El Método Geométrico en Spinoza

8/11/2019 El Mtodo Geomtrico en Spinoza

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facilitate this style of reference, the official ;ournal of Spinoza studies, Studia

Spinozana, has

set the following pattern, which is used in this article + E < Ethics15, ., 0, 8, 6 < :art 5,

., etc4

A < Appendix 1the Appendix to E 8 is di(ided into separate sections, ordered as aput ,

aput , and so on hence, E 8A5


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dealing with !escartes's method

:iet Steen#a""ers 15==8+ 5824 asserts that the geometrical method is the result of a

long

historical process of transmission, reception and interpretation, rather than the conscious

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%he )eometrical ethod in Spinoza'sEthics

886

of clearly stated axioms and definitions, from which a series of propositions

a#out )od, the mind, the emotions, desire, and happiness are deduced At

the end of the :reface to :art 6, Spinoza writes that he intends to deduce

all those things which concern the mind's #lessedness from the mind's

"nowledge alone 1E 6:raef4 n the :reface to :art 0, he writes that he

will treat the nature and power of the emotions and the mind's power o(er

them in the same way he has treated )od and the mindFin the geomet-rical manner, considering human actions and appetites ;ust as if it were a

&uestion of lines, planes and #odies 1E 0:raef4 t seems odd, if not per-

(ersely misguided, to consider our emotions, desires, and the conditions

of our well-#eing in the same manner as geometrical figures Euclidean

geometry is, after all, the domain of strict necessity and a#solute certainty

%riangles are eternally and e(erywhere the same %heir properties, such as

the sum of their interior angles e&ualing 5/2 degrees, are deduci#le from

their natures as specified #y their geometrical definitions and the first prin-

ciples of geometry !oes Spinoza thin" the certainty of mathematics can

#e extended to the in(estigation of human life and well-#eing$

Aristotle expresses our dou#ts and intuitions a#out this sort of enter-

prise in theNicomachean Ethics1NE4, asserting that we cannot demand the

precision of mathematical studies in moral and political philosophy, where

we in(estigate topics such as fine and ;ust actions, which exhi#it much

(ariety and fluctuation 1NE 0, 52=8#56 5=/8+ 53024 Accordingly, we ha(e

to #e content with merely indicating the truth roughly and in outline and

with spea"ing a#out things which are only for the most part true 1NE 0,

52=8#.2G.5 5=/8+ 53024 s Spinoza ignoring Aristotle's point that it is the

mar" of an educated man to loo" for precision in each class of things ;ust

so far as the nature of the su#;ect admits 1NE 0, 52=8#.6 5=/8+ 53024$

*urthermore, if Spinoza's concept of freedom has a great deal in commonwith Aristotelian eudaimonia, what are we to ma"e of Spinoza's adopting

a method that Aristotle clearly thought to #e inappropriate to this su#;ect

matter$ Why, in spite of the affinity of its goal with that of theNicomachean

Ethics, is Spinoza'sEthicsdemonstrated in geometrical order$

n order to answer these &uestions, we need to understand the relation

of the geometrical method of theEthicsto its content A (ariety of opin-

ions a#out this can #e found in the secondary literature Scholars such as

Carry Wolfson 15=>5 ?5=08@+ 664 argue that there is no logical connection

#etween the su#stance of Spinoza's philosophy and the form in which it

creation of Euclid *or example, the captions o(er the principlesF'definitions,' 'postu-

lates,' 'axioms'Fare interpolations of a later date Steen#a""ers 1i#id4 traces theclean-


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cut, systematic differentiation #etween them to the wor" of :roclus !iadochus 1fifth

cen-

tury E4

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88>:oetics %oday ./+0

is written Hather, the reason for its choice was pedagogical, #ecause

of the clearness and distinctness with which the geometrical form was

#elie(ed to delineate the main features of an argument and to #ring them

into high relief 1i#id4 Similarly, Edwin urley 15=/6+ 82.4 asserts that the

geometrical method represents nothing more, and nothing less, than an

awesome commitment to intellectual honesty and clarity Ce maintains

that Spinoza sets out his philosophy in the form of propositions deri(ed

from clearly stated axioms and definitions #ecause he wishes to use no

important term without explaining the sense in which it is to #e under-

stood, to ma"e no crucial assumption without identifying it as a proposi-tion ta"en to re&uire no argument, to draw no conclusion without #eing

(ery explicit a#out why that conclusion is thought to follow from his

assumptions 1i#id4 Still, urley 15=//+ xi4 finds that Spinoza's axiomatic

style of presentation does not in fact pro(ide the clarity Spinoza intended+

the definitions are typically o#scure, the axioms fre&uently not e(ident,

and the demonstrations all too often uncon(incing Ie(ertheless, he finds

it hard to escape the feeling that there is something there worth ta"ing

pains to try to understand his strategy for understanding Spinoza's phi-

losophy 1as the titleehind the !eometrical "ethodimplies4 is, therefore, to

penetrate #eneath the surface of theEthicsand to unco(er the dialogue

Spinoza was conducting with his predecessors 1i#id4 *or example, he

proposes to explicate theEthics' accounts of )od, mind, and matter as the

results of Spinoza's criticism of the philosophy of !escartes 1i#id+ 0G/4

urley 1i#id+ xi4, howe(er, finds that this dialogue is something the geo-

metric presentation ser(ed to conceal, and was, perhaps, partly designed

to conceal

%he thesis that Spinoza wished to conceal his real (iews, such as the

identity of )od and nature, from religious authorities who would suppress

them and persecute him #ecause of their unorthodoxy was most famously

de(eloped #y Leo Strauss in hisPersecution and the #rt of $riting15=// ?5=6.@4

Efraim Shmueli 15=33+ .524 endorses this interpretation, adding that Spi-noza had to appease his li#eral friends who remained hristian #elie(ers

of (arious shades %herefore, he concealed his partial #ut decisi(ely impor-

tant disagreement with these hristian li#erals *urthermore, Shmueli

argues, the impersonality and impartiality of the method were intended

to encourage tolerance from readers+ calling for careful and dispassionate

reasoning, the geometrical method discourages religious pre;udice rooted

in di(isi(e and unexamined emotion *inally, he argues that Spinoza used

8 See Iadler 5=== for a detailed account of orthodoxy, suppression, and persecution in

Colland during Spinoza's lifetime

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the method as a de(ice of self-discipline, to a(oid the personal touches

which ordinary composition #rings clearly into light 1i#id+ .2/4 Shmueli

supports this position #y arguing that the nongeometrical portions of theEthicsare (ery different in emotional tone from the geometrical portions

What he finds remar"a#le a#out theEthicsis the difference #etween the

restrained and detached, although contro(ersial assertions dressed in the

geometrical form, and the non-geometrical assertions loaded with harsh

re#u"es, refutations, ridicule and scorn 1i#id+ .2=4

Li"e Shmueli, Jirmiyahu Jo(el 15=/=4 claims that Spinoza meant the

calm impartiality of the geometrical method to encourage dispassionate

rationality Ce maintains, howe(er, that Spinoza did not thin" e(eryone

capa#le of this and distinguished the philosophical reader, who could put

emotion aside and reason carefully, from the mem#ers of the irrational

multitude, only led #y sensation, imagination, and emotion 1i#id+ 5.=4%hese two fundamentally different readerships had to #e addressed in dif-

ferent ways onse&uently, theEthics, directed at the first readership, is

Spinoza's purest philosophical text 1i#id+ 5034 Emphasizing the (alues

of clarity, rigor, and philosophical detachment, it is a model of how Spi-

noza would li"e his potentially philosophical readers to respond to issues

that arouse strong emotions 1i#id+ 50=4 n contrast, the Theologico%Political

Treatise, directed at the nonphilosophical multitude, must employ another

strategy to increase human freedom Spinoza did not thin" mem#ers of the

multitude could put aside their emotional and imaginati(e attachment to

their traditional religious #eliefs in order to consider calmly the arguments

for his unorthodox philosophical system onse&uently, it would #e futile

to structure the Theologico%Political Treatisegeometrically, expecting that the

logic of argument could persuade the multitude to accept deeply distur#-

ing ideas a#out )od and nature nstead, the Theologico%Political Treatise

ad(ocates social and religious reforms meant to reshape pu#lic emotion

and imagination, so as to reduce the intolerance that was the destructi(e

conse&uence of the psychology of the multitude 1i#id+ 5.=G024 :rudently,

the Theologico%Political Treatisecloa"s theEthics' unorthodox philosophy,

which is the conceptual warrant for these reforms, in a rhetorical mas" of

e&ui(ocation 1i#id+ 58.4

Kther commentators, such as artial )uroult 15=>/+ .6G03, 5=38+ 8>3G/34, Mance axwell 15==2+ 50.4, HS Woolhouse 15==0+ 054, Ste(en Iadler

15===+ ..>4, and Aaron )arrett 1.220+ 504, do discern a logical connection

#etween the content of theEthicsand its geometrical form %hey are in

agreement in asserting that the deducti(e relations #etween the axioms,

definitions, and propositions of theEthicsmirror the causal necessity of

nature %his logical connection is well expressed #y Iadler !enying that

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the geometrical method is some superficial shell for material that couldha(e #een presented in a different, more accessi#le manner, he 15===+


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..>4 asserts that the structure of the uni(erse, with its causally necessary

connections, is mirrored #y the structure of ideas, with their logically nec-

essary connections

systematically de(elop this position, offering a reading of theEthics

which shows that its geometrical demonstrations fulfill the Aristotelian

ideal of epist&m& *urthermore, demonstrate that, contrary to Aristotle, thededucti(e certainty of this type of "nowledge can #e extended to the in(es-

tigation of human life and well-#eing #y considering the ways in which the

three distinct elements of Spinoza's ethical pro;ect promote human flour-

ishing in the midst of the strict causal necessity that the method mirrors

After this, consider the role of the geometrical method in an aspect of

theEthicsthat can #est #e descri#ed as dialectical in the sense, discussed

#y Aristotle in the Topics, of persuading an audience #y arguing on the

#asis of propositions that would #e persuasi(e to it 1 Topics 5, 522a.6G02

5=/8+ 5>>4 argue that theEthicsis directed, historically, at the mem#ers

of the philosophical circle with whom Spinoza shared his ideas during all

of his adult life and, more generally, at readers intellectually similar tothem %he mem#ers of this circle were radical #ut de(out hristians %hey

(alued reason and were sympathetic to artesian philosophy argue,

against scholars li"e Shmueli, that Spinoza did not wish to conceal his

(iews from these radical #ut de(out friends nstead, he wished to persuade

them of the truth of his system #y starting with artesian principles that

they would accept readily also consider why Spinoza confidently used

the geometrical method to con(ince his artesian friends, e(en though

!escartes himself, when as"ed to demonstrate his philosophy in the geo-

metrical manner, asserted that it cannot so con(eniently #e applied to

these metaphysical su#;ects 1#uthor's (eplies to the Second Set of Ob)ections,

A% M+ 56>G63 5=/8 ?5>85@+ 5554 *inally, demonstrate that theEthics

does not always operate in the thin and impersonal air of deduction from

6 urley 15=//+ 04 also asserts that theEthicshas its starting point in artesian

philosophy

n explicating Spinoza's philosophy, his method is to start from the philosophy of

!escartes

and to see how far the central themes of the Ethicscan #e deri(ed from critical

reflection

on the artesian system As noted a#o(e, howe(er, he argues that the geometrical

method

concealed this dialogue Jo(el 15=/=+ 5034 asserts, #ut does not de(elop in the way that

do, the point that Spinoza clearly ta"es into consideration his audience and its point of

departure *urthermore, Jo(el also claims that this audience consists of artesians Ce

asserts that the first ele(en propositions address proponents of the Iew :hilosophy in a

tacit effortFpolemical and didacticFto draw them away from !escartes and toward

Spi-

noza's position 1i#id4

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D%he )eometrical ethod in Spinoza'sEthics


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88=

self-e(ident first principles t shows many traces of Spinoza's effort to

engage the opinions, difficulties, and emotions of his intended audience

onse&uently, some of the nongeometrical portions of theEthicsare rhe-

torically aimed at managing its readers' emotional responses to the most

distur#ing parts of the text, so that these responses will not interfere withtheir a#ility to attend rationally to the tra;ectory of the argument

The Geometrical Method and the Causal ecessity o! ature

n its ideal form, the geometrical method deduces theorems rigorously,

without appeal to outside concepts, from axioms concei(ed as necessary

truths that are disco(ered #y reason n this way, theEthicsis an example

of Aristotelian epistNmN %his type of "nowledge is discussed in thePos%

terior #nalytics, especially the first #oo" Ho#in Smith 15==6+ 834 explains

that epistNmN is a #ody of "nowledge a#out some su#;ect, organized into

a system ofproofsor demonstrations and asserts that Aristotle's model for

such demonstrati(e "nowledge was the mathematical disciplines of arith-

metic and geometry, which in his time were already #eing presented as sys-tematic series of deductions from #asic first principles Euclid'sElements

aspires to this ideal

!eduction, orsyllogismos, is characterized #y Aristotle in thePrior #na%

lytics1 5, .8#5=G.2 5=/8+ 824 as a discourse in which, certain things #eing

stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessityfrom their

#eing so 1emphasis added4 %he rele(ant point here is the necessity of

assenting to certain propositions on the #asis of the acceptance of others

Writing in the geometrical manner ma"es manifest that the nature of the

relationship #etween a set of premises and what follows from them is one

of logical necessity *urthermore, the logical necessity of the relationship

#etween premises and conclusions in Spinoza's geometrically ordered text

reflects the causal necessity actually present in nature Hather than #eing

poles apart, logic and the fa#ric of reality are in perfect harmony+ #ecause

of this actual causal necessity, deducti(e relationships represent real causal

relations %hat is, ;ust as theEthics' propositions a#out nature are the nec-

essary logical conse&uences of its premises a#out the nature of )od, so too

the constituents of the natural world itself are the necessary effects of the

di(ine first cause Logical necessity go(erns the construction of the text

#ecause causal necessity or determinism reigns in the actual world

haracterized #y this all-per(ading determinism and an unflinching

naturalism, the cosmological framewor" of Spinoza'sEthicsseems #lea"and comfortless )od does not transcend nature, as he does in orthodox

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:oetics %oday ./+0

supernaturalist (iews, #ut is identified with the causal power of nature

Cuman #eings are parts of nature, su#;ect to its impersonal causal laws

and easily o(ercome and annihilated #y its immense, indifferent forces

Jet the goal of theEthicsis freedom 1 libertas4 1E 6:raef4, which Spinoza

further &ualifies as #lessedness 1 beatitudo4 1E 6:raef4 and sal(ation 1salus4

1E 6:8.S4 n positing freedom as the goal of theEthics, Spinoza mightseem to #e directing us to the Stoic ideal of freedom in a deterministic


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uni(erse, namely, impertur#a#ility or atara*ia %his state is attained #y

retreating inward and resol(ing to care only for that which is directly in

our controlFour emotional reactions to whate(er fortune #rings our way

As explain later in the essay, Spinoza denies that we possess this "ind

of freedom As part of nature and su#;ect to its power, we cannot simply

choose to #e unpertur#ed #y the natural forces that threaten our li(es andour happiness

n what, then, does our freedom consist$ Spinoza's understanding of

#lessedness has much in common with Aristotle's conception of eudai-

monia, understood as flourishing through the perfected exercise of human

capacities But how is flourishing possi#le in Spinoza's deterministic, indif-

ferent uni(erse$ *urthermore, what is the relationship #etween a method

that mirrors the causal determinism of nature, on the one hand, and the

happiness of finite creatures necessarily su#;ect to pitiless fortune, on the

other$

Spinoza's ethical teaching for the achie(ement of human freedom is

de(eloped in :arts 0 to 6 of theEthics %his teaching, preceded #y anaccount of the nature of )od in :art 5 and of the human mind in :art ., has

three distinct elements %he first, de(eloped in :art 8 of theEthics, start-

ing at E 8:5/S, is practical+ it consists of rational principles for the self-

interested regulation of our conduct and our relationships with others %he

second element is therapeutic+ it indicates how one might #e less trou#led

#y distur#ing emotions :resupposing the analysis of emotion in :arts 0

and 8 of theEthics, it is de(eloped in :art 6 of theEthicsfrom its #eginning

to E 6:.2 %he third element might #e called soteriological, #ecause it

completes the ethical pro;ect #y pointing the way to the highest form of

#lessedness or sal(ation t follows the therapeutic sections of :art 6 of the

Ethics Bearing these elements in mind, let us re(iew the fi(e parts of the

Ethicsin order to see the place of the ethical teaching in the geometrical

ordering of the wor" as a whole

:art 5 of theEthicsesta#lishes the relationship of )od to nature )od

necessarily exists, or existence follows necessarily from his nature 1E 5:554

)od is the only su#stance 1E 5:584, and e(erything is in )od 1E 5:564

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%he )eometrical ethod in Spinoza'sEthics865

ind and matter are attri#utes of )od 1E .:5, .4 Whate(er is, is in )od

Iothing can #e or #e concei(ed of without )od 1E 5:564 %hat is, all the

finite things of ordinary experience, ta#les and chairs, dogs and trees,

human minds and #odies, are modes of )od :art 5 also argues for com-

plete determinism )od is the immanent cause 1 causa immanens4 of all things

1 omnium rerum4 1E 5:5/4 Cis actions are not the result of the free choice of a

will exempt from causal determination #ut, instead, follow from the inner

causal necessity of his nature 1E 5:534 %here is no contingency 1E 5:.=4

onse&uently, the freedom possi#le in this uni(erse must #e understood

#y Spinoza in compati#ilist terms+ a thing is free if it is exempt, not fromall causal determination #ut only from determination #y causes external to


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it ompati#ilist freedom is the expression of the inner causal necessity of

a thing's nature without external causal determination )od is free in this

sense+ #ecause there is nothing external to him, his actions follow from his

nature alone :art 5 also esta#lishes that )od's essence is causal power Ce

is the power #y which all things exist and act 1E 5:084

All finite things are determinate or limited expressions of )od's infinitepower 1E 5:.64 %his esta#lishes a dispositionalist ontology of power-

ful particulars or finite things endowed with determinate causal powers

and capacities 1E 5:0>4 Because )od's actions are not exempt from inner

causal determination, neither are the actions of finite things %heir free-

dom, therefore, must also #e a freedom from external causal determina-

tion %he pro;ect of theEthics, then, is to show how freedom from exter-

nal constraint is possi#le for finite things, although, unli"e )od, they are

enmeshed in the we# of uni(ersal determinism

:art 5 ends with an appendix which clearly delimits the exiguous space

within which Spinoza must construct his ethical teaching aimed at human

freedom t ma"es these limits clear #y explicitly stating some of the conse-&uences of this complete determinism *ree will, understood as complete

freedom from all causal determination, is once again denied *urther-

more, the existence of a pro(idential order directing all things for the good

of human"ind is re;ected Iormati(e terms such asgoodand evil, beautyand

ugliness, orderand disorderare asserted to express human su#;ecti(e e(alua-

tions of what is useful or pleasing As such, they do not apply o#;ecti(ely or

a#solutely to )od or nature 1E 5A4

> Spinoza defines attri#utes as what the intellect percei(es of a su#stance, as

constituting

its essence 1E 5!ef84 )od is a su#stance consisting of infinite attri#utes, each of

which

expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence 1E 5:554

3 %he termpowerful particularsis from the wor" of Hom Carr and Edward adden

15=36+ 64,

who argue, contrary to Cumean s"epticism, for the attri#ution of causal powers to

material

things

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:oetics %oday ./+0n summary, :art 5 esta#lishes that, contrary to Aristotle, we canexpect

the same precision in moral philosophy as in mathematics #ecause the

entire uni(erse is to #e understood as the necessary expression of the self-

caused di(ine power Iothing is exempt from this immanent necessity

%he fact that all things follow with a#solute necessity from the nature of

)od means that we need not #e content with reaching conclusions that are

only for the most part true Cuman #eings and their #eha(ior can, and

should, #e treated in the geometrical manner #ecause e(erything follows

from )od as the self-caused, first cause t is #ecause of its assertion of

uni(ersal determinism that Spinoza'sEthics, unli"e Aristotle'sNicomachean

Ethics, is demonstrated in the geometrical order:art . of theEthicsdenies that the human mind and #ody can inter-


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act with each other ind and #ody are causally closed systems 1E .:64

Bodies are extended things 1E .!54 Bodily powers and capacities are

descri#ed in terms of the laws of mechanical physics, such as the law of

inertia, which Spinoza #riefly outlines in the :hysical !igression of :art .,

following E .:50 %he mind, on the other hand, is understood in terms

of intentionality+ it is essentially directed at an o#;ect, the human #ody1E .:55G504 ntentionality is as genuine a feature of the world as inertia

But this does not mean that mind and #ody are metaphysically separate

su#stances 1E 5:52S4, as they are for !escartes 1"editations on +irst Philoso%

phy, A% M+ 3/G3= 5=/8+ 684 %he "ey to the relationship #etween mind

and #ody is Spinoza's su#stance monism ind and #ody are attri#utes of

the one su#stance, understood as causal power %hey are the same causal

power differently expressed 1E .:34 or, in !a(idsonian terms, under irre-

duci#ly different descriptions 1see !a(idson 5=/24 %his explains the con-

sonance of logic and the fa#ric of reality ind mirrors the physical world

%he logical necessity of the geometrical method models the causal neces-

sity of the world %he unity and order of the world can #e captured in aunified and ordered system of propositions that ha(e #een deduced from

first principles #ecause the world it represents is the necessary conse&uence

of )od's self-caused nature

:art 0 of theEthicsde(elops the doctrine of the conatus1from the Latin

(er# conor, meaning to endea(or4 %his doctrine is found in the wor" of

!escartes, Co##es, and, ultimately, the Stoics t refers to the stri(ing,

not necessarily conscious, of all finite things in the world to perse(ere in

their existence 1E 0:>4 %he law of inertia is an instance of this stri(ing

Because each finite thing is defined in terms of its continued effort to per-

sist as a powerful particular with a repertoire of characteristic capacities

and the acti(ities which express them, this stri(ing constitutes its essence

1E 0:34 %he goal of Spinoza's ethical teaching is to preser(e and enhance

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human #eings' power to perse(ere in existence and express their character-

istic capacities in acti(ity %his enhancement of power entails an increase

in freedom, insofar as freedom is understood in the compati#ilist sense ofinner as opposed to external causal determination %he more the conatus is

expressed, the less the indi(idual suffers external constraint %his increase

in freedom is e&ually what Spinoza means #y #lessedness Cere is where a

comparison with Aristotle's doctrine of eudaimonia is most rele(ant+ finite

things flourish when they exercise their capacities in the #est possi#le way

According to Spinoza, they do this when they are undiminished #y exter-

nal forces

Io finite thing can achie(e the a#solute freedom that )od en;oys,

namely, that of completely internal determination )od is a#solutely

free, his actions following from his nature alone, #ecause there is nothing

external to him to constrain him n contrast, #y the definition of fini-tude 1E 5!.4, there is necessarily always something external to a finite


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thing that might constrain it All finite #eings are externally determined

to some extent 1E 5!., E 5:./4 %hey are not the whole of )od or nature

#ut merely a part of it Cowe(er, the doctrine of the conatus implies that,

though ine(ita#ly mo(ed to some extent #y the other parts of nature, each

finite thing has its own powers and capacities Although all finite things

are passi(ely determined #y other finite things 1E 5:./4, the immanenceof )od's power in nature endows all things with their own intrinsic acti(e

powers and capacities 1E 5:5/, E .:86S4

%hus, finite things must #e understood in terms of two distinct lines of

causation, which we might respecti(ely call the mechanical and the free

%hese two lines of causation correspond to the two ways in which nature

is to #e understood Spinoza gi(es these the Latin names, natura naturata

1nature natured or nature as passi(e4 and natura naturans1nature naturing or

nature as acti(e4 1E 5:.=S4 Iatura naturata is the infinite series of external

causes that #ear down on each finite indi(idual Iatura naturans is the set

of intrinsic causal capacities that each indi(idual possesses #ecause it is an

expression of )od's internally determined causal power Although there isno respite from necessary determination, freedom consists in diminishing

the causal power of natura naturata and enhancing that of natura natu-

rans %he practical, therapeutic, and soteriological elements of the Ethics

in(estigate the ways in which this enhancement and diminution can #e

performed #y the indi(idual and coordinated powers of human #eings

/ Sa(an 15=/>+ 5264 refers to these two lines of causality as the topographic axis and

the

radial axis

= urley's translation lea(es these terms in the Latin

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:oetics %oday ./+0

:art 0 of theEthicsanalyzes the emotions 1 affectus4 2 %hey are not,

strictly spea"ing, powers themsel(es #ut increases or diminutions in the

powers of acting that characterize the essence of human #eings 1E 0!04

Spinoza defines and classifies all emotions in these terms Ooy, for example,

is defined as an increase in our essential capacities to act, sadness as a dimi-

nution of these capacities 1E 0:55S4

%he :reface to :art 0 asserts that emotions are to #e treated geometri-

cally #ecause they are go(erned #y a strict necessity 1E 0:raef4 Iature isalways the same, #ecause the laws that go(ern natural powers are unchang-

ing 1E 0:raef4 As human #eings are finite parts of nature, the powers that

constitute the essence of human nature, and their increase and diminution,

are su#;ect to these unchanging laws 1E 0:raef4

Being part of nature and su#;ect to its immense forces, we are, in Spi-

noza's words, dri(en a#out in many ways #y external causes li"e wa(es

on the sea, dri(en #y contrary winds, we toss a#out, not "nowing our out-

come and fate 1E 0:6=S4 Against this sea of forces, the ethical teaching

endea(ors to enhance our intrinsic causal powers as much as possi#le Spi-

noza identifies (irtue with power or acting from the laws of one's nature

rather than #eing determined #y external causes 1E 8!/4 %he good iswhate(er promotes this 1E 8!54 Spinoza is, therefore, an ethical natural-


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ist+ normati(e terms such as virtueand the goodare ultimately reduced to

natural properties understood in terms of essential power

:art 8 explores the impediments to the exercise of our powers Io finite

thing is so powerful that the powers of nature outside it cannot dominate

and destroy it 1E 8Ax54 We cannot step outside of nature and #ecome

a#solutely self-determining 1E 8:., 84 Kur own internal acti(e power islimited and infinitely surpassed #y the power of external causes 1E 8:04

Cuman agency, then, can ne(er #e exercised in complete independence of

the mechanistic, external determination of natura naturata %he practical

element of Spinoza's ethical pro;ect responds to the ine(ita#le external

determination of human agency with a Baconian pro;ect of putting the

understanding of nature in the ser(ice of controlling nature Iatura natu-

rata is to #e understood and o#eyed so that it might #e commanded f

nature's laws are understood, they can #e managed and exploited in order

to minimize the powers of the mechanical series that threaten human free-

dom and to harness and amplify those that enhance it Oust as the geome-

ter deduces the properties of geometrical figures from their definitions,so too Spinoza deduces the laws of material and social engineering from

52 urley translates this term as affect

55 Bacon writes that we cannot command nature except #y o#eying her 1New

Organon,

Aphorism 5.= 5=>2+ 55=4

Page 13

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the concept of )od or nature n this respect, the geometrical method

is in the ser(ice of the practical pro;ect of controlling natura naturata

*or example, in the :hysical !igression, which considers natura naturata

under the attri#ute of extension, we find laws that go(ern the interactions

of material #odies, such as the law of inertia 1E .L04 %he material world

can #e managed #y using these laws to create de(ices that channel nature's

physical forces Kptical lenses, for example, ground #y Spinoza to earn

his li(ing, ma"e use of the law of refraction to enhance our (isual powers

#y focusing light n the same way, theEthicsunco(ers laws that go(ern

human interaction *or example, E 8:0.G:08 demonstrate the power ofemotion to create social conflict and strife, E 8:06 the power of reason to

create harmony E 8:5/S demonstrates that cooperation with other ratio-

nal people coordinates and concentrates human powers, ma"ing each per-

son stronger than he or she would #e alone Knce these laws are "nown,

they can #e used to encourage and create social practices and institutions

that enhance freedom %he institution of marriage, for example, ser(es this

end when those who enter into it are rational 1E 8:>/S4 *urthermore, on

the #asis of the ad(antages of cooperation, E 8:03S. ad(ances a contract

theory of the state

%he therapeutic element of Spinoza's ethical teaching is grounded

in a theory of the emotions that has strong affinities with that of OohnSearle 15==/+ ==ff4 Emotions and desires in(ol(e propositionally consti-


13/32

tuted #eliefs a#out the world %hat is, they include propositional attitudes

or statements a#out the world, which are either true or false Lo(e, for

example, in(ol(es the ;udgment that some external cause is responsi#le

for an increase in one's power 1E 0A>4, hate in(ol(es the ;udgment that

an external cause is responsi#le for its decrease 1E 0A34 We can alter our

emotions #y analyzing and re(ising their propositional content, replacingfalse #eliefs with true ones %hese true #eliefs are the results of the demon-

strations of the geometrical method Cere is an example of an emotional

state altered #y ha(ing true #eliefs as its content+ hatred of a particular

person will #e dissipated if his or her actions are seen as the product of infi-

nite chains of necessity rather than as wholly caused #y his or her male(o-

lent and free will 1E 6:.4 %his, in turn, reinforces the social engineering

pro;ect+ if our hatred and anger are diminished, so too are their corrosi(e

social conse&uences We are, then, less trou#led #y distur#ing emotions,

emotionally and practically, when we understand the world in the geomet-

rical mannerFas go(erned #y a causal necessity grounded in the nature

of )od Because understanding the necessity that go(erns nature ma"esour emotions less trou#lesome, understanding in the geometrical man-

ner is itself a form of therapy %his therapy has strong affinities with the

Page 14

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:oetics %oday ./+0

Stoic pro;ect of amending our emotions #y correcting the ;udgments they

in(ol(e We do this #y replacing false, unrealistic ;udgments with ;udg-

ments that accurately represent the necessity that go(erns all things

%he third element of the ethical teaching is soteriological, #ecause it

points the way to the final and highest stage of freedom, #lessedness or

sal(ation %his soteriological element is moti(ated in part #y Spinoza's

recognition of the limitations of the practical and therapeutic elements As

concerns the former, no matter how s"illed and powerful our material and

social engineering, we can master neither nature nor oursel(es entirely

Although we might defend and increase our capacities, we can ne(er fully

extricate oursel(es from the causal we# of nature in which we, as finite

#eings, are enmeshed E(ery finite thing, including an indi(idual person

or an entire society, is a part of nature and necessarily su#;ect to its forces

1E 8Ax54 As for the therapeutic aspect, e(en if all of our #eliefs are true

descriptions of nature, we will sometimes #e unhappy, #ecause, as finiteparts of nature, we are necessarily (ulnera#le to that which is external to

our own indi(idual #eing

Spinoza, therefore, finds the Stoic position unrealistic in that it asserts

that our emotions depend entirely on our will, and that we command

them a#solutely 1E 6:raef4 Spinoza denies that we ha(e such complete

control o(er our emotionsFexperience cries out against this 1E 6:raef4

*or Spinoza, the necessity that go(erns all things ma"es this ideal of a#so-

lute control impossi#le Ooy necessarily follows upon the increase of our

power, sorrow upon its decrease Although emotions can #e made less dis-

tur#ing when we re(ise their propositional content to reflect accurately the

causal order, we could no more free oursel(es of them completely thanwe could ta"e oursel(es outside of nature We will always #e emotionally


14/32

affected #y the external Cuman #eings and their emotions are not exempt

from the laws of nature While the Stoic (iew implies that human #eings

are somehow outside of nature and not su#;ect to its laws, Spinoza's posi-

tion is more modest We can ma"e our emotions less painful and socially

corrosi(e #y ma"ing the ;udgments they in(ol(e more realistic We can-

not, howe(er, control them completely Io one is exempt from necessityAll things follow necessarily from the di(ine nature 1E 5:5>4 %his is why

SpinozaF#ut not the StoicFconsiders human nature in the geometrical

manner

Still, we can increase our acti(ity and freedom, e(en when threatened

#y the forces of nature arrayed against us, #y the acti(ity of understand-

ing itself when it is determined #y causes internal, rather than external,

to us %he possi#ility of this "ind of understanding is rooted in Spinoza's

epistemological distinction #etween ideas that are ade&uate, or complete

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and perfect, and ideas that are inade&uate, or incomplete and imperfect

1E .!ef8, :.=4 We ha(e inade&uate ideas insofar as we are part of natura

naturata or finite parts of the infinite series of external causes %he ideas of

sensation and imagination fall into this category, #ecause they arise from

#odies external to our #ody that affect our organs of sensation 1E .:.=S,

:82S.4 magining and sensing, therefore, cannot #e the source of freedom

from external determination onse&uently, we are not free when we sense

and imagine Kn the other hand, in forming ade&uate ideas, the mind

turns in on itself t experiences itself as natura naturans, there#y consider-

ing the causal power of )od immanent in it 1E .:03, 0/4 n understanding

ade&uately, therefore, the mind is internally determined onse&uently,

the acti(ity of understanding #y means of ade&uate ideas increases our

freedom

Spinoza posits two ways of ade&uately or perfectly and completely

understanding nature 1E .:82S., E .:854 %he first, reason, deri(es com-

mon notions and ade&uate ideas of the properties of things 1E .:82S.4

from reflection on )od's immanent causal power 1E .:0/, 0=, 0=4 t is,

therefore, the source of the deducti(e inferences of the geometrical methodthat mo(e from propositions a#out the nature of )od to propositions a#out

all things in nature %his means that reasoning #y means of the geomet-

rical method in and of itself increases freedom #ecause it is an inwardly

determined acti(ity

Heason is also the source of the "nowledge of the laws of nature upon

which rests the practical Baconian pro;ect of the control of nature+ while

the causal interchanges of finite things cannot #e ade&uately "nown indi-

(idually, or one #y one, #ecause the mechanical series to which they

#elong extends to infinity, the laws which descri#e them can #e ade&uately

"nown %his is #ecause these laws descri#e actions which are expressions

of the causal powers common to all finite things as determinations of thesame attri#ute of )od )i(en, howe(er, that the "nowledge of these laws is


15/32

an inwardly determined acti(ity and there#y increases freedom, it is also,

apart from the program of controlling nature, an end in itself

%he other way of ade&uately understanding the necessity of nature is

intuiti(e science 1scientia intuitiva4 %his "ind of understanding is intuiti(e

in the philosophical sense of direct or unmediated t is defined as "nowl-

edge that proceeds from an ade&uate idea of the formal essence of cer-tain attri#utes of )od to the ade&uate "nowledge of the essence of things

1E .:82S.4 %his definition is misleading if one fails to ta"e the immanence

of the di(ine into account+ the wordproceedsimplies inference from one

5. urley translatesscientia intuitivaas intuiti(e "nowledge 1Spinoza 5==8+ E

.:82S.4

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:oetics %oday ./+0

proposition to another rather than immediate intuition ntuiti(e science,

howe(er, is the understanding that the essence of )od, expressed as it is#y the attri#utes of thought and extension, and the essence of things are

not ontologically distinct #ut one t does not, therefore, mo(e discursi(ely

from one discrete idea to another, as reason does when it deduces the exis-

tence and properties of all finite things and the laws that go(ern them from

the nature of )od and his attri#utes nstead, it immediately percei(es the

identity of nature and )od in one act of mental (ision t is the immediate

insight that the world and all things in it are di(ine t consists, therefore, in

a shift in mental perspecti(e away from #oth sensation and the deductions

of reason %he di(ine causal essence is directly apprehended as it is imma-

nent in each finite mode nfinity, as it were, is seen in a grain of sand

n summary, we sense insofar as our organs of sensation are affected #y

#odies outside us We reason insofar as we infer conclusions from premises

%he geometrical method deduces the immanence of )od in nature from

the di(ine nature, for example, in E 5:5/ ntuiti(e science, #y contrast,

directly intuits the presence of the di(ine in the finite While distinct from

reason, intuiti(e science can arise from it t cannot, howe(er, arise from

imagination or opinion 1E 6:./4 When we achie(e this inwardly caused

intuition of the di(ine in the finite, we are at the height of our power on-

se&uently, we experience the greatest well-#eing possi#le Spinoza, accord-

ingly, refers to intuiti(e science as the highest (irtue 1E 6:.64 t completes

the soteriological element of Spinoza's ethical teaching and is the final andhighest stage of freedom

t is not, therefore, per(ersely misguided to consider the conditions of

our well-#eing in the geometrical manner irroring the causal necessity

of nature, the geometrical method is essential to #oth the practical and

the therapeutic elements of Spinoza's ethical pro;ect for the achie(ement

of human freedom %he propositions it deduces from the nature of )od

#oth inform the physical and social engineering pro;ects in the practical

element and replace the unrealistic propositional contents of distur#ing

emotions in the therapeutic element %he geometrical method is e&ually

essential to the soteriological element, where Spinoza's ultimate answer to

the &uestion of how we should li(e lies in the life of the mind Pnderstand-ing #y means of ade&uate ideas is a free and inwardly determined acti(ity


16/32

that is possi#le e(en in the face of the destructi(e powers of nature %he

geometrical method is an instance of one form of ade&uate understanding,

reason t leads to the second, intuiti(e science

50 See Bla"e's#uguries of nnocence15=/.+ 8=24

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The Geometrical Method and the Dialectical Aspect o! the Ethics

Ca(ing explained the role that the geometrical method plays in the prac-

tical, the therapeutic, and the soteriological elements of Spinoza's ethical

teaching, we can now turn to consider the method in the light of the dia-

lectical aspect of theEthics Aristotle states in his Topics1 5, 522a.6G024

that dialectical arguments persuade an audience #y arguing on the #asis

of propositions that would #e persuasi(e to it 15=/8+ 5>>4 %his aspect oftheEthics#ecomes clear when we consider its intended audience and the

circumstances of its composition

As Iadler 15===+ 5=0G=84 tells us in his #iography, Spinoza was far from

#eing the solitary recluse he was depicted as #eing in older #iographies

Ce was, instead, the leader of a group of philosophical friends %heologi-

cally, these friends were radical #ut de(out :rotestants philosophically,

they were artesians n late 5>>. or early 5>>0, he sent to these friends

portions of theEthicsas he wrote them, in(iting their &uestions and com-

ments 1i#id+ .2.4 %hese philosophical readers were the ideal audience

for the geometrically structuredEthics !isciplined #y the careful study of

artesian philosophy, they were capa#le of following a difficult argument

where(er it would lead and accepting the truth of distur#ing ideas if they

were rigorously demonstrated Being committed to the mechanical (iew of

nature articulated in !escartes'sPrinciples15=/6 ?5>88@4, they were capa#le

of forming the ade&uate ideas of reason descri#ed a#o(e

onse&uently, urley's 15=//+ xi4 assertion that the geometrical method

conceals and was, perhaps, partly designed to conceal the dialogue Spi-

noza was conducting with the philosophy of !escartes cannot #e accepted

Spinoza does not intend the geometrical method to conceal his philosophy

from his artesian readers #ut to con(ince them of its truth #y the force of

argument Kn the other hand, the geometrical method would #e unsuit-a#le for those who form their ideas mainly through sensation and imagi-

nation and whose emotions ha(e these inade&uate ideas as their proposi-

tional content n this respect, we can contrast the geometrical method of

theEthicswith the narrati(e style of the Theologico%Political Treatise %he

latter is directed at those who form their ideas #y means of sensation and

imagination and must #e persuaded #y means directed at these faculties

Spinoza was well aware of how contro(ersial his philosophy was and

careful a#out those with whom he shared it 1Iadler 5===+ .884 ts doc-

trine of the immanence of )od re;ects the personal, transcendent )od

of orthodox religion 1see, for example, E 5A4 n conse&uence, orthodox

58 %his difference #etween the two texts is discussed in Jo(el 5=/=+ esp 5./G6.


17/32

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:oetics %oday ./+0

religious authorities would li"ely suppress it *or these reasons, Strauss and

Shmueli assert that Spinoza wished to conceal his (iews onsideration

of theEthics' ideal reader and the rigorous demands that the geometricalmethod places on reason, howe(er, clarifies Spinoza's intentions %he geo-

metrical method is meant to "eep potentially hostile readers, whose ideas

come from sensation and imagination, from e(er "nowing the true content

of his philosophical system Headers cannot #e angered #y ideas they ha(e

not encountered %he orthodox cannot suppress ideas of which they are

unaware Spinoza's ideal reader can #e persuaded of the truth of his sys-

tem #y the rigor of theEthics' geometrical demonstrations %he reader who

forms ideas from sensation and imagination, orthodox religious authorities

included, would find the geometrical presentation an impenetra#le #ar-

rier to e(er learning its content *ollowing its deduction re&uires rational

powers that they do not possessSpinoza had nothing to fear within his closed circle of friends Ce

expected the geometrical method to engage them rationally Ie(ertheless,

while the artesian system, which they accepted, could easily coexist with

their li#eral yet de(out hristianity, the philosophy of theEthicswould con-

flict with it *urthermore, although theEthicswould stri"e them as shoc"-

ingly unorthodox in some respects, it would seem distur#ingly reactionary

in others Kn the one hand, Spinoza's pantheism would push their hris-

tianity, howe(er radical, #eyond the #rea"ing point %he transcendent cre-

ator )od of the artesian system would ha(e to #e replaced with a )od

understood as the causal power immanent in nature Kn the other hand,

Spinoza's understanding of finite indi(idual things as powerful particulars

would seem to these same readers to reinstate the late medie(al doctrine

of su#stantial forms that !escartes tried to o(ercome once and for all As

a result, the mem#ers of Spinoza's circle might find his philosophy #oth

radical and retrograde %hat this would ma"e con(incing them a difficult

challenge explains the dialectical necessity of #eginning theEthicswith

artesian principles they would accept a"ing this clear re&uires a #rief

outline of the artesian system

The Cartesian System

n the artesian system, )od is the necessarily existing transcendent cre-

ator and preser(er of nature 1Principles of Philosophy: 5Art58, A% MA+52G55 !escartes 5=/6+ 5=3 : 5Art.5, A% MA+ 50 !escartes 5=/6+ .224

56 Heferences to thePrinciplesfollow the following pattern+ :


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matics could ha(e #een otherwise if he had so chosen 1Letter to ersenne,

April 56, 5>02, A% + 58> !escartes 5==5+ .04

%he created world consists of two metaphysically separate su#stancesF

mind and matter 1Principles: 5Art/, A% MA+ 3G/ 5=/6+ 5=64 %he essence

of mind is thought 1Principles: 5Art/G=, A% MA+ 3G/ 5=/6+ 5=64 Will

is a mode of thought 1Principles: 5Art0., A% MA+ 53G5/ 5=/6+ .284Cuman #eings possess free will 1Principles: 5Art03, 0=, A% MA+ 5/G.2

5=/6+ .26G>4 n the freedom of their will, human #eings resem#le )od

1"editations, A% M+ 63G6/ 5=/8+ 824 As the perceptions of the human

intellect are limited, it is finite %he will, on the other hand, is a pri(ileged

faculty since we o#ser(e without exception that its scope extends to any-

thing that can possi#ly #e an o#;ect of any other willFe(en the immeasur-

a#le will of )od 1Principles: 5Art06, A% MA+ 5/G5= 5=/6+ .284

%he essence of matter is geometrical extension 1Principles: .Art8, A%

MA+ 8.G80 5=/6+ ..84 !aniel )ar#er 15==.+ =6G55>4 explains that this

account of matter is grounded in a re;ection of the Scholastic notion of

su#stantial forms as the ultimate explanatory principle of the #eha(ior ofnatural su#stances Such notions, according to !escartes, are without any

explanatory force Substantial formis merely a term for the un"nown cause

of a percei(ed property !escartes understands hea(iness or gra(ity as the

premier example of a su#stantial form, descri#ing it as a (irtue or &uality

5> n a letter to Hegius, !escartes characterizes su#stantial forms as principles

introduced

#y philosophers solely to account for the proper actions of natural things 1%o Hegius,

Oanu-

ary 5>8., A% + 62>G/ 5==5+ .2/4 %his doctrine is expressed, for example, in the

assertion

in the oim#rian ommentaries that there are indi(idual and particular #eha(iors ?

func%

tiones@ appropriate to each indi(idual natural thing these #eha(iors do not arise

from

matter alone which has no power to #ring anything a#out %hus, they must arise

from the su#stantial form 1&uoted in )ar#er 5==.+ =>4 %his doctrine is ultimately con-

nected to certain Aristotelian notions n thePhysics, Aristotle asserts that things

existing #y

nature ha(e in themsel(es a principle of motion and standing still Iature is an acti(e

realm

ndi(idual natural things ha(e natures that are understood in terms of the causal powersthat

explain their acti(ities 1Physics 5, 5=.#52G.6 5=/8+ 0.=4 %he su#lunary elements,

earth,

air, fire, and water, are understood in terms of their dispositions to mo(e to certain

natural

places 1 On !eneration and -orruption 5G8, 0./#.2G005#06 5=/8+ 60/G8.4 n On

the .eavens1

5G0, .>/#52G.32#024, Aristotle 15=/8+ 883G654 asserts that, while simple #odies

composed of

these elements possess a principle of rectilinear motion in their own nature, hea(enly

#odiescomposed of the fifth element, ether, naturally mo(e in circles


19/32

53 !escartes asserts that no natural action at all can #e explained #y these su#stantial

forms, since their defenders admit that they are occult and that they do not understand

them themsel(es 1%o Hegius, Oanuary 5>8., A% + 62>G/ 5==5+ .2/4 Ce also claims

that

when philosophers explain an action as proceeding from a su#stantial form, they are

merelyasserting that it proceeds from something they do not understand 1%o Hegius, Oanuary

5>8., A% + 62>G/ 5==5+ .2/4

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:oetics %oday ./+0

inherent in e(ery #ody we call hea(y, which ma"es it tend towards the cen-

tre of the earth 1%o ersenne, 50 Ouly, 5>0/, A% + ..0G.8 5==5+ 555G5.4

nstead of resorting to such o#scure and empty explanations, !escartes

proposes a reduction of all physical explanation to the di(ision and motion

of matter understood as extension 1Principles: .Art.0, A% MA+ 6.G605=/6+ .0.G004 )ra(ity, for example, is explained #y the downward pres-

sure of particles dri(en #y the motion of the (ortices 1 Principles: 8Art.2G

.3, A% MA+ .5.G5> 5=/6+ .>/G324

Because matter is nothing #ut inert extension, the primary cause of

motion in the created world is )od When )od created the world from

which he remains transcendent, he made all of the matter in it and set it

in motion Ce now preser(es what he originally created Because )od is

perfect, he operates in a manner that is constant and unchanging on-

se&uently, he preser(es the exact amount of motion he conferred on the

material world at the moment of creation 1Principles: .Art0>, A% MA+

>5 5=/6+ .824 Since this &uantity is conser(ed, mo(ing #odies can always

#e expected to mo(e in certain ways *or example, a #ody will not acceler-

ateFslow down, speed up, stop, or change directionFunless there is trans-

ference of motion #etween it and another #ody *urthermore, when two

#odies collide, they might transfer motion one to the other, #ut the sum of

motion after the collision must e&ual the sum of motion #efore Accord-

ingly, !escartes first deri(es three laws of nature from the immuta#ility of

)od's preser(ation of the amount of motion in the created material world+

a law of inertia 1Principles: .Art03, A% MA+ >.G>0 5=/6+ .82G854, a law

of rectilinear motion 1Principles: .Art0=, A% MA+ >0G>8 5=/6+ .85G

8.4, and a law of collision 1Principles: .Art82, A% MA+ >6 5=/6+ .8.4%hese are followed #y se(en laws, e&ually grounded in this conser(ation of

motion, go(erning the direction and speed of #odies after impact 1Principles

: .Art8>G6., A% MA+ >/G32 5=/6+ .864

n summary, !escartes #anishes su#stantial forms from his physics in

his campaign to o(ercome the explanatory o#scurity of Scholastic philoso-

phy Ce asserts that matter is inert, passi(e extension A material #ody can-

not mo(e itself or change its state of motion or rest Knly #eings endowed

with minds are to #e understood as acti(e )od initiates motion in matter

5/ According to the om#rians, Since hea(y and light things tend toward their natural

places, though a#sent from that which produces them, they must necessarily ha(e #een

gi(en some means ? instrumentum@ that remains with them #y (irtue of which they aremo(ed


20/32

But this can only #e their su#stantial form and what follows from it, hea(iness and

lightness

1&uoted in )ar#er 5==.+ =>4

5= !escartes does refer to forces or powers 1(is4 of #odies to act on or resist the action

of

other #odies as one of the factors determining the outcome of collisions 1 Principles:.Art80,

A% MA+ >>G>/ 5=/6+ .80G884 Westfall 15=35+ 6.=4 remar"s that the termforce

appears in

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in the created uni(erse as a whole Besides )od, finite human minds can

initiate motion in the human #odies to which they are attached 1"edita%tions, A% M+ /8G/> 5=/8+ 6/4 2 Because matter is the inert extension

of the geometers, in !escartes's hands physics is reduced to geometry

%he only principles re&uired or accepted in physics are those of geome-

try and pure mathematics 1Principles: .Art>8, A% MA+ 3/ 5=/6+ .834

Scholastic o#scurity has #een replaced with the clarity and certainty of

mathematics

The Ethics!rom a Cartesian "erspecti#e

We ha(e seen that Spinoza asserts a artesian set of laws go(erning the

motions of material #odies Ce therefore accepts !escartes's physics at

the le(el of its description of phenomena+ artesian physics applies to

the causal interactions of the infinite series of finite #odies that consti-

tute natura naturata %his is #ecause the artesian account of matter as

passi(e extension is consistent with each part of natura naturata's #eing

causally influenced #y the infinitely many other finite parts of nature But

all finite things are products of two distinct lines of causation, natura natu-

rans as well as natura naturata By the causality of natura naturans, all

finite things, #oth minds and #odies, are endowed with causal powers and

capacities 1E 5:08, 0>4 %his explicitly contradicts the artesian account

of matter as passi(e extension, in which )od must impart motion to the

material world, which is then transferred from one #ody to another n a

letter to %schirnhaus, Spinoza explicitly criticizes !escartes's account ofmatter as inert extension Ce writes that matter, defined #y !escartes as

extension, must, instead, #e defined #y an attri#ute which expresses an

eternal and infinite essence 1%o %schirnhaus, Letter /0, Ouly 56, 5>3> Spi-

noza 5==8+ .36G3>4 What he means #y this is made clear in theEthics

atter is an attri#ute of )od All things are in )od, who is their effi-

cient cause 1E 5:5>.4 )od's power is his essence itself 1E 5:084 Whate(er

exists expresses this essence or power 1E 5:0>4 aterial #odies are not

inert and passi(e #ut acti(e expressions of the power of )od %hey are, as

we ha(e seen, powerful particulars

!escartes' writings in great profusion and speculates that pro#a#ly it was this fre&uent

use


21/32

which ga(e it general currency and led to its ultimate selection as the name of the

concept

central to dynamics !escartes's references to forces or powers, howe(er, seem &uite

incon-

sistent with his ontology of two created su#stances, matter, understood in terms of

passi(e,inert extension, and acti(e mind *or a discussion of this issue and the secondary

literature

concerned with it, see )ar#er 5==.+ .=0G==

.2 )ar#er et al 15==/+ 6/24 point out that, more rarely, #odies are animated #y the

minds

of angels

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:oetics %oday ./+0

Spinoza's understanding of #odies as powerful particulars was li"elyto stri"e his artesian friends as a return to the explanatory o#scurity of

the Scholastic doctrine of su#stantial forms *urthermore, the doctrine of

su#stantial forms itself was associated with conser(ati(e al(inist forces

in !utch intellectual life As Iadler 15===+ 55.4 points out, artesianism

was lin"ed to the ideological di(isions of !utch society and had #een con-

demned #y more conser(ati(e al(inist leaders %he conser(ati(e rector

of the Pni(ersity of Ptrecht, Moetius, for one, was a strident critic of !es-

cartes's re;ection of su#stantial forms Ce wanted artesian philosophy

#anned from the uni(ersities Ce feared that the elimination of these tradi-

tional Aristotelian notions would undermine the foundations of traditional

Scholastic philosophy and education 1 Oolley 5==.+ 0=64 *urthermore, he

understood the doctrine of su#stantial forms to #e the necessary philo-

sophical underpinning of the notion of nature as pro(identially ordered

1(an Huler 5==6+ >4 Such contro(ersies would ha(e cemented the asso-

ciation #etween philosophical reaction and the doctrine of su#stantial

forms, thus sharpening the o#;ections of Spinoza's artesian friends to

that doctrine

While associated with reactionary al(inists, howe(er, Spinoza's doc-

trine of powerful particulars was pro#a#ly, on the other hand, more of

a reform of traditional religion than Spinoza's radical hristian friends

could easily accept Although they wanted to li#erate hristianity fromthe rites and dogma of esta#lished religion, asserting that inner faith alone

was the source of sal(ation 1Iadler 5===+ 5824, they would #e reluctant to

dissol(e hristianity into naturalism and pantheism As Stephen )au"-

roger 1.22.+ 3>4 has pointed out, mechanism appealed to figures li"e er-

senne precisely #ecause it stripped nature of all acti(e power n doing

so, it reaffirmed )od's transcendence against the pantheism that seemed

to #e the ine(ita#le conclusion of Henaissance Aristotelian naturalism

%his naturalism endowed nature with so many acti(e powers that )od was

ine(ita#ly incorporated in it As such, Spinoza's philosophy would ha(e

had alarming resonances all around While it was too artesian for Moetius

and traditional educators, it was not sufficiently artesian for Spinoza'simmediate audience


22/32

Descartes on Method

%hus, Spinoza faced a formida#le challenge in persuading his audience

of artesian friends onsider what !escartes says a#out the geometrical

method When as"ed to demonstrate his philosophy in this manner, he

declares, it cannot #e so con(eniently applied to these metaphysical su#-

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8>6

;ects 1 Second Set of (eplies, A% M+ 56>G63 5=/8+ 5554 Why, then, does Spi-

noza choose the geometrical method in defiance of !escartes's expressed

reser(ations$ %o answer this &uestion, we must recall the reasons for !es-

cartes's restriction of the geometrical method

n his/iscourse on the "ethod, !escartes contrasts the certainty of mathe-

matics with the dou#tful and disputatious nature of philosophy Ce arguesthat the syllogism, the cornerstone of the method and logic of the medi-

e(al schools, is of less use for learning things than for explaining to others

the things one already "nows or e(en for spea"ing without ;udgement

a#out matters of which one is ignorant 1/iscourse on the "ethod of (ightly

-onducting One's (eason and See0ing the Truth in the SciencesA% M+ 53G5= 5=/6

?5>03@+ 55=4 %hat is, it is not useful for the disco(ery of new "nowledge

At #est it ser(es, insofar as it can display the systematic relations #etween

ideas, as a method for organizing, presenting, and explaining things already

"nown At worst, the historical authority of its Aristotelian origins con-

fers a spurious legitimacy on those with mere pretensions to "nowledge

n contrast, the method of the geometers seemed a promising method

of disco(ery to !escartes, #ecause it ena#led the geometers to arri(e at

their most difficult demonstrations 1/iscourse on the "ethod of (ightly -on%

ducting One's (eason and See0ing the Truth in the SciencesA% M, 5=G.2 5=/6+

5.24 !escartes'sPrinciplesalso seems to endorse the geometrical method

of deducing propositions from first principles Because the "nowledge of

all other things depends on the "nowledge of )od 1Principles: 5Art50,

A% MA+ =G52 5=/6+ 5=34, the explanation of created things should #e

deduced from "nowledge of )od 1Principles: 5Art.8, A% MA+ 58G56

5=/6+ .254 %his gi(es us the most perfect scientific "nowledge+ "nowledge

of effects through their causes 1Principles: 5Art.8, A% MA+ 58G56 5=/6+.254 n light of these passages, it appears that !escartes's endorsement of

the geometrical method is unrestricted onse&uently, Spinoza's use of it

in theEthicsseems appropriate, gi(en the artesian readers to whom the

wor" is directed

But !escartes's attitude to the form in which Euclid cast his wor" is not

so straightforward When as"ed in the Second Set of Ob)ectionsto demon-

strate his philosophy geometrically, he expresses his reluctance, ma"ing it

clear that his admiration for the method of ancient mathematicians is not

.5 !escartes is, in fact, s"eptical a#out the power of all forms of deduction to produce

new

"nowledge *or a discussion of this, see Cac"ing 5=/2 and )au"roger 5=/=+ esp 55>G.> *or


23/32

a critical discussion of the standard understanding of the rationalist program as consist-

ing in an a priori deduction from first principles, see urley 5==. %he relation of the

first

principles of !escartes's metaphysics to the details of his natural philosophy is

discussed in

)au"roger .22.+ esp 5G05 and )ar#er 5==.+ esp 0=G63

Page 24

8>>

:oetics %oday ./+0

directed at the method of Euclid, which he considers to #e the method of

synthesis Ce descri#es this as an a posteriori method which demonstrates

conclusions #y means of a long series of definitions, postulates, axioms,

theorems and pro#lems 1 Second Set of (eplies, A% M+ 56>G63 5=/8+ 552G

554 t does not, in his (iew, engage the minds of those who are eager to

learn, since it does not show how the thing in &uestion was disco(ered

1 Second Set of (eplies, A% M+ 56>G63 5=/8+ 5554 onse&uently, !escartesprefers the method that he asserts is employed in the"editations Ce calls

this method analysis, descri#ing it as showing the true way #y means of

which the thing in &uestion was disco(ered methodically and as it were a

priori 1 Second Set of (eplies, A% M+ 566G6> 5=/8+ 5524 %his method, there-

fore, can #e characterized, for purposes of understanding !escartes's atti-

tude toward the geometrical method, as a method of disco(ery, illustrated

#y the method of the"editations, which does not follow the Euclidean pro-

cedure of deducing conclusions from axioms, definitions, and so on t

was so admired #y the ancients, he claims, that they "ept it to themsel(es

li"e a sacred mystery 1 Second Set of (eplies, A% M+ 56>G63 5=/8+ 5554

!escartes actually diagnoses synthesis as ha(ing the same limitations

he has ascri#ed to the syllogisms of Scholastic philosophy Both are meth-

ods of demonstration and presentation, #ut neither can disco(er true first

.. *or a discussion of the terms a posterioriand a prioriin this context, see note .0

#elow

%he translators' comment 1!escartes 5=/8+ 552n.4 pro(ides a useful gloss on the

historical

senses of these terms

.0 Apart from this, it is not at all clear what !escartes means #y the method of analysis

oncerning the fact that !escartes refers to the method of the"editationsas analytic,

urley15=/>+ 5604 asserts that there is no general agreement a#out what this means and

concludes

that on the artesian proposition that disagreement indicates that no party to the

dispute

has "nowledge, it follows that we must say that no one "nows, at this stage, what that

important fact means *or a list of the representati(e secondary literature dealing with

this

topic, see urley 5=/>+ 535n. !escartes complicates rather than clarifies the concept of

analysis #y asserting that it proceeds a priori, while synthesis proceeds a posteriori 1

Second

Set of (eplies, A% M+ 56>G63 5=/8+ 552G554, #ecause he seems to #e using theseterms in


24/32

neither the modern, post-Lei#nizian sense nor the medie(al, %homistic sense %he

former

sense, in which the a priori is that which is "nown independently of sense experience,

while

the a posteriori is that which is "nown #y means of experience, does not seem appropri-

ate, gi(en that !escartes clearly distinguishes the clear and distinct ideas of arithmeticand

geometry from ideas which are the result of sensation 1 Principles: 5Art>=, A% A+

00G06

5=/6+ .53G5/4 %he latter, medie(al sense, in which the a priori proceeds from cause to

effect,

while the a posteriori proceeds from effect to cause, does not seem to apply to the

"edita%

tions %his is #ecause the"editationsproceeds from the disco(ery of my existence as a

thin"-

ing thing to the proof that )od exists as the only possi#le cause of my existence 1

"editationson +irst Philosophy, A% M+ .8G60 5=/8+ 5>G0>4

.8 )au"roger 15==0+ 5354 points out that, in Hule 8 of the(ules for the /irection of the

"ind,

!escartes complains that :appus and !iophantus, 'with a "ind of low cunning,' "ept

their

method of disco(ery secret, presenting us with 'sterile truths' which they 'demonstrated

deducti(ely' 1(ules for the /irection of the "ind, A% Q+ 03>G034

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8>3

principles Synthesis might #e used when first principles are not in dispute,

when all that is re&uired is the proper deduction of the conse&uences

1 Second Set of (eplies, A% M+ 56>G63 5=/8+ 5554 n contrast, it cannot

#e con(eniently applied to metaphysical su#;ects, precisely #ecause

there is nothing which causes so much effort as ma"ing our perception of

the primary notions clear and distinct 1 Second Set of (eplies, A% M+ 56>G

6/ 5=/8+ 555G5.4 %his is why !escartes does not write the"editationsin

the form of '!isputations,' as the philosophers ha(e done, or '%heoremsand :ro#lems,' as the geometers would ha(e done 1 Second Set of (eplies, A%

M+ 563G6/ 5=/8+ 55.4

The Ethics!rom Cartesian "remises

Spinoza, howe(er, does write theEthicsin the geometer's form of theorems

and postulates, untrou#led #y !escartes's methodological scruples %his

is #ecause he accepts the first principles disco(ered #y artesian analysis

Analysis has done its wor"+ the pre;udices of the senses ha(e #een dis-

carded, and the correct first principles ha(e #een unco(ered *urthermore,

Spinoza uses the power of the geometrical method to re(eal clearly what

can and must #e inferred from an initial set of premises to show that !es-

cartes failed to draw the correct conclusions from his own first principlesn so doing, Spinoza deri(es the elements of his own philosophical system


25/32

from these first principles As a result, he is a#le to persuade his artesian

friends of the truth of his system, and the ethical teaching founded on it,

#y using the principles they would accept

%he foundations of Spinoza's philosophical system are esta#lished in

:art 5 of theEthics Arguing, first, that there can #e only one su#stance,

and second, that this one su#stance is )od, Spinoza concludes that )odand nature are one *rom this, two other pantheistic doctrines follow+

mind and matter are attri#utes of )od, and )od is to #e understood as the

immanent causal power in all things Spinoza deduces these propositions

from concepts of su#stance, )od, and the infinite that he shares with !es-

cartes %hat is, Spinoza uses these artesian concepts as the first principles

of his own philosophy %o grasp this, it is necessary to consider !escartes's

account of su#stance, )od, and the infinite

!escartes defines su#stance in terms of independence+ it is that which

exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence 1 Prin%

ciples: 5Art65, A% MA+.8G.6 5=/6+ .524 )od alone exhi#its this inde-

pendence fully and completely 1Principles: 5Art65, A% MA+ .8G.6 5=/6+.524 reated things can exist only with )od's concurrence %hey can, how-

e(er, #e called su#stances in a secondary sense, insofar as their existence

Page 26

8>/

:oetics %oday ./+0

is ontologically independent of other created things %hat is, mental and

material su#stance are ontologically prior to their &ualities or attri#utes,

such as shape and motion, or sensation and will 1Principles: 5Art65G60, A%

MA+ .8G.> 5=/6+ .52G554 *urthermore, no created su#stance is onto-

logically dependent on any other created su#stance+ mental and material

su#stance are really distinct 1Principles: 5Art>2, A% MA+ ./G02 5=/6+

.504 Cence, the termsubstancedoes not apply uni(ocally, or in exactly the

same sense, to )od and his creatures, #ecause they are not independent

in exactly the same way 1Principles: 5Art65, A% MA+ .8G.6 5=/6+ .524

onse&uently, )od's creatures are properly called su#stances only in this

secondary sense 1Principles: 5Art6., A% MA+ .6 5=/6+ .524 *urther-

more, !escartes contrasts )od with created things not only in terms of

his a#solute independence #ut also in terms of his infinity )od alone is

infinite, which !escartes understands as #eing unlimited, ha(ing no limit

whatsoe(er 1Principles: 5Art.3, A% MA+ 56G5> 5=/6+ .2.4:art 5 of theEthicsderi(es the doctrine of pantheism from these arte-

sian concepts of su#stance, )od, and the infinite Li"e !escartes, Spinoza

defines su#stance in terms of independence 1E 5!ef04 and )od in terms of

infinity )od is defined as the a#solutely infinite #eing 1E 5!ef>4, while the

finite is the limited 1E 5!ef.4 %he a#solutely infinite is limited #y nothing

whatsoe(er 1E 5!ef>Ex54 *rom this it follows that if )od is the a#solutely

infinite independent su#stance, he can #e limited #y nothing Iothing can

stand outside of him 1E 5:58, 564 But a transcendent )od, li"e the one of

!escartes's system, is ontologically separate from his creation, as a carpen-

ter is distinct from the structure he #uilds %herefore, a truly infinite )od

cannot transcend his creation #ut must #e immanent in it 1E 5:56, 5/4 Spi-noza concludes that )od is the immanent causal power #y which all things


26/32

exist and act 1E 5:084 Although each finite thing is externally determined

#y the infinite series of other finite things, natura naturata, the force #y

which it perse(eres in existence follows from the power of )od immanent

in it, natura naturans 1E .:86S4 !escartes's transcendent )od is replaced

.6 am inde#ted here to urley's 15=//+ /4 pro;ect of showing that the artesian

meta-physic leads #y (ery plausi#le steps to the Spinozistic one y understanding of the

steps

#y which Spinoza mo(es from artesian principles to his own philosophy, howe(er, dif-

fers from urley's urley correctly notes that E 5:58 argues not only from )od's

a#solute

infinity #ut also from E 5:6's assertion that there cannot #e two or more su#stances of

the

same nature or attri#ute %he artesian distinction #etween attri#utes that can #e

ascri#ed

to )od and those that can #e ascri#ed to his creation alone, howe(er, is effecti(ely

refuted onthe grounds of )od's a#solute infinity f no attri#utes can #e denied of )od, then

attri#utes

reser(ed #y !escartes for the created world must #e attri#uted to him E 5:6 eliminates

a

much less plausi#le dou#led ontology, in which the attri#utes that !escartes reser(ed

for

created things exist #oth as attri#utes of )od and as attri#utes of a second order of

created

su#stances

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8>=

#y Spinoza's )od immanent in nature !escartes's understanding of mat-

ter as inert extension must gi(e way to Spinoza's dispositionalist ontology

of powerful particulars All finite things are determinate or limited expres-

sions of )od's infinite power 1E 5:.64 As such, they are endowed with

determinate causal powers and capacities 1E 5:0>4

The on$eometrical "ortions o! the EthicsIot all of theEthicsis written in the geometrical manner Spinoza some-

times #rea"s the order of deduction, most nota#ly in the Scholia, Expli-

cations, :refaces, and Appendices While the chains of inference in the

strictly geometrical parts of the text are directed to the reason of its readers,

material can also #e found in theEthicsthat appeals to their emotions We

can understand Spinoza's insertion of this material #y considering Aris-

totle's statement in the(hetoric1 5, 503/a.5G..4 that the emotions are all

those feelings that so change men as to affect their ;udgements, and that

are also attended #y pain or pleasure 15=/8+ .5=64 Spinoza was as"ing a

great deal of his readers who were #oth hristian and artesian %hough

careful and disciplined reasoners, they were finite human #eings su#;ect toemotion+ emotions could affect their ;udgment and impair their a#ility to


27/32

attend to the demonstrations of the geometrical portions of the text

As a student of the emotions, (ery much aware of their power, Spinoza

would thin" it prudent to anticipate and counter the emotional resis-

tance his readers might ha(e to the distur#ing tra;ectory of his demon-

strations Ce corrects the pertur#ations of emotion with carefully calcu-

lated counterforces *re&uently, he ;udges it sufficient simply to remind hisreaders of their rational powers At one point, he does this #y distinguish-

ing his readers from those who cannot reason carefully and attenti(ely

%o his demonstration that it #elongs to the nature of su#stance to exist

1E 5:3!4, he adds that this will #e difficult to concei(e for those who ;udge

things confusedly, and ha(e not #een accustomed to "now things through

their first causes 1E 5:/S.4 Later, he expects resistance to the assertion

that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of )od Ce ac"nowl-

edges that he is as"ing a great deal of readers and appeals to their ratio-

nality #y as"ing them to continue on with me slowly, step #y step, and to

ma"e no ;udgment on these matters until they ha(e read through them all

1E .:55S4.> *or a discussion of the history of the addition of scholia to Euclid'sElements, see

Ceath

5=6>+ >8G38 nterestingly, Spinoza writes the scholia to his owntext %his indicates that

he

is stepping out of the demonstration proper to reflect and comment on it or to add

material

he does not wish to include in the chain of deductions of the main text

Page 28

832

:oetics %oday ./+0

Sometimes, Spinoza #rea"s the order of his deduction simply to reassure

his readers oncerned that his doctrine of ethical egoism might #e asso-

ciated with (ice rather than with the con(entional (irtues, he pauses to

summarize his position clearly Ce assures his readers that self-interest,

rationally understood, does not imply a life of tyrannical self-indulgence

Hational persons, desiring nothing for themsel(es which they do not

desire for other men, are ;ust, honest and honora#le 1E 8:5/S4

At other times, Spinoza treats irrational, emotional responses to his

argument with a much stronger rhetorical medicine We ha(e seen that

Shmueli discerns in these sections elements of anger and sarcasm, whichare not present in the portions of the wor" that attempt to persuade #y

purely rational means When these passages are read carefully, howe(er,

one does not there find unrestrained anger #ut something much more

interesting n all of these passages, Spinoza demonstrates that a certain

position actually leads to the opposite of that which its defenders inferred

from it %he tone of these passages is one of intellectual delight in ironic

re(ersal, s"illfully executed %he reader is expected to share this delight

%his "ind of intellectual pleasure engages the powers of reason and, as

such, is an appropriate remedy for emotions that might interfere with care-

ful attention to a demonstration %hree re(ersals of this "ind are especially

noteworthy, for they ha(e as their o#;ect the issues that might particularlydistur# Spinoza's artesian friends


28/32

%he Appendix to :art 5, as indicated a#o(e, denies the existence of a

pro(idential order, there#y re;ecting finalist notions of nature, which

understand natural processes as #eing designed #y )od to ser(e the inter-

ests of human"ind We ha(e already noted the possi#ility that a artesian

reader might identify Spinoza's dispositionalist ontology with the su#stan-

tial forms of conser(ati(e anti-artesians such as Moetius Moetius defendedthe doctrine of su#stantial forms as the metaphysical support for the doc-

trine of a pro(idential order grounded in finalist notions of causation 1(an

Huler 5==6+ >4 n refusing to attri#ute a pro(idential design to nature, Spi-

noza neatly clears up any misunderstandings a#out the real implications of

his ontology of powerful particulars+ he is not criticizing !escartes simply

to return to the metaphysics of the medie(al Scholastics %o distance

his philosophy from the medie(al schools, Spinoza attac"s these finalist

notions #y demonstrating that they actually imply the opposite of what

their adherents thought Iature's destructi(e powers thwart our am#itions

.3 Lloyd 15==>+ .54 notices that theEthicsis rich in irony She, howe(er, finds a

muchgreater difference #etween the method of theEthicsand that of Euclid'sElementsthan

do

She argues, for example, that there is in fact little resem#lance #etween reading the

Ethics

and reading Euclid

Page 29

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835

and swamp our agency %herefore, the supposition that nature is go(erned

#y a di(ine intelligence does not imply that )od is wise and #ene(olent #ut

that he is as mad as men 1E 5A4

%wo later interesting examples of ironic re(ersal are directed at !es-

cartes %he first re(ersal, found in the :reface to :art 0, concerns !es-

cartes's doctrine of the freedom of the will %he central artesian (irtue

is generosity 1 !enerosit14, the "nowledge that all that really #elongs to us

is our free will and the resol(e to use it well 1 The Passions of the Soul:S

0Art560, A% Q+ 88> 5=/6 ?5>8=@+ 0/84 n the artesian uni(erse, it is

in (irtue of the freedom of the will that human #eings #ear in some waythe image and li"eness of )od 1"editations, A% M+ 63G6/ 5=/8+ 824 As

such, the possi#ility of the freedom of the will is grounded in !escartes's

notion of the di(ine as transcendent and radically free f this freedom

were eliminated from his metaphysical system, human #eha(ior would #e

no less #lindly determined than chun"s of matter mo(ing according to geo-

metrical necessity %he will is the only thing that li#erates human #eings

from the mechanistic necessity of matter %his doctrine, howe(er, is at odds

with !escartes's program of doing ethics en physician, that is, as a natural

philosopher 1 The Passions of the Soul2 Prefatory 3etters, Egmont, 58 August

5>8=, A% Q, 0.> 5=/6+ 0.34 Spinoza asserts that, although !escartes

aspires to treat emotional life in the same rigorous fashion as his mathe-matical physics treats the motion of #odies, he founds his ethics, instead,


29/32

on an undetermined act of the will that could not #e comprehended #y any

science K#(iously sa(oring the irony, Spinoza writes that the cele#rated

!escartes, although he too #elie(ed that the mind has a#solute power o(er

its own actions, ne(ertheless sought to explain human affects through their

first causes, and at the same time to show the way #y which the mind can

ha(e a#solute dominion o(er its affects But in my opinion, he showednothing #ut the cle(erness of his understanding, as shall show in the

proper place 1E 0:raef4

%he same "ind of s"illful re(ersal is directed at the doctrine of the pineal

gland in the :reface to :art 6 Ca(ing criticized the Scholastics for the

o#scurity of their explanations, !escartes rests his doctrine of interaction

on the pineal gland, a hypothesis more occult than any occult &uality

1E 6:raef4 %a"en together, these three passages suggest that the non-

geometrical portions of theEthicsser(e to differentiate Spinoza, on one

side, from the Scholastics 1E 5A4 and, on the other side, from !escartes

1E 0:raef, 6:raef4

./ %his reference to thePassions of the Soulfollows the following pattern+ :S 2 The New Organon and (elated $ritings, edited #y *ulton C Anderson

1ndianapolis,

I+ Bo##s-errill4

Bla"e, William

5=/. The -omplete Poetry and Prose of $illiam la0e2 Newly (evised Edition, edited

#y !a(id M

Erdman 1Ber"eley+ Pni(ersity of alifornia :ress4

urley, Edwin

5=/6 Editorial :reface, in The -ollected $or0s of Spinoza, edited and translate

Documents

El Método Geométrico en Spinoza