1

ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE COLD WAR, AND

COUP ATTEMPTS:

Exploring a conditional relationship

Preliminary draft

Abstract

Are coup attempts more likely during an economic crisis? While older studies argued that economic

performance does matter, recent studies almost entirely come out against the argument. I address

this disparity by exploring the moderating effect of the Cold War. During the Cold War, almost all

national governments around the world received economic support from either the US or the USSR.

These aid-receiving regimes, therefore, were able to provide benefits for their ruling coalitions even

during periods of economic crisis. After the Cold War, however, the direct political interference by

the superpowers was drastically reduced, and economically ill-performing leaders suddenly risked

coup attempts. I interrogate this hypothesis by employing the Powell and Thyne coup-dataset

covering the period 1950–2011 in three steps. First, I scrutinize the effect of economic growth

during the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods respectively in order to reveal the overall

conditional pattern. Secondly, I utilize recent external support data in order to test the theoretical

argument more directly. Finally, by instrumenting for economic growth I present empirical

evidence against reverse causality and omitted variable bias concerns. The results suggest that the

effect of economic growth on coup attempts is in fact a conditional one.

9633 words including reference-list but excluding appendices

Suthan Krishnarajan

Ph.D. student

Aarhus University

Email: Suthan@ps.au.dk

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Introduction

Coup attempts have occurred more than 460 times since World War II affecting the lives of millions

of people every year (Powell and Thyne, 2011). Significant events include France (1961), Congo

(1965), Chile (1973), Portugal (1974), Russia (1991), Egypt (2011), and some would even say

Ukraine (2014). These society-changing events have often occurred during times of economic crisis

and have been precipitated by public upheavals and dissatisfaction with the incumbent

government’s inability to deliver services and increase living standards. Recent examples include

angry mass demonstrations during the country-wide banking crisis before the failed 2000

Ecuadorian Coup attempt, sit-in protests by discontented ‘Red-shirts’ and ‘Yellow-shirts’ preceding

the numerous coups in Thailand, and disappointed Egyptians with unfulfilled dreams demonstrating

at Tahrir Square leading to the ousting of Mohamed Morsi in 2013.

The idea that a causal relationship between poor economic growth and coup attempts

exists is so common in both contemporary media coverage (e.g. CNN, 2013) and contemporary

political science textbooks (e.g. Ezrow & Frantz, 2011). Journalists, commentators, and researchers

generally take the public upheavals and demonstrations preceding a coup attempt as a sign of the

importance of economic performance in assessing the risk of these events. However, existing

studies have provided inconclusive and contradictory results: While older studies argued that

economic crises do increase the risk of coup atetmpts (e.g., Fossum, 1967; Nordlinger, 1977;

O’Kane, 1981; Johnson et al., 1984; Galetovic & Sanhueza, 2000), all recent studies, marshaling

newer data, almost entirely present findings against the argument (e.g., Powell, 2012; Marinov &

Goemans, 2013; Svolik, 2012; Thyne, 2010).

This begs the question: does the level of economic growth affect the risk of coup

attempts? The present paper revisits this oft-cited relationship and argues that there is in fact a

substantial effect of economic growth on coup attempts, but that this effect is conditional on the

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degree of external economic support in general and the Cold War period in particular. During the

Cold War, the United States and the USSR went to great lengths to secure the political stability and

survivability of allied co-operative administrations around the world – primarily by providing

covert economic and military aid. These aid-receiving governments, therefore, were able to provide

benefits for their essential constituents even during periods of economic crisis. For that reason, the

relationship between economic growth and coup attempts were effectively suppressed during the

Cold War. After the Cold War, however, the direct political interference by the superpowers was

drastically reduced. Economically ill-performing leaders then suddenly risked losing essential

support because an economic crisis now meant a deficiency in distributable economic resources,

ultimately making coup attempts more likely.

I interrogate this hypothesis in three steps by employing coup-data from Powell and

Thyne (2011) for 136 countries in the period 1950–2011. First, I show – both by splitting samples

and employing interaction models – that economic growth significantly decreases the risk of coup

attempts in the Post-Cold War period whereas the effect is consistently insignificant during the Cold

War period. Second, I employ data on external superpower support from several sources and show

that the suppressing effect of the Cold War is only valid for countries that actually received

superpower support during the Cold War. Finally, by using IV estimation and instrumenting for

Economic growth I present further empirical evidence for the proposed causal direction, and argue

against the alternative interpretation which suspects that coup attempts do not occur because of

weak economic growth, but that the economy in coup-prone countries is weak due to the risk of

those exact same coup attempts.

The purpose of this study is not to explain why so many coups happened during the

Cold War nor is the purpose to explain the reasons, rationales, and dynamics behind the many CIA-

instigated coups in this period. The purpose of this paper is limited to investigating the different

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effects of economic growth during and after the Cold War with a theoretical and empirical focus on

external superpower support. All in all, the estimations are robust to splitting samples and

interactions terms, an array of exogenous controls including regional and country fixed effects,

investigating coup outcome, employing alternative data sources, and instrumenting for economic

growth.

The literature

The scholarly interest on coup attempts has generally waned in recent years, leaving the subject to

decades-old area studies that both employ outdated data and miss the bigger picture. In fact, recent

coup-studies have mostly investigated the effect of economic growth as a secondary finding in

articles examining other relationships. These studies have, moreover, provided inconclusive and

contradictory results. Decades-old studies generally argue that economic performance does matter

(see, e.g., Fossum, 1967; Nordlinger, 1977; O’Kane, 1981; Johnson et al., 1984; Galetovic &

Sanhueza, 2000), while more recent studies, marshaling newer data, almost entirely come out

against the argument (see, e.g., Powell, 2012; Marinov & Goemans, 2013; Svolik, 2012; Thyne,

2010; Singh, 2014). Still, despite the lack of an agreement in the literature, we too often simply

accept the accounts of authors stating that economic factors, such as economic growth, are pivotal

for the risk of coup attempts (see e.g Ezrow & Frantz, 2011), while empirically this theoretical

perception has not yet been supported.

The literature on economic growth and coup attempts

In a classical study, Fossum (1967) endeavors to explain coup attempts in Latin America with a

particular focus on societal factors. By employing a simple typological test, he finds that coup

attempts are more frequent in periods of economic downturn. Likewise, Johnson et al. (1984) –

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seeking to explain coup attempts by extending Jackman’s (1978) model with military and economic

factors – find support for the argument that coups and coup attempts are more likely to occur in

periods of economic downturn. Thirdly, O’Kane (1981), in an analysis of 125 independent

countries, also argues that economic performance does matter, especially in poor countries

dependent on primary commodity exports. Finally, Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000), analyzing 89

non-communist autocracies, yet again find the occurrence of coups more likely during recessions.

However, recent studies employing more refined statistical methods with more up-to-

date data find no significant relationship between economic growth and coup attempts. The primary

purpose of Marinov and Goemans (2013) is to examine which factors are likely to push coup

leaders towards democratic elections after a successful coup. In their online appendix, however,

they find an insignificant relationship between economic growth and coup attempts. Likewise,

Thyne (2010), who analyzes the effect of U.S. foreign policy on coup attempts in Latin America,

also finds that economic growth does not significantly affect coup attempts. This result, he argues,

is explained by the elite nature of coup attempts: general levels of economic growth, mostly

affecting the broader population, have less of an effect on coup attempts as these are undertaken by

state elites such as the military (Thyne, 2010: 454). In similar fashion, Svolik (2012) undertakes a

game-theoretic analysis of military intervention in autocracies. In his statistical models as well, the

economic growth coefficients fail to attain statistical significance.

Note, however, that the insignificant results of the economic growth variables should

be interpreted with caution, as the model specifications in these studies are intended to measure the

effect of other main independent variables. Consequently, the effect of economic growth is at risk

of being ‘taken over’ both by the main independent variables and by some control variables

included in the models, in this way being prevented from attaining statistical significance. Powell

(2012), who attempts to investigate the effect of structural coup-proofing strategies and military

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characteristics, actually addresses this issue. More specifically, he omits variables that could

possibly ‘take over’ the effect of economic growth, such as societal instability or regime type, only

to realize that the results in these additional models are substantively similar to the other results:

economic growth does not significantly affect the risk of coup attempts. So far, the only attempt to

bridge these inconclusive results has been Kim (2014). By employing an instrumental variable (IV)

approach, using year-to-year fluctuations of rainfall and temperature as sources of exogenous

variation in income to capture the short-run transitory shocks, he finds economic growth to

significantly affect coup attempts. Still, in his models the non-IV estimates yield insignificant

results for the relationship between economic growth and coup attempts.

The argument

Following Powell and Thyne (2011: 252) this project defines a coup attempt as an ‘illegal and overt

attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive’. That

is, the target of a coup attempt is the sitting executive such as a dictator or a democratically elected

president. The perpetrators of a coup attempt are elites from within the state apparatus. These

include members of the military and security services as well as civilian members of the state

administrative apparatus. The activity of overthrowing the sitting executive must be illegal and

possibly, but not necessarily, violent. A coup attempt is defined as successful if the perpetrators

seize and hold on to power for at least seven days. However, if the perpetrators attempt a coup but

fail to hold on to power for at least seven days (either by failing to seize power in the first place or

by failing to hold on to power for the required amount of time), we define it as a failed coup attempt

(ibid.).

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In general such coup attempts occur – both in democracies and autocracies – when

coup plotters have both the motivation and the opportunity to challenge the incumbents (Powell,

2012: 1021; Finer, 1988: 64-76; see also Huntington, 1968). High motivation for coup attempts is

important as these undertakings are high-risk events in which even small mistakes can have large

consequences. Hence, state elites should really feel discontented to be willing to risk their

privileges, their freedom, and even their lives. Still, in order for the idea of undertaking a coup

attempt to become very attractive, the opportunities for undertaking a coup attempt should be

favorable as well. Coup plotters always calculate the probability of success before attempting a

coup. Coup conspirators only attempt a coup when the expected probability of victory (and

expected rewards) is high enough to offset the dire consequences of a failed revolt because ‘rational

dissidents do not participate in losing causes’ (Lichbach, 1995: 62). The opportunity of coup

attempts is in turn a function of two factors: 1) whether they will succeed in seizing power in the

first place, and 2) whether they (or those they install in power) can hold on to power afterwards (see

Lichbach, 1995: 80; O’Kane, 1981: 294; Nordlinger, 1977: 105; Luttwak, 1968: 22; Galetovic &

Sanhueza, 2000: 184, 187; Tamada, 1995: 37).

Economic growth and coup attempts

Regarding the motivation for coup attempts, state elites will support the sitting government if the

leader in power provides these elites with more benefits than they might receive under an

alternative leadership (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Such benefits could take different forms

ranging from direct cash flows, favorable access to markets, influence over policy, to more

cooperate-like benefits for specific organized interests. However, periods of economic crisis

increase the motivation for coup attempts by putting the economic interests of state elites at risk.

These elites may see their bank accounts dwindle, lucrative businesses falling behind, cooperate

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interests like military budgets being cut, all of which may result in discontentment and a wondering

of whether another leader would be better able to secure their high-earned economic privileges.1

Especially the government’s decreasing ability to keep up the military expenditures seems pivotal in

this regard. As the military is by far the most pivotal actor in coup attempts (see e.g., Needler, 1966;

Luttwak, 1968; Farcau, 1994; Hebditch & Connor, 2005), a potential budget crisis in the military

and the resulting discontentment in the barracks will almost surely lead to high motivation for (at

least part of) the military to view coup attempt as the preferable course of action (see e.g. Koga

2010).

Yet, in order for the idea of undertaking a coup attempt to become very attractive, the

opportunities for undertaking a coup attempt should be favorable as well. That is, the potential

perpetrators should expect that they will succeed in their undertakings. The process of seizing

power is structured into a series of (mostly) well-defined acts involving the coordination and

recruitment of some key state elites followed by the arrest and capture of others. More specifically,

coup plotters make secret preparatory arrangements with key actors within the state – agreeing on

objectives, duties and rewards. They launch the operation by cutting phone lines and arresting

political opponents in an attempt to minimize the amount of opposition, and finally surround or take

over various strategic locations such as airports, TV stations, and parliament buildings (see Needler,

1966; Luttwak, 1968; Farcau, 1994; Hebditch & Connor, 2005; Singh, 2014). Potential coup

plotters will expect such operational tasks to go much smoother during times of economic crisis as

key individuals around these power centers will most likely be discontented with the economic

situation, thereby less loyal to the sitting government, and consequently, more likely to provide

support for the coup attempt.

1 Sure, these factors will also increase the risk of other instability-events like civil wars, demonstrations, quest for

elections and so on. Yet, I do not argue that coup attempts will be the only (or even most likely) way to revolt against a

poor performing government. The assertion is simply, that coup attempts – possibly along with other events such as

civil wars, demonstrations, and elections – are more likely during economic crises. The question of the relative

probability between these different events is beyond the scope of this analysis.

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Still, coup plotters may decide not to attempt a coup because they calculate that they

(or those they install in power) cannot hold on to power, even though they have the wherewithal to

seize power temporarily. Coup attempts could be met with civil resistance that could take form

as mass demonstrations from ordinary citizens or as a general disobedience among civil servants, in

this way preventing a successful coup attempt. Diverse examples such as Germany in 1920 (Kapp

Putsch), Japan in 1936 (February Mutiny), and Venezuela in 2002, show how coup attempts can fail

due to civilian opposition. A pivotal factor for coup plotters’ ability to hold on to power after a coup

attempt is their ability to justify the action to the public (Wiking, 1983). During periods of

economic crisis, citizens tend to have fewer job opportunities and less income, and when the

government fails to deliver what citizens expect of it, it loses legitimacy (Rothstien, 2011: Ch. 3;

Tilly, 2007: Ch. 4; Lipset, 1959). This subsequently gives citizens more incentives to engage in

antigovernment activities, which in turn gives coup plotters the perfect opportunity to legitimize the

coup with honorable motives such as ‘restoring public order’ or ‘saving the integrity of the nation’.

Hence, during times of economic crisis, citizens, civil servants, and other state elites will be more

likely to remain passive or acquiesce to a coup attempt, thereby further strengthening coup plotters’

expectations of holding on to power after the coup attempt.

Figure 1: Causal model

Economic crisis Coup attempt

Economic

interests at risk

More support

during attempt

Less resistance

after takeover

Motivation

Seizure of power

Holding on to

power

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Economic growth and coup attempts during the Cold War

During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union went to great lengths to secure

the political stability and survivability of allied co-operative administrations around the world, as

leading decision makers in both countries firmly believed in the necessity of all-out recruitment and

the idea of containment and deterrence. The support included economic, diplomatic, intelligence,

and especially military support – the latter of which included increased military budgets, military

hardware, and military training (see Schmitz, 2006; Westad, xxxx).

This kind of support was given by both superpowers to countless of countries in all

continents around the world. On the African continent the primary challenge facing the United

States was the decolonization. The US policymakers generally feared that these newly independent

African countries were primitive, unable to govern themselves, and consequently, subjective to

communist ideas and influence. Prominent examples of American support included the racist

Apartheid government in South Africa as well as the Mobutu government in Congo. In Asia, the

power vacuum and subsequent revolutionary potential in countries such as Korea, Vietnam,

Cambodia, and not least Indonesia worried American administrations, again, leading to massive

economic and military support (W & S xxxx). In the American ‘backyard’ Latin America, the

interference was no less extensive most prominently exemplified by the US backing to the Pinochet

regime in Chile.

While the Soviets most often put their bets on left-wing rebel movements that could

ultimately pave the way for socialist revolutions, in many places the Communist superpower also

tried to create government-to-government links that resembled the American counterpart’s

undertakings. Most obviously this was the case in the numerous Soviet satellite states from the

Central Asian ‘Stan’ countries to the Baltic Sea, as well as the more formalized Warsaw Pact-

Alliance including countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania etc. In addition, the

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Soviets also supported regimes like Communist China, Sukarno’s Indonesia, the Baathist regimes in

Iraq and Syria, Nasser’s Egypt, Tolbert’s Liberia, and Nehru’s India both economically and

militarily (W67, 129).

In this way, the advent of the Cold War and the ensuing global, extensive, and

persistent foreign interference from both superpowers drastically affected the environment in which

coup plotters carried out their undertakings. Coups were no longer an exclusively domestic

phenomenon. Instead, the effect of economic growth on both the motivation and opportunities for

undertaking coup attempts were suppressed as a result of this extensive external interference.

First of all, leaders and governments in crisis-afflicted countries were able to provide

benefits for their essential constituents due to the massive US and USSR economic and military aid

that they received. In this way, these leaders were able to keep their essential constituents pleased,

and minimize the motivation for coup attempts. The countless examples of regimes reigning over

recession-economies – for example the many Eastern European countries during the 80’s or the

Pinochet Regime which presided over many years with negative growth – only serves to underscore

the fact that the two superpowers were often responsible for the ability of many rulers to stay in

power despite economic crises and public dissatisfaction. As Arne Westad puts it: ‘many third

world elites willingly mortgaged their states’ futures in order to secure the short-term survival of

their regimes, or, in some cases, their own corrupt gain’ (W157). Furthermore, both superpowers

were in general disinterested in the economic performance of their client regimes and what mattered

was first and foremost security concerns (Boschini & Olofsård, 2007).

Yet, one could think that some elites would still be left discontented and feel betrayed

during an economic crisis, thus conspiring to overthrow the sitting regime. However, even these

motivated state elites would expect much more difficulties in the operational tasks of the seizure of

power and holding on to power. The United States and Soviet Union provided – in addition to

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generous economic and military aid – intelligence rapports to their client-countries alerting them of

possible revolts and coup attempts. For example, in July 1966 the United States provided Mobutu

with pivotal intelligence reports alerting for a planned coup attempt, allowing him arrest the

conspirators and undermine the attempt before it even started (//30-31//). Furthermore, both the

United States and the Soviet Union went to great lengths to fingerpick their preferred candidates to

important positions in both the government and military for these regimes (see e.g. Schmitz, 2006:

xxxx). Hence, essential operational tasks like the surrounding of various strategic locations such as

airports, TV stations, and parliament buildings was more challenging as key individuals around

these power centers were most likely loyal to their external superpower patrons interests, and

consequently, less likely to provide support for the coup attempt. So, whereas some discontented

crisis-ridden state elites will be more inclined to support the attempt, those elites who are in the

pockets of their superpower patron will most likely oppose the coup – complicating the operational

tasks of seizing power. This also meant that potential coup plotters would meet difficulties in the

holding on to power. As (major) part of the military establishments in these regimes where in the

pockets of their external sponsor, coup makers in these countries could expect counter-coups with

external backing (see e.g Hebditch & Connor, 2005: Ch.6). As most famously put forward by

Geddes (1999) drawing on ‘the battle of sexes’, the military will much rather stay in the barracks

and not attempt a coup than go through with their undertakings and risk internal conflicts.

To sum up then, I argue that economic growth did not increase the risk of coup

attempts during the Cold War. Without the superpower support economic crises would have set the

economic interests of state elites at risk and additionally would have increased coup plotters ability

to receive support during and after the coup attempt. However, during the Cold War the superpower

backing meant that even during economic crises most essential state elites would maintain their

privileges as these hinged on the inflow of resources from the external sponsor leaving the

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motivation for coup attempts unchanged. Additionally, although some operational tasks were made

easier during crisis periods, this dynamic was offset by the military and intelligence support

provided by the external supporters. In this way, the coup-alluring effects of economic crisis was

suppressed and offset by countervailing mechanisms during the Cold War.

Figure 2: The suppressed relationship

DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The chosen research design is quantitative statistical analysis consisting primarily of regular logit

regressions. The analysis covers a sample of 136 countries in the period 1950–2011, which amount

to 6257 country-year observations with 307 coup attempts. These coup attempts occurred in 73 of

the included 136 countries. One would expect that observations within the same country over time

are unlikely to be independent (cf. Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998). To deal with this potential

problem of autocorrelation (and heteroscedasticity), all models are estimated using robust standard

Economic crisis Coup attempt

Economic

interests at risk

More support

during attempt

Less resistance

after takeover

Motivation

Seizure of power

Holding on to

power

External support:

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errors clustered on country. To reduce simultaneity problems, all relevant time-variance variables

are lagged by one year.

The dependent variable

As stated above, the dependent variable of this study is Coup attempts. That is, the phenomenon to

be explained here is whether someone inside the state apparatus – be they military or non-military

elites – attempts to stage a coup. To test the proposed hypotheses, I rely on data from Powell and

Thyne (2011). I choose this data first and foremost due to its explicit incorporation of earlier

datasets, which increases the overall measurement validity, combined with its extensive

geographical (almost all world countries) and temporal (1950–2013) coverage. The Powell and

Thyne (2011) dataset includes all instances of both failed and successful coups from 1950 to 2013.

As all these instances of coups are coup attempts before they either fail or succeed, I collapse the

occurrence of failed and successful coups into a dependent variable that I call Coup attempt. The

variable takes the form of a binary indicator where 0 is given for years without a coup attempt and 1

is given for years with one or more coup attempts in a given country. Hence, by nature of my

coding procedure, a country can have only one coup attempt in any given year. Country-years with

more than one coup attempt are therefore still given the value of 1.

Independent variables and control variables

The main independent variable of this study, Economic growth, is measured with data from the

Maddison Project (Bolt & Zanden, 2014). I choose this data due to the widely held

acknowledgement and popularity of the dataset combined with its temporal and spatial coverage.

Additionally, in some models a Cold War variable is included. This variable takes the value 1 for

the Cold War period (1952-1991) and 0 for the Post-Cold War period (1992-2011).

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I also include a number of control variables based on their potential confounding

effects, that is, variables that are theoretically expected to affect both economic growth and the risk

of coup attempts. I control for economic development by including (logged) GDP per capita with

data from the Maddison Project (Bolt & Zanden, 2014) as well as ongoing civil war with data from

the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/International Peace Research Institute (UCDP/PRIO) Armed

Conflict Data set, version 4 (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Additionally, I include a range of geographical

variables: population size and land area with data from the Maddison Project (Bold & Zanden,

2014) as well as ethnic fractionalization with data from Fearon and Latin’s updated ethno linguistic

fractionalization index (ELF). Also, I control for regime characteristics by including the degree of

democracy with Polity IV data, as well as dummy variables for different autocratic regime types:

Party, Military, Monarchy, and Personal dictatorships) with data from Geddes, Wrigth, and Frantz

(2014). Finally, I follow the method of Carter and Signorino (2010) by including cubic polynomials

of the time since last coup attempt was observed for each country.

FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION

The results from the examination of the proposed hypotheses are presented in Table II. Table II

consists of 12 conventional logit models, measuring the effect of economic growth on coup

attempts in the period 1950–2011. I disaggregate the data into three subsamples: The whole time

period (1950-2011), the Cold War period (1950-1991), and the Post-Cold War period (1992-2011).

Disaggregating the model explicitly allows the coefficients and standard errors to vary across each

subsample, thus allowing me to examine the supposedly suppressed effects of economic growth. I

also add a product term equal to the product of economic growth and the Cold War as an

independent variable in order to explore the conditional relationship more explicitly. These 4

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specifications are presented with immediate economic growth effects controlling for region fixed

effects (model 1-4), two-year moving averages of economic growth with region-fixed effects

(model 5-8), and finally, immediate economic growth effects controlling for country-fixed effects

(9-12).

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Immediate effects (region) Two-year moving averages (region) Immediate effects (country)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) Whole time

period

Cold War

period

Post-Cold

War period

Interaction

variable

Whole time

period

Cold War

period

Post-Cold

War period

Interaction

variable

Whole time

period

Cold War

period

Post-Cold

War period

Interaction

variable

GDP/cap growth t-1 -0.021 -0.005 -0.073*** -0.064*** -0.010 0.008 -0.088*** -0.070** -0.025* -0.006 -0.088*** -0.075***

(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.010) (0.013) (0.025) (0.021)

Cold War 0.601*** 0.574** 0.655**

(0.175) (0.177) (0.250)

Growth*Cold War 0.062*** 0.081** 0.072**

(0.018) (0.026) (0.024)

GDP/cap. (log) t-1 -0.404** -0.353* -0.511 -0.407** -0.414** -0.361* -0.481 -0.411** -0.654** -0.293 0.719 -0.674*

(0.128) (0.152) (0.269) (0.133) (0.130) (0.154) (0.260) (0.135) (0.247) (0.400) (0.942) (0.267)

Land Area (log) 0.088 0.059 0.095 0.075 0.088 0.059 0.087 0.073 omitted omitted omitted omitted

(0.052) (0.063) (0.114) (0.054) (0.052) (0.063) (0.113) (0.054)

Democracy t-1 -0.016 -0.010 0.005 -0.006 -0.017 -0.010 0.005 -0.006 0.015 0.021 0.048 0.025

(0.016) (0.017) (0.047) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.045) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.051) (0.018)

Ongoing civil war t-1 0.248 0.174 0.462 0.262 0.275 0.190 0.478 0.279 0.467* 0.283 0.781 0.410*

(0.177) (0.203) (0.339) (0.181) (0.178) (0.202) (0.331) (0.179) (0.193) (0.242) (0.482) (0.197)

Population size (log) t-1 -0.196** -0.149 -0.202 -0.160* -0.199** -0.148 -0.197 -0.159* -1.317*** -1.343*** -0.277 -0.812**

(0.071) (0.085) (0.192) (0.076) (0.071) (0.085) (0.190) (0.075) (0.230) (0.389) (1.271) (0.298)

Ethnic fractionalization 0.452 0.488 -0.130 0.388 0.458 0.500 -0.139 0.395 omitted omitted omitted omitted

(0.426) (0.533) (0.736) (0.455) (0.427) (0.536) (0.718) (0.454)

Party dictatorship t-1 -0.363 -0.434 -0.189 -0.424 -0.375 -0.442 -0.162 -0.428 -0.073 -0.220 0.052 -0.095

(0.248) (0.288) (0.632) (0.255) (0.248) (0.288) (0.629) (0.256) (0.295) (0.353) (0.874) (0.299)

Military dictatorship t-1 0.333 0.246 0.489 0.314 0.332 0.242 0.542 0.317 0.435 0.269 1.009 0.379

(0.246) (0.278) (0.609) (0.251) (0.248) (0.279) (0.610) (0.252) (0.247) (0.283) (0.651) (0.249)

Monarchy t-1 -0.600 -0.635 omitted -0.652 -0.619 -0.656 omitted -0.671 0.031 -0.036 omitted 0.006 (0.361) (0.419) (0.367) (0.361) (0.420) (0.370) (0.549) (0.632) (0.550)

Personalist dictatorship t-1 -0.138 -0.052 -0.049 -0.088 -0.142 -0.054 -0.033 -0.093 0.242 0.129 -0.011 0.217 (0.235) (0.312) (0.399) (0.241) (0.235) (0.311) (0.378) (0.239) (0.273) (0.341) (0.603) (0.276)

t1 -0.185*** -0.267*** 0.013 -0.169*** -0.189*** -0.269*** 0.021 -0.169** -0.089* -0.173** 0.039 -0.090* (0.053) (0.056) (0.093) (0.051) (0.053) (0.056) (0.092) (0.052) (0.042) (0.067) (0.106) (0.042)

Tabel II: Logit regressions of coup attempts

18

Note: Robust standard errors (clustered on country) are in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. ‘Monarchy’ is omitted in post-Cold War models since no monarchies experienced coup attempts in this period. Time invariant variables such as ‘ethnic fractionalization’ and ‘land area’ are omitted in the fixed effects models.

t2 0.006 0.013** -0.002 0.006 0.007 0.013** -0.003 0.006 0.004 0.011* 0.001 0.004

(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)

t3 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000

(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

Constant 2.904* 2.452 2.890 2.105 3.024* 2.475 2.661 2.134 (1.385) (1.642) (3.622) (1.477) (1.398) (1.654) (3.503) (1.486)

N 6257 3684 2450 6257 6257 3684 2450 6257 3642 2219 611 3642

No of coups. 307 248 59 307 307 248 59 307 307 248 59 307

Log pseudolikelihood -1022.4041 -781.2674 -220.95787 -1011.778 -1024.4249 -781.21545 -222.8383 -1013.8418 -813.94109 -595.18608 -125.71091 -806.03509

Fixed effects (region) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES

Fixed effects (country) YES YES YES YES

19

In general, Table II reveals that the effect of economic growth on coup attempts is insignificant for

the overall time period 1950-2011. That is, except for the fixed effects model (model 9), the

economic growth coefficients come out insignificant if we simply regress coup attempts on

economic growth without distinguishing between the Cold war and post-Cold War period (model 1

and model 5). Increasing the economic growth variable from the 25th

percentile to the 75th

percentile, that is from approximately -0.18 % to 4.5%, only reduces the annual risk of a coup

attempt from 5.0% to about 4.6% – a small and insignificant reduction.2 Thus, in line with other

recent studies, I do not find an overall robust effect of economic growth on coup attempts.

Distinguishing between the Cold War and Post-Cold war period reveals a different

picture, though. One the one hand, economic growth does not affect the risk of coup attempts

during the Cold War (model 2, 6, and 10). Increasing economic growth from the 25th

percentile to

the 75th

percentile during the Cold War period, that is, from -0.5% to about 4.5%, only reduces the

annual risk of a coup attempt from approximately 6.7% to about 6.6%. On the other hand, economic

growth significantly and considerably decreases the risk of coup attempt in the Post-Cold War

period (model 3, 7, and 11). Increasing economic growth from the 25th

percentile to the 75th

in the

Post-Cold War period, that is from 0.35% to 4.5%, reduces the risk of coup attempts from 2.2% to

1.7% – a coup-risk decrease of 23%. Thus, this supports the main proposition of this study: lower

economic growth increases the probability of a coup attempt in the Post-Cold War period whereas

the relationship does not hold during the Cold War period.

Moreover, the results reveal that the conditional effect of economic growth is evident

regardless of whether the models are run with regional or country fixed effects. This means that the

conditional effect is present both when exploring the variation between all countries in their

2 All predicted probabilities, interaction effects, and graphical presentations in this study are calculated from the models

with the fixed effects (region) estimation. Predicted probabilities from all other models are available in the Appendix A.

The probabilities are calculated by using the ‘margins’ command in Stata using the ‘observed values approach’ (see

Hamner & Kalkan, 2013). The results do not in any way change substantially when setting all other variables at mean or

median values, or by using the Clarify software packet by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000).

20

respective regions over time (model 1-8), and when only employing the variation within countries

over time (model 9-12). This further means that the suppressing effect of the Cold War period is not

just an artifact of some unique regional or country characteristics as I in fact control for such time-

invariant regional and country-specific unobserved heterogeneity – thus reducing the risk of omitted

variable bias. Furthermore, both immediate effects (model 1-4 and 9-12) and more slow-chancing

moving averages of economic growth (model 5-8) reveal the same conclusions. That is, both brief

and more persistent crises seems to have an effect on coup attempts in the Post-Cold War period

and both seems to be irrelevant during the Cold War period.

Model 4, 8, and 12 further reveals that the interaction-effect of economic growth and

the Cold War are robust and significant. The positive coefficient suggests that the negative effect of

economic growth on coup attempts is dampened during the Cold War period. Figure 3 lend further

support to this interpretation. Here we see – in line with the results in table II – that during the Cold

War period it didn’t matter whether the economy improved or deteriorated with respect to the risk

of experiencing a coup attempt. This is illustrated by the almost completely horizontal line

indicating a yearly 5% coup risk during the Cold War regardless of economic performance.

However, the downward sloping line for the Post-Cold War period suggests – again, in line with the

results in table II – that after the Cold War economic performance does matter. Figure 4 further

illustrates the difference in average marginal effects of economic growth in the Post-Cold war and

Cold War period (first differences). As is evident, the average marginal effect of economic growth

is negative and significant in the Post-Cold War period whereas it is insignificant in the Cold War

period. This difference in average marginal effects (second differences) is, as presented in Table III,

significant at the 5% level. Thus, by presenting a significant interaction variable, predicted

probabilities for the two periods, average marginal effects for the two periods, and most

importantly, by showing that the average marginal effects for the two periods are significantly

21

different from each other, we can hereby conclude that the results reveal substantially meaningful

interaction between economic growth and Cold War/Post-Cold War period (for discussion on

interaction in discrete choice models see Norton et. al., 2004; Nagler, 1991; Berry et. al, 2010;

Bowen, 2010; Berry et al., 2014).

Figure 3: Predicted probabilities of coup attempts Figure 4: First differences

Table III: Second differences

dy/dx Standard error P-value 95% Confidence Interval

Economic growth 0.0017169 0.0007809 0.028 0.0001862; 0.0032475

22

External support analysis

I define superpower Cold War support as persistent and substantial economic or military support

given by a superpower to another country’s government or military. The extensive and substantial

criterion is included as I am interested in support that was considerable enough in order to affect

elite calculations. I only focus on USA and USSR support as these were the only countries

providing the extensive and substantial support that I am interested in. And finally, as coup attempts

are state-elite affairs I am only interested in superpower support that is given to client countries’

governments and militaries – not developmental aid given to e.g. schools or other charity projects.

Scrutinizing the external support argument in a direct way can be a difficult task due

to its covert nature. Hence, getting a comprehensive overview of which countries received support,

how much they received, as well as when the inflow of resources started and stopped can be a

tedious task. Existing foreign aid and arms export data (e.g. OECD/DAC or SIPRI data) is unfit for

use in this regard as the most important government-to-government superpower economic and

military support from USA and USSR during the Cold War would not be detected and included in

these datasets (again, due to its covert nature), leading to both unreliable and biased results. In

addition, existing alliance data (e.g. COW or ATOP data) is unfit for use as I am not interested in

formal alliances and treaties but instead, again, covert superpower support given by the two

superpowers to client-governments in third-world countries. Yet, two existing datasets provide

some help for this study. First, Regan and Meachum (2014) provide data for third party

interventions defined as ‘convention breaking military, economic, or diplomatic activities in the

internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the

aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces’ for all

countries that are ‘at-risk’ operationalized as countries scoring above 0.3 in Goldstone et al.’s

(2010) risk forecasting model. In addition to that, the UCDP External Support Project (Högbladh,

23

Pettersson, & Themnér, 2011) also provides data on external support for all countries that are

experiencing an intrastate conflict. Together, these two datasets constitutes an applicable way to

measure external superpower support during the Cold War in a direct way. Instead of relying on

official accounts (as most foreign datasets do) these datasets attempts to scrutinize the external

support by employing archival searches of historical accounts and newspapers, in this way both

detecting public support as well as alleged support that have a more covert nature.

Based on these two datasets I construct a dummy variable indicating whether a given

country received superpower support during the Cold War. I restrict the analysis to the Cold War

period due to the inherent difficulties in figuring out when the superpower support started and when

it was terminated. Hence, if none of the datasets detect that a given country has received support

during the Cold War I assume that this country was not considered pivotal for the superpowers, and

consequently, didn’t receive any substantial and extensive superpower support during the Cold War

period. Accordingly, I code this country as 0 throughout the Cold War period indicating ‘no Cold

War superpower support’. On the other hand, if one of the datasets detects that a given country’s

government did receive substantial economic or military aid from either the USA or USSR once or

more during the Cold War, I take this as an indication on that this country was perceived as a

strategic asset for at least one of the superpowers in the Cold War framework, and accordingly, in

general receiving superpower support during most of the Cold War period. Hence, I code this

country as 1 throughout the Cold War period indicating ‘receiver of Cold War superpower support’.

I present, discuss, and consider in more detail the coding procedure and its strengths/weaknesses in

the appendix (see Appendix A).

Here we should expect, if the argument put forward is right, that the suppressing effect

should be most clear for countries actually receiving superpower support during the Cold War

whereas the effect of economic growth should take its natural course for countries not receiving

24

superpower support during this period. Table IV and V as well as Figure 6 and 7 supports this

assertion. As is evident in Table IV’s model 2, economic growth significantly decreases the risk of

coup attempts when External support is set to 0 (as they are in interaction models), meaning that

coup attempts are more likely during economic crises for countries that did not receive superpower

support even during the Cold War. This effect, however, is suppressed for countries receiving

superpower support evidenced by the significant and positive interaction term. Figure 6, 7, and

Table V brings further evidence for this interaction effect. Again, we see that economic crises did in

fact increase the risk of coup attempts for countries not receiving superpower support represented

by the downward sloping line in Figure 6, that this effect is significant (due to confidence intervals

in Figure 7 not including 0), and that the overall interaction effect (second differences) is significant

at the 5% level evidenced in Table V.

25

Tabel IV: External support and coup attempts during the Cold War

(1) (2)

GDP/cap growth t-1 -0.004 -0.037* (0.013) (0.018)

External Support 0.437*

(0.170) 0.372*

(0.174)

Growth*Support 0.055* (0.026)

GDP/cap. (log) t-1 -0.323* -0.330* (0.145) (0.146)

Land Area (log) 0.063 0.067 (0.063) (0.064)

Democracy t-1 -0.009 -0.008 (0.017) (0.017)

Ongoing civil war t-1 0.067 0.094 (0.203) (0.202)

Population size (log) t-1 -0.153 -0.157 (0.086) (0.086)

Ethnic fractionalization 0.239 0.188 (0.533) (0.539)

Party dictatorship t-1 -0.392 -0.382 (0.288) (0.287)

Military dictatorship t-1 0.270 0.260 (0.278) (0.281)

Monarchy t-1 -0.669 -0.665 (0.410) (0.413)

Personalist dictatorship t-1 -0.052 -0.065 (0.310) (0.308)

t1 -0.267*** -0.269*** (0.057) (0.058)

t2 0.013** 0.013** (0.004) (0.004)

t3 -0.000* -0.000* (0.000) (0.000)

Constant 2.319 2.463

(1.530) (1.531)

N 3684 3684

Number of coups 248 248 Log pseudolikelihood -778.32873 -775.71565

Fixed effects (region) YES YES Note: Robust standard errors (clustered on country) are in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

26

Figure 6: Predicted probabilities of coup attempts Figure 7: First differences

Table V: Second differences

dy/dx Standard error P-value 95% Confidence Interval

Economic growth 0.002995 0.0015 0.046 0.0000528; 0.0059372

IV estimation

A major reservation with the results of this study is the possibility of simultaneous causation in the

relationship between economic growth and coup attempts. On could possibly argue that coup

attempts do not only occur because of weak economic growth, but also that the economy in coup-

prone countries is weak due to the risk of those exact same coup attempts. Even though this

problem is partly overcome by including the time polynomials and by lagging the independent

variables, we still need a more explicit way of testing for this kind of endogeneity. This calls for an

exogenous measure of economic growth. Therefore, I employ an IV strategy with rainfall and

temperature variation as instruments for economic growth, in order to isolate the exogenous

variation in economic growth – an approach that has been employed by several other studies (see

e.g. Satyanath & Sergenti, 2004; Burke & Serginti, 2004; Kim, 2014). Similar to Burke & Leigh

27

(2010) and Kim (2014), I interact rainfall variation with the median share of labor force in the

agricultural sector in order to capture the differencing effect of rainfall on economic growth in

agriculture/non-agriculture countries. In addition, as higher temperatures increase growth in cold

countries and reduce growth in already warm countries, I follow Burke & Leigh (2010) and Kim

(2014) by multiplying change in temperature by -1 for countries with <12o C for the period 1960-

1970. The use of both weather shock measures ensures that the instruments capture the effects of

both poor agricultural countries and more modernized countries. In order to avoid including

endogenous control variables I merely include region dummies as control variables.3 Due to data-

availability the time period is limited to 1962-2011.

The results are presented in Table V. As is evident, economic growth does not affect

the risk of coup attempts in the whole time period. Furthermore, the pattern evidenced in previous

analyses is repeated in this analysis as well: the effect of economic growth is insignificant in the

Cold War period, but significant and negative in the Post-Cold War period.

Thus, this supports the overall finding in this study: the effect of economic growth on

coup attempts is suppressed substantially during the Cold War period whereas after the Cold War

the relationship is allowed to take its natural course. Even more, this result strengthens the belief

that it is economic growth that is in fact increasing the risk of coup attempts rather than the risk of

coup attempts decreasing economic growth. Future studies could scrutinize this assertion further by

employing more qualitative methods like ‘middle-N’ Causal Process Observations or Process

Tracing methods (cf. Haggard & Kaufman, 2012; Blatter & Blume, 2008; Ross, 2004).

3 The results do not change substantially when including other relatively exogenous controls such as Oil production and

Population size, or when including relatively endogenous variables like Democracy, Ongoing civil war, and Ongoing

interstate war (see Appendix F).

28

Table VI: IV probit estimation of Coup attempts, 1962–2011 (1) (2) (3) Whole time period (1962-2011) Cold War period (1962-1991) Post-Cold War period (1992-2011)

Second stage

-8.945 -8.454 -15.798***

GDP/cap growth t-1 (6.098) (4.661) (1.279)

Constant -1.255*** -1.192*** -0.434

(0.320) (0.209) (0.423)

First stage

Rainfall deviationt-1 * Median

agriculture

0.017*** 0.028*** 0.006

(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)

Temperature deviationt-1 -0.142 -0.254 -0.199 (0.152) (0.152) (0.255)

Constant 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)

N 4659 2587 2072

Kleibergen-Paap F statistic Fixed effects (region) YES YES YES

Robust standard errors (clustered on country) are in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Robustness checks

[Here I intend very briefly to present the results of the robustness checks. The analyses themselves

will be presented in the Appendix]

Appendix B: Placebo tests (Done and available in appendix)

Appendix C: Employing other GDP measures (Done, but no presentation ready)

This yield substantially similar results

Appendix D: Different moving averages of economic growth (Done, but no presentation

ready)

Employing moving averages with a longer time span, e.g. 3, 4, or 5-year moving

averages yield substantially similar results, although the significance-levels of Post-

Cold War effect gradually decreases.

Appendix E: Including alternative controls e.g. Oil production, Ethnic fractionalization, and

Interstate War (Done, but no presentation ready)

This yields substantially similar results, although the ‘Whole period’ samples reveal

a significant effect of economic growth in some models.

29

Conclusion

[Conclusion and brief discussion here]

30

Appendix A

Working definition:

I define external Cold War support as persistent and substantial economic or military

support given by a superpower to another country’s government.

Extensive and substantial: This criterion is included because I am only interested in

support that was considerable enough in order to affect elite calculations.

Superpower: I only focus on USA and USSR support as these were the only

countries providing the extensive and substantial support that I am interested in.

Another country’s government: As coup attempts are state-elite affairs I am only

interested in superpower support is given to client countries’ governments.

In the table below I show which countries are coded as ‘receiver of superpower support’ and ‘no

superpower support’. All color-marked countries are coded as ‘receiver of superpower support’ and

all countries not marked with a color are coded as ‘no superpower support’.

Country Receiver of

external Cold

War support

External

supporter

Examples of support

Afghanistan YES (R&M)

+ UCDP

USSR In 1978 the USSR provided massive military support to the Afghan government – primarily

for its fight against the Mujahadeens. The support included Makarov pistols, Kalashnikov

Rifles, and Combat Radios.

Troops as secondary warring party, Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic

Support

Albania

Algeria

American Samoa

Andorra

Angola UCDP USSR Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise

Antigua and

Barbuda

Argentina YES (R&M)

+ UCDP

USA In 1976 the United States provided massive (unspecified) military aid to the Argentinian

government which, among other things, were used for its fight against the Peoples Revolutionary Army.

Access to Territory, Access to military or intelligence infrastructure, Intelligence material, Other forms of

support, check codebook

Armenia

Aruba

Australia

Austria

Azerbaijan

Bahamas, The

Bahrain

Bangladesh

Barbados

31

Belarus

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bermuda

Bhutan

Bolivia YES (R&M)

USA In 1984 the United States openly proclaimed that they would oppose any coup, suspected to

be undertaken by rightist in the military.

Bosnia and

Herzegovina

Botswana

Brazil YES (R&M)

REBELS

USA country year opposition_group1 target intervener BRA 1964 Rightists Rebels United

States of America

BRA 1964 Rightists Rebels United States of America

BRA 1964 Rightists Rebels United

States of America

Brunei

Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cape Verde

Cambodia UCDP USSR Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support

Cameroon

Canada

Cayman Islands

Central African

Republic

Chad UCDP USA Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support, Intelligence material

Chile country year opposition_group1 target intervener

type_intervention military_intervention economic_intervention diplomatic_intervention

CHL 1970 Leftists Rebels United

States of America Gas grenades 1 0 0 CHL 1970 Leftists Rebels United

States of America Blocked funds from World Bank, IDB, Import-Export Bank, 0

1 0 CHL 1970 Leftists Rebels United

States of America Submachine-guns 1 0 0 CHL 1970 Leftists Rebels United

States of America Offered coordination to groups looking overthrow President 1

0 0 CHL 1970 Leftists Rebels United

States of America Rounds of ammunition 1 0

0 CHL 1974 Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR)

Rebels United States of America Non-

military assistance limited to 25 million 0 1 0 CHL 1974 Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR)

Rebels United States of America Ban on

Military Aid 1 0 0

China UCDP USSR Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support

Colombia YES (R&M) + UCDP

USA In 1963 the United States provided military support to the Colombian government which, among other things, included training that would help the government fight the unstable

situation in the country.

Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Funding/Economic Support

Comoros

Congo, Dem.

Rep.

YES (R&M)

+ UCDP

The United

States

In 1967 the United States provided massive military aid to the Mobutu government which

among other things included C-130 transport planes.

Materiel/Logistics

Congo, Rep.

Costa Rica

32

Cote d'Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Curacao

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican

Republic

YES (R&M) USA In 1964 the United States provided military materiel to the Dominican government which

among other things included tear gas.

Ecuador country year opposition_group1 target intervener

type_intervention military_intervention economic_intervention diplomatic_intervention

ECU 1971 Labor Rebels Russia Aid planning a general labor strike 0 1

0

Egypt, Arab Rep.

El Salvador UCDP

The United States

Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support

R&M

country ccode year opposition_group1 target intervener type_intervention military_intervention

economic_intervention diplomatic_intervention

SAL 92 1977 Peoples Revolutionary Army Rebels United States of America Sanction

on military sales 1 0 0

Equatorial Guinea

Eritrea

Estonia

Ethiopia UCDP USSR Weapons, Training/Expertise

Faeroe Islands

Fiji

Finland

France

French Polynesia

Gabon

Gambia, The

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Greenland

Grenada

Guam

Guatemala YES (R&M) + UCDP

United States

Both in 1960 (several times) and in 1963 the United States provided massive military aid which among other things included Aircraft Carriers, Destroyers, Bombers, and Anti-

Guerilla training.

Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti In 1988 the United States provided substantial economic aid to the Haitian government

Honduras YES (R&M) United

States

In 1982, 1983, and 1984 the United States provided military aid to the Honduran

government which among other things included counter-insurgency training and helicopters.

Hong Kong

33

SAR, China

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia UCDP USA Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support

Iran, Islamic

Rep.

UCDP ??

Iraq UCDP ??

Ireland

Isle of Man

Israel UCDP USA Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Funding/Economic Support

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan YES (R&M) United

States

In 1958 the United States provided military aid to the Jordanian government which among

other things included 50 Navy Jets.

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Kiribati

Korea, Dem.

Rep.

Korea, Rep.

Kosovo

Kuwait

Kyrgyz Republic

Laos UCDP USSR Weapons, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support

Latvia

Lebanon UCDP USA Troops as secondary warring party, Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Funding/Economic Support

Lesotho

Liberia UCDP USA Training/Expertise Intelligence material, Other forms of support, check codebook

Libya

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macao SAR, China

Macedonia, FYR

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Marshall Islands

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Micronesia, Fed.

Sts.

Moldova

Monaco

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco UCDP USA Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support

Mozambique UCDP USSR Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support

Myanmar

Namibia

Nepal

34

Netherlands

New Caledonia

New Zealand

Nicaragua UCDP USSR Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support

Niger

Nigeria

Northern

Mariana Islands

Norway

Oman UCDP USA Weapons, Training/Expertise

Pakistan

Palau

Panama YES (R&M) UCDP

United States

In 1959 the United States provided military aid to the Panama Government which among other things included Air patrols and other kinds of armaments.

Funding/Economic Support

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru country year opposition_group1 target intervener

type_intervention military_intervention economic_intervention diplomatic_intervention

PER 1960 Communists Rebels Russia

Economic assistance for a revolt 0 1 0

PER 1963 Communists Guerrillas Rebels

Russia Organizing opposition 1 0 0

Philippines YES (R&M)

+ UCDP

United

States

In 1969 the United States provided military aid to the Philippine Government which among

other things included planes and crews.

Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support

Poland

Portugal country year opposition_group1 target intervener

type_intervention military_intervention economic_intervention diplomatic_intervention

POR 1975 Conservative Military Rebels Russia Funding for Communist Party 0

1 0

Puerto Rico

Qatar

Romania country year opposition_group1 target intervener type_intervention military_intervention

economic_intervention diplomatic_intervention

ROM 1990 Anti-communist protestors Rebels United States of America Withholding of economic aid

0 1 0

ROM 1990 Anti-communist protestors Rebels United States of America 0

0 1

Russian Federation

Rwanda

Samoa

San Marino

Sao Tome and Principe

Saudi Arabia UCDP USA Training/Expertise

Senegal ????

Serbia

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

35

Singapore

Sint Maarten (Dutch part)

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

Somalia YES (R&M) +

UCDP

United States

In 1982 the United States provided military aid to the Somali Government which among other things included USD of weapons, arms and supplies.

Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise,

Funding/Economic Support

South Africa UCDP USSR Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise,

Funding/Economic Support

South Sudan

Spain YES (R&M) United

States

In 1969 the United States provided military aid to the Spanish Government which among

other things included joint military exercises.

Sri Lanka UCDP USA Materiel/Logistics

St. Kitts and

Nevis

St. Lucia

St. Martin (French part)

St. Vincent and

the Grenadines

Sudan UCDP USA Weapons, Training/Expertise

Suriname

Swaziland

Sweden

Switzerland

Syrian Arab

Republic

UCDP USSR Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise

Tajikistan

Tanzania

Thailand UCDP USA Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support

Timor-Leste

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and

Tobago

UCDP USA Training/Expertise

Tunisia

Turkey YES (R&M) + UCDP

United States

In 1969 the United States provided military aid to the Spanish Government which among other things included joint military exercises.

Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise,

Funding/Economic Support

Turkmenistan

Turks and Caicos Islands

Tuvalu

Uganda YES (R&M)

+ UCDP

USSR In 1977 the Soviet Union provided military aid to the Ugandan Government which among

other things included advisors for training and MiG-21s.

Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise

Ukraine

United Arab

Emirates

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay

Uzbekistan

Vanuatu

Venezuela, RB country ccode year opposition_group1 target

36

intervener type_intervention military_intervention

economic_intervention diplomatic_intervention VEN 101 1965 Venezuelan National Liberation

Army (FALN) Rebels Russia Cash 0

1 0

Vietnam

Virgin Islands

(U.S.)

West Bank and Gaza

Yemen, Rep. UCDP USSR Weapons, Materiel/Logistics

Zambia

Zimbabwe UCDP USSR Weapons, Materiel/Logistics, Training/Expertise

37

Appendix B

Placebo tests

A quick and cursory way of testing the Cold War/Post-Cold War effect is to see whether the

different impacts of economic performance is visible only at the 1991-year cut-off point or whether

we see changing effects at other cut-off points, which in that case would question the Cold War

argument put forward in this study. More specifically, I divide the time period into six 10-year

periods (the 1950s, 60s, 70s, 80s, 90s, and 00s). If the Cold War argument should find support, we

should see that the effect of economic growth should be insignificant in all 10-year periods in the

Cold War period and significant in all 10-year Post-Cold War periods. On the other hand, if a more

mixed picture emerges – e.g. if the growth effects is significant in some Cold War periods – it

would question the argument put forward in this study, as we should see the suppressing external

power effect to be present throughout the Cold War regardless of which random sub-periods we

examine.

Figure 5: Average marginal effects of economic growth in random 10-year periods

As is evident in Figure 5, the average marginal effect of economic growth is indistinguishable from

zero in all Cold War 10-year periods (1950s, 60s, 70, and 80s), and significantly affects coup

attempts in the all Post-Cold War periods (1990s, and 00s). This lends further support to the

38

assertion that it was in fact the extensive and persistent external support that suppressed the effect of

economic growth in the Cold War period. However, the effect of economic growth is almost

significant during the 1980s, hence to some extent questioning the persistent superpower support

argument. Yet, this in fact fits very well within the superpower support frame. More specifically,

important developments on both sides of the superpower fence in the 80s resulted in less extensive

superpower support – making the suppressing impact of economic performance less distinct. In the

United States, a remarkable policy-shift was introduced as the Vietnam War and the CIA’s role in

the Chilean coup changed the domestic political climate and raised new debates and questions

concerning the American support for Right-wing dictatorships around the world. In this period,

American foreign policy became to an increasingly degree dependent on the approval by the

Congress, most notably exemplified by the establishment of the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence (also known as the Church Committee) in 1975-76, which main purpose was to

investigate American covert operations such as support for right-wing dictators around the world.

Hence, both during the Carter and Reagan years we were witnessing a more balanced approach –

self-imposed by Carter and forced on Reagan (for a more extensive description see Schmitz, 2006;

Westad, xxxx). Likewise, on the Soviet side the inauguration of Mikhail S. Gorbachev resulted in a

loosened grip on most Soviet satellite states, leading both to a reduced amount of economic and

military support, but also to a significant decrease in the number of troops and tanks that were based

in these Eastern Bloc countries (xxxxx).

All in all, the placebo tests lend further support to the proposition put forward in this

study: the effect of economic growth on coup attempts is suppressed during the Cold War period

due to the extensive and persistent superpower support but are allowed to take its natural course in

the Post-Cold War period due to the absent of the very same superpower interference.

39

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