Ecologically counterproductive tax concessions in Germany

European EnvironmentEur. Env. 8, 58–65 (1998)

ECOLOGICALLYCOUNTERPRODUCTIVE TAXCONCESSIONS IN GERMANY

Ursula Triebswetter*

Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich, Germany

There is the general view in theenvironmental economics literature thatmany forms of state aid (subsidies, taxallowances, grants, etc) trigger theunintended effect of promoting economicactivities which are not compatible withsustainable development. Moreover someof this state aid, in particular taxallowances, contribute to the maintenanceof a complicated tax system accompaniedby budgetary losses, a fact which gainsimportance in periods of severe budgetdeficits. However, the identification ofthe linkage between state aid andenvironmental degradation is difficultbecause there is often only an indirectconnection. Also the quantification ofstate aid poses problems. This paper isfocused on a particular part ofenvironmentally damaging state aid inGermany, i.e. environmentallycounterproductive tax allowances. Thepaper presents an analytical frameworkfor the identification of the taxallowance–environment linkage and forestimating the budgetary effects in the

case of a reform. On the basis of acomprehensive study a breakdown of theempirical evidence is given by sectorsfavoured by the tax allowances and alsoby type of tax. It is found thatenvironmentally damaging tax allowancesat present exceed DM 45 billion inGermany. ? 1998 John Wiley & Sons,Ltd and ERP Environment.

BACKGROUND AND POLICYCONTEXT

A lthough an EU-wide CO2/energy tax hasvirtually failed and Germany too has livedup to the agreement on the voluntary

obligation to introduce an energy tax to protectthe climate, both the European Commission andthe German government are concerned withadvancing the idea of ecological tax reform byother means. In June 1996, for example, at aconference organized by the Directorates Generalfor the Environment, the Single Market andTaxation entitled Economic Incentives and Dis-incentives for Environmental Protection, it wasevident that the strategy of the European Com-mission had changed to the extent that the majorreform of the energy tax was no longer beingpursued but instead efforts were directed at exam-ining and, if necessary, reforming the entire taxand charges system with regard to its ecological

*Correspondence to: Ursula Triebswetter, Department of Environ-mental Economies, Ifo Institute for Economic Research,Poschingerstr. 5, D-81679 Munich, Germany.

CCC 0961-0405/98/020058–08 $17.50? 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT

impact (O} kologische Briefe, 1996). This policyreflects the intention of the Fifth EnvironmentalAction Programme to integrate environmentalconsiderations into fiscal policy needs (EuropeanCommission, 1995). Strong emphasis is placed onthe removal of ecologically harmful tax conces-sions in the individual Member States. The mostprominent example in Europe and the world isthe mineral oil tax exemption for kerosene. Thismeans a considerable subsidy for atmosphericpollution from aircraft and at the same time asubstantial income loss for governments. Avariety of legal exceptions exist on the nationallevel that encourage negative environmentaleffects. A study on the phenomenon of environ-mentally damaging tax concessions was under-taken for the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairsin Germany in 1994 (Triebswetter et al., 1994).Some political parties have also begun to discussthe problem (Steenblock et al., 1995; Sozialdemok-ratischer Informationsdienst, 1995; Die Woche,1995). This article will present and update thisdiscussion.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

DEFINITION OF ECOLOGICALLYCOUNTERPRODUCTIVE TAXCONCESSIONS

The method for identifying ecologically counter-productive tax concessions is oriented aroundspecific taxation and environmental criteria. Anecologically counterproductive tax regime existswhen the goals of environmental protection arecontravened by activities eligible for tax relief.However, the linkage between environmentaldegradation and tax concessions is not alwaysclear at first sight. From a perspective of taxationecologically counterproductive tax concessionscan be suspected to be the case for taxes witheither direct or indirect environmental connection.On the one hand, a direct connection to anenvironmental medium (e.g. the direct linkbetween real property tax and land as an environ-mental medium) and on the other hand thebreadth of a tax (e.g. income tax) or its proximityto an environmentally damaging activity canpresent an environmental connection. With thesecriteria, the following definition can be formu-lated: ‘Ecologically counterproductive rules areunderstood as tax concessions for environ-mentally damaging activities by bypassing thepolluter-pays principle and not internalising

external costs of pollution. Furthermore, taxesimposed on environmentally positive economicactivities are included because they place a dis-incentive on environmentally-friendly behaviour.The perpetrator of environmental damage is thusfavoured vis-a-vis those who are regularly taxed.The concessions and burdens relate to the taxbase and/or the tariff applied. Additionallyincluded in the analysis are tax concessionsof environmentally damaging activities in thesense that these activities are not only favouredby a lower than usually applied tariff, but aretotally exempt from a specific tax’ (Franke andTriebswetter, 1994, p. 16)1.

ESTIMATING THE BUDGETARY EFFECTSIN CASE OF REFORM

At the same time an estimation is made of therevenue shortfalls caused by tax concessions;these shortfalls occur in the form of genuinerevenue shortfalls or as a waiver of interest in thecase of special depreciation allowances. The esti-mation of budgetary effects in the case of reformcan necessarily convey rough information only.Income and substitution effects as a consequenceof eliminating or changing tax concessions wouldlead to a situation where additional tax revenuewould most probably not be as high as theshortfall figure. Shortfall figures can therefore beregarded as reflecting the maximum amount ofadditional revenues in the case of a reform.Simultaneously it must be noted, as was pointedout similarly in an earlier article in this journal,that the environmental benefit from removal ofenvironmental damaging tax concessions is differ-ent from the financial magnitude of the taxconcessions (Maddison et al., 1997). In otherwords, there is a ‘double dividend’ (release ofgovernment resources and improvement of theenvironmental situation), but its extent is unclear.All too often there is a lack of information about

1It is clear that the focus of this study on the environmentaldimension of tax allowances is only one aspect in the widercontext of sustainable development. A more comprehensiveapproach is shown by Barg (1996). He argues that governmenttaxation policy should take place on sustainable developmentgrounds and provides a comprehensive framework for evaluatingtaxation/subsidy policy with respect to economic efficiency,equity, environmental integrity and interactions among thesefactors. The violation of environmental integrity is checked by thefollowing questions. Does a subsidy reduce soil, water and airquality? Does it weaken ecosystem functioning? Does it discourageresource stewardship? Does it discourage the precautionaryapproach under uncertainty? Does it discourage biologicaldiversity? (Barg, 1996, p. 33).

ECOLOGICALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE GERMAN TAX CONCESSIONS

? 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. Eur. Env. 8, 58–65 (1998)

59EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT

the precise environmental damage which is causedby specific tax concessions. Moreover, one wouldhave to know the slope of the demand and supplycurves for the goods which are affected by theremoval of environmentally counterproductivetax concessions.

Unlike earlier suggestions proposed by the IfoInstitute for ecological reform of the mineral oiland road taxes, in this study we do not urge thatchanges be made to the basis of tax assessment ortax rates but that first an elimination of loopholesin the assessment basis of individual taxes bemade (Korner, 1993; 1995).

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

SECTORAL OVERVIEW

The analysis of ecologically damaging tax conces-sions in the tax system reveals clear tax benefitsfor some industries, especially environmentallyharmful ones, but also for private households.Reform should thus concentrate on regulations inthis sector. The following presents some of thetax concessions that burden the environment aswell as the budget2.

TRANSPORT

In the transport sector several mineral oil taxexemptions are immediately obvious. The notori-ous tax exemption for kerosene is one of themost ecologically harmful and the individualregulation that accounts for the highest revenueshortfall. According to the German mineral oil taxcode (Section 4 Abs. 1 No. 3 MinoStG) aircraftfuel used by domestic airlines and air transportsimilar to that of airlines (official planes, officialuse of military planes and air rescue operations)is exempt from the mineral oil tax. This regula-tion was introduced in 1953 to promote airtransport. Not only domestic flights but alsointernational air transport, according to theChicago agreement, are exempt from mineraloil tax.

This regulation means that a litre of keroseneonly costs DM 0.30; applying the normal tax andusing the quantities contained in the mineral oiltax statistics, a revenue shortfall of DM 7.3 billion

is the result3. This tax exemption, which con-tributes to cost reduction in air transport, shouldbe eliminated for reasons of environmental andtax policies. Not only are emissions from airlinesparticularly harmful for the earth’s atmosphere,the exemption is also a discrimination againstroad transport and diesel-driven rail transport,both of which are subject to the mineral oil tax.In order to dampen the excessive demand forenvironmentally harmful air transport, we recom-mend that this tax exemption be eliminated. Sincean EU state cannot act alone due to the directiveof harmonizing consumption taxes, an EU-wideinitiative is required (Bundesministerium derFinanzen, 1997).

An elimination of this tax exemption wouldhave several positive ecological effects (Bund-/Landerarbeitskreis, 1993). The tax burden wouldput pressure on airlines to upgrade their fleets tomore fuel efficient aeroplanes. The higher operat-ing costs would also force airlines to raise theirprices. This would mean a declining demand in airtransport and an improvement in the railway’scompetitive position over shorter stretches. Theextent of the price effect depends on the airlines’cost structures and the tax rate applied. With fuelamounting to 10% of total costs, taxing aircraftfuel at the same tax rate as diesel fuel would leadto about a 20% increase in costs. This would alsobe the maximum price increase.

According to the German mineral oil tax code(Section 4 Abs. 1 No. 4 MinoStG) heavy oils suchas fuels for commercial inland water transport arealso tax exempt. According to calculations onthe basis of actual consumption taken from themineral oil statistics the tax shortfall thisaccounted for in 1995 was ca. DM 1.5 billion4. Incontrast to air transport, the EU directives onharmonizing the structure of consumption taxeson mineral oil (92/81EEC, Art. 8 Sec 2,19.10.1992) gives the Member States the choiceof exempting inland waterway transportation ornot. An exception is the obligation for tax exemp-tion for certain ships, e.g. in the Rhine and itstributaries in connection with an international

2The study by Triebswetter et al. (1994) contains a more compre-hensive treatment of this subject.

3The 16th Subsidy Report of the federal government lists a revenueshortfall of only DM 470 million for 1995 (Bundesministerium derFinanzen, 1997). This difference can be explained by the fact thatthe government takes only the fuel used by domestic airlines intoaccount for the calculation of the revenue shortfalls. In a taxterminological sense, no revenue shortfall takes place when foreignairlines take the fuel out of Germany after tanking. (See alsoDeutscher Bundestag, 1995).4The 16th Subsidy Report of the federal government lists a revenueshortfall of only DM 350 million for 1995 (Bundesministerium derFinanzen, 1997). The explanation for the difference is analogous tonote 3.

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60 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT

agreement. In Germany, however, the rest ofwaterway transport is treated the same way. Thegovernment has stated ‘Because of the mineraloil taxes imposed on road transport and onrail transport with diesel locomotives, thispreferential treatment is no longer justified’(Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 1995; 1997).Moreover, the elimination of this tax concession,which would promote fuel conservation, shouldbe extended to all waterways since maintainingthe preference on some stretches would discrimi-nate against stretches that are not tax exempt.Reform in this area requires negotiations withother EU countries and with partners to inter-national treaties.

One consideration, however, is that watertransportation produces far fewer emissions perkilometre ton than road and air transport. Incomparison to the railways, water transportationis more environmentally friendly than rail trans-port, which is subject to mineral oil tax only inthe areas of SO2 and CO2 emissions. There arethus gaps in the environmental motivation formaintaining this tax preference. Therefore, forecological reasons the tax preference for inlandwaterways should be eliminated. This would giveclear signals towards fuel conservation in inlandwaterway transport. Eliminating this tax exemp-tion, however, would worsen the competitiveposition of ship transportation vis-a-vis lorrytransport, which in turn would have negativeenvironmental effects. For this reason, thoughtshould be given to raising taxes on lorrytransport5.

Consumption taxes, according to the Germantax system, are meant to tax consumption inGermany in a way that, in a narrow terminologi-cal sense, revenue shortfalls in air and ship trans-port do not occur ‘. . . insofar as the amounts referto fuel in the tanks of foreign airlines or shipswhich leave the German taxation territory im-mediately after tanking’ (Deutscher Bundestag,1995). Because of cross-border environmentaldamage, however, a limitation of mineral oil taxesto individual states is not adequate. Currently, inaddition to EU law and international treaties,there are 120 bilateral agreements in air traffic thatstand in the way of tax reform.

Finally, the lower tax levied on diesel fuel incomparison to petrol is also ecologically counter-productive especially because of soot and benzol

emissions. The resulting revenue shortfallsamounted to DM 7.9 billion in 1995 (Steenblocket al., 1995). Although new registrations of diesel-powered cars fell after the diesel fuel tax wasraised, the still lower fuel tax and lower fuelconsumption of diesel cars could be an incentivefor increased use. A substitution of diesel cars bypetrol-engine cars would also have counter-productive ecological effects in the form of evenhigher benzol levels. With a convergence ofthe mineral oil tax on diesel and petrol, atleast a portion of the external costs caused bydiesel-powered cars would be internalized.

The transportation sector also receives prefer-ential treatment from the road tax. According tothe German road tax code (Section 10 KraftStG)an application for road tax exemption can bemade for excess trailers. ‘Excess’ means that roadhaulage firms frequently have more trailers thantractors. As long as these excess trailers carry aregistration plate and are drawn by a tractor forwhich a trailer supplement has been paid, noadditional road tax need be paid for the trailer.

The resulting revenue shortfalls in 1995amounted to DM 50 million, according to thegovernment’s sixteenth subsidy report. Thisindividual regulation is ecologically counter-productive since it benefits emission-intensiveroad transport and exacerbates the competitivesituation of the more environmentally friendlyrailway. For this reason, this tax preference shouldbe eliminated (BLAK, 1993).

There are also tax preferences in the income taxcode that benefit the transport sector. For com-mercial ships, ocean fishing vessels and aircraft ininternational transport, the income tax code con-tains a discretionary valuation for ships via aspecial depreciation allowance of up to 40% andup to 30% for aircraft in the first five years. In1995, resulting revenue shortfalls were estimatedat DM 35 million and newer data indicates themto be as high as DM 70 (Bundesministerium derFinanzen, 1995; 1997). This regulation was intro-duced in 1965 and runs to 31 December 1999. Itis an ecological burden in the environmentallyharmful air transport sector and also does notcontribute to an internalization of costs in shiptransport (accident risk, etc). Moreover, especiallythe fact that lowering costs in transportation willnot contribute to sustainable development shouldlead governments to abolish this tax concession(BLAK, 1993).

The income tax code contains another ecologi-cally counterproductive tax concession: owners ofa business or trade can write off from their income

5This is also the position of BLAK (1993), the federal and stateworking group for economy and tax-related problems of theenvironment.




tax the full amount of the purchase price of a caras stipulated in the tax depreciation tables. Thisunlimited write-off on the purchase price of acompany car leads many to buy more expensiveand less environmentally friendly (high-fuel-consumption) cars than they would otherwiserequire for business purposes. The environmentaland fiscal impact of this tax benefit could not bedetermined. Our recommendation is to set anupper limit that can be written off the price of anew business car (Sprenger et al., 1994). Thisreform could also be an incentive for using therailway instead of maintaining a company car.

AGRICULTURE

The agricultural sector also enjoys several taxconcessions that have counterproductive effectson the environment. Farm tractors are exemptfrom road tax, a historical regulation intended topromote motorization in agriculture but which isan anachronism today and amounted to DM 170million in revenue shortfalls in 1995, according tothe government’s subsidy report which takes intoaccount a tax concession of 75% in comparisonto the regular tariff applied (Bundesministeriumder Finanzen, 1997). Moreover, farms are alsoexempt from trade tax because of the demarcationto business enterprises as defined in the incometax code (Section 13 Sec. 1 EStG) because ofthe relatively high upper limits for number ofcattle. Because of this regulation farms alsoreceived preferential treatment in real propertytax (annual revenue shortfalls in property tax,DM 13 million) (Buop, 1991). According to thetrade regulation code (Section 51 BewG) a farm isnot a business establishment as long as thenumber of cattle units per business year is notmore than ten for the first 20 hectares, not morethan seven for the next 10 hectares, not morethan three for the next 10 hectares and notmore than 1.5 for additional areas of farm land.Subject to trade tax, however, are incorporatedfirms, commercial co-operatives, and mutual insur-ance associations insofar as these are businesses inagriculture or forestry.

According to the regulations of the Inter-national Federation of Organic Agriculture Move-ments (IFOAM), an ecologically operated farmhas a maximum number of two head of cattleper hectare (BMELF, 1990). Lower limits to thenumber of cattle per hectare would mean thatmore farms would be subject to trade tax and thatin this way the polluter would pay for at least partof the environmental damage from agriculture.

This must be qualified, however, by the commentthat battery farming with a high surface areawould still receive favourable tax treatment witha lower limit to animals per hectare. In order,however, to effectively ward off environmentaldamage caused by farming, the whole agriculturalpolicy, especially that of the European Union,must be redrawn. For this reason, changing thelimits of animals per hectare should be seen morein terms of the financing than the environmentalaspects.

INDUSTRY

Tax concessions in industry are receivedespecially by the mineral oil industry, petro-chemicals and the chemical industry. The exemp-tion from the mineral oil tax for running factories(manufacturer’s privilege) in the mineral oil indus-try led to tax shortfalls of DM 250 million in1995, according to the government’s subsidyreport (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 1995;1997). The environmentally harmful mineral oilindustry and also the petrochemical industry—insofar as it operates under identical assumptions—thus receive a competitive advantage overother industries that use heating oil. This taxconcession should thus be changed, for bothenvironmental and competitive reasons. Here,too, Directive 92/81/EEC stands in the way. Theuse of tax-exempt mineral oil as a raw material inthe chemical industry accounted for tax shortfallsof DM 3 billion in 1995 (calculations using themineral oil tax statistics: Federal Statistical Office,1995). This includes light oil, heavy oil, benzol,toluol, xylene, liquid gas, petroleum coke andnatural gas, which, insofar as they are not taxexempt, are assessed at the highest tax rate. Thenon-energy area of mineral oil use poses a par-ticular problem with respect to external costs. Themajor portion of emissions does not occur withinthe manufacturing of products of the chemicalindustry, but only when these products are readyfor disposal. Therefore a change in the tax con-cession for the non-energy area of mineral oil usemust possibly use a tax rate that is below thehighest tax rate.

HOUSEHOLDS

Currently households receive tax preferences inthe form of mileage allowance for travel to workand the reduction in the mineral oil tax ondomestic fuel, a measure enacted for social-policyreasons.

U. TRIEBSWETTER



For years demands have been voiced that themileage allowance be changed to a distance allow-ance that is independent of the means of trans-portation. The current mileage allowance containsthe ecologically counterproductive incentive to

drive the car to work and to tolerate longerdistances as long as the costs for the journey fallbelow the allowance. According to the FederalEnvironmental Agency revenue shortfalls in 1994were DM 3 billion (Umweltbundesamt, 1997).

Table 1. A survey of ecologically counterproductive tax allowances in the German tax system in 1995.

Sectorspecific taxallowance

Criterion forecological harmfulness

Suggestion forchange/reform

Expected budgetary effectof reform suggestion

TransportMineral oil tax exemption forcommercial inland water transport

benefits for (partially) ecologicallyharmful water transport

elimination max. DM 1.5 bill.

Mineral oil tax exemption forkerosene

benefits for ecologically harmfulaircraft use


Tax preference in the mineraloil tax for diesel-powered cars

benefits for production of sootand benzol emissions

use of higher petroltax rate

max. DM 7.9 bill.

Road tax exemption forexcess trailers

benefits for ecologically harmfultransport sector

elimination max. DM 50 mill.

Discretionary valuation ofcommercial ships, oceanfishing vessels and aircraft

benefits for ecologically harmfulwater transport and aircraft use


Unlimited write-off forbusiness cars

benefits for ecologicallyroad transport sector

introduction of upperlimit for write-off

no data available

Total transport min. ca. DM 16.82 bill.

AgricultureRoad tax exemption for farmtractors

incentive for increased use oftractors

elimination max. DM 170 mill.a

Trade tax exemption for farms toa large extent

benefits for agricultural pollution lower limits to thenumber of cattle perhectare

no data available

Property tax exemption to a largeextent

benefits for agricultural pollution lower limits to thenumber of cattle perhectare

max. DM 13 mill.

Total agriculture min. DM 183 mill.

IndustryMineral oil tax exemption forrunning factories

benefits for production andprocessing of mineral oil


Mineral oil tax exemption fornon-energy use of mineral oil

benefits for processing of mineraloil


Total industry max. DM 3.25 bill.

Private householdsMileage allowance benefits for car driving distance allowance

independent of themeans oftransportation

max. DM 3.0 bill.b

Tax concession on mineral oil foruse as a domestic fuel

benefits for use of mineral oil increase of tariff max. DM 23.1 bill.

Total private households max. DM 26.1 bill.

Grand total expectedc ca. DM 46.35 bill.

aAssumption of reduced tariff according to 16th Subsidy Report, 1997.bIn 1994.cRelating to tax allowances where data is available.




There is also a tax concession on mineral oil foruse as a domestic fuel. Gas oil or fuels with asimilar boiling point for the production of elec-tricity, warmth and light and for gas transport orstorage are taxed at a lower tax rate. This taxconcession was made for social-policy reasonssince primarily mineral oil as a domestic fuel is taxreduced. For 1995, based on the mineral oil taxstatistics, tax shortfalls here amounted to anenormous DM 23.1 billion, an amount which isalso not justifiable in social-policy terms. The ca.DM 0.07 tax per litre heating oil introducedin 1989 is a signal for change which is welcomefrom an ecological perspective (Sprenger et al.,1994).

CONCLUSIONS

This study has reached the conclusion that theexisting tax system contains a considerablenumber of environmentally questionable regu-lations that tend to encourage undesirableecological behaviour and that accounted for taxshortfalls of DM 46.35 billion in Germany in1995. Eliminating or changing these regulationswould lead to additional revenue which, however,would not be as high as this shortfall figure due toincome and substitution effects.

An analysis of the individual rulings showedthat only a few economic sectors receive specialtax concessions, but these sectors are particularlyenvironmentally harmful. These sectors includeroad, water and air transport, agriculture andthe mineral oil processing industry and the(petro)chemical industry. To some extent environ-mentally harmful behaviour of private householdsreceives tax concessions.

CONTEXT OF ECOLOGICAL TAXREFORM

The elimination and modification of ecologicallycounterproductive regulations would make a con-tribution both to environmental protection and toderegulating the tax system and making it moretransparent. It would also be the beginning ofbuilding the tax system on ecological foundations.This will of course lead to conflicts, of which amajor concern will be an increase in the tax loadratio. In order to keep this constant, other taxeswould have to be lowered or eliminated. Thiswould also be necessary for cushioning socialhardships. A conceivable solution, for example,would be to eliminate ecologically problematic

gaps in the bases of tax assessment and to use theresulting revenue to help reduce non-wage labourcosts (Vogler-Ludwig, 1996).

The concept of a reduction of ecologicallycounterproductive tax concessions harmonizeswell with the original idea of an ecological taxreform, which at the moment no longer seems tobe a matter of public discussion in Germany (IfoInstitute, 1996).

POLITICAL ECONOMY

Similar to the general debate about subsidyreduction, the main barriers in reducingenvironmentally-damaging tax concessions arepolitical and institutional (Barg, 1996). Many ofthe tax concessions which are listed in this articlewere introduced a long time ago and their originalgoals are no longer valid. Still they are difficult toabolish due to a mix of vested interests fromdiverse parties involved in the political process.Frequently a lack of transparency concerningcosts and effects of tax allowances and also withrespect to winners and losers prevents reform(Welfens, 1997). The general resistance to give uplong-term financial benefits is particularly hard toovercome. Therefore a reduction of tax deferralprogrammes for the betterment of both theeconomy and the environment involves thechallenge to develop the social consensus andthe political will that is necessary for a moresustainable development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This paper is a shorter version of a studyoriginally undertaken on behalf of the FederalMinistry of Economic Affairs in 1994. Since thenthe topic has been pursued independently.

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BIOGRAPHY

Ursula Triebswetter is Research Fellow in theDepartment of Environmental Economics, IfoInstitute for Economic Research, Poschinger-strasse 5, 81679 Munich, Germany. Tel.: +49 899224 1432. Fax: +49 89 985 369. Email address:100064.226 compuserve.com




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Ecologically counterproductive tax concessions in Germany