EIAS Briefing Paper - dipot.ulb.ac.be

By Coraline Goron

July 2011

Building an ASEAN Community

by 2015

New Concepts for a Revival of the ‘ASEAN Way’

towards Regional Integration ?

EIAS

Briefing Paper

Coraline Goron

European Institute for Asian Studies 1

Building an ASEAN Community by 2015 New Concepts for a Revival of the ‘ASEAN Way towards

Regional Integration?

By Coraline Goron1

Since the Asian crisis and with renewed impetus since the adoption of the ASEAN

Charter in 2008, ASEAN has proved to be a formidable source of conceptual

creativity pertaining to regional integration. While clinging to ASEAN‟s defining

principle of non-interference, as expressed in the treaty of Amity and Cooperation

and while maintaining a persisting aversion for any “Europe-like” transfer of

national sovereignty to supranational entities, a new language, symbol of a

renewed political rhetoric of integration, has emerged. Formulas such as “visions”,

“roadmaps”, “blueprints”, “connectivity”, “scorecards” and “soft regionalism” have

served to keep a consensual narrative of a voluntary-based integration, while

bringing a qualitative change to the initial „ASEAN way‟ doctrine. Whereas neo-

realists dismiss them as mere artifacts, aimed at maintaining the “delusion” of an

Asian integration process, these new concepts and mechanisms, perhaps,

encapsulate the dynamics necessary to fulfill the political commitments put forward

by ASEAN leaders in the ASEAN Economic Blueprint, to turn ASEAN into a „single

market and production base‟ and a „competitive region‟ but also the longer-term

objective of promoting its centrality as a hub for regional integration in East Asia.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my gratitude to Prof David Camroux for his supportive comments and

corrections. This paper would definitely not have been achieved without his contribution. I

would also like to thank Mr Dick Gupwell, Vice-Chairman of EIAS, and the EIAS team for their

numerous and useful inputs and feedbacks.

1 Ms. Coraline Goron is a Junior Researcher at the European Institute for Asian Studies. She holds a Master's Degree in European Studies of Institute for European Studies at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and a double Bachelor in French and Common Law from the University of Cergy Pontoise (France)

Building an ASEAN Community by 2015

2 European Institute for Asian Studies

Index

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3

Building an ASEAN Economic Community – a challenging path to regionalism ....................... 5

From market-driven to institution-driven economic integration: the post Asian crisis

shift in the discourse on economic integration ................................................................ 5

Critical assessment of the ‗ASEAN way‘ to economic integration ....................................... 8

East Asian Economic development patterns ................................................................ 9

The Asian Crisis and its consequences for regional integration in East Asia ................... 11

New concepts striving to maintain the momentum of economic integration- added value

and shortcomings ........................................................................................................ 14

Presenting the new instruments aimed at implementing the economic blueprint: ASEAN

‗connectivity‘ and the ‗scorecard‘ mechanism ............................................................... 15

Connectivity – a bold concept ................................................................................. 15

The Scorecard – ASEAN‟s Open Method of Coordination? ............................................ 19

Maintaining the process and retaining centrality - political objectives superseding

economic realities ..................................................................................................... 22

FTAs versus Community or FTA + Community? ......................................................... 22

Deeper regional institutionalisation or inefficient superposition? .................................. 24

ASEAN striving for leadership in the region ............................................................... 25

Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 27

Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 29

Official documents: ................................................................................................... 29

Books: .................................................................................................................... 29

Articles: .................................................................................................................. 29

News articles: .......................................................................................................... 31

Coraline Goron


Introduction

2011 began with a bleak outlook for ASEAN, with the worrying escalation of the Thai-Cambodia

border dispute in February, which, according to Prof. Bilveer Singh from the S. Rajaratnam

School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, endangers the very raison d‟être of

ASEAN as a regional ‗security complex‘2. Despite this dramatic event, which seemed to have

fallen outside the diplomatic control of ASEAN, 2010 had seen very encouraging signs in

ASEAN‘s march towards realizing its 2015 Vision of an ―ASEAN Community‖3. Important

achievements were made. In particular, the public release of the ASEAN Economic

Community‘s ―scorecards‖ in March 2010 and the adoption of a ―Master Plan on ASEAN

Connectivity‖ in Hanoi, on 28 October 2010, marked important innovations on the way towards

promoting ASEAN as the engine of regional integration in East and South-East Asia.

Experience internationally has demonstrated that regional integration requires permanent

innovation, with no ―key-in-hand‖ readily applicable formula. In particular, it has long been

recognized that the European model of integration cannot be replicated entirely elsewhere in

the world; thus each region must find its own ‗path to regionalism‘.

ASEAN was created in 1967, mainly as a regional peace-building political project in the

immediate aftermath of decolonization4, amid fears of the ‗balkanisation‘ of South East Asia.

Comprising ten countries since 1999, it has a population of 575 million and a combined GDP of

$1,282 billion5. From its inception in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN was envisaged as

an inclusive process ultimately aiming at gathering all South-East Asian countries under a

single framework of cooperation. Already at that time, economic cooperation was deemed

essential, in order to bring stability and prosperity to the region. Yet, neither definite aims nor

elaborate plans and instruments were elaborated then. What has been subsequently described

as the ‗ASEAN way‘ of regional cooperation was based on ―the avoidance of institutional grand

designs and the adoption of a consensual and cautious approach6‖, paying more than mere lip

service to the independence and sovereignty of the member states. Economic integration,

therefore, was essentially informal and ‗private sector-led‘. Hence, the initiative to put forward

an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 was more a practical response to the needs of the

nascent ―East Asian integrated circuit‖ of production7 than a genuine integration project.

2 Singh, Bilveer, Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby, ―Thai-Cambodian skirmishes: Endangering ASEAN‘s ‗raison d‗être‘‖, School

of International Studies, Singapore , in The Jakarta Post , 21 February 2011 3 The ASEAN Vision Statement Vision 2020, adopted at the ASEAN Summit of Kuala Lumpur in 1997, envisaged ASEAN

economic integration to be achieved by 2020. This time frame was then shortened to 2015 in the ASEAN Economic

Community Blueprint, adopted in 2007. 4 Crozier, Andrew J, ―Festina Lente: An Introductory Sketch of the History of ASEAN‖, In Welfens, Paul J.J, ―Integration

in Asia and Europe: historical dynamics, political issues, and economic perspectives‖, 2006, Springer Science &

Business, pp 13-29. According to Andrew J. Crozier, the Thai foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, who played a

formidable role in the creation of ASEAN, envisaged it as a remedy to the ―power vacuum‖ left behind by the colonial

powers, which could have attracted outsiders to step in for political gains. 5 Atje, Raymond, Kartika, Prativi, “A Bumpy Road Towards ASEAN Economic Community 2015” , in The Global

Economic Crisis, Implications for ASEAN, Singapore, ISEA, 2010, pp 125-143 6 Acharya, Amitav, ―Ideas, Identity and Institution-building: from the ‗ASEAN Way‘ to the ‗Asia-Pacific Way‘?‖, The

Pacific Review, Vol 10 n°3, 1997, pp 319-346 7 Nicolas, Françoise "The Political Economy of Regional Integration in East Asia, Economic Change and Restructuring,,

Springer, Vol 41, n°4, 2008, pp 345-367. Françoise Nicolas argues that intra-regional trade in East Asia has been

largely driven by the growing ‗vertical trade‘ in parts and components. The rise of China as a major platform for

processing and assembling parts and components produced at lower costs in the South East Asian countries and re-

exporting final products to the western markets has played a critical role in this process.

http://www.google.fr/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=+inauthor:%22Paul+J.+J.+Welfens%22



However, the Asian Economic crisis, which hit most East Asian countries in 1997-98, revealed

that the regional structural and normative weaknesses had played their part in accelerating the

propagation of the plague throughout the region. Arguably, as a result of this, a change of

mindset occurred regarding further regional integration and more particularly the economic

integration process. At the ASEAN summit of Bali, in 2003, ASEAN ministers adopted the

landmark ―Bali Concord II declaration‖, within which they committed themselves to

establishing an ASEAN Community comprising of three pillars, namely the ―ASEAN Political and

Security Community‖ (APSC), the ―ASEAN Economic Community‖ (AEC) and the ―ASEAN Socio-

Cultural Community‖ (ASCC). However, to date, only the AEC has been subject to a

comprehensive implementation scheme with definite objectives and a schedule for

implementation, put forward in the ―ASEAN Economic Blueprint‖, which was adopted, at the

12th ASEAN Summit, in November 2007.

Parallel to these evolutions, since the Asian crisis and with renewed impetus since the adoption

of the ASEAN Charter in 2008, ASEAN has proved to be a formidable source of conceptual

creativity pertaining to regional integration. This article argues that the theoretical emulation

among ASEAN epistemic communities stems from the perceived need to manage two diverging

aspirations. While clinging to ASEAN‘s defining principle of non-interference, as expressed in

the treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and while keeping a persisting aversion for any ―Europe-

like‖ transfer of national sovereignty to supranational entities, a new language, symbol of a

renewed political rhetoric of integration, has emerged. Formulas, such as ―visions‖,

―roadmaps‖, ―blueprints‖, ―connectivity‖, ―scorecards‖ and ―soft regionalism‖, have served to

keep a consensual narrative of a voluntary-based integration, while bringing a qualitative

change to the initial ‗ASEAN way‘ doctrine.

Whereas neo-realists dismiss them as mere artefacts, aimed at maintaining the ―delusion‖ of

an Asian integration process8, these new concepts and mechanisms, perhaps, encapsulate the

dynamics necessary to fulfil the political commitments put forward by ASEAN leaders in the

ASEAN Economic Blueprint.

This article, focusing on the political economy of ASEAN, as it involves probably the most

advanced area of the region‘s integration process, explores the possible added-value, beyond

rhetoric, of two concepts recently endorsed by ASEAN ministers. The first of these concepts is

that of ―connectivity‖, put forward in the ―ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity‖, adopted in

November 2010. Encompassing ―physical connectivity‖, ―institutional connectivity‖ and

―people-to-people‖ connectivity, it seems to address several challenges pointed out earlier as

impediments to the economic integration process. Notably, it offers a comprehensive approach

to tackling challenges of pan-regional infrastructure building, as well as non-tariff barriers to

trade. This analysis assesses how effective this approach can be in the context of ASEAN. The

second concept deserving of attention is that of a ―scorecard‖. Referring to a kind of ―peer

review‖ mechanism entrusted to the ASEAN Secretariat in the 2007 Economic Blueprint, it

serves as a basis for monitoring its implementation by the member states. In response to

critics, who have dismissed the ASEAN Economic Community idea as mere ―paper words‖, this

author argues that this mechanism is intriguing for various reasons: firstly, it mirrors the

―ASEAN Way‖ preference for ‗non-judicial‘ implementation mechanisms; secondly, it provides

8 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, Regional Delusion,

Northhampton, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006, 269 pages

Coraline Goron


for a new instance against which the merits of a non-binding political mechanism, as opposed

to a classical judicial review mechanism, can be tested.

One of the purposes of this article is to present and contextualise the emergence of these new

concepts. In particular, it seeks to situate them in the theoretical debate between the

constructivist, the realist and the European approaches to regional integration, in the field of

political economy. Then, it proposes to assess their potential as instruments capable of

realizing ASEAN‘s goals. These goals include the medium-term goal of creating an ―economic

community‖ by 2015, turning ASEAN into a ‗single market and production base‘ and a

‗competitive region‘ 9 but also the longer-term aim of promoting its centrality as a hub for

regional integration in East Asia.

Building an ASEAN Economic Community – a challenging path to

regionalism

Economic cooperation has always been a cornerstone in the project to create an integrated

East Asian or South-East Asian region. In the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976), the

founding members of ASEAN already committed themselves to ―promote active cooperation in

the economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative fields10‖. Yet, these aspirations did

not materialise in the first twenty years of ASEAN‘s existence. Subsequent developments since

the 1990s gave momentum to ASEAN‘s economic integration. However, the East and South-

East Asian patterns of economic development and regionalism have been viewed from very

different perspectives according to the theoretical framework used by the authors. Whereas a

theoretical orthodoxy in Asian studies has developed, arguing for an ―Asian Way‖ towards

regional economic integration, scholars drawn from the realist school of international relations

have rejected their findings. Both schools of international relations have interpreted treaty

commitments and empirical data in opposite ways. While on the European continent the

development of an Asian regional integration rhetoric since the late 1990s has been followed

with interest and has received strong political support, ASEAN endeavours and methods of

integration, however, have raised doubts seen from the standpoint of the EU‘s own experience.

In order to assess the pertinence of the most recent conceptual innovations of ASEAN

leaderships, it appears necessary to take into account these diverging approaches.

From market-driven to institution-driven economic integration: the post Asian crisis shift in

the discourse on economic integration

It seems to have been the belief from the inception of ASEAN that the objective of ensuring

Asian countries‘ path to development and security independent of interference from the great

powers would be best pursued through regional cooperation, in particular in the economic

area. Hence, the Philippines foreign minister at the time of the Bangkok Declaration (1967),

Narciso Ramos, was quoted as saying:

9 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (DAC II), Section B, Bali, Indonesia, 7 October 2003 10 Article 4, Chapter 3, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, Indonesia, 24 February 1976



“The fragmented economies of Southeast Asia [with] each country pursuing its

own limited objectives and dissipating its meagre resources in the overlapping or

even conflicting endeavours of sister states carry the seeds of weakness in their

capacity for growth and the self-perpetuating dependence on the advanced,

industrial nations. ASEAN, therefore, could marshal the still untapped potentials

of this rich region through more substantial united action11”.

Notwithstanding these early aspirations, efforts towards cross-border economic cooperation

hardly materialized until the 1990s. The first attempts towards transnational cooperation took

mainly the form of patchy and voluntary preferential trade agreements from the mid-1970s

onward; then, eventually, the establishment of sub-regional growth zones amongst ASEAN‘s

most developed economies (Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia)12 started a sub-regional

dynamic of economic integration. These projects were aimed at joint-industrial development.

The first pan-ASEAN-six trade liberalization project came through the Australian initiative for

an Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation process (APEC), in 1989, which included also the

industrialized economies from North-East Asia and North America. ASEAN itself embarked on a

formal economic cooperation framework only in 199213 with the signing of the ASEAN Free

Trade Agreement (AFTA) trade liberalisation project (to be implemented over 15 years).

Therefore, early trans-regional economic and trade patterns in East Asia were arguably a

―spontaneous process‖, fuelled by the private sector and by the quest for efficiency on the part

of multinational companies, initially mostly Japanese, but later from the so-called ―New

Industrialized Economies‖ (NIE) of Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, seeking to build up

marketing and supply chain networks to exploit economies of scale from the division of labour

and specialisation14. Subsequently, the rise of China as an ―outward processing region for

goods developed elsewhere in Asia‖ and its integration in the regional production network

further encouraged the development of East Asian intra-trade, from 35 to 57% of overall trade

over the period 1980-200515. However, it must be noted that this rise was primarily due to the

increase in trade between individual ASEAN countries (with sharp differences among them)

and the rest of East Asia. Intra-ASEAN trade, on the other hand, grew only from 18% to

25.5% of total ASEAN trade over the period 1990-200516. We shall see in the next section how

these trends have been interpreted in terms of evidence of regional economic integration.

The Asian financial crisis that broke out in Thailand in the summer 1997 diminished some of

the enthusiasm about the ―Asian miracle17‖. While the actual causes of the crisis, regional or

systemic, continue to be debated, one of its side effects has been to strengthen the political

commitments of ASEAN countries to deepen economic integration among them and with the

wider East Asian region. This ambition was officially stated in the ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted,

11 Flores, J.M, Abad, J, cited in Crozier, Andew J, Loc Cit., p 19 12 Jones David, Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, Op. Cit. 13 Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Singapore, 28

January 1992 14 Nicolas, Françoise ―East Asia and Western Europe: Between Regionalisation and Globalisation”, in Boisseau du

Rocher, Sophie and Fort, Bertrand (eds), Paths to Regionalisation – Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe,

Singapore, Marshall Cavendish Academic, Asia-Europe Research Series, 2005, p 3-7 15 Nicolas, Françoise, Loc. Cit. ―The Political Economy of Regional Integration in East Asia‖ 16 Austria, Myrna S, ―Tackling Non-Tariff Barriers in ASEAN‖, in ASEAN Economic Blueprint Report N°4, ASEAN Studies

Centre, ISEAS, Singapore, 2009 17 World Bank, ―The East Asian miracle : economic growth and public policy‖ 1993/09/30 , Report n° 12351 (Vol. 2 of

2), 1993

http://www.asean.org/12375.htm

http://www.asean.org/12375.htm

Coraline Goron


at the height of the crisis, by ASEAN Heads of State and Governments at the Summit of Kuala

Lumpur, on 15 December 1997:

―We resolve to chart a new direction towards the year 2020 called, ASEAN 2020:

Partnership in Dynamic Development which will forge closer economic integration

within ASEAN‖.

Notably, they chose to endeavour to advance economic integration by ―fully implementing the

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and accelerating the liberalization of trade in services (ASEAN

Framework Agreement on Services introduced in 1995), realising the ASEAN Investment Area

by 2010 (AIA, initiated in 1998) and the free flow of investments by 2020; intensifying and

expanding sub-regional cooperation in existing and new sub-regional growth areas; further

consolidating and expanding extra-ASEAN regional linkages for mutual benefit, cooperate to

strengthen the multilateral trading system, and reinforcing the role of the business sector as

the engine of growth18‖. Then, in 2003, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, adopted in Bali,

developed the economic integration project into the idea of an Economic Community, which

was to establish ASEAN as ―a single market and production base‖. Although substantially very

different from the European model, the rhetoric surrounding it clearly referred to far-reaching

economic integration goals. In 2007, the ASEAN Economic Blueprint, a legally binding

document that committed the ASEAN-ten to implement the AEC, set up distinct

implementation deadlines and periodical implementation reviews, which could arguably have

been inspired by the ―Delors Plan19‖- the latter outlined the three sequences leading to the

European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by 2000. The Blueprint presents two main

objectives: to transform ASEAN into ―a single market and production base‖ and make it ―a

competitive economic region20‖. One should be aware, however, that despite the bold

language, the ideas put forward in this document remain ―significantly lower than the

economic integration in the EU‖21. Notably, no custom union and no single currency are

envisaged.

In the meantime, the ASEAN Charter, adopted in 2008, granted ASEAN an international legal

personality -quite ironically before the European Union obtained such a status in the Treaty of

Lisbon- and for the first time left room for possible sanctions in case of members‘ ―egregious

violations of their obligations‖, as well as room for non-consensual methods of reaching

agreement by the ASEAN Summit22.

Although weaknesses have been pointed out in all these documents, their multiplication shows

the strong – but perhaps only apparent – political will that lies behind the realisation of

economic integration. However, as mentioned above, these achievements have been

interpreted in very diverging ways across the academic spectrum. While constructivists point

to the progressive build-up of a South-East Asian and eventually pan-East Asian regional

identity, realists accuse them of nurturing an illusion of regional integration that does not live

up to the reality. The European approach to regional integration, if perhaps less entrenched,

18 ASEAN Vision 2020, Section ―A Partnership in Dynamic Development‖ , page 3 19 The ―Delors Plan‖ is the popular name given to the ―Report of the Committee for the Study of Economic and

Monetary Union‖, appointed by the European Council and chaired by the then president of the European Commission

Jacques Delors. The report‘s conclusions were presented at the Maastricht Summit and for the most reproduced in the

relevant provisions on EMU in the Treaty on the European Union. 20 ASEAN Economic Blueprint, 2007, paragraph 8, p 6 21 Vandoren, Paul ―Regional Economic Integration in South East Asia”, ASEAN Economic Journal, n° 3, 2005, pp 517-

535 22Hsu, Locknie, “The ASEAN Charter and A Legal Identity for ASEAN‖, in The ASEAN Community – Unblocking the

Roadblocks Report N°1, ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS, Singapore, 2008



insists a great deal on the role of institutions and legal norms and thus struggles to grasp the

dynamics of East Asian regionalism.

Critical assessment of the ‘ASEAN way’ to economic integration

The ―ASEAN way‖, claims a distinctive approach to regional cooperation. It ―consists of a code

of conduct for inter-state behaviour, as well as a decision-making process based on

consultations and consensus‖23. While this code of conduct puts forward internationally agreed

norms, such as ‗non-interference‘, ‗non-use of force‘ and ‗pacific settlement of disputes‘,

ASEAN‘s uniqueness, arguably, is to ―operationalise these norms into a framework of regional

integration24‖. In this regard, Amitav Acharya argued in the 1990s for the ―ASEAN way‖ to be

seen as a ‗process‘ rather than ‗substance‘. According to him, this ‗process‘ was characterized

by ‗a preference for informality‘ over ‗structured, formalistic and legalistic procedures‘, the

‗aversion to formal, centralized institutions‘ and the practice of ‗consensus‘, which should not

be mistaken for ‗unanimity‘, since it does not require the express agreement from all the

parties, but still enables a forward movement in the direction which elicits broad support, as

long as core national interests are not disregarded25. In short, the ‗ASEAN way‘ doctrine has

been developed in opposition to the ‗European Union way‘, in which the partial handing over of

sovereignty to supranational institutions was present from the very beginning, in 1951, in the

form of the ‗high authority‘ of the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC).

While this peculiar regionalization process in South-East Asia has been advocated by ASEAN

policy makers, its success has been looked at through different lenses by scholars belonging to

the constructivist, realist, and European schools of studies.

Constructivism, in a nutshell, argues that norms emerge from the interaction among actors

who, in turn, develop structures to manage these interactions, so that actors and structures

are co-constructed26. In this approach, regions do not exist naturally but are subjectively

constructed by human agency. Thus, in the process towards regional integration, notably in

the European Union, they emphasize the socialization role of common institutions, which

induces a progressive but irreversible redefinition of the national interest in relation to the

others27. This process, according to constructivist scholars, fosters the creation of a shared

‗identity‘ and facilitates the spreading of commonly agreed norms and rules. Socialization can

occur in different institutional settings and, therefore, constructivism does not have a legalist

approach to regional integration. What matters is not that norms can be judicially enforced by

supranational bodies, such as the European Court of Justice, but rather that they become part

of the mindset of the people to which they apply, through ‗borrowing‘, ‗localization‘ and the

further ―reshaping of both existing beliefs and practices and foreign ideas in their local

context‖28. In this process, constructivists privilege the role of ―transnational moral

entrepreneurs29‖. Therefore, constructivism has easily been able to come to terms with the

idea of the ―ASEAN way‖ to regional integration. Hence, it could be argued that it served to

23 Acharya, Amitav, Loc. Cit. 24 Hsu, Locknie, Loc. Cit. 25 Hsu, Locknie, Loc. Cit. 26 Saurugger, Sabine, Théories et concepts de l‟intégration Européenne , Paris, Presse de Science Po, 2009, 483 pages 27 Chirstiansen, Thomas, Jorgensen, Knud Erik, Wiener, Antje, ―The social Construction of Europe”, Journal of

European Public Policy, Vol 6, n°4, 1999, pp 536-543 28 Acharya, Amitav, ―Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism‖,

International Organization, Vol 58, n°2, Spring 2004, pp 239-275 29 Acharya, Amitav, Loc. Cit. ―Ideas, identity, and institution-building: From the 'ASEAN way' to the 'Asia-Pacific way'?”

Coraline Goron


anchor the concept into a comfortable theoretical framework. Notably, ASEAN‘s claim to a non-

legalistic decision-making process and the emphasis put on the role of ‗track two‘ (epistemic

communities, notably CSCAP and ASEAN-ISIS30), in driving the integration process, reflect

some of the main ideas advocated by the constructivists.

Realists refute this analytical framework and its findings. Realist and neo-realist approaches to

international relations define the international system as structurally anarchic and recognize

the sovereign, self-interested States as the only significant international actors. Therefore,

they tend to be extremely suspicious of any regional integration projects. Hence, whereas

some successes of the European Union integration arguably puzzle them, they certainly reject

any weaker form of regionalism as irrelevant. Along this line, David Martin Jones and Michael

L.R Smith argue that the ‗ASEAN way‘ merely mirrors the fact that norms in South-East Asia

―are essentially what states, pursuing their strategic self-interest, make of them‖, which is, in

their view, not much. They emphasize the fact that ASEAN‘s structure, even after the Charter,

remains intergovernmental, while interactions remain state-driven31.

The European Union has been a pioneer in the process of regional integration. Especially in the

field of economic integration, ―an assumption remains that the EU is the paradigmatic case of

regionalism against which all other regional projects are judged32‖. As a result, Europeans

particularly (but not only them) have tended to assess the East Asian developments only

through the critical lenses of their own experience and their practice of institutionalized forms

of integration. Indeed, a Eurocentric approach has ―imposed an understanding of regionalism

as bound up with ‗formal institutionalization‖ and the creation of ―supranational politico-

institutional bodies33‖. However, this approach has engendered theoretical blinkers to the

analysis of regionalism and probably also encouraged the rejection of the ‗Brussels model‘ by

Asian leaders. Yet, the most recent institutional developments in East Asia have narrowed the

analytical gap and allowed sensible comparative research to take place.

Three elements of East Asian economic ‗regionalism‘ have been interpreted from completely

antagonistic standpoints. The bones of contention concern, first, the interpretation of the

empirical trends of economic development in East Asia from the 1980s onward. The second

disagreement concerns the causes of the 1997 Asian crisis and its consequences in terms of an

ASEAN commitment to pursue a goal of genuine regional economic integration.

East Asian Economic development patterns

Any analysis of the economic integration trends in ASEAN cannot be made in isolation from the

wider East Asian context within which they are embedded. Given the reality of economic

exchanges in the region, such a study would not only be dubious, it would also contradict the

spirit of the AEC. Hence, the project of the AEC is to exploit the strategic position of ASEAN, at

a crossroad between India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south and China,

Japan and South Korea to the north, to transform itself as a hub for economic exchanges in

the wider region. The objective of ‗inclusiveness‘ in the AEC seems to make also reference to

the earlier idea of creating an ‗East Asian Economic Group‘ (EAEG), which was put forward by

30 ASEAN CSCAP is the abbreviation for ―ASEAN Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific‖, whereas ASEAN

ISIS is the abbreviation for ―ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies‖ 31 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Michael L.R, ―Making Process, not Progress – ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian

Regional Order”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 148–184 32 Higgott, Richard ―Alternative Models of Regional Cooperation? The Limits of Regional Institutionalization in East

Asia‖, in Telo, Mario (Eds), European Union and New Regionalism, Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-

Hegemonic Era, second edition, Oxon, Ashgate Publishing, 2007, pp 75-106 33 Richard Higgott, ibid



Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia in the early 1990s34. Following opposition from the United

States, this became an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) and can be seen in another

reincarnation as ASEAN +3. Hence, as proclaimed in the AEC:

“In establishing the AEC, ASEAN shall act in accordance to the principles of an

open, outward-looking, inclusive, and market-driven economy consistent with

multilateral rules as well as adherence to rules-based systems for effective

compliance and implementation of economic commitments”35.

Thus, all studies of ASEAN economic integration expand beyond the ten ASEAN countries to

include at least Japan, China, South Korea (ASEAN +3) and India (ASEAN+4), when they do

not extend to the broader Asia-Pacific Region (APEC). As mentioned earlier, all economic

studies point to the fact that trade expansion in East Asia, in the 1990s, ―can be attributed

mainly to an intensification of trade relations between Northeast and Southeast Asia‖36. This

trend resulted from the use of South-East Asia as a production base by Japan, the NIEs and,

more recently, China. However, these data have been analysed through different lenses.

On the one hand, constructivists have emphasised that progressive economic integration,

though imbalanced and incomplete, was the source of economic development in the region.

According to this view, economic integration took place throughout the 1990s, although

―private sector-led‖ and export-oriented, by conforming to the ASEAN informal, lightly

structured way and thanks to the progressive appropriation, by these countries, of the

international norms of the market economy.

Realists, on the other hand, see East Asian economic performance in the same period of time

only as the result of the replication of the ‗Japanese developmental model‘ by the NIEs, based

on a strong state leadership and export-led growth37. They point to the fact that ―ASEAN, as a

regional grouping, was far from integrated‖ and highlight a situation where the more dynamic

ASEAN economies not only were ‗export-oriented‘, but also ―competed between themselves

both for foreign direct investment and as low-cost manufacturing bases for North-East Asian,

European, or North American multinational corporations38‖. This combination of low intra-

ASEAN trade and intra-regional competition provides, according to them, evidence of the

failure of the ―ASEAN way‖ to foster regional economic integration.

One way to reconcile these interpretations is to underline the fact that the promoters of Asian

regional integration do not deny the persistent low level of ASEAN trade. Indeed, the

acknowledgement of this reality is often presented as a reason to integrate the South-East

Asian region further. Put simply, regional economic integration should be distinguished from

mere trade intensity figures. This dichotomy has been underlined by Richard Higgott, who

differentiates between ―regionalization”, referring to ―those processes of integration that arise

from markets, private trade and investment flows‖, and ―regionalism”, which is more ―a state-

led project of cooperation that emerges as a result of intergovernmental dialogue and

34 Terada,Takashi, ―Constructing an ‗East Asian‘ concept and growing regional identity: from EAEC to ASEAN+3‖, The

Pacific Review, Vol. 16 No. 2, 2003, pp 251–277 35 ASEAN Economic Blueprint, 2007, paragraph 5, p 5, (emphasis added) 36 Engammare, Valérie, Lehmann, Jean-Pierre, ―East Asian Power and the 21st Century Global Economy: from a

Production Base to a Market Base?‖, Boisseau du Rocher, Sophie and Fort, Bertrand (eds), Paths to Regionalisation –

Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe, Singapore, Marshall Cavendish Academic, Asia-Europe Research

Series, 2005, pp 8-30 37 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, Loc. Cit, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, Regional Delusion 38 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, ibidem

Coraline Goron


treaties39‖. Furthermore, it could be argued that the replication and adaptation of the Japanese

developmental model among South-East Asian countries reflects the diffusion of norms

highlighted by constructivists.

Until the end of the 20th century, the European model of integration seemed to be of a

completely different nature and, therefore, not particularly pertinent as a reference point for

other integration projects. However, it should be noted that the European Monetary Union

project played a role in motivating ASEAN leaders to put into place AFTA in 199240.

The Asian Crisis and its consequences for regional integration in East Asia

The financial crisis that hit East Asian countries in 1997 had terrible, although relatively short-

lived, consequences. Within the space of a few months, it put the ―Asian tigers‖ and the fast

developing countries in South-East Asian on their knees. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines and South Korea, in particular, were severely affected with a brutal fall in the

countries‘ growth rates paralleled by the explosion of unemployment, with no social security

net to mitigate the dramatic social effects. An intense academic debate soon developed

concerning the causes that precipitated this crisis. In broad terms, the theory of a purely

―Asian crisis‖ opposed that of the ‗localized‘ manifestation of a ―systemic crisis‖41. According to

the first analysis, the Asian economic model itself was seen as the source of the crisis because

of its ―current account deficits, a speculative property boom, short-term borrowing to fund

long-term investment, as well as poor banking and financial regulation, which ran the

spectrum from the inept and opaque to the fraudulent and corrupt42‖. On the contrary, the

theory of a systemic crisis, as alluded to by Walden Bello, argued that, ―first of all, one of the

prime causes of the current crisis has been the indiscriminate globalization of financial

markets43‖. For diverse political and economic reasons (supposedly those countries‘ humiliation

and the harsh economic restructuring policies demanded by the IMF in exchange for loans),

the second view was largely embraced by Asian governments, who shaped their response

accordingly. Yet, given that the reactions to the crisis have been both national and regional,

this has left room for disagreement between the realists and the constructivists.

Realists have supported their scepticism of Asian regionalism by pointing, first, to the initial

and uncoordinated reactions to the crisis by South-East Asian countries. David Martin Jones

and M.L.R Smith, notably, underline the fact that, while Thailand and Indonesia accepted the

rescue packages of the IMF and the restructuring plans attached to them, Malaysia rejected

them and imposed currency controls. Then, these authors dismiss the economic integration

rhetoric expressed in the Hanoi declaration on the ASEAN Community. On the contrary, they

see no subsequent progress in the liberalisation of the ASEAN ‗internal‘ market.

Constructivists, on the other hand, view the Asian crisis as a catalyst for regional integration.

They refer to two major institutional developments to support this theory, which are the

Chiang Mai Initiative in May 2000, which within the framework of ASEAN+3 (Japan, China and

South Korea) set up a more robust regional financial cooperation system. Moreover, the

39 Richard Higgott, Loc. Cit. 40 Engammare, Valérie, Lehmann, Jean-Pierre, Op. Cit 41 Figuière, Catherine, Guilhot, Laëtitia, « L‘Asie d‘une Crise à L‘autre : Impact sur l‘intégration régionale », Paper

presented at XXVIème Journées du développement de l‟Association Tiers-Mondes : Crises et soutenabilité du

développement, Strasbourg, June 2010. 42 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, Loc. Cit, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, Regional Delusion;

Camdessus, Michel, ―Crise Regionale ou Crise de Système?‖, Sociétal, n°23, 1998, pp 15-18, (Michel Camdessus was

then director of the International Monetary Fund) 43 Bello, Walden, ―East Asia : On the eve of a great transformation?‖, Review of International Political Economy, vol 5,

N°3, 1998, pp 424-444



endorsement of the concept of an ASEAN Community in 2003 indicated the crisis had

engendered greater integration. According to this view, the narrative developed by ASEAN

epistemic communities has become a consensus view among, not only the ASEAN-10, but also

among its partners, with Japan and China eager to get involved in the ASEAN+3 initiative.

There is no space in this article to develop the argument extensively over the pertinence of the

ASEAN+3 setting. For the purpose of argumentation, it suffices to highlight the antagonist

viewpoints on it. Indeed, the constructivists, on the one hand, assume that the common

handling of the Asian financial crisis has created an unprecedented sense of regional identity

and shared interest. This would explain the arguable decline of APEC and the increased

momentum for a purely East Asian setting44. Furthermore, they put emphasis on the central

role played by ASEAN and the ―ASEAN way‖ as a centrifugal force, recalling that the ASEAN+3

initiative was taken by Singapore‘s Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, when, at the 1995 ASEAN

Summit, he proposed to invite Japan, China and South Korea as a triumvirate to join ASEAN

informal summit meetings. ―In sum, the formation of the East Asian concept and awareness of

a shared identity within the same region of East Asia can be said to be gradually fermenting as

an essential foundation for the establishment of the ASEAN+3 meetings.45‖ For the realists, on

the other hand, this institutional arrangement makes little sense and represents mere ―paper

words‖. They argue that China, for instance, has grown into a major economic competitor for

ASEAN‘s less industrialized economies. ―The rise of China after 1998, and its attraction by

foreign investors, actually affected growth negatively in Southeast Asia, whose low-technology

manufacturing industries also depend upon foreign direct investment.46‖ Arguably though, the

ASEAN approach to China has rather been a mix of both, with the AEC expressly aimed at

resisting the competitive pressure from China, while at the same time a landmark ASEAN-

China free trade agreement entered into force in 2010. Whereas the incoherence of this

strategy can reasonably raise questions about the viability of South-East Asian integration

ambitions, it shows, if anything, that the preferences of South-East Asian leaders are not as

clear-cut as realists assume.

The concept of ―Community‖ and its ―three pillars‖ basis raises serious questions for European

observers. While the terms seem directly borrowed from the vocabulary developed by the EU,

the content they have been given and the instruments put into place to achieve their goals are

radically different from those adopted in Europe. The same point can be made concerning the

AEC objectives to create a ―common market‖ and a ―common production base‖. The orthodoxy

pertaining to economic integration has been traditionally developed from the European model

of institutional regionalism and puts forward an incremental integration process based on a

progressive treaty revision through four stages, each of which adds a new layer to the

preceding one. The first ‗level‘ of economic integration is a ‗Free Trade Area‖ (FTA), which

implies the removal of all tariffs on trade among the members. The second level is a customs

union, which adds a common external tariff to the FTA. The third level is a ―common market‖,

where barriers to the free movement of capital and labour are removed, in addition to the free

movement of goods and services. In Europe, this is known as the ―EU Four Freedoms concept‖.

44 Yu, Hyun-Seok , ―Explaining the emergence of new East Asian Regionalism: Beyond Power and Interest-Based

Approaches‖, Asian Perspectives, Vol 27, n°1, 2003, pp 261-288 45 Takashi Terada, Op. Cit. 46 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Michael L.R, Op. Cit., ―Making Process, not Progress – ASEAN and the Evolving East

Asian Regional Order”

Coraline Goron


The fourth and last level is an economic union, which involves the unification of economic

institutions, a single currency and the coordination of economic policies47.

In this iterative process, a customs union is a necessary step on the way towards the creation

of a ―common market‖. However, in ASEAN, the ―free flow of goods simply implies removal of

tariffs and non-tariff barriers‖, and an attempt to ―minimize adverse effects of border and

behind border measures through trade facilitation, custom integration, the ASEAN single

window, harmonization of standards, etc48‖. In short, it is more an ―AFTA+‖ project than the

creation of an EU-like internal market.

Parallel to this, the institutions49 proposed by ASEAN to achieve the ASEAN Economic

Community by 2015 diverge strikingly from those chosen by European leaders back in the

1950s. On the contrary, as with the European Commission in the area of a common market,

the ASEAN Secretariat has no decision-making power at all. Hence, decision-making remains,

even after the adoption of the ASEAN Charter, intergovernmental and consensual. Moreover,

financial and monetary integration is only embryonic, with only two initiatives, the Chiang Mai

initiative in 2000, modified at least twice—the most recent being in 2009—and the Asian Bond

Market Initiative since 2003. Furthermore, although ―Asian‖, it is substantially ―external‖ to

ASEAN, since it has developed from a Japanese initiative in the framework of ASEAN+3 and

since Japan and China contribute over two-thirds of the capital in the fund.

ASEAN also rejected the option of establishing an ―ASEAN Court of Justice‖, which would have

the authority to enforce regional commitments upon its member states. For European jurists,

who see the European Court of Justice as a masterpiece in the successful construction of the

common market, this absence means the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Thus, many

European observers tend to agree with the realist analysts who claim that ASEAN ideas are

bound to remain merely ―paper words‖.

Finally, European scholars have pointed to the fact that the ASEAN solidarity mechanisms,

which would be required to realize a ―community‖, were no match for those put into place in

the European context. The European Union supported its integration project with four types of

‗structural funds‘, among which the ‗regional development fund‘ is the best known. Moreover,

the European Investment Bank played an active role in financing development projects50,

notably in the new members. In ASEAN, on the contrary, arguably until the ―Master Plan on

Connectivity‖, ―the major instrument for convergence and ―sub-regional‖ development has

been sub-regional cooperation51‖, while being financed mostly through external sources,

notably the Asian Development Bank. This adds to the fact that, as opposed to the EU, some

among the ‗least developed countries‘, like Cambodia, Laos and Burma-Myanmar, have been

integrated into ASEAN without any pre-accession economic convergence criteria being imposed

upon them. While this mirrors ASEAN‘s ‗inclusive‘ philosophy and its overall development

47 Balassa, Bela, The Theory of Economic Integration, 1961, Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. Irvin Inc, 1961, 308

pages. 48 Atje, Raymond, Kartika, Prativi, Op. Cit. 49 ―Institution‖ here refer to ―persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural

roles, constrain activity and shape expectations‖, as defined by Robert Keohane in Keohane, Robert International

Institutions and State Power: Essay in International Relations Theory, Mountain, US, Boulder (Col) Westview Press,

1989, 270 pages 50 Cuyvers, Ludo, ―Contrasting the European Union and ASEAN integration and solidarity‖, Paper presented at Fourth

EU-ASEAN Think Tank Dialogue, EU and ASEAN – Integration and Solidarity, European Parliament, Brussels, 25-26

November 2002 51 Cuyvers, Ludo, Op. Cit



project, it also explains the wide development gap between its members and the tremendous

challenge ASEAN faces to bridge it.

Since the Asian crisis, while the ―ASEAN way‖ concept has remained the same in essence, it

has certainly adopted a new stance with regard to institutions. In particular, economic

integration seems to have shifted from being merely seen as ‗market-led‘ to one that needs to

accept more ‗institution-led‘ integration. The AEC, but also the ASEAN+3 initiatives, are

illustrative of the new ―faith‖ in regional institutions. This is particularly interesting from a

European point of view, at a time when the merits of institutionalism are strongly questioned

in the EU52. How far this new rhetoric has been matched by the actual economic policies of

ASEAN individual member states clearly remains the main bone of contention that divides

academia. Hence, the bottom line to any initiative remains the refusal of any perceived loss of

sovereignty. In this regard, ASEAN has developed a series of new concepts, which remain in

line with the ―ASEAN way‖ core principles, while going further than purely informal and

―laissez-faire‖ policies. In this context the ideas of ―ASEAN connectivity‖, ―ASEAN scorecard‖

and ―ASEAN-X‖ have been promulgated.

We will now turn to these new concepts, presenting them within this theoretical framework and

assessing their potential effectiveness in helping ASEAN members to realize their aspirations.

New concepts striving to maintain the momentum of economic integration-

added value and shortcomings

The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint was adopted in 2007, in order both to establish a

time frame and to establish specific deadlines to reach the objective of creating the AEC by

2015. The Blueprint is a legally binding document, which commits the member states to

making ASEAN ―a single market and production base‖, ―a highly competitive economic region‖,

―a region of equitable development‖ and ―a region that is fully integrated into the global

economy53‖. This last characteristic is the manifestation of the ASEAN member states‘ acute

consciousness of their dependence on exports for domestic growth. To achieve these goals, the

Blueprint lists a number of ―actions‖ to be implemented within specific timeframes, with a

differentiation between the original ASEAN-6 members and the less-developed economies of

Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV). The Blueprint identifies a certain number of

material challenges: these mainly concern non-tariff barriers to intra-ASEAN trade, the

involvement of ASEAN businesses in regional economic integration, national investment

regimes, competition policy (or the lack of it), infrastructure development and international

production networks. Another identified methodological challenge pertains to the monitoring of

the implementation of the blueprint by the member states. Finally, two major challenges to

ASEAN integration, which at the same time potentially constitute the region‘s principal assets,

52 Higgott, Richard, Op. Cit. In his article, Higgott talks about the questioning of institutionalism in the EU in the

aftermath of the rejection of the European Constitution. However, his remark remains pertinent even after the

adoption and entry into force of the Lisbon treaty. Indeed, in spite of renewed institutional creativity, the traditional

faith of Europeans in institution‘s capacity to enhance the integration process has waned. 53 ASEAN Economic Blueprint, paragraph 8, p6

Coraline Goron


concern both its internal economic diversity and the geostrategic position of ASEAN, anchored

within a wider, economically booming, Asian region.

Each of the concepts we will now turn to have been developed to address these challenges in a

specific, ―ASEAN‖ way. They put forward a new form of limited regional institutionalisation,

consistent with ASEAN core principles, while at the same time putting the emphasis on

regional institutions as the engine for regional economic development. Whereas, four years

ahead of the AEC 2015 deadline, it is still premature to formulate a meaningful appraisal of

their effectiveness, it appears nonetheless possible to draw some conclusions as to the

renewed impetus for the regional integration they are designed to provide.

Presenting the new instruments aimed at implementing the economic blueprint: ASEAN

‘connectivity’ and the ‘scorecard’ mechanism

The ASEAN Vision 2020, the ASEAN Community, the ASEAN Charter and the AEC Blueprint are

four documents that seem to be in contradiction with the pragmatism and aversion for any

pre-determined architecture implicit in the ―ASEAN way‖. Potentially, they establish a new

modus operandi for regional integration, one that seems more ‗state-led‘ and directed than

previously. The concepts of Connectivity, Scorecard and ASEAN-X, although different in nature,

are all instruments designed to operationalise these objectives. They also illustrate ASEAN‘s

own approach to institutionalisation.

Connectivity – a bold concept

The concept of ―Connectivity‖ was first discussed by the ASEAN leaders at the 15th ASEAN

Summit in Cha-am Hua Hin, in Thailand, on 24 October 2009. The idea was proposed by the

Thai Prime Minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kasit Piromya, and

seems to have been inspired by a globalist vision of an ―interconnected world‖. The basic idea

is to turn both the diversity in internal economic development and the strategic central position

of ASEAN in East Asia into assets, through a bold project of ―connecting‖ all segments and all

the communities of ASEAN. The deepening and widening of connectivity in the region would

reinforce ASEAN‘s position as the hub of the East Asian region, which could further be

strengthened through realizing the potentials of a broader connectivity in the longer term with

its partners in the wider region. In this regard, the Leaders were of the view that this concept

of ASEAN connectivity would complement and support integration within ASEAN and within the

broader regional framework in East Asia54.

In more specific terms, ―connectivity‖ encompasses “physical connectivity‖, pertaining to

infrastructure building; ―institutional connectivity”, targeting trade liberalization and facilitation

measures; and finally “people-to-people connectivity”, enhancing shared education, culture

and tourism55. The concept of ‗Connectivity‘ therefore involves pursuing several of the goals at

the core of ASEAN‘s regional project: bridging its internal development gap, fostering the

emerging economic complementarities across the region and unlocking some of the biggest

―roadblocks‖ to foreign investment, namely the lack of regional infrastructure, legal

uncertainty and the related increase in logistical costs56. Indeed, the lack of adequate cross-

border infrastructure has been identified by the Asian Development Bank as a major

54 ASEAN Leaders‘ Statement on ASEAN Connectivity, Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand, 24 October 2009, paragraph 6, 55 Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, executive summary, (i) 56 Introduction, ISEAS, ASEAN Studies center, ―ASEAN Community, unlocking the roadblocks Report N°1”, Singapore,

2008



impediment to the region‘s economic growth and integration. In short, the concept of

―connectivity‖ is also intended as a strategic response to stagnant intra-ASEAN trade and a

palliative to the relative loss of competitiveness in comparison to the booming Asian powers

(China and India) in the wake of the global financial crisis.

The concept of ―connectivity‖ encompasses cross-border infrastructures in both ―hard‖ forms,

such as roads, power grids, pipelines, etc., and ―soft‖ forms like cross-border regulation,

harmonization and mutual recognition. While it is not a trade liberalization measure per se but

rather a means that targets the environment surrounding and supporting trade, this aspect is

often overlooked by economists, who address the issue of economic integration only from the

perspective of trade intensity. Yet, several studies from the World Bank and the Asian

Development Bank have demonstrated the link between spending on infrastructures and long-

term economic growth57. According to Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, considering the large

imbalance in levels of basic infrastructure across ASEAN member countries—with only 13% of

the population of Myanmar having access to electricity compared to 64.5% in Indonesia—the

potential benefits from large-scale building of regional infrastructure are considerable 58.

Hence, infrastructure building has also been a key to the European integration project, while

more recently China has vaunted its mammoth infrastructure projects as a way of reducing the

development gap between the developed east coast and the less-developed inland. The

decision of the ASEAN countries to ―regionalise‖ the issue is consistent with the objective of

pursuing multilateral development projects that can benefit all the countries in the region and

produce a sense of ―shared identity‖. Once again, it appears from the political discourses that

the European Union‘s achievements in this respect have inspired the vision of a ―connected‖

and ―borderless‖59 area. However, as distinct from the EU, ASEAN ‗connectivity‘ has at its core

integrating the neighbouring regional powers as well. Indeed, considering the trade patterns in

East Asia, ‗connecting‘ ASEAN with the rest of Asia seems as crucial as ―connecting‖ ASEAN

countries among themselves. Moreover, Japan, South Korea and more recently China, as

major economic actors in South-East Asian production circuits, have heavily invested in

physical infrastructure projects. Together with international institutions, such as the World

Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the private sector, these regional partners are

targeted as major sources of funding for ASEAN infrastructure development, which, according

to the ADB, require some US$ 600 billion in investment for the period 2006-201560.

―Institutional infrastructure‖ covers essentially the regulatory measures necessary to ensure

the ―free flow‖ of goods, services, investment and ―skilled labour‖, which is the cornerstone of

the AEC. These measures concern the harmonization of customs procedures (the ASEAN single

window) and the integration of goods transit routes with the objective of eventually agreeing

on establishing an ―ASEAN single Shipping Market‖. Furthermore, they involve updating and

implementing ASEAN database on non-tariff barriers to trade and removing technical barriers

to trade through harmonizing standards, technical requirements, mutual recognition

agreements, etc.

57 World Bank, ―Infrastructure for Development‖, World Development Report 1994, New York, Oxford University Press,

1994; Bramait, Seethepalli, K. M, Veredas, D, ―How relevant is infrastructure to growth in East Asia?‖, Policy Research

Working Paper 4597, World Bank, Washington DC, 2008 58 Bhattacharyay, Biswa Nath, ―Infrastructure for ASEAN Connectivity and Integration‖, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol

27, No 2, 2010, pp 200-220 59 Pibulsonggram, Pradab, Thai Representative to the High Level Task Force on ASEAN Connectivity, introductory

remarks, International Seminar on ASEAN Connectivity, Bangkok, Thailand, 10 September 2010 60 Pibulsonggram, Pradab, Op. Cit.

Coraline Goron


Following the Hua Hin Summit in 2009, a High Level Task Force (HLTF) was established to

draft a ―Master Plan‖, in order to give flesh to the concept and chart its implementation. The

HLTF was composed not only of senior officials from the member states but also of private

sector representatives and a former ASEAN Secretary-General. The ―Master Plan on

Connectivity‖ was adopted at the 17th ASEAN Summit in Hanoi, on 28 October 2010, and

presented as a stepping-stone in the project of building the AEC and, beyond that, the ASEAN

Community.

In contrast to former ASEAN political documents, the Master Plan is a very detailed 85-page

study that not only gives an exhaustive list of all the ongoing regional and sub-regional

projects and agreements but also clearly highlights the current shortcomings and failures.

Hence, the document recognises that most of these pertain to the lack of ratification and

delayed implementation in the individual member states. It then details a number of ―key

strategies‖ to remedy the situation, which are to be implemented within specific time frames.

For instance, addressing the problem of underperforming customs services, the Master Plan

lists a series of ―key actions‖:

Accelerate the full implementation of the National Single Windows (NSWs) for

ASEAN-6 as soon as possible, noting that the deadline for the establishment of

NSWs in ASEAN-6 was in 2008, and for CLMV in 2012.

Activate and operate the ASEAN Single Window in selected ports as early as

possible for Member States who are ready to implement it, and for all ASEAN

Member States, by 2015.

Simplify customs procedures, formalities and practices of all Member States with

priority on those serving to a single market and single production base (such as

design and operation of outward processing, inward processing, temporary

admission) by 2013 with the target of reducing processing costs by 20 percent by

2013 and by 50 percent by 2015.

Develop a comprehensive and compatible regulatory framework on customs

procedures and border management operations by 2014.

Promote partnership and active engagement of businesses and industries into the

process of policy making in fostering its speedy and smooth implementation.

Develop the human resources necessary to complement the above actions by

201361.

Be that as it may, it should be noted that most of the projects identified in the ‗Master Plan‘

were already ongoing, either at a regional or at a sub-regional level. In the area of land

transportation for instance, the Singapore Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) project already existed,

even though, due to the lack of funding, some important sections were missing. Where the

Master Plan clearly innovates is in the fact that it brings all the sub-regional projects and

initiatives under the single regional umbrella provided by ASEAN. It also addresses rather

frankly the thorny issues of financing and implementation, clearly referring to regional

institutions as preferred solutions.

On the implementation side, the Master Plan saw the appointment of an ‗ASEAN Connectivity

Coordinating Committee‘ and ‗national coordinators‘ supported by the ASEAN Secretariat, to

―coordinate and oversee the implementation of the Master Plan‖ and regularly report to ASEAN

leaders on the progress made in coordination with other ASEAN bodies. Moreover, many

61 Master Plan on Connectivity, Chap 3, paragraph 29, p 53



measures are subject to the ―AEC scorecard mechanism‖ for peer review, in particular with

regard to the ratification of regional agreements.

Implementation Arrangements for the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity:

Note: Coordinating

Reporting

Source: Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, Figure 5.1, p 69

Regarding the funding, the ‗Master Plan‘ not only refers to the traditional external sources

(ADB, WB and bilateral assistance programmes with developed countries, such as the ASEAN

Economic Integration Support Programme with the EU), but also advances the idea of

establishing an ASEAN Infrastructure Fund, ―in an effort to clearly signal ASEAN‘s self reliance

and centrality as part and parcel of an ASEAN connectivity package62‖. It also refers to the

financial resources that could be ―generated by the deepening of regional and local financial

and capital markets‖ and their eventual integration at regional level, under the ASEAN Capital

Market Forum and the setting up, by 2011, under the ASEAN+3 Asian Bonds Market Initiative,

of a $700 million trust fund (CGIF). This initiative, which is aimed more generally at ―reducing

the currency and maturity mismatches and making the regional financial system more resilient

to volatile capital flows and external shocks‖, is also intended, for the purpose of ‗connectivity‘,

to encourage private investment in ―bankable‖ ASEAN infrastructure projects.

From these considerations, it appears that the idea of ―connectivity‖ fits perfectly into the

discourse of ASEAN leaders on regional integration. ―ASEAN Connectivity can be achieved by

enhancing physical connectivity and institutional connectivity thereby reducing the costs of

investment and international trade in goods and services, including services link costs and

network set-up costs. Enhanced physical and institutional connectivity can contribute to

narrowing development gaps by expanding the frontiers of production/distribution networks

62 Master Plan on Connectivity, Chap 4, paragraph 13, p 63

ASEAN Summit

ASEAN Coordinating

Council/ASEAN Community Councils

ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee

(Comprising the Permanent Representatives to ASEAN or

any other special representatives appointed by respective ASEAN Member

States)

ASEAN Secretariat

(Dedicated unit at the ASEAN Secretariat to

be established)

ASEAN Sectoral Bodies

Sub-regional Arrangements related

to ASEAN Connectivity

National Coordinators for Implementation

Coraline Goron


and augmenting people-to-people connectivity, which will further nurture a sense of

community in ASEAN.63‖

The discourse on connectivity clearly contributes to creating a sentiment of togetherness and a

new sense of solidarity with the less developed parts of ASEAN. This document details a series

of political commitments to harmonize norms and procedures across the region, distinguishes

regional institutions as a solution and seems to show ASEAN‘s desire to involve the civil and

business communities in a so far mainly ‗elite-oriented‘ rhetoric of regional integration. In this

regard, the Master Plan seems to corroborate a constructivist paradigm according to which ―a

felt need for interdependence and a common destiny (or fate) can over time transcend

egotistical state identities and forge a group identity that will, in turn, fashion new norms that

establish an alternative pattern of interests that has the potential to displace older, more

restrictive identities64‖. Whether it is successful in doing so is, of course, questionable, and one

of the generally acknowledged weaknesses of constructivist theories is the difficulty of testing

their hypothesis against hard data. In this regard, it needs to be underlined that, while the

ambitions displayed in the Master Plan are particularly bold, the implementation remains

entirely in the hands of national actors, and the ASEAN Secretariat is yet to be given the

appropriate means to perform its monitoring tasks. These elements would certainly lead to a

realist criticism that the Master Plan is, once again, a political smokescreen, one designed to

delude. For example, a ‗red line‘ appears clearly in the documents, beyond which power

transfer to regional institutions and the pooling of sovereignty becomes too demanding for

ASEAN political leaders. Yet, whereas benchmarking with the EU integration model is often

rejected on these aspects, it still begs the question of the feasibility of ASEAN‘s stated

ambitions with the extremely limited implementation tools at its disposal. In order to address

the implementation problem, the latest concept proposed by ASEAN is the ―scorecard‖

mechanism, which, while going beyond mere ―summit politics‖, still strictly respects the ―soft ―

consensual forms of implementation mechanism acceptable to ASEAN leaders.

The Scorecard – ASEAN’s Open Method of Coordination?

The concept of a ―scorecard‖ was developed by the ASEAN Secretariat following the adoption

of the AEC blueprint, as a way to carry out its duty to report to ASEAN economic ministers

about implementation progress towards the 2015 deadline. The first AEC ‗scorecard‘ was

produced by the ASEAN Secretariat in December 2009 and made available to the public in

March 2010.

A ‗scorecard‘, in its original meaning, is a term used in some sports -golf and cricket in

particular- to designate a printed card or screen on which the names of the players, their

scores and other important statistics of the match are recorded. Applied to business, the

‗balanced scorecard‘ refers to a strategic planning and management system originated by

Robert Kaplan and David Norton at the Harvard Business School, and is a system that ―is used

extensively in business and industry, government, and non-profit organizations worldwide to

align business activities to the vision and strategy of the organization, improve internal and

external communications, and monitor organization performance against strategic goals65‖.

The basic idea borrowed by the ASEAN Secretariat is to provide a method of monitoring the

implementation of agreements by the member countries, which makes use of public reporting

63 Master Plan on Connectivity, Introduction, paragraph 11, p 3 64 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, Loc. Cit, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, Regional Delusion ,

chapter 5, in which the authors present Wendt‘s constructivist theory before refuting it. 65 Definition displayed on the website of the ―Balanced Scorecard Institute‖, which claims to be a Strategic

Management Group company. http://www.balancedscorecard.org/Home/tabid/36/Default.aspx



and benchmarking, while preserving the sovereignty of the member countries. As ASEAN

Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan said:

“This is not just to blame one against the other; this is just to be frank and

candid among family, who is falling behind on what promise.66”

This mechanism resembles the European ―Open Method of Coordination‖ (OMC) introduced in

the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam in the field of employment and social policies. Indeed, the OMC

is a method developed to encourage policy convergence among EU Member States through the

production of benchmarks and indicators of best practices, upon which the results reported by

the Member States are measured with regard to the convergence objectives they had

previously set to attain.

The OMC and the Scorecard have several similarities both in method and goals but, first and

foremost, in the reasons for their adoption. Indeed, in both cases, the main reason was the

refusal by the Member States to transfer areas of competence to the supranational level. In

the EU, the OMC has often been criticised as an important step backwards from the traditional

―Community Method‖ (involving some transfer of competences to the EU level and the top-

down diffusion of norms through the integrated European judicial system) and the results are

often seen as far from optimal. Whereas, in ASEAN, the ‗Scorecard‘ fills the vacuum on

monitoring that pre-existed, objectively, the ‗Scorecard‘ appears to be a compromise between,

on the one hand, the refusal to put into place an EU-like system of integrated judicial

enforcement and, on the other hand, the recognition that mere declaratory policy was

insufficient to move forward the agenda of economic integration. It was further linked to an

assessment that only a ―common‖ and politically ―neutral‖ institution, like the ASEAN

Secretariat, could legitimately produce such a proposal and document. The merits and

efficiency of these kinds of ―soft law‖ enforcement mechanisms are hotly debated in academia,

both among European studies specialists and among international law scholars. For South-East

Asia, it suffices to mention that, considering the broad divergence of economic interest

between ASEAN countries and the acknowledged powerful domestic economic interest that

keeps putting pressure on their government to protect them from intra-regional competition,

the challenge seems enormous compared to this rather ―weak‖ implementation tool. It is, of

course, too early to judge the long-term results of this method on effective regional economic

integration. The first Scorecard found that, as of December 2009, 91 out of 124 AEC legal

instruments had been ratified and entered into force in all ASEAM member countries,

representing 73.6% of the total. However, these figures in themselves do not say anything

about post-ratification compliance. As opposed to the EU integrated judicial order, where

individuals can invoke EU Law against contradictory national laws before national courts,

according to the doctrine of the supremacy of EU law and direct effect67, ASEAN citizens and

private interests have no means to ―force‖ their country to respect its regional engagements.

The only mechanism put into place so far is the legally non-binding ASEAN ―Consultation to

Solve Trade and Investment Issues‖, an internet based instrument, which is adapted from the

66 Anthuvan, Augustine, ―Scorecard evaluates ASEAN progress‖, Asia Pacific News online, 10 April 2010 ASEAN

Secretary-General Dr Surin Pitsuwan reportedly made this statement answering to a question from Mr Ong Keng Yong

and Mr Rodolfo Severino, both former ASEAN secretary-generals, on how leaders of the 10-member grouping would

ensure compliance with economic commitments, at a ‗live‘ video conference organized with Academia, civil society

organisations, media and other stake holders from seven ASEAN cities at the close of the 16th ASEAN Summit, in

Hanoi, Vietnam, on 9 April 2010 67 Theses doctrine were developed by the European Court of Justice from the landmark cases Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR

585 (6/64) (for the supremacy of EU law on national law) and Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 (26/62)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Costa_v_ENEL

Coraline Goron


EU SOLVIT mechanism68. Yet, a study by the Philippines Institute for Development Studies

showed that ―there exists a large gap between policy and practice; coordination among

government agencies has remained ineffective; governance has been weak; poor

infrastructure continues to hamper efficient business operations; and many processes, such as

registration and applications for permits and licenses, have remained complex, problematic,

and costly.69‖

Other criticisms of the system put in place have been made already, notably concerning the

lack of transparency in the preparation of the ‗Scorecard‘ and the control that ASEAN political

leaders maintain over its content and publication70. In this regard, it should be kept in mind

that the ‗Scorecard‘ is primarily a reporting mechanism for the benefit of individual ASEAN

member governments, one that is to be presented to them at summit meetings before they

decide whether to disclose it to the public. Indeed, the published version of the first scorecard

appears to be written in very general terms, not mentioning any country in particular. In this

context, suspicions have been expressed that the ‗Scorecard‘ can be manipulated to brush up

complacent positive achievements, while hiding less glorious records71. In any case, the lack of

transparency of the ‗Scorecard‘ undermines the potential for public pressure, upon which the

efficiency of all peer review mechanisms is based.

These caveats aside, the ‗Scorecard‘ review mechanism still represents a significant step away

from previous conventional behaviour in ASEAN and a significant adaptation of the ―ASEAN

way‖. Moreover, it is, arguably, only the first concrete move towards the strengthening of

centralised compliance mechanisms. The already-existing dispute settlement mechanism,

stemming from the 2004 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM),

has never been used for adjudicatory proceedings, most likely because its functioning depends

on the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (―SEOM‖), a political body working through consensus

-so involving the parties to the dispute- and ―devoid of any notion of adversarial approach to

dispute resolution among members72‖. However, the EDSM has now been allocated earmarked

funding and ―ASEAN is considering improvements to the current arrangements and

mechanisms for dispute settlement in the region to ensure that the ASEAN DSM meets the

purposes it is designed to serve.‖ Arguably, APEC ―concerted unilateralism‖, even if supported

by reports, voluntarily made by individual governments, of progress towards the 1994 Bogor

Goals, lags now a step behind ASEAN in terms of its implementation mechanisms. According to

the ASEAN Secretary-General for the ASEAN Economic Community, this shows the move from

a ―process-based regionalism‖, defined as ―the series of meetings, dialogues, consultations and

engagements‖, towards a ―result-based regionalism‖, ―supported by concrete results and

outcomes based on a structured and rules-based regime73‖. In this regard, the traditional

assimilation between the ―ASEAN Way‖ and the ―Asia-Pacific way‖ seems less relevant than

previously.

68 ―SOLVIT is an on-line problem solving network in which EU Member States work together to solve without legal

proceedings problems caused by the misapplication of Internal Market law by public authorities. There is a SOLVIT

centre in every European Union Member State which can help with handling complaints from both citizens and

businesses. They are part of the national administration and are committed to providing real solutions to problems

within ten weeks. SOLVIT has been working since July 2002.‖ See http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/about/index_en.htm 69 Aldaba, Rafaelita M. & al, ―ERIA Study to Further Improve the ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard: the

Philippines‖, Discussion Paper Series N° 2010-24, Philippines Institute for Development Studies, Makati City, October

2010, 208 pages 70 Basu Das, Sanchita, ―Building the ASEAN Economic Community‖, Business Times, Singapore, 25 January 2011 71 Atje, Raymond, Kartika, Prativi, Loc. Cit 72 Atje, Raymond, Kartika, Prativi, Loc. Cit 73 Pushpanathan, Sundram, ―No place for passive regionalism in ASEAN‖, The Jakarta Post (online), 7 April 2010 ; Mr

Pushpanathan is secretary-general for ASEAN Economic Community.



It will be noted that as distinct from to the concept of ‗connectivity‘, the ‗Scorecard‘

mechanism is exclusively targeted at ASEAN countries and no mention has been made of

expanding it to the wider East Asia. This pertains to the fact that the ‗Scorecard‘ mostly relates

to the obligations subscribed by ASEAN member countries in the framework of the ASEAN Free

Trade Area (AFTA), as part of the AEC. As long as debates about an ―East Asian Free Trade

Area‖ belong to the realm of academic speculations, ASEAN innovations in terms of

implementation mechanisms can only be worked out within its own borders. This being said,

ASEAN+1 FTAs (with China, Japan, Republic of Korea, India, etc) are also replete with dispute

settlement mechanisms.

Maintaining the process and retaining centrality - political objectives superseding economic

realities

The two concepts presented above are salient because they reinforce the perception that

ASEAN members have a strong political willingness to respect their regional commitments.

They are symbolic of a renewed language supportive of a larger movement towards

accelerating (or deepening in Eurospeak) the ―process‖ of ASEAN integration through common

institutions.

However, the overriding question about their capacity to bring about an ASEAN Economic

Community by 2015 remains unanswered. Admittedly, beyond these instruments‘ own limits,

two major trends challenge this goal. The first of these trends, which has raised considerable

wonders in the literature, pertains to the proliferation of cross-cutting Free Trade Agreements

involving ASEAN member states and creating preferential trade corridors with third countries

both in East Asia and beyond. This pattern of practical, perhaps ―short-termist‖ economic

integration seems to contradict ASEAN‘s push for a multilaterally concerted and reasoned

approach to economic integration. The second trend relates to the increasing superposition of

layers of cooperation in East Asia to which ASEAN is a party.

FTAs versus Community or FTA + Community?

As of 31 July 2010, some 474 Regional Trade Agreements (RTA), counting goods and services

notifications separately, have been notified to the GATT/WTO, among which 283 agreements

were in force at that time74. By May 2010, East Asia has emerged at the forefront of global FTA

activity, with 45 FTAs in effect and another 84 in various stages of preparation75. This

explosion is motivated, according to most specialists, by the belief that FTAs can support the

growth of trade and investment. It is seemingly a response to stalled multilateral liberalization

in the WTO Doha Round of negotiations. Interestingly, the biggest promoters of FTAs have

been the regions‘ largest economies, Japan, South Korea and, above all, China. Yet, some see

China‘s FTA policy towards South-East Asia as motivated principally by foreign policy priorities

and notably a competition for leadership with Japan in the region76. In South-East Asia,

Singapore has been by far the most active economy in terms of the number of FTAs. As a

founder of AFTA, the main argument of Singapore to justify its ―aggressive‖ bilateral policy is

74 WTO Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm, consulted

on 16 February 2011. 75 Kawai, Masahiro, Wignaraja, Ganeshan, ―Free Trade Agreements in East Asia: A Way toward Trade Liberalization?‖,

ADB Brief N°1, June 2010; Comparative and cumulative data on Asia FTAs up to January 2011 is available on the

website of the Asian Development Bank at http://aric.adb.org/ftatrends.php, consulted on 16 February 2011 76 Sally, Razeen, ―FTAs and the Prospect for Regional Integration in Asia‖, ECIPE Working Paper N° 01/2006, 2006

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm

http://aric.adb.org/ftatrends.php

Coraline Goron


to continue the momentum of liberalization by overcoming the ‗convoy‘ problem, in which the

pace of trade integration is held back by the ‗least willing‘ members, and initiating a ‗domino

effect‘ that would eventually result in pan-regional, and then global, liberalization77.

However, this vision of a web of FTAs as a ―benign ―competitive-liberalization‖ process, a

building block of multilateral liberalization78‖ has been seriously questioned. It is beyond the

scope of this paper to cover this discussion in detail. It should simply be noted that while the

prospects for an East Asian FTA are still limited, what has come to be described as ―the

spaghetti bowl‖ or ―noodle bowl‖ of FTAs in East Asia has raised an array of criticisms79. In

October 2010, the ADB summarized the challenges associated with Asian FTAs80. It stated that

while Asian firms are poor users of FTA preferences, Japanese and Chinese firms are largely

dominating the process. Moreover, the multiplicity of overlapping rules of origins and the

divergence in terms of the goods covered by the trade agreements (notably agricultural

products), as well as their level (many of Singapore‘s FTAs are WTO-plus, including non-trade

related measures) are cited as issues of concern.

Besides these general worries, the relationship between these FTAs and the regionalism

advocated by ASEAN is controversial. Notably, bilateral FTAs carry the risk of marginalizing

ASEAN‘s poorer member states81, which seems to run counter to ASEAN‘s ―people oriented‖

development project to integrate all SEA countries into a comprehensive framework of regional

cooperation. However, the dynamic between ASEAN and wider regional FTAs can also be seen

in a positive light. Hence, the CLMV countries and Indonesia have relied on ASEAN, as a block,

to enter into FTAs with the region‘s larger economies. Most remarkably, the ASEAN-China FTA,

negotiated in 2002 and fully in force since January 2010 with ASEAN-5 original members +

Brunei (CLMV in 2015) and covering ―substantially all trade‖, initiated a wave of FTA

negotiations between ASEAN and Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, India and even

the US and the EU (negotiations started in 2007 but suspended in 2009). However, this trend

has not prevented bilateral FTAs from the most advanced ASEAN member states to flourish at

the same time.

The result of this, either negative or positive in terms of economic growth, challenges the

conventional understanding of ―economic community‖, which supposedly implies an inward

looking economic integration, whereby the member countries create a ―block‖ for the purpose

of their economic relations with the outside world. Whereas the idea of ―open regionalism‖ that

developed within the framework of APEC tries to come to terms with this contradiction,

arguably ASEAN‘s latest institutionalization struggles to cope with the regional economic

reality. From an historical point of view, the ASEAN economic community building, in a post-

WTO era, faces tremendously more challenges than that of the European countries in the

1950s.

The attempt by ASEAN to match economic trends with institutions is reflected in the

multiplication of East-Asian frameworks of cooperation since the Asian crisis.

77 Mahani, Zainal-Abidin, ―ASEAN Integration : At risk of Going in Different Directions‖, The World Economy, Vol 25, n°

9, September 2002, pp 1263-1277 78 Sally, Razeen, Loc. cit 79 Bhagwati, Jagdish, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade, New Delhi,

Oxford University Press, 2008, 139 pages 80 Kawai, Masahiro,Wignaraja, Ganeshan, ―Asian FTAs: Trends, Prospects, and Challenges‖, ADB Economics Working

Paper N° 226, October 2010 81 Engammare, Valérie, Lehmann, Jean-Pierre, Loc. Cit.



Source: Ernest Z. Bower, “A New Paradigm for APEC?1 http://csis.org/publication/new-paradigm-apec

Deeper regional institutionalisation or inefficient superposition?

Within the economic domain alone, ASEAN is involved in ASEAN+3, APEC (at least some

members) and more recently the East Asian Summit (EAS), while, bilaterally, it is also

engaged in structured relationships, for instance with the EU, under the auspices of the Asia

Europe Meeting (ASEM). None of these settings, however, focuses solely on trade and all deal

with several fields of cooperation.

Asia regional architecture:

This institutional effervescence makes the essence of Asian regionalism extremely difficult to

grasp and prompts many questions. A dynamics of competition-collaboration seems to

underline ASEAN initiatives towards its neighbours, in particular China and India. For instance,

while the aforementioned ASEAN-China FTA and the ASEAN+3 initiatives of financial solidarity

tend to push for a far-reaching ―North-South‖ Asian integration, one of the stated reason for

the AEC is precisely to resist competition from China and India82. Moreover, while some

authors point to the disappearance of APEC in favour of the East Asian Summit since 2005 and

the related ―asianisation‖ of Asian regionalism83, the recent move to invite the US and Russia

to join the EAS makes it become a trans-pacific structure again. This recent development

raises again the difficulty of defining the relevant ―borders‖ of East Asian regionalism. Hence,

the viability of any project of East Asian regionalism is controversial. Arguably, this is where

82 Hew, Denis, ―Towards and ASEAN Economic Community by 2015‖, in ASEAN Community, unlocking the roadblocks,

ISEAS, ASEAN Studies center, Report N°1,2008 83 Bower, Ernest Z, ―A New Paradigm for APEC‖, Southeast from the Corner of 18th & K streets, CSIS, Southeast Asia

Program, Vol 1, n° 24, August 2010; Yu, Hyun-Seok, Loc. Cit.

http://csis.org/expert/ernest-bower

Coraline Goron


the divergence between realists and constructivists crystallizes. The latter claim that a

progressive construction of an Asian ―identity‖ is occurring, one they see reflected in the

integration and institutionalisation of East Asia. The former, on the contrary, denounce a

delusion, by underlining all the aforementioned contradictions. In any case, the regional

architecture in East Asia appears to be largely fragmented and resembles more a

superimposition of ―circles‖ of integration, with overlapping membership but different functions

and logical underpinnings. Notably, the redundancy between the different layers risks

jeopardising the global economy of the regional governance. More specifically, the

compatibilities between the ―ASEAN Economic Community‖ and the ―ASEAN+3‖ framework of

cooperation are questionable. A striking example of this is the dichotomy between the

frameworks of economic integration (AEC single market) and those for financial integration

(ASEAN+3 Chiang Mai Initiative). This ―two-level‖ integration model is markedly different from

the path followed by the European Union, where financial and monetary integration was

pursued, in order to deepen the integration of the single market proclaimed by the Single

European Act (despite acknowledged shortcomings), within the same geographical borders.

While this might be explained by the fact that ASEAN economies alone, unlike European

countries, do not possess enough capital to sustain such a financial scheme, it is a real

challenge for their leaderships to ensure the coherence of the choices made. In turn, these

processes run the risk of paralyzing initiatives because of contradictory leaderships in the

superimposed institutional frameworks. One element, however, stands out in the most recent

developments: the increasing centrality of ASEAN to all the different circles of cooperation in

East Asia.

ASEAN striving for leadership in the region

It has been observed in the case of the European Union, that ASEAN rhetoric and choices are

driven by ―identity‖ objectives at least as much as by substantive political or economic

objectives. In this regard, the ―identity objective‖ that transcends ASEAN ―community

discourse‖ is to preserve its central position in East Asia, in the face of rapidly growing regional

competition. In light of rapid developments in the region and the world resulting from

globalisation, ASEAN must continue to strive to maintain its centrality and proactive role by

being the driving force in the evolving regional architecture. To do so, ASEAN needs to

accelerate its integration and Community building efforts while intensifying relations with

external partners.84

For individual South-East Asia countries, direct economic and political competition with the

Chinese and Indian giants is a threat to their economic survival in a globalized world. However,

there is also an ever growing interdependence between their economies. Unable to contain the

rise of regional economic competitors, South-East Asian elites have no choice but to embed

their rivals within a framework of cooperation, in order to make their voice audible. However,

in order to achieve this goal, it is crucial for ASEAN countries to ―lead by example‖ and, thus,

propose an ostensibly successful regional integration project. As the preceding arguments have

sought to demonstrate, this goal explains why all ASEAN countries adhere to the enhanced

―community‖ discourse and concede to be gradually constrained by a more rigid legally binding

regional framework, even though this does not always consistently match with their immediate

economic priorities. This argument is linked to the concept of leadership, given that one of the

most debated topics in the literature on East Asian regionalism revolves around this issue. In

this regard, Richard Higgott makes a useful distinction between ―structural/institutional

84 Master Plan on Connectivity, Executive Summary, paragraph 2, p i



leadership‖ and ―agency oriented/political leadership85‖. He then asks the question, ―Where are

the East Asian Schumans and Monnets?‖

Leaving aside the leadership issue in political and security-related matters, the leadership, in

terms of economic integration, involves three kinds of actors. First of all, industrialized

economies – particularly the US -, play a crucial role in South-East Asian economic growth, as

principal export-markets. More importantly, Asia‘s major competing powers, namely Japan,

China and India, have an important role to play. Finally, ASEAN, as it has developed into a

relatively stable and non-threatening grouping of states, can also take the lead. Hence, with

the perceived withdrawal of the US and the intensification of intra-Asian trade, ASEAN member

states see an opportunity to endorse their own leadership, at least of the

―structural/institutional‖ kind. From a neo-realist perspective, this opportunity can also be

explained by the unwillingness of China, Japan, India or the US to tolerate any other major

Asia-Pacific power taking the lead in the region. ASEAN, which is perceived as weak and non-

threatening, is the only viable alternative, acceptable to all.86 Hence, the emerging East Asian

structures since the Asian crisis, namely ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Summit (as well as the

earlier ARF), are all centred on ASEAN. Therefore, while the ‗liberalising‘ push through FTAs

comes from China, Japan and other non-regional powers, East Asian institutionalisation seems

to have been entrusted to ASEAN, if by default.

Increasingly, ASEAN is becoming the centre of a wider, multi-faceted and multi-layered

regional institutional framework. This strategy seems to be the only way for ASEAN countries,

and certainly for its poorest members, to get their way through the incredibly fast

development of the region, even if it is at the price of coherence. The Economic Community,

the concept of connectivity and the gradual legalisation of cooperation in ASEAN all strive to

establish it as a hub for economic exchanges in East Asia and sustain the momentum for

foreign investment, as it is the main driver of economic growth. Moreover, in the wake of the

rapid and robust recovery from the 2008 global economic crisis, the idea of rebalancing a

South-East Asian export-led growth pattern with more internal market-based orientation could

find its way through among ASEAN leaders. According to Kiichiro Fukasaku, an economist in

the OECD Development Centre, ―The global financial crisis has offered Southeast Asian

countries an opportunity to rethink past growth strategies and define new development

objectives. Both regional integration and national efforts will help promote more balanced

growth in the region87.‖ In this regard, establishing an ―ASEAN market‖ is an idea that is

gaining momentum, in order to reach the lower hanging fruits of regional economic activity.

85 Higgott, Richard, Op. Cit. 86 Kesavapany, K, ―special lecture on ASEAN centrality in regional integration‖, Bangkok, 26th February 2010, Report

by ISEAS, http://www.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/asco07-10.pdf 87 OECD, ―ASEAN Countries returning to pre-crisis growth‖, OECD Development Center webpage,

http://www.oecd.org/document/2/0,3746,en_2649_33731_46367966_1_1_1_1,00.html , consulted on 26 February

2011

http://www.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/asco07-10.pdf

Coraline Goron


Conclusion

With the AEC, ASEAN has developed a new approach to regional integration. The ―ASEAN way‖

discourse has shifted towards a more ―rule-based‖ regional order, which distinguishes it from

the ―Asia-Pacific way‖. In parallel to this, pan-East Asian relations have intensified greatly, and

several superposed frameworks of cooperation have emerged, with ASEAN being entrusted

with the institutional leadership. While constructivists have found that it was an indicator that

the informal ―ASEAN way‖ had spurred cooperation and a feeling of shared identity throughout

the region, realists have not attributed any great significance to these achievements. However,

none of these opposing standpoints offers a satisfactory explanation for the complexity of

Asian regional integration. In this regard, given the EU‘s own experience, European scholars

could offer a more nuanced appraisal of the situation. Indeed, debates surrounding the issues

of a shared identity and the limits to enlargement are amongst the hottest in the European

Union. On the other hand, most of the realist criticisms about ASEAN‘s regional integration

project pertaining to the persistence of national interest-based calculations also apply to the

EU. Furthermore, Europeans‘ strong belief in the power of law to manage peaceful inter-state

relations—a belief that underlies the whole European integration process—seems to have

gained ground in East Asia. The increasing trust in a commonly defined rule-based regional

system is arguably the most striking departure from the traditional ―ASEAN way‖.

Despite these ―rapprochements‖, some fundamental differences persist between the European

Union and ASEAN. As argued above, ASEAN‘s ‗rule-based‘ system finds its limits in the deep

resistance to the ―pooling of sovereignty‖ and the extremely limited acceptance of mutual

intervention in the member‘s domestic affairs. In the economic realm, these limits are

particularly striking in two areas: First of all, it appears in the goal to integrate customs

procedures without creating a customs union (common external tariff). Secondly, it finds

shape in the ‗Scorecard‘ implementation mechanism, which strives to deepen the mutual

commitment to the regional legal agreements, while continuing to respect strictly the principle

of non-intervention.

ASEAN integration is taking place in a regional and post-Cold War global context that is

fundamentally different from the European continent of the 1950s. Indeed, the Asian regional

economic and major powers are located outside ASEAN, whereas in Europe, the Franco-

German couple has been the main driver of the integration project since its inception.

Moreover, South-East Asian countries‘ economic growth has been largely export-led, taking

place in a post-WTO era of globalised competition. Thus, ASEAN, for all its integration

ambitions, cannot be built into an ―Asian fortress‖. ASEAN has also increasingly become a

regional development project, whereby new members have been accepted despite enormous

divergences in terms of political regimes and levels of industrialization. In this view, ASEAN is

seen as the framework through which each nation can enhance its economic development

peacefully. However, a consequence of this is the tremendous challenge of building a single

market while satisfying different needs and capabilities, much more than in the EU, where pre-

accession criteria have ensured a certain degree of convergence between the new and old

members.

The EU has long been a strong supporter of ASEAN integration. Through several programmes

such as the TREATI (Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative) or ASEAN-EU Programme for

Regional Integration Support (APRIS II), it has offered technical assistances in the field of

customs, compliance mechanisms and other measures linked to the building of an internal



market. Hence, many of ASEAN‘s new instruments are adaptations of mechanisms in place in

the EU. However, the EU has been, perhaps, too quick in recognising ASEAN as its peer,

thereby failing to understand the different political dynamics behind Asian regionalism. For

instance, one of the reasons, which led to the stalemate of EU-ASEAN free trade negotiations

in 2009, is the fact that the EU Commission had received a mandate to negotiate only with

ASEAN-7, the most advanced economies, while leaving a door open for Cambodia and Laos to

join later and refusing, for political reasons, to include Burma/Myanmar88. This segregation

was seen as totally unjustified by the ASEAN countries themselves, given their inclusive

philosophy of regional integration. Moreover, European demands for a ―WTO+‖ trade

arrangement, including service and investment liberalisation and the tackling of non-tariff

barriers between the two regions, clearly showed a misunderstanding of the actual stage of the

construction of ASEAN‘s internal market. However, the trend since then, to pursue bilateral

FTAs only with those individual ASEAN countries which are ready to meet EU‘s liberalisation

demands (like Singapore), is not devoid of contradiction with the EU‘s stated intentions to

support ASEAN community building. It could be argued that the EU so far has not lived up to

its ambitions, in terms of support to other regional integration projects. In particular, it has

failed to make other regions benefit from its own experience, beyond the sharing of expertise

on technical market mechanics. However, as the ASEAN case illustrates, there is perhaps not a

strong demand outside of Europe for anything more than this kind of technical assistance in

integration matters.

In order to enhance its relations with ASEAN - a goal, for example, reaffirmed by European

Trade Commissioner De Gucht at the 42nd ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM) in August

201089 - the EU should perhaps seek more to upgrade its understanding of the dynamics and

parameters, of East Asian regionalism as a whole. This area is certainly where an open and

equal-footed interaction between the well-developed European integration studies and

international relations studies in East and South-East Asia can bring a critical contribution.

88 Astuto, Michaela, ―EU-ASEAN Free Trade Negotiations‖, IPSI Analysis n°26, October 2010 89 Invited to attend the meeting for the first time in three years, the EU Commissioner for trade De Gucht stated that

he ―"came here to underline Europe‟s desire for greater economic and political engagement with ASEAN“, and that

"ASEAN as a region is becoming one of the most dynamic parts of the world. And the people in both the EU and the

countries of South-East-Asia will benefit if we manage to strengthen our trade links in the coming years“. Europa Press

Release, ―EU Pushes Links with ASEAN in Economic Ministers‘ Meeting, Brussels, 27 August 2010,

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=611&serie=363&langId=en , consulted on 20 February 2011

Coraline Goron


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Official documents:

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, Indonesia, 24 February 1976

ASEAN Vision Statement Vision 2020, ASEAN 2nd Informal Summit Meeting of Kuala Lumpur,

15 December 1997

Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (DAC II), Bali, Indonesia, 7 October 2003

ASEAN Economic Blueprint, 12th ASEAN Summit, Cebu, the Philippines, 13 January 2007

Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, 17th ASEAN Summit, Nanoi, Vietnam, 28 October 2010

ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard, 1st March 2010

Books:

Balassa, Bela, The Theory of Economic Integration, 1961, Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. Irvin

Inc, 1961, 308 pages.

Bhagwati, Jagdish, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine

Free Trade, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2008, 139 pages

Boisseau du Rocher, Sophie and Fort, Bertrand (eds), Paths to Regionalisation – Comparing

Experiences in East Asia and Europe, Singapore, Marshall Cavendish Academic, Asia-

Europe Research Series, 2005, 157 pages

Jones, David Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, Regional

Delusion, Northhampton, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006, 269 pages

Keohane, Robert International Institutions and State Power: Essay in International Relations

Theory, Mountain, US, Boulder (Col) Westview Press, 1989, 270 pages

Saurugger, Sabine, Théories et concepts de l‟intégration Européenne, Paris, Presse de Science

Po, 2009, 483 pages

Telo, Mario (Eds), European Union and New Regionalism, Regional Actors and Global

Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era, second edition, Oxon, Ashgate Publishing, 2007,

406 pages

Articles:

Aldaba, Rafaelita M. & al, ―ERIA Study to Further Improve the ASEAN Economic Community

Scorecard: the Philippines‖, Discussion Paper Series N° 2010-24, Philippines Institute for

Development Studies, Makati City, October 2010, 208 pages

Acharya, Amitav, ―Ideas, Identity and Institution-building: from the ‗ASEAN Way‘ to the ‗Asia-

Pacific Way‘?‖, The Pacific Review, Vol 10 n°3, 1997, pp 319-346

Acharya, Amitav, ―Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian

Regionalism‖, International Organization, Vol 58, n°2, spring 2004, pp 239-275

Astuto, Michaela, ―EU-ASEAN Free Trade Negotiations‖, IPSI Analysis n°26, October 2010

Atje, Raymond, Kartika, Prativi, “A Bumpy Road Towards ASEAN Economic Community 2015” ,

in The Global Economic Crisis, Implications for ASEAN, Singapore, ISEA, 2010, pp 125-

143

Austria, Myrna S, ―Tackling Non-Tariff Barriers in ASEAN‖, in ASEAN Economic Blueprint Report

N°4, ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS, Singapore, 2009

Bello, Walden, ―East Asia: On the eve of a great transformation?‖, Review of International

Political Economy, vol 5, N°3, 1998, pp 424-444



Bhattacharyay, Biswa Nath, ―Infrastructure for ASEAN Connectivity and Integration‖, ASEAN

Economic Bulletin, Vol 27, No 2, 2010, pp 200-220

Bramait, Seethepalli, K. M, Veredas, D, ―How relevant is infrastructure to growth in East

Asia?‖, Policy Research Working Paper 4597, World Bank, Washington DC, 2008

Camdessus, Michel, ―Crise Regionale ou Crise de Système?‖, Sociétal, n°23, 1998, pp 15-18

Chirstiansen, Thomas, Jorgensen, Knud Erik, Wiener, Antje, ―The social Construction of

Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol 6, n°4, 1999, pp 536-543

Crozier, Andrew J, ―Festina Lente: An Introductory Sketch of the History of ASEAN‖, In

Welfens, Paul J.J, ―Integration in Asia and Europe: historical dynamics, political issues,

and economic perspectives‖, 2006, Springer Science & Business, pp 13-29

Cuyvers, Ludo, ―Contrasting the European Union and ASEAN integration and solidarity‖, Paper

presented at Fourth EU-ASEAN Think Tank Dialogue, EU and ASEAN – Integration and

Solidarity, European Parliament, Brussels, 25-26 November 2002

Bower, Ernest Z, ―A New Paradigm for APEC‖, Southeast from the Corner of 18th & K streets,

CSIS, Southeast Asia Program, Vol 1, n° 24, August 2010

Engammare, Valérie, Lehmann, Jean-Pierre, ―East Asian Power and the 21st Century Global

Economy: from a Production Base to a Market Base?‖, Boisseau du Rocher, Sophie and

Fort, Bertrand (eds), Paths to Regionalisation – Comparing Experiences in East Asia and

Europe, Singapore, Marshall Cavendish Academic, Asia-Europe Research Series, 2005, pp

8-30

Figuière, Catherine, Guilhot, Laëtitia, « L‘Asie d‘une Crise à L‘autre : Impact sur l‘intégration

régionale », Paper presented at XXVIème Journées du développement de l‟Association

Tiers-Mondes : Crises et soutenabilité du développement, Strasbourg, June 2010

Hew, Denis, ―Towards and ASEAN Economic Community by 2015‖, in ASEAN Community,

unlocking the roadblocks, ISEAS, ASEAN Studies center, Report N°1,2008

Higgott, Richard ―Alternative Models of Regional Cooperation? The Limits of Regional

Institutionalization in East Asia‖, in Telo, Mario (Eds), European Union and New

Regionalism, Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era, second

edition, Oxon, Ashgate Publishing, 2007, pp 75-106

Hsu, Locknie, “The ASEAN Charter and A Legal Identity for ASEAN‖, in The ASEAN Community

– Unblocking the Roadblocks Report N°1, ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS, Singapore, 2008

Jones, David Martin, Smith, Michael L.R, ―Making Process, not Progress – ASEAN and the

Evolving East Asian Regional Order”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 1, Summer

2007, pp. 148–184

Kawai, Masahiro, Wignaraja, Ganeshan, ―Free Trade Agreements in East Asia: A Way toward

Trade Liberalization?‖, ADB Brief N°1, June 2010

Kawai, Masahiro,Wignaraja, Ganeshan, ―Asian FTAs: Trends, Prospects, and Challenges‖, ADB

Economics Working Paper N° 226, October 2010

Kesavapany, K, ―special lecture on ASEAN centrality in regional integration‖, Bangkok, 26th

February 2010

Mahani, Zainal-Abidin, ―ASEAN Integration: At risk of Going in Different Directions‖, The World

Economy, Vol 25, n° 9, September 2002, pp 1263-1277

Nicolas, Françoise, "The Political Economy of Regional Integration in East Asia, Economic

Change and Restructuring, Springer, Vol 41, n°4, 2008, pp 345-367

Nicolas, Françoise, ―East Asia and Western Europe: Between Regionalisation and

Globalisation”, in Boisseau du Rocher, Sophie and Fort, Bertrand (eds), Paths to

Regionalisation – Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe, Singapore, Marshall

Cavendish Academic, Asia-Europe Research Series, 2005, p 3-7

Sally, Razeen, ―FTAs and the Prospect for Regional Integration in Asia‖, ECIPE Working Paper

N° 01/2006, 2006

http://www.google.fr/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=+inauthor:%22Paul+J.+J.+Welfens%22

Coraline Goron


Terada,Takashi, ―Constructing an ‗East Asian‘ concept and growing regional identity: from

EAEC to ASEAN+3‖, The Pacific Review, Vol. 16 No. 2, 2003, pp 251–277

Vandoren, Paul ―Regional Economic Integration in South East Asia”, ASEAN Economic Journal,

n° 3, 2005, pp 517-535

World Bank, ―The East Asian miracle: economic growth and public policy‖ 1993/09/30 , Report

n° 12351 (Vol. 2 of 2), 1993

World Bank, ―Infrastructure for Development‖, World Development Report 1994, New York,

Oxford University Press, 1994

Yu, Hyun-Seok, ―Explaining the emergence of new East Asian Regionalism: Beyond Power and

Interest-Based Approaches‖, Asian Perspectives, Vol 27, n°1, 2003, pp 261-288

Zainal-Abidin Mahani, ―ASEAN Integration: At risk of Going in Different Directions‖, The World

Economy, Vol 25, Issue 9, September 2002, pp 1263-1277

News articles:

Anthuvan, Augustine, ―Scorecard evaluates ASEAN progress‖, Asia Pacific News (online), 10

April 2010

Basu Das, Sanchita, ―Building the ASEAN Economic Community‖, Business Times, Singapore,

25 January 2011

Europa Press Release, ―EU Pushes Links with ASEAN in Economic Ministers‘ Meeting, Brussels,

27 August 2010

OECD, ―ASEAN Countries returning to pre-crisis growth‖, OECD Development Center webpage

Pibulsonggram, Pradab, Thai Representative to the High Level Task Force on ASEAN

Connectivity, introductory remarks, International Seminar on ASEAN Connectivity,

Bangkok, Thailand, 10 September 2010

Pushpanathan, Sundram, ―No place for passive regionalism in ASEAN‖, The Jakarta Post

(online), 7 April 2010

Singh, Bilveer, Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby, ―Thai-Cambodian skirmishes: Endangering ASEAN‘s

‗raison d‗être‘‖, School of International Studies, Singapore, in The Jakarta Post , 21

February 2011

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