OSMANLI'DA iLM-i KELAM

-~er,Eserler,~eseleler

Editorler

Osman Demir

VeyselKaya

Kadir GOmbeyaz

U. Murat Kllavuz

iSTANBUL 2016

TRACING MENTAL EXISTENCE IN AlrGALANBAwi'S

THOUGHT

TimOUGH THE COMMENTARY TRADIDON*

Sfuneyye Panldar**

Ismac-J.l ibn Mu~tafa ibn Mal~1rn:ud al-Galanbawi (d. 1205/1791) is

one of the prominent scholars of the eighteenth century. He wrote on

varying spectrum of topics from logic and mathematics to kalam. In this

paper, the notion of mental existence will be evaluated through his

Risala .fi l-wujild al-dhibni and his lftisbiya cata l-]alal (which is a gloss

on al-Dawwani's Commentary on <Ac;lud al-Din al-Iji's [d. 756/13551 al­

~qa)id) together with his I;Itishiya cata l-Tabdbib (which is a gloss on

Abu l-Fat}J. al-Miri's Tahdhfb).

The aim of this paper is to focus on the notion of existence by

comparing it to two other related notions, being in the extramental

world (al-a cyan) and the realm of being itself (nafs al-amr). The evalua-

• I am indebted to respected scholars, Murat Ka~, KObra ~enel, and Assist. Prof. Veysel .J

Kaya who had been very helpful in the composition process of this article by sharing their valuable information, providing main sources, and by commenting on the text.

" Ogr. Gor. Dr.; istanbul Oniversitesi ilaruyat Faktiltesi

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Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought!S. Panldar

tion will begin with an analysis 9f mental existence in al-Sayyid al-Sharif

al-Jurjani's (d. 816/1413) Commenta1y on al-Mawtiqif as this is one of

the main texts for the history of the notion of mental existence. The

search for shifts in the discussions between the first commentaries and

later literature is a secondary goal of the research. This will be aimed

through comparing the sections on existence in al-Mawtiqif in al­

Jurjani's commentary with eighteenth-century scholar Ismac-u al­

Galanbawi's gloss and treatise.

The main reason for choosing al-Galanbawi's book is that he

writes at a later period until which scholars already established discus­

sions on mental existence in Islamic lands. Thus his writing can be

deemed as a summary of the accumulated discussions on mental exist­

ence. His period is also an era in which Western ideas started to influ­

ence Ottoman tho.ught. Therefore, there is an opportunity in investigat­

ing al-Galanbawi's works in order to observe what is unique to the late

Otto~n kalam thought, and how interaction of philosophy and kalam

resulted in the Ottoman experience.

Talking about a well-developed and sophisticated topic such as

mental existence in the late tradition requires starting with an earlier and

more classical text that influenced the framework in which mental exist­

ence was discussed throughout. I will start this investigation with al­

Jurjani's treatment of mental existence in Sharf? al-Mawaqif, followed by

its comparison to al-Galanbawi's Ristila .fi l-wujud ~l-dhihni [Treatise on

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Osmanh'da ilm-i Kelam: Alimler, Eserler, Meseleler

Mental Existence], a manuscript available in Si.lleymaniye Library,

Giresun Yazmalar section, no. 106, at folios 82-83. This introductory

section also aims to present the main discussion areas of mental exist­

ence at the time of al-Galanbawi.

The second section will evaluate the details of al-Galanbawi's

Ristila fi l-wujud al-dhihni through the help of his other texts, such as

Gloss on ]ala./ (lftishiya 'ala 1-jalal), his other treatise on non-existents

in another manuscript at Si.ileymaniye Library, Re~id Efendi, no. 989,

fols. 252 ff.,1 and Ta'lfqat(andlor lftisbiya) 'ala 1-Tahdbib, which is on

Abu 1-Fatl:i al-Miri's lftishiya 'alii 1-Tahdhib. The result of this investiga­

tion will be manifested at the last section in which I will contextualize al­

Galanbawi's discussion of mental existence among general subjects of

philosophical research. I believe al-Galanbawi's discussion re-evaluates

discussion of mental beings from a more independent research topic

into a matter of kala.m in general and knowledge of God in particular.

We also find out that he accepts strong ties of the topic to philosophers'

stance. In that context, he synthesises the tl1eological and philosophical

positions. This research is more in the form of notes that does not prom­

ise a complete picture of either al-Galanbawi's thought or of the discus-

See also (MS Istanbul: Koprillii Library, 23), as Risdla fi <ibn Allah tar.tila bi-l­

ma<dftmat 'ala madhhab al-mutakal/imin. The treatise was published in a corpus titled Rasa'il-i imti/Jdn (al-Risiila li-1-GalanbawT fi 'ibn Allah ta<afa bi-1-ma<df.mzat

[Istanbul: Ma~ba'a-i <Amira, 1302 AHJ, 178-194).

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Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought!S. Panldar

sions on mental existence in the traclition.2

I. General Frame: Mental Existence in SbarlJ al-Mawiiqif

Al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjani defines mental existence by building

it on extra-mental existence (al-wujud al-dhihni). There is fire, posses­

sive of heat and material properties, but is there another being that can

fire from which its material features are extracted? The crucial question

that causes a debate is as such: When a second mode of existence is

admitted, then, is the essel)ce the same in extra-mental being and mental

being? In this formulation, the debate also rests upon the various con-

For a more complete picrure on al-Galanbawi's mought, see: Okudan, Rifat, Gelenbevl ve Vabdet-i Vucud (Isparta: FakOlte Kitabevi Yaymlan, 2006); AkgOt;, Alunet, ismail Gelenbevi'de Varltk Dii~iincesi (PhD dissertation; Ankara: Ankara

Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstittisi.l, 2006). For a developed discussion on mental existence in me Onoman tradition, see: Tashkupnzada, AbO 1-Khayr <Isam ai-Din AJ:unad Efendi, Zibinsel Varlrga Dair Tmtr§malarda Ozfm ve Hakikatin Tespiti (in Orner Mahir Alper [ed), Osmanlt Fe/sefesi: Sepne Metinler, translated and edited wim an introduction on Tashkupnzada by Omer Mahir Alper; Istanbul: Klasik Yaymlan, 2015), 241-302. There are also a number of studies on al-Jurjaru mat worlh mentioning, but I will contend wim two most related studies which are aumoritative in the field; see van Ess, Josef, Die Erkenntnislebre des <Af!udaddin at-lei:

Obersetzung tmd Kommentar des er-sten Bucbes seiner Mawaqif (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1966) (yet this book is a translation of and commentary on only me f1tst part of al-Mawtiqif, mus it does not analyze me section on existence); Ti.lrker, Orner, Seyyid $erif Ciircani'nin Tevil Anlayz~r: Yorumun Metafizik, Mantrki ve

Dilbilimsel Temelleri (PhD dissertation; Istanbul: Marmara Oniversitesi Sosyal Bilirnler Enstittisi.l, 2006). One of me most comprehensive texts about me discussions on mental existence in me tradition can be found in an article by Murat K.a~: "Mustafa ~evket Efendi'nin Risalesi I~1gl!lda Zihin, Harle ve Nefsu'l-Emr K.avramlartnlll Analizi, ~ islamMedeniyetiA1-a~tmnala11 Dergisi (iMAD) 1/1 (2014), 58·87.

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OsmanlJ'da ilm-i Keliim: Alim.ler, Eserler, Meseleler

ceptions of knowledge. It has been custom to discuss knowledge in

terms of its being an accident ( carat;f), a relation (it;lafa), a qualification

(kayjJ, attribute ($ija), and also to describe it as active and passive (/Ni

and infi'tlli).3 Additionally and essentially for many scholars, confirma­

tion of mental beings is connected to accepting knowledge as presence

of forms in the soul. As a result, in a rough sketch, we can say that when

knowledge is taken as a passive process (at-citm al-l;nt$Ctli) of forms

occurring in the mind, it is also taken as a process of production of men­

tal existence.4

As it becomes more explicitly accepted in the later tradition, the

real debate topic between theologians and philosophers is not about

affirmation or denial of mental existence per se (I). The question centers

around the definitions of soul and mental existence, and the relation

between these two. The implications of defining knowledge as form

being in the soul seem to be the real irritants in the kalam tradition.

Once mental existence is accepted, knowledge will be described as an

immaterial process. In this case, we would admit that the soul itself is an

immaterial substance as the similarity between object and knower is a

3 For a presentation of these categories in the early Islamic tradition see Memi~. Murat, Mu 'tezilf Bit· Bakt§la Bilgi Problemi (Ankara: Sarka<; Yaymlan, 2011), and for more

specific discussions dealing with these categories, see Koroglu, Burhan, Necmeddfn

el-Katibf el-Kazvtnf'nin Bilgi Teorisi Ostanbul: Bah<;~ehir Oniversitesi 1'aymlan, 2015).

4 AI-Galanbawi, Risala.fi taf?qfq %n Allah ta<afa al-muta<afliq bi-l-asbya!(in Rasa!il-i

imti/Jflt1; Istanbul: Ma~ba'a-i 'Arnica, 1302 AH), 173 ff.

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Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought!S. Panldar

requirement. Early theologians refrain from attributing immateriality to

the soul. Parallel to this, al-Jurjani lists nine groups that deny irrunateriali­

ty of the soul whilst attributing this materialist tendency to the majority

of theologians.5 The second issue is that the essence in the extra-mental

world and the essence in the mind are regarded as identical and that

they only differed in their existence: one being in the extra-mental

world, and the other being in the mind. This kind of explanation re­

quires a third being that connects these two realms and that guarantees

identity of quiddities: a separate intellect which is the source for each

quiddity, the Active Intellect. This is the case for Ibn Sina. Thanks to the

Active Intellect, Ibn Sina establishes a base for true and certain

knowledge and he can then equate quiddity (mtihiyya), reality (f?aqiqa),

Al-Jurjaru, Abu 1-I:Iasan al-Sayyid al-Sharif 'Ali ibn Mubammad ibn 'Ali, $erhu '1-MeiJOkif: Mevdkif $erhi (Metin-9eviri) [Sbar!J al-Mawdqi}J (Arabic text with a Turkish

translation by Orner Turker; Istanbul: Turkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Ba~kanl1jp Yaylnlan, 2015), II, 1212 ff. A deeper look would show that the claim about

immateriality of the soul attributed to Ash'arls requires further analysis when individual thinkers are the case. Al-Ghazali's stance is already a topic of scholarly

debate, see Frank, Richard M., Al-Ghazdli and the Ash'arite School (Durham &

London: Duke University Press, 1994), 55-56, and Marmura's statements in his translation of Tabtifut (al-Ghazali, Abu I:Jamid ·Mul)ammad ibn Mul)ammad, 1be

Incoherence of the Philosophers lA parallel English-Arabic te.xt translated, introduced,

and annotated by Michael E. Marmura; 2nd ed.; Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000], 218 ff.) and Shihadeh, Ayman, • Al-Ghazali and Kalam: The

Conundrum of His Body-Soul Dualism," Islam and Rationality: 1be Impact of al­Gbazali. Papers Collected on His 900tb Anniversaty. vol. 2 (ed. Frank Griffe!; Leiden

& Boston: Brill, 2016), 117 ff.

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Osmanll'da ilm-i Kelam: Alimler, Eserler, Meseleler

and essence (dhat).6 However, theologians refrained from admitting

beings (divine or half divine that are supra-material beings) in between

material beings and God. Following Ka§'s categorization, there are vari­

ous lineages within which the discussions on mental existence contin­

ued: Fakhr al-Din al-R.azi- al-Taftazani - al-Jurjaru lineage, commentary

tradition on Na~Ir al-Din al-TGsi's Tajrid, Ottoman literature developed

by Ibn Kamal Pasha, Tashkuprizada, and al-Galanbawi, and finally, the

literature following Mulla Sadra.7 It is however debatable that Mulla

$adra has formed a mental-existence tradition on his own. Related to our

study here, al-Galanbawi might also be considered as someone who

followed the discussions with reference to the first lineage that follows

al-Razi and al-Jurjani. That is why my research starts with al-Jurjaru's

analysis. It is worthy of analysis and further study though, to investigate

how the evaluation of the topic changed until al-Galanbawi's time and

how much of his analysis exhibit then an original take on mental exist­

ence.

Al-Jurjani begins with positing the difference between those

groups that disagree on mental existence: Is the form the same in the

mind and the extra-mental world? In Tactiqat/J:Iashiya, al-Galanbawi too

deals with the issue of different positions regarding mental existence,

6 Ibn Sina, Abu <AJi al-I;Iusayn ibn <AbdAllah, al-sbija•, al-ManJiq 1: al-Madkbal(eds.

Georges Anawati, Ma.J:unud al-Khu<;layri, Sa<Jd layid, and A]:unad Fu'ad ai-Ahwaru;

Qum: Manshurat Maktabat Ayat Allah al-'11~ al-Mar<ashi, 1984-1985), I, 28. 7 ~. "Mustafa $evket Efendi'nin Risalesi," 64.

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Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thoughr/S. Panldar

explaining the meaning of the claim that the theologians denied mental

existence. It is not the case that the theologians denied that when human

thinks/imagines (yata.?awwm'~ something or confirms something of

something, no form occurs in the mind/intellect ('aql). What they deny

is that the same quiddity of the thing or a simile of the quiddity of the

thing is occurring in the mind.8

On the one hand, we see the claim that the theologians are those

who deny mental existence and the philosophers are the ones that ac­

cept them. Sinillarly a common view is that the latter group which ex­

plains knowledge processes through the presence of the forms are re­

quired to accept mental existence whilst the former group describes

knowledge as a relation.9 However, both al-Jurjani's and al-Galanbawi's

analyses imply that the reality of the matter is not that simple.

It is common to start the discussion of mental beings by analysing

the proofs for it. So does al-Jurjani. He gives the proofs for mental exist-

8 Al-Galanbawi, Ta'/iqat al-Galanbawl 'alii Mir al-7;abdhfb min al-man{iq wa-1-

kalam (• J:ltishiyat a/-Galanbawi 'alii J:ltisbtyat Mir Zabid 'alii Shari) ai-Dawwanf

li-Tahdhib ai-Ta.ftazdni fi 1-manfiq) (Istanbul: o.-p., 1234), 240 (also available at:

hnp://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fsllobjectldisplay/

bsb10219175_00071.html). 9 It is common among philosophers to see the notion of knowledge as a relation, and

the acceptance of mental existence as two inconsistent views; see al-Rlizi, Abu ·<Abd

Allah Mubammad ibn Mubammad Qutb al-Din al-Ta)).t:ani, al-Risttla al-ma'mftlafi 1-

t~awwur wa-l-t~diq (in Risdlattin .fi l-lrJ$awwur wa-l-ta$dfq, ed. Mahdi Shan'ati;

Qum: Mu'assasat Isma'"iliyyan, 1995), 23.

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Osman.h'da ilm-i Kelam: lJimler, Eserler, Meseleler

ence and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's criticisms against them. The first proof

focuses on the possibility of conceiving non-existents including impos­

sible beings and ultimate non-existence. As these are most definitely

non-existent in the extra-mental world, but as we can conceive them

and talk about them through true sentences, they should be affirmed

some form of existence, which is rp.ental existence.10 This proof is built

on the principle that affirmative true judgements require exist­

ence/establishmet (thubttt) of their subjects. This principle is also named

as principle of presupposition (qtt'ida far'iyya): affllliling something of

something presupposes the existence of the subject.

Al-Jurjani seems to admit this proof as he defeats the criticisms

against it. Having said this, he further discusses al-Razi's criticism, which

is as follows: We cannot conceive of something (a concept) that is non­

existent extra-mentally. The concept is either existent by itself or not.

The first is like the similitudes of Plato and philosophers defend the lat­

ter by positing the Active Intellect as the source of forms. So according to

the philosophers, the things in the mind are sustained by the Active In­

tellect.

Nevertheless, presence in the Active Intellect presuppos~s exist­

ence in the extra-mental world. If the mental forms were in Active Intel­

lect, then we would have impossible beings present in the extra-mental .J

world. However, this is not sound. and it is explicitly wrong. Then we

10 Al-Jurjani, ~e1hu 'l-Meuakif, I, 533.

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Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought!S. Panldar

come to admit that mental existents are established, but these beingS will

be different from the forms in the Active Intellect. Consequently only

similes and shadowy existents are those that are in the mind. This is the

explanation made by al-Jurjani.11

The second proof focuses on generalizations and universals. As

these concepts cannot exist individually and extra-mentally, they should

be established mentally. Lastly, the third proof is based on the very pos­

sibility of forming propositions, thus it is similar to the first proof.12

Al-Jurjani's position in Sbm-[J al-Mawaqifis that he does not deny

mental existents. He legiti.rrtizes his stance on th~ fact that the judge­

ments on mental existents are different from those about extra-mentals.13

Different rules apply to each category of mental and extra-mental exist­

ents.

We can go back to the original claim of the philosophers that fire

in the extra-mental world and fire in the mind (mental) are different but

only in terms of their existence. In regards to their essence, they are the

same. This stance became troublesome for some theologians mainly

because they were distant to ontological and epistemological dualist

accounts. Accepting mental existence is cl9sely linked to explaining the

process of knowledge through the presence of form which is extracted

11 Al-Jurjaru, $erbu 'l-Meuakif, I, 543.

11 Ibid . ._ I, 539-544-

13 Ibid., I, 533-544; al-Galanbawi, Ta'liqat, 240.

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Osmanlt'da ilm-i Keliim: Alirnler, Eserler, Meseleler

from matter, and this is based on accepting matter-form duality for the

objects of knowledge as well as for the knowing soul. In addition, the

identity of the essence is to be guaranteed by the existence of the Active

Intellect. As a result, the claim requires two immaterial entities: the im­

material substantial soul and a separate intellect, namely the Active Intel­

lect. It is then no surprise that theologians did not welcome these impli­

cations of mental existence.

In terms of al-Galanbawl's texts, he does not use these proofs in

his . treatise on mental existents although these proofs were widely

known and well-established among theologians. In addition, they were

frequently used in both classical kalam and falsafa texts. Instead, al­

Galanbawi chooses to start his analysis on mental existents by stating

that theologians denied mental existence. He takes side with the theolo­

gians, yet uses the method by which philosophers explain mental exist­

ence, witl1out committing to the metaphysical implications of their ideas.

n. Al-Galanbawi and His Treatise on Mental Existence

Al-Galanbawi starts the discussions by analyzing relations (nisba)

as mental beings. First question he deals with is "What is it that makes it

possible for the relations to be true (madar al-$idq)?" (1) And the second

question is 'What is tl1e principle of abstraction thanks to which we pos­

sess mental beings?" (2). In tllis evaluation, along with relations ~nisab);

quantity (kam.), relative beings (Nibtirtit), non-existent (ma'dftm) and

relational accidentals (a 'rtirj nisbiyya) are listed as examples of mental

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Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought!S. Panldar

beings. Together with existence and non-existence, a third component

will be added to the discussion: the realm of the thing itself (najs at­

am?). This introduces the question of the relation between extra-mental

being and the thing itself. As the two questions mentioned above imply,

the central manoeuvre of the theologians is to find the principle of truth

and abstraction of mental beings in a reality that is in the extra-mental

world. The evaluation then is inherently epistemological and therefore

deals with definitions of knowledge. Moreover, considering the Active

Intellect, ontological connection can be found upon epistemological

grounds. For the Peripatetic tradition in which knowledge is the occur­

rence of forms, the Active Intellect plays an ontological role as well as an

epistemological one. It is the giver of the forms as well as the agent that

activates the knowledge process. Thus, considering knowledge as the

presence of forms and acceptance of mental existence seem to follow

one another. Belonging to a school that does not employ emanational

cosmology, early theologians would disagree with any epistemological

and cosmological role played by the Active Intellect. However al­

Galanbawi is a later theologian whose stance is (as I have mentioned is

the case with al-Jurjaru, centuries before him) more complicated as it

reflects the historical developments in theology in which many philo­

sophical theories and concepts were integrated into the. new melting pot

of later theology.

Al-Galanbawi defmes knowledge in his al-Burhan in a similar

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Osmanh'da ilm-i Keliim: AI imler, ~erler, Meseleler

way to that of philosophers. Knowledge is the presence of forms in the

intellect.14 As mentioned before, thi.s type of definition requires accept­

ing mental existence, the result of which will be two forms of being in

the mind and extra-mental world. So does al-Galanbawi. He affirms

mental existence. Furthermore, he doesn't define knowledge as a special

relation between the knower and the known, as theologians do. Alterna­

tively, he redefines thi.s relation of knower as the mind and the known as

the form. 15 Knowledg~ defined either as the reception of forms or as

relation requires, in al-Galanbawi's case, the occurrence of forms and

thus acceptance of mental existence. In evaluating the position of theo­

logians against mental existence, al-Galanbawi agrees with al-Jurjani that

what theologians criticize is basically that the form received in the mind

is the very essence.16 However, knowledge received is mainly built on

the extra-mental reality. Thus, al-Galanbawi avoids adopting the meta­

physical connotations of mental existence as much as he can.

In al-Galanbawi's universe, realization (ta/;Jaqquq) of a thing has

14 Al-Galanbawi, Burhan-i Galanbawi (along with his lfdsbiyat ai-Bttrhdn; Istanbul: n.p., 1253), 4. One of many examples for the Peripatetic approach to knowledge: "Form is something that both the internal and external senses perceive, but the external sense perceives it first and then relays it to the internal sense ... The connotational attribute is something that the soui perceives from the sensible without the external senses f1rst perceiving it." (Psychology, 1.5, 43.6-11) qugted from McGinnis, Jon, Avicenna (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 98.

15 Akgti10, ismail Ge/enbevi'de Varltk DU§ii.ncesi, 62. 16 Ibid., 63.

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Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought/S. Panldar

three levels: extra-mental, mental, and the thing itself (nafs al-am1).

Occurrence of a thing in the mind and extra-mental world happens to be

the base for their specific consideration in nafs al-amr. Thus, so a specif­

ic consideration of not being necessarily dependent on the existence of

a thinker (fan;l-ijti.1i¢") is attached to a mental or extra-mental thing and

then it is taken to be in nafs al-amr.17 In accord with this defutition, if

something has no reality other than the consideration of its thinker, such

as 'four is an even number,' then it can only have realization in the mind

but not in nafs al-amr. Despite this point, we will see that in some sec­

tions, al-Galanbawi does not refrain from explaining fictionals through

naft al-am1·.18 This level of realization is not itself a· realm of occurrence.

This is a level in which we consider things through their specific consid­

erations. In this sense, najs al-amr is understood as the situation in

which the thing itself occurs (fa-qawlunti. bti.dhti. mawjUd111 .fi naft al­

am.r yu,-acf' bi-l-a111.11 najs' dbtilika 1-shay). The irnpossibles are worthy

of mentioning as they showcase the inbetween case of being in the mind

but not occurrent. Al-Galanbawi summarises the Peripatetic position in

this context that impossibles lack quiddities in nafs al-anzr and their sole

occurrence in the mind takes place through imitation and analogy (tash-

17 Al-Galanbawi, Tanbfh (in Rastl'il-i imti~Jt!n; Istanbul: Ma~ba'a-i 'Amira, 1302 AH),

198. 18 It i~ dear that nafs al-amr is understood with nuances among different thinkers and

the term itself is far from having a dear description either in classical texts or in

contemporary studies. Thus I do welcome any further srudy that falsifies my understanding of nafs al-amr:

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Osmanh'da ilm-i Kelam: Alimler, Eserler, Meseleler

bib and tamthil).19

Al-Galanbawi mainly analyses propositional cases in which

propositions are various combinations of predicates and subjects chosen

from extra-mentals and possibles. TI1e ultimate cases are ''AnqiP (a

mythical bird) is possible' (i) and 'Zayd is blind' (ii). Both the mythical

bird and being possible are situations that we cannot find in the extra­

mental world. Zayd himself is an extra-mental being whilst blindness as

a negative attribute is arguably abstracted from the very extra-mental

being of Zayd hinlself. Thus (i) showcases fictionals whilst (ii) is a dis­

cussion about non-existents in the form of negative attribute.

Al-Galanbawi weaves his Risalafi l-wujftd al-dhihniaround ex­

amples of this kind and he starts the discussion with the case of simple

relation between light and day. We lmow there is a relation of necessity

between light and day just as we know there is no such relation between

light and day. However, where is the relation itself? The · general ap­

proach seems to derive the relation from the very extra-mental being of

the day itself. Such is the common stance among theologians: to find the

principle of abstraction in the extra-mental world.

To complicate the issue, al-Galanbawi enlarges the discussion

with less clear cases such as 'A ·simile of this world is possible' (iii). Nei­

ther simile of the wodd, nor being possible are extra-mental realities. If ./

19 Al-Galanbawi, I<fam anna kulf munzktd" wajilf"' kana aw mumkirf'" ... (in Rasa'il­

i imtifJtin; Istanbul: Mat~a'a-i 'Anura, 1302 AH), 166.

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Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought/S. Panldar

one tries to derive the simile from the existent world, then deriving the

existence of 'the partner of God' becomes possible too. Then an absurd

situation will occur that the words of an infidel who says 'a partner to

God is possible' should be accepted as truth. In order to avoid such ab­

surdity, the only ~scape is to tum the proposition into negative. The

negative predications do not follow the principle of presupposition and

thus, existence of the subject is not required.

With this, al-Galanbawi provides us with two types of truthmak­

ers for two types of predicates. If the proposition is affirmative, the

truthmaker (m.adar al-$idq) is abstracted from either an existent in the

extra-mental world or a thinking subject (man yat~awwaruha). If it is

negative, correspondence (m~ttabaqa) alone is sufficient and existence

of the subject is not required for the sentence to be true.

Then, al-Galanbawi asks about the propositions that cannot be

tested through human senses - i.e. the proposition occurs independent

of human perceptions' reach. The example is about a leaf that falls down

in a dark "night. Where is the relation b~tween the leaf and its movement?

It cannot be found by the p.elp of human perception and mind as it is a

situation independent of what the senses can acquire. Then the relation

will be sought in either a lower or higher intellect. Lower intellect would

not be capable of imagining, and so it cannot be the answer. In the case

of higher intellect, the choices are that the form is in it in a particular

manner or universally. As well as type of knowledge (universal or par-

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Osmanh'da ilm-i Kelam: Alim!er, Eserler, Meseleler

ticular) time of knowledge becomes a relevant question. Is it before or

after the leaf falls down, or is knowledge maintained at the time of its

fall? At this point, the falling of the leaf in a dark night is the case where

al-Galanbawi links the discussion of mental existents to the discussion of

God's knowledge. Remember that theologians deem knowledge as a

relation and dependence (tacalluq). Knowledge is created (f?tidith) ac­

cording to the theologians, and in terms of the event of a leaf falling, the

event itself is created too. However, attributing created knowledge or

some form of knowledge that affects the knower to God's knowledge is

unacceptable. One way of solving the issue of God's knowledge is then

to consider God's knowledge as eternal but the dependence as created20•

Problem of unending continuity and regress occurs if the relation be­

tween God's will and the possible beings is taken as eternal?1

To sum up, many of the cases al-Galanbawi discusses are exam­

ples in which it is difficult to find the principle of abstraction in the extra­

mental world. He states that the principle of abstraction (mabda> al­

intiza') is either extra-mental or built upon the nature of human after

estimation, by human beings?2 Therefore in the case of the abstraction

of a relation between a leaf and its movement (falling) is estimated by

20 Al-Galanbawi, Ta<Jiqat, 241. 21 Al-Galanbawi, J:ldsbiya li-Isma'if al-Galanbawf <ala /-]alai min gf-<Aqd'id

(Darsa<adat: Shirkat-i Khayriyya-i Sabifiyya, 1307), 58. 22 Al-Galanbawi, Risa/a fl l-wujud a/-dbihni (MS Istanbul: Si.ileymaniye Library,

Giresun Yazmalar, 106), 82a.

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Tracing Mental Ex.is£ence in al-GaJanbawl's Though£/S. Panldar

the mind after the fall embedded in the nature of human.

According to al-Galanbawi, naft al-amr is more comprehensive

than the realm of the mental existence. This is because it includes every­

thing extra-mental and also some of the mental. Naft al-amT is mainly

necessary to allow affirmative true statements. An example in which no

consideration of mind is required would be a leaf falling down in a dark

room when nobody can observe it, but someone says a leaf fell down.

What makes this sentence true is nafs al-amr.

Furthermore, in Ristila .fi l-wujtid al-dhihni, al-Galanbawi pre­

sents other examples regarding the same issue. Th~se are mainly propo­

sitional and they showcase relation to a realm which is neither mental

nor extra-mental: 'The object is white,' 'Human being is a species,' 'Zayd

is blind,' and 'the mythical bird <Anq~P.' The subjects and predicates are

chosen among extra-mentals and objects of consideration (i'tibtirtit) and

when they are both objects ofconsideration, their confirmation is to be

found in najs al-anu·.

The discussions of these later examples are treated in a similar

way to d1at of d1e earlier examples. The general schema seems to fmd

the principle of abstraction or the truthmaker of the relation either in the

extra-mental world or in a relation to the extra-mental world. If it is not

prov~ded d1rough the extra-mental woilc!, then theologians apply to a

world of realities called naft al-am1·. Although the mechanism of naft

al-amt· seems to be sinillar to that of mental beings, it help to overcome

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Osmanh'da ilm-i Kelfun: AlimJer, Eserler, Meseleler

some of the metaphysical concerns since there is no any other realm of

intellect such as the Active Intellect. Thus the discussion seems to have

been evolved in theological tradition into accepting mental existence

with a reduced role and into excluding of the Active Intellect as a meta­

physical principle and epistemological truthmaker. Thus, although the

formulation of the question is still .whether there is mental existence or

not, the content is not a question, based on some scepticism of positing

a mode of mental existence. Thus the claim 0) can be applied to al­

Galanbawi's case that mental existence is not denied per se.23

When discussing the example of 'Zayd is blind,' al-Galanbawi

mentions an interesting point that admitting mental existence might lead

to regress, because in the case of Zayd's blindness, once possibility of

attributing a non-existent quality is made possible, then another non­

existent over that attribution can be considered possible as well. As a

result, these possibilities of attribution can carry on without an end.

Similar to views of many other classical period thinkers, al-Galanbawi

also admits that this regress is to be avoided.

Going back to najs al-am.r, the important thing about it is that

purely fictional mental beings are excluded from this realm. As in the

case of ''Anq~P is possible,' one can argue that the predicate is derived

from the concept of 'Anq~P itself and 'Anq~P is derived from different .J

23 (0 The real debate topic is not about affirmation of mental existence.

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Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi's Thought/S. Panldar

pieces that were gathered from sense perceptions.24 Together with" this,

al-Galanbawi implies that the truth of propositions about fictional beings

such as ''Anq~P is a bird' and 'Five is an even number' are related to najs

al-amr. Accordingly, he should commit himself to a more comprehen­

sive understanding of najs al-a1nr that includes those which are in the

mind and purely fictional. However, he does not explain the situation of

fictionals in accord with these points. Indeed, his explanations and way

cf dealing with the issue leave us many questions which are not an­

swered by him in the work.

Conclusion

A number of conclusions can be derived from the general struc­

ture and content of al-Galanbawi's treatise on mental existence.

First of all,_ al-Galanbawi's exemplary cases are not only follow­

ing the various examples that were widely discussed in kaHim and falsa­

fa traditions but also because they are handled by al-Galanbawi in such

a way th~t he reflects his peculiar viewpoint on the issue. His main dis­

cussion of mental existents is on objects of considerations (i'tiban:tt). His

main approach to the issue appears to be defined by the general frame­

work of major theological problems. l'tiba1·at are impottant because it

provides him with shifting the main focus of the discussionS from the

mental existence for human knowledge into God's knowledge. The ob-

24 AI-Galanbawi, Risala.fi l-wujud al-dbihnf, 83.

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Osmanh'da ilm-i Kelam: Alimler, Eserler, Meseleler

jects of considerations and especially those of relations are important

because they relate to the relation between the world and God. The shift

from a problem of nafs (the human soul) turns into the knowledge of

the possibles in eternity and a problem about knowledge of God. A sec­

ond issue he discusses in length is the possibility of infinity related to -

mental existents, because the pn:;>blem is again shifted into eternal

knowledge and whether the possibles known before the extra-mental

existence can be infinite.

Although he mentions that the mainstream theologian stance is to

deny mental existence, he comes to the point of saying that this is a se­

mantic discussion.25 His account of the exceptional cases discussed in

the paper, through eid1er nafs al-amr or dlrough estimation embedded

in the nature of human, appears to be an indirect phrasing of mental

existence. The general difference between theologians and philosophers

is not really about denying mental existence per se, but on understand­

ing of knowledge and its implications .in terms of God's knowledge. He

does not focus on the implications in terms of immateriality of the source

or in terms of accepting form.

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