Egyptian Politics and American Diplomacy

7/28/2019 Egyptian Politics and American Diplomacy

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Middle east Policy, Vol. XiX, No. 2, suMMer2012

Egyptian politicsandamErican diplomacy

William A. Rugh

Ambassador (ret.) Rugh was a U.S. Foreign Service ofcer for 30 years. He

served at embassies in six Arab countries, including as ambassador to the

United Arab Emirates (1992-95) and Yemen (1984-87). This article is based

on his recent trip to Egypt.1

The Egyptian-American rela-

tionship has undergone several

changes over the past six de-

cades, and has now entered a new

phase. The uprising that began on January

25, 2011, and ended by ousting President

Husni Mubarak 18 days later led to a

political revolution that has continued into

2012 and not yet run its course. The gener-

als in the Supreme Council of the Armed

Forces (SCAF) who took over said they

would transfer power to a new president

and parliament as soon as they were demo-

cratically elected. The ultimate outcome

of this transition is not yet entirely predict-

able, but it already seems clear that the

domestic political scene has changed in

signicant ways and is unlikely to return

to the kind of authoritarian rule Mubarak

enjoyed. This in itself will have conse-

quences for the U.S.-Egyptian relationship

as new forces and new leaders assume

power in Cairo.

The uprising and its aftermath have

been almost entirely an Egyptian domes-

tic affair, and the Egyptian people have

paid relatively little attention to the United

States since it started. This is in contrast to

turning points in the past, when the United

States has been seen as the primary cause

of Egypts problems (as in the disastrous

1967 war with Israel), or an important help

(as in President Carters 1978 role at Camp

David). It is probably true that the Obama

administrations support of the militarys

decision to jettison Mubarak made a dif-

ference. But the U.S. role was very quiet,

and Egyptians give credit for the ouster to

the large numbers of their citizens in Tahrir

Square who persisted in their demands that

Mubarak leave power. Unlike many occa-

sions in the past, the questions of Israel and

U.S. support for it have not been major top-

ics of discussion during the many months

since Mubarak departed. Israel became the

focus of public attention only on one brief

occasion, when a mob stormed the Israeli

embassy; the United States did not even

then become part of the discussion.

Yet an issue over American nongov-

ernmental organizations (NGOs) arose un-

expectedly and cast a spotlight on the U.S.

relationship, causing bilateral tension for

several months and revealing some latent

Egyptian suspicions regarding American

actions and intentions.

THE NGO CONTROVERSY

When Mubarak was overthrown as a

result of a massive street protest against his


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Rugh: Egyptian politicsand amERican diplomacy

rule and it seemed that Egypt might actu-

ally be entering a transition to democracy,the Obama administration was encouraged

to think this was a positive development

that America should embrace and support.

U.S. ofcials pledged assistance, and pri-

vate American organizations sought to take

advantage of the opportunity to help Egyp-

tians implement their expressed desire for

democracy after decades of authoritarian

rule. American NGOs that had been try-

ing to promote democracy in Egypt since2006, including the National Democratic

Institute (NDI) and International Republi-

can Institute (IRI), regarded the new situa-

tion as much more open to their efforts.

But on December 29, 2011, Egyp-

tian police raided the Cairo ofces of 10

NGOs, including four American ones: the

NDI and IRI plus Freedom House and the

International Center for Journalists. The

police conscated documents and sealedthe premises. Egyptian authorities charged

16 Americans and 27 other NGO staff with

violating the law, and a judge imposed a

travel ban on them. The authorities said

that the NGOs had failed to register, as

required by Egyptian law, and that they

had spent foreign money in Egypt with-

out necessary permissions. Some of the

Americans were not in Egypt at the time,

but seven were ordered not to leave thecountry, and three of those took refuge in

the American embassy to avoid arrest.

Reaction in Washington was surprise

and indignation. The American NGOs

have some U.S. government funding

and high-level American support among

members of Congress and other promi-

nent American personalities. Senator John

McCain is chair of IRI, and Madeleine Al-

bright is chair of NDI; both boards includeformer and current members of congress.

The IRI director in Egypt Sam LaHood

the son of U.S. Transportation Secretary

Ray LaHood, was one of the Americanswho were sheltered in the U.S. embassy.

Senior ofcials in the Obama administra-

tion criticized the Egyptian action against

NGOs. Some voices on the Hill pointed

out that Egypt receives more than $1.5 bil-

lion in nancial assistance annually from

the United States. Congress instructed the

secretary of state not to release that money

unless she could certify that Egypt was

making progress toward democracy.Questions were raised about what had

happened. Why did the generals in SCAF

allow this action to be taken against Ameri-

can institutions when it could jeopardize the

U.S. assistance that the military presumably

wanted very badly? Moreover, since the

NGOs were only working to help promote

Egyptian democracy, which the Egyptian

people themselves were obviously call-

ing for with their revolution, why wouldthe government not want that assistance?

Ray LaHood told the press, We simply

support the democratic process; we do not

pick winners and losers. And why were

they suddenly being targeted? They had

been working in Egypt for years; some had

even participated in the 2011 parliamentary

election as monitors, invited to do so by the

authorities. There must be some mistake.

American diplomatic and private ef-forts went into high gear to try to resolve

the problem. The U.S.-Egyptian relation-

ship has been a cornerstone of Americas

Middle East policy for more than three

decades, and Egypt is, for U.S. interests,

arguably the most important Arab country

in the entire region. Thus, when the NGO

crisis erupted a year later, senior U.S. of-

cials approached the generals in SCAF

to help resolve it quickly. Senator McCainew to Cairo himself to make the case to

lift the arrest order on the Americans


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currency reserves had fallen to $16 bil-

lion from the pre-uprising level of morethan $20 billion. The government has so

far maintained subsidies to prevent food

prices from rising an important politi-

cal measure. But serious import shortages

could soon occur if something is not done

to deal with the crisis. The Arab Gulf

states promised nearly $3 billion in aid

after Mubarak fell, but by May 2012 they

had delivered only $1 billion, and were

promising soon to deliver more. Cairoseemed to exacerbate the problem by turn-

ing down an IMF loan in 2011, although in

spring 2012 it was again negotiating for a

new $3.2 billion loan.

Temporary Relief for the NGOs

The trial of the 43 NGO staff members

started February 26, but the three-judge

panel resigned from the case, and it was

transferred to an appeals court. ThereJudge Magdi Abdul Bari announced that

the travel ban on the suspects had been

lifted. The four American NGOs report-

edly posted $5 million bail for their staffs,

and on March 1, six of the Americans,

along with seven other foreigners, left

Egypt on a special plane brought in by the

U.S. government; one American chose

to remain behind. The Americans signed

statements that they would appear for thetrial if summoned, but as of May the trial

had not resumed.

State Department spokesperson Vic-

toria Nuland welcomed the decision but

added, We have continuing concerns that

the NGO issue be settled completely, end-

ing up in the registration not only of our

own NGOs but also of Egyptian NGOs.

The judicial process was discussed for a

few weeks. Some Egyptians, including thenewly elected speaker of parliament, Saad

El Kitatni accused the judges of lifting

Growing Criticism of America

Yet the crisis was not so easily re-solved. Voices in Egypt raised the stakes

with inammatory charges against the

United States. Faiza Abulnaga, the Egyp-

tian minister of international cooperation,

made public statements alleging that the

accused NGO personnel were actually

working to undermine the Egyptian state,

divert the Egyptian revolution, and serve

American and Israeli interests. Leading

personalities and the media echoed theaccusations. Egypts premier daily news-

paper published a front-page story with a

banner headline: Investigations Reveal

Facts about Dividing Up Egypt.2 The

story asserted that a map found by police

in an NGO ofce divided Egypt into four

parts, proving that the United States

planned to split Egypt into four separate

countries. It also claimed that suitcases full

of cash meant the NGO was paying mil-lions of dollars to inuence the parliamen-

tary elections.

Politicians and media pundits as well

as the grand sheikh of Al Azhar, one of the

Islamic worlds most revered institutions,

took up the charges. Sheikh Ahmed Mo-

hamed el-Tayeb announced on February 16

that he supported the call for rejection of

American assistance and was establishing

a Fund for Dignity and Respect (sanduqal azza wa al kirama) to raise 500 billion

Egyptian pounds from private sources so

that the country would be independent of

foreign inuence.3 He asserted that it was

an affront to Egypts dignity to accept

foreign money; its people could get along

perfectly well without it.

Such bravado raised eyebrows among

Americans who knew that the Egyptian

economy was suffering badly from theloss of foreign investment and tourism

revenues By June 2011 Egypts foreign-


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successful transition to democracy. Clin-

ton was invoking a provision in the lawallowing an exception on national security

grounds, thus releasing the $1.5 billion.

The State Department ofcial argued that

Egypt had made more progress [toward

democracy] in 16 months than in the last

60 years. But the ofcial allowed that

more work remains to protect universal

rights and freedoms.4

DEEPER IMPLICATIONSThe NGO incident is instructive. It re-

veals some of the dynamics of the current

Egyptian political scene relating to Egyp-

tian law on NGOs and how key players in

Egypt regard American attempts to support

their democracy.

There is some confusion about the

NGO law and its application. The NGOs

have always required licensing and per-

mission before spending foreign money inEgypt. However, the bureaucracy has often

been slow to respond to license applica-

tions, and the NGOs believed they could

start working anyway under the assump-

tion that the license would be granted. One

regulation even provided that lack of denial

of an application within 60 days constituted

acceptance of the organization as a legal

entity.5 The American NGOs therefore

understandably assumed they were protect-ed even though they lacked licenses. The

Egyptian governments willingness to have

them help monitor the parliamentary elec-

tions encouraged them to think they would

be welcome to promote democracy in other

ways. The crackdown surprised them.

Minister of International Cooperation

Faiza Abulnaga, who ordered the crack-

down in December, asserted that the action

was no different from those undertakenby U.S. law-enforcement ofcials. 6 She

was probably referring to the Foreign

the travel ban under political pressure,

which they denied. Prime Minister KamalGanzouri felt obliged to declare, Egypt

will never kneel, will never submit, and

will never change its stand on the issue

of foreign funding. He added that Egypt

would not yield to threats over the annual

aid it receives from the US.

After Senator McCain visited Cairo

and met with General Tantawi, he said that

SCAF was working diligently to resolve

the case. SCAF generals denied that theypressured the court, and it is likely that

Abdul Bari did make the decision on the

merits of the case, since he said the offense

was a misdemeanor not requiring a travel

ban. In his day, Mubarak would prob-

ably have phoned a judge and ordered the

Americans released. The SCAF does not

have this kind of power.

With the travel ban lifted, the U.S.

government still had to decide whether tooverride the congressional hold on Egypts

annual assistance package requiring cer-

tication of progress toward democracy.

Inside the administration, the matter was

debated quietly. There were arguments

for releasing all or part of it, or for await-

ing further developments. Releasing it

would open the administration to criticism

from Congress and others for pandering

to the generals. Stopping or delaying itwould further add to bilateral tensions.

Finally, on March 22, 2012, a senior State

Department ofcial said that Secretary

Clinton had decided that, on the basis of

Americas national security interests, she

will waive legislative conditions related

to Egypts democratic transition, allowing

for the continued ow of Foreign Military

Financing to Egypt. The ofcial added,

the move reects our overarching goal: tomaintain our strategic partnership with an

Egypt made stronger and more stable by a


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went with it. Publicly rejecting American

and other foreign inuence is now fashion-able and certainly more possible.

Some Egyptians have criticized Abul-

naga as a retrograde inuence, one of

the holdovers (falool) from the Mubarak

regime seeking to turn the clock back to

an authoritarian era. It is true that not all

senior Mubarak ofcials have been purged.

One reason is that the SCAF generals

probably discovered that, for the sake of

effective government functioning, theycannot disqualify everyone associated with

the Mubarak

regime. Min-

istries must

be managed

by people

who know

their institu-

tions and how

to get things done. Apparently, Abulnagawas regarded as one of those people. She

probably recognized the popular wave of

xenophobia that has come with the uprising

and was trying to ride it to enhance her own

power inside the system.

She is not alone in expressing dis-

trust of foreign intervention and NGOs.

Few Egyptians know much about these

NGOs; they work quietly and do not seek

or attract much media attention. When theauthorities shut them down and accused

them of breaking the law, and worse, the

public was unable to hear the NGOs side

of the story: that they believed they were

only helping the Egyptian people.

Political-party representatives who

spoke out on the matter also knew little

about NGOs other than what the govern-

ment said. Since the ofcial rhetoric put

the case in terms of national pride andrejection of unwanted foreign inuence, it

was easy for them to applaud the action

Agents Registration Act (FARA), rst

passed by Congress in 1938. The actrequires anyone representing a foreign

government or organization to register

with the Department of Justice. However,

FARA requires no specic licensing, only

disclosure. And the few prosecutions of

FARA violations have sometimes resulted

in nes, but certainly not in threats of jail

time, as in the Egyptian case.

Abulnaga claimed that the crackdown

was triggered by Washingtons announce-ment in June 2011 of a $40 million grant

to the NGOs

to promote

Egyptian

democracy.

She did not

explain,

however, why

she chose to

order a police raid and a travel ban insteadof simply asking the NGOs to suspend op-

erations. Nor did she explain why she then

used the issue to make public accusations

against Washington for trying to harm

Egypt. She even claimed that the NGOs

were part of an Israeli plot and encouraged

the press to say that the NGOs were target-

ing religious organizations. These were

especially incendiary accusations in the

Egyptian context. Minister Abulnaga has long been

known to U.S. ofcials as very tough and

adversarial. American ambassadors have

tangled with her in the past and not always

won. But in some ways she represents part

of the new post-Mubarak public mood, as

Egypt tries to restore its pride and self-

respect. Most Egyptians used to be afraid

to criticize Mubaraks friends, such as the

United States. Today there is a much greaterwillingness to criticize authority, especially

the Mubarak system and everything that

[It was] even claimed that the NGOs were

part of an Israeli plot and...were targeting

religious organizations. These were

especially incendiary accusations in the

Egyptian context.


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generals did not inherit any of this power.

Moreover, the generals in SCAF as-sumed authority on a temporary basis, and

consistently said they would only keep that

authority during the transition to democ-

racy and would leave when a new parlia-

ment and a new president were in place.

In February 2011, they were riding high

in popular esteem. The Egyptian army has

long been respected by the public, in con-

trast to the feared police and other security

forces that were hated for their corruptionand brutality. The army deployed in Tahrir

Square during the uprising provided a

calming presence without the use of force,

and when the generals orchestrated the

peaceful removal of Mubarak, this only

increased their prestige. Yet, in the 16

months since then, they have been increas-

ingly blamed for a variety of problems

because they were in charge.

For example, the generals have beenblamed for not stopping the escalating

street crime, although they have explained

to visitors that the army is trained to ght

wars and defend the countrys borders, not

to patrol the streets. The real problem is

the lack of a properly trained police force.

During the 2011 uprising, when angry

mobs attacked the police and burned down

police stations, many ofcers ed and did

not return. The ones who remained arestill poorly trained and are now afraid of

the public. The government has failed to

undertake a signicant effort to recruit new

people and train them in law enforcement

that is respectful and fair. Many Egyptians

today worry that crime is becoming an

increasing problem; they tell stories of

people they know who were mugged or

robbed. The American press has reported

on this,7

but, as one Egyptian-Americanlong-time resident in Cairo told me, Egyp-

tians notice street crime now because it

The grand sheikh of Al Azhar, who under

Mubarak might have checked with thepresidents ofce rst for advice on what

to say, probably saw no reason not to join

the chorus of those condemning the NGOs.

Most of the media, although now headed

by new chief editors, were still staffed by

reporters trained in the Mubarak era who

simply took the story from the government

without bothering to investigate the Ameri-

can NGOs side of the story.

There were a few exceptions. Saad Ed-din Ibrahim, Egypts most outspoken and

courageous critic during the Mubarak era,

who had endured prison and then exile,

returned to Cairo when Mubarak fell and

began writing regular newspaper op-eds.

He used his columns to criticize Abulnaga

sharply and defend the NGOs. Other writ-

ers and the public, however, seemed to

accept her allegations against the NGOs

uncritically.

But What about the Generals?

Why did the generals in SCAF not

prevent the U.S.-Egyptian crisis over

the NGOs? It is important to remember

that SCAF, despite its legal authority as

the highest political body in the land,

does not have the powers that President

Mubarak had. They succeeded him but did

not inherit any of the levers of power hehad developed over the years. Mubarak

not only controlled the security services

and appointed the prime minister; he also

completely dominated the parliament

through his National Democratic Party,

which controlled the vast majority of seats.

He also appointed the heads of all major

media outlets, including not only radio

and television but the leading newspa-

pers; he appointed the grand sheikh of AlAzhar and the university presidents; and he

inuenced many of the judges The SCAF


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the president would in fact be likely to do

everything possible to keep it alive. It isof substantial benet to the U.S. economy,

paying for military equipment built in the

United States, such as M1 Abrams tanks

manufactured in Ohio, an important state

in the 2012 presidential election.

What about the Judges?

The judiciary has been playing an im-

portant role since the uprising. Egyptians

like to think their judiciary is an institutionthat is traditionally independent of politi-

cal pressures. But during the Mubarak era,

some judges tended to follow the wishes

of the regime, while others showed their

independence. For example, when promi-

nent dissident Saad Eddin Ibrahim was

convicted and sent to jail on trumped-up

charges by one judge, he was released on

appeal by another, who was apparently not

intimidated by Mubarak and ruled on themerits of the case.

Today when trials occur, savvy ana-

lysts look closely at who the presiding

judge is, in order to predict whether the

defendant will get a fair trial. In the NGO

case, the appeals-court magistrate real-

ized the travel ban was unfair and voided

it, despite the fact that he might anger the

administration. The presiding judge in the

trial of President Mubarak is consideredindependent, so the case may be decided

on its merits. This probably means he will

be acquitted on the capital charge but con-

victed of corruption. Whatever the verdict,

in the current atmosphere of more open

debate, some will accuse the court of one

sort of bias or another.

THE NEXT PREOCCUPATIONS

Following Washingtons decision togo ahead with the assistance package, theconfrontation over American NGOs disap-

was essentially zero under Mubarak. This

observer said it is still much lower than inany large American city.

The generals have attempted to gov-

ern, but it has not been easy. When they

tried to set a parliamentary election date,

the liberals said it was too early and they

needed more time to prepare, so the gener-

als postponed the date more than once. The

Muslim Brotherhood and others have in-

creasingly complained about various mat-

ters, such as military trials for civilian law-breakers. The regular gatherings in Tahrir

Square that started with the simple demand

in January 2011 that Mubarak step down,

continued after he left and turned increas-

ingly against SCAF, the group ofcially in

charge. SCAF started its own website and

Facebook page to communicate better with

the street, and SCAF generals appeared

from time to time in Tahrir Square to make

their case, but the criticism continued.Thus by the time the NGO issue arose,

SCAF was in a somewhat weakened posi-

tion and planning to step down in a few

months. All indications are that they did

not know in advance that Abulnaga was

going to shut down the American NGOs.

They must have realized quickly that her

action was popular, so were disinclined for

political reasons to take any hasty action

to put a stop to it. They knew the issue wascausing problems with the U.S. relation-

ship, but domestic political circumstances

trumped this concern. They heard mem-

bers of Congress calling for a reexamina-

tion of the assistance package but seemed

not to believe it was really in jeopardy.

One general told a visiting American that

he was condent President Obama would

not allow the ow of aid to Egypt to stop

a serious overestimate of the presi-dents power. Yet to some analysts looking

at the nature of the military aid package


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tian Party, which specically appealed to

Muslims (If you are Christian, when youjoin me, bring three Muslims with you),

while the Muslim Brotherhood sought to

attract Christians to its new Freedom and

Justice Party (FJP). The series of elections

was held in a manner that was peaceful

and judged to be fair, a complete rever-

sal of the blatantly rigged process under

Mubarak. Representatives of the Carter

Center who observed the parliamentary

elections said, The results appear to be abroadly accurate expression of the will of

the voters. However, the ultimate success

of Egypts transition will depend on the

earliest possible handover of power to a

civilian government that is accountable to

the Egyptian people. The Carter Center

also regretted that only 12 women had

been elected to parliament.8

The elections to the two houses of par-

liament, the Peoples Assembly and ShuraCouncil, awarded 70 percent of the seats to

Islamists. The FJP, representing the Muslim

Brotherhood, won 42 percent, while the al

Noor party, representing the more ortho-

dox salafs, won more than a quarter of the

seats. The liberal Egyptian Bloc won only 7

percent (35 out of 508). The success of the

FJP was expected, but the strong showing

by the salas was a surprise.

The Islamists benetted from theirsuperior organizational abilities around the

country. The Muslim Brotherhood and the

salas are known and respected for their

social services on the local level, provid-

ing education, medical care and food to the

poor; that helped them win the election.

But the voting also reected a strong sense

among the electorate that, after decades of

Mubarak cronyism, Egypt needed leaders

who were not corrupt, and the Islamistslled the bill. It also reected the fact that

the vast majority of Egyptians consider

peared from public debate in Egypt. Ev-

eryone was much more focused on internalissues, including major ones such as the

election of a new president and the review

of the constitution, not to mention security

and the economy. The trial of the Americans

in the NGO case was expected to resume,

but as of this writing (May 2012) nothing

more has been heard about it. This is prob-

ably helpful for the U.S. relationship, since

it is unlikely the accused Americans who

left Egypt would return for a trial.In Washington, however, the Obama

administration is closely watching Egypts

internal developments and trying to

ascertain the nature of the new adminis-

tration. Like most Egyptians, American

ofcials are following the preparations for

the presidential election, the rewriting of

the constitution, the economic situation,

and speculation about the future role of the

military.

Assessing the Parliament

The good news is that a democrati-

cally elected bicameral parliament has

now started its work. After Mubarak

resigned, political parties sprang up, and

large numbers of Egyptians who had been

totally apathetic and pessimistic about

politics under Mubarak, became enthusi-

astic participants in the political process.Egyptians who had never voted during

the Mubarak era suddenly became politi-

cally active. Young people, in particular,

were participating in political rallies and

discussions as never before. They believed

the process was now open and allowed

unrestricted involvement in politics for the

rst time in memory. Most party leaders

sought to present their platforms as ecu-

menical and inclusive of multiple trendsin society. The Coptic Christian billionaire

Naguib Sawiris formed the Free Egyp-


9/14


A member of parliament who was

elected on a liberal platform told merecently that early sessions of the Peoples

Assembly have been chaotic and unruly,

since most of the members are new to

the process and have not organized them-

selves to conduct legislative business. He

said there are some discussions across the

aisle between Islamists and secularists,

but most of these are based on previous

personal friendships rather than new alli-

ances, which have yet to form. Members ofparliament are slowly learning the ropes,

but it will take time before they are fully

functional.

The Presidency

The presidency is the next institu-

tion to be lled. SCAF set voting for May

23-24, with a runoff on June 16-17, the

winner to be announced by June 21. SCAF

is scheduled to turn over power by the endof that month.

Preparations for the presidential elec-

tion caused considerable speculation that

SCAF generals and others may be pull-

ing strings behind the scenes, but actually

no political group has been dominant.

Twenty-three candidates applied for

certication by the Presidential Election

Commission (PEC), but the senior judges

who constituted the PEC approved only13. They disqualied Mubaraks former

intelligence chief Omar Sulaiman, putting

to rest rumors that the SCAF generals were

secretly maneuvering to get him elected.

They also disqualied Keirat al Shatir, the

candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, and

the popular preacher Hazim Abu Ismail,

the candidate of the salas, contradicting

rumors that SCAF was conspiring with

the Islamists to capture the presidency.Sulaiman had failed to gather the required

30 000 signatures for his application; Shatir

themselves devout Muslims and say in polls

that Islam is important in their daily lives.This does not mean that they necessar-

ily want the new parliament to pass strict

Islamic laws such as a ban on alcohol

or rigid restrictions on dress for women.

(Egyptian analysts think that Egyptian

salas picked up their conservative ideas

from Saudi Arabia.) Most Egyptians do not

want Egypt to become like Iran or even

Saudi Arabia; they simply want an honest,

uncorrupt government that provides basicservices to the people.

It is not clear how well the two major

Islamist parties in parliament, the Broth-

erhoods FJP and the salasts al Noor,

will work together. They may occasion-

ally join ranks to form coalitions, but they

may also have trouble working together.

The Muslim Brotherhood has had years

of working within the political system as

independents in Mubaraks parliaments,since religious-based parties were banned.

They are more familiar with parliamentary

practices than are the salas, who stayed

out of politics in the Mubarak era and were

more purely ideological.

In February, during one of the early

sessions of the new Peoples Assembly, a

salast al Noor MP stood up from his seat

at three in the afternoon and declared that

it was prayer time and everyone shouldgo to pray. The presiding delegate, also

an Islamist but from the FJP, gaveled him

down, saying he was out of order. The

salast shouted his insistence that every-

one go immediately to pray. The chairman

calmly responded that the Prophet Muham-

mad had allowed the faithful to delay their

prayer if they were in the middle of an

important activity, so the session would not

be interrupted. The salast MP stormed outof the hall with his colleagues, complain-

ing about the ruling


10/14


get votes from Mubaraks supporters and

non-Islamists, but he is tainted by his pastservice. The other candidates are leftists,

socialists, Marxists, Islamists and liberals

who have little chance of winning.

Writing a New Constitution

Debates over the writing of the consti-

tution constitute another test of where the

Egyptian political system is heading. In

March 2011, a national referendum passed

by a wide margin, stipulating that the newparliament would appoint 100 people to

a commission to rewrite the constitution.

One year later, the parliament named a

commission of 50 parliamentarians and 50

outside experts. However, when the Broth-

erhood joined the salas to ensure that

three-quarters of the commission members

were Islamists, the secular and liberal

members walked out in protest of the lack

of balance. The sheikh of Al Azhar, Ahmedel-Tayeb, also declared that the commis-

sion was not balanced. On April 10, the

Administrative Court voided the com-

mission as insufciently representative of

the Egyptian people, and parliament was

charged with establishing a new one.

There are several contentious issues

in the review of the constitution. One is

Chapter 4, dening the role of the presi-

dent. In Mubaraks day, the president wasall powerful, but the Islamists want more

power in the legislature, where they have

a majority. The constitutional powers of

the president may therefore change after

he is elected. (Muhammad Elbaradei was

originally a candidate in 2011, but then

dropped out. As he told me then, he could

not run for president without a clear job

description.) Another issue is the provi-

sion that Islam is the main source of legis-lation, something that hard-line Islamists

want strengthened (to say the only

had been jailed twice under Mubarak and,

although SCAF had pardoned him, he hadfailed to get a court order restoring his po-

litical rights. Ironically Abu Ismail, a strong

critic of the United States, was disqualied

because his mother had become an Ameri-

can citizen (family members of candidates

may not have foreign citizenship). He tried

to contest the ruling, claiming his mother

only had a green card, but the PEC said

they had a letter from the State Department

conrming her U.S. citizenship. His reac-tion: Why accept that [letter]? Are you

going to obey American orders?

Of the 13 certied candidates, only

four were thought to have a chance of

winning. Polls showed the frontrunner to

be Amr Moussa, 75, Mubaraks foreign

minister 1991-2001 who resigned in a

disagreement with the president and then

became secretary-general of the Arab

League. His support comes from secularand liberal Egyptians who want an expe-

rienced leader with nationalist credentials

(he was known for his criticism of Israel).

Moussa is urbane and sophisticated, and

well known to American diplomats and

other Westerners. Also a strong contender

was Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former

senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood

who was expelled when he declared his

candidacy. Many secular liberal EgyptiansI spoke to recently said they prefer him

over Moussa because he is trustworthy

in addition to being moderate. He is also

helped by an endorsement from the salas,

who apparently see him as an effective way

to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Brotherhood nominated Muhammad

Mursi as a backup candidate to the disqual-

ied Kheirat al Shatir. He could win with

Brotherhood backing but lacks charismaand name recognition. Finally, Ahmad

Shak Mubaraks last prime minister will


11/14


lenge for whoever is in charge of the gov-

ernment in the coming months and years.By the end of June, Egypt should have a

new president, a new prime minister and

cabinet, and possibly a new constitution

and a parliament ready to pass new legisla-

tion. With these political developments be-

hind them, the public will turn its attention

to Egypts increasingly serious economic

situation. Insecurity has decimated the all-

important tourism industry and has scared

away most foreign direct investment. Thatneeds to change. The government has man-

aged to keep food prices from rising, but it

cannot continue such a policy without crip-

pling the economy. Reforming the subsidy

program, however, could lead to severe

political consequences. And worker strikes

for higher wages continue.

CONCLUSION

Uncertainties remain, but the outlinesof Egypts new political system have

begun to emerge. First, it had been tightly

controlled from the top and sclerotic under

Mubarak, but it has opened up consider-

ably. Parties, the media and individuals are

freer than they were. The trajectory so far

has shown positive signs: a new parliament

has been elected in a fair and relatively

peaceful process, new political parties

have emerged, and most important, thepublic has shown unprecedented enthu-

siasm to participate in politics. There is

constant jockeying and give-and-take be-

tween the main players, but none are afraid

to challenge the SCAF generals. The mass

demonstrations in Tahrir Square have

continued to recur and, although they have

not spawned specic political leaders, their

demands have had an impact. Some judges

have shown courage. The new system sofar has been one of disbursed political

power; even SCAF as the formal and legal

source) and secularists want weakened.

And if the commission wants to stipu-late that parliament controls the military

budget, as the Brotherhood has hinted, the

generals in SCAF may object.

Other Pending Issues

The trial of Mubarak and his sons is

another pending issue whose resolution

could be politically explosive. The former

president has been indicted for allegedly

giving the order to re on innocent civil-ians during the January-February 2011

uprising. The prosecutor has asked for

the death penalty in this case, and many

Egyptians believe he deserves to die. On

the other hand, Egyptian legal experts say

no conclusive evidence has been presented

that would lead to Mubaraks conviction

on the charge, and it now seems unlikely

he will get the death penalty. Whatever the

verdict, some Egyptians will be pleasedand others unhappy. A verdict is due June

2, but the generals probably would like it

postponed so they will not be in charge

when it is handed down.

There has been constant speculation

that the generals in SCAF will renege on

their promise to give up authority once

democratic institutions are in place. There

is an understandable suspicion that rulers

do not give up power, another legacy ofthe Mubarak era. In addition, the Egyptian

military has been a major player in the

countrys politics since independence in

1952. Moreover, the army owns a large

portion of the economy (estimated at over

30 percent) that it wants to protect: if the

parliament or the writers of the new consti-

tution take that away, SCAF might stay to

protect its vested interests. But all signs at

this writing are that SCAF will withdrawfrom political power at the end of June.

The economy will be a daunting chal-


12/14


constitutional committee and in a surprise

announcement supported former MuslimBrotherhood leader Aboul Fotouh. Every

indication so far is that Islamist members

of parliament are not likely to move quick-

ly to change society according to strict reli-

gious principles, and that for a time at least

they will recognize and respect the long-

standing traditions of the country. They

say they support free-market principles,

and this could help the economy. If Aboul

Fotouh wins the presidency, he is unlikelyto change Egyptian society radically. In

fact, American-Egyptian relations might

well benet from good relations with a

moderate Islamist president of the largest

country in the Arab world.

The Israel-Egyptian peace treaty does

not seem to be in jeopardy, but minor

disputes with Israel may arise in the future.

For example, in April 2012 Egypt termi-

nated a Mubarak-era contract to supplynatural gas to Israel that many had criti-

cized because the price paid was consid-

erably below market level. The deal was

arranged by wealthy businessman Hussain

Salem with support from Mubarak; after

Mubarak was deposed, the court convicted

Salem of corruption for it. Egyptians wel-

comed cancellation as correcting a mistake

of the Mubarak regime.9

American policy in this situationshould be sensitive to the new currents

unleashed by the uprising and to the more

open environment that started in February

2011. The United States has signicant

interests in its relationship with Egypt, and

Washington can nurture that relationship

if it is open to new ways of thinking about

a country that had changed little over the

past four decades. The U.S. government

will undoubtedly face several policy ques-tions in the months ahead. One is how to

deal with Egypts new Islamist leaders

authority of the state has nowhere near

the power that Mubarak exercised behinda facade of a sham democracy. The new

parliament is more likely to balance the

powers of the president. This is all new.

There has been some violence, but far less

than in Syria and Yemen, where political

transitions are also ongoing.

Second, the pride most Egyptians feel

about the way their youth and their army

behaved in removing President Mubarak,

and their sense of national renewal intransitioning to a truly democratic system,

have come with a certain amount of xeno-

phobia about foreign interference. Egyp-

tians who chafed under Mubaraks rule

also resented his close association with

the United States and believe he followed

Washingtons wishes on Israel/Palestine

and the Iraq War. So, when he was over-

thrown, their criticism of U.S. inuence

over Egypt emerged. Although Egyptiansare not focused much on foreign-policy is-

sues because so much is going on domesti-

cally, resentment of outside interference

is still an element in the current political

scene. The next president will have to

manage that resentment to ensure it does

not damage positive relations with other

countries that Egypt needs.

Third, clearly Islamists will play an

important role in Egyptian governance, atleast in the near future, but it is too early

to predict exactly how they will carry out

that mandate. Already they have shown

some unpredictability. The Muslim Broth-

erhood was not going to contest so many

seats in parliament or run a presidential

candidate; they expressed a desire for vari-

ous views to be expressed in the consti-

tutional committee, but then took actions

that reversed these promises. The salastswon more seats than expected, then joined

with the Muslim Brotherhood to pack the


13/14


Here too, U.S. ofcials should express

disapproval but avoid the appearance ofmeddling in Egyptian politics. The NGO

controversy clearly revealed that the Egyp-

tian public and leadership have less toler-

ance now for the kind of heavy-handed

democracy promotion they saw under the

Bush administration.

The third area of interaction is in

economic development, and here it would

be wise for Washington to do everything it

can to help Egypts economy in this dif-cult transition period. American economic

assistance to the new Egyptian government

would be in our national interest, as an

investment in the countrys prosperity and

as a visible gesture of support for the coun-

trys new direction. Congress and oth-

ers may wish to tie assistance to Egypts

domestic situation, but it would be prudent

of U.S. ofcials to delink the two as much

as possible. Egyptian stability is in ourinterest as well as theirs.

The Obama administration has already

opened a dialogue with Egyptian Islamistsin key positions in Cairo, the very people

Mubarak did not want us to talk to. That

is wise; Washington should continue to

develop good relations with any Islamists

who are willing to talk to us. We should

also nd opportunities to show respect for

Islam. This would help undo the damage

caused by the impression created by the

Bush administration that America is hos-

tile to Muslims. If the parliament shouldpass legislation in any way undermining

the peace treaty with Israel, the United

States should of course speak out clearly

against that. If it passes domestic Is-

lamic legislation for example, banning

alcohol or un-Islamic books U.S.

ofcials should explain the American view

of those measures, while at the same time

being careful to show respect for Egypts

sovereign right to govern itself.A second challenge may arise if Egypt

takes steps we regard as undemocratic.

1 This essay is a revised and updated version of The Egyptian NGO Case: Politics and Diplomacy, pub-

lished in the online journalAmerican Diplomacy in March 2012.2Al Ahram, February 12, 2012.3Al Ahram, February 17, 2012.4 Susan Cornwell and Arshad Mohammed, Clinton to Let Military Aid to Egypt Continue: State Depart-

ment Ofcial, Reuters, March 22, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/23/us-egypt-usa-aid-idUS-

BRE82L13D20120323.5 David J. Kramer, Egypts Full-Frontal Assault on Civil Society, Washington Post, March 11, 2012, http://

www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-ngo-raids-are-a-full-frontal-assault-on-civil-society/2012/03/11/

gIQAP1jx5R_story.html.6 Fayza Aboulnaga, Why Egypt Moved against Unregistered NGOs, Washington Post, March 9, 2012,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-egypt-moved-against-unregistered-ngos/2012/03/05/gIQA-

EHrf1R_story.html.7 Leila Feidal, Rising Crime Has Some Egyptians Yearning for the Old Police State, Washington Post,

March 13, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/rising-crime-has-some-egyptians-yearn-

ing-for-the-old-police-state/2012/03/09/gIQAwwzB9R_story.html.8 The Carter Center, Carter Center Witnessing Mission for Egypt Peoples Assembly Elections Executive

Summary of Findings, press release, January 13, 2012, http://cartercenter.org/news/pr/egypt-011312.html.9 Niveen Wahish and Sherine Abedl-Razek, Egypt Blocks the Pipe,Al Ahram Weekly, May 1, 2012, http://

weekly ahram org eg/2012/1095/fr2 htm


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