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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA (ESCWA)
STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF THE ARAB CITY:
THE REALITY OF THE CONTRADICTIONS AND DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN ARAB CITIESA CRITICAL VISION AGAINST THE BACKDROP
OF SELECTED URBAN PATTERNS
United Nations
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Distr.
GENERAL
E/ESCWA/SDD/2009/8
15 December 2009
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA (ESCWA)
STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF THE ARAB CITY:
THE REALITY OF THE CONTRADICTIONS AND DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN ARAB CITIES
A CRITICAL VISION AGAINST THE BACKDROPOF SELECTED URBAN PATTERNS
United Nations
New York, 2009
09-0559
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Preface
Arab cities undergo many changes in their economic social and constructional structures that interact,
interfere and contradict in their characteristics. Such contradictions, disparities and interests are reflected in
different urban forms and urbanite patterns, due to internal factors or external impacts stemming from
globalized economic relations. Those transformations are diversified and interfering governed by economic,
social, cultural and political circumstances of different societies facing different governance and
administrative systems in each country. This report studies the case of three cities namely Beirut, Cairo and
Dubai, as it sheds the light on contradictions and disparities within and between these cities on the backdrop
of urban patterns.
This study is based on the explanation of political, social and economic transformations as well as the
urbanite fields in modern cities on the one hand and on the concept of urban fragmentation as an analytical
framework in understanding urbanite patterns affected by such modifications through linking the spatial
particularity (through the social and cultural facets) with the temporal particularity (modernity crisis and
passage to the economic globalization) procedural systems (governance and administration), and urban
sphere (through urban patterns).
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CONTENTS
Page
Preface ............................................................................................................................................. iii
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter
I. PROBLEMATIC OF ARAB CITIES................................................................................ 2
II. GENERAL FRAMEWORK: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ............................. 3
A. Transformation of cities ................................................................................................. 3
B. Cities under formation .................................................................................................... 3
III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: FRAGMENTED CITIES .......................................... 3
A. Beirut .............................................................................................................................. 5
B. Cairo ............................................................................................................................... 8
C. Dubai .............................................................................................................................. 10
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN FRAGMENTATION PATTERNS ................................ 12
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 13
References ....................................................................................................................................... 15
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Introduction
The twenty first century is by excellence the era of urbanism, as more than half of the world
population live in cities. In 1970, 38 per cent of Arabs were living in urban realms. This rate increased to
55 per cent in 2005, and may exceed 60 per cent in 2020 (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Arab human Development Report 2009).
Cities are expanding, so is their influence (World Bank, 2000). Experts, researchers and decision
makers agree that cities and urban agglomerations have become the basis of economic and political forces on
the expense of Nation-States (Sassen, 2000). Nation-States are undergoing plural pressures from higher
forces namely international organizations dealing with environment, trade, economic and security affairs on
the global level; or lower ones from local authorities as to their competency to deal with different issues such
as local participation and protecting local cultural heritage. The city becomes therefore an experimental field
for the adequacy of political institutions, the effectiveness of governments and governance as well as
urbanite planning.
No doubt this situation provides opportunities for urban development (World Bank, 2000). Although
cities store energies as the drivers of economic development, through creating working opportunities andcreative urban cultures, such opportunities face major challenges namely inequality, urban violence,
increasing social marginalization and poverty. However, the main challenge remains the way to deal with
growing urban fragmentation, in particular urban poverty and social marginalization due to urban patterns
impacted by globalization and decentralization.
The Arab Human Development Report 2009 states that the growing urban transformation in Arab
cities adds new burdens on the already critical infrastructure, as it creates in many cities unhealthy situations
aggravated by over-crowdedness and lack of security. The city is no longer merely a material reality, rather
an important social one diversified in its structure. On the one hand, it forms the material conceptualization
based on urban and constructional patterns and on the other hand a social conceptualization based on social
life and ramified relations between individuals and groups.
Some may examine one of these elements alone and link it to one of two fields: tangible manifest
urban field, which organizes the activities of people within constructional, urban and technical elements parts
of this field in a specific time (Grafmeyer, 1994, p. 25), or a non-manifest social intangible field, which
organizes the behaviors, practice and representations of its citizens and groups in a specific period (Bourdieu,
1995, p. 25). The city is, however, an interaction and interference between those two fields in space and
time. It is a place and a surrounding (Le Goix, 2005, p. 7) and forms as well part of a political and
ideological national system with material, cultural and social production and reproduction mechanisms. Such
a system is as well impacted by a global political system with its own ideologies and production
mechanisms. Moreover, all these elements and variables interact, interfere and contradict in the city, whereas
contradictions, differences and interests are reflected as different urbanite forms and urban patterns.
This report presents a critical view of some urban patterns based on contradictions and differencesbetween the above variables and elements as well as their impact within and between Arab cities. The study
covers three cities namely Beirut, Cairo and Dubai. These cities represent three conditions of the Arab city
witnessing structural transformations in its economic, social and urban structures reflected in different
patterns. Those patterns wear different forms impacted by internal factors or external ones resulting from
globalized economic relations. Those diversified and interfering impacts are governed by economic, social,
cultural and political circumstances prevailing in every society which interacts with different governance and
administrative systems. These three cities form different advanced models representing similar
transformations undergone by many Arab cities. Comparison of those urban patterns and their contradictions
paves the way for following diversified in-depth researches dealing with those patterns and their impacts on
the path of Arab cities facing modernization and modernity challenges.
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I. PROBLEMATIC OF ARAB CITIES
The previous decade witnessed a number of theoretical approaches in an attempt to explore the
different models of urban governance, starting with the relation between central and local authorities to the
increasing influence of urban systems and urban alliances and the organization of urban agglomerations.
The concept of government based on considering the community as a unit faces increasing challenges
(Foucault, 1982), namely the emergence of local agglomerations as a new field for the management of
different affairs affecting the lives of individuals and groups on one side, and the interactions of globalized
economic relations on the other. Transformations closely linked to the emergence of these new situations
include the emergence of urban regions and fields semi-independent in their dynamics, particularly as to
economic interaction and political governance on one side, and the active presence of international trans-
boundary organizing institutions (World Bank; international commercial treaties) on the other.
In other words, the authority of the State as a model for central authority is being challenged and
such a challenge is reflected in fields of arbitration in social conflicts in different fields including according
to Jouve (Jouve 2005) ( and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO,
2005) the following: (a) lack of trust in the capacity of the political force to address the problematic ofmodern societies with the emergence of a civil society claiming a bigger role in organizing authority (Keane,
2998); (b) dissociation of decision making systems due to implied or direct decentralized effects and
federalism dynamics (Loughlin, 2001); (c) emergence of new issues such as marginalization, integration and
governance, etc., which can no longer be dealt with by sectoral policies, as they require consolidated and
joint approaches between institutions based on different logic and culture at work (Duran and Thoenig,
1996); (d) emergence of new fields for collective work, particularly in urban areas where different forms of
social movements contradict with upper integration policies (Hamel, 2000).
Arab countries are not immune against these interactions as they go through a phase of slow political
development. Most of these countries are still trying to develop good governance and representation
institutions capable of ensuring balanced participation of all categories, justice in wealth distribution between
different groups and respect of cultural diversity. As a result, groups with different identities in a number ofArab states lacking perfect harmony in their population, such as Iraq, the Sudan, Yemen and Lebanon,
sought to oppose the authority of the Nation-State through the appropriation of fragments of cities (Arab
human Development Report 2009). This situation resulted in destructive effects in the cities of these
countries. On the other hand, the same report considers that conflicts and differences allegedly emerging
from identity-related considerations are frequently caused by the incapacity to reach political authority and
wealth, the absence of representation channels, political participation and the repression of cultural and
linguistic diversification. This problematic leads to a number of conclusions namely:
1. Transformation in the political structure as follows: (a) change in the relation between public
authorities and civil societies; (b) modern transformation of the practice of citizenship in Arab countries as to
claiming political rights; (c) increasing demands of the civil society to participate in the formulation of
public policies.
2. Transformation in the urban environment namely: formation of zonal units separated against the
backdrop of different urban patterns reflecting social situations and agglomerations. These transformations
evoke a series of substantial questions namely: what is the nature of these zonal units? Are they
administrative or political realms? Are they sectarian, ethnic or cultural regions? Are they neighborhoods
with different economic and social characteristics? Are they areas with different functions and activities,
different urban structures, or a combination of these elements? How to identify them and on what basis are
these fragmented areas defined? What are the indicators for identifying and delimiting those areas?
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II. GENERAL FRAMEWORK: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
A. TRANSFORMATION OF CITIES
In brief, the city is no longer what it previously was. Many researches and writings reflect the deep
transformations of the city and review the different phenomena as a pivot for these changes: (a) some
consider these phenomena to be new fields of economic globalization that transform the city into a favored
place for global economic exchange (Harvey, 1993); (b) some consider cities to be new areas for cultural,
ethnic and confessional distinctions (Davie, 1994) or for social distinction with the development of some
walled suburbs for rich people distinguished from the rest of the city (Dear et Flusty, 1998); (c) some see
the emergence of regions with cultural identities such as Beirut in the aftermath of civil war where the
gradual natural development of the city led to: (i) a different pattern based on the change of the features of
the center as a space for social blending; (ii) urban divisions delimited by demarcation lines; (iii) geography
of fear; (iv) service-based matrixes based on self-sufficiency of different groups in their regions (Davie,
1992, 1994; Khalaf, 2002); (d) some see new horizons for urban patterns following the bilateral city (the old
city and the new city); for those, the city does not only comprise suburbs, but includes traditional villages
and secondary cities as well, and they base their analysis on the plurality and diversity of daily practice in
transport from one side, and the tendency of middle classes to live in suburbs adjacent to the center andworking centers from the other (Secchi, 2008); (e) other see an attempt to seek modernity and modernization
through imitation and expatriation (Sheshtawy, 2008).
B. CITIES UNDER FORMATION
All above studies state that the city emerges as a field under financial, economic and social
transformation and formation, whether as a result of global economy and transformation in the social
structure or the search for good governance.
This general approach which pictures the city as a field under formation through specific peripheral
areas, tends to be the most appropriate to understand the reality of contradictions and differences between
Arab cities. Perhaps the best definition of the peripheral area is that of Bernard Debarbieux who considersit a field to coordinate financial and symbolic resources in order to organize the day-to-day life affairs of the
individual and the group as it defines in return their identity and its importance.
This approach enables us to go beyond cognitive and sectoral divisions in economy, sociology and
politics, which burden the global production on the one hand, and keep off the fixed and rigid ideological
frameworks in analyzing and discussing those phenomena on the other hand. The approach is founded on the
changes in urbanite administration, social agglomerations and communities, as well as on transformations in
urban patterns.
III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: FRAGMENTED CITIES
The concept of internal social differences that wear different forms in the urbanite field is not new, butthe radicalism that characterizes it incites up to talk more and more about urban fragmentation: differences
are dramatically deepening within urban agglomerations, and the dynamics of the evolution of these regions
seem dependent of each other (Veltz, 1996).
The deep inner differentiations as a context for urban fragmentation in the city puts forth main
challenges and raises questions on the urban surveillance and the tools of management and development of
urban environments. This has led during the last couple of decades to abundant scientific writings on urban
fragmentation and the associated phenomena and factors, including:
(a) The development of new sectors in the city due to the enticements of the global economy with the
support of local and international actors and their networks (Sassen, 1996);
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(b) Reaffirming the impacts of land development strategies, particularly in the field of housing and
accommodation, supported by slack and yielding liberal urban policies that lead to increasing urban
expansion along with the development of new neighborhoods such as social agglomeration, walled cities and
slums (Donzelot, 1998);
(c) zoning approach based on directed uses of lands, such as industrial cities and others, or on the
establishment of modern financial and economic agglomerations (Edwards, 1991);
(d) Reaffirming the cultural and social dynamics and their association with the identity crisis in
developing countries, where administrative, political and economic systems are being modernized
independently from the characteristics of prevailing traditional, social and cultural structures (Navez-
Bouchanine, 1993);
(e) The impact of geographic reliefs and natural phenomena on the different forms of urban
expansion, thus on urban fragmentation ((Piroddi, 1991);
(f) Urban history of the city, as well as the concept of urban fragmentation as a phenomenon
associated with the urban reality rather than a modern one (Topalov, 2000).
Such writings led to a more accurate definition of urban fragmentation on the one hand, and the
emergence of a set of theories covering issues related to this fragmentation on the other hand.
Urban fragmentation is reflected in a weak social relation in the urban field (Navez-Bouchanine,
2002), resulting from weak interaction and collaboration in community, associated with a deficiency in the
representative system and redistribution of services and wealth among citizens. In this framework, urban
fragmentation is completely different from other spatial social differentiation concepts in modern cities, such
as marginalization, discrimination and exclusion. Cases described by such concepts are completely different
although they may contribute to and result in urban fragmentation.
In short, the concept of differentiation indicates the condition of industrial and service-related citieswitnessing the emergence of spatial agglomerations in particular of local or immigrant labor force. The
concept of marginalization refers to illegal regions such as slums expanding on the borders of or even within
cities. Such regions, although they are not linked to the public service network, establish and organize their
own urban services as well as an economy similar and connected to the formal one. The concept of exclusion
refers to social agglomerations focused in specific places. The three concepts put together form the
problematic of social, political and economic urban systems, in their attempt to integrate less fortunate and
weaker groups. From this perspective, urban fragmentation forms a new facet of modern urbanization.
In brief, the adoption of the approach of contradictions and differences between Arab cities, on the
backdrop of urban patterns, according to the concept of urban fragmentation as an analytical framework, is
the capacity of this framework to link the spatial particularity, through the social and cultural aspects, the
temporal particularity, through the crisis of modernity and passage to economic globalization, proceduralsystems, governance and administration and the sphere of the city through those urban patterns.
The analytical framework of the concept of urban fragmentation which will be adopted in the
discussion of urban patterns and their contradictions in the three cities is based on a descriptive pattern that
summarizes the plural approaches of two researchers (Navez-Bouchanine, 1993; Vidal-Rojas, 2002) who
studied the different economic, political, economic and spatial forms of urban fragmentation:
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Overview of fragmentation patterns and forms:
1. Fragmentation of the urban form, the repercussions of this pattern are of two types:
(a) Internal separations and barriers resulting in the loss of urban blending. Different forms include:city made of different fragments; superposition in the planning approach; specific uses of the land;
homogeneous cities (cultural, social, classes, and others); and divisions in regards of infrastructure, highways
and electric and air installations;
(b) Urban scattering, as in the loss of communication and the resulting lack of rapprochement.
Different forms include: new economic approach and logic and new social and living patterns.
2. Socio-spatial fragmentation. Different forms include:
(a) Closed gatherings and walled areas such as: definite populated areas including social groups from
one environment;
(b) Socio-spatial formations, reflected in: fragmentation on socio-economic bases; globalization and
socio-spatial inequality; lack of movement; and specific cultural practice and behaviours.
3. politico-administrative fragmentation. Different forms include:
(a) Fragmentation of authorities in the city, which is reflected in the problematic of citizenship;
(b) Urbanization and divisions, such as: geographic and administrative divisions; levels of
administration; the center in the confrontation of parties; local versus central; providing urban services;
planning public and local policies and urban administration.
A. BEIRUT
1. Urban fragmentation between regional disparities and political crisis
Beirut has developed from a small coastal city on the Mediterranean, with a number of citizens not
exceeding four thousand at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to the faade of modernism in the
ottoman era, to a resplendent capital of culture and the affairs of the Arab world, to a torn city due to civil
war, and finally to a city characterized by large reconstruction projects, growing side by side with popular
neighborhoods and slums as well as confessional and sectarian agglomerations.
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Few cities change so many times in less than one century such as Beirut. Is this the characteristic of a
city that comprises 19 confessions, or rather a general problematic occurring in every space marked with
differences, disparities and a struggle to acquire political rights as well as the right to being different and to
participation?
Beirut suffered greatly the impact of war, which started in the suburbs but soon extended to the center
and turned it into wrecks. The city was then divided into two parts through a demarcation line which some
tangible social effects remain despite its physical annulment. Direct results of the war included the
mandatory movement of Lebanese from one region to another, in a trend that affected hundred thousands of
internal migrants (Nasr, 1984). The war resulted as well in the formation of illegal neighborhoods or their
expansion in different areas of the capital and its suburbs (Bourgey, 1982; Clerc-Huybrechts, 2008).
The political transformation resulting from war was reflected in the absence of the State and
emergence of the fait-accompli powers that imposed their authority, each in its territory. Such authorities
expanded to cover the collection of taxes, providing services and infrastructure (Harb-Alkak, 1996), and
remained openly active until the ratification of the Taif Agreement and the beginning of a new phase in
Lebanon. During this phase, Lebanon witnessed a growing and discrepant decline of this practice paving the
way for the establishment of the Lebanese State. Another result of the war was the fall of the downtown asan economic center and the emergence of different economic centers such as Ashrafieh, Kaslik and Verdun,
and the enhancement of other centers such as Hamra (Boudisseau, 2001), which have undergone
modifications since the beginning of the nineties.
In a true paradox, Beirut witnessed a large construction trend during war, which was. Construction
was aimed to ensure residences for internal migrants and for seekers of residence away from confrontation
lines (Verdeil, 2002). Therefore, the post-war unified Beirut expanded to include what was later on known
as the Greater Beirut (Verdeil, Faour, Haddad, Velut, 2005).
2. Construction
Reconstruction projects started in 1992 were characterized by the wish to recover the pre-war image ofBeirut as the economic center and the cosmopolitan city. The main two challenges resided first in reviving
the trade center in an attempt to establish a central point in which the entire movement of the city would
pour; and second, in opening areas with different confessions and political views through focusing on
different road and infrastructure projects (Verdeil, 2002).
This phase is characterized by the emergence of Solidere project, which aimed essentially to remove
the marks of war. Although the Solidere project eliminated some heritage features such as ancient souks, it
preserved the structure formed during the French colony period, with a change in entertaining and touristic
uses. Main obstacles delaying this project include the persisting political crisis in Lebanon and the Arab and
regional surrounding, as well as the economic crisis started in the mid-nineties.
3. Spatial and social fragmentation
As mentioned before, the main features of the fragmentation of Beirut are reflected in the
contradiction between the center which emerges as an independent space, as well as between the
administrative Beirut and its southern suburb which exceeds Beirut in its space and number of population
(Harb Al-kak, 1996). This region is differentiated from its surrounding from a confessional perspective as the
majority of population is Shiite (residents and migrants from the South and the Beqaa due to the Israeli
aggressions and the civil war). It is also characterized by the concentration of poverty in some of its quarters
especially in slums which occupy large spaces. Despite its stereotyped image, the southern suburb comprises
one homogeneous and harmonious category, but includes as well different political and social categories as
proved by the 1998 municipal elections, when parties resorted to coalitions with families to form municipal
councils (Favier, 2001).
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As for the northern suburb, it cannot be considered as an independent unit comprising a Christian
majority, as it also has ethnic differences in Borj Hamoud which comprises a large Armenian gathering, in
addition to quarters with Assyrian and Chaldean majorities, and other quarters with Shiite majority such as
Rweissat Metn. In contrast with the stereotyped images, this region is characterized by political, economic
and social differences.
4. Urban administration and participation and their impact on the form of the city
There are many actors in the field of public affairs, particularly in Beirut and its suburbs after the war,
including municipalities, economic authorities, civil society organizations and representatives of confessions.
There are as well the fait accompli forces which participated in the civil war, in a way that enhanced their
capacity to pertain their dominance over their private spaces. Such dominance was associated with basic
projects such as schools, universities, hospitals, dispensaries, and cultural, sports and religious centers etc.,
with the support of different entities and through the establishment of housing projects targeted towards
specific confessions, such as the jihad projects of construction and residences for the Orthodox religious
endowments in Hadath in the eastern suburb.
As for economic actors, they also have a main role in impacting the spatial realm in Beirut.Construction is considered to be of the main economic sectors in Lebanon as to the labor force and the
capital. Although it faced a crisis at the end of the nineties, it resurged since 2001 to comprise different
investment projects such as luxurious residences, skyscrapers as well as walled neighborhoods and malls.
Other large projects were built on filled up spaces of the sea such as Lenore, Marina Khoury and others.
Moreover, huge malls which started to emerge on the borders or in the center of the city represent a passage
towards intensive consuming patterns, which leads to the establishment of new centers in the urban context.
As for municipalities, despite their limited budgets, their role in the participation in public affairs is
increasing through restructuring the urban scenery of Beirut. They are building public gardens, providing
infrastructure and entertainment and sport centers and organizing different activities. However, the relation
of these municipalities with the representatives of confessions and parties is a crucial factor that can be
identified in municipal unions, where the public interest is merely linked to the interest of the confession orthe group.
Therefore, Beirut looks like a fragmented city with every fragment having its own characteristics. As
for the public context, it is a reflection of these fragments, where every fragment is characterized by its own
symbols and behavioral and cultural practice. Asaad Asaad crossroad in Chiah municipality in the southern
suburb is a clear example to that, as it was transformed from a military demarcation line during the civil war
into a latent demarcation line between two spaces with different symbols and mottos, although its citizens
belong to the same economic classes and the same municipality (Farah, 2006).
In parallel, a middle class is growing in Beirut, relatively young and cross-areas in post-modernity
regions away from confessional leaderships. This class is dynamic and linked to globalization, as it is rich in
different kinds of organizations (Davie, 2007).
Some would start by saying that greater Beirut which comprises around a million and a half
inhabitants is a series of quarters and confessional and factional agglomerations divergent economically and
socially, in such a way for the city to become no more that a mosaic of contiguous groups. Questions are
raised: do public policies and urban administration of these different fragments form a factor of
fragmentation? Does the cultural and social practice or the interaction with the space give the fragment its
character, and therefore fragments become as diversified as the practice? Is it the globalization and the
resulting differentiation between categories that became integrated in its system whereas other categories
remained marginalized? Is it, as previously mentioned, a unique condition of a city seeking to gather too
many confessions and ethnicities in one space?
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The main question remains: if urban fragmentation is a reflection of the absence of ethnic, cultural and
social homogeneity, how would it be possible to guarantee the right to be different between groups and
individuals and the integration with the space in devising policies, without overlooking the social dimension
and resorting to isolation and marginalization?
B. CAIRO
1. Challenges of globalization between spatial fragmentation and the problematic of social justice
Cairo is expected to include around 43 per cent of Egypts population by 2020. This growth rate is
perturbing, as the city attracts many Egyptians, particularly urban citizens. Around 1000 people are estimated
to come weekly to Cairo looking for a job or residence (Elsheshtawy, 2006). As for secondary surrounding
cities, they are considered to be annexed to it due to a much centralized system. Eight million people, an
unofficial number, out of the overall population of the city live in slums.
2. Economic impact: deepening inequality patterns
Some researchers (Davis, 2008; Lavergne, 2007; Singerman, 2007) consider the changes in Cairofeatures and its urban and social structure to be the direct result of the State policies during the last forty
years, which had led to an economic and social disparity. Around 25 per cent of Egyptians are considered to
be living beneath poverty line, and another 25 per cent on the line of poverty, which means that half of the
population is poor despite the increasing number of rich people.
Current public policies include orientation towards privatization and facilitation of the conditions of
investment for foreign land companies seeking to build luxurious projects, meant for a class of rich people,
as they profit of tax exemption and different facilitations. In parallel, numbers of poor lacking a residence
keep increasing. This policy is much criticized, especially since some of these projects are built on public
lands, or at least benefit directly from services provided by the State (Davis, 2008).
Therefore, the Egyptian community is divided in two: the upper rich class which has moved awayfrom the center of the city to luxurious quarters, and a poor class living in poor quarters, slums and even
graveyards. The upper class frequents schools, clubs and places different from the ones frequented by the
majority of people, in such a way for every class to have its own space, which accentuates the difference
between categories within the same city.
3. Problematic of spatial fragmentation: walled communities and slums
These differences between economic and social levels in Cairo lead to the emergence of separate
spaces for each of the poor and rich classes. Some observers describe Cairo as a large slum including regions
of organized residence. Based on IRIN report (IRIN, 2000), Cairo comprises three of the biggest thirty slums
in the world. The rich moved to cities built specially for them in east Cairo, and are almost totally governed
by the private sector. Mitchell (Mitchell, 2008) sees that this rich class has a network of relations that linksthose walled quarters together. On the other hand, the inhabitants of these quarters have an important mainly
economic authority that enables them of managing and controlling economic affairs, without having to live
in the city. The number of population in Cairo slums is disturbingly growing by a rate three times bigger than
other regions (Singerman, 2007), which incited people to take things in charge, including providing shelter,
services and necessary infrastructure they can provide.
The spread of slums is a proof to the incapacity of successive Egyptian Governments during past
decades to provide the required numbers of decent residences, in addition to the hesitation in allowing
building on agricultural lands. Some observers deem building on agricultural lands the best solution for the
Government to provide shelters for millions of people coming to the city (Davis, 2008). In parallel, attempts
to build shelters in desert regions outside Cairo did not succeed in attracting sufficient numbers of people,
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due to the poor transport system outside Cairo, lack of services and weak facilitations as to launching
workshops or small businesses.
On the other hand, some Governmental projects sought to promote those slums, but registered only
partial accomplishments, whereas private efforts are achieving bigger success. Examples to this success
include the project of reviving and developing old Cairo regions by the Aga Khan organization, and the
project of promoting Manshiyat Nasser with the support of a German institution for development. Within
this project, the State took effective measures by admitting the presence of slums, and integrating the system
for registering the ownership of lands and houses (Elsheshtawy, 2006).
It is possible to consider therefore, that the constructional structure in Cairo is governed by slums, and
old governmental buildings, neighboring many luxurious projects such as malls, information technology
centers, and walled communities of rich.
Obviously, these luxurious land projects are not the solution for the urban problem, they rather
increase the sense of loss of social justice and social exclusion, factors which, if added to political
extremism, may negatively affect the structure of society (Salama, 2007). Official authorities often
encourage these projects considered to yield large amounts of money to the country; however their long-termimpacts are much more complicated. Large investment companies launched luxurious projects in Cairo, in
particular Gulf companies from the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, or even local companies, as a direct
result of the Government policy as to privatization, aimed to attract direct foreign investment.
This type of projects benefits of large promotional publicity promising a unique lifestyle away form
urban problems. Most of these projects seem like different regions secluded from the rest of the city through
doors and walls, as well as through their specific road networks, sidewalks and infrastructure. Yasser
Elsheshtawy (Elsheshtawy, 2007) considers those projects to be projections meant to be similar to Dubai, but
are dispersed in the heart of Cairo without any adaptation to the environment and the community, in the
midst of a falling constructional structure and a poor environment, which paves the way for risky social
disorders.
As for the other problematic, it lies in the impact of these projects on the rise of prices of surrounding
lands, which may become beyond the reach of middle and poor classes. This phenomenon has a fundamental
impact on the constructional and social structure of the city, and thus raises the issue of sustainability. In fact,
land companies, which could transform the constructional shape of city, may in turn lead to social problems
and a deepening gap between categories of the same city.
4. Urban administration and sustainability
The way Governments deal with slums, or old markets, which are often impossible to move to another
place, is not expected to work without taking the plural and complicated social and economic aspects into
account. These slums form living spaces for their residents and include strong social networks that are part of
the social capital, despite extreme poverty and the absence of services. Therefore, policies of moving citizensfailed, and the proof to that is that many of those given new residences resorted to selling or leasing them and
went back to their slums that are closer to working opportunities (Elsheshtawy, 2006).
The Government justifies the severity of its measures in dealing with extremism, crime and factors of
risk to the establishment of security, which leads us into a vicious circle because the failure of State policies
to deal effectively with the deep causes of crises undergone by the residents of these marginalized slums,
contributes to the establishment of an environment that leads to more violence, which constitutes an
argument to increase severity. It is well-known that social justice, good governance and the ability of citizens
to communicate their demands are of the most important factors contributing to the sustainability of cities.
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The limited space to express oneself, in particular political expression, and weak mechanisms of
participation in devising urban policies related to the living space of individuals and groups have a
significant impact on the formation of the public space in Cairo, which has become a weak concept.
Exclusive privatization has transformed the public space into a private one benefitting major investors and
the rich elite, whereas the public space could as well be a walled space limited to tourists (Singerman, 2007).
Spatial and social fragmentation in Cairo is reflected in the weak participation in public and sectoral policies
and the profound contradictions between walled luxurious neighborhoods and slums and old houses
interfering sometimes with graveyards.
C. DUBAI
1. City of immigrants and social and ethnic fragmentation
Every year, Dubai attracts more visitors, customers and workers from all over the world. In view of its
modern infrastructure, strategic seaports and airport, and its luxurious colossal projects, it is expected to
receive over 10 million visitors in 2010 (Davis, 2007).
Dubai is considered unique in view of its demographic structure with 71 per cent of the overallpopulation being immigrants and workers in 2007. Most workers are Indians and Pakistanis, in addition to
other nationalities such as Bangladeshi, Philippine and others. Dubai is successfully seeking to form an
international city through daring achievements in urban planning, and ensuring an attractive working
environment with superior services that would dazzle visitors and observers.
Some describe Dubai as the biggest construction site in the world, with approximately 600 skyscrapers
(Davis, 2007), biggest malls in the world and most luxurious hotels. It is seeking to break all records in this
field, through the biggest mall, highest tower, largest airport, biggest artificial island, first hotel under water
and others. Dubai comprises as well specialized cities such as the city of internet and of media in addition to
other projects under construction (Elsheshtawy, 2006).
2. Historical overview
Some researchers admit that Dubai was established as a city of business and economic profit, and has
been relying for decades on free trade and the policy of annulling or reducing taxes and providing modern
infrastructure, making use of the abundant financial resources, and cheap labour force. It turned in no time
from a desert, with a population living on raising cattle and harvesting palms to a forest of skyscrapers
(Lavergne, 2007). Some observers indicate that the success of the city is largely due to calm and stability.
3. Spatial and social fragmentation
A large gap exists between poor dispersed neighborhoods approximating modern streets with
skyscrapers and luxurious colossal projects. Middle-class people live in regions such as Al-Dira and Ber
Dubai, in addition to Al-Jafiliyya and Satwa.
Poor regions approximate rich regions in a way to accentuate the disparity between humble houses and
the towers of Sheikh Zayed Street. Trees are planted to cover these poor areas.
The social structure is a mosaic of social classes. Far from being a comprehensive society, it is rather
pyramidal with the governing class on the top, followed by a minority of citizens, and thousands of different
nationalities on the basis. The landslide which constitutes the base of the pyramid comprises different classes
of workers, namely Indians, Pakistanis, and Philippine as well as Sri Lankan female workers (Lavergne,
2007). Some observers note that every category has its sphere of work, schools, residence, cafes and
restaurants even newspapers and televised channels. Due to high temperatures and the largeness of the city,
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most of these categories, particularly poor ones, find it hard to move easily, and therefore remain in their
neighborhoods.
Disparity is evident between generations within the same category, youth are raised by foreigners,
whether at home or at school, which leads to the fading of social values disturbingly substituted by foreign
values (Lavergne, 2007). The public orientation and adopted policies can accentuate dissimilarities between
different categories of the city. Critics note that the city may be moving away from its Arab roots to turn into
a picture with no cultural depth looking like Monaco of Gulf, with the aim of attracting a certain elite (Davis,
2007; Lavergne, 2007). Although new orientations are forcing their way through social policies and foreign
acquisition policies, the city remains a combination of human groups governed by clear social distinctions,
where people may interact in order to achieve gains but on very discrepant levels.
4. Problematic of citizenship
The demographic reality in Dubai constitutes a problematic reflected in the clear discrepancy between
citizens forming a minority, and an overwhelming majority of foreigners. This discrepancy defines the role
of each of these two different categories in public affairs and social security. Citizens try not to dissolute in
the waves of immigrants flowing in the city and seek to protect their social and cultural particularities.
5. Central authority and good administration
The government is considered to be the main factor of development in Dubai, despite efforts to find a
conventional private sector independent of the financial support of the government. Therefore, the actual
authority lies in the hand of the governing circle whereas the fate of the city is tightly tied to the personality
of the governor and his assistants. Some may consider that decision makers in the city are present in different
places in global metropolitans and include owners and managers of international companies, and the
government is actually composed of a team of managers. Therefore, the central administration is linked to
three dimensions namely: the tribal authority, the Islamic Shariaa and the culture of companies (Davis,
2007).
From time to time, some initiatives form the nucleus of a civil society trying to claim its political and
social demands, however the city is still far from being a space of democratic representation, and a haven for
full political and civil rights.
6. Dubai the international city
As long as Dubai lacks its personal and independent decision, and depends on the wish of investors
choosing it to be the center of their projects and investments; as long as it lacks the internal social,
demographic and cultural core, it cannot become an international city such as Shanghai or Hong Kong. Some
wonder about the nature of the structure or the institutional and legal basis which would secure the
sustainability of the city and its projects in case factors which have led to its emergence and quick evolution
fade or cease, whereas a general worry stems from the establishment of global economy in Dubai withoutworking on finding a solid basis to secure its sustainability (Davis, 2007). Such concern was surprisingly
reflected during the financial crisis which has exploded lately, and voices were heard calling for the necessity
to find an electoral system, representative councils and wider participation in the management of public
affairs.
We can therefore consider that the challenges of globalization in Dubai, this unique city as to services
and outer shape, as well as to the unbalanced demographic structure, may lead to the fragmentation of the
city reflected on the level of the social structure, which would lead to the multiplicity of dissimilar fragments
as to construction and structure patterns and to the plurality of closed networks thus resulting in diminishing
interaction between different categories living in the same city.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN FRAGMENTATION PATTERNS
The three cities represent different kinds of fragmentation stemming from private interactions and
dynamics, and reflect contradictions, discrepancies and differences within and between them. The results of
this comparison can be summed up in four points:
(a) The following elements have a great impact on urban patterns and fragmentation in the three
cities:
(i) Globalization and means adopted by countries and cities to deal with it: having exposed the
main studies covering the urban problematic of the three cities, it became clear that
fragments of the three cities have become more than ever linked to globalized economic and
cultural dynamics; whereas large parts are still beyond the reach of globalization linked in
their evolution to local dynamics, even if such dynamics are directly or indirectly impacted
by globalization. No doubt globalization has a main impact on the evolution of cities today,
even if such impact is discrepant. Dubai, for instance, is largely based in its urban evolution
on economic globalization dynamics such as colossal land projects, huge foreign
investments, regional an international centers of multinational companies, and infrastructureat the service of globalization (international airport, large seaports and others). In Cairos
example, the urban texture clearly reveals this deep contraction imposed by the impacts of
dissimilarities resulting from globalization. Differentiation is made between categories
getting richer, influenced by globalization, semi-secluded from the city and living in regions
linked through their own networks and channels as well as their own surface, and categories
getting poorer secluded from economic relations and globalization and undergoing exclusion
and marginalization in slums forming the largest part of the city. In the example of Beirut,
although globalization did not have this dramatic role characterizing the urban development
in Dubai and Cairo, it is particularly reflected in the development of consuming economic
structures;
(ii) Changes in means of production, the labor market and labor force: economic transformationsthat have accompanied the decline of the intensive manufacturing phase in the Western
world, represent in specialized western literature the main reason of urban fragmentation in
such societies. The fall of the social contract which used to link production forces, as in
employers, to the State has led to an increase of unemployment, social exclusion and urban
seclusion of large categories of the previous working community. Among the studied cases,
Cairo is the closest to this situation. Egypt is the only case in which industry had a crucial
role in the national economic structure. As for Lebanon, It has witnessed an industrial phase
in the seventies of the last century; however, the economy of profits, particularly in Beirut,
had the main role in planning the Lebanese economy. As for the United Arab Emirates, in
particular Dubai, it has no industrial heritage worth mentioning, although it is witnessing
today an economic activity attracting large numbers of works, which however has not led to
the formation of a social contract such as the western one. Therefore, this dimension has alimited role in urban fragmentation, which emerges mainly in the form of exclusion and
seclusion of large parts of society in Cairo;
(iii) The relation between urban fragmentation and exclusion, among cultural communities and
social classes: the cultural factor emerged as an essential factor in urban fragmentation. It is
crucial as to the integration or seclusion of social categories or individuals in the life of a
certain community through participation in cultural symbols, tools and values. This factor
has two main impacts: emergence of barriers and cultural sections (classes, ethnic and
confessional) and confiscation of the public space. Beirut emerges as the eminent example to
this kind of fragmentation which does not exclude Cairo and Dubai. In Cairo, the factor of
social classes plays the main role in the separation between walled rich neighbors and slums,
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although they are sometimes geographically approximate. As for Dubai, although the
separation factor is weaker, there is clearly an emerging phenomenon of ethnic and
nationalistic neighborhoods;
(iv) Barriers and borders between neighborhoods and regions: the direct result of urban
fragmentation is naturally the establishment of barriers. Such barriers can be material in the
form of gates and fences such as the walled rich neighborhood in Cairo, security-related
such as many large private commercial or residential projects in Dubai, Cairo and Beirut, or
symbolic such as the war demarcation line in Beirut which is still present in some minds
despite its physical termination.
(b) Discrepancy is a permanent characteristic of the city particularly historical cities such as Cairo.
The new phenomenon is not the discrepancy itself but its transformation into a fragmentation factor. The
difference between the two is that although the discrepancy separates neighborhoods of a city on the
backdrop of its social and economic discrepant reality, it does not however cut communication and
interaction between those neighborhoods. In this case, the city remains a social unit with unified interest. As
for fragmentation, it cuts communication lines and disassembles interactive interests which unify citizens,
thus linking some neighborhoods to others in other cities instead of linking them with their own surrounding,whereas other neighborhoods become confined whether out of auto-seclusion or seclusion imposed by the
surrounding;
(c) The inevitable result of urban fragmentation is the emergence of fragments, but the cognitive
problematic for any researcher or observer would be to define those fragments. From a theoretical or
ideological perspective, we see incompatible, sometimes contradicting definitions of these fragments. Some
may look at them from the class or working perspective as a result to globalization, whereas others from
cultural, ethnic, confessional or lifestyle perspectives etc. In view of the reality of the three cities, we see that
these categories contradict and merge in reality, therefore it is useful to study the definition of fragments not
only from the theoretical categories perspective, but also from the expressional dimension and social and
mental representations, from which residents and users express their understanding of the city fragment;
(d) The State plays a crucial role in the establishment of spatial distinctions, preserving or removing
them at all times, which makes its role a crucial factor in implementing what is produced by the labour force,
or by limiting the effect of such production. In times of economic liberal policies globalization and
privatization, actors of the private sector and civil society have an effective role in the governance of the city.
Openness on those circles in the western world witnessed a balance between the role of the private sector and
that of the civil society in formulating modern urban policies, but the withdrawal of the State and the weak
structure of the independent civil society in the Arab world have granted the interests of the private sector the
main role in defining those policies. This sector generally works on securing its personal interests and
isolates the interests of large categories in society. This has led to increasing privatization of service-related
sectors in some countries. With this transformation, companies usually seek quick gain. According to
Graham and Marvin (Graham, Marvin, 2003), we have moved from a unifying infrastructure to an isolating
one. Although this phenomenon is still in its first stages in the three countries, the resulting urbanfragmentation has started to emerge sharply as affirmed by Verdeil (Verdeil, 2008).
V. CONCLUSION
This primary reading of the urban patterns in the three Arab cities and the main questions raised, have
shown that urban fragmentation is a ramified phenomenon with several aspects, impacted by social and
spatial practice and behaviors as well as by the plural political dimensions and radical changes in global
economy and technology.
Some pessimists dont see in the city but an area for the balance of forces, conflicts, contradictions,
marginalization and differentiation, as well as mechanisms to produce spatial agglomerations that coexist
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without sharing. Whereas we adopt a different point of view of the urban reality based on the principle of the
city for everyone, where every individual finds his own place because the city is a political, moral and
esthetic claim, where everybody meet in the frame of urban civilization based on respect (Paquot, 2009).
Where are our Arab cities from this optimist view? Is there any way to connect our fragmented cities to
sustainable development based on equality, participation and justice?
There is therefore an urging need for a critical study that clarifies the urban problematic and develops
monitoring and analysis tools. Urban fragmentation is one of these theoretical tools that aim to real
sustainable development in urban and social policies, in addition to finding means to implement good urban
administration based on the principles of citizenship and political and social rights for individuals and
groups.
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