WorldWarI:TheEasternFront

AsidefromthewarinFrance,themostimportantfrontoftheFirstWorldWarwasthethreecorneredfightbetweenGermany,AustriaHungary,andRussiaontheEasternFront.Intermsofstrategy,theEasternandWesternfrontswereintimatelylinkedeventsontheoneinvariablyeffectedthemilitarysituationontheother.SinceGermanywasfightingonbothfronts,theGermanswereable,atleastintheory,toutilizetheirinteriorlinesofcommunicationandtheirsuperbrailwaysystemtoswitchtroopsbackandforthasneeded.DespitemanyRussiandisasters,despitetheultimateRussiandefeat,thereislittledoubtthatRussiacontributedmuchtothefinalalliedvictory.ItisquitepossibletoargueRussianmilitarymovesintheEastsavedtheFrencharmyinthewestonatleasttwovitallyimportantoccasions.Duringthefirsttwomonthsofthewar,thesurprisingspeedoftheRussianattackonEastPrussiaforcedHelmuthvonMoltketotransfer3fullcorpsofsoldierstotheeastatatimewheneverysoldierwasneededdesperatelyintheWest.ThistrooptransferweakenedtheGermansjustenoughtoallowtheFrencharmytocounterattackMoltkesforcessuccessfullyontheMarne,andthusdefeattheSchlieffenplan.Twoyearslater,attheheightoftheBattleofVerdunduringthesummerof1916,theRussianslaunchedasurpriseattackagainsttheAustrians.TheunexpectedsuccessofthisattackforcedErichvonFalkenhayntorushGermanreservestotheEastonceagaintoplugthegap:ThisdepletedtheGermanreservesattheheightofthebattleofVerdun.FrancewassavedandthemystiqueofFalkenhaynwasonceandforalldiscredited.Buttojudgefromthecharacterofoperationsonthetwofronts,onewould,thinkthetwowarswerefoughtindifferenteras.ThewarintheEastwascharacterizedbyunusualmobilityandsmashing,clearcut,decisivetacticalvictories.IntheEast,therewasevenaroleformassedcavalryinpursuitofretreatingarmies.

Westernersvs.Easterners

ThemostinterestingstrategicdebateoftheentirewasthearguementbetweenWesternersandEasternersintheGermanHighCommand.TheWesternerswerethose,likeErichvonFalkenhayn,whothoughtthatthekeytovictorylayinFrance. TheEasternerswereledbytheteamofHindenburgandLundendorffandtheirnameroussupporterswithinthearmy.Indeed,HindenburgandLudendorffwereenormouslypopularwithinthecountryitself.ColonelMaxvonHoffmannsummeduptheviewpointof theEasternersiinDec.1914,whenhesaidthat: ThemethodofconductingtheWarintheWestterrifiesme.Falkenhaynistheevilangelofourfatherlandand,unfortunately,hehastheKaiserinhispocket.

Inreality,thefinaldecisionlayintheKaisershandsinfact,thiswouldbethemostimportantroleplayedbyKaiserWilliamintheentirewar.HesidedwiththeWesternerslargelybecausehegenuinelylikedErichvonFalkenhaynandbecausehedespisedanddistrustedHindenburgandLudendendorff.Nevertheless,theGermans,forthemostpart,triedtoremainonthedefensiveinthewestwhileamassingarmiesintheeastlargeenoughtoknockRussiaoutofthewar.ThetwoexceptionstothisrulewouldbetheGermanattackonVerdunin1916(whichyouhavereadaboutintheHornebook)andthegreatLudendorffoffensivesofspring1918.OntheGermanside,thegreatpointofcontentionwasalwaysthepreciseweightofmilitarypowerassignedtoeachfront.BecausebothFalkenhaynandtheKaiserwerecautiousandconcernedaboutholdingthelineinFrance,theynevercouldbringthemselvestotakeachanceofstripping

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theWesternFronttoraisealargeenoughforcetodeployintheEast.TheacrimoniousdebatebetweenWesternersandEasternersdividedtheGermangovernmentandarmyformuchofthewar.

TheGermanHighCommandconcludedbluntlyattheendof1915thatnodirectmilitaryapproachcouldbringvictoryagainstGermanysmostpowerfulenemy:GreatBritain. Bythesametoken,noconceivablealliedoffensiveinFranceseemedlikelytooverwhelmtheGermandefenses. Adopting the tactical defensive in theWest meant that theGermans had to devisedefensivetacticseffectiveenoughtocounterthegrowingAlliedsuperiorityinmanpower.Theanswerwastodig,pourconcrete,andworktocreateanevertougherdefensivezone. WouldthisdefensivesysteminFrancepaystrategicdividendsbyfreeingupenoughmenandgunstowin a decisive victory in Russian that would force the Russians to sue for peace? Mosthistorians have condemned Erich von Falkenhayn for his excessive caution, his strategicindecisiveness.Aboveall,Falkenhaynnever tookadvantageofGermanysonegreatstrategicadvantage: the ability to move troops rapidly from West to East to secure a temporarysuperiority. His principlewas to cautiously secure the defenseon both fronts. As the greatBritish strategist SirBasilH.LiddellHartwrote: His actions and hismental attitudewerethoseofacommanderstrivingtowardoffimpendingdefeatratherthanonewhosemightyarmyhadonlymisseddecisivevictorybyahairsbreadth. (Horne,p.33)Inotherwords,Germancommanders,especiallyFalkenhayninthekeyyearsof19151916,wereextremelycompetentoperational leaders, but failed topursueaconsistentandcoherent strategy forvictory.Asweshallsee,HindenburgandLudendorffsharedaninclinationtowardstheoppositeextremethetendencytogambleeverythingononeattack.

Afterthewar,almosteverymilitaryobserverintheAlliedcountriescouldnotunderstandwhyGermanyhadnottakensomerisksintheWestinordertoachieveasuperiorityagainsttheRussiansandpossiblyknockRussiaoutofthewarayearearlier.ThegreatBritishstrategistSirBasilH.LiddellHartargued: If,aftertheMarnein1914,orevenlater,she[Germany]hadadoptedawarpolicyofdefenseintheWest,offenceintheEast,theissueofthewarmightwellhavebeendifferent. (LiddellHart,p.189)WinstonChurchill concurred: Onehalftheeffort,onequarterthesacrifice,lavishedvainlyintheattackonVerdunwouldhaveovercomethedifficultyofthedefectivecommunications[inRussia].Russiamighthavebeenknockedoutofthewarayearearlierevenifshestaggeredon,withthewheatandrawmaterialsoftheUkrainetuckedbeneaththeirbelt,theCentralPowerscouldhaveprolongedthefight,undismayedbytheRoyalNavysblockade.FortunatelyfortheAllies,itwasFalkenhayn,notLudendorff,whoheldthereinsin1916. (Horne,p.35)

Lets turn now to an early and fairly typical exampleofWarfare in the east, the battle ofTannenberginAugust,1914. (BreakdowntheBattle)

Tannenberg:wastypicalofEasternFrontwarfareinmanyimportantrespects:

1. First it demonstrated, that the German army enjoyed a marked superiority over theRussians The Germans were more mobile, better disciplined. They had much moreefficientStaff workandplanningandtheirweaponrywassuperior:

2. ThecampaignsintheeastwereoftencampaignsofmaneuverThefrontwasnotfrozenintothekindofsiegewarfareonagiganticscalethatcharacterizedtheWesternfront.

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3. OntheEasternfront,decisivetacticalvictorieswerepossible:Onehallmarkofatrulydecisivevictoryisalwaysthecaptureoflargenumbersof prisonersatTannenbergforexample,TheGermanscapturedordestroyedSamsonovsentirearmyThesekindsofdecisivetacticalresultswereimpossibletoachieveintheWest

4. Andyet,asintheWest,eventhemostdramatictacticalvictorieslikeTannenbergcouldnotanddidnotleadtoastrategicdecisiontheRussianslostmoremenatTannenbergthantheFrenchdidatSedanin1870,yetthewardraggedon.

Whywasthisso?HerearethreefactorsthatimpactedGermanandRussianarmiesontheEasternFront:Geography,Sociopoliticalproblems,andTechnologicalgapsbetweentheopposingforces.

Geography

IntheWest,thefrontextendedabout450milesoveranareawithrollinghills,manyrivers,manyforests,andfirmchalkysoil.UndertheconditionsoftheFirstWorldWar,Francewasgooddefensiveground.Inaddition,theWesternfrontwasmannedbyverylargeopposingarmieswellover10,000,000menonbothsides.ThesoldiersontheWesternfront,for themostpart,werewelltrainedandwellequippeddrafteesandvolunteersrepresentingmodernindustrializedsocieties.Thiscombinationofmen,equipmentandgeographywereidealforthedevelopmentofthemostsophisticateddefensivepositionsinthehistoryofwarfare.However,intheEastthesituationwasverydifferent.Thefrontwasmuchmorefluidandthedistancesinvolved,werevast.ThefrontextendedfromtheBalticSeasouthtotheCarpathianmountains,thenEasttotheCaucasusmountainsall toldadistanceofnearly1800miles!Inotherwords,theEasternFrontwasnearly4timesaslongasthefrontinFrance.Therewerefarmoresoldiersintheeast,about15,000,000menbuttherearestillnotenoughmentoholdtheFrontinacontinuous,unbrokenseriesofdefensivesystems.Ingeneral,thesoldiersintheeastfoughtwithoutthedegreeofmassedartillerysupportthatcharacterizedthewarinFrance.Furthermore,thelanditselfwasnotsuitablefordefensivewarfare,muchoftheterritoryinvolvedwasflatplainsbrokenbyoccasionallargeriversandpineforests.Thislandwasidealforcavalryoperationsbuthardtohold. UnlikeFrance,whereadefensivelinecouldbeanchoredbytheChannelandtheAlps,therewerenogeographicfeaturesuponwhichtobaseadefense.ThesoilitselfintheEasttendstobesandyandmuchlesssuitedforearthworksandtrenches.

TwoofthethreearmiesinvolvedintheEasternFrontsufferedfromgraveinternalandpoliticalweaknesses.AnoffensiveagainsteithertheRussiansortheAustrianshadfarmorechanceofsuccessthananattackagainsttheGermans.

TheRussianArmy

TheImperialRussianarmycouldmustermillionsofsoldiers,oftenpoorlytrainedbymodernstandards,butremarkablybraveandobedient.InthewordsofJohnKeegan: TheRussianofficercorpsunitedtwoclasseswhichscarcelykneweachother,abroadmassofcompanyandbattalioncommandersthattookordersfromanarrowuppercrustofaristocrats.(Keegan,p.141) TheImperial Russianmilitarysystemwascharacterizedbyfavoritism,

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corruptionandinefficiencyandnoneofthesefactorschangedforthebetterduringthewar.AsaresulttheRussiansoldierwasusuallyhungrierandequippedwithfewerandpoorerweaponsthanhisGermanopponents.ThehighestofficersoftheRussianarmyoftenwereincompetentswhogainedtheirpostthroughinfluenceatCourt.RussianStaffandorganizationalworkwasleftinthehandsofincompetentsaswell.Evenduringthewar,theStaffCollegewasclosedforuptoofeachmonthforholidays.Despitetheseobviousdisadvantages,theRussianArmybeganthewarwithasenseofconfidence.NumbersaloneseemedtoindicatethatGermanfearsoftheRussianarmyhadasolidbasis.InAugust1914,RussiainvadedEastPrussiawith98infantrydivisionsand37fulldivisionsofcavalry! (Ibid)

TheAustrianArmy

InsomewaysthesituationwasfarworseintheAustrianarmy.However,theAustrianmilitarysystemwassomewhatbetterthantheRussianarmyifonlybecausethecommandstructurewaslargelystaffedbyGermans.About75%ofallofficerswereGerman!TheordinarysoldierwearingtheuniformofFranzJosefsarmymightbePolish,Italian,Czech,Slovakian,orHungarian.Moretothepoint,hemightnowevenspeakGerman,theofficiallanguageofthearmyandthegovernment.ThearmyofAustriaHungaryisacasestudyoftheeffectsofethnicdifferencesonmilitaryeffectiveness.In1914,theAustrianarmywasawelterofdifferentandoftendisaffectedethnicgroups.ManyAustriansoldiersfeltmoreofasenseofsolidaritywiththeenemythanwiththeirGermanspeakingofficers.AsJohnKeeganputsit:

Oftheninelanguagegroupsofthearmy,44%wereSlav(Czech,Slovak,Croatian,Serb,Slovene,Ruthenian,PolishandBosnianMuslim,28%German,18%Hungarian,8%Rumanian and 2% Italian. The Germans were always dependable the Hungarians,privilegedcoequals,remainedreliableuntildefeatstaredthemintheface,theCatholicCroats had a long recordof loyalty to the empire, thePoles, hating theRussianswereloyal.Oncewarceasedtobeabriefadventure,theAustrianarmybecameforitssoldiersaprisonof thenationswiththeubiquitousGermanofficersactingas jailers. (Ibid,p.156)

Thedeepethnicdifferencesthatdividedtheempiressocietydivideditsarmyaswell theneteffectofallthiswasthatdesertionbecameagiganticproblemfortheAustrianarmy.ThepowerofNationalismcanbeadisruptiveforceaswellasacohesiveforcewithinanarmy.By1915,GeneralLudendorffcouldcomplainthattheGermanarmywasshackledtoacorpse. Inotherwords,Germanyhadaveryunreliableally.ThisaccountsforthefactthattheAustrianarmyoftendidnotfightverywellandindefeathadatendencytodissolvewithlargenumbersofprisonersdesertingtotheRussians.ToethnicminoritiesliketheCzechs:desertionbecamealmostapatrioticduty

Technological

PerhapsthemostimportantsinglereasonwhythewarintheeastwasmoremobilewastheimmenseGermansuperiorityoverRussiaintechnology.ThistechnologicalgapbetweentheGermanandRussianarmieswassoextremethattheEasternFrontwouldhavesomeofthe

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characteristicsofColonialwarfare.TheGermanswerealmostalwayssuccessfulwhenandwheretheychosetoattack,unliketheWesternFrontwheretheGermansfacedarmiesassophisticatedastheirown.ThetechnicalbackwardnessoftheRussianarmywasstaggeringesp.whencombinedwiththeirinadequaciesofcommand,communicationsandsupply.In1914,theRussianarmywasequippedwith7batteriesoffieldartilleryineachdivisionwhiletheGermanshave14batteries.TheentireRussianarmyhadonly6Obatteriesofheavyartillery(gunsover150mm),theGermanarmyhad381.Onetimein1915,when theGermansconcentrated200heavygunsagainsttheRussianThirdarmy Theycouldonlymuster4heavygunsinresponse.Tactically,thissuperiorityinheavyweaponsmeantthattheGermanscouldlay down oneofthefamousCreepingbarragesthatwouldliterallyprotecttheirattackinginfantrybehindawallofmovingexplosionsandprojectthemintoandthroughtheRussiantrenches.

ThesituationforsmallarmswasevenworsetheRussianarmyhadonly650,000modernrifles in 1915 and over 10,000,000men. There are many accounts of Russian units sent intoattacks unarmed themenwere told to takeweapons from their dead andwounded.Even iftherehadbeenenough rifles togoaround, theywould still have faced theproblemof findingammunition. The Russians Faced catastrophic shortages of ammunition throughout the War.Duringthefirstyearofthewar,Russianindustrywasonlyabletoproduce550millionroundsofsmallarmsammothearmywasexpending250millionroundspermonth.

Duetothesefactors,theGermanarmywasusuallyabletosmashthroughtheRussiandefenseswitheaseasituationunknownontheWesternfront.

BoththeGermansandtheRussiansthemselveswerewellawareoftherelativebackwardnessoftheRussian armytheRussianstriedtocompensatefortheirtechnicalinferioritybydesigningtheirtacticstomakeuseoftheirgreatestasset:Manpower.Russiansoldiershavelongbeenfamousfortheirdoggedpersistence,theirstolidwillingnesstoendurephysicalhardships,andtheirunquestioningcourage.ButthishadalwaysbeenRussia'sprincipalmilitaryasset alongwiththealmostlimitlessterritorialexpanseofWesternRussia.Russiacanusuallytradespacefortimeandweardownanyattacker.Thesefactorsin1812,alongwiththeRussianwinter,explainwhyRussiawassuchaformidableopponenttoNapoleonBonaparte.Butthismanpowerwasmuchlessofanadvantageinthetechnologicalclimateof1914.TheGermanarmy,equippedrichlywithartillery,magazineriflesandmachinegunswereeasilyabletooffsetthetraditionalRussianadvantageofnumbers.UnfortunatelyfortheRussians,theGermantacticalsuperiorityinweaponsandmobilityproved,decisive.ButunfortunatelyfortheGermans,noteventhissuperiorityproveddecisiveeenoughtobringaboutastrategicvictorythatwouldknockRussiaoutofthewar.TheGermanarmywasamagnificentmilitarymachine.TheGermanswerewellarmed,welltrainedandsuppliedbyanextensiveRRsystem.InthecommandteamofPaulv.Hindenburg,ErichLudendorff,andMaxv.Hoffmann,theGermansclearlyhadthebestoperationalcommandersofthewar.HowdidRussiaendure? Onceagain,thesimpleanswerliesinthefactthatGermanyhadtofightatwofrontwarandtheGermangeneralstaffcouldnotagreeonhowtoconcentrateenoughforcesintheEasttowinastrategicvictory.DuetotheneverendingdemandsformoremenandgunsfortheWesternfront,therewereneverenoughmenandmaterialavailablefortheeast.Intheeventofatacticalvictoryorbreakthrough,therewereneverenoughreservesavailabletoexploitthebreakthrough andpushontowardsMoscow.

TheFirstWorldWarwasarailwaywar.IthadlongbeenaGermanstrategytousetherailwaytomovelargenumberofmentotheflanks,orevenbehindtheflanksoftheenemyat

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thebeginningofawar.ThisstrategyledtovictoriesagainstAustriain1866andFrancein1871.Italmostworkedagainintheformof SchlieffenPlanin1914.ButtheGermanswereunable toexploit theRussian railwaysystem topulloff somethingsimilar.The reason forthiswas theFrenchadvisorswhohelpedRussia build theirmilitary railroads in the1890smade sure thatGermany could not have easy access to the net in case of a quick victory.Duringconstructionof theRussian railroads, theRussiansdeliberatelychose tobuild theirrailroads on on a different guage in other words, Russian railroads were wider than thestandard European guage. This meant that the Germans would be unable to use theirlocomotivesandrollingstock inRussia.AsaresultofallthisistheemergenceofdistinctmilitarypeckingorderontheEasternfront,butthistoo leadstoastrategicstalemate.

1. TheGermanarmyrepeatedlyprovesabietosmashtheRussiandefencesandpushthemoacktothelimitsofGermansupplies,communicationsandendurance.

2. The Russians are vastly inferior to the Eermans, but extremely stubborn andperservering. More importantly, Russian manpower reserves are sufficient toreplace even the heaviest losses. And finally, after 1916 the Russian supplysituationbeginstoimprove.

3. TheAustrianarmyismuchbetterequippedthantheRussianbutsuffersfromethnicliabilitiesevenmorecripplingthantheRussians.TheAustrian armyisfallingapartfromwithinintoitscomponentnationalities.