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Mali: making peace while preparing for war

IntroductionFollowing the deadlock that lasted for several months, major steps towards the management of the crisis in Mali were taken at three main events: • The high-level meeting on the Sahel, held on 26 September 2012 in the margins

of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly session• The unanimous adoption of Resolution 2071 on Mali by the UN Security Council,

on 12 October• The meeting in Bamako of the Support and Follow-up Group on the situation in

Mali, on 19 October, convened for the purpose of discussing the draft strategic concept for the resolution of the Mali crisis, later adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) at its meeting in Addis Ababa on 24 October

This series of meetings firstly provided an opportunity to analyse the different aspects of the crisis, thus raising collective awareness about the threat to international peace and security posed by the Malian crisis. Secondly, it laid the groundwork for a consensus that needs to be consolidated on the outlines of the intervention mechanisms that must be put in place in order to implement the mediation efforts and military action. Finally, it highlighted, particularly during the 19 October meeting, the importance of putting Malian actors at the helm of the decision-making process and the willingness of the international actors to work with the Malian transition authorities, irrespective of the level of legitimacy they enjoy within and outside Mali.

The meetings also confirmed international engagement in Mali and reiterated what outside actors expect both from the Malian authorities, in terms of developing a roadmap for the transition, and from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in terms of developing a realistic concept of operation. Nevertheless, a number of questions remain, particularly with respect to the modalities of the implementation of the planned intervention mechanisms, the mobilisation and role of the main actors involved, and the logistical and financial support for the envisaged military operation.

The following analysis and recommendations are based on field research conducted in Bamako in August 2012, follow-up telephone conversations in September and October 2012, as well as media monitoring. The purpose of this document is to present, six months after the signing of the Framework Agreement of 6 April 2012, a status report on the two main missions entrusted to the transition government and supported by regional, continental and international actors; that is, to manage the crisis in northern Mali and organise the presidential elections.

ECOWAS Peace and Security Report

ISSUE 1 October 2012

ECOWAS PEACE AND SECURITY REPORT SERIES

The ECOWAS Peace and Security Report series seeks to provide the decision makers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with analysis on critical and topical human security situations in West Africa. The objective is to produce independent, field-based policy research in a timely manner to inform ECOWAS’ decision-making process or alert its governing structures on emerging issues. The ECOWAS Peace and Security Report series includes analyses of country situations and other thematic issues, along with recommendations. It is circulated, free of charge, both electronically and in hard copy, to a diverse audience in West Africa and beyond. The ECOWAS Peace and Security Report is an initiative of the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division (CPRA) of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) implemented by the Dakar regional office with the support of the other ISS offices in Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Pretoria.

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Establishment of the institutional architecture of the transitionThe unexpected coup d’état of March 22 dealt a deathblow to the democratic process, which had long been derailed by actors who were more focussed on own interests than on good governance and improving the living conditions of their fellow citizens. As early as 27 March, ECOWAS held an extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State in Abidjan that focused on three aspects of resolving the crisis: (1) the return to constitutional order; (2) the implementation of a mediation process under the auspices of the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré; (3) and the activation of the ECOWAS Standby Brigade ‘to deal with any eventuality’.

However, five months passed between the coup d’état of 22 March and the announcement of the second transitional government on 20 August 2012. During that period, armed groups and terrorists in northern Mali grew stronger after gaining military victories first against the Malian army and then against the independent Touareg movement, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). These groups also perpetrated serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the north, created a haven for terrorists and organised crime, and destroyed part of the religious and cultural heritage of Mali and humanity.

The issue of the return to constitutional order was the subject of an ECOWAS mediation effort led by Burkina Faso in a bid both to persuade the junta to hand over power to civil government and to ensure the safe departure of the deposed president, Amadou Toumani Touré, to Senegal on 19 April. It was in this context that, on 1 April 2012, junta leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo made a solemn declaration ‘restoring the 25 February 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Mali and the republican institutions’. The mediation led to the signing on 6 April 2012 of the ‘Framework Agreement on the implementation of the solemn commitment of 1 April’ (Framework Agreement), described by some as ‘the original sin’ because it placed the junta at the centre of the decision-making process, a position it later would be reluctant to relinquish.

The first transitional government was put in place in April, but was deemed not representative enough by some Malian politicians and the international community. The second

so-called government of ‘national unity’, which differed little from the previous one, was announced on 20 August. Despite mild protests in the beginning, external partners seem prepared to work with the authorities in place, perhaps to avoid contributing to the establishment of a new authority that would just serve as a front while those actors whom the normative frameworks sought to exclude take the real decisions in the background.

Actually, this government illustrates the fragmentation of the political class, the opposition between some political and military actors and how the power relations are largely skewed in favour of the military junta. This reshuffle has only reproduced a three-member governance structure dominated by three actors: Sanogo, leader of the military junta; Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra; and Interim President Dioncounda Traoré. Within this transitional architecture, Sanogo has remained influential, even though he has moved to the background. It is also obvious that the Interim President has little room to manoeuvre, as the Prime Minister’s supporters, especially the High Islamic Council (HCI), often question his decisions. Despite the apparent unity displayed at the 19 October meeting in Bamako, power remains divided, and the risk of a new institutional crisis cannot be discounted.

The transition from the military coup to the restoration of constitutional order has been beset by a number of contradictory processes, and there are different definitions of the so-called inclusive transitional government. In some circles in Bamako, constitutional order is synonymous with influence peddling in the upper echelons of the Establishment while democracy is synonymous with electoral corruption, and many are wondering just how representative those politicians were who were elected five years ago on the basis of a ridiculous voter turnout rate. All this highlights the gap between the opinions of insiders and outsiders looking at the same situation. The focus on normative frameworks seems to have prevented a full appreciation of the complex political, military and social realities that characterised the latter days of Touré’s regime. In this context, the efforts of members of the international community have, rightly or wrongly, been perceived by those disappointed in Malian democracy as an attempt to restore to power the largely discredited political elite.

In addition to managing the transition, the Framework Agreement signed on 6 April between the junta and the ECOWAS mediator entrusted the transitional government with two missions: to manage the crisis in the north; and to organise free, transparent and democratic elections.

Managing the crisis in the northMaking peace ...Apart from the negotiations conducted by the ECOWAS mediator in southern Mali in a bid to manage the institutional crisis, preliminary moves were made to contact the groups in the north with a view to preparing the ground for possible negotiations. The mediator’s approach has tended to favour negotiation with groups perceived as ‘Malian’ and ‘simply armed’, as opposed to

Despite the apparent unity displayed at the 19 October meeting in Bamako, power remains divided, and the risk of a new institutional crisis cannot be discounted.

Continued…

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groups described as ‘non-Malian’ and ‘terrorists’. The first category includes, in the opinion of a growing section of the international community, the MNLA and Ansar Dine. The second category includes MUJAO and AQIM.

This strategy can be called into question because the divide between the armed and terrorist groups in the north of Mali is far from clear-cut. The bases for a dialogue, according to ECOWAS and the AU, are as follows: ‘(i) [T]he reaffirmation of the territorial integrity of Mali; (ii) the centrality of the 1992 Constitution; (iii) the outright rejection of terrorist and criminal groups, as well as of armed rebellion; and (iv) the imperative of allowing humanitarian access to the rebel controlled zones.’ 1

In his address to the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2012, the Prime Minister reaffirmed the ‘commitment of the Interim President of the Republic of Mali to negotiate with our compatriots who are not terrorists’. He pointed out, however, that ‘we shall not negotiate with terrorists, we are not prepared to negotiate issues that question the integrity of the territory, national unity and secularity of the Republic’.

Until recently, the options for negotiation have apparently been limited. The armed Islamist groups have demanded the imposition of Shari’a law as a prerequisite for any negotiation, whereas the MNLA, before it started talking about ‘self-determination’ on 7 October, stated that the independence of the north was non-negotiable. Discussions are under way and the claims of the armed groups of the north are being redefined. However, in Bamako, many actors still doubt the sincerity of those of their compatriots who have taken up arms in the north.

Nevertheless, many informal communication channels have been opened over the past few weeks with a view to future negotiations through local inhabitants. The ‘National Committee for Negotiations’, announced on 29 July 2012 by Traoré and requested by the ECOWAS Heads of State at the second meeting of the Contact Group on Mali on 9 July 2013, has not yet been formalised. Instead of this structure, it would appear that the currently preferred formula, which will have to be endorsed by

a future national consultative process, is a commission or forum, as yet unnamed, based on dialogue and reconciliation and bringing together all Malians with political claims. The national consultation, initially scheduled for late September, could not take place due to a disagreement about its terms of reference and the selection of its chairman, prompting some parties to refuse to take part in the process. Holding this consultation speedily would help the consensual effort to lay the foundations of dialogue and reconciliation and determine the roles of the different national and international actors in the negotiations. This is all the more important as the countries that are central to resolving the crisis, such as Algeria and Mauritania, are in favour of a negotiated solution. In any case, it will be vital to coordinate the national and regional efforts in order to avoid having the parties involved use the various initiatives to serve their own interests.

… while preparing for war by rebuilding the Malian army …The second area of focus, the military intervention, calls for a careful appraisal of the situation as well as of the developments in relations between Mali and ECOWAS on this issue. At the national level, it is worth noting the extent to which the situation that led to the coup d’état of 22 March was the result of years of poor governance, especially related to defence and security. Many practices undermined the Malian security apparatus: a recruitment process based on nepotism and cronyism, promotion based on anything but merit and competence, integration into the army of former rebel fighters without any training or monitoring, the involvement of senior military officers in all sorts of trafficking, including with armed groups and terrorists …

The events of 24 January 2012 in Aguelhoc, during which 150 Malian soldiers2 were reportedly killed by elements of the MNLA and Islamist armed groups after asking in vain for food and ammunition supplies, will remain in people’s minds for a long time. Those events highlighted the lack of equipment, the duplicity of certain officers and soldiers who changed sides at the last moment (and this is related to the integration of Touareg ex-rebels into the army), and the priority given to the militia over the regular army in the management of security issues in northern Mali. When asked about the frantic retreat of the Malian army in early 2012, a military source had this to say: ‘They described us as an army which fled. It is true, we fled. But we were not happy to do so. We were abandoned by our hierarchy.’ This issue of army leadership is compounded by the fact that due to recruitment practices, many soldiers joined the army without ever thinking that they could be asked to fight.

The indifference of the army leadership to fighting in the field, caring for the wounded who were evacuated to the south and dealing with the families of those killed in action, prompted the following words from the soldiers sent to the north: ‘Ni i sara malikola, i sara fou.’ This means, in the dominant Bambara language in Mali: ‘If you die for Mali, you die for nothing.’ It clearly illustrates the morale of the troops and their

‘If you die for Mali, you die for nothing.’ This sentence, translated from Bambara, depicts the state of morale among soldiers and the scope of their resentment towards the government before the 22 March coup.

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disgruntlement. Further, the acts of cruelty witnessed by many soldiers caused some of them to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. The Malian military medical services have difficulties treating such cases because of the taboo surrounding psychological disorders as well as the lack of specialised resources in this field.

Rebuilding the Malian army, considered vital by the country’s partners and supported in particular by the European Union (EU), therefore involves more than just providing training and equipment, because the poor management of the mental health of certain soldiers, compounded by the desire for revenge, may cause them to abuse civilians during the planned military operation in the north. With that in mind, it is necessary to enhance the normal disciplinary and military justice mechanisms that are essential to an army operating under an effective command and control system.

Besides, there are still tensions and differences within the junta as well as between the green berets (mainly members of the junta responsible for the coup d’état) and red berets (elite army staff notably in charge of presidential security) who clashed during the counter-coup attempt in April 2012. This shows how urgent it is to rebuild the Malian army in order to reconquer the north, but also how complex it is going to be.

The issue of building the capacity of the army is mentioned in the Framework Agreement of 6 April. Pursuant to its Article 7, the Military Committee for monitoring the reform of the defence and security forces (CMSRFDS) was established by an Act adopted by the National Assembly in June 2012. The Act establishing the CMSRFDS3 and the decree setting out the details of its organisation and operation,4 however, do not provide guidelines commensurate with the magnitude of the task at hand, do not seem to have benefitted from the requisite technical advice and apparently do not provide sufficient bases for future security governance reform.

Good security governance and the return of the army under civilian control are central to Mali’s future. While it is true that this committee is only expected to operate until the end of the transition and was established to manage the urgent need to reconquer the north, it is important that it lays the foundation of a genuine security sector reform process. The discreet appointment by decree,5 on 8 August 2012, of Sanogo as chairman of this committee, was not appreciated by all the international actors, but once again shows that there are still many centres of power in Bamako.

… and by planning a foreign interventionDespite recent progress, there are still important issues on which national and international actors need to agree, especially the definition of the armed groups to be targeted in the military campaign. In other words, there is still no consensus about who should be considered the enemy during the military intervention. The role of foreign actors in the military intervention has also created tension between the transitional authorities and ECOWAS, which has not made it easy to obtain a consensus among partners from outside the region. The disagreement between Bamako and ECOWAS had especially to do with the issue of prioritising the various stages of the mission proposed in the ECOWAS Concept of Operation.

The mandate of the ECOWAS Standby Force, as authorised by the AU Peace and Security Council at its 323rd meeting of 12 June 2012, sets three main objectives:

1. ensuring the security of the transitional institutions;

2. restructuring and reorganising the Malian security and defence forces; and

3. restoring State authority over the north and combating terrorism and criminal networks. The communiqué of that meeting further states that the required security and military arrangements should be put in place in collaboration with the core countries, namely Algeria, Mauritania and Niger.

The first of the three phases envisaged the deployment of troops in Bamako in order to secure the transitional institutions and ECOWAS civilian, police and military personnel, since the office of the Special Representative of the President of the ECOWAS Commission would be based in the capital. However, the Malian army, which felt that it was quite capable of securing its own institutions despite the ‘unfortunate incident’ that led to the physical attack on Traoré on 21 May 2012, believed the priority was rebuilding the army in order to speedily reconquer the north.

The decision by ECOWAS to deploy troops in Bamako was thus seen as an attempt to keep an eye on the coup leaders and, if necessary, be in a position to control them. This difference of opinion and the long discussions that ensued revealed the magnitude of the crisis of confidence between Bamako and the West African organisation. This crisis was compounded by several elements: it first emerged quite clearly that the states parties are not very familiar with the ECOWAS instruments, in particular the Additional Protocol of 2001 on democracy and good governance. Since their implementation has not taken place in a gradual and systematic manner, several moves by ECOWAS were interpreted in Bamako as showing a lack of solidarity. This situation was then cleverly exploited by the military junta to mobilise part of the public against ECOWAS. The sharp disagreements over the right approach could readily have been settled if the Malian representatives had been involved from the beginning in the first planning conference held in Abidjan in June.

ECOWAS’ attitude towards the concerns expressed by the Malian authorities was perceived as a form of arrogance and caused

There is still no consensus about who should be considered the enemy during the military intervention.

Continued…

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suspicion about its real motivations and objectives. This situation was, however, officially settled after the visit to Abidjan on 22 September by the Malian Minister of Defence, Yamoussa Camara. At the end of his discussions with the current president of ECOWAS, Côte d’Ivoire’s Alassane Ouattara, he declared that ‘the issue was the best method of deploying these forces without affecting the susceptibilities and sensibilities of the populations who will be carefully watching the deployment of any foreign troops in our country [...]. We agree with ECOWAS to deploy forces in Mali [...] together with all the structures that go with them. However, in the interest of the operations themselves, things must be done with some discretion in order to guarantee the effectiveness that is essential to the conduct of the operations.’

This solution was finally reached amid an epistolary cacophony, in view of the large number of letters sent, apparently without any coordination, by the Malian authorities to ECOWAS and the UN requesting the deployment of a military force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The change in language, from ‘assistance by ECOWAS’ 6 to ‘international military force’, 7 also speaks volumes about the desire to cast a wider net, beyond ECOWAS, to include non-member African countries and garner support outside the continent from countries such as France, the United States and Germany.

The UN Security Council, since the time it was approached by ECOWAS and its Resolution 2056 of 5 July, has been asking for details about the ‘objectives, means and modalities of the envisaged deployment and other possible measures’. Despite numerous planning meetings, ECOWAS has not yet succeeded in preparing a strategic concept for the resolution of the crisis in Mali that is satisfactory to the UN. Resolution 2071, presented

by France just like Resolution 2056, opens the way for the deployment of an ‘international military force’. It asks the UN Secretary General ‘immediately to provide military and security planners to assist joint ECOWAS and African Union planning efforts’. It also asks for a written report to be submitted within 45 days that would include the ‘means and modalities of the envisaged deployment, in particular the concept of operations, force generation capabilities, strength and financial costs’.

It is hard to miss the thinly veiled comment on the lack of detail in the responses ECOWAS has provided so far to the UN’s concerns. However, the problems ECOWAS faced in submitting a convincing plan to the UN Security Council are perhaps not solely due to its weakness in terms of planning and the complex nature of the task, but also to the lack of coordination and collaboration with its partners, particularly the AU. This situation may be due to rivalry between ECOWAS and the AU, which dates back to the post-electoral crisis management in Côte d’Ivoire. The Malian interlocutors in fact do not hesitate to mention the lack of professionalism in the initiatives of the region’s leaders, which is surprising given the Organisation’s experience in conflict management and the institutional memory available, despite the fact that the leadership of the Commission on these issues has only recently taken office.

With respect to the electionRegarding the presidential election, it should be underscored that it was initially meant to take place on 29 April 2012. Electoral materials had been distributed across the country and to polling stations abroad. The posters for the campaign can still be seen in the streets of Bamako. The coup d’état of 22 March interrupted

The current interim President, Dioncounda Traoré, was chosen as the flag bearer of his party, ADEMA-PASI, ahead of the scheduled April 2012 presidential election, which did not take place.

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the process. Many observers claim, however, that Touré, taking advantage of the crisis, was planning to invoke the relevant provisions of the Constitution in order to postpone the election and remain in power.

The Framework Agreement of 6 April provides that the transitional organs are in charge of ‘conducting the transition until the organisation of the Presidential election based on a duly revised voter registration list that is accepted by all’. 8 It also contains provisions to ‘enable elections to be held in good conditions throughout the country’. Since the transition is expected to last for 12 months, the election should be held by the end of April 2013. In view of the fact that the election is considered in the Framework Agreement as a crisis resolution mechanism, it is especially important to maintain a climate of confidence and establish mechanisms that make the electoral process credible by ensuring that it is transparent enough for political parties, civil society and the media to supervise and take ownership of it. Great care must be taken that the electoral process does not cause a new crisis. Discharging the second mission of the transitional government raises two issues: revising the voter registration list in order to make it more credible, and organising elections in a country where two-thirds of the territory is not under state control. The current voter registration list is seriously challenged, especially because there is no reliable means of verifying the identity of voters and because it contains many double registrations due to the lack of a unified system in the census method used. The preparatory stages of the voter registration list auditing are

under way. All indications are that, despite the tight deadline, Mali is on track towards developing a new secure voter registration list.

There are two opposing views regarding new elections: there are those who feel that they should be held immediately in order to genuinely restore constitutional order with an elected president; while others think it is indecent to even talk about elections while the country is occupied. It is difficult to ascertain the exact proportion of the electoral population currently living in the occupied zone. Whatever the figures, however, it is above all a matter of symbolic importance to organise the election in as credible a manner as possible across the country. In order to learn from the experience of countries emerging from crises and those that do not have control over their entire territory, the ministry of territorial administration in September 2012 sent missions to Abidjan and Kinshasa and has been working on different scenarios. Organising presidential elections in a divided country is fraught with challenges, particularly in terms of relevance and legitimacy. Beyond the terms and conditions of their actions, the external partners should appreciate the importance of sparing no efforts to prevent the electoral process from carrying the seeds of future discord.

Continued…

‘Libya expels and kills,’ says this graffiti on a wall in Bamako, reminding passers-by of the far-reaching consequences of the Libyan crisis.

Great care must be taken that the electoral process does not cause a new crisis.

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ConclusionThe deteriorating political and military situation in Mali and the Sahel has once again stretched the regional and continental prevention, management and conflict resolution mechanisms. Although this crisis is taking place in Mali, its effects are felt beyond the borders of the country and its management calls for concerted efforts at the regional, continental and international level. Indeed, it is the lack of unity in terms of opinions and efforts that has, for many years, prevented the establishment of an effective regional strategy to deal with the security threats in the Sahel. It is therefore essential that all stakeholders work together and avoid the multiplicity of strategies, special envoys or representatives for the Sahel that will only increase rivalry and create more confusion. It is urgent that closer monitoring and coordination mechanisms be established that will ensure the synergy and coherence of international efforts. The last few weeks have demonstrated the determination of the international agenda on Mali and confirmed the engagement of the international community, but there is still a need to build consensus on the

practical modalities of the implementation of the intervention mechanisms envisaged jointly with the Malian actors.

Notes1 Strategic concept for the resolution of the crises in Mali, Meeting of

the Support and Follow-up Group on the situation in Mali, Bamako, 19 October 2012.

2 FIDH/AMDH Crimes de guerre au Nord-Mali [War crimes in Northern Mali], 11 June 2012, http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapmali592f.pdf

3 Act no 12-26/AN-RM of 29 June 2012 establishing the Military Committee for monitoring the reform of the defence and security forces.

4 Decree no 2012-462/P-RM of 20 August 2012 setting out the details of the organisation and operation of the Military Committee for monitoring the reform of the defence and security forces.

5 Decree no 2012-433/P-RM of 8 August 2012 appointing the Chairman of the Military Committee for monitoring the reform of the defence and security forces.

6 Letter from President Dioncounda Traoré to the current President of ECOWAS dated 1 September 2012.

7 Address by Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra to the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2012.

8 Article 6.

1. The option that has been favoured thus far (that is, to make peace through negotiation while preparing for war by rebuilding the Malian army and planning an international intervention) has clear advantages. Military pressure could indeed speed up the negotiations. However, it entails certain risks, and must therefore be conducted in a concerted manner on the basis of clear guidelines and a precise timetable to avoid a quagmire or a military adventure with unpredictable consequences.

2. Once the national structure responsible for dialogue and negotiations has been formalised, it will be essential to better coordinate national and regional initiatives, not only to make them more coherent and productive, but also to prevent some actors from taking advantage of the multiplicity of initiatives to look for a mediator who favours them. Holding the national consultation as soon as possible would help clarify the bases of the negotiations and the role of the national actors and structures in the process.

3. After the adoption of Resolution 2071, which accepts the principle of an international force in northern Mali, it is now urgent to build a consensus that includes the ‘core countries’ that are not ECOWAS members, namely Algeria and Mauritania, on the practical modalities of an intervention. Restructuring and reorganising the Malian army should be based on a comprehensive evaluation, because its needs include much more than the training and equipment mentioned earlier. The operational aspect of this restructuring process to address the immediate needs of the envisaged military intervention should be

undertaken as soon as possible. However, it should be considered only as the starting point of a more conventional long-term security sector reform.

4. Genuine cooperation, based on the comparative advantages of the different organisations and compliance with the processes of the African peace and security architecture and international procedures, is needed to help Mali out of this crisis. The rivalry that seems to characterise relations between different organisations such as ECOWAS, the AU, and more recently the UN, should end. This is all the more necessary because the rivalry is due more to the institutions’ desire to position themselves than to any substantive disagreements. The lack of coordination has delayed progress toward a consensus, even a partial one, on the modalities for resolving the crisis both in the north and in the south.

5. The importance of supporting any process aimed at restoring confidence in the electoral process, especially by helping to produce a credible voter registration list, cannot be exaggerated. Organising presidential elections in a country where two-thirds of the territory is not controlled by the government is fraught with challenges, particularly in terms of relevance and legitimacy. It is necessary to support and guide the Malian authorities to organise the elections, while ensuring that they do not carry the seeds of future problems and disputes. Towards that end, political parties, civil society and the media should take full ownership of the process, which should be conducted as transparently as possible.

Recommendations

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www.issafrica.org ECOWAS Peace and Security Report

19 October Support and Follow-up Group Meeting in Mali

12 October Adoption of UNSC Resolution 2071

7 October The NMLA amends its demand and opts for self-determination instead of independence

26 September High Level Meeting on the Sahel in the margins of the UN General Assembly Session

1 September Islamist group MUJAO captures Douentza

20 August Formation of the Government of National Unity

19 July Interim President Dioncounda Traoré delivers a speech after his treatment in France

55 July Adoption of UNSC Resolution 2056

12 June NMLA is defeated by the Islamist groups and expelled from its last Asongo stronghold

26 May Attempt at merging NMLA and Ansar Dine and creation of the Azawad Islamic State

21 May Mob attacks Interim President Dioncounda Traoré

25 April A post-coup government of transition is formed

17 April Cheick Modibo Diarra is appointed Prime Minister

12 April Interim President is sworn in

6 April ECOWAS mediator and the military junta (CNRDRE) reach an agreement on a transition of power | The MNLA declares the independence of Azawad from Mali

1 April Junta leader announces that the CNRDRE will reinstate Mali’s previous constitution | Insurgent groups capture Timbuktu, the last major Malian-controlled city of the northern region

22 March Mutiny/coup d’état by the CNRDRE

17 January Tuareg-led insurgency begins in northern Mali

DonorsThis report is published through the support of the International Development Research Center of Canada, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and the Ghana office of the Hanns Seidel Foundation.

As a leading African human security research institution, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security and gender mainstreaming.

Key events ContributorsISS DakarDr Lori-Anne Théroux-BénoniMrs Awa Faye Daou Mr Paulin Maurice Toupane

ISS PretoriaDr David Zounmenou

© 2012, Institute for Security Studies

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of the Institute. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors.

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