Eetl Hazop Report Rev 1

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ENGRO ELENGY TERMINAL NOVEMBER 2014HAZOP STUDY OGL/DA/10106

Excelerate EnergyEngro Elengy Terminal

Ship to Ship LNG Transfer OperationsHazard Operability Study

Report No. OGL/DA/10 106

Revision: 1Date: November 2014







1. Report No.

OGL/DA/10106

2. Report date

November 2014

3. Revision date 4. Type of report

Technical –Rev 1

5. Title & SubtitleEXCELERATE ENERGY

ENGRO ELENGY TERMINAL

SHIP TO SHIP LNG TRANSFER OPERATIONSHAZARD OPERABILITY STUDY

6. Security classification of this report

Commercial in Confidence

7. Security classification of this page

Commercial in Confidence

8. Author(s)

T KoliopulosGlobal Manager Special Projects , Energy

G BurtonAssistant Risk Specialist, Energy

9. Authorisation

Gopal PallichadathTechnical ManagerLloyd’s Register Energy - Houston

10. Reporting organisation name and address

Lloyd’s Register North America, Inc.1330 Enclave Parkway Suite 200

Houston, TX 77077

11. Reporting organisation reference(s)

None

12. This report supersedes

None

13. Sponsoring organisation name and address

EXCELERATE ENERGY P.L.

14. Sponsoring organisation reference(s)

15. No. of pages

11

16. Summary




EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report details the results of the HAZOP study, which constitutes part ofExcelerate Energy’s risk assessment for the Engro Elengy Terminal at Port

Qasim in Karachi, Pakistan.

The study undertook a detailed examination of the FSRU and shuttle LNG

carrier’s transit operations, manoeuvring /berthing operations and the ship-to-

ship cargo transfer operations, in compliance with the formal HAZOP

methodologies.

The major events related to marine system failure and/or operating failure

have been considered in all aspects of the proposed operations and appropriate

mitigation measures have been proposed.

The study identified a number of potential operational drawbacks and system

conditions which could cause a reduction in operational safety. However,

none of the identified hazards are thought to be unusual or to pose a level ofrisk which is higher from typical LNG marine terminal operations and all can

be mitigated by appropriate design and operational measures.




CONTENTS1.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1

1.1

GENERAL .......................................................................................................... 1

1.2

PAKISTAN LNG IMPORT PROJECT ................................................................... 1

1.3

TERMINAL FACILITIES ...................................................................................... 2

2.

HAZARD OPERABILITY ................................................................................ 4

2.1

HAZOP STUDY ................................................................................................ 4

3.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................................ 7

3.1

R ECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY ........................................................................ 7

4.

REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 11

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 HAZOP Work Sheets

Appendix 2 Marine Charts and GA




1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 General

Lloyd’s Register North America, Inc. (Lloyd’s Register) has been engaged by

Excelerate Energy L.P to carry out Hazard Operability Study (HAZOP) for the

planning, marine and cargo transfer operations of a new regasification

terminal at Engro Elengy Terminal Limited (EETL) existing site at Port Qasim

in Karachi, Pakistan.

1.2 Pakistan LNG Import Project

The project consists of the development of the Engro Elengy Terminal at a

new jetty to be constructed near the chemical offloading jetty at EETL

terminal. The terminal will allow the long termed berth of a FSRU able toexport high pressure (HP) regasified LNG (RLNG) to a 6 km pipeline for

delivery to the designated Custody transfer points at the connection to a 42”

NB pipe line operated by Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd (SSGC).

RLNG will be delivered to the SSGS gas distribution network at contract flow

rates up to 500 MMSCFD at a pressure between 300 psig (20.7 barg) and

1,200 psig (82.76 barg) and at a temperature of not less than 41.0 °F (5.0 °C)or greater than 100.0 °F (37.8 °C) with the potential for peak flow rates up to

690 MMSCFD.

The FSRU with a nominal cargo capacity of up to 173,400 m3 will provide all

the facilities and functions for the loading, storage and re-gasification of LNG

and the heating and metering of the RLNG prior to discharge to the jetty

facilities.

The FSRU will be re-supplied with LNG from conventional LNGC’s with

nominal cargo capacities between 120,000 m3 and 266,000 m3 (Qmax), which

will be moored alongside the FSRU.

The shuttle LNGCs will be moored and connected starboard side of the FSRU




-diameter 8"

-bending radius min 0.65m-length 15 m

-max. capacity 1,000 m3/h

-quantity total 8 pieces

-supplier GUTTELING

The hoses will be connected by spool pieces on both the LNGC and the FSRU

manifolds. The spool pieces provide connection for two hoses on every liquid

line (3 x 2 hoses) and for two (2) hoses on the vapour return line; this alsoallows one extra liquid line for redundancy.

The composition of the LNG will be controlled via an LNG Purchasing

specification and by stock management during transit from the loading port to

the re-gasification port such that the LNG will be fully cooled before transfer.

All vapour displacement and boil off gas arising from the LNG transfer will be

actively managed by the FSRU and LNGC operators. A necessary requirementwill be that the LNGC operator will receive vapour from the FSRU and have

the capability to manage the boil off gas using cargo tank ullage, gas burning

and/or re-liquefaction.

1.3 Terminal Facilities

The regasification terminal will be developed adjacent to the existing EETL

chemical terminal located at co- ordinates 24°47'20.82"N, 67°21'48.78"E,

near Port Qasim in Karachi, Pakistan. Figure 1 below refers.

Engro Elengy

Terminal




The terminal will consist of a new steel piled and concrete capped jetty

adequately sized to provide berthing and mooring facilities for the FSRU andlargest LNGC, personnel gangway, RLNG gas offloading arm and emergency

shutdown valves. A control and utility area will be provided on the new jetty

approach trestle, at a safe distance from the offloading arm. It is assumed that

the FSRU berth will have access to and will utilise existent services including

electrical power, fire water and utility nitrogen.

For the purposes FSRU RLNG offloading the jetty will be provided with a gas

offloading arm of “S” type double counterweighted design which is fully balanced in all positions.

The emergency system of the FSRU and the LNGC will be connected to the

jetty’s system by the ship to shore interface which will incorporate the ESD

system and works as Ship to Shore data communication Link (SSL).




2. HAZARD OPERABILITY

2.1 HAZOP Study

The HAZOP study took place at OCIMF offices in London. The team review

was led by a Chairman assisted by a Recorder from Lloyd’s Register; the

remainder of the HAZOP team comprised of specialists from FSRU

operations, LNGC stakeholders/operators, EETL management and other

parties (see Appendix 1 for detailed list of attendees).

The main objectives of the HAZOP were:

Identify marine operational hazards associated with the FSRU and

LNGC approach, entry and estuary crossing operations to

the proposed facility

Identify marine operational hazards associated with the shuttle LNGC

manoeuvring berthing, mooring connection and STS LNG cargo

transfer at the jetty.

Identify hazards associated with the jetty lay-out, mooring dolphins

position, ship traffic impact, marine facilities support for operation ofthe terminal

Undertake a detailed examination of the STS cargo transfer system

during regasification operations, on a line by line basis, in compliance

with the formal HAZOP process.

Assess the adequacy of the existing isolation, control and operating

procedures to prevent or control the hazards and establish additionalmeasures to enable safe operations at all times.

The study was led by a Chairman whose main responsibilities were:

P d d h d l d l d hi h




The Chairman was assisted by a Recorder who suitably ‘word processed’ all

actions, recommendations and clarifications raised by the team during thestudy sessions. The specific HAZOP software ‘PHA-Pro8’ was used.

Each part of the proposed operations and the area(s) which would take place

either on marine transit or at berth was reviewed in turn by the HAZOP team,

applying guide words or considering potential failure scenarios, to identify

potential hazards. Causes of the potential hazards and resultant consequences

were then identified, together with any safeguards and mitigating measures.

For the STS operations described in Node 4 the upset conditions on the LNG

cargo and vapour return lines were described by the use of standard HAZOP

parameters and deviations. The standard HAZOP parameters and deviations

used were as follows:

Parameters Deviations

Flow No

High

Low

Reverse

Pressure High

Low

Temperature High

Low

Level High

Low

Composition Change in

The agreed observations and conclusions were recorded in HAZOP

worksheets.




The team discussions were recorded on the HAZOP work sheets, which are

presented in Appendix 1. The work sheets are divided into the followingcategories:

Item

Parameter

Deviation

Cause

Consequence

Safeguards

Recommendations

The Marine Charts and the GA plans examined by the studies are included in

Appendix 2.




3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The proposed FSRU and LNGC marine operations with LNG STS cargo

transfer at EETL’s new berth facility have been assessed for their suitability to

handle major hazards and based on the findings of the HAZOP study, they are

judged not to present any intolerable risks, nor any risks significantly greater

than those found to be acceptable for operations at conventional LNG

offloading marine terminals. The major events of marine transit operationsfailure, manoeuvring failure, STS cargo transfer failure and emergency

response/security control have been considered and mitigation measures were

identified to reduce the risks.

A total of fifty three (53) recommended actions were identified by HAZOP

and these are presented in detail on the HAZOP Work Sheets, Appendix 1 of

this Report. The summary table of recommendations/actions is presented below:

3.1 Recommendations Summary

Recommendations Responsibility

1.Port to identify whether a dedicated pilot vessel will be employed and whatis the specification of the vessel with regards to boarding means for thepilot. It is recommended in order to make boarding feasible up to Hs=3mwave (which is maximum allowable for tug operations) that an elevatedboarding platform to be installed on the vessel. Safety review of theboarding operations to be undertaken to ensure safety procedures aremet.

PQA

2.It is recommended that in adverse monsoon conditions PQA introducepilot boarding at an earlier area at a location more than the current 2.5nautical miles boarding of buoys 1 & 2. This would provide more time forPilot and Master to exchange information and assess the conditions for

safe channel passage prior to entry through buoys 1 to 2.

PQA

3.Operating procedures should be put in place which should reflect theowner/operator own safe passage conditions. This means that the Masterof the LNGC would have to make appropriate decision of navigating in thearea off the pilot station until approved weather conditions would allowPilot boarding and undertaking passage through buoys 1 & 2

LNGC

4.SiPort study report to be finalised to include the following:1) Maximum environmental conditions acceptable for safe entry to beclearly defined and project to establish limiting weather criteria for

Project/PQA





apply:

a) a 75 ton or greater bollard pull escort tug should be provided to facilitatemaneuvering at speed during critical turns of the passage. The use andbenefits of this size escort tug have been verified in the SiPort study andappropriate recommendation should be incorporated in the final studyreport.b) Maritime HAZID has identified LNGC loss of power as a critical event

which can have direct impact on to Port Qasim operations. It isrecommended that the Port would provide a second escort tug for thepassage. This tug can be met at Buoy B1 and together with the escorting75 bollard ton tug, will ensure the capability during loss of power to preventvessel grounding and take it to a safe pre-established anchorage area. Ifrequired optimum positioning of tugs during transit through Phitti Creek tobe further determined in any following simulation program at Siport21.

7.Port to finalise numbers and sizes of tugs for the turning maneuverer. It is

recommended that the SiPort Report be finalised to include for a 75 tonbollard which will be the minimum tracking tug for the passage to berthtogether with other 3 tugs to be available at a port location to execute theberthing maneuver (minimum size of 60 ton bollard suggested for the 3tugs in order to mitigate against a potential loss of the 4th tug duringcritical manuoerve).

PQA

8.Port to address dynamic silting impact inside entry channel and addresswhether additional dredging would be required especially after monsoonperiod. Periodic channel bathymetry / soundings to be published in Noticeto Mariners and on the Port Website. Port to timely indicate prior ofLNGC loading if there are any particular months where navigation has tobe taken with caution due to post monsoon effects.

PQA

9.Port to establish water density changes during the Monsoon period. This

information to be published in the Port Handbook or on the Port Website.Operators to verify any potential impact to LNGC operations.

PQA/LNGC

10. It is recommended that in order to improve vessel turning capabil ity forberthing that the approved turning basin should clearly be defined by theuse of the proper aid to navigation (i.e. lighted yellow daymarks orsimilar). Details to be included in the Port Handbook and an approvednavigation chart.

PQA

11. An efficient channel maintenance plan including the aids to navigation tobe put in place by PQA and be communicated to the participating LNGCand FSRU as appropriate. Any changes to configuration of buoyageshould be supported by appropriate port notices to project prior to LNGCpassage.

PQA

12. PPUs were used in the SiPort simulat ions and if considered accuratepilots should be given portable PPU's to be used in the passage as anadditional aid for navigation.

PQA

13. LNGC supply vessel to ensure that the latest navigation char t used by thePakistani Navy or latest ENC/BA charts to apply throughout. Port toissue latest updates through Notice to Mariners available to all parties.

PQA

14. LNGC supply vessel operators to address passage plan at 7.8m draftand recommend any additional action necessary.

LNGC

15. LNGC Owner to conduct Opt imoor analysis of LNGC moored to FSRU asper project assessed mooring configuration and the jetty layout. Port toestablish the maximum limits for ship passing speed and minimumdistance off the STS double banked arrangement. Project to calculatesurge loads on the STS arrangement. It is noted that the approximate

distance from STS outer shell to mid fairway is over 150m.

PQA / LNGC / FSRU

16. Deviations from the PIANC guidelines of channel breadth have beendiscussed and justified by the concept QRA study. EETL to update andfiinalise QRA report in line with the new improved site layout includingberthing pocket and new trestle at an appropriate time with nextexpansion step.

PQA/EETL

17. It is recommended that integrity of civil design, foundations design, pipingand major equipment design to be verified against internationallyaccepted Engineering Codes and Standards by Independent Certificationprocess

Floating Solutions LLC,Lender’s Engineer





flange for the LNGCs (QFlex). Notably Q-Flex has the possibility to offer

16"x16" and 20"x16" reducers at connecting flanges.24. Compatibility assessment to address manifold line up and verify the

offset position for the smaller size of LNGC (125k) would operate withinthe ERS connection/hose arrangement to be applied.

FSRU/LNGC

25. Project requires Master and Chief Officer (as a minimum) to undergoSTS cargo transfer training prior to their involvement in operations atterminal. Details of number of participants, location of training andarrangements to be agreed between project and stakeholders.

FSRU/LNGC

26. Project requires Master and Chief Officer to undergonavigation/maneuvering passage training in real time simulationconditions at SiPort (to receive SiPort certificate). Such details to beagreed between project and stakeholders giving due consideration toother similar projects operating worldwide and reducing logistical

concerns and costs if possible. It is recommended that all ship officers tobe compliant with STCW training requirements for WW trade, unlimitedtonnage.

LNGC

27. The frequency and renewal for Master’s Cert ification for ‘SiPort’ trainingneeds to be discussed and agreed by all project stakeholders.

FSRU/LNGC/EETL

28. FSRU will provide certi ficate and supporting information appropriatelyrequired by stakeholders completing their own due diligence for all STSinstalled equipment. This will enable LNGC owners to address issuessuch as materials, weights, components etc.

FSRU

29. It is noted that the new proposed saddle design may not fit over theexisting Qflex railing because of the existing brackets. Project shouldensure compatibility study is completed with the standard design ofproposed STS equipment against vessel specifics, in order to establishrequirements to be adopted by the ship's deck structure. It is consideredbeneficial for project operations to maintain common design of allcomponents to the necessary degree to facilitate compatibility with allstakeholders.

LNGC

30. Project to verify that relief valve capacity is adequate for two 10“ hosesbetween ESDVs and also for trapped condition without fire in ambient airtemperature and subjected to solar radiation.

FSRU

31. For 10" hose service (and for longer hoses), project to address whetherany specific manufacturer recommendations apply regarding cool downtime. KLAW to clarify whether hydraulic testing of the choke valveoperations for the new ERS can be checked in cold conditions.

FSRU/KLAW

32. Project operation to address potential of flow rate exceeding the design

flow rate of the hoses and couplings by undertaking a surge analysis.Based on the result of the study, project to adopt appropriate mitigationmeans (restriction orifice plates or other).

FSRU

33. It is noted that the new design potential ly has a common failure modeassociated with the functionality of the ‘paddle’ design, failure of whichwould prevent hydraulic activation of the ERC. It is recommended thatdesign evaluates this further in order to ensure the continuous availabilityof the system. It is recommended that in line with the above designshould address the SIL rating of the HPU. Any procedural mitigationneeds to be addressed and in place prior of operating the system.

FSRU

34. 10” ERS system should finalise all testing and achieve Certification priorto be used by the project.

FSRU

35. ESD tests prior to cargo transfer should be incorporated into the cargo

transfer plan as common to all terminals.

FSRU/LNGC

36. Operating Procedures to address the best location of the Deck Watchduring STS. Evaluate whether this location will be within reach of thelocal ESD button (if it’s safe for the operator to activate this) and/or needcommunications with the control room in order to activate ESD1.

FSRU/LNGC

37. Compatibility study to address whether there is a provision of a runningwater curtain underneath the LNG manifold deck onboard the LNGC. Ifsuch a provision does not exist then appropriate modification with waterprovision from the fire water mains should be undertaken.

LNGC





be checked whether this is the case for smaller vessels which may

require additional operating measures to enable tanks to move outsidethe sloshing zones after disconnection. Consideration to be given tocurrent operations experience in other FSRU terminals worldwide.

46. Industry best pract ices for cargo transfer and topping off to be employedby FSRU.

FSRU

47. Terminal to conf irm cargo parameters set in composition andtemperature. Any specific requirement or deviation from contractedvalues/ range on temperature and cargo arrival condition is to be agreedprior loading the vessel. Due consideration should be given for thevoyage time from Ras Laffan.

SSGC/ FSRU

48. Composition to be compatible with retained heel and specificat ions atload port to be transmitted to FSRU to plan distribution accordingly.

EETL

49. A specific Security Study is repor ted to be undertaken by ConocoPhillips. It is noted that results of the study or the full report is beingconsidered to be shared with interested parties during 4th quarter of theyear.

EETL/ LNGC

50. Work permit and visitat ion request system and Declaration of Securityprocess, to be applied and all visits whether occasional from FSRU toLNGC via the FSRU or seaside visits to the LNGC have to be monitoredand operated by permits.

FSRU/LNGC/EETL

51. It is noted that the FSRU as part of the terminal operations is in theprocess of finalising a Due Diligence security review involving terminalsite/operations which will ensure the security of the FSRU and itssupplies at the terminal. It is considered that the security level defined bythe FSRU operators review would be imposed by the safety/securitychecklists to visiting LNGCs and this would be updated with due intervals.Based on this, combined with enhance port security assets, it isconcluded that level of security requirements for LNGC's will be fulfilled.Moreover Conoco Phillips is undertaking security assessment of the Portin Dec 2014.

FSRU/PQA

52. It is noted that Port Qasim is currently ISPS code compl iant for a specificlevel of security (to be defined). Flag operating LNGCs would berequired to inform their own flag operators at the time of visit to PortQasim and confirm whether the Port security level is at the same level setby the Flag state for this particular area. If there is a difference thenLNGC operators would have to update own security requirements toaddress desired security level imposed by the Flag.

LNGC

53. With regards to a dedicated marine patrol service for the terminal, it isnoted that the requirements for marine patrol at the facility is currently

fully undertaken by the Pakistani Navy and Maritime Security Agencywhich should include the water ways of the terminal approach andoperation. Initial Port Security Assessment indicates the marinecomponent to be vulnerable. PQA to provide suitable floating securityand rapid response assets as appropriate and acceptable to Project.

PQA




4. REFERENCES

Engro Elengy Terminal, Pakistan LNG Import Project Risk Assessment –

Hazard Identification and Operability Study, by Lloyd’s Register Doc.

No. OGL/DA/10078, February 2014

ETPL LNG Project- GA provisional platform phase 2 E-1010011-M-

0200-005 Rev 2

ETPL LNG Project- GA pilot plan E-1010011-M-0200-005 Rev 0

ETPL LNG Project- GA indicative jetty layout E-1010011-M-0201-001

Rev 2

ETPL LNG Project new birth layout general arrangement E-1010011-C-0200-015 Rev 0

HAZOP Regas Functional Diagram

Navigation Simulation Study 2014




Appendix 1

HAZOP Worksheets




Appendix 1

HAZOP Team Members




Appendix 1




Appendix 1













ELENGY TERMINAL NOVEMBER 2014HAZOP STUDY OGL/DA/10106

Appendix 1

Node: 2. LNGC berthing manuoerve and STS mooring

Deviation: 1.

Design Conditions/Parameters: Drawings / References:

Type: Equipment ID:

Hazard Consequence Effective Safeguards Recommendations Responsibil ity

2. Emergency disconnection during STS 1. Inability to disconnect mooring lines. Inability toleave FSRU berth due to tug/s unavailability. Impacton passing traffic, impact on Port Qasim operations.

1. Provision of remotely operatedmooring hook system. FSRU hasbeen provided with the ability toremotely disconnect mooring linesfrom LNGC on FSRU QRHs. (Note:The ability to disconnect LNGC

mooring lines (head and stern lines)leading to the jetty mooringdolphins remains solely within the

jetty control room.)

18. It is noted that currently there will be aprovision for one junction box on theFSRU to release all the STS mooring linesfor the LNGC. It is recommended that toimprove safety and operability, oneadditional box to be obtained and installed

on the FSRU which, via cable link, willenable the stern and bow hook release forthe LNGC as well. Project to address.

FSRU

19. Project to undertake LNGC - FSRUcompatibility with regards to mooringsystem and establish an STS mooringplan for every participating LNGC.Mooring operations to be addressed bysafety checklists as appropriate.

FSRU/LNGC

20. Project to address LNGC trim changesduring offloading, cargo tank stripping andpotential impact on mooring system.

FSRU/LNGC

3. ESD1 and ESD2 initiated due to gas release, fire

event, equipment malfunction, excessive weatherconditions, loss of mooring integrity, humanerror, other.

1. Potential LNGC departure from site. Fire-fighting,

supporting tugs, emergency evacuation requiringEmergency Response Procedures in place

1. Compatibility process will address

mutual agreement on emergencyprocedures

21. A combined Emergency Response

Procedure should be put in place toaddress all events between FSRU &LNGC prior to terminal operations. A listof standard emergencyresponses/procedures identified by riskassessment should be included within theshared Terminal Operations Manual.

FSRU/LNGC




Appendix 1

Node: 3. STS Equipment and Operations

Deviation: 1.


Type: Equipment ID:


1. Hose and STS equipment lifting including hoses,saddles, specific tooling etc. potential fordropped object event, human error

1. Impact on equipment on deck, inadequate flangeconnection, hose/saddle placement resulting in loadimpact on system, potential for LNG release,potential for personnel injury

1. Training standards integralrequirement of project.

22. FSRU should provide a hose handlingmanual for the LNGC. The manual willinclude STS personnel transfer, allhandling procedures, hose connection,saddle placement, disconnection, hosesecuring etc.

FSRU

23. FSRU to establish size, type andspecification required of presentationflange for the LNGCs (QFlex). Notably Q-Flex have the possibility to offer 16"x16"and 20"x16" reducers at connectingflanges.

FSRU

24. Compatibility assessment to addressmanifold line up and verify the offsetposition for the smaller size of LNGC(125k) would operate within the ERSconnection/hose arrangement to beapplied.

FSRU/LNGC

25. Project requires Master and Chief Officer(as a minimum) to undergo STS cargotransfer training prior to their involvementin operations at terminal. Details ofnumber of participants, location of trainingand arrangements to be agreed betweenproject and stakeholders.

FSRU/LNGC

26. Project requires Master and Chief Officerto undergo navigation/maneuveringpassage training in real time simulationconditions at SiPort (to receive SiPortcertificate). Such details to be agreedbetween project and stakeholders giving

due consideration to other similar projectsoperating worldwide and reducinglogistical concerns and costs if possible. Itis recommended that all ship officer’s tobe compliant with STCW trainingrequirements for WW trade, unlimitedtonnage.

LNGC

27. The frequency and renewal for Master’sCertification for ‘SiPort’ training needs tobe discussed and agreed by all project

FSRU/LNGC/EETL

ELENGY TERMINAL NOVEMBER 2014




Appendix 1

Node: 3. STS Equipment and Operations

Deviation: 1.


Type: Equipment ID:

Hazard Consequence Effective Safeguards Recommendations Responsibil itystakeholders.

2. Impact on STS equipment weight on LNGCmanifold max design load limits

1. Manifold structural integrity loss due to hosesystem/Y piece and reducer weight.

28. FSRU will provide certificate andsupporting information appropriatelyrequired by stakeholders completing theirown due diligence for all STS installedequipment. This will enable LNGC

owners to address issues such asmaterials, weights, components etc.

FSRU

3. Position of saddle affecting manifold reducer/ Ypiece and hose line-up, potential impact onmanifold deck lay-out

1. Hose load impact due to Y piece and saddlepositioning. Limited lay-down area for operations

1. FSRU will establish test rig toascertain feasibility of arrangementand ensure safety of connectionoperations as part of EN-1474Parts 2 and 3 compliance testing.

29. It is noted that the new proposed saddledesign may not fit over the existing Qflexrailing because of the existing brackets.project should ensure compatibility studyis completed with the standard design ofproposed STS equipment against vesselspecifics, in order to establishrequirements to be adopted by the ship'sdeck structure. It is considered beneficialfor project operations to maintain commondesign of all components to the necessarydegree to facilitate compatibility with all

stakeholders.

LNGC





Appendix 1

Node: 4. FSRU to LNGC Manifolds and connected Hose

Deviation: 1. No Flow


Type: Equipment ID:


1. ESD 1 will initiate ESD valve closures behindmanifolds and trip pump flow.

1. Locked-in LNG inventory within liquid hoses potentialof hose over pressurisation

1. Provision of safety relief valvesincorporated in standard LNGCmanifold. Also drain and purgeprocedures for the hoses havebeen included in the hose handlingmanual.

30. Project to verify that relief valve capacity isadequate for two 10“ hoses betweenESDVs and also for trapped conditionwithout fire in ambient air temperature andsubjected to solar radiation.

FSRU


Deviation: 2. Low Flow


Type: Equipment ID:


1. Rapid cooling down of hoses at elevated cargotransfer speed. Unregulated use of a main cargopump for cooling down service (in those ships

that don’t have/use spray pumps)

1. High thermal stress impact on STS equipmentcomponents, potential of loss of integrity.

1. Requirement by operator toundertake stroke test of the ERSsystem. Hydraulic testing of the

choke valve operations checked forthe new ERS.

31. For 10" hose service (and for longerhoses), project to address whether anyspecific manufacturer recommendations

apply regarding cool down time. KLAWto clarify whether hydraulic testing of thechoke valve operations for the new ERScan be checked in cold conditions.

FSRU/KLAW

2. Cooling down operations of thehose system will be undertaken bythe offloading LNGC. Low flowspray pumps will be used byLNGCs.

3. One ship will undertake the warmESD testing then the otherparticipant will do the cold ESDtesting

4. It is noted typical time for cool down8" hose is recommended by

operator - typically 90 mins cooldown of service flow





Appendix 1


Deviation: 3. High Flow


Type: Equipment ID:


1. Potential for spurious trip of hydraulic ESD valveduring a scenario of 4 liquid LNG manifolds inuse.

1. Potential overpressure impact to the rest of thesystem due to the closure of 2 hoses, potentiallyexceeding the manufacturer’s recommendations forflow/pressure of the 10" hoses and ERC.

1. Max flow design is 2,250 m3 perhose capacity to make a max cargotransfer rate of 12,000 m

3 using 6

LNG transfer hoses. This is basedon maximum flow specification ofthe hose and reflects the ERCdesign meeting the specification.

32. Project operation to address potential offlow rate exceeding the design flow rate ofthe hoses and couplings by undertaking asurge analysis. Based on the result of thestudy, project to adopt appropriatemitigation means (restriction orifice platesor other).

FSRU

2. Max design pressure of commonLNG header is 10 bar

33. It is noted that the new design potentiallyhas a common failure mode associatedwith the functionality of the ‘paddle’design, failure of which would preventhydraulic activation of the ERC. It isrecommended that design evaluates thisfurther in order to ensure the continuousavailability of the system. It isrecommended that in line with the abovedesign should address the SIL rating ofthe HPU. Any procedural mitigationneeds to be addressed and in place priorof operating the system.

FSRU

3. ESD testing takes place prior toSTS operations. Spurious valvefailure is considered a lowprobability event

34. 10” ERS system should finalise all testingand achieve Certification prior to be usedby the project.

FSRU

4. Project will deploy a new 10” KlawERS. The new design incorporatesan internal ‘paddle’ valve whichduring an ESD2 needs to close firstbefore a hydraulic interlock initiatesrelease of the coupling. Thehydraulics from the HPU activatesfirst the paddle and the releaseERC mechanism.










Appendix 1


Deviation: 8. High Temperature


Type: Equipment ID:

Hazard Consequence Effective Safeguards Recommendations Responsibil ityas fire relief valves as there is notan IGC Code requirement. It isnoted that the integrity of thesystem is also complemented bycooling water system on manifold.


Deviation: 9. Low Level


Type: Equipment ID:


1. Variance in cargo tank levels due to offloadingoperations

1. During adverse environmental conditions oremergency disconnection scenario, excessivesloshing loads may be imposed on tanks.

1. Manage time required to go out ofcritical sloshing levels for tanks asper recommendations on GTT forevery ship type.

44. An effective transfer plan for offloadingships to be put in place to ensure all thetime that management of critical levels willoccur within specified safe time.

LNGC

2. Topping up procedures in place forthe FSRU.

45. Project to address emergency departureassessment for critical volumes. For

certain LNGCs study has been completedby GTT but this needs to be checkedwhether this is the case for smallervessels which may require additionaloperating measures to enable tanks tomove outside the sloshing zones afterdisconnection. Consideration to be givento current operations experience in otherFSRU terminals worldwide.

LNGC


Deviation: 10. High Level


Type: Equipment ID:





HAZOP STUDY OGL/DA/10106

Appendix 1


Deviation: 10. High Level


Type: Equipment ID:


1. FSRU Tank overfill during STS cargo transfer 1. Potential tank overfill with tank PRV opening,potential of cryogenic brittle fracture of steel deck,potential of gas plume impact on FSRUdeck/accommodation.

1. Topping up procedures in place forthe FSRU.

46. Industry best practices for cargo transferand topping off to be employed by FSRU.

FSRU

2. Tank instrumentation includes HLalarm and HHL trip which initiatesESD1 closing FSRU manifoldESDVs.


Deviation: 11. Change of Composition


Type: Equipment ID:


1. Change of composition 1. Cargo density out of specification with FSRUrequirements presenting a roll-over risk.

1. Cargo specification has beenincluded in supply contract.

47. Terminal to confirm cargo parameters setin composition and temperature. Anyspecific requirement or deviation fromcontracted values/ range on temperatureand cargo arrival condition is to be agreed

prior loading the vessel. Dueconsideration should be given for thevoyage time from Ras Laffan.

SSGC/ FSRU

2. Cargo temperature out of specification with FSRUrequirements presenting a roll-over risk.

48. Composition to be compatible withretained heel and specifications at loadport to be transmitted to FSRU to plandistribution accordingly.

EETL







Appendix 1

Node: 5. Security arrangements

Deviation: 1.


Type: Equipment ID:

Hazard Consequence Effective Safeguards Recommendations Responsibil ityservice for the terminal, it is noted that therequirements for marine patrol at thefacility is currently fully undertaken by thePakistani Navy and Maritime Security

Agency which should include the waterways of the terminal approach andoperation. Initial Port Security

Assessment indicates the marinecomponent to be vulnerable. PQA toprovide suitable floating security and rapidresponse assets as appropriate andacceptable to Project.





Appendix 2

Marine Charts & GA





Appendix 2





Appendix 2





Appendix 2





Appendix 2





Appendix 2

Documents

Eetl Hazop Report Rev 1