbytheTFHeadtosubmittheirrespectivepositionpaperssothatthesamemaybeforwardedtotheCommissionenbanc,togetherwiththerecommendationsoftheTFHead.'TheTFHeadreturnedtothecountingcenterattheSuluStateCollegeandcalledhistechnicalstafftodeterminetheextentofthetechnicalerrorandtoenablehimtosubmittheappropriaterecommendationtotheCommissionenbanc."Uponconsultationwiththetechnicalstaff,itwasdiscoveredthatintheMunicipalityofTalipao,someofthelocalballotswererejectedbythemachine.Verificationshowedthatwhiletheballotsweregenuine,ballotpaperbearingawrong"sequencecode"wasusedbytheNPOduringtheprintingprocess."Briefly,thefollowingisthemannerbywhichasequencecode"determinedgenuinenessofaballot.Amunicipalityisassignedaspecificmachine(exceptforJolo,whichwasassignedtwo(2)machines,andsharingofone(1)machinebytwo(2)municipalities,namely,H.P.TahilandMaimbung,PandamiandK.Caluang,PataandTongkilandPanamaoandLugus).Amachineisthenassignedaspecific"sequencecode"asoneofthesecurityfeaturestodetectwhethertheballotspassingthroughitaregenuine.Sinceacountingmachineisprogrammedtoreadthespecific"sequencecode"assignedtoit,ballotswhichbeara"sequencecode"assignedtoanothermachine/municipality,evenifsaidballotsweregenuine,willberejectedbythemachine."Othermunicipalities,suchasSiasi,Indanan,TapulandJoloalsohadthesameproblemofrejectedballots.However,sincethemachineoperatorswerenotawarethatoneofthereasonsforrejectionofballotsistheuseofwrong"sequencecode",theyfailedtodeterminewhetherthecauseforrejectionofballotsforsaidmunicipalitieswasthesameasthatforthemunicipalityofTalipao."Inthecaseof'misalignedovals',thecountingmachinewillnotrejecttheballotbecauseallthesecurityfeatures,suchas"sequencecode",arepresentintheballot,however,sincetheovalismisalignedornotplacedinitsproperposition,themachinewillcredittheshadedovalforthepositionwherethemachineisprogrammedto"read"theoval.Thus,insteadofrejectingtheballot,themachinewillcreditthevotesofacandidateinfavorofhisopponent,orintheadjacentspacewheretheovalshouldbeproperlyplaced."Itcouldnotbedeterminediftheothermunicipalitiesalsohadthesametechnicalerrorintheirofficialballotssincethe"misalignedovals"werediscoveredonlyaftermembersoftheBoardofElectionInspectorsoftheMunicipalityofPatacomplainedthattheirvoteswerenotreflectedintheprintoutoftheelectionreturns."Astheextentorcoverageofthetechnicalerrorscouldnotbedetermined,theTFHead,uponconsultationwithhistechnicalstaff,wasofthebeliefthatitwouldbemoreprudenttocounttheballotsmanuallythantoproceedwithanautomatedsystemwhichwillresultinanerroneouscount."TheTFHeadthusorderedtheindefinitesuspensionofcountingofballotsuntilsuchtimeastheCommissionshallhaveresolvedthepetition/positionpaperstobesubmittedbytheparties.TheTFHeadandhisstaffreturnedtoCampGeneralBautistatoawaitthesubmissionofthepositionpapersofthepartiesconcerned."Uponreceiptofthepositionpapersoftheparties,theTFHeadfaxedthesameintheeveningofMay12,1998,togetherwithhishandwrittenrecommendationtoproceedwithamanualcount."AttachedarecopiesoftherecommendationsoftheTFHead(Annex"1"),andthepositionpapersofthePhilippineMarinesandPhilippineNationalPolice(Annex"2"),LAKAS-NUCD

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TanWingAnnex(Annex"3"),Lakas-NUCDLoongWing(Annex"4"),LAKAS-NUCD-MNLFWing(Annex"5")andLAMMP(Annex"6").SaidrecommendationsandpositionpaperswerethebasesforthepromulgationofCOMELECMinuteResolutionNo.98-1750datedMay13,1998(Annex"7"),directingamongotherthings,thattheballotsandcountingmachinesbetransportedbyC130toManilaforbothautomatedandmanualoperations."MinuteResolutionNo.98-1750wasreceivedbytheTFHeadthroughfaxonorabout5:30intheeveningofMay13,1998.Copieswerethenservedthroughpersonaldeliverytotheheadsofthepoliticalparties,withnoticetothemthatanotherconferencewillbeconductedatthe3rdMarineBrigadeonMay14,1998at9:00o'clockinthemorning,thistime,withLt.GeneralJoselinNazareno,thenAFPCommander,SouthernCommand.Attachedisacopyofsaidnotice(Annex"8")bearingthesignaturesofcandidatesTan(Annex"8-A")andLoong(Annex"8-B"),andtherepresentativesofcandidatesTulawie(Annex"8-C")andJikiri(Annex"8-D")."OnMay14,1998,theTFHeadpresidedoversaidconferenceinthepresenceoftheheadsofthepoliticalpartiesofSulu,togetherwiththeircounsel,includingLt.Gen.Nazareno,Brig.Gen.Subala,representativesoftheNAMFREL,mediaandthepublic."Afterhearingthesidesofallpartiesconcerned,includingthatofNAMFREL,theprocedurebywhichtheballotsandcountingmachinesweretobetransportedtoManilawasfinalized,witheachpoliticalpartyauthorizedtosendatleastone(1)escort/watcherforeverymunicipalitytoaccompanytheballotboxesandcountingmachinesfromthecountingcenterattheSuluStateCollegetotheSuluAirportuptothePICC,wheretheCOMELECwasthenconductingitsSenatorialCanvass.Therebeingfourparties,atotalofseventy-two(72)escorts/watchersaccompaniedtheballotsandcountingmachines."TwoC130sleftSuluonMay15,1998totransportalltheballotboxesandcountingmachines,accompaniedbyalltheauthorizedescorts.SaidballotsboxesreachedthePICConthesameday,withalltheescorts/watchersallowedtostationthemselvesattheballotboxstoragearea.OnMay17,1998,anotherC130leftSulutoferrythemembersoftheboardofcanvassers."Fifth.TheevidenceisclearthattheintegrityofthelocalballotswassafeguardedwhentheyweretransferredfromSulutoManilaandwhentheyweremanuallycounted.

AsshownbytheTolentinomemorandum,representativesofthepoliticalpartiesescortedthetransferofballotsfromSulutoPICC. Indeed, in his May 14, 1992 letter to Atty. Tolentino, Jr., petitioner Tupay Loong himself submitted the names of hisrepresentativeswhowouldaccompanytheballotboxesandotherelectionparaphernalia,viz:[if!supportFootnotes][20][endif]"DearAtty.Tolentino:"Submittedherewitharethenamesofescort(s)toaccompanytheballotboxesandotherelectionpharaphernaliatobetransportedtoCOMELEC,Manila,towit:1.Jolo-JosephLu2.Patikul-FathieB.Loong3.Indanan--DixonJadi4.Siasi-JamalIsmael5.K.Kaluang-EnjimarAbam6.Pata-MarvinHassan7.Parang-SiyangLoong8.Pangutaran-Hji.NasserLoong9.Marunggas-TaibMangkabong10.Luuk-JunArbison11.Pandami-OrkanOsman12.Tongkil-UsmanSahidulla13.Tapul-AlphawanisTupay14.Lugus-PattaAlih15.Maimbong-MikeBangahan16.P.Estino-Yasirlbba17.Panamao-HambaLoong18.Talipao-IsmaelSali"Hopingforyourkindand(sic)considerationforapprovalonthismatter."Thankyou.

Verytrulyyours,(Sgd.)TupayT.Loong(Sgd.)AsaniS.Tammang"

The ballot boxeswere consistently under thewatchful eyes of the parties' representatives. Theywere placed in an openspaceatthePICC.Thewatchersstationedthemselvessomefive(5)metersawayfromtheballotboxes.Theywatched24hoursadayandsleptatthePICC.[if!supportFootnotes][21][endif]

Theparties'watchersagainaccompaniedthetransferoftheballotboxesfromPICCtothepublicschoolsofPasayCitywheretheballotswerecounted.AfterthecountingtheyoncemoreescortedthereturnoftheballotboxestoPICC.[if!supportFootnotes][22][endif]

Infine,petitioner'schargethattheballotscouldhavebeentamperedwithbeforethemanualcountingistotallyunfounded.Sixth.Theevidencealsorevealsthattheresultofthemanualcountisreliable.

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Itbearsstressingthattheballotsusedinthecaseatbarwerespeciallymadetosuitanautomatedelection.Theballotswereuncomplicated.Theyhad fairly largeovalsopposite thenamesofcandidates.Avoterneededonly tochecktheovalopposite thenameofhiscandidate.WhentheCOMELECorderedamanualcountofthevotes,itissuedspecialrulesasthecountinginvolvedadifferentkindofballot,albeit,moresimpleballots.TheOmnibusElectionCoderulesonappreciationofballotscannotapplyfortheyonly apply to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots. The rules were spelled out in MinuteResolution98-1798,viz:[if!supportFootnotes][23][endif]"InthematteroftheMemorandumdated17May1998ofExecutiveDirectorResurreccionZ.Borra,reprocedureofthecountingofvotesforSulufortheconveningoftheBoardofElectionInspectors,theMunicipalBoardofCanvassersandtheProvincialBoardofCanvassersonMay18,1998at9:00a.m.atthePhilippineInternationalConventionCenter(PICC),'RESOLVEDtoapprovethefollowingprocedureforthecountingofvotesforSuluatthePICC:'I.CommonProvisions:'1.Opentheballotbox,retrievetheMinutesofVotingandtheuncountedballotsortheenvelopecontainingthecountedballotsas

thecasemaybe;'2.Segregatethenationalballotsfromthelocalballots;'3.Countthenumberofpiecesofboththenationalandlocalballotsandcomparethesamewiththenumberofvoteswhoactually

votedasstatedintheMinutesofVoting:-IfthereisnoMinutesofVoting,refertotheVotingRecordsatthebackoftheVRRstodeterminethenumberofvoterswhoactually

voted.-Iftherearemoreballotsthanthenumberofvoterswhoactuallyvoted,thepollclerkshalldrawoutasmanylocalandnational

ballotsasmaybeequaltotheexcessandplacethemintheenvelopeforexcessballots.'IICountingofVotes'A.NationalBallots:'1.Ifthenationalballotshavealreadybeencounted,returnthesameinsidetheenvelopeforcountedballots,resealandplacethe

envelopeinsidetheballotbox;'2.Ifthenationalballotshavenotyetbeencounted,placetheminsideanenvelopeandgivetheenvelopethroughaliaisonofficerto

themachineoperatorconcernedforcountingandprintingoftheelectionreturns;'3.Themachineoperatorshallaffixhissignatureandthumbmarkthereon,andreturnthesametothemembersoftheBEI

concernedfortheirsignaturesandthumbmarks;'4.Thesaidreturnsshallthenbeplacedincorrespondingenvelopesfordistribution;'B.LocalBallots:'1.Groupthelocalballotsinpilesoffifty(50);'2.TheChairmanshallreadthevoteswhilethepollclerkandthethirdmembershallsimultaneouslyaccomplishtheelection

returnsandthetallyboardrespectively.'Ifthevotersshadedmoreovalsthanthenumberofpositionstobevotedfor,novoteshallbecountedinfavorofanycandidate.'3.Afterallthelocalballotsshallhavebeenmanuallycounted,thesameshallbegiventothemachineoperatorconcernedfor

countingbythescanningmachine.ThemachineoperatorshallthensavetheresultsinadisketteandprintouttheelectionreturnsforCOMELECreference.

'4.TheBEIshallaccomplishthecertificationportionoftheelectionreturnsandannouncetheresults;'5.Placetheelectionreturnsintheirrespectiveenvelopesanddistributethemaccordingly;'6.Returnallpertinentelectiondocumentsandparaphernaliainsidetheballotbox.'III.ConsolidationofResults'A.NationalBallots'1.TheresultsofthecountingforthenationalballotsforeachmunicipalityshallbeconsolidatedbyusingtheERsoftheautomated

electionsystem;'2.Aftertheconsolidation,theMachineOperatorshallprintthecertificateofcanvassbymunicipalityandstatementofvotesby

precinct;'3.Toconsolidatetheprovincialresults,theMOshallloadallthediskettesusedinthescannertotheERs;'4.TheMOshallprinttheprovincialcertificateofcanvassandtheSOVbymunicipality;'5.Incasethereissystemfailureinthecountingand/orconsolidationoftheresults,thePOBC/MOBCshallreverttomanual

consolidation.'B.LocalBallots'1.-TheconsolidationofvotesshallbedonemanuallybytheProvincial/MunicipalBoardofCanvassers;'2.Theproclamationofwinningcandidatesshallbebasedonthemanualconsolidation.'RESOLVED,moreover,thatthepertinentprovisionsofCOMELECResolutionNos.2971and3030shallapply.'LettheExecutiveDirectorimplementthisresolution."'

Asaforestated, five(5)SpecialBoardswere initiallycreatedunderAtty.Tolentino, Jr. toundertakethemanualcounting,[if!supportFootnotes][24][endif]viz:"a)Atty.MamasapunodM.Aguam

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Ms.GloriaFernandezMs.EsperanzaNicolasb)DirectorEsterL.Villaflor-RoxasMs.CeliaRomeroMs.RebeccaMacarayac)Atty.ZenaidaS.SorianoMs.JocelynGuiangMa.JocelynTand)Atty.ErlindaC.EchaviaMs.TeresaA.TorralbaMs.Ma.CarmenLlamase)DirectorEstrellaP.deMesaMs.TeresitaVelascoMs.NellyJaena"Later, the COMELEC utilized the services of 600 public school teachers from Pasay City to do the manual counting. Five (5)elementaryschoolsservedasthevenuesofthecounting,viz:[if!supportFootnotes][25][endif]"1.GotamcoElementarySchool,GotamcoStreet,PasayCity-forthemunicipalitiesofIndanan,Pangutaran,PanglimaTahil,Maimbung;"2.ZamoraElementarySchool,ZamoraStreet,PasayCity-forthemunicipalitiesofJolo,Talipao,PanglimaEstino,andTapul;"3.EpifanioElementarySchool,TramoStreet,PasayCity-forthemunicipalitiesofParang,Lugus,Panamao;"4.BurgosElementarySchool,BurgosStreet,PasayCity-forthemunicipalitiesofLuukandTongkil;5.PalmaElementarySchool-forthemunicipalitiesofSiasiandKalingalangCaluang."Frombeginningtoend,themanualcountingwasdonewiththewatchersofthepartiesconcernedinattendance.Thereafter,thecertificatesofcanvasswerepreparedandsignedbytheCity/MunicipalBoardofCanvasserscomposedoftheChairman,Vice-Chairman,andSecretary.Theywerealsosignedbytheparties'watchers.[if!supportFootnotes][26][endif]

Thecorrectnessofthemanualcountcannotthereforebedoubted.Therewasnoneedforanexperttocountthevotes.Thenaked eye could see the checkmarks opposite the big ovals. Indeed, nobody complained that the votes could not be read andcounted.TheCOMELECrepresentativeshadnodifficultycountingthevotes.The600publicschoolteachersofPasayCityhadnodifficulty.Thewatchersofthepartieshadnodifficulty.Petitionerdidnotobjecttotherulesonmanualcountonthegroundthattheballotscannotbemanuallycounted.Indeed,inhisoriginalPetition,petitionerdidnotcomplainthatthelocalballotscouldnotbecountedbyalayman.Neitherdidtheintervenorcomplaininhispetitionforintervention.Theallegationthatitwilltakeatrainedeyetoreadtheballotsismoreimaginedthanreal.

Thisisnotall.AsprivaterespondentTanalleged,themanualcountcouldnothavebeenmanipulatedinhisfavorbecausetheresultsshowthatmostofhispoliticalopponentswon.Thus,"theofficialresultsshowthatthetwocongressionalseatsinSuluwerewonbyCongressmanHussinAminoftheLAKAS-MNLFWingforthe1stDistrictandCongressmanAsaniTammangoftheLAKAS-LoongWingforthe2ndDistrict.Intheprovinciallevel,oftheeight(8)seatsfortheSangguniangPanlalawigan,two(2)werewonbythecampofrespondentTan; three(3)bythecampofpetitionerLoong; two(2)bytheMNLF;andone(1)byLAMMP. In themayoral race, seven (7) out of eighteen (18) victorious municipal mayors were identified with respondent Tan; four (4) withpetitionerLoong;three(3)withtheMNLF;two(2)withLAMMPandone(1)withREPORMA."[if!supportFootnotes][27][endif]ThereislogictoprivaterespondentTan'scontentionthatifthemanualcountwastampered,hiscandidateswouldnothavemiserablylost.Seventh.WefurtherholdthatpetitionercannotinsistonautomatedcountingunderR.A.No.8436afterthemachinesmisreadorrejectedthelocalballotsinfive(5)municipalitiesinSulu.Section9ofR.A.No.8436provides:"SEC.9.SystemsBreakdownintheCountingCenter.Intheeventofasystemsbreakdownofallassignedmachinesinthecountingcenter,theCommissionshalluseanyavailablemachineoranycomponentthereoffromanothercity/municipalityuponapprovaloftheCommissionEnBancoranyofitsdivisions.Thetransferofsuchmachinesoranycomponentthereofshallbeundertakeninthepresenceofrepresentativesofpoliticalpartiesandcitizens'armoftheCommissionwhoshallbenotifiedbytheelectionofficerofsuchtransfer.Thereisasystemsbreakdowninthecountingcenterwhenthemachinefailstoreadtheballotsorfailstostore/saveresultsorfailstoprinttheresultsafterithasreadtheballots;orwhenthecomputerfailstoconsolidateelectionresults/reportsorfailstoprintelectionresults/reportsafterconsolidation."Asthefactsshow,itwasinutilefortheCOMELECtouseothermachinestocountthelocalvotesinSulu.Theerrorsincountingweredue to themisprinting of ovals and the use ofwrong sequence codes in the local ballots. The errorswere notmachine-related.Needlesstostate,tograntpetitioner'sprayertocontinuethemachinecountofthelocalballotswillcertainlyresultinanerroneouscountandsubvertthewilloftheelectorate.Eighth.InenactingR.A.No.8436,Congressobviouslyfailedtoprovidearemedywheretheerrorincountingisnotmachine-relatedforhumanforesightisnotall-seeing.Wehold,however,thatthevacuuminthelawcannotpreventtheCOMELECfromlevitatingabovetheproblem.Section2(1)ofArticleIX(C)oftheConstitutiongivestheCOMELECthebroadpower"toenforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite,initiative,referendumandrecall."Undoubtedly,thetextandintentofthisprovisionistohaveCOMELECallthenecessaryandincidentalpowersforittoachievetheobjectiveofholding

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free,orderly,honest,peaceful,andcredibleelections.Congruenttothisintent,thisCourthasnotbeenniggardlyindefiningtheparametersofpowersofCOMELECintheconductofourelections.Thus,weheldinSumulongv.COMELEC:[if!supportFootnotes][28][endif]"Politicsisapracticalmatter,andpoliticalquestionsmustbedealtwithrealistically-notfromthestandpointofpuretheory.TheCommissiononElections,becauseofitsfact-findingfacilities,itscontactswithpoliticalstrategists,anditsknowledgederivedfromactualexperienceindealingwithpoliticalcontroversies,isinapeculiarlyadvantageouspositiontodecidecomplexpoliticalquestionsxxx.Therearenoreadymadeformulasforsolvingpublicproblems.Timeandexperiencearenecessarytoevolvepatternsthatwillservetheendsofgoodgovernment.Inthematteroftheadministrationoflawsrelativetotheconductofelection,xxxwemustnotbyanyexcessivezealtakeawayfromtheCommissiononElectionstheinitiativewhichbyconstitutionalandlegalmandatesproperlybelongstoit."Inthecaseatbar,theCOMELECorderforamanualcountwasnotonlyreasonable.Itwastheonlywaytocountthedecisivelocalvotesinthesix(6)municipalitiesofPata,Talipao,Siasi,Tudanan,TapulandJolo.Thebottomlineisthatbymeansofthemanualcount, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literalinterpretationtoR.A.8436.R.A.8436didnotprohibitmanualcountingwhenmachinecountdoesnotwork.CountingispartandparceloftheconductofanelectionwhichisunderthecontrolandsupervisionoftheCOMELEC.Itoughttobeself-evidentthattheConstitutiondidnotenvisionaCOMELECthatcannotcounttheresultofanelection.Ninth.Ourelectionsarenotconductedunderlaboratoryconditions.Inrunningforpublicoffices,candidatesdonotfollowtherulesofEmilyPost.Toooften,COMELEChastomakesnapjudgmentstomeetunforseencircumstancesthatthreatentosubvertthewillofourvoters.Intheprocess,theactionsofCOMELECmaynotbeimpeccable,indeed,mayevenbedebatable.Wecannot,however,engageinaswivelchaircriticismoftheseactionsoftentakenunderverydifficultcircumstances.Evenmore,wecannotorderaspecialelectionunlessdemandedbyexceptionalcircumstances.Thus,thepleaforthisCourttocallaspecialelectionforthegovernorshipofSuluiscompletelyoff-line.Thepleacanonlybegroundedonfailureofelection.Section6oftheOmnibusElectionCodetellsuswhenthereisafailureofelection,viz:"Sec.6.Failureofelection.-Ifonaccountofforcemajeure,terrorism,fraud,orotheranalogouscauses,theelectioninanypollingplacehasnotbeenheldonthedatefixed,orhadbeensuspendedbeforethehourfixedbylawfortheclosingofthevoting,orafterthevotingandduringthepreparationandthetransmissionoftheelectionreturnsorinthecustodyorcanvassthereof,suchelectionresultsinafailuretoelect,andinanyofsuchcasesthefailureorsuspensionofelectionwouldaffecttheresultoftheelection,theCommissionshallonthebasisofaverifiedpetitionbyanyinterestedpartyandafterduenoticeandhearing,callfortheholdingorcontinuationoftheelection,notheld,suspendedorwhichresultedinafailuretoelectbutnotlaterthanthirtydaysafterthecessationofthecauseofsuchpostponementorsuspensionoftheelectionorfailuretoelect."Tobeginwith, thepleaforaspecialelectionmustbeaddressedtotheCOMELECandnottothisCourt.Section6oftheOmnibusElectionCodeshouldbereadinrelationtoSection4ofR.A.No.7166whichprovides:"Sec.4.Postponement,FailureofElectionandSpecialElections.-Thepostponement,declarationoffailureofelectionsandthecallingofspecialelectionsasprovidedinSections5,6,and7oftheOmnibusElectionCodeshallbedecidedbytheCommissionenbancbyamajorityvoteofitsmembers.Thecausesforthedeclarationofafailureofelectionmayoccurbeforeoraftercastingofvotesoronthedayoftheelection."Thegroundsforfailureofelection-forcemajeure,terrorism,fraudorotheranalogouscauses-clearlyinvolvequestionsoffact.ItisforthisreasonthattheycanonlybedeterminedbytheCOMELECenbancafterduenoticeandhearingtotheparties.Inthecaseatbar,petitionerneveraskedtheCOMILECenbanctocallforaspecialelectioninSulu.EveninhisoriginalpetitionwiththisCourt,petitioner did not pray for a special election.His plea for a special election is amere afterthought. Too late in the day and toounprocedural.Worse,thegroundsforfailureofelectionareinexistent.TherecordsshowthatthevotersofSuluwereabletocasttheirvotesfreelyandfairly.Theirvoteswerecountedcorrectly,albeitmanually.Thepeoplehavespoken.Theirsovereignwillhastobeobeyed.

There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special election only for thepositionofGovernorwillbediscriminatory andwill violate the rightofprivate respondent toequalprotectionof the law.TherecordsshowthatallelectedofficialsinSuluhavebeenproclaimedandarenowdischargingtheirpowersandduties.Thus,two(2)congressmen, a vice-governor, eight (8) members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and eighteen (18) mayors, numerous vice-mayorsandmunicipal councilorsarenowserving in theirofficial capacities.Theseofficialswereproclaimedon thebasisof thesamemanuallycountedvotesofSulu.Ifmanualcountingisillegal,theirassumptionofofficecannotalsobecountenanced.Privaterespondent'selectioncannotbesingledoutasinvalidforalikescannotbetreatedunalikes.Afinalword.OurdecisionmerelyreinforcesourcollectiveeffortstoendowCOMELECwithenoughpowertoholdfree,honest,orderlyandcredibleelections.Aquickflashbackofitshistoryisnecessarylestoureffortsbelostinthelabyrinthoftime.

The COMELECwas organized under Commonwealth Act No. 607 enacted on August 22,1940. The power to enforce ourelectionlawswasoriginallyvestedinthePresidentandexercisedthroughtheDepartmentofInterior.AccordingtoDeanSinco,[if!supportFootnotes][29][endif]theviewultimatelyemergedthatanindependentbodycouldbetterprotecttherightofsuffrageofourpeople.Hence,theenforcementofourelectionlaws,whileanexecutivepower,wastransferredtotheCOMELEC.

Fromastatutorycreation,theCOMELECwastransformedtoaconstitutionalbodybyvirtueofthe1940amendmentstothe1935ConstitutionwhichtookeffectonDecember2,1940.COMELECwasgenerouslygrantedthepowerto"haveexclusivechargeoftheenforcementandadministrationofalllawsrelativetotheconductofelectionsxxx."[if!supportFootnotes][30][endif]

Thencamethe1973Constitution. It furtherbroadenedthepowersofCOMELECbymaking it thesole Judgeofallelection

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contestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsofmembersofthenational legislatureandelectiveprovincialandcityofficials.[if!supportFootnotes][31][endif]Infine,theCOMELECwasgivenjudicialpowerasidefromitstraditionaladministrativeandexecutivefunctions.

The1987Constitutionquickened this trendof strengthening theCOMELEC.Today, COMLECenforces and administers alllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofelections,plebiscites, initiatives,referendaandrecalls.Electioncontests involvingregional,provincialandcityelectiveofficialsareunderitsexclusiveoriginal jurisdiction.Allcontestsinvolvingelectivemunicipalandbarangayofficialsareunderitsappellatejurisdiction.[if!supportFootnotes][32][endif]

Our decisions have been in cadence with the movement towards empowering the COMELEC in order that it can moreeffectively perform its duty of safeguarding the sanctity of our elections. InCauton vs.COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]we laiddownthisliberalapproach,viz:xxx'ThepurposeoftheRevisedElectionCodeistoprotecttheintegrityofelectionsandtosuppressallevilsthatmayviolateitspurityanddefeatthewillofthevoters.Thepurityoftheelectionsisoneofthemostfundamentalrequisitesofpopulargovernment.TheCommissiononElections,byconstitutionalmandate,mustdoeverythinginitspowertosecureafairandhonestcanvassofthevotescastintheelections.Intheperformanceofitsduties,theCommissionmustbegivenaconsiderablelatitudeinadoptingmeansandmethodsthatwillinsuretheaccomplishmentofthegreatobjectiveforwhichitwascreated--topromotefree,orderly,andhonestelections.ThechoiceofmeanstakenbytheCommissiononElections,unlesstheyareclearlyillegalorconstitutegraveabuseofdiscretion,shouldnotbeinterferedwith."InPacisvs.COMELEC,[if!supportFootnotes][34][endif]wereiteratedtheguidingprinciplethat"cleanelectionscontroltheappropriatenessoftheremedy."Thedissent,forallitsdepth,isoutofstepwiththismovement.ItcondemnstheCOMELECforexercisingitsdiscretiontoresorttomanualcountwhenthiswasitsonlyviablealternative.Itwouldsetasidetheresultsofthemanualcountevenwhentheresultsarefreefromfraudandirregularity.Worse,itwouldsetasidethejudgmentofthepeopleelectingtheprivaterespondentasGovernor.Upholding thesovereignty of the people is what democracy is all about.When thesovereignty of the peopleexpressedthrutheballotisatstake,itisnotenoughforthisCourttomakeastatementbutitshoulddoeverythingtohavethatsovereigntyobeyedbyall.Welldoneisalwaysbetterthanwellsaid.INVIEWWHEREOF,thepetitionofTupayLoongandthepetitionininterventionofYusopJikiriaredismissed,therebeingnoshowingthatpublicrespondentgravelyabuseditsdiscretioninissuingMinuteResolutionNos.98-1748,98-1750,98-1796and98-1798.OurstatusquoorderofJune23,1998islifted.Nocosts.SOORDERED.


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