Educational Access and Peace Duration in Post-Conflict Countries

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Educational Access and Peace Durationin Post-Conflict CountriesJohn Ishiyama a & Marijke Breuning aa University of North TexasAccepted author version posted online: 22 Nov 2011.Publishedonline: 22 Feb 2012.

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International Interactions, 38:58–78, 2012Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 0305-0629 print/1547-7444 onlineDOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.640211

Educational Access and Peace Durationin Post-Conflict Countries

JOHN ISHIYAMA and MARIJKE BREUNINGUniversity of North Texas

Does increased access to education after the end of a civil warreduce or increase the risk of the resumption of civil war? As severalscholars have argued, increased access to education is linked withthe promotion of civil society, reduces economic inequality, andimproves the livelihood of the population (Walter 2004). Moreover,by promoting education, the government signals to the popula-tion that it is concerned with the citizens of the country (Thyne2006). Further, the opportunity for education increases the oppor-tunity costs for rebels to fight the government, hence reducingthe likelihood that former rebels will reinitiate a conflict (Collierand Hoeffler 2004; Walter 2002). On the other hand, others havepointed out that education may contribute to conflict particularlyif employment opportunities do not keep pace with educationalattainment (Buckland 2005; Degu 2005). Despite the claims of atheoretical linkage between access to education and peace dura-tion, most empirical studies have examined the effects of civil waron education (Buckland 2005; Lai and Thyne 2007) as opposed tothe effects of educational access on the recurrence of civil conflictor have focused largely on individual cases. In this article, usinga stratified proportional hazard analysis, we empirically examinethe relationship between increased education enrollments and thelikelihood of civil war recurrence from 1990–2008.

KEYWORDS civil war, education, higher education, peaceduration

Data and replication files are available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/internationalinteractions.

Address correspondence to John Ishiyama, Department of Political Science, University ofNorth Texas, 1155 Union Circle #305, Denton, TX 76203, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

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Education and Peace Duration 59

Does increased access to education after the end of a civil war reduce orincrease the likelihood of the resumption of a civil war? As several scholarshave noted, civil wars often reoccur as a result of a “conflict trap”—poorcountries are more susceptible to civil wars and conflict prone countriesare likely to be poor (Collier, Elliotte, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, andSambanis 2003). The expansion of educational access is seen by many asa way out of this “conflict trap.” As Peter Buckland notes (2006:7) “educa-tion is expected to contribute significantly to rebuilding shattered societies.Policymakers assert that it can heal the psychosocial wounds of war, solveyouth unemployment, deliver decentralization and democracy, build peaceand promote economic and social development” (Buckland 2006:8; see alsoBuckland 2005).

Broadening access to education is also linked with civil society develop-ment, the reduction of economic inequality, improvements in the livelihoodof the population (Walter 2002; see also Bloom, Canning, and Chan 2006;Davies 2004; Seitz 2004; Sommers 2003). Moreover, by promoting expandedaccess to education, the government signals to the population that it is con-cerned with its citizens, thus assuaging potential future dissidence (Thyne2006). In addition, the opportunity to receive an education increases theopportunity costs for rebels to rebel, hence reducing the likelihood that for-mer rebels will reinitiate a conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Walter 2002).However, others have pointed out that expansion of educational access maycontribute to conflict, particularly if employment opportunities do not keeppace with educational attainment (Buckland 2005; Degu 2005).

Often after the end of a civil war there is rapid reconstruction ofeducational systems and an increase in educational enrollments (Buckland2005) with some countries increasing enrollments more rapidly than oth-ers. However, does expanded access—and the increased enrollments thatfollow—lead to an increased or decreased likelihood of a resumption ofconflict? Despite the claims of a theoretical linkage between expansion ofeducational access and peace duration, most empirical studies have exam-ined the effects of civil war on education, as opposed to the effects ofeducation on the recurrence of civil conflict (Buckland 2005; Lai and Thyne2007). Most work that has examined the impact of the expansion of edu-cational access on conflict has been largely inconclusive and has focusedmostly on individual cases and policy prescriptions (Do and Iyer 2007;Obura and Byrd 2009; Parwez 2006; Tawil and Harley 2004). Further, moststudies have not distinguished between expansion of educational accessgenerally and the expansion of access to higher education on recurrenceof civil war. In this paper, using hazard analysis, we empirically exam-ine the relationship between accessibility to education (in terms of schoolenrollments at the primary, secondary, and tertiary or higher education insti-tutions) and the likelihood of civil war recurrence in 1815 post-conflict dyadsfrom 1975–2008.

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60 J. Ishiyama and M. Breuning

LITERATURE REVIEW

Educational Access and Civil War

There is currently a substantial literature that seeks to explain the resump-tion of civil conflicts. In particular, scholars have focused on the context inwhich the conflict takes place, the characteristics of the previous conflict(such as whether the conflict was an ethnic or religious one, the level ofintensity of the conflict, and the length of the conflict), and the character-istics of the settlement (Crocker and Hampson 1996; Hartzell and Hoddie2003; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Walter 1999; Walter 2002). However, therehave been remarkably few studies in political science that have linked edu-cational access with civil war and civil conflict. This is surprising, given theimportance attached to the expansion of education as a means to create theconditions for a durable peace.

Indeed, a growing body of work has emerged in recent years thathas related education and widespread civil conflict and civil wars, partic-ularly among education scholars (Buckland 2005; Davies 2004; Evans 2008;Gallagher, 2004; Tawil and Harley 2004). Generally this literature has focusedon three areas in relating education and conflict. The first deals with thenegative and destructive effects of conflict on educational systems. The sec-ond focuses on the design of the educational system and the content ofthe curriculum as it relates to peace education (Davies 2004; Evans 2008;Gallagher 2004; Tawil and Harley 2004). The third examines how educa-tional opportunity (or the ability of people to have access to education)affects the probability of the start or restart of a major civil conflict. Thispaper is related primarily to the third approach.

Most works on education and civil war concentrate on the conse-quences of civil war on education. For instance, Lai and Thyne (2007) foundthat civil war has a devastating effect on a country’s educational system.This is because, first, civil wars destroy a country’s educational infrastruc-ture and decimate teaching personnel, and, second, during the course ofthe civil war, the government cuts educational spending as it increases mili-tary spending. Hence, civil wars have tremendously damaging effects on theeducational system.

A 2005 World Bank report (Buckland 2005) also underlined the dam-aging effects of civil wars on education, but also outlined some of thechallenges of rebuilding education systems after violent conflicts end. In thisstudy of 52 countries from 1990–2004, Buckland (2005) finds that civilwar occurrence has a negative effect on both the quantity of teachersand, particularly, the quality of teachers at primary and secondary educa-tional levels—“the most profound and lasting impact of conflict on primaryeducation, however, is on quality rather than access” (Buckland 2005:20).Nonetheless, educational systems can be rebuilt, and rather quickly, oncethe conflict ends.

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A second approach relates to the reconstruction of educational systems,and in particular creating educational systems and curricula that will pro-mote peace (Baxter 2000; Burns and Aspeslagh 1996; Davies 2004; Fountain1999; Salomon and Nevo 2002; Tawil and Harley 2004; Wintersteiner Spaijic-Vrkas, and Teutsh 2003). This literature tends toward the proscriptive, butsome scholars (Gallagher 2004, for instance) empirically evaluate the effec-tiveness of peace education across a number of countries, focusing on peaceeducation programs at the primary and secondary school levels.

The third approach examines the impact of expanded educationalopportunity on the probably of the onset of major civil conflict. One of thevery few pieces that have directly linked civil war and educational opportu-nity is the work of Thyne (2006), who focuses on the relationship betweeneducational opportunity and civil war onset. For Thyne, the effect of educa-tion on conflict onset is linked to the often cited “grievance” model (Collierand Hoeffler 2004). From this perspective, education promotion is nega-tively related to the incidence of civil war. Increases in educational funding,for instance, help to reduce the grievance of potential rebels because suchincreases signal to rebels that the government cares about the people, seeksto reduce economic inequality, and to improve the quality of life of thepopulation. Further, the opportunity for education increases the opportunitycosts for rebels to rebel, hence reducing the likelihood that former rebelswill initiate a conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Walter 2002).

Educational expansion can also help deter the initiation (or reinitiation)of conflict because increased educational opportunity helps build social cap-ital and civil society—and civil society organizations are crucial in mediatingconflict (Putnam 1993). Indeed, “Education is one of the most powerfulinfluences on political behavior almost anywhere. . . . Historically, educa-tion may have played an important role in strengthening the foundations forthe civic community” (Putnam 1993:188).

The rapid reconstruction and expansion of the educational system canalso accelerate the post civil war economic recovery. As Murdoch andSandler (2002) argue, the expansion of educational opportunities spurs eco-nomic growth because a more educated society generally leads to better,higher paying jobs in an economy (which also means that potential rebelswould be faced with very large opportunity costs if they choose to reinitiatea conflict). As an example, post-war El Salvador is often lauded as an exam-ple of a rapidly reconstructed educational system and rapidly expandingenrollments at all levels throughout the 1990s, an expansion of opportuni-ties that contributed directly to the maintenance of the peace there after theend of the civil war (Guzman 2005).

The expansion of educational access, however, may not necessarilylead to the generation of a more durable peace. Indeed, other scholarshave suggested that the expansion of educational opportunities may in factcontribute to the incidence of civil conflict as opposed to detracting from

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it—education access can help prevent conflict, but can also cause con-flict to spread (Buckland 2005; Crisp et al. 2001; Davies 2004; Retamal andAedo-Richmond 1998; UNESCO 2002). For instance, the common assump-tion, “whatever is done to ensure more education, contributes to promotingdemocratic attitudes” (Schell-Faucon 2001:56) has been vehemently criti-cized by recent analyses of the effects of educational opportunity in thecontext of ethnic conflicts (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Smith and Vaux 2003).Contrary to this common wisdom Smith and Vaux claim that “simply pro-viding education does not ensure peace” (Smith and Vaux 2003:10; see alsoTawil and Harley 2004).

There have been other works that have questioned the role of educationin promoting peace. For instance, a World Bank report (Buckland 2005) hasnoted that “educational systems and schools, which are widely expected toplay a role in mediating the relationship between ethnic and religious groupsand so build ‘social capital’ at the same time often stand accused of deep-ening conflict among ethnic, religious, and other social groups” (Buckland2005:9). Along these lines, Tawil and Harley (2004) note that the content ofthe curriculum affects education’s ability to facilitate coexistence or fuel hate.Degu (2005:141) furthermore argues that education can contribute to the cre-ation of widespread civil violence or the intensification of existing conflict.This has less to do with the amount of funds expended on education, andmore to do with the extent to which there is equity in educational access. Forinstance, gaps between rural schools and urban schools may create greaterresentments among rural populations, resentments that are often directed atthe government. Additionally, if the expansion of educational opportunity isnot accompanied by a similar expansion in economic opportunities, there isthe possibility of an increasing number of educated unemployed or under-employed. Given that historically, large-scale revolts (such as the Taipingand Nien rebellions in China, and the Tonghak in Korea) and contemporaryterrorist groups have been led by such educated unemployed, this does notbode well for the maintenance of peace.

Empirically, the Nepalese case illustrates the potential dangers ofexpanded educational access. Parwez (2006), using district level data from1990–2006, found that the higher the level of average educational attainmentthe greater the likelihood that intense conflict would occur in that districtduring the Nepalese Civil War. An earlier British (DFID 2003) study indi-cated that higher levels of education coupled with high unemployment rates(and hence lower opportunities for employment) significantly contributed tothe onset of civil war in Nepal.

Much of the focus of the literature that has examined the educationalaccess/civil conflict relationship has generally not differentiated between theeffects of education generally and the specific effects of higher education(that is, the college or university level) on the potential for the reoccur-rence of widespread civil conflict. Although Ghani and Lockhart (2008:89)

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note that “a first-rate system of higher education” is a prerequisite for thedevelopment of leadership capacity, they do not address the role of accessto higher education in the aftermath of civil conflict in reducing the likeli-hood that conflict will recur. Indeed, most studies have examined only theeffects of primary and secondary education as a deterrent (or catalyst) forthe initiation—or reinitiation—of conflict. However, there is good reason tobelieve that signaling that opportunities in higher education exist impacts onthe grievances (and greed) of the former rebels, particularly the leadershipof rebel groups.

First, many rebel and terrorist organizations explicitly recruit more edu-cated cadres, largely because such recruits make for reliable fighters andmore reliable local leaders. As Krueger and Maleckova (2003:122) note,rebel organizations prefer to select those who have better education, inpart because there is a belief that high levels of education is “probably asignal of one’s commitment to a cause and determination, as well as one’sability to prepare for an assignment and carry it off.” This notion is sup-ported by a study conducted by Nasran Hassan (2001) of 250 PalestinianMilitants and their associates. Hassan found that groups such as Hamasspecifically look for more highly educated recruits among the hordes offrustrated and unemployed young men who flock to Hamas, because theyare more likely to be more committed to the cause than those who are moti-vated by the desire to seek an “alternative means” of livelihood. In the caseof the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (CPN-M) during the civil war, theCPN(M) was very selective in terms of recruiting younger cadres to staff thelocal party organizations (Weinstein 2007:302; see also Evans 2008), oftenselecting more educated recruits. Membership recruitment for the CPN(M)was highly “selective” (Klapdor 2009), based on the candidates’ “dedica-tion to the cause of the revolution.” After the end of a civil war, the allureof higher education would be more appealing to those who already hadsome education prior to the onset of the civil war. Thus, rebel comman-ders and local leaders are likely to personally benefit from access to highereducation (or at least secondary education) more so than from access toprimary education.

Second, once enrolled in university, the opportunity costs to reinitiateconflict become significantly higher because this entails they will not com-plete their university education nor reap its benefits. Such opportunity costsnot only face former rebels, but also potential rebel recruits, or those whomay be thinking about joining the rebels among the societal elites.

On the other hand, some scholars have noted that access to highereducation may actually increase the likelihood of the reinitiation of con-flict. Throughout the world, universities have been breeding grounds forradicals and rebels (such as Arturo Guzman of the Sendero Luminoso).Thus increased access to higher education may not deter the reinitiationof conflict, but actually increases the likelihood that conflict reoccurs. This

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is especially true, if the economic opportunities available to highly educatedyoung people are limited. Indeed, in recent studies of terrorist behavior,the evidence shows an overrepresentation of higher educated among vio-lent operatives, such as suicide bombers (Kruger and Maleckova 2003) andin particular for groups such as engineers and doctors (see Gambetta andHertog 2009).

Thus, the above literature suggests a set of contending hypothesesregarding the impact of educational access on the likelihood of the reoccur-rence of civil war. On the one hand, there is the proposition that increasesin educational access following the end of a conflict should promote theduration of peace (because of the reduction of grievances via the signalingeffect of increased expenditures and the increased opportunity costs thataccompany enrollment opportunities, particularly at secondary and tertiarylevels).1 This suggests two hypotheses based on the assumption that accessto education increases the opportunity costs associated with conflict:

H1: Countries that have greater increases in educational access (in primaryand secondary education) as measured by educational enrollments, in theperiod following the end of a conflict, are less likely to have recurrence ofconflict and a longer period of peace duration.

H2: Countries that have greater increases in educational enrollment, espe-cially at the higher education levels, are less likely to have recurrence ofconflict and a longer period of peace duration.

On the other hand, whether increased enrollments in educationdecreases the likelihood of the resumption of conflict may depend on theextent to which there are economic opportunities, especially opportunities(or the lack thereof) that are available to those enrolled, especially in highereducation. Thus, access to higher education may increase the likelihood ofresumption of conflict, and reduce the period of peace duration.

The above suggests the following hypothesis derived from the assump-tion that higher education fosters radicalism:

H3: Countries that have greater increases in educational enrollment, espe-cially at the higher education level, interacting with decreased economicopportunities, are more likely to have recurrence of conflict and a shorterperiod of peace duration.

1There are, however, potential limitations on what we can interpret from the results. For instance, the factthat our level of analysis was dyadic for the dependent variable, but educational access is measured bynational level data, there is certainly a potential for aggregation problems. However, if our argument wasthat actual educational participation hindered conflict restart, then we would need data on participationby rebels in higher education. This data (of course) is not available, but it is important to note that weuse the educational access measure (as indicated by aggregate participation) as an indicator of the state’scommitment to education (or signaling).

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Other Factors Affecting Civil War Recurrence

Beyond educational access (as an indicator of state signaling of educationalopportunities), there are several control variables that need to be considered.For instance, economic and social context has been cited as impacting onwhether a conflict reoccurs. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009), Fearonand Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (1998), for instance, demonstratea strong inverse relationship between the level of economic developmentand civil war. Generally, economic growth, measured in GDP per capitagrowth (for Collier and Hoeffler 1998) or per capita income (for Fearon andLaitin 2003) dampens the likelihood of civil war occurrence. This is becausean expanding economic pie helps reduce the economic grievances that driveconflict in the first place. It would make sense, then, that economic growthand wealth expansion, particularly after the end of a conflict, should alsohave a dampening effect on the resumption of hostilities after a settlementhas been reached.

The nature of the previous conflict also affects whether or not a con-flict restarts. For instance, Walter (1999:147) points out that ethnic conflictsare more likely to restart because such conflicts are “disputes betweencommunities that see themselves as having distinct heritages over powerrelationships between the communities, while ideological civil wars are con-tests between factions within the same community over how that communityshould be governed.” Ideological commitments are often quite flexible andfluid, whereas factions in ethnic civil wars are far more rigid. Kaufmann(1996:139) argues that, in ethnically based civil wars, identity hardens tosuch an extent that “cross-ethnic political appeals become futile.” Svensson’s(2007) findings modify this to suggest that this applies primarily when reli-gious or ethnic claims are central to the conflict. In any case, ethnic wars aremore difficult to resolve because such conflicts “generate intense securitydilemmas, both because the escalation of each side’s mobilization rhetoricpresents a real threat to the other, and even more because intermingledpopulation settlement patterns create defensive vulnerabilities and offensiveopportunities” (Kaufmann 1996:139).

Another aspect of the nature of the conflict is the intensity of the pre-vious conflict and its duration. Post-conflict countries are more likely torecover from conflict at a faster pace than countries that have experiencedlong-term conflict or genocide (Buckland 2005). In terms of the intensity ofthe conflict, Walter (2002:373) suggests that wars with high casualties leavea legacy of revenge and retribution, and hence are more likely to resume.On the other hand, scholars like Mason, Gurses, and Brandt (2005:5) arguethat higher casualty rates and longer duration of a conflict actually act asdeterrents to the resumption of hostilities on the part of a rebel organization.Basing their approach on models developed in conflict studies generally(particularly models of international conflict, such as Wittman’s (1979) and

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Stam’s (1996) model of interstate war termination, Mason and Fett’s (1996)and Mason, Weingarten, and Fett’s (1999) models of civil war termination,and DeRouen and Sobek’s (2004) explanation for civil war duration), theyargue that “whether or not former or aspiring new rebel organizations actu-ally initiate a new conflict is a function of their estimate of whether theywould be better off if the peace endures than if the conflict resumes” (Mason,Gurses, and Brandt 2005:2).

Whether rebel groups choose to resume a conflict thus depends onwhether a resumption of hostilities provides perceived greater benefits forthe rebels (such as victory or better settlement terms) than does maintainingthe status quo (or sticking to the agreement). This perception is based onprevious experiences on the part of the rebel group. If the previous conflictprior to the agreement was intense with high casualities, this sends a clearsignal to the rebel groups that a resumption of hostilities is likely to come athigh cost.

Similarly, the length of the previous conflict is also argued to impact onthe probability of the resumption of hostilities (Touval and Zartman 1985).Long conflicts cause both sides to become exhausted, so there is less incen-tive to immediately restart a conflict. Mason, Gurses, and Brandt (2005),further note that as with high casualty rates, the duration of the previousconflict sends a clear signal to the combatants that the cost of achieving vic-tory would be extremely high, thus acting as a further deterrent to resuminghostilities.

In addition to the nature of the conflict, the features of the settle-ment also affect the probability of conflict resumption. Hartzell, Hoddie,and Rothschild (2001) argue that conflicts that end in a negotiated settle-ment tend to lead to longer periods of peace duration, particularly if thepeace settlement includes multiple dimensions of power-sharing (includingdisarmament and amnesty) between the former protagonists. Of particularimportance is whether the opposition gains representation in the centers ofpower after the settlement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Hoddie and Hartzell2005; Walter 1999; Walter 2002).

On the other hand, Wagner (1993) and Licklider (1995) have arguedthat many negotiated settlements preserve the organizational capacities ofthe combatants, particularly the rebel side, making it easier for one side tore-initiate the conflict. For this reason Licklider (1995) contends that negoti-ated settlements are actually more likely to lead to the restart of an armedconflict than if one side or the other wins the conflict.

There is also the relationship between democracy and civil warresumption. Indeed, there has been some literature that suggests thatdemocracies are less likely to experience civil war because the insti-tutions and processes of democracy help defuse violence by funnelingdiscontent into nonviolent protest and electoral competition (Hegre et al.2001). Opposition groups can thus seek redress of their grievances through

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electoral means and government leaders have an incentive to accommodatesuch groups for electoral reasons. Further, elected leaders are much lesslikely to repress dissident groups, because of the electoral consequencesthat might result.

However, others have questioned the connection between democracyand civil war resumption. Licklider (2002) found that, although democracyappears to encourage the toleration of more political dissent, reduce govern-ment violence, and can act as a symbolic reward for groups within society, itis not clear that such attributes really affect whether or not a country returnsto civil war. In their analysis, Fearon and Laitin (2003) found no relation-ship between democracy and rebellion—in other words, democracy doesnot appear to inoculate a country against civil war.

Finally, there has been a considerable amount of literature that suggestsa link between access to lootable resources and civil war occurrence. Forinstance, Collier and Hoeffler (2001) have argued that access to lootablewealth, defined as lucrative, easy-to-transport resources, like gems, tropicaltimber, and illicit drugs, generates disorder by supplying the motive andmeans for armed rebellion (see also Weinstein 2005; for counter evidence tothis proposition, see Snyder 2006).

DATA AND METHODS

To investigate the effects of the expansion of educational opportunitieson whether a conflict restarts, we first constructed a data set to identifyconflicts which had ended (given our interest in what affects the restartof conflict). This was based upon the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’sConflict Termination dataset version 2.1 (UCDP 2009). From this UCDPdataset we selected only those conflicts that were listed as intrastate con-flicts (or conflicts that occurred between the government of a state andone or more internal opposition group(s) with or without interventionfrom other states [secondary parties] on one or both sides) that terminatedfrom 1975 (or roughly the beginning of the third wave of democratization)until 2008.

Given that we are interested in explaining why a civil conflict resumesafter an agreement (either peace agreement or ceasefire), our unit of anal-ysis is the agreement itself. This meant that essentially we examine thedyadic relations between the rebel group and the state. Further this alsomeant that it was quite possible to have several different observations percountry—with different rebel groups coming to separate agreements withthe government (each of which would be considered a separate case).A single rebel organization may have come to several agreements with thegovernment over the period 1975–2008, each of which would also be codedas a separate case. In total, we coded 1,815 cases.

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For our dependent variables we defined a conflict year as a year inwhich the opposition group was reported to relaunch attacks against thegovernment, or fighting began again, and coded that as “1”—peace yearwas coded as a “0” (UCDP 2009). Although perhaps a better measure of thisis whether or not the opposition “shot first” and violated the agreement, itwas not possible to determine whether the government or the oppositionshot first, in most cases. Nonetheless, it is likely that even if the govern-ment shot first, tensions had escalated enough that either side could beheld responsible for violating the peace agreement. Thus for both practi-cal and theoretical reasons we merely code a year as a conflict year or apeace year.

As to our primary independent variables we measured this using dataon primary and secondary student enrollments and university student enroll-ments per capita by year as reported by the Cross National Time Series dataset (Banks 2011). We believe that the first five years after the end of aconflict is crucial in terms of signaling the government’s intention of pro-viding educational opportunities to former (and potential) rebels. Althoughto some extent, signaling might be better measured by expenditures oneducation, this data was not available for the time period covered in thisstudy. However, increasing enrollments may indicate that expenditures mayhave also increased. More importantly, since we are interested in increasedopportunities for rebels and potential rebels, then increasing enrollmentswould provide these opportunities. Thus we calculate the average increasein enrollments for the first five years following the end of the conflict,for both primary/secondary students and university enrollments as well, todetermine whether early expansion in enrollment helps as an early hedgeagainst conflict resumption. However, increases in enrollments may not beas important as the actual number of enrollments per capita. Indeed, if thereare only a few enrollments in education, then small absolute increases inenrollments will show up as large percentage increases. Thus we also controlfor the number of enrolled students at the primary/secondary and universitylevels per capita in the model. In addition we also create an interactive termwith university enrollments by GDP growth. If GDP growth rates remainpositive (keeping pace with university enrollments) this should also preventconflict resumption (hypothesis 3). However, if GDP grow rates are loweror negative, and university enrollments increase, this should (according tohypothesis 3) increase the likelihood of conflict resumption.

In terms of economic factors we follow Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner’s(2009) use of GDP per capita growth rate. Economic growth rates purport-edly provide strong incentives to not engage in rebellion and hence act as apowerful deterrent to the resumption of conflict.

As mentioned above, the restart of civil wars may be due to theethnic nature of a conflict, particularly one that pitted large groupsagainst one another (which are likely to be more intense than more

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fractionalized societies). To measure ethnic polarization we use Montalvoand Reynal-Querol’s (2005) index of Ethnic Polarization (EP) or

1 −N∑

i=1

(1/2 − πi

1/2

)2

πi

Where π i is the proportion of each ethnic group and N is the number ofethnic groups.

Ethnic polarization is highest when there are two equally-sized groups.The value diminishes as the number of groups increases, but also as thepercentage share of the population of the largest group increases. For thisstudy we use the cross-sectional ethnic polarization data for our countries.However, inasmuch as such data were not available for all countries, weimputed values for the missing cases based upon the data provided byFearon and Laitin’s (2003) data on the percentage share of the second largestethnic group in the population.

In addition, as indicated above, the characteristics of the previous con-flict also impact the likelihood of civil war resumption. This includes thelength of the conflict prior to the first peace agreement (measured in termsof years). This would help test the proposition that the length of the conflictmay create an “exhaustion” effect. Further this would also be tested by theintensity level of the previous conflict, measured by the UCDP measure INT(or the intensity of conflict that the settlement addressed). We recoded theINT measure so that a conflict was coded as “0” for conflict episodes thatonly consist of years of minor armed conflict (25–999 deaths) and a cod-ing of 1 indicated that the conflict episode include at least one year wherefighting reached the intensity of war (or at least 1,000 battle deaths).

In addition we also coded for each year the Polity2 score for the gov-ernment (to determine if there was a difference between democratic andautocratic regimes in terms or conflict re initiation). Further, as mentionedabove, the outcome of the previous conflict affects the likelihood of recur-rence. Using the data from the UCDP conflict termination data (UCDP 2009),we recoded the OUTCOME measure from the six categories into a dummyvariable with two values.2 For conflicts that ended peacefully via a com-prehensive peace agreement or a cease-fire (scores 1, 2, or 3), these werecoded as 1, and those ending otherwise were coded as 0.

Finally, we created a dummy variable for access to lootable resources(as reported by Snyder 2006) where countries with large deposits of gems(particularly easily accessible alluvial diamonds), tropical timber, and illicitdrugs (such as coca and opium), were coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.

2The outcome measure captures issues of amnesty, disarmament, and other aspects of settlement(especially the comprehensive peace agreement category).

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This is included in the model to control for the effects of access tolootable resources.

ANALYSIS

The above literature, what little there has been of it that has examined theimpact of educational access on civil war, has presumed a generally linearrelationship between access and peace, that is, that expansion of educa-tion increases the likelihood of peace (Buckland 2005; Ghani and Lockhart2008). Thus, given that much of the literature suggests a linear relationshipbetween educational access and conflict, in our analysis we, as a first steptoward assessing the relationship, also test this proposition using a varietyof linear models.

A stratified Cox’s proportional hazard model is used to test and ana-lyze the relationship (or lack thereof) between education enrollments andduration of peace in post-conflict societies. This survival model assesses therisk or hazard rate of peace failure (that is, civil war recurring) in a givenyear while taking into account the length of time a country has been atrisk along with the independent variables. Factors that shorten the dura-tion of peace increase the hazard rate compared to the baseline hazard,whereas factors that prolong the duration of peace decrease the hazard rate(Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Mason,Gurses, Brandt, and Quinn 2011). The Cox model does not “parameter-ize time dependency,” which allows one to test and control for the possiblenon-proportionate effects of each variable (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003:42).Failure to control for non-proportional hazards can lead to “false inferencesabout a variable’s substantive and statistical significance” (Box-Steffenmeieret al. 2003:34; Box-Steffenmeier and Jones 2004; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn2001). Thus, we employ the Cox procedure.

Since the Cox model assumes that the hazard rate is proportionate,we tested for the presence of non-proportional hazards. The tests fornon-proportionality for our model are presented in Table 1. The p valuefor global test is .036, and therefore we must reject the null hypothesisof proportional hazards, that is, that the assumption that the hazard rateis proportional is violated. Further investigation, via the results from theSchoenfeld residuals tests, identify the particularly problematic variables—GDP per capita growth, the Polity2 scores, and number of years the previousconflict lasted. These variables violate the assumption of proportional haz-ards. To address this possible misspecification issue we used as a correctivemeasure the procedure recommended by Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2003)and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004); That is, we estimated the modelswith interaction terms between each of these variables and natural logarithmof time.

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TABLE 1 Nonproportional Hazard Diagnostics for Duration of Post-Conflict Peace

Variable Rho χ 2 Prob > χ 2

Average percent increase in enrollment at primary/secondary level in first five years after settlement

0.0802 1.26 0.2611

Average percent increase in enrollment at highereducation level in first five years after settlement

0.1164 1.57 0.2101

Enrollments in primary and secondary school per capita(×1,000)

−0.1119 1.49 0.2225

Enrollments in higher education per capita (×1,000) 0.0108 0.01 0.9256Enrollments in higher education × GDP growth rate 0.0455 0.18 0.6726GDP per capita growth rate 0.1843 4.06 0.0440Ethnic polarization −0.1363 1.82 0.1508Polity2 0.1667 3.32 0.0684Previous conflict intensity score −0.1206 1.59 0.2079Length of previous conflict in years 0.1635 3.17 0.0748Type of outcome dummy 0.0108 0.01 0.9109Global test 20.78 0.0358

In addition, there is a potential problem with repeated events, partic-ularly since several dyads have more than one peace period in the dataset. Indeed, treating these observations as if they were independent “couldyield misleading variance estimates and possibly biased estimates of thecoefficients” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:155). Following the cue ofMason, Gurses, Brandt, and Quinn (2011), who point out that the odds ofpeace failure in a dyad is higher when there have been previous peace fail-ures, we employ a simple count variable to control for this problem. We thenstratify the Cox analysis by this variable to “allow each strata to have its ownbaseline hazard rate while coefficients are restricted to be the same acrossstrata” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:160, emphasis in the original).

Table 2 reports the results of the stratified Cox proportional hazardsprocedure. As indicated by the results, early expansion of primary and sec-ondary enrollments neither increases nor decreases the likelihood of conflictreinitiation, a rather surprising result given the emphasis on quickly rebuild-ing primary and secondary education systems in post-conflict societies.Although the hazard ratio is less than one, and the relationship appearsnegative (as indicated by the sign of the z statistic) suggesting that earlyexpansion of primary and secondary enrollments reduces the likelihood offailure (i.e., conflict restart), the relationship is not statistically significant.3

However, the results do indicate that increases in enrollments in highereducation within the first five years of the end of a conflict significantlyreduced the likelihood of the recurrence of conflict even when control-ling for annual numbers of university enrollees per capita. These results do

3It is important to note that hazards ratios do not have signs, and hence are not interpreted in the sameway a coefficient. Rather the sign of the Z statistic indicates the direction of the relationship.

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TABLE 2 Stratified Cox Regression Results for Post-Conflict Peace Duration

Variable

Hazard ratios(Robust SE)

[z-score]

Average percent increase in enrollment at primary/secondary levelin first five years after settlement

.5535(2.46)[−0.13]

Average percent increase in enrollment at higher education level infirst five years after settlement

.1491∗

(.1715)[−1.67]

Enrollments in primary and secondary school per capita (×1000) . 9991∗∗∗

(.0003)[−3.08]

Enrollments in higher education per capita (×1000) .9948∗∗∗

(.0018)[−2.76]

Enrollments in higher education × GDP growth rate 1.001(.0002)[.76]

GDP per capita growth rate 3.07e+42∗∗∗

(2.49e+44)[1.21]

GDP per capita growth rate × ln(time) 2.56e−06∗∗∗

(.0001)[−1.21]

Ethnic polarization 1.0879(.6142)[.156]

Polity2 1.05e+20(8.91e+21)

[.54]Polity2 × ln(time) .0023

(0260)[−.54]

Previous conflict intensity score 1.4001(.5902)[.80]

Length of previous conflict in years 3.79e+55∗∗∗

(1.09e+57)[4.47]

Length of previous conflict in years × ln(time) 4.88e−08∗∗∗

(1.84e−07)[−4.47]

Type of outcome dummy .9570(.2880)[−.15]

Lootable resources dummy .8377(.3715)[−.40]

Note: Variance Inflation Factor Scores for all variables were below 2. N= 1815. Log likeli-hood = −453.55127. Prob > χ 2 = 0.0000.∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01; ∗∗∗∗p ≤ .001.

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not support hypothesis 1, but do support hypothesis 2. Early expansion ofhigher education opportunities has a significant reductive effect on the like-lihood of the recurrence of civil conflict, reducing the hazard of civil conflictrecurrence by about 86%.

Further, hypothesis 3 is also not supported by the results. The interac-tion between the annual GDP growth rate and the average annual increase inhigher education enrollments was unrelated to whether a conflict recurred.Thus, the idea that higher education enrollments increase the probabilityof conflict recurrence, especially if economic opportunities do not keep upwith the number of higher education enrollments, is not supported by theevidence. These results stand in contrast to the long-standing arguments thatit is the denial of economic opportunities for highly educated people thatfeeds conflict and conflict reinitiation.

Of the control variables, not surprisingly, the length of the original con-flict appears to be positively related to the recurrence of a civil conflict, butnot the previous intensity of the conflict. Thus the longer the duration ofthe previous conflict, the more likely the conflict was to resume (which isconsistent with the literature—see for instance Buckland 2005). Further GDPgrowth rates appear to be positively related to the recurrence of conflict. Theremaining control variables (the Polity2 score, the measure of ethnic polar-ization, the type of outcome, and access to lootable resources) were largelyunrelated to whether the conflict restarted.

Finally, it should also be noted that we checked for potential problemswith multicollinearity by producing Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores forthe independent variables (Fox 1991). None of our VIF scores were above 2,indicating that multicollinearity did not present a problem for our analysis.

CONCLUSION

The above paper has suggested that increased educational access, partic-ularly increased access to higher education (as measured by enrollments)increased the likelihood of peace duration. Indeed, increasing enrollmentsin higher education in the first five years after the end of a conflict signif-icantly decreases the likelihood of the restart of a civil war, more so thanthe expansion of educational opportunities (measured in terms of enroll-ments in the first five years after the end of a conflict) at the primary andsecondary levels. This relationship holds even when controlling for the num-ber of enrollments per capita and a number of other contextual variablesfrequently mentioned as related to the likelihood of civil war restart.

Generally, this inverse relationship between increasing higher educa-tion enrollments and the restart of civil wars might be explained by thesignaling and opportunity cost arguments articulated above. In other words,increased enrollments in higher education in the short run (which signals

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that there are greater opportunities for upward mobility for elites) raises theprospective opportunity costs for both former rebel leaders and comman-ders, but also members of the middle and upper classes who may havebeen potential rebel leaders and commanders. This is especially true if rebelgroups sought to attract more educated recruits (as was the case in Nepal,but elsewhere as well) who made for more committed cadres. For sucheducated cadres, higher education opportunities early after the end of thecivil war provides for the opportunity to return to the university campus.Thus, increased access to education generally, but early access to highereducation in particular, acts to diminish the likelihood of civil war restart.Although certainly it may be the case that the content of education (or whatis offered as part of the curriculum) is an important consideration in whetheror not a civil war restarts (Kruger and Maleckova 2003; Tawil and Harley2004), this is far beyond the scope of this study, which primarily focuses oneducational access.

Although some have argued that increased opportunities in higher edu-cation might in fact lead to an increased probability for civil war or civilwar restart, especially if economic opportunities do not keep pace withexpansions in higher education enrollments, our analysis indicates other-wise. The interaction between economic growth and the expansion of highereducation enrollments was unrelated to the likelihood of civil war restart.

What we have not examined in this paper is the content of the highereducational system, which may make for a promising direction for futureresearch. Indeed, do higher education systems that focus on “practical skills”as opposed to the “liberal arts” better prevent conflict restart? Althoughcontent of education is certainly an important consideration, this remainsbeyond the scope of this article, which has focused primarily on whether stu-dents have access to education. This will have to wait until further systematicdata on content and curriculum become available.

In sum, perhaps greater attention should be paid to improving highereducation systems as a means to reduce the likelihood of civil war recur-rence. Although largely ignored in the literature, rebuilding and enhancinghigher education institutions and systems may be an effective way to beginto consolidate the peace. This is not to say that rebuilding primary and sec-ondary educational systems is unimportant. Indeed, for longstanding peacethese systems will be needed to be rebuilt as well—especially to provideopportunities for students in conflict-torn rural areas. However, given thatmost universities and institutions of higher education in countries that haveexperienced civil war are not generally located in conflict zones within suchcountries, restarting universities and expanding enrollments may be able tobe accomplished fairly quickly. This would suggest that both education andpolitical science scholars interested in conflict reduction might do well topay attention to the unexplored area of the impact of higher education oncivil war and its reoccurrence.

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Documents

Educational Access and Peace Duration in Post-Conflict Countries