1ECOWAS Peace and Security Report • Issue 5 • July 2013

A tenuous solution in Mali:between internal constraints and external pressures

IntroductionWith the announced date of the presidential election in Mali fast approaching, the continued occupation of the Kidal region by armed Tuareg rebels compromised the organisation of elections throughout the country. It was in this context that a Preliminary Agreement for the Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks was signed in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on 18 June 2013, between the rebel movements and the transitional authorities. The signing was followed on 1 July 2013 by the transformation of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) into the United Nations Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), pursuant to United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013. With these developments, efforts to resolve the complex crisis facing Mali are entering a new phase.

This report, which is based on field research and interviews conducted in Bamako in June 2013, aims to analyse these developments by placing them in context. The objective is to better understand their meaning and identify the obstacles that may hamper the search for a solution. The report is divided in three parts: first, the Ouagadougou negotiations with a focus on their context and the content of the resulting agreement; second, the implications of the agreement for the on-going process, with respect to both its election and reconciliation components; and finally, the rehatting of AFISMA into MINUSMA, which marks the concluding phase of the long process through which the international community has strived to address the security dimension of the Malian crisis.

Background and scope of the Ouagadougou negotiations

Malian dynamics and the international community’s impatienceThe agreement of 18 June was the result of a process that took much longer than the 11 days of difficult and highly-publicised negotiations preceding it. Before the stepping-up of military action in January 2013, the mediation team of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), supported by external partners, had already designed a two-stage process: first an arrangement to hold elections throughout the country, followed by peace talks aimed at addressing the core issues of the crisis. The negotiations were expected to involve the transitional authorities and the two armed groups then considered to be ‘Malian and non-terrorist’, namely the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine. However, by taking part in the military offensive launched by the northern armed groups in January 2013, Ansar Dine became one of the military targets, leaving only the MNLA, which had been driven out of the main northern towns several months earlier, at the negotiation table. Four features of the context of the negotiations ought to be highlighted:

ECOWAS Peace and Security Report

Issue 5 July 2013

ECOWAS PEACE And SECurity rEPOrt SEriES

The ECOWAS Peace and Security Report series seeks to provide the decision makers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with analysis on critical and topical human security situations in West Africa. It results from a partnership between the ISS and the ECOWAS Commission (Regional Security Division). The objective is to produce independent, field-based policy research in a timely manner to inform ECOWAS decision-making process or alert its governing structures on emerging issues. The ECOWAS Peace and Security Report series includes analyses of country situations and other thematic issues with recommendations. It is circulated, free of charge, both electronically and in hard copy, to a diverse audience in West Africa and beyond. The ECOWAS Peace and Security Report is produced by the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division (CPRA) in ISS Dakar with the support of CPRA staff in ISS Addis Ababa, ISS Nairobi and ISS Pretoria.

2 ECOWAS Peace and Security Report • Issue 5 • July 2013

The first is the reconfiguration of the Tuareg armed groups. This process began with the creation of the Azawad Islamic Movement (Mouvement islamique de l’Azawad, or MIA) by Alghabass Ag Intalla, an Ansar Dine dissident and son of the traditional leader of Kidal. It was followed by the MNLA’s claiming of Kidal and the surrounding region in late January 2013. This claim was made public after the French troops of Operation Serval and the Chadian forces hunting down the terrorist groups entered Kidal, without the Malian army. Largely perceived in Bamako as a deliberate move to place the rebellion in a position of strength, this situation convinced an already suspicious Malian public that the international community, especially the French government, was not willing to use force against this group and rather preferred to promote a negotiated solution among ‘Malian brothers’. Thereafter, the elder brother of Alghabass, Mohamed Ag Intalla, created the High Council of Azawad (HCA), presented as a structure that would enable ‘all the sons of Azawad to unite under a single entity and to work together to resolve the crisis’.1 The third act was the dissolution of the MIA, which merged with the HCA in late May, and the blessing the traditional leader of Kidal granted to the HCA, transformed on that occasion into the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA). The restructuring of the Tuareg armed movements can be interpreted in several ways. It can be seen as an attempt, as the negotiations drew closer, to unite the Tuareg actors so that they could articulate common demands and carry greater weight at the negotiating table. It can also be perceived as a strategy by the traditional Ifogha authorities to regain control over the ‘tributary’ groups that dominated the MNLA negotiation team. Given that the unification attempts did not succeed, the MNLA and the HCUA signed the Preliminary Agreement as separate entities under the umbrella of a ‘coordination’. The second factor is the determination of the Malian transition authorities to be in the driving seat during the negotiations. Initially managed by the mediator and associate mediator mandated by ECOWAS, namely Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaoré and Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan, the negotiation process had, since the military action in January 2013, involved a number of actors who seemed to act without much coordination. The appointment, on 16 May 2013, of Tiébilé Dramé as Special Adviser to the Interim President of the Republic in charge of the negotiations with the armed groups in northern Mali was part of the country’s efforts to reclaim ownership of the process. The involvement of this former minister, who is also the presidential candidate of the Party for National Renewal (Parti pour la Renaissance Nationale, or PARENA), was made public amid increasing outrage in Mali at the MNLA’s continued occupation of Kidal. Further, the transition government decided to enlarge the circle of participants in the dialogue to include two other so-called ‘self-defence’ armed groups opposed to the secessionist agenda of the MNLA: the Arab Movement of Azawad (Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad, or MAA) and the Coordination of the Patriotic Movements and Forces for Resistance (Coordination des Mouvements et Forces patriotiques de Résistance, or CMFR).

The third factor is the pressure coming from the international community, and its impatience. Some of its most influential members wanted a rapid negotiated solution so that the

elections could be held on 28 July, the date set by the govern-ment at the insistence of its external partners.2 However, both on the street and within political circles, one of the few issues that enjoyed consensus was the rejection of a presidential election without Kidal, which would sanction the de facto partitioning of the country. The matter became all the more important for the international community as reports of acts of retaliation by the Tuareg rebels against ‘dark-skinned’ citizens in Kidal surfaced in early June. This, along with the temptation of the Malian army to push its military advantage on the ground after regaining control of the town of Anéfis on 5 June, increased tension and raised the risk of direct clashes between the Malian army and Tuareg rebels. Such a situation would have put Serval, AFISMA and the UN in a very difficult position. These three factors shaped the mindset of both the signatories and the representatives of the international community when they started the negotiation process in Ouagadougou. On the one hand, there was a group of Tuareg movements whose cohesion was more apparent than real and who had been convinced by a number of external actors to sign a preliminary agreement guaranteeing that their claims would be considered at a later stage. On the other hand, there was a Malian transition government determined to make its voice heard during the negotiations and not to be locked in a tête-à-tête with the Tuareg armed groups, emboldened by developments on the military front and subjected to strong pressure from its public opinion and the international community. Overlooking the negotiations were the international actors, who, for once, seemed to share similar views and were determined to have these heard by the Malian parties. For them, the priority was to avoid at all cost an armed confrontation over Kidal and to quickly organise the presidential election in order to ensure that Mali would be headed by a more legitimate authority and interlocutor.

Operation Serval was launched on 11 January 2013.

3ECOWAS Peace and Security Report • Issue 5 • July 2013

A minimal agreement secured in extremis The preliminary agreement for the presidential election and inclusive peace talks, signed on 18 June, aimed to create conditions for holding the presidential election in July 2013, while preparing the ground for a post-electoral negotiation process leading to a ‘global and final peace agreement’. On the same day, two other groups, the MAA and the CMFR, signed a declaration to join the agreement.

The signatories affirmed their commitment to the national unity of Mali and the integrity of its borders, as well as their respect for the secular nature of the state and for human rights. Under the supervision of the Joint Technical Security Commission (JTSC) and according to the modalities to be determined by the latter, the agreement provides for a ceasefire, the cantonment and disarmament (after the signing of the global and final peace agreement) of the armed groups in the north, as well as the redeployment of the defence and security forces in the Kidal region. The JTSC operates under the authority of a monitoring and evaluation committee chaired by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and includes representatives of the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS.

The agreement provides for the creation of an International Investigation Commission on war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, sexual violence and drug trafficking committed on Malian territory. Further, the agreement mandates the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission, in the period following the elections, to determine the outlines of, and initiate, inclusive peace talks with a view to promoting a global and final agreement.

The positions of the parties were difficult to reconcile on three points: the modalities for the return of the Malian army to Kidal, the lifting of legal proceedings against the leaders of the rebel groups, and the inclusion of the term ‘Azawad’ in the agreement. A comparative reading of the successive versions of the draft reveals a balance of power in favour of the government which, on a number of occasions, demanded and obtained amendments while the MNLA and HCUA were ready to sign.

Furthermore, the presence, imposed by the government, of the MAA and the CMFR at the negotiations was meant to send a strong signal that the government was not prepared to negotiate with the Tuareg groups only. A quote from an elected representative from northern Mali illustrates this point: ‘Tuaregs are not the only people living in the north who are suffering from the sun and under-development.’ In short, by increasing the number of actors, the objective was to dilute the influence of the Tuareg armed movements and not let them reap alone the ‘benefits of having taken up arms’.

The international community’s unanimous welcome of the preliminary agreement contrasts with the mixed reactions it generated in Mali. Those ranged from discreet satisfaction – itself indicative of a certain discomfort – to polite calls for vigilance, and outright hostility. Many people feel that the government delegation made too many concessions. This situation illustrates the depth of the resentment many Malians have toward the

armed Tuareg groups. It also reveals the magnitude of the task awaiting the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission.

Accelerating the electoral timetable and relaunching the reconciliation process

The electoral equation: act now and think later? By allowing the return of the Malian army and the local govern-ment to Kidal, the preliminary agreement made it possible to restore the territorial integrity of Mali and lift the last obstacle to the holding of elections throughout the country. However, the situation in Kidal is still tense, and there are other major obstacles. On 27 June, the Independent National Electoral Commission (Commission électorale nationale indépendante, ou CENI), which is supervising the election, explained the deficiencies of the electoral process to representatives of the political parties. A few days later, during the fifth meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali, held in Bamako on 1 July 2013, the hitherto taboo question was on all minds: should the presidential election be postponed?3

The somewhat diplomatic answer is contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the meeting’s conclusions. After recalling that the Malian authorities undertook to organise the elections on 28 July, the participants encouraged the latter to ‘continue to assess the state of preparation of the elections with the view to facilitating effective action to resolve outstanding issues and create the best possible conditions, under the circumstances,

The CENI supervises the electoral process in Mali, but is not in charge of the actual organisation of the election.

4 ECOWAS Peace and Security Report • Issue 5 • July 2013

for the holding of free, fair, transparent and credible elections, within the stated timetable, in order to successfully conclude the Transition and lay the foundation for durable peace, security and development in Mali’. 4

Implicitly, the Support and Follow-up Group acknowledges that the elections will take place in conditions that are far from perfect, but still believes that they should be held at that date, in line with the pledge of the Malian government. It also calls on the Malian actors to accept this state of affairs and not to take advantage of the shortcomings of the election to challenge its results. The declaration by the Minister of Territorial Administration on 2 July before the technical and financial partners in Bamako, broadcast over national television, seemed to close the debate on the election date.5

There are four sets of challenges to the holding of the elections. The first results from the introduction, following a political consensus, of biometric details in the voter identification process with the so-called NINA card. This card, which contains the holder’s national identification number, fingerprints and embedded photo, was initially meant to be a simple national ID card. It has now become a voter’s card. All 6.8 million NINA cards were delivered to Bamako on 24 June and are being distributed. However, observers are worried that it may not be possible to distribute enough of these cards before the deadline and about the lack of details on the cards on where to vote.

The inclusion of internally displaced persons and refugees in the electoral registry poses an additional challenge. A voter registered during the administrative census residing in Timbuktu, for example, and who now lives in Sikasso, could until 27 June go to an administrative commission in charge of validating the electoral lists to request to be transferred to his new place of voting. However, his NINA card will first be dispatched to his initial place of registration before being sent back to Bamako, where unclaimed cards will be redirected to the new place of residence. For their part the refugees will have to voluntarily register on the lists abroad for their cards to be redirected after the to- and fro-ing between their place of registration and Bamako. Time is obviously very short. The voter turnout, usually low in Mali, may be even lower this year because of the many obstacles mentioned above. Another factor is related to the actual return of local administration to the whole territory. In view of the delay in the redeployment of the public service in the Kidal region, allowing little time for the preparation of electoral lists, voting throughout the country – a highly emotional topic in Mali, which is also vital from the political point of view, – may turn out to be nothing more than symbolic. More globally, the organisation of the election is under the purview of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, which cannot carry out this task without the effective return of public servants to their postings. The last challenge is related to security. While the operations conducted by Serval and AFISMA have considerably reduced the threat posed by the armed groups, the latter are still present and have even spread geographically, as evidenced by the attacks in Niger on 23 May this year. The presence of Islamic

radicals, especially in the Gao region, carries the risk of suicide attacks or other asymmetric attacks close to or during the elections, creating a situation that does not encourage a high voter turnout and against which the normal security arrange-ments are not very effective. There are two approaches to the postponement and, more generally, the role of this post-conflict election. The first approach is to make the process and the election results credible. This calls for an election conducted in conditions that will limit the risk of contestation as much as possible, enable an acceptable voter turnout rate compared to past elections and lend the elected president the level of legitimacy necessary to launch the far- reaching reforms that Mali needs. According to this approach, a delay of a few weeks at the most would allow time to improve the NINA card distribution scheme and the management of the transfers in order to afford a greater number of Malians the opportunity to vote. It would also enable the elaboration of the required guidelines, since the NINA card does not carry any information on voting stations. A delay that would enable the elections to be held after the rainy season and Ramadan is also seen as likely to increase the turnout rate.

The NINA card, which will serve as a voter’s card, carries the holder’s national identification number, fingerprints and embedded photo.

5ECOWAS Peace and Security Report • Issue 5 • July 2013

The second approach is based on the fact that no post-conflict election is perfect. For its proponents, who acknowledge that the 28 July election will be ‘botched’, the desired end-state is, above all, the conclusion of the transition. The latter, they point out, has shown its limits, and the President elect and his government, whatever the voter turnout may be, ‘cannot do worse than the current authorities’. According to this argument, the elections should be held, however imperfectly, and lessons can be drawn from the exercise with a view to reforming the Malian democratic system, including a review of the constitution and electoral code. No matter how valid these arguments may be, the fact remains that neither of these options is ideal. On the one hand, elections held in spite of the current technical deficiencies would provide losers with valid grounds to challenge the results. In the medium or long term, the legitimacy of the President elect and, more globally, the overall agenda of his government, may be questioned. On the other hand, a delay may lead to criticism of the political compromise reached by the Malian stakeholders on difficult issues relating to voting by those who have just reached majority or the sponsoring of candidates by elected officials. Reopening the debate on these issues would cause a delay of several months amid possible challenges to the transitional authority, including from the army. The state of emergency, which until now enabled the transitional authorities to contain any attempts to contest the current institutions, was lifted during the night of 7–8 July 2013. In principle, the military presence of Serval and MINUSMA, together with international political pressure, reduces this risk, although recent events in Mali have shown that the behaviour of the actors is not always based on a rational assessment of power relations.

On the Malian side, none of the organs involved in the elections would like to be blamed for a postponement. ‘We will start thinking again on 12 August [after the second round], but for the moment, we need to go ahead,’ said one of the actors in the process. Obviously, it is unlikely that the international partners who pleaded for early elections will suddenly change their minds and support the idea of delaying the presidential election. Even the doubtful among them have chosen to keep quiet rather than appear to question a decision for which the Malian stakeholders have taken responsibility.

Ultimately, many inside and outside Mali have, with varying levels of embarrassment, watched the runaway train. In case of violent contestation of the results, serious security incidents or future governance problems arising from the President elect’s lack of legitimacy, it will be difficult for the international community to plead innocence. Nor will the Malian actors be able to claim innocence, even though it may be said in their favour that power relations with their partners never left them much margin for manoeuvre. The formal request for a postponement by PARENA candidate Dramé filed with the Constitutional Court on 8 July, claiming that electoral law was violated, particularly its provisions relating to the equality of citizens with respect to voting, is perhaps the only honourable reason that can be given for an orderly postponement that would allow both the Malian structures and international actors to save face.6

Reconciliation, a long-term processUntil recently, an increasing number of Malian political actors and observers were openly voicing their doubts about the relevance of the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission in its current composition, saying that it was bound to fail because it did not have a clear mandate. By mentioning it by name, the Ouagadougou Agreement now endows the commission with a new legitimacy.

Officially mentioned in the road map of the transition government adopted on 26 January 2013, the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission was established by decree in March. It was expected to be inclusive and all the northern communities were to be represented.7 While there is no doubt in the minds of the Malian actors about the need for dialogue and reconciliation, the establishment of the commission in its current form seemed to have been prompted by external demands. The reasoning that prevailed in the setting up of the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission may be summarised as follows: ‘You wanted a commission? Here it is!’

The Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission, established on 6 March 2013, has a two-year term.

6 ECOWAS Peace and Security Report • Issue 5 • July 2013

Established with a two-year mandate, the commission is tasked with promoting ‘reconciliation among all the Malian communities through dialogue’. However, when Dramé was appointed as envoy for the negotiations, many observers wondered whether his powers did not overlap with or even render irrelevant those of the commission. By placing the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission at the centre of the negotiations for the future global agreement, while cleverly providing Dramé with a way out since he planned to run for the presidency, the 18 June Agreement has clarified the situation.

As stipulated in the chapter of the agreement on the post-electoral process, ‘60 days after its installation, the new government of Mali, in collaboration with the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission, shall, with the support of the international community, initiate peace talks with all the communities in the north, the signatories as well as the armed groups that have joined the present agreement, with a view to reaching a comprehensive and final peace’. The announced inclusive dialogue will include, among others, ‘Mali’s admini-strative and institutional organisation, particularly in the northern regions that some people call Azawad’, ‘the strategy for regional and local integrated development’, ‘the reorganisation of the Defence and Security Forces as well as the socio-economic Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme for the armed northern armed groups’, ‘the improvement of administrative, economic and political governance’, ‘the return of the refugees and internally displaced persons and their resettlement’, and the protection and promotion of human rights, justice and reconciliation.

Even before it was given a clear role in the crisis resolution process, external partners were eager to support the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission. This goodwill should, however, be properly channelled and coordinated by the partners to avoid overwhelming the commission with external support that is not necessarily adapted to its needs. From this point of view, it is necessary to build the capacity of the commission to enable it to determine its priorities and work plan in keeping with the expectations of the Malian actors and the realities on the ground.

Despite the enthusiasm of the international community, it will be necessary to ensure that the elected government continues to provide the required support to the commission. While this structure has been given a role in the post-election process, much remains to be done regarding the definition of the national reconciliation agenda. The link between the Dialogue and

Reconciliation Commission and the International Investigation Commission should also be clarified, bearing in mind that it is difficult to further reconciliation without addressing the issue of justice. In view of the tense discussions in Ouagadougou on how best to address the serious human rights violations committed during the conflict, the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission should help strike a delicate balance between the need to hold the perpetrators of those crimes accountable, as called for by many Malians, and the necessary reconciliation that requires forgiveness.

Transformation of AFISMA into MINUSMAThe signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement took place about two weeks before the transfer of authority from AFISMA to MINUSMA pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2100. The decision to deploy MINUSMA was primarily driven by France’s concerns. After the French forces under Operation Serval, with the support of the Chadian AFISMA contingent, regained control of northern Mali, and in view of the financial and logistical constraints that compromised the sustainability of the African mission, France very quickly suggested that the UN should take over. The Malian authorities supported this option despite Malian doubts whether a UN mission was the appropriate arrangement to deal with the situation on the ground.

France had to fight hard to ensure that the MINUSMA mandate was formulated in robust enough terms to dispel these doubts about the usefulness of a UN operation in the Malian security context. Further, Resolution 2100 provided for the establishment of a parallel French force that could be called upon to carry out offensive actions.

While the AU and ECOWAS supported the transformation process, the adoption of Resolution 2100 generated tensions between these two organisations and the UN. In its communiqué of 25 April 2013, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) complained that Africa was not adequately consulted during the drafting of the resolution, and that its concerns were not taken into account.

Two points need to be highlighted in this regard. The first relates to the political role of ECOWAS and the AU, which seemed to be relegated to the background by the provisions of the Resolution entrusting the UN Secretary General, through his Special Representative, with the task of facilitating political dialogue between Malians. The second has to do with lack of acknowledg-ment of on-going efforts regarding regional security cooperation, which is required to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism. The discontent was worsened by the appointment of a non-African to lead the mission, whereas the AU had proposed the head of AFISMA, Pierre Buyoya, for that post.

MINUSMA is therefore deploying in a context fraught with doubts over its capacity to deal with the security challenges in northern Mali, as well as resentment on the part of African actors who feel that the UN does not treat them as true partners and is reluctant to recognise their rightful role. Therefore, the mission’s every move is carefully watched. It will have to quickly prove its worth

Despite the enthusiasm of the international community, it willbe necessary to ensure that the elected government continuesto provide the required support to the commission.

7ECOWAS Peace and Security Report • Issue 5 • July 2013

Main recommendations

on the ground. Securing the electoral process, despite the tight election deadline, will be the first test. Regarding the political part of its mandate, suffice it to say that the ‘hegemonic’ vision of the UN’s role was proven wrong during the Ouagadougou negotiations. African actors played a much more important role in the process than envisaged by Resolution 2100. All indications are that their contribution will continue to be vital in the subsequent period.

While their concerns may be well founded, ECOWAS and the AU would be mistaken to focus only on their relations with the UN. One major dimension is the manner in which regional and continental levels interacted during the continent’s management of the Malian crisis. Perspectives sometimes differed, coordination was not always adequate and bureaucratic rivalries affected the efficacy of the African effort.

The request by the PSC in its communiqué of 25 April regarding a workshop to draw lessons from the African experience in Mali in order to enhance future coordination between the actors concerned, as well as the envisaged establishment of a joint

AU-ECOWAS office in Mali, is somehow an acknowledgement of the weaknesses that appeared in the coordination between the two organisations and the expression of a desire to avoid repeating the same mistakes.

ConclusionThe Ouagadougou Agreement, in theory at least, makes it possible to avoid the resurgence of conflict between the Malian army and the Tuareg rebels, hold presidential and subsequent elections throughout the country, and relaunch the reconciliation process at a time when many were beginning to have doubts about the usefulness of the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission. In practice, however, many challenges still lie ahead. It is important first of all to successfully implement the security component of the agreement. Then the decisive test of the presidential elections will have to be successfully passed. Finally, the reconciliation process relaunched by the Ouagadougou Agreement will be of vital importance.

The international community’s support for efforts to address the crisis will be critical. On the ground, this support is provided by MINUSMA. It is not an overstatement to say that the mission is being watched very closely. On the one hand, the mandate of the UN forces – which is quite robust compared to traditional UN missions – must be proactively interpreted and implemented in order to preserve the security gains achieved so far. On the other hand, the success of MINUSMA will also depend on the level of coordination between the UN and African actors, whose role and comparative advantages cannot, and should not, be overlooked.

1. If the elections are held on 28 July 2013, one cannot rule out the results being contested, which could plunge the country into another political or even security crisis. Together with other members of the international community, ECOWAS should take preventive measures. One such measure is to minimise the risks of contestation by supporting the national authorities in the search for solutions to existing technical challenges and by ensuring as effective an election observation mission as possible, especially through close coordination with the other election observation missions present in Mali. An additional measure would be to contribute to an international arrangement to manage a potential post-electoral crisis, particularly by implementing preventive initiatives with the major candidates who could challenge the results.

2. The full implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement should remain a central concern for ECOWAS, which should, as part of the existing monitoring mechanisms, pay equal attention to the preliminary measures agreed upon for the presidential election and to the ‘inclusive post-electoral talks’ component. This effort should

obviously be undertaken together with international partners, especially within the framework of the Support and Follow-up Group, which ECOWAS co-chairs with the AU and the UN.

3. The transformation of AFISMA into MINUSMA does not mean that ECOWAS, which contributed to the launching of the first military operation, and the AU should lose interest in the ‘peacekeeping’ dimension of the international effort. ECOWAS and the AU should continue to advocate for the most robust possible interpretation and implementation of MINUSMA’s mandate.

4. ECOWAS and the AU should draw lessons from their collaboration in the management of the Malian crisis and AFISMA. In this regard, the workshop envisaged by the PSC in its 25 April communiqué should take place as soon as possible and could provide the two commissions with the opportunity to consider setting up a joint office, as envisaged by the PSC. In so doing, they would enhance their efficiency, and make better use of their limited resources.

MINUSMA’s every move is carefully watched. It will have to quickly prove its worth on the ground.

8 ECOWAS Peace and Security Report • Issue 5 • July 2013

DonorsThis report is published through the support of the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the International Development Research Centre of Canada.

In addition, the Institute for Security Studies is grateful for the support of the following core partners: the governments of Norway, Sweden, Australia and Denmark.

The Institute for Security Studies is a leading African policy research and training organisation. The vision of the ISS is a peaceful and prosperous Africa for all its people. The mission and overall goal of the ISS is to advance human security in Africa through evidence-based policy advice, technical support and capacity building.

ContributorsiSS dakarDr Lori-Anne Théroux-BénoniBaba Dakono

ContactConflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division ISS Dakar Ouakam road, Atryum Building (Accross Mermoz Lycée) 4th floor, B.P. 24378 Dakar, Senegal

Tel: +221 33 8603304/42 Fax: +221 33 860 3343 Email: dakar@issafrica.org Website: www.issafrica.org

notes1 Jeune afrique, Mohamed Ag Intalla: The

HCA is the only way to peace in Mali, 8 May 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20130508104838/.

2 Decree No 2013-478/P-RM of 27 May 2013 on the convening of the electoral college, and the opening and closing of the electoral campaign on the occasion of the election of the President of the Republic.

3 The publication, on 26 June, of an International Crisis Group article entitled ‘Elections in Mali: a short delay would pay long-term dividends’ certainly helped open up the debate.

4 Conclusion of the fifth meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali, Bamako, 1 July 2013.

5 He stated: ‘The government never set two dates for the elections and there will not be two dates. When the elections date was set, we had selected 28 July for the presidential election and our position has never changed.’

6 Whether there is a postponement or not, one of the characteristics of the future election is likely to be the interference of religion in politics. Further, the current focus on the presidential elections should not be allowed to hide the importance of the legislative elections in order to renew the National Assembly and the fact that these elections also entail high political and security risks.

7 Decree N°2013-212/P-RM of 6 March 2013 establishing the organisation and modalities for the operation of the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission.

Important dates

11 January 2013 Beginning of Operation Serval

25 April 2013 Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2100 and holding of the 371st PSC meeting in Addis Ababa

15 May 2013 Granting of 3.2 billion euros during the Donors Conference in Brussels

16 May 2013 Appointment of Tiébilé Dramé in negotiations with the armed groups

27 May 2013 Date of presidential election set for 28 July

5 June 2013 The town of Anéfis is retaken by the Malian army

8 June 2013 Start of direct negotiations in Ouagadougou

18 June 2013 Signing of the Preliminary Agreement

1 July 2013 Rehatting of AFISMA into MINUSMA and 5th meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group in Bamako

5 July 2013 Malian army enters Kidal

28 July 2013 Date set for the first round of the presidential election

11 August 2013 Date set for the second round of the presidential election

© 2013, Institute for Security Studies

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of the Institute. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors.

Subscribe electronically to the ECOWAS Peace and Security Report at www.issafrica.org/subscribe.php