Vol. IV, No. 5

September 1970

EAST-WESTcontoctaA "BimoidMy Review

International Documentation andInformation Centre (Interdoc)The Hague - Van Stolkweg 10

Netherlands

The purpose of 1NTERDOC is to promotea better and wi der knowledge of East-West problems, through the exchange ofdocumentation and information.

INTERDOC specialises in the collectionof information, the preparation anddissemination of periodicals and specialstudies, and the organisation of confer-ences. !

Editor:EditorialThe

AnnualPer copy: GuiliSuggested ways1. postal cheque

number 633695, INetherlands

2. international

C O N T E N T S

IDEOLOGYSoviet Criticism of the Convergence Theory lThe Theology of Violence 7Party Theoreticians vs. Sociologists 13

POLITICSBrandt's Historie Initiative 19Chancellor Brandt's Eastern Policy 22Standard-Bearers of Beaction in West Germany 28New Encouraging Trends in Europe 30Proposals for Agenda of All-European Conference 35Thirty Years of Soviet Bule in the Baltic States 39Dubcek — What they can't forgive him for 44Politica! Accounting in Czechoslovakia 47The Glas s Enemy — The Boot of all Evil 50Arms and the (Bussian) Child 52Struggle to Begain its Feet 54Fidel Admits it, Faith is not Enough 58

ECONOMICS

Economie Co-operation 62Soviet Foreign Trade in 1969 64End of Enterprise Councils 67Bussia Grants ICL Special Trading Status 68The Appeal of Management Consultants 69

CULTURE

French Film on Stalinism in CzechoslovakiaEnthusiastically Beceived in Yugoslavia 73The Mind-Changers 79The New Concept of Sociology 82Beethoven in the GDB 84Brodyagi - Hoodlums a la USSB 85Soviet Historians Préparé for International Congress 87

I DE O LOG Y

SOVIET CRITICISM OF THE CONVERGENCE THEORY

Fedir S. Hayenko

(Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, 7-7-'70)

Summary: Party criticism of the theory that capitalismand communism (personified by the United States andthe Soviet Union )are developing along converging pathsin the new technological age has been intens ified inrecent years. The Soviet public is deliberately kept inthe dark about the true nature of thls process and ispresented with only one side of the argument, but itis less easy for the Kremlin to prevent top scientists,who are the spearhead of the technological revolution,from speaking their minds.

During the past five or six years in the Soviet Union there hasbeen much criticism of the theory that the world's two majorsocial, economie and political systems -- capitalism andcommunism — are moving along converging paths. Objectionshave been voiced by professional journalists, economists,philosophers, prominent historians such as A. Galkin and theleading Party theoreticians A. Rumyantsev and M. Mitin.

The opponents of the "convergence theory" appear to beattacking an unseen enemy, because works supporting the theoryare slmply not published. Consequently, the broad mass of theSoviet population has no means of acquainting itself with thepros and cons of the theory apart from the biased accounts of itsdetractors. In the Soviet Union the convergence theory isofficially regarded as the most subtle anti-communist weaponand the campaign to discredit it, usually conducted at a purelypropaganda rather than an impartial scientific Ie vel, is beingstepped up.

Convergence as a socio-political concept arose during the1950s. In natural science it signifies a similarity in the sub-stance or functions of organisms only distantly related to oneanother in origin which comes about under the influence ofsimilar environmental conditions. Sociology and economicsadopted this term to describe the process by which Westerncapitalism and Eastern communism (personified by the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union) are drawing closer together witha possible fusion at some point in the future. The term first

l

- 2 -

came into use in the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s, prior to whichthere had been talk only of a theory of synthesis or hybridizationof the capitalist and socialist systems.

Many scientists regard the struggle between rival ideologiesas the main source of present international tension. It is, theysay, the real obstacle to world stabüity and peaceful competitionbetween opposing systems because every ideology is basically anunscientific justification of a given social order. Now, however,it is not the spectre of communism which is haunting Europebut the technological revolution which looms before the worldand is unfolding independently of ideology. The struggle betweentwo opposing ideologies is merely an obstacle to this developmentand therefore obsolete. Hence the present talk of dismantlingideologies, a concept arrived at earlier by political economists.

Critical situations are now arising in both the capitalist andthe socialist systems in eqoal mëasure. Neither system approvesof the classical market economy and modern economie theoryconsiders the ideal solution tö bë ei mixed economy with a more 'extensive socialized sector than at piresent common in the Westand more importance attached to the private sector than is thécase in the Soviet bloc. In other wórds, what is needed is asynthesis of capitalist efficiency and socialist eqoality. This isindeed the trend. In the West, pressuré lor gréatèr economieefficiency is leading to more centralized planning and statemanagement, while for the same reasons thé Soviet bloc is re-ducing the amount of centralized planning and state interferencein the running of the economy.

In certain important respects both systems are bècotaingincreasingly alike: they have the same technology and similareconomie problems regarding capital investment, labor product-ivity, material incentives, etc. They are experiencing the samescientific and technological revolution and, mastering their ownindividual problems and adopting positive features of the othersystem, are moving in the same direction of optimal efficiencyleading to social and economie standardization. The economistsand sociologists who are studying this procèss see an increasingnumber of common features and believè that a new sócio-economicsystem, superior to capitalism and socialism or communism,is in the making.

The convergence theory, therefore, points to the direction in

- 3 -

which modern man is evolving, and a prominent Soviet economist,E. Br egel, admits, although with reservations, that this theorycorresponds to present realities (Sovremennye burzhuaznyeteorii o sliyanii kapitalizma i sotsializma (ContemporaryBourgeois Theories on the Merging of Capitalism and Socialism),Moscow, 1970, p. 62).

In a comparatively short space of time the convergence theoryhas also found wide acceptance in the countries of Asia, Africaand Latin America among leading economists, sociologists,politicians and scientists. Even in the West, however, it is nota single, uniform theory, having been modified according towhether it is applied to the natural and social sciences, art,philosophy, etc. Nor is there unanimous agreement about thenature of the convergence. An American professor, G. Griffin,believes it is only the Soviet Union that is developing in thedirection of the United States, while most experts maintain thatboth systems are drawing closer to one another and differ onlyin the principal motivation behind this development. The Frenchscientist and publicist, M. Duverger, is confident that theUnited States and Western Europe will never become communistbecause, as a result of inevitable pro.cesses of liberalization with-in the East bloc and progressive socialism in the West, bothsystems will arrive at a single democratie socialism. HerbertMarcuse, a stern critic of both capitalism and socialism, seesno future for either of these systems.

In the Soviet Union the convergence theory is officially reject-ed on principle. It is unacceptable because communists believèthat mankind is predetermined to turn to communism and toacknowledge the convergence theory would be an admission thatthe Soviet socialist system is not evolving towards the left inthe direction of communism but towards the right in the directionof capitalism. It would also be an admission that moderncapitalism is capable of reforming itself and not doomed to ex-tinction as Marxism-Leninism teaches. The Party leaders wantto limit the spread of this theory at all costs and it is hardlysurprising, therefore, that Soviet experts misrepresent it as anunscientific theory based on facts which "falsely reflectobjectively existing phenomena and processes" (ibid., p. 25).Soviet supporters of the convergence theory are said to ex-aggerate the advantages of capitalism and to caricature thesocialist countries, while a well-known Soviet economist,

- 4 -

V. Cheprakov, claims that "objectively the concept of asynthesis of the two systems is an attempt to achieve two endssimultaneously: to find a sense of purpose for capitalism and toweaken the attraction of socialism" (ibid., p. 132). Sovietauthors allege that "bourgeois ideologists" are unable to advanceideas capable of attracting wide support and are therefore obligedto poach socialist ideas to give their own worn-out concepts afresh flavor palatable to the masses. They maintain that formerly,when faith in capitalism was unshaken, there was no thought ofacknowledging the viability of the socialist system let alone talkof converging with it. And Kommunist. the theoretical organ ofthe Party Central Committee, states: "Obviously this apparent'doctrine' compromise is being concocted by the ideologists ofimperialism not from the goodness of their hearts, but has beenproduced by the immense rise in the popularity of socialism inthe international arena" (No. 4, 1970, p. 124).

The scientific and technological revolution began in the West,however, and was imported later into the Soviet Union, which isstill forced to go shopping in the West for the most modern plantand patents but has no equivalent to offer in exchange. Thiscannot be concealed in the Soviet Union and thus experts mustpublicly answer questions such as: "How did it happen that theimperialist system, a decaying system, the entire economieand political life of which experiences the oppressive weight ofthe monopolies, has expanded opportunities for the applicationof the achievements of science and technology in production"(Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye. No. 8, 1969, p. 31).G. Frantsov, a leading specialist on the history of ideology, hasa ready answer to this question. The existence of a socialistsociety, hè says, for ces the monopolies to continually stimulatetechnological advance because otherwise they would be overtakenby the socialist world (ibid., pp. 31-32).

Criticism of the convergence theory is now one of the mostimportant tasks of Soviet propaganda, even though this tbeoryis said to be far-fetched and based on distortion of facts.Bumyantsev and Mitin war n that although the arguments ofbourgeois ideologists hold no water in practice they must stillbe carefully analysed and "skilfully refuted" (Pravda, September16, 1969). V. Cheprakov was even more specific:

This compels criticism of the theory of convergence,

- 5-

which possesses a certain virulence, from the positionof creative Marxism, which explains facts and is ableto penetrate deeply into phenomena. This is why old,fossilized notions, which do not embrace new phenomena,are unable to assist in revealing the bankruptcy of thetheory of convergence, which operates with specific facts.(Sovremennye burzhuaznye teorii o sliyanli kapitalizma isotsialiszma, op. cit., p. 133)

Soviet critics of the theory point to an unbridgeable gulfbetween private property in the West and socialized or stateproperty in the USSR, and claim that there is increasing ex-ploitation of the workers in the West and a total absence of thisexploitation in the USSR. But not all communists consider thatproperty in the Soviet Union is owned by all the people. In atextbook entitled "Political Economy", published in Yugoslaviain the late 1950s, M. Perovic said that "state property is notthe property of the whole nation" and that "socialism and the state,and also socialism and state property are two opposed and in-compatible concepts" (G.I. Zinchenko, Kritika sovremennogorevizionizma v oblasti politicheskoy ekonomii (A critique ofContemporary Revisionism in the Field of Political Economy,Moscow 1959, p. 55). The same applies to the exploitation oflabor, which is said not to exist in the Soviet Union because themeans of production are in the hands of the workers themselves.In fact they are controlled by the state, and as far as theappropriation of the surplus product is concerned the Sovietstate takes a larger cut than any industrially developed countryin the West.

The weak spot in Soviet criticism of the convergence theoryis that, unlike their counterparts in the West, Soviet expertsmust view the future prospects of modern capitalism and worldsocialism through the eyes of Marx, Engels and Lenin, whoprovide no answer s to many contemporary problems. Sovietcritics must also adhere to the propaganda line which the Partyconsiders it opportune to put out at a given moment and evensuch prominent figures as Eumyantsev and Mitin can find nomore sophisticated argument than that

the theory of "convergence" serves as a kind of pseudo-scientific basis for making tactical advances towards

l

- 6 -

individual socialist countries in order to "build bridges"and "dig trenches" and, with the aid of a "silent counter-revolution", to wrench these countries from the socialistcommonwealth, restore capitalism in them and under-mine the power of world socialism. (Pravda, October13, 1969).

There is good reason to believe that the convergence theoryenjoys considerable support in thinking circles in the SovietUnion, especially among the higher technical intelligentsia. A.Sakharov's famous pamphlet "Beflections on Progress, PeacefulCo-existence and Intellectual Freedom'Vpublished illegally in theSoviet Union, is proof that its author firmly believes in thetheory and is expounding views held by many scientists. Anappeal by Sakharov, V. Turchin and B. Medvedev to Brezhnev,Kosygin and Podgorny, critically analysing the condition of theSoviet economy and pleading for further extension of the economiereform on Western lines, recently became known outside theSoviet Union. Earlier, in 1968, a Soviet critic, V. Shchebin,also stated that many artists and cultural workers favor a"single stream" in art and deplore the distinction between"bourgeois" and "proletarian" or "socialist" culture ;

(Literaturnaya gazeta, October 30, 1968, pp. 4-5).In 1969, the leading Soviet physicist, Peter Kapitsa, visited

the United States. In a lecture to the National Academy ofSciences in Washington on October 8, 1969, hè expressed hisbelief in the concept of convergence and also praised Sakharov'smemorandum. His speech was reported the following day inThe New York Times but ignored by the Soviet press. Severaldays later, however, Pravda published a long article byBumyantsev and Mitin entitled "Current Questions of the StruggleAgainst Anti-Communism" which, although it did not mention.Kapitsa by name, ean be considered a reply to his speech in theUnited States. The article stressed that ".... the chief assign-ment of anti-communism is.... the creation of such socialistdoctrines which could serve as a counterbalance to Marxismand prove the possibility of a non-communist path of developmentfor human society" (October 13, 1969).

Kapitsa's speech in the United States is thus regarded as amanifestation of anti-communism. The article by two leadingParty theoreticians was directed not so much at Kapitsa himself,

-l -

however, as at all those who consider the convergence theoryworthy of attention and for whom Kapitsa, taking advantageof a visit abroad, was acting as spokesman.

THE THEOLOGY OF VIOLENCEJulio Lobos(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, 20-6-'70)

In answer to the question as to whether a "theology ofviolence" is really being advocated by a sector of the BomanCatholic Church in Latin America to justify social violence asa method of revolution, a pro-clerical, right-wing journal,minimizing the importance of this phenomenon, deplored what itregarded as an unhappy expression taken by a small group ofclerics, and explained that in the present situation, when socialrealities are removed from the social Christian doctrine basedon justice and equity, tendency appears for the establishmentof a social-Christian state by means of a violent revolution.Quoting statements made by the head of the Boman CatholicChurch and some of his encyclicals, the journal naturally suggeststhat it is the wrong road which in its opinion bodes no good for themission of Christianity, nor for that matter for the oppressedclasses of society. The journal does not mention, however, thatthe priests and monks who preach this "theology of violence" donot question their religion but rather seek to revalorize andimplement the Christian dogmas on social justice, which in theiropinion are best expressed in today's world by the socialistthought in the broadest sense of the word.

One might well wonder how this phenomenon could arise on acontinent which is so completely Boman Catholic, and withinan institution which, no less than the conquering regiments,helped establish a social order which it has for centurieszealously defended as its most select ideological vanguard.

As a result of the three hundred years' colonization by Spainand Portugal, the countries of Latin America inherited not onlysome important elements of the cultural tradition of the colonizersbut also two economie and politically dominant social forces- first the landed oligarchy and later the export-import bour-geoisie elosely linked by trade with foreign monopolies. Theentry of foreign capital, first British and then American which

- 8 -

became dominant, determined the one-crop nature of the LatinAmerican economies. But in spite of its large natural resources,Latin America has remained underdeveloped as a continent,and very unevenly developed from one country to the next. Al-though the average national income per capita is around 350dollars, it is distributed extremely unevenly. Some five per centof the population have an income higher than 200 dollars, whereasone half earn less than 120 dollars. Yet in many of these countries,one fifth of one per cent of the nation (the well-known rulinggroups of a dozen rich families) have an income that is severalhundred times greater than the population as a whole, whichillustrates the unbelievably deep social differences. Thesediffereuces are rooted in an unequitable land ownership patternwhich permits two per cent of the population to hold more thanfour fifths of arable land in all of Latin America. The fact thatthe differences among countries in per capita national incomerange up to 12 times as high needs no comment. On the otherhand, however, by concentrating on the lucrative extractiveactivities and trade, the American and other Western capitalsnot only make a three dollar profit for every dollar invested, butalso retard the development of Latin American national economiesby making them increasingly dependent. The situation in thesector of commerce is particularly difficult in view of the prob-lems of the prices of raw materials and services, which resultin an annual deficit in the balance of payments running toseveral milliard dollars. Therefore, the large landholders, whoare not particularly interested in modernizing agriculture evenwithin the framework of a capitalist system, and Americancapital are the main culprits for the slow and very unevendevelopment of this continent. The living conditions for themajority of the population are extremely bad, because of eco-nomie stagnation, deficit, indebtedness, lack of capital, smallinvestments and constant inflation. Since in almost half thecountries not even the necessary minimum calories in the diet areattained, and shanties of mud, cardboard or tin - the notoriousfavelas, villas miserias, barriadas, etc make up more thanhalf of the available housing, the undernourishment of thepopulation and the housing shortage are serious problems ofthis region, whose picture is made even more wretched by highmortality, particularly among children, and illiteracy whichinvolve on the average one third of the population. Of course all

- 9-

this is linked with the problem of acute unemployment, orunderemployment, and a very limited system of social securitywhich according to some estimates only covers one fifth ofthe economically active population. The unbroken chain ofpolitical instability, social upheavals and unrest, politicalclashes and conflicts ranging from the method of democratiedialogue to the method of armed action, are the natural conse-quences of such activity.

The Roman Catholic Church in Latin America, as in the restof the world, which for centuries has been a solid ideologicalbulwark and patron of the existing social orders, has recentlytried to make an about-face and to consider the problems of thesituation which is giving rise to the "theology of violence". Theseefforts are also partially the result of certain circumstancesand factors which, at least so far as this region is concerned,have had a negative effect on the church as an institution. Theforemost problem is that of rejuvenating the clerical ranks.Every year this problem becomes more acute, as the number ofcandidates for the seminaries steadily dwindles. To make mattersworse, an enormous majority of students, even as many as fourfifths, drop out of seminary during the course of studies, and thisnumber usually contains the most able and promising students.The papal Curia is therefore compelled to fill the gaps by sendingpriests and monks from Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy). But inspite of these measures, the Church leadership continues to beconcerned by the fact that although every third Roman Catholicin the world is a Latin American, this continent accounts foronly one tenth of the total clerical staff in the world. The sizablepresence of foreigners (in some countries the ratio of foreignto native born priests is as much as four fifths, while foreignmonks account for half of all the monks in Latin America) causesnew problems and difficulties for the mission of the Church. Bythe very fact that they are foreigners, the newly arrived priestshave less feeling for the problems of the country, particularlysocial problems, whereas native born priests are as a rulemore liberal and more radical. On the other hand, as a resultof time-honoured tradition, the social order and the closedschool system which favour the rich, most of the high clergyof Latin America still cling to their conservative views, in spiteof the attempts by the liberal wing to adapt the Church to modernneeds as soon as possible.

- 10 -

The division into the liberal and conservative wings springsfrom the differences on how to change the church and its dogmasinstltutionally, and how far to go in changing the obsolete socio-economic structures. The lower clergy who are in direct contactwith the broad masses have the image of the most desperatepoverty constantly before their eyes. Of course they participatein various charitable organizations under the auspices of theChurch and initiate many humanitarian projects, but all thistaken together appears to them as a mere drop in the ocean ofpoverty and destitution. Consequently, they have been dis-illusioned by the stereotyped sermon to the rich to be generous,and to the poor to be humble, because it does not give thedesired results. This is why there have been various attemptswithin the liberal wing to find a way to distribute the nationalincome more equitably, which means to establish social justice,which is still far from becoming a reality. Thus the idea ofexerting pressure on the ruling circles began to take root. Thisidea, very broadly conceived, has already taken on very diverseforms of action.

One of the most popular currents in the liberal wing of theRoman Catholic Church is that represented by H. Camara,Bishop of the Brazilian town of Eecife, whose movement of"moral and liberal pressure" is nevertheless opposed to violence.In fact this current advocates ideas of a strong reformist pro-gramme involving structural changes in the present social andeconomie system, which can only be carried out by socialismadapted to Latin American conditions. The importance and moralstrength of this trend is not only because ït is championed by ahigh official in the Church's hierarchy, but because its deepcriticism of the present state of affairs is the expression of thebroadest and most progressive circles within the clergy. Thestudy of the difficult social situation and its representation inits true colours has become the preoccupation of the day. Itseems that there is a rather broad agreement as to the objectof creating a new society, which wül be non-capitalist and basedon social justice. It is interesting to note that a certain numberof the lower clergy hold the view that in an established socialistsociety with developed self-management there is no need for theexistence of the Church as an institution, where faith wouldacquire a different role and retain the same significance. Whereas

- 11 -

there is much unanimity about the first phase, the studying andportraying of the real situation, there are several variantsconcerning the second phase. Thus there is rather widespreadendorsement for violence as a method of action. It arose out ofdemands for social justice, making a clear distinction betweenthe violence of the rich who rule and the justified violence ofthe oppressed, and insisting on the recognition of the rights ofthe people to legitimate self-defence and to every method whichwould promote their emancipation and the abolition of oppressionand exploitation. This is what is popularly called the violenceof "hunger, poverty and backwardness". Violence has thustheoretically gained acceptance, although there is a variety ofopinions and even movements on how it should be implemented.Many would go no further than the theoretical justification ofviolence, while others think that they should actively join inworkers' and student demonstrations. Still others try topersuade the military about the need for far-reaching reforms,even by over-throwing the existing multiparty parliamentaryrégime, the institutional mechanism of government in the capi-talist system. The most radical ones even consider guerrilla,the most outstanding example being Roman Catholic priestCamillo Torres who was killed some years ago in the mountainsof Colombia. Since the urban guerrillas have gained ground, agood portion of the clergy and monks assist them or even becomedirectly involved, as witnessed by some facts recently come tolight particularly in Brazil and Uruguay.

The fact is that the Roman Catholic clergy in Latin Americahave been swept up by a strong wave of different ideological,and primarily reformist currents. The well-known papalencyclical, "Popularum progressie", has been given variousinterpretations, one of which e. g. allows the organization ofarmed rebellion because the peaceful means which were pre-viously advocated had ceased to be effective. Thus the so-called"underground church" has come onto the scène as a protagonistof violence and represents a threat, but for some also a promise.However, all these currents resulting from the ideologicalcrisis within the Church have been more or less spontaneous.They first erupted into sight at the time of the EucharistieCongress the year before last in Bogota in the presence and withthe direct participation of the Pope himself, who was delugedwith dozens of petitions, declarations and resolutions sent by often

!\

- 12 -

as many as several hundreds of priests from the entire continent.The theme "Christianity and Violence" became a frequent topicof discussion in various forums and even congresses, both ofadvocates and opponents of violence. What organized formsthese movements will take, if they take any at all, and whatsocial forces they will rely on is hard to teil in view of thetraditionally strict discipline and hierarchical subordinationwithin the Church. Some movements have already appeared, ofwhich the "Movement of Priests of the Third World" has a veryindicative name. Those whose activities send them to prison, orwho are victimized in other ways, evoke the early days ofChristianity and thus give rise to large new problems, puttingCburch authorities in the delicate position of having to act intheir defence. This in turn inevitably leads to frequently seriouscrises in the relations between the Church and State, which insome countries are taking on very alarming aspeets.

The governing circles in all countries are obviously vitallyinterested in condemning any violence as a method of solvingsocial and other problems. In this they enjoy direct support ofthe high clergy, who teil the advocates of the "theology ofviolence" to concern themselves first of all with the "moralpart" of the life of the people, and leave the material side oflife to the politieians. Whereas some priests gladly take onthe label of "rebels" or "revolutionaries", in these warningsthey are called objects or victims of "communist infiltration".The Church authorities state in no uncertain terms that it is : .unacceptable for the clergy to hold a Bible in onë hand and amachine gun in the other, forgetting incidentally that theirpredecessors almost five centuries before had conquered a newcontinent under the banner, deposed the Indian states andmercilessly wiped out their civilizations.

A great unrest among the masses, which are seeking waysof a faster development and solutions to social inequalities andvarious contradictions that have accumulated for years, hascaught up the whole of Latin America. The most articulatespokesmen of this unrest are representatives of the lower clergy,who are putting forward demands for radical changes. Theirdesires reflect ideological f er ment within a very dynamic, in-ventive, but unfortunately disunited poUtical left. These desiresconstitute an attempt to start a centuries-old institution, enslaved

- 13 -

by its own dogmas and bound by an almost blind obedience, onthe path of reform more rapidly and effectively than it has beendoing its elf and to adapt it to the new, contemporary needs ofsociety.

PARTYTHEORETICIANS VS. SOCIOLOGISTS(Radio Free Europe Eesearch, 24-7-'70)

Summary: The USSR Institute for Empirical SocialResearch of the Academy of Sciences was founded tothe accompaniment of Party support; a broad propagandacampaign and great hopes expressed in its futureaccomplishments. It was supposed to become a clearinghouse for the investigations, heretofore scattered amongvarious institutions, in the field of empirieal sociology.However, after only a few months the Institute becameembroiled in a deep conflict involving Party ideologists,philosophers, and economists. A report was publishedrecently on a conference called by the Academy of SocialSciences of the CPSU CC at which the attitudes of somesoeiologists, incompatible to the Party line, werediscussed. The following paper deals with this report.

On 20-24 November 1969, a conference took place at theAcademy of Social Sciences of the CC of the CPSU, dealing withthe "Lessons on Sociology" written by Yu. A. Levada, a doctorof philosophical sciences. Professor Levada's lectures weredelivered for the most part in 1967 and had already been publish-ed in the "Information Bulletin" of the Scientific Council of theAcademy of Sciences of the USSR in two volumes. The attemptwas then made at the newly-founded Institute for EmpiricalSocial Research of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to usethese "lessons" as a sort of foundation for all Soviet sociology.This plan provoked the resistance of Party ideologists withina short period of time and led to the convocation of the above-mentioned conference. The meeting did not take place at theInstitute itself but rather at the Academy for Social Sciencesof the Central Committee of the CPSU. A report has just appeared. *

* V. E. Kozlovskij and Yu. A. Sychev "Obsuzhdenie kursalekcii Yu. A. Levady po sociologii", in Filosofskie nauki.No. 3/1970, p. 173. et. seq.

l \

- 14-

Conflict Between Historical Materialism and Sociolog

The raain points of this conflict deserve mention not onlybecause they indicate the problems confronting sociology in theSoviet Union today, but also because the unrest which thesociologists provoked among the Party ideologists is a symptomof the crisis of communist ideology. In the Soviet Union,sociology was only allowed a "resurrection" after years of re-sistance by conservative Party ideologists and philosophers tothe discipline's specific tasks and methods. They had maintainedthe point of view that dialectical materialism was in itself aMarxist sociology, and together with historical materialism, itwas said to represent the basis of all social sciences, andnaturally of sociological activity.

In the course of time, sociology became established as anentity unto itself, although the interdependence between dialecticaland historical materialism and sociology and its methods re-mained a problem. It was especially unpleasant for the Partyto realize that the new Institute did not rid the USSR of theseconflicts, but in fact only deepened them. This is one explanationfor the vehemence with which criticism was directed at Levada.

For example, the doctor of philosophical sciences, F.M.Burlatsky accused Levada's "lessons" of ignoring the complexityand sharpness of the ideological battle and of revealing an"abstract" attitude toward social problems. The well-knownphilosopher, G.E.Glezerman, scolded him for practisingbehaviour "which stands apart from the classes" and ofencouraging Soviet sociology to adopt the same categories,principles and laws as are usual in a capitalistic society:

Levada considers culture as well as language to be ageneral means of communication between men...But an observation of culture from the standpointof class analysis is lacking. This author lackscompletely a class content in the definitions ofphenomena like state, fascism, totalitarianism, etc.Thus, the state, for example, is regarded solely asan institution for the preservatidn of the culture whichapplies to the society and for its imposition on men.

Professor A.A. Amvrosov accused Levada of seeingsociology as but a generalized science whose content is in-

I V

- 15 -

dependent of the various social systems.The strongest criticism against Levada was, however,

apparently the result of his critique of the state of Soviet socialsciences. For example, the doctor of philosophical sciencesI.A. Kryvelev claimed: "In his work, our social sciences, withthe exception of sociology, whose role is artificially inflated,are described in caricature". F. V. Konstantinov, a leader ofthe Soviet Association of Sociologists, an organization whichparticipates in international sociological congresses, also joinedin the criticism. In the Party, hè is seen as a high authorityfor sociology. After granting that Levada is a "talented scientist",hè continued in the same breath to say that his greatest mistakewas ignoring historical materialism, the "soul of Marxistsociology", in his work.

The Influence of Parsons and Western Society

One major criticism which is levied by Levada's opponentsis that the latter's work is influenced by Western, and especiallyAmerican, sociology. For example, Professor M. V. Jakovlevsaid:

In the lessons one senses a certain influence of thetheoretical constructions of T. Parsons and otherbourgeois sociologists. One can excuse the authorfor his superfluous enthusiasm for his field, as wellas for his conviction that sociology forms the life-saver of our social sciences. Unforgivable, however,is a certain departure from the social-philosophicalfoundations of Marxism.

Levada was also criticized by other speakers for havingadopted nearly the entire range of Western sociological methods.These speakers claimed to have found in this "mistake" thereason for Levada's lack of criticism of bourgeois society inhis work. The above-mentioned G.E.Glezerman was especiallystringent in his criticism here. Levada is accused of havingrepressed the results of Soviet sociological investigations, orof having underrated them. C. A. Stepanyan, a well-knownphilosopher and Academy member, said further:

The major deficiency lies in the fact that the authorhas attempted to create a new theoretical sociology,

l

- 16 -

which by definition differentiates itself from historicalmaterialism. Yu. A. Levada wanted to realize thisimmediately by reducing the role of social sciencesin our country and indirectly (by formulating) hisperiodic table of the history of sociology in the secondhalf of the 19th century with alchemy. It was at this time,as we all know, that for example Marxist sociologyalready existed.

Fear of Sociology as a Force of BeformIf one examines the other contributions made to the conference's

discussion, the reasons for the meeting in the first place becomeclearer. Party ideologists and their "assistants" In the scientificfield were first and foremost upset by the attempts being madeto emancipate sociology as an independent science, Levada'scritics have distorted the conflict between sociology and historicaland dialect!cal materialism for their purposes. Levada is,according to everything known about him, in no way an opponentof Marxist methodology, in sociology as well as elsewhere, butrather is convinced that sociology's rapid development will havecertain effeets.on the social sciences as a whole and will notonly enrich them but call for their reworking. It is not by chancethat the sharpest criticism came from those philosophers whohad already made a name for themselves as interpreters of theParty line under Stalin and who still see their main task today"in the battiLe for the purity of Marxism". Professor Glezermandid not have much luck with his attempt to turn one of Levada'sown sentences into a boomerang against the sociologist: "It .doesn't mean much to regard oneself as a Marxist, one mustemploy Marxism in practice".

A further reason for attacks was Levada's acceptance andencouragement of the use of Western sociological methods.Yet the Party ideologists were unable to find something in thesemethods which they could turn down on a scientific basis. Forpurely ideological reasons they deny Western methods,especially as regards empirical research whose methods revealfacts which the Soviet system would rather ignore. Instead ofprofiting from the revelations, the attempt is made to influencethe interpretation of the results or their formulation alonglines sympathetic to the Party and the Soviet system in general.

- 17 -

The most interesting thing about this conference is thatneither Professor Levada nor a number of other sociologistssurrendered their standpoints. Levada explained at the con-clusion: "Historical materialism forms the foundation of every(branch of the) liberal arts, but sociology cannot be reduced tothat; indeed to a certain extent it departs from social philosophicalsciences". In a report on the discussion, it is said:

Yu. A. Levada did not agree with a single criticalremark of the speakers. In the final analysis theimpression was created that Yu. A. Levada saw thecriticism of his book not as the concern of the publicabout the development of the science and the qualityof sociological literature, (that) hè did not sense inthis criticism the wishes of his comrades to be ofassistance to him in overcoming errors.

Several of his associates at the Institute attempted to defendLevada by pointing out only secondary, unimportant mistakes.V.N. Shubkin, doctor of philosophical sciences, for example,called the process of development of sociological research inthe Soviet Union contradictory. On the one hand, the sociologistscan make a contribution to the development of the social sciences,but on the other hand are upset about the "mass profanation" ofcertain results of sociological research. He praised the positivesides of Levada's work, and located its deficiencies in differentareas than did the other speakers. B. A. Grushin, also anassociate of the Institute, was in agreement with some of thecriticism, but at the same time accused the other critics of nottaking into account the fact that "Levada took it upon himselfto make up for the urgent need for development of a system ofcategories for social research".

The well-known sociologist G. V. Osipov, doctor of philo-sophical sciences, recognized the work which Levada had done.He found it a positive fact that in the discussion a number ofpoints had not been brought up which, but a short time ago, hadstill been debatable in the Soviet Union; for example, the useof sociology and its importance as a Marxist-Leninist scienceof society.

Under pressure from the Party, the conflicts will nowapparently be dealt with in the Institute itself. This was hintedat by the deputy director, F.M. Burlatsky, who said that

Party ideologists have been provided with new, unpleasantproblems as the result of this institution.

- 19-

P O L I T I C SBRANDT'S HISTORIC INITIATIVE

'Ostpolitik' could prove to be 1970's most important world move.writes French ex-premierPierre Mendés-France(Prime Minister of France, 1954-55)

Summary: Pierre Mendés-France, the French politicianand writer who while in office devoted much thoughtto the possibilities of an eventual European settlement,here assesses the importance of the continuing moves byWest German Chancellor Willy Brandt to improve andstabilise relations with the East.

The year 1970 is already turning out to be a vintage one forevents of international significance (South-East Asia, the MiddleEast, Great Britain and the Common Market, etc.). But whenhistory comes to be written, its most important feature, and theone likely to have the widest consequences, will, I think, proveto be the radical change in direction which relations between theFederal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union have taken.

Obviously a process of this nature will have its ups and downsand setbacks as it develops. The 25 years that have just passedhave left situations in their wake which cannot be amended fromone day to the other; it was only recently, after all, that thecruel happenings in Czechoslovakia aroused a deep feeling ofshock throughout Europe, and particularly in Germany, which isstill far from being forgotten. The new Ostpolitik is inevitablymeeting very strong opposition from people in both East andWest Europe, as was shown very clearly by the meeting betweenthe heads of government for the two Germanies at Kassei onMay 21, the regional elections in the Federal Republic and theFrench hesitancy when confronted with Chancellor Willy Brandt'sinitiative.

Nonetheless, the Chancellor appears to have decided tocontinue along his chosen route. He knows what obstacles mustbe cleared and hè is aware of the relative precariousness of hisposition in Germany itself and the sort of reaction to expect ifEast European countries and, above all, the Soviet Union becometoo demanding. But hè seems convinced that the USSR wants the

- 20 -

negotiations to succeed and that a situation is being createdwhich even his most determined opponents will not be able toback out of if they return to power. He has obviously weighedthe enormous advantages, both in the short and medium term,to his country from a solemn agreement with the Soviet Union,knowing that such an agreement would considerably enhanceWest Germany's political role in Europe (and elsewhere), whileat the same time actually diminishing the influence of the GDR(German Democratie Republic).

The GDR knows this too — hence its negative attitude in theface of the very real advantages offered to it by Brandt. ForBrandt's proposals at Kassei in fact amounted to a de factorecognition of the GDR which would inevitably have beenfollowed one day by a de jure one. By rebuffing these proposals,Herr Willi Stoph was perhaps trying to delay developmentswhich hè fears but which hè well sees are likely to continue, inspite of him, with the active concurrence of Moscow and Warsaw.

Stoph's stopping powerOne is therefore faced with the paradoxical situation that very

favourable provisions will figure in the texts signed by BrandtandKosygin (independence, frontier s and diplomatic relationsto be respected, eventual entry of the two Germanies into theUnited Nations on an equal footing, etc. — all things aboutwhich the Democratie Republic has preferred not to negotiateitself) and will only benefit the GDR through the agency of theUSSR. Nevertheless, East Germany retains a means of applyingpressure and a bargaining power which is far from negligible:it is clear that the four-power discussions on the status ofBerlin are hanging f ir e because the USSR (which, let us notforget, proposed them in the first place) is unable to make theslightest concession without the consent of the GDR.

This does not alter the fact, however, that the governmentsof Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest appear anxious that thepresent détente between themselves and Bonn should continue.The Federal Republic of Germany has more than once in the past10 years tried to enter .into discussions with the Soviet Union,and in particular with Poland, on the basis of commitments tonon-aggression and a renunciation of force, and to the con-solidation of the balance achieved since the last war. On each

- 21 -

occasion these proposals were either ignored or rejeeted by theEast Europeans. This year, however, they hastened to welcomeBrandt's advances, which have made it possible for them to drawup a plan whose main point is known here and now. It seems thatthe grave preoccupations of the USSR in Asia and its openconflict with China are leading it to seek a stabilisation of thesituation in Europe, and that involves establishing normalrelations with the Federal Republic whatever the objections andreservations of the GDR.

In the agreements now being drafted, West Germany hasundertaken to renounce the use of force and to respect the ex-isting frontiers, especially the Oder-Neisse line and the frontierbetween the two Germanies. In actual fact these pledges werealready made in Chancellor Adenauer's time in the Parisagreements of October 23, 1954. Contrary to what Kiesinger,Strauss, Barzel and their friends of the CDU (ChristianDemocratie Union) are saying, if one goes to the bottom of things,the present government in Bonn is making no really new con-cessions, nor is it "capitulating". It is simply setting the sealwith the Soviet Union on a situation which in fact no one dreamsof challenging and which in truth the Federal Republic hadalready explicitly agreed to respect up to 16 years ago.

Same Direetion

At the same time — and the fact that it happens now couldhardly be said to be fortuitous — the USSR and its allies haveovercome their long-held repugnance and on June 22 acceptedthe principle of the American presence in the Europeansecurity system. If the Soviet proposals, made with an eye toconvening a European conference and a general agreement onsecurity and co-operation between all the countries of Europe,are to succeed, then they must be worked out and applied —in the interpretation that the East European countries give themtoday — with the co-operation of the United States. (Under sucha security pact one provision would probably call for a reductionof the military potential ove'r the whole European continent whichin turn would speed up the reduction of the American militarypresence in Europe).

Present diplomatic developments are not therefore workingtowards the dissolution of the two bloes but tend instead to

- 22 -

to confirm the détente between them. The essential issues, letthere be no doubt about it, continue to be debated and evenorganised by the two super-powers. Far from providing anobstacle, the present policies of Federal Germany are movingin this direction and it is for this reason that they have gainedAmerica's approval.

CHANCELLOB BRANDT'S EASTERN POLICY

(German International, June 1970)Amid all the excursions and alarms and the brouhaha sur-

rounding the second inter-German summit meeting at Kassei,one fundamental fa et has tended to be obscured.

The eastern policy which the Brandt Government launchedon taking office late last year is essentially long-term in concept.Each step such as the Kassei meeting or the increasinglyproductive parallel negotiations in Moscow and Warsaw must beseen in perspective, and in a perspective not only of circumstanceand place but, above all, of time.

For, to deal with the Soviet Union a very long-term viewindeed must be taken. Just how long-term is the Soviet Union'sview — of for example the threat of China — was emphasizedyears ago by the former Soviet Prime Minister Malenkov in themonths before hè was exiled as manager of a Siberian powerstation, in a conversation with British Cabinet ministers. "Bythe end of the century", hè warned, "there will be a thousandmillion of them (the Chinese) and we, the Bussians, will haveto face them with only a quarter of that number".

The Kremlin thinks in decades. To negotiate with the Kremlinone must think in the same dimension. Of course, if quickresults can be achieved — and Secretary of State Egon Bahrp r i m a f a c i e would have appeared to achieve just that inMoscow in his conversations with Foreign Minister Gromyko —all to the good.

But Chancellor Brandt's eastern policy goes much furtherthan the mere rapid attainment of tactical gains. As hè hasrepeatedly stated hè believes in gradual step by step progresstowards his goal.

Much of the Brandt Government's policy, however, must beseen in the context that most well-informed students of develop-

- 23 -

ments in Bussia's Eastern European Empire now believe that acompletely new era is dawning. The success of the Brandtpolicy, therefore, depends on political, sociological, andeconomie changes which are already becoming apparent inEastern Europe, and which will almost certainly become offundamental importance in the next quarter of a century. As aresult most previous cold war type thinking is now completelyobsolete.

No one , of course, can predict accurately what will happenin the Communist world in the next 20 or 30 years, but there isalready considerable evidence of the trend.

Anglo-Saxon diplomats in the Eastern European capitals arealready convinced that Soviet influence — despite Brezhnev'sterrible blunder in Prague — is on the decline.

The consequences of that decline, of course, are double-edged. For if Mr. Ceausescu in Bucharest has become moreindependent, so too has Herr Ulbricht in East Berlin — withconsequences which were very apparent in Kassei.

But then East Berlin, the capital of the most prosperousSoviet satellite with by far the highest Standard of living in theSoviet bloc, however, is something of a curiosity in the com-munist world.

One of the world's greatest left-wing thinkers and analysts,Djilas, recently pointed out that "nobody today really believesany more in Communism — except Ulbricht or maybe Gomulka(Polish Communist Party Chief)".

Walter Ulbricht, that venerable relic of a Stalinist past is nowin his late seventies. He cannot last indefinitely. And with theinevitable disappearance of Ulbricht in the next few years, eventhe East Berlin hardliners must come to realize that they cannotremain insulated from what is going on in the rest of EasternEurope.

Increased freedom in Eastern Europe, of course, must largelydepend on trends within the Soviet Union itself.

But Djilas, among other experienced Kremlinologists believesthat Bussia — with an economy already in serious recession —may ver}' well need help from the West in coming years.

"Her economy is more and more inefficiënt and the Comecon(Communist Bloc Trade Organization) is a failure. Bussia will beforced to cooperate with the West, because she cannot afford to

l

- 24 -

remain Isolated", says the brain which originally conceivedmany of the revolutionary reforms which today make Yugoslaviathe laboratory of experimental socialism.

"And don't forget China", hè says, "in 20 years she willknow how to throw the hydrogen bomb on to any Bussian city,she will have morepeople, more divisions, and if she has amind to expand, she will go in one direction only — West.

"Eussia must then go towards resolving all her problemswith the West. She cannot have two enemies".

Even in the Soviet Union itself there are notable signs of newthinking — even within the Kremlin. During the celebrations tomark the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth, the supremeSoviet ideologist, communist "party pope" Mikhail Suslov, madethe astonishing confession that during the thirties a fundamentalerror of the Comintern had been to regard the Western socialdemocrat parties — and particularly the German socialdemocrat party — as the arch enemy instead of cooperating with

them against Hitler.The nod in the direction of Brandt and the SPD is too obviousto require further comment. To back that up, influential Pplit-buro member Kirilenko recently told the French CommunistParty: "It is very far from the intention of the Soviet Unionto ignore the changes which have presently taken place in theleadership of the Federal German B epublic".

Internationally famous Soviet intellectuals in public go muchfurther. Famous Soviet atomic scientists ranging from theNestor of Soviet physics, Cambridge-trained Peter Kapitza tohis distinguished pupil, Academician Zacharov, in urging reformsof the Soviet ;Union's political and economie system, now openlydiscus s the so-called "convergence theory" which envisages thegradual coming together of communist and capitalist economiepractice if not theory.The future implications for divided Germany are so obviousthat the whole question of convergence is now the secret night-mare of East Berlin Communist leaders. East German PrimeMinister Willi Stoph even went out of his way at Kassei to denystrenuously to Willy Brandt that there was not the slightestpossibility of a mixture of socialism and capitalism.

In this vast perspective, details of what was or was notachieved at Kassei became irrelevant. And however valid the

- 25 -

criticism made by the CDU of Chancellor Brandt's policiesmay have been in terms of cold-war and immediate post-cold-war thinking, many of their arguments now seem outdated.

Chancellor Brandt and his closest collaborators from theoutset have warned that the course on which they are may welltake years. Even if no further meeting between Herr Brandt andHerr Stoph takes place this year or even next year, from afundamental long-term standpoint it will not be of enormousimportance. The important fact is that after a long period ofyears, during which the Bonn Government pretended that theGerman Democratie Republic did not exist, the leaders of thetwo Germanies can sit down together and in good fellowshipdiscuss their differences.

The East Germans at the moment are adopting an all-or-nothing attitude. They believe that time is on their side. Shortterm that may be so, but in the long term nothing is furtherfrom the truth.

It was obvious at Kassei that Herr Stoph was following a well-mapped plan of campaign. He was hard and tough and made noconces slons — but hè had no intention of breaking off thenegotiations. He was clearly following the brief which hè and hisbos s Walter Ulbricht and his rival Erich Honecker had receivedin the Kremlin a few days earlier. Equally clear was the factthat the East German delegation had been warned that theWarsaw Pact Bloc would take a very low view if East Berlincaused the negotiations to collapse. And the obvious regard ofthe Kremlin for Chancellor Brandt's domestic political welfarewas demonstrated 24 hours later by the announcement thatagreement had been reached between Bonn and Moscow on thegroundwork for a treaty on the mutual renunciation of force.

All the evidence suggests that a substantive draft treaty isalready in existence. That is very remarkable progress withina little more than six months.

But the possibilities amid the imponderables of the futuremay go very far indeed. Herr Ulbricht will disappear in thefullness of time and age. Herr Stoph with a new prestige gainedby his most efficiënt conduct of his negotiations with ChancellorBrandt, and in the developing climate of the Eastern Bloc, maywell prevail over his hard-line rival Honecker.

Future Kremlin policy as always is an enigma wrapped in amystery. But whatever the zig-zags between reform and reaction,

- 26-

the Soviet Politburo in the present or future must face twohard facts:1. The economy of the Soviet Union, far from overtaking theUnited States as Khrushchev once boasted, is moving in theopposite direction.2. Chairman Mao's China within a few years will have nuclearweapons and a delivery system which, if small compared withthe Eussian armory, will be sufficient to destroy many Sovietcities.

To all these vast geo-political facts and expectations must beadded another factor which I personally believe the leaders inboth West and East Germany tend to play down — in public atleast — for very obvious reasons.

That is the fundamental basic instinct of the Germans on bothsides of what is no longer the Iron Curtain to come togetheragain as a united German people.

An innate feeling for this basic instinct is no doubt the reasonwhy Chancellor Brandt, although saying that hè does not expectGerman re-unification in his lifetime, refuses to abandon theconcept of two German states within a single German nation.

The East German leaders, ho wever, in their deep-dyed old-fashioned Marxism will have no truck with a bourgeois WesternGermany. But even already in this context, significant by-products of the intrinsic fact of the German summit meetingsare beginning to appear.The East Germans, as a result of a remarkable rise in materialprosperity, have recently according to many observers, begunto develop a sort of East German national identity. But they,and still more their leaders, have a deep-seated inferioritycomplex towards the Federal Eepublic and all its works. Clearestmanifestation of this is their claim for Ml diplomatic recogni-tion by Bonn — a claim which at best can lead to nothing morethan a paper confirmation of a fact that has existed for 20 years.

This inferiority complex is compounded of the ghetto dwellers'classic reaction to what is outside and a curious love-hateattitude to the still greater material prosperity of West Germany.For it must never be forgotten that the citizens of EastGermany, too, are Germans; ambitieus, pushing and with thattypical German belief that nothing is so successful as success

- 27 -

itself.But since the Kassei meeting there has been a subtle change

which has produced curious contradictions in the East Germanpropaganda machine. While carrying on a constant barrageagainst Bonn to dampen down any expectations of the East Germanpeople, the Communist party newspapers and news agencies haveemphasized with apparent pride that the East German Premierhas been received with all dignity attached to his rank on WestGerman soil for the first time. In simple words, they have nowbeen accepted by the Joneses.

Any steps towards making the East Germans feel they are ona par with the West Germans are, therefore, an important steptowards a major amelioration in the relationship between thetwo Germanies. And there can be little dispute that the merefact of the latest meetings of the two German statesmen hastransformed the position in a psyehological if not a politicalsense.

The cold war attitudes of the past 15 years have disappearedand the people of the two Germanies, whatever may be true oftheir leaders, are again much closer to the outlook of the lateforties and early fifties,when reunion still seemed an ultimatepossibility.

The more able and constructive of Chancellor Brandt'scritics in the Christian Democratie Opposition, such as theBaron von Guttenberg, are of course completely correct intheir claim that every German, East or West, has the rightto freedom and political self-determination. But politics asalways is the art of the possible. Any progress to improverelations between the two parts of Germany, even in the mostfavorable circumstances, must be gradual. What has alreadybeen achieved, therefore, is a step in the right direction.

Chancellor Brandt has said that the primary aim of his policyis to achieve that reconciliation with the Federal Republic'sEastern neighbors which was reached a decade and a half agowith her neighbors in the West. But even Konrad Adenauer tooksix years to gain sovereignty for the Federal Bepublic innegotiation with powers who were basically benevolent.

If that be the measure, the present Government has still muchtime in hand and all the evidence is that international develop-ments are on its side.

- 28 -

STANDARD-BEABEES OF REACTION IN WEST GERMANY

(Soviet News, 28-7-'70)The objective logic of political struggle in the F e d e r a l

Eepublic of Germany has led the Christian Democratie andChristian Social Union bloc to become the standard-bearer ofthe most reactionary chauvinist forces in West Germany, writesA. Yulyev in an article published in P r a v d a recently.

Examining the attitude of the Christian Democratie andChristian Social Union leaders in their opposition to the Brandt-Scheel government, hè writes:

"The present programme of the Christian Democratieand Christian Social Union absorbs everything negative,unrealistic and dangerous in the political life of theFederal Republic of Germany and in essence merges withthe lines of policy of the neo-nazis".

He describes the policy of the Christian Democratie andChristian Social Union leaders, who are continuing to call forrevision of the results of the Second World War, violation of theexisting frontiers in Europe and the creation of a new "GreatGerman Reien", as "a policy directed towards worsening inter-national tensions and intensifying the arms race, a policy directedtowards another war".Yulyev goes on to say that the removal from the governmentof the political bankrupts of the Christian Democratie andChristian Social Union, who had turned West Germany into acentre of dangerous tensions in Europe, was natural since theentire course of postwar development, and above all the interestsof the Federal Republic itself, necessitated a change in thepolicy of the Federal Republic of Germany, taking presentrealities into account.Noting that "understanding of this is making headway in WestGermany", Yulyev goes on to say that it is probably this, morethan anything else, that infuriates all those who want to establish

a new Reich.When the need to introducé a note of realism into the country'spolicy is mentioned, they start screaming that the FederalRepublic "is being stabbed in the back".

They are ready to accuse the present government of the

- 29-

Federal Republic of all the deadly sins, since it is trying to finda way out of the blind alley created by two decades of theChristian Democratie and Christian Social Union policy, eventhoQgh the government, in so doing, is very timid and in-consistent, making all kinds of reservations and showing ex-cessive caution.

The opposition is not squeamish in its choice of methods forattacking the government. It has recourse to the "leaking" ofgovernment secrets, not being in the least concerned about theinternational standing of the Federal R epublic of Germany orabout observance of political decency. They mix charges of hightreason with sinister prophecies about an approaching economieslump, inflation, etc.

In short, the Christian Democrats are making an attempt toprove something which cannot be proved, namely, that animprovement in relations between the Federal Republic ofGermany and socialist countries will involve West Germany inincalculable tribulations, both on the international scène andin the country's domestic life.

Although the Brandt-Scheel government has not introducedinto the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany anythingthat was not long overdue and might have been expected, thefact remains that one can see its aspiration even though notvery clearly expressed, to bring the political guidelines of theFederal Republic into accord with political developments on thecontinent of Europe, to assess the existing situation in Europein a more realistic way and to take objective requirementsinto account. Nevertheless, even the very idea that the FederalRepublic of Germany might have normal relations with socialistcountries on the basis of the existing order of things meetswith fierce resistance from the Christian Democrat and ChristianSocial Union bloc.

The Federal Bepublic of Germany, Yulyev writes in con-clusion, is facing important problems — problems on thésolution of which the paths of its future development will largelydepend. The solution to these problems will not come of its ownaccord.

"The future of the Federal Republic of Germany can be as-sured only on the road of peace and peaceful co-operation withother nations", hè says. "This is precisely why it is necessary

- 30-

to face up to the realities in Europe, with its systems of statesand frontiers as they are, and not to look at them through thespectacles of dogmas and concepts whose inconsistency has beenthoroughly demonstrated by life itself'.

NEW ENCOURAGING TRENDS IN EURQPE

— Phases and Processes—

Dr. Djura Nincic(Review of International Affairs, 20-7-'70)

The increasingly dynamic and broad-based political trendsin Europe have lately been assuming certain novel features whichintroducé new and definitely interesting elements into thepattern of relations on our continent. Although still burdenedwith many old interests, ideas and attitudes, which hamper themin various ways, these trends — with all the new and positivethings they bring in their wake -- are nevertheless gainingground more and more clearly so.

The dialogues which have been started on some of the problemsthat lie at the very core of European security and principallythe talks of Bonn with the Soviet Union, Poland and the Demo-cratie Eepublic of Germany based on an understanding of thepresent realities and their implications along with the increas-ingly intensive contacts among the European countries on otherquestions in the sphere of European cooperation and securitypoint to an upsurge of these trends on an ever broader and— one would say — on a more durable basis evidently as aresult of the growing awareness of the European countries as towhere their real and long-term interests, both political andeconomie, lie. The number of those supporting such tendenciesis increasing and so is the scope of their individual andcollective activity which, logically, is the cause and consequenceof the breadth and constructive nature of the trends in question.In other words, the role of the small European countries, bothnon-aligned and aligned, and their influence on the presentcurrents on the old continent are gaining scope and intensity andthis explains to a good measure their favourable prospects. Inthis context the recent Rome meeting of the NATO Council ofMinisters is characteristic for two reasons: for the contribution

-S l -

of the small European members of the alliance and the intro-duction of certain novel, more flexible accents into the finaldocuments of the meeting and for recognition of the place androle of the neutral and non-aligned countries in all phases of theplanned consultations and negotiations (to our knowledge thisis the first time that in a European context the term "non-aligned" has been entered into a bloc organization's document)whereby the natural yet long denied European dimension of thepolicy of non-alignment has also been recognized in a documentof this sort. This new dimension is expressed in a perhaps lessdirect but no less characteristic form in the acknowledgement,if only a verbal one, of the need for a non-bloc approach to theproblems of European cooperation even on the part of blocpolicy protagonists.

At the same time, as a consequence and as a componentpart of these positive trends, the differences of opinion whichnaturally remain are nevertheless being reduced and there isincreasing scope for agreement on a number of vital and so farcontroversial aspects of theproblem of European cooperationand security. Moreover, what appears to us of singularimportance is that an understanding is not being sought orattained along the Unes.of a compromise between the rnutuallyopposed conceptions of the two bloes only or as miióh as in thegense of a common denominator for broader European interestsand aspirations. In this context, it would s office, for example,to compare the present deliberatipns on the proposed Europeanconference to the discussion on this subject last year, when theconference was still considered by some quarters as being anexpression and possible instrument of particular short or long-term political interest and was thus made a subjeet of blocbargaining and ,even propaganda competition. Having emergedfrom this context, although not entirely so, this idea is todaywidely aecepted, even among many of those who were earlierreserved to it, as a democratie alternative, as a potentialsignificant factor in the development of more just and stablerelationships on the European continent. It is viewed, more andmore so, as an integral part of broader European processes andis therefore often referred to as the first in a series of con-ferences that could develop into a multilateral form of all-European cooperation and embrace corresponding organs whosefunctions would also cover the sphere of European security. Not

- 32 -

even the question of the agenda, i.e., the content of this kindof European conference, seems to be provoking any longer such"insurmountable" differences of opinion as it did bef ore, althoughsome differences of view still remain reflecting to a greateror lesser extent divergent approaches to the essence of theproblems which the conference should deal with. Apparently,there is general agreement that the conference should encompassboth questions in the sphere of security and those in the sphereof cooperation and this in fact means recognition of the linkbetween the two spheres — which Yugoslavia has never missedto highlight --• and bears out the conviction that cooperationgenerates conditions for security and that security expands thefield of cooperation. Moreover, the prevalent opinion is thatthe conference should devote separate items of its agendato these two spheres; within the framework of the first item itshould assert and elaborate the basic principles on whichEuropean cooperation and security would be promoted and with-in the second one it should provide for ways of stimulatingEuropean cooperation. The differences emerge when it comesto a more detailed elaboration of the two items. What to en-compass in the principles, how to formulate them and whatspheres of intra-European relations to have them apply to?Should one of the elementary principles formulated in the UNCharter — that which appears most topical at the givenmoment — be singled out or at least accentuated or should theemphasis be on the fullest possible application of all theprinciples contained in the Charter? How far should one go inelaborating the principles ? Should they be made to apply torelations between all the European states or should theirapplication be restricted, if only tacitly, to specific categoriesof intra-European relations? Different answers are still beingoffered to these questions reflecting, as we said before,different ideas — static or dynamic, narrow or broad-minded, —about the essence of the problem of European security. Theidea according to which one should tend towards a consistentapplication of all the principles of the UN Charter in relationsbetween all the European states is obviously in agreement withthe concept of security as a process in the course of which theEuropean nations would acquire increasing scope for organ-izing their own free and unhindered interna! development and

- 33 -

for pursuing an independent international activity on a footingof equality. Some differences of view also remain over thequestion of what aspects of cooperation should be envisagedalthough there seems to be growing support for the necessity ofcooperation in diverse areas of common interest. Another matterover which views are somewhat divergent concerns the relation-ship between the European Conference and the existing organ-izations and bodies concerned with the promotion of Europeancooperation, although it should be clear here, too, that the roleof the Conference in this sphere should be to stimulate and notto take over the activity of those organizations and bodies ofwhich certainly the most important is the Economie Commissionfor Europe. Finally, as regards the question of regionalmeasures of disarmament, no one any longer disputes eitherthe significance of such measures for the promotion of Europeansecurity or the complexity of the problems they create. Somedivergencies remain as to when and how this outstanding issueshould begin to be resolved (or considered) but it would appearthat such differences were being exploited for political-pro-paganda ends far les s today than in the past when reasonablyenough this had hampered the creation of the conditions forpositive treatment of this problem. If European deliberationsand the European conference and regional measures of dis-armament in Europe were all to be understood as the componentsof one and the same general process, then the most naturalcourse to take would apparently be to include individual measuresof disarmament into definite phases of that general process(meaning the talks, conferences, etc.) in a manner that wouldbest suit the real possibilities existing within a given phase andat the same time work towards the furthering of the actualprocess itself.

Naturally enough, all these positive trends within Europeand what they bring in their wake are still evolving within theframework of the old pattern of European relations and withinthe wider international context which is by no means favourableat this moment and which, for its part, is making itself feitin a variety of ways. The bloc divisions with all their political,military and other implications are still present and at workcounteracting and intermingling with the positive trends dis-cussed here, narrowing their field of action and distorting theircharacter. The adverse developments in other parts of the world

- 34 -

and particularly in the Mediterranean are not without repercus-sions of their own on the European continent in spite of therelative "Europeanization" of European trends. One is stillaware of efforts being made to keep European currents undercontrol and to have them subjugated to other "broader" interestsand have them follow the "tested" bloc courses. Nevertheless,and this seems to be a characteristic feature of the presentinstant, these tendencies no longer appear in such an open and"frontal" form as before but tend to take on more subtle and lessconspicuous forms. We are particularly aware in this contextof endeavours to establish a rigid inter-dependence betweenvarious aspects or phases of the European trends, in fact tohave broader European current conditioned by and thus sub-ordinated to narrow bloc dialogues. Although, of cour se, itwould be unrealistic in the extreme to refute the mutual con-nection between individuai forms in which the European processesappear and phases in which they unfold and even less so to denythe significance which the talks between the Federal Bepublicof Germany and some of the European socialist countries havein this general context, one must bear in mind that this con-nection — as confirmed by experience — is not in one directiononly, that it implies "inter-dependence" and not "dependence"(if, for example, there is no denying the fact that the mentioneddialogues have contributed to the creation of a favourableclimate for other European contacts and for consultations on theproposed European conference, neither is there any doubt thatthese contacts and consultations have, in turn, improved theconditions for the dialogues). About the same could be said ofthe conditioning of individuai phases of European talks and evenof the preparations for a European conference on the "success-ful" outcome of the previous one — which in fact means layingconditions for the beginning of the "next" phase. Even if weput aside all the arbitrariness of this sort of demarcation ofindividuai phases of what is in fact a unified proces s it is stillclear that the party called upon to assess whether or not therequired conditions have been met would be in a position tostart or obstruct the actual process depending on whether itconsiders the process to be unfolding in line with what itbelieves to be its interests or not. Disparate in terms oftheir starting positions but not so very different by their im-

- 35 -

plications are suggestions that the preparations for a Europeanconference be entrusted to a narrow and actually bloc-conceivedbody under the pretext of stepping up their progress. This wouldnot only reduce the scope of the preparations and restore theactual European talks to bloc foundations but would determinein advance the very character of the conference in a sensedistinctively opposed to the aspirations and interests of theEuropean countries. In contrast to such tendencies and ideas,efforts are being made by an increasing number of Europeancountries under the impact and within the scope of the describedpositive European currents to make sure that the present con-sultations and talks are continued with increasing intensity andin all directions and that they also take on multilateral formsso that they may naturally develop into such a broad-baseddemocratie meeting as the proposed European conference hasbeen imagined. It is, therefore, imperative, of cours e, that the"multilateralization" should be effected on the broadest possiblebasis (enabling all the European and other directly interestedcountries to take part) and on one that would be widely acceptable.

All these complex and in many ways controversial trends,taken together, present an encouraging prospect. The positivetendencies can be discerned more and more clearly and so cantheir supporters, the courses of development are becomingmore clearly outlined, the problems tackled more comprehens-ively, the differences — although still considerable — graduallyreduced. Tendencies to the contrary are still at work and theopposition is still strong. However, the manner in which theyhave been forced to adjust shows that their positions have beenundermined. In Europe, the old is definitely giving way to thenew.

PBOPOSAIjS FOB AGENDA OF ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE

Memorandum of Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers(Soviet News, 30-6-'70)

The conference of Foreign Ministers of member statesof the Warsaw Treaty Organization, held in Budapeston June 21 and 22, worked out and approved a memo-randum on questions concerning the holding of an all-European conference.

- 36 -

The conference proposed that the agenda of the all-European conference should be expanded to includean item on "the setting up at the all-European Conferenceof a body to deal with questions of security and co-operation in Europe".The government of the Hungarian People's Republic,in whose capital the Conference of Foreign Ministers ofWarsaw Treaty member-states was held, has presentedthe memorandum to the governments of interested states,possible participants in the all-European conference.The text of the memorandum is given below:

The governments of the People's Bepublic of Bulgaria, theCzechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German DemocratieRepublic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People'sRepublic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics find it necessary to inform interestedstates of their views which, they believe, would be in the interestsof preparing and convening an all-European Conference onQuestions of Security and Co-operation in Europe.

They note with satisfaction that in the course of büateral andmultilateral consultations and exchanges of views, the positionsof interested states on a number of important questions con-nected with an all-European conference were brought closer.The results of the consultations and exchanges of views showthat the proposals advanced in Prague in October 1969 createda basis for putting preparations for the all-European Conferenceon to a practical plane in the very near future and for passingon, along with bilateral talks, to multilateral forms of preparingthe all-European conference. It is desirable that interested statestake a direct part in all stages of the preparation and arrang-ing of the all-European conference in forms that will be foundfeasible, including appropriate preparatory meetings by repre-sentatives of these states.

The question of the composition of the participants in theconference has been clarified: all European states can take partin it, including the German Democratie Republic and the FederalRepublic of Germany, on an equal footing with each other andon equal terms with other European states, as well as the UnitedStates and Canada. The initiative of the Finnish government inproposing to hold the conference in Helsinki is meeting with a

- 37 -

positive response. An understanding exists that the holding ofthe conference should not be made dependent on any preliminaryconditions.

The view is shared in many countries that the success of thefirst all-European conference — the preparations, organizationand holding of which should be the r es uit of contributions by allinterested countries — would pave the road to a joint discussionin the future of other European problems, especially the prob-lem of creating a firm system of European security, and thatin this connection it would be useful to hold a number of all-European conferences and to set up an appropriate body of allinterested countries on questions of security and co-operationin Europe.

The discussion of questions concerning the content of thework of the all-European conference and its agenda is continuing.The two items on the agenda, proposed in Prague, are in accordwith the interests of ensuring security and developing co-operationin Europe and are questions on which extensive accord can bereached. These proposals do not evoke principled objections. Atthe same time, a number of states comes out for an expansionof the agenda of the conference.

Proceeding from the desire to reach accord on an agenda ofthe all-European conference that would be acceptable to allinterested states, the governments of the People's Republic ofBulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the GermanDemocratie Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, thePolish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania andthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics propose the inclusion onit also of the question of the setting up at the all-EuropeanConference of a body to deal with questions of security and co-operation in Europe.

The governments which adopted the present memorandumbelieve that a study of the question of reducing foreign armedfor ces on the territory of European states would serve theinterests of a d é t e n t e and security in Europe. In order tocreate in the shortest possible period of time the most favourableconditions for the discussion of appropriate questions at theall-European conference and in the interests of securing fruitfulresults from the study of the question concerning the reductionof foreign armed for ces, this question could be discussed inthe body which it is proposed to set up at the all-European con-

- 38 -

ference or in another marnier acceptable to interested states.They believe, moreover, that problems of the environment

could be discussed within the framework of the second item ofthe agenda proposed in Prague, and that this item could beexpanded by including into it a proposition on the developmentof cultural ties.

Thus, the following questions could be submitted for con-sideration by the all-European conference:

On ensuring European' security and on the renunciationof the use of force or the threat of its use in mutualrelations between states in Europe:On the expansion of trade, economie, scientific - technicaland cultural ties on an equitable basis, directed at thedevelopment of political co-operation between Europeanstates:On the creation at the all-European conference of a bodyto deal with questions of security and co-operationin Europe.

The governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, theCzechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German DemocratieRepublic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People'sRepublic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics express the hope that the proposalscontained in the memorandum, which take into consideration theviews expressed by many interested states, will meet with afavourable response from the governments concerned. Theseproposals are especially directed at reaching agreement on anagenda acceptable to all interested states and on methods ofpreparing the all-European conference. Preparations could bestarted in the very near future.

The governments which are putting this memorandum forwardare convinced that the holding of an all-European conference,following joint efforts by all interested states, would be animportant contribution to the attainment of a d é t e n t e , tothe strengthening of security and to the development of peacefulco-operation in Europe.

- 39-

THIRTY YEARS OF SOVIET RULE IN THE BALTIC STATES(Radio Free Europe Research, 21-7-'70)

Summary: This year marks the 30th anniversaryof Soviet rule in the Baltic republics of Lithuania,Latvia and Estonia. Soviet media continue to falsifyhistory as to the nature of their incorporation intothe Soviet Union and fail to mention the activitiesof persons and groups opposed to Soviet rule. Thispaper attempts to give a background for both.

Thirty years ago this summer, the Soviet Union forcibly oc-cupied and annexed the three Baltic republics of Lithuania,Latvia and Estonia. In the heraldry that surrounds such"liberation", Soviet media continue to misinform its audience asto the true nature of this event. The latest TASS report, forexample, explains "the restoration of Soviet power" as "a resultof the revolutionary struggle and Latvia's voluntary joiningwith the fraternal family of the Soviet republics" (1) whilePravda claims that the "toilers of Lithuania voluntarily joinedthe socialist family of the peoples of the USSR". (2) In fact,the destiny of all three nations had been decided by two foreignpowers — Fascist Germany and the Soviet Union.

In violation of treaties made by the Soviet Government in thepost-revolutionary years recognizing the independence of theBaltic states, (3) the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 included:l) the "Secret Additional Protocol" of 23 August 1939 whichstipulated that: "in the event of the territorial and politicalrearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States(Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundaryof Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the sphere of in-fluence of Germany and the U.S.S.R."; and 2) the "Secret Sup-plementary Protocol" of 28 September 1939 which recognized

(1) TASS, 19 July 1970

(2) Pravda, 18 July 1970

(3) Signed with Estonia on 2 February 1920; with Lithuania on12 July 1920; and with Latvia on 11 August 1920

- 40 -

"that the territory of the Lithuanian State falls to the sphereof influence of the USSR". (4) In June of the following year, theRed Army overran all three nations. In sham elections (heldwhile the countries were under military occupation), puppetgovernments were established which, within seven days of beingelected, requested the incorporation of their countries into theUSSR — a request that was granted in each case by the SupremeSoviet the following month.

Failing to take the above facts into account, the Soviet pressis also reluctant to mention the executions and mass deportationsof over one-half million of the Baltic peoples during the firstdecade of Soviet rule.

Despite the severity and duration of the communist regimes,there are many indications that resistance and dissent have notbeen eradicated. Manifestations of dissent in the Baltic countriescan be categorized as being primarily of three types: 1) adevotion to the particular nation, a reverence for its past, bothcultural and political, and resistance to the encroachment of aforeign, particularly Russian, nationality; 2) a supra-nationalconcern for human rights that trans cends the boundaries of aparticular nation and deals with the Soviet Union as a whole;and 3) less regard for reform and change andprimary concernsimply for escape through emigration,

Although censorship in the border republics is extremelyrigorous, evidence of the first type of activity was provided ina Pravda article last year. The correspondent, writing fromVilnius, Lithuania complained:

There are still some people in our country who, thoughsharing the socialist ideology as a whole, continue toremain partially under the influence of nationalist viewsand traditions on one question or another.Lenin, as is known, warned that Communists too arenot insured against nationalistic mistakes.One still encounters people who underestimate thegreat strength of the fraternal assistance and mutualaid among the peoples of our country and the significance

(4) Nazi-Soviet Relations, Washington, D.C., 1948, pp. 78and 107

-41 -

of the exchange of cadres among the peoples of the USSR,people who sometimes express distrust for cadres ofother nationalities and take a non-objective attitudetoward other nationalities. Such sentiments are oftenmanifested in an unwillingness to combat survivalsamong representatives of one's own nation... Ineveryday life as a whole, survivals of nationalism stillmake themselves feit more forcefully than anywhereelse. (5)

On the basis of the above, it seems both Communist and non-Party Lithuanians share common ground in their love of country,resistance to Moscow's policy of political, economie and culturalintegration, and antipathy toward "other nationalities", a thinlyveiled reference to the Bussians. A specific example of the wayin which this feeling manifest itself took place on 18 November (6)of last year when a number of Latvians gathered at the grave ofJanis Chakste, the first President of independent Latvia. "Near-by graves were decorated with flowers — a row of red bouquets,a row of white ones, then red again, af ter the colors of theLatvian national flag. Candles were lit on the graves, a row ofred, a row of white, then of red. The red-and-white stripedflag was raised at President Chakste's graveside". (7) Pre-dictably, the authorities' reaction is to suppress such activity.On this occasion ten persons were arrested though releasedeight days later. Others have not been so fortunate. ViktorKalnynsh, a Latvian, was arrested in 1962 for belonging to" 'an underground anti-Soviet nationalist organization' " andsentenced to 10 years imprisonment in a concentration camp. (8)

(5) Pravda. 24 January 1969

(6) The day on which a Latvian national government proclaimedindependence in 1918. According to the Chronicle. "InLatvia it is almost an officially recognized date". TheChronicle of Current Events, No. 11, 31 December 1969

(7) Ibid

(8) Posev, No. 6, 1970, p. 8

- 42 -

A recent issue of the Chronicle lists the names of severalpersons in Vladimir prison "convicted for so-called nationalistcases" (9) and various issues of the Chronicle have reportedthe arrest of nationals from the Baltic states for anti-Sovietactivity. Apparently nationalist views are so strongly held thatthe authorities found it expedient to arrest 84-year old Dr.Fricis Menders, one of 38 persons who in 1918 proclaimed anindependent Latvia, and sentence him to five years in a con-centration camp for spreading anti-Soviet propaganda. (10)Naturally, such needless repression only aggravates the situation.

On a broader plane, Baltic nationals have also participatedin the inter-national movement within the Soviet Union todemand more rights for all its citizens. The Program of theDemocratie Movement of the Soviet Union, for example, wascomposed by "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine and the Baltic(States)" the political aims of which included: "the creationof a democratie state — a Union of Democratie Republics,governed by representatives of all parties, non-party (i. e.,independent), national, class or religious groupings of society",and a demand for ten fundamental rights and freedoms for allcitizens of the Union.

In the second half of 1968, a large number of the technicalintelligentsia of Estonia compiled an appeal for the democratiza-tion of Soviet society and insisted on a reconciliation betweenEast and West, freedom of press and political activity, theliquidation of Stalinism, the liberation of all political prisoners,a fundamental transformation of the Soviet economy, and themoral rearmament of all Soviet citizens. (11)

On 13 April of the following year, Ilya Rips, a student fromRiga, came near to sacrificing his life in protest against theSoviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Standing in Freedom Squarein Riga next to the Freedom obelisk (built during the period of

(9) The Chronicle of Current Events, No. 11, 31 December 1969

(10) Arbeitet, 5 October 1969(11) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 December 1968

- 43 -

Latvia's independence), hè unfurled a banner proclaiming"Freedom to Czechoslovakia" and attempted self-immolation.(12)

A part of the Jewish population in the Baltic countries, how-ever, shares neither nationalist aspirations nor the desire forreform but simply the right to leave the Soviet Union and toemigrate to Israël. Their petitions graphically describe theirplight at the hands of the Communist rulers. A recent letterto U Thant and other United Nations officials signed by sevenLithuanian Jews declares: "Our only desire — is to leave theUSSR and return to the land of our fathers,to the Jewish stateof Israël At present there are few of us left in Lithuania...it has been entirely transformed into a mute grave where300 thousand of our brothers and sisters (comprising 87% of theJewish community in Lithuania on the eve of the Second WorldWar) were tormented. And today, no-one but us remembersthem. Even the inscriptions in the Jewish language at the placesof mass executions have been rubbed out.... For almost fivecenturies the life of part of our people glimmered here, thesons of whom in gratitude named its capital 'Yerushalaim deLita' ('Lithuanian Jerusalem1). In Lithuania, especially inVilnius, our distinctive culture developed, precisely here wehad secondary schools in Ivrit (Modern Hebrew) and Yiddish....a Hebrew Scientific Institute (IVO), many books, newspapers andjournals in Ivrit and Yiddish, Hebrew theaters and clubs. Thisused to be, but it is no longer and will never be.... If Hitler'sFascists accused every Jew of being a communist, thensuddenly (under communist rule) we became cosmopolitans andspies, murderers in white gowns (a reference to the anti-Semiticnature of Stalin's contrived "Doctor's Plot"), currency speculators,etc. Our culture was immediately rendered leaderless — ourbards and poets were killed, as were our writers and artists,and our learned men of world-wide renown. And all becausethey were Jews.... Let us go. Let us go home'.1'. (13)

(12) The Chronicle of Current Events. No. 7, 30 April 1969

(13) English text in Moshe Dekter (ed), Redemption: JewishFreedom Letters from Russia, New York, 1970, pp. 84-87

-44 -According to the above, anti-semitism In Lithuania under

Communism has been as bad as that under Hitler and muchworse than under Tsarist or independent rule. Since Jewishemigration is discouraged and since no significant steps havebeen taken to eradicate anti-semitism (indeed, it has probablyincreased in view of the recent deluge of anti-Zionist propaganda),the appeals continue. Most recently 30 Jews from Biga askedthe USSE Supreme Soviet to consider the question of emigration(14) and 28 Jewish scientists, also from Riga, appealed toforeign scholars for assistance in their attempt to emigrateto Israël. (15)

From the available Information, it is not possible to predictwhether these three dissident groups will ever be able to achievetheir aims, but their very existence testifies to the Sovietfailure either to forcibly suppress public opinion or to satisfyits needs.

DUBCEK — WHAT THEY CAN'T FORGIVE HIM FOR

His real 'crime' was not political: it was his human sincerity

Sonia WinterSummary: The fate of Alexander Dubcek, the formerleader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, has reacheda crucial stage. In the past few weeks articles publisheddaily in the Czechoslovak press have attacked hischaracter and policies with increasing ferocity. SoniaWinter, a young writer of Czech parentage who had first-hand experience of the 1968 'Prague Spring', gives herea personal view of Dubcek - both the man and the politician.

"I am so sorry about poor Mr Dubcek", commiserates mynext-door neighbour. "Such a nice man with such an open face,if you know what I mean". "Yes", I say, "I know what you mean".And indeed, these few words uttered by a middle-aged Britishhousewife convey the essence of the Dubcek phenomenon.

Her sympathy was not for Alexander Dubcek, the lifelongcommunist, the former leader of the Czechoslovak CommunistParty. It was never Dubcek the politician who inspired theloyalty and support of 14 million Czechs and Slovaks two yearsago. It was Dubcek the man. Today, long after the politicianhas been stripped of all power, it is Dubcek the man who isbeing vilified and humiliated and persecuted far bevond the

(14) New York Times. 15 July 1970 and the Chicago Tribune,15 July 1970

(15) The Daily Telegraph. 14 July 1970

-45 -rationale of political sacrificial offerings.

When Dubcek replaced Antonin Novotny as First PartySecretary in January 1968, hè was virtually unknown. He seemedto be a typical Party official: born of a working class family,son of a dedicated Slovak communist, hè joined the Party at 15.He was educated in the Soviet Union and had devoted his life toa career within the Czechoslovak Party apparatus.

Elected as a compromise to bridge the conflict between theconservative and progressive elements in the Central Committee,this record satisfied the hardliners, while Dubcek's criticismof Novotny's centralism gave hope to the reformers. Dubcekdeeply resented the arrogance of the Prague leadership towardsSlovak communists, the high-handed treatment of the intellectualsand the economie discrimination against Slovakia. He saw this asa manifestation of Novotny's dictatorial system rather than asa consequence of the practice of communism in Czechoslovakia— a belief hè acquired much later gradually and painfully. Heresolved therefore to rehabilitate the Communist Party in theeyes of the population, to replace the fictional unity betweenParty and people with a genuine bond of mutual need andvoluntary support.

Even then, many of his friends and admirers doubted thewisdom of Dubcek's appointment. One of them said to me at thetime: "Dubcek is an exceedingly nice man, sincere and honest,but hè is not the stuff of which First Secretaries are made. Hehasn't got what it takes to be a leader".

True, there was little to impress anyone in Dubcek'sappearance — a tall, slightly gauche figure, always meticulouslydressed in a dark suit, plain white shirt and sober tie, hè couldhave been an accountant from the provinces on a weekend tripto the capital, or a minor bureaucrat on the town council.Thinning light brown hair neatly brushed back, small eyespeering from behind glasses, the quiet voice and modestunassuming manner completed the picture of a conventionalwhite-collar worker. Only the nose was remarkable — longand pointed, it dwarfed the rest of his features, adding aslightly comical touch.

This similarity to the "man in the streef' proved, however,to be one of Dubcek's greatest as sets in the most powerfuloffice of the state. He had none of the arrogance, of the air ofinfallibility and righteous superiority that characterise most

-46 -

communist leaders. He displayed an emotional warmth, areadiness to laugh and joke, to argue and discuss, that wasutterly new in a top Party official.

He often engaged in impromptu chats and discussions, buthè was essentially a shy man and was always reluctant to makea formal public appearance. Most of all hè dreaded speakingon television and for a long time hè evaded all efforts to get Mmin front of a camera. When hè did finally consent (in lateFebruary 1968) it was an ordeal for everyone in the studio.

I sat watcMng him as hè hesitantly faced the camera, his facepale and expressionless, the tension hè feit spreading through-out the room. He read his text awkwardly with frequent pausesand each time hè faltered and repeated himself. Ms glassesslipping further and further down Ms nose, we willed Mm silentlyto go on and get it over with. Everyone breathed a sigh ofrelief when the broadcast finally came to an end. Dubcek turnedapologetically to a technician who happened to be the mannearest him and promised: "Next time it will be better".

Out of Frailty, Triumph

It never was better, often it was even worse, but what wouldhave been a catastrophe for any other politician becamë atriumph for Dubcek. Here was a man, a fellow human being inall his frailty, and the people embraced Mm as one of their own.The long nose, the precariously balanced glasses, the badlyread script becamë a familiar feature on television. So did thepicture of Dubcek's attractive wife and three teenage sons. Itbecamë common knowledge that his occasional weekend tripstoTrencin in Slovakia were a tribute to the city's soccer team,that the new First Secretary (now known by his diminutive,Sasha) was an enthusiastic football fan. For the first time in20 years people paid attention not to the office, but to the manwho held it.

For Dubcek, however, there was no such division. Heassumed Ms political responsibilities with a characteristicconscientiousness, working long into the Mght and turning adeaf ear to Ms colleagues' entreaties to get some rest. Hishealth was not particularly strong, but hè would carry on regard-less, even resorting to little boys' tricks to dupe the doctors."There's so much to do", hè would say repeatedly. "There's

-47 -

so much to do".Dubcek was the easiest of men to work with, always ready

to listen and discuss and accept advice — with two fatal ex-ceptions. Against the judgement of many of his colleagues andfriends, hè would not resort to strong measures in dealing with Mspolitical foes, but treated them with the same humaneness thatcharacterised all his actions. He allowed them to remain inoffice because hè respected their long-term membership in theParty, because hè believed their hypocritical proclamationsof good faith, or simply because hè feit sorry for them.

On one occasion the wife of Salgovic, a discredited Stalinistfunctionary, came to see Dubcek with a woeful tale of anonymousletters and "persecution" by the press. It touched him so deeplythat a short while later hè appointed the husband head of police.

Dubcek was easüy swayed to emotion, but when hè feit anissue to be one of moral principle nothing would persuade himto alter his decision. His surprising obstinacy on these mattersproved to be politically disastrous, for it was this attitude thatpermitted the Stalinist diehards to retain their seats in theCentral Committëe throughout the Prague Spring, right up to theSoviet invasion and after. And it was his unshakeable convictionthat every genuine commuMst, above all the Soviet communists,could not but share his ideal of creating a truly representativepopular Communist Party, that rendered him blind" to the natureof the opposition. He believed firmly that this arose solely froma misunderstanding of his policies and all hè had to do was toexplain them patiently over and over again.

The nation, however, understood. To the people Dubcek's faithnieant that an era of power politics was over, that governmentwithout regard for human values was "fiMshed". The nationrespected, and was willing to follow Mm not because, but inspite of the fact that, hè called his policy communist. CommuMsmwas given another chance in Czechoslovakia because Dubcekhad lent it Ms "human face".

POLITICAL ACCOUNTING IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The expulsion of Alexander Dubcek from the CzechoslovakCommunist Party on June 26 was the logical sequel to Msgradual demotion since April, 1969, when hè was replaced asparty leader by Gustav Husak. Apart from ending Ms public

w

-48 -

career, the Central Committee decision symbolised the windingup of the reform movement for which hè stood. Indeed, virtuallythe only survival of the Prague Spring is the present leadership'scontinued commitment to legality. But although Husak emphasisedagain that there would be no return to the show trials of the1950s and that no one who obeyed the laws need fear for hissecurity, much still depends on the interpretation of the law,as well as on the resolution of any political struggle behind thescènes. Eecently the evidence has been of continuing pressureby the hard-liners.

Husak's report to the Central Committee (which met on June25 and 26) on the implementation of the May, 1969, partydireotives, made no mention of Dubcek, though it concentratedon the process of "cleansing" the party of undesirable elements.He revealed that at its meeting on April 14, the Presidium haddecided to stiffen cadre policy because of "the growing mani-festations of liberalism and the conciliatory attitude which hasaccompanied the exchange of party cards". According to thereport on the purges presented by Milos Jakes, head of theControl and Auditing Commission, the interviews confirmedthat the party had been "deeply hit by right-wing opportunism".Husak said that rectification would take a long time; atpresent those responsible for the past crisis were being madepolitically accountable, but this would not automaticallyeliminate the roots of trouble. While warning that the dangerfrom the rightists was the greatest, Husak also said that thefight against them was not helped by people who weakened theparty by divisive action — even if they used "revolutionarydemands and watchwords". And though hè held out the prospectof stricter party controls in all State organs and moreideological indoctrination of the masses and the young, hè alsooffered reassurances.

There would be "fair, legal but rigorous prosecution ofanti-social activities", and yet "we shall not take the path ofrigging so-called political trials", hè said. The difficulty is thatalmost anything could be represented as being anti-social ornot "in f uil harmony with our valid laws". Husak's claim that"firm foundations of social and legal certainty" have been laiddown is open to doubt.

Harsher measures seemed to be foreshadowed in Husak's

- 49-

criticisms of the judiciary. He complained of persisting liberalismand connivance at criminal offences of all kinds and declared thatthe party would not tolerate "inconsistent action against anti-social activities". The same point was made by the FederalPrime Minister, Lubomir Strougal, to the National Assemblyon May 29, when hè stated that the recent purge of the publicprosecution offices and the courts was aimed at imposing"a precise line of policy" reflecting correct ideologicalprinciples on organs judged to have acted too independently. OnMay 27, the Assembly had dismissed seven Supreme Courtjudges, including the Chairman, Otomar Bocek, who was accusedof having contributed to the "disorientation of the Court".

Reasons unexplainedA brief party resolution on the progress of "consolidation"

and a list of cadre changes accompanied the publication ofHusak's report on June 27. It was confirmed that as well as hisparty membership, Dubcek has lost his seat in the FederalAssembly and his post of Ambassador to Turkey. No reasonswere given for these measures, nor was there any announcementof the expected expulsion from the Central Committee of OldrichCernik, who was recalled from his last government post twodays bef ore the party plenum, when Dubcek's dismissal asambassador was first officially announced.

Two Slovaks were promoted to important party posts. MiloslavHruskovic ceases to be a member of the party's IdeologicalCommission and a Federal Deputy Prime Minister to becomea party Secretary and Chairman of the party Economie Com-mission (in place of Frantisek Pene). Matej Lucan leaves theSlovak Ministry of Education to become a Federal Deputy PrimeMinister and, like Hruskovic, a Central Committee member.Pive others co-opted to the Central Committee were Jan Baryl,a Secretary of the Czech Party Bureau, Jaroslav Kozesnik,Chairman of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, MichalKudzej, head of the defence and security department of theSlovak party, Miroslav Mamuia, party First Secretary for theïtorth Moravian region and Zdenek Zuska, head of state and«ocial organisations in the Czech Party Bureau — all of whomhave taken over from liberals.

The hard-line editor of the party newspaper, R u d e P r a v o

- 50-

(which Husak praised for its ideological rectitude), MiroslavMoe, wrote on June 29 that Dubcek's expulsion from the partyhad ended another chapter in Czechoslovak party life. Judgingby his charges against the fallen leader, there are forces inthe country which believe that the settling of accounts has notyet gone far enough.

THE CLASS ENEMY -- THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL

(Badio Free Europe Research, 24-7-'70)

The view is generally accepted that the main causes of theunscientific approach to crime lies in the idealized, volun-taristically interpreted thesis about survivals from the pastin the minds of the people, and in the theses about the class-enemy attitude of the deposed bourgeoisie as the main causesof lawbreaking. (Professor D. Ladislav Schubert, Directorof the Institute of Criminology, General Prosecutor's Office,in Pravnik No. 6, June 1965).

This view is by no means generally accepted today. Lt. ColRudolf Pathy, Head of the Federal Center of Criminal Invest-igation, has recently said the very opposite:

Some survivals in the thinking of the people aliento the cause of socialism.... are strongly supported...by the actions of the internal and especially theexternal enemy It is certainly not accidentalthat a serious increase in the incidence of violationsof the law has been particularly evident since thebeginning of the Sixties, when theories about acomplete overcoming of class antagonism began tobe advanced (Zlvot Strany No. 14, 6 July 1970).

The Czech Minister of Justice, Dr. Jan Nemec, advanceda similar theory when hè said that the incidence of lawbreakinghas been evaluated wrongly since 1960 and is in conflict withthe facts, because the number of violations of the law in the1962-1969 period had risen by 50 per cent (Radio Prague,14 July 1970). Nemec went even further than Pathy when,mentioning the increasing number of fires, hè said that thistrend was not fortuitous, but was due to direct action by the

- 51 -

forces of subversion. He did not substantiate this statement,however.

These coincident statements by two representatives of thepresent establishment form a new peak in a campaign whichhas already lasted some months. The tenor of everything thathas been written on the subject is clear and uniform. Theincidence of violations of the law ros e by 7 per cent in 1968,i. e., several times faster than in the preceding years; and inthe first half of 1969 it actually went up by 20.4 per cent. Onthe other hand, the number of offenders apprehended is fallingconstantly; this decline is viewed as a direct result of thereforms introduced after January 1968.

According to Pathy, in 1968 and 1969 the newspapers, radio,and television made concerted efforts to discredit the policeand the judiciary. "Support from the public" (a euphemism fordenunciation) was no longer forthcoming, and the relaxationof the central management of the economy created favorableconditions for criminal offenses in that field. Illicit enterprisebecame rampant.

Pathy indicated the measures which had been taken to stemthis tide of offenses: investigation and prosecution of thosewho engage in trading without permission, who speculate, orbuy foreign currency; raids on bars where, allegedly, thepolice found many persons who were supposed to be at work atthe time. He admitted that the flushing out of shirkers wasnot really a job for the police, but said that hè could not keepsilent about these things because "floaters and loafers are abreeding ground for crime "

Nemec's statement about the duties of the judiciary was madeat a recent meeting of judges (Radio Prague, 14 July 1970). Heasked them to implement the Party line consistently andreminded them that they are a part of the power structure ofthe "socialist" state. He described penalties imposed by thedistrict courts as too mild. These observations by the CzechMinister of Justice amount to massive pressure on the judgesby the justice department. And the Czech judges are not theönly victims of this interference: the Slovak Minister ofJustice, Dr. Felix Vasecka, told the Slovak judges recently thatlt was their duty to protect "the will of the ruling class". Ajudge who interpreted his official duties in this spirit did not

- 52 -

require instructions, Vasecka said (apparently judges who sawtheir office in a different light did need "instructions"), andjudges could boldly exercise this kind of "independence",because they were doing so "in the spirit of the policies of theParty and in the interest of fulfilling the function of the socialiststate" (Nove Slovo, 11 June 1970).

It is hardly surprising that at the conference held underNemec's chairmanship, the judges penitently declared that theywere aware of their shortcomings and that they were determinedto step up the "struggle against liberalism" in judicialdecisions.

ABMS AND THE (BUSSIAN) CHILD'Little Octobrists', aged 7-10. on paradeGeorge Embree

For the last two-and-a-half years the Bussians have consider-ably intensified their already substantial military indoctrinationof chüdren from the moment they enter kindergarten. This isthe chief conclusion of S. A. Paas, a professional Dutch officerwho specialises in Soviet affairs.

Writing in the Dutch magazine Oost-West, hè points out thatmilitary education and indoctrination for school chüdren existedunder the Czars and has always been a part of the Sovietideological training. But a revision of the compulsory militaryconscription law of January l, 1968, included provisions forpara-military instruction in the schools to be taught by reserveofficers under the command of General A.I. Adintsov, whoheads the Ministry of Defence's para-military training operations.This is the first time professional soldiers have been givenschool teaching jobs, hè points out.

The 1958 education law provided for military-politicaleducation to begin in kindergarten, where patriotism, hatred forthe West, and respect for the Communist Party and the armyare taught. In addition to such courses, during grade school about30 per cent of the gymnastic classes had to be devoted to military-oriented sports. During secondary school 50 class hours a yearhad to deal with purely military subjects.

Instruction however, was in the hands of regular teachers, who

- 53 -

concentrated their attention on the communist youth organisations,the "Little Octobrists" (7-10 years-of-age) and the "Pioneers"(10-14). "It's highly doubtful that teachers were completelyenthusiastic about this programme, because of their alreadyheavy teaching schedules and their lack of military experience",Paas writes.

All the Skills

This failure to implement the existing law, plus Moscow'sdecision to cut military service from three to two years, werethe chief reasons for the new legislation, hè believes. Theschools are now, in effect, responsible for indoctrinating newrecruits and giving them basic instruction in such purely müitaryskills as firing a Ml range of weapons (everything from pistolsto anti-tank weapons) and even basic tactics.

Chüdren attending Russian ten-year schools, which combinegrade and secondary education, must receive 15 hours a yearof civü defence training taught by reserve officers when theyare 11-13. Between 14 and 17 they receive 140 hours of puremilitary instruction in classes of no more than 10 students each,to ensure each boy or girl masters the subjects. "An additional140 hours a year is required during vacations and takes theform of manoeuvres in the field", reports Paas.

To ensure the success of this phase each school is "adopted"by army units at local camps, which the kids visit regularlyduring their "free" time for instruction in the use of weapons,military traditions, tactics, etc.

Upon graduation they are conscripted into the army for twoyears. "The trade schools are given the special job of turningout skilled young people already trained to take over specialisedmilitary jobs such as radar operators, Communicationstechnicians, and mechanics".

The training programme for young people who leave schoolat 14 is less exacting, even though it is just as well organised'fey the factories and collective farms where they work."The Soviet leadership clearly doesn't want this instruction to,interfere with the production process", Paas comments.[ The "voluntary" communist organisations such as the"Pioneers" have been clearly given the job of stimulating interest

- 54-

in the army by making a "game" out of war which 10-14year-old boys and girls are encouraged to play.

The Moscow publication Kalendarj sjkolnika of August 8,1969, gives some idea of how realistic this "game" is made:"It's 10 o'clock in the morning, and outside the school the'Blue' (army) has assembled. Their orders are to capture thefortifications. The'Green' (army) hasn't arrived yet. Thecommander of the 'Pioneer' unit called the 'Sputnik' gives hisofficers their orders: 'By-pass the enemy, who is already onthe move; capture the nearby hill and defend it at all costsuntil reinforcements arrive' ".

'Sharpshooter' MedalsAnother "voluntary" group is DOSAAF, a well-established

Soviet civil defence organisation. Everything points to it havingbeen given a new leading role in para-military training of youngpeople, particularly those who have left school to work inthe factories and on the collective farms.

Since 1965 it has organised military-oriented sportsprogrammes which offer medals to the kids who qualify as being"Ready for the Def ence of the Fatherland". It also gives courseswhich award "Young Seaman" and "Young Sharpshooter" medalsto those who successfully complete them.

Soviet press comment about the success of this para-militarytraining is mixed. M. V. Seremenko, Party Committee Secretaryfor the city of Mogiljev-Podolski, recently reported inKommunist Vooroezlonnich sil that training in the localfactories is excellent. However, M. Nazirov wrote in WolennieZnania in 1968: "Para-military training in the schools still hasnot been properly organised. Only a small number of schoolshave actually adopted the new system (There is still toolittle experience and co-operation in this instruction".

STBUGGLE TO REGAIN ITS FEET(Financial Times, 16-7-'70)

One year short of its 50th anniversary, the "great, glorieusand correct" Chinese Communist Party still does not exist as

- 55 -

a viable nationwide organisation. The process of restoring itto life after the Cultural Revolution is infinitely slow and in-trospective ~ this month's 49th Party anniversary drew ratherless publicity in Peking than Prince Sihanouk's triumphant visitto North Korea and the anniversary of the Korean War.

It is enough to make the student of Communist affairs, steepedin the Leninist gospel of an omnipotent Party, give up in despair.The sinologist can only humbly explain to his sovietologistfriend that they order these things differently in China. Earlyin 1966 all Party organisations were placed in suspense exceptfor those at the top (the Central Committee and Politburo) andthose at army level or above in the armed forces. In April lastyear the ninth Party Congress elected a new Central Committeeto replace the surviving Maoist rump; the Party had begun torebuild itself lower down the scale a few months earlier.

The next rungNearly two years later, the Party has only regained the use

of its limbs in a few places, and it is still totally trunkless. TheChinese Press has publicised the establishment of a fair numberof local Party branches, and a much smaller number of PartyCommittees at the level of "county". The next rung on the ladder,the province, continues to be served throughout China by thehybrid "revolutionary committees" which replaced the Partyorganisations all over the country during the Cultural Revolution.

The political picture in China to-day easily lends itself to theworst of interpretations. These "revolutionary committees" areofficially defined as a triple alliance between the army ~ whichassumed so much responsibility for running the country whilethe Cultural Revolution was at its height, the "revolutionarycadres" (those officials who took the Maoist side), and the re-presentatives of the Red Guards and other "mass organisations".Perhaps inevitably, the army representatives dominate theleadership of these committees in most cases. So here we havea situation where the Party struggles to regain its footing onground already pre-empted by the all-powerful army.

This explanation makes sense in terms of power politics,but the sinologist must again explain, with humility and somefear of being thought hopelessly naive, that this is not theChinese way. Certainly the Cultural Revolution has left a legacy

- 56 -

of a greatly increased military influence in running the country.But probably of more importance are the new attitudes en-gendered by the Cultural Bevolution in Chinese civilian societytowards political participation and the expression of dissent.The Party has indeed lost prestige and standing, but less soby comparison with the army than wlth the "masses" who becamepolitically active and assertive (often in pursuit of their ownsectarian interests) during the Cultural Revolution.

Hence one of the major and most frequently highlightedproblems to-.day is to restore the Party member's badly erodedsense of confidence, to make him both feel like and behave likean "advanced element of the proletariat" — the key Maoistphrase in a recent People's Daily editorial on the Party annivers-ary. Recently hè has been urged to do so in terms which couldnever have been used in the more egalitarian days of theCultural Revolution. In Fukien province hè has been told "notto regard himself as an ordinary person".

At the same time — and here is the familiar Maoist contra-diction — the Party member (and much more so the Partyleader) must come from the masses and stay close to them. Tosome extent the delay in Party rebuilding may be caused by agenuine process of protracted consultation and debate, whichalso helps to ensure that the leadership represents the variousinterest groups which become more vocal in the CulturalR evolution.

The more obvious source of delay in Party rebuilding — ob-struction by the revolutionary committees - certairüy has beena factor in the past year, but it seems to be on the wane, exceptin a few places where factional disunity was especially pro-nounced.

In cases like that of Yunnan where the struggle to set up re-volutionary committees was long and fiercely contested by thepopular factions, people may argue that it is better not to upsetthe compromise result by starting all over again with the Party.

Once the Party group has been set up, it must still establishits authority over the revolutionary committee. In theory theformer "exercises leadership" over the latter; in practice itmay not be so easy, especially when the membership of thetwo bodies overlaps, but the principle of Party leadership isbeing made increasingly clear.

- 57 -

However, a recent definition of this relationship fromShanghai, coined at the No. 17 Cotton MUI (a celebrated "model"for Party building in the Chinese Press) introduces a new noteof ambiguity. It explains that the Party should only make decisionson "major questions", rather than "monopolise all activities".Thus the revolutionary committee would still retain someinitiative for policy-making; one can imagine the demarcationdisputes to which this concession might lead.

Whether the Party is fully revived in time for next year's50th anniversary remains to be seen, although that is pre-sumably the intention. Since May there has been a fresh spurtin Party building, and much more emphasis on observing theParty constitution. But any shift leftwards in national policywhich lays more stress on "class struggle" and on the role ofmass criticism is likely to slow the pace again. A slight shiftleftwards has in fact been detected by some observers recently,though the evidence is not conclusive. Politburo member HsiehFu-chih, the man who ran Peking and kept it on an even keelduring the Cultural Revolution, has disappeared from sightsince the middle of March, amid rumours that hè is undercriticism for nis earlier handling of one of the "ultra-Left"Red Guard groups.

Only countryThe future shape of the leadership could become clearer later

this summer, when, according to some indications, the NationalPeople's Congress may be held. This is the highest organ ofState (as distinct from Party) power, and it will have to redefinethe whole apparatus of government and administration in thecountry which, like the Party, has been largely submerged in therevolutionary committees. (It may also teil us who is Ministerof which Ministry ~ China must be the only country in the worldon which we lack this basic Information).

What we shall not learn from the Congress or from any otherexpression of national policy is the real shape and texture ofpolitical life at the local level. Nor may it be entirely clear tothe Chinese leadership itself. But we can predict with somesafety that the monolithic Leninist Party, all-powerful and un-questioned by the masses, is a thing of the past.

- 58 -

FIDEL ADMITS IT, FAITH IS NOT ENOUGH

After the bungling, will the technocrats be given a chancein Cuba?

Kobert Mos s

Summary: Fidel Castro's extraordinary admissions ofwidespread political and economie mismanagemënt inCuba have deservedly drawn worldwide attention.In this article Eobert Moss, a specialist in LatinAmerican affairs who has travelled widely in the region,reviews the Cuban leader's confessional speech --and singles out some significant implications.

"Our enemies say we have problems, and frankly, ourenemies are right". Eleven years after hè came to power, Gastrowas admitting failure. He was speaking to a crowd of 150, 000in Havana's Plaza de la Revolucidn on Sunday, July 26. It wasa doublé occasion: the anniversary of the attack on the Moncadabarracks that started the Cuban revolution back in 1953, and theofficial end of the sugar harvest that has gone on for the bestpart of a year — the longest spate of cane-cutting in Cubanhistory.

For 24 hours, the Cubans were let loose with rum andcigarettes and music to catch up on all the holidays they havemissed since Castro's drive for revolutionary austerity gotunder way two years ago. But for Gastro himself, there was nocause for celebration. The sugar harvest was a record erop— 8.5 million tons — and more than enough to comfortably fillthe Cuban quotas in Europe and the Soviet bloc. But it was avery long way short of the magie target of 10 million tons thatall of Cuba's propaganda media have been booming out over thepast year. All Castro's battle-rhetoric — the product of thesiege-mentality that made him urge workers to get out into thefields and chop down the weeds nicknamed " Uncle Sam" and"Don Carlos" — suddenly sounded hollow. And the failore toreach the target could not simply be blamed on mechanicaldefects, heavy rains, and a nconspiracy" of traitors and exiles.The whole system was at f a uit: the desperate baste, the lack ofcareful planning, the sheer wastage of manpower through over-regimentation and the failure to understand that men work best

- 59-

for rewards.Castro's speech on July 26 was an attempt to come to terms

with his mistakes. He confessed not only that the harvest hadbeen mismanaged, but that an obsessive concern with the cane-cutting had damaged most other sectors of the economy. Withremarkable frankness, hè recited a series of figures that re-vealed stagnation or decline in most of the lesser industriesCuba has been trying to build up to lessen its perilous dependenceon sugar for 85 per cent of the export income. The milk supplywas down by 25 per cent, cement production dropped by 23per cent (from 1968) and the manufacture of soap and detergentswas down by 32 per cent. There was even 11 per cent lesstoothpaste available than last year. Sagging production oftenreflected a crippling diversion of manpower to the canefields.Cane-cutters were often for eed to work in shoes without soles,for example, because the shoe factories were desperately shortof men and were suffering from a rate of absenteeism evenhigher than the appalling national average of 15 per cent.

The "great leap" into the canefields had other harmful side-effects. Trucks and cars were commandeered to move sugar-cane, while vital imports piled up at the docks awaiting delivery.Huge stockpiles of fertilisers have failed to reach the farmers.And there were only two-thirds as many private passengers asthere were last year.

Short of evervthing

These figures fail to convey just how badly the Standard ofliving has slumped in Cuba. Havana has become the city that isshort of everything, where you have to queue for three hours tobuy an ice cream and have to queue on Monday to get a table ina café on Saturday. Gastro admitted in his speech that there isa general spirit of defeat and disillusionment. It seems that hisidea that men can be made to work well without material in-centives has misfired. His Eussian advisers are said to havebeen telling him for some time that the only way to get thingsmoving again is to install a system of rewards commensuratewith labour. Gastro has been trying to make the Cubansfunction on faith alone — on the idea that they are fighting acrusade against "Yankee oppression" and backwardness. Thatfaith has now worn thin.

- 60-

In an extraordinary moment during his speech, Gastroshouldered personal responsibility for his country's ills. "Theproblem is the responsibility of the leadership and mine inparticular". He even offered to resign if the people wanted it.That offer should not be taken too seriously. Gastro can playthe prima donna tp perfection, and this was one of those momentswhen, by threatening to walk out, hè wanted to make his .audience teil him to stay. But hè may be planning radicalchanges in the administration.

Early in July, Gastro threw out two of his cabinet ministers.One of them, Francisco Pardon, minister responsible for thesugar industry, was a predictable casualty of the disillusion-ment following the harvest. The other, José Llanusa, ministerfor education, was an old crony of Castro's and bis replace-ment ~ a bright young army technocrat called Major CastillaMas — may be the spearhead of a "technocratie takeover" inCuban politics. The party hacks (uneducated men from thehills unfitted for the tasks of promoting economie development)have held power for too long.

Todor puts his foot in itIn recent years, Cuba has been drilled and militarised.

Soldiers ran the sugar-harvest, and men in uniform now headmany of the public corporations, and even the lunatic asylums.Eegimentation and rule from above are symptoms of populardisappointment with life in Castro's Cuba. Gastro acknowledgedin his speech that workers have lost motivation and should beallowed to participate more fully in the admistration of factoriesand plantations. He has projected a new type of committee systemfor industry. But this may fall into the trap of merely addingto the amateurism of Cuba's managerial class. Cuba isdesperately short of experts. That is only partly because somany trained men have sought refuge in what Gastro calls"the dolce vita of Miami". It is also because students andprofessional men are made to spend far too much of their timewielding machetes or fitting bolts beside the men on the factory-floors — possibly an admirable egalitarian approach, buthópelessly wasteful.

Gastro had one sop for his audience. After his speech, hèdisclosed that the hands of Che Guevara (rescued by the Bolivian

- 61 -

defector, Antonio Arguedas) are going to be put on display inHavana. Some of the crowd looked a little happier when theyheard the news. But the only man who seemed confident thatall is well was Castro's guest, Todor Zhivkov (Bulgaria'sPrime Minister), who seems to have been without an interpreter,since hè stood up after Castro, sublimely oblivious to all thathad gone bef ore, and congratulated him on Cuba's prosperity.

- 62 -

E C O N O M I C S

ECONOMIC CO-OPEBATIQN

The path to strengthening peace in Europe(Soviet News, 30-6-'70)

Europe can and must be a continent of fruitful co-operation,an area of peace and mutual understanding, says NikolaiPatolichev, the USSR Minister of Foreign Trade, writing inP r a v d a on June 18.

In his article, published under the heading "Economie Co-operation — The Èoad to the Strengthening of Peace in Europe",Nikolai Patolichev says that socialist countries, in proposingthat an all-European conference should discuss the question ofexpanding trade, economie, scientific and technical relationsbetween European states, are proceeding on the basis of the factthat "a general European agreement on the development of tradeand economie, scientific and technical co-operation would bean effective means of strengthening mutually beneficial economieand political relations.

"An agreement of this kind", hè writes, "wouldhelp to bring about a more rational and effectivesolution to problems posed by the scientific andtechnical revolution".

He points out that the USSB is one of the biggest tradingpowers of the world. Last year, its foreign trade turnoveramounted to nearly 20, 000 million roubles.

Soviet trade and economie, scientific and technical co-operation are developing particularly intensively with socialistcountries, and above all with the member-states of Comecon.

At present, about 600 Soviet research and design organisationsand enterprises have joint plans with more than 700 organisationsin Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Eepublic,Hungary, Poland and Bomania. International research centresconcerned with different branches of science are being set up.

Pointing out that the USSB's trade, economie, scientific andtechnical relations with developed capitalist countries haverecently been becoming more extensive and diversified, hè notesthat Soviet trade turnover with t h o s e countries increased

- 63 -

from 1,200 million roubles in 1958 to 4,300 million roubles in1969. Included in this is an increase from l, 100 million to3, 500 mülion roubles in the case of trade with countries inWestern Europe.

He writes that the reasonable approach displayed by govern-ment and business circles in France to co-operation with theSoviet Union has resulted both in a strengthening of inter-staterelations and in an expansion of mutually beneficial business ties.

Sound basisTrade turnover with Britain has increased by more than 50

per cent since 1965, amounting to 600 million roubles in 1969.Nikolai Patolichev notes the stability of Soviet economie

relations with Finland and points out that the USSB's trade withSweden, Holland, Austria and other west European countriesis developing actively.

He goes on to say that the Soviet Union's economie ties witncapitalist countries are closely intertwined with scientific andtechnical co-operation.

All this, hè writes, points to the fact that there alreadyexists a great deal of experience in the sphere of trade andeconomie, scientific and technical co-operation which can serveas a sound basis for the further development of this co-operationand at the same time for the solution of general Europeanpolitical questions.

At the same time, hè continues, it is necessary to state thatthe trade, economie, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation between socialist and capitalist countries would havebeen greater and the scope of the trade turnover would have beenmore in keeping with the economie potential of these countriesif certain artificial barriers erected in the way of this develop-ment had been removed.

"These obstacles", hè writes, "are the aggressive policy ofNATO, the maintenance of the ban on the export of so-called'strategie' goods to socialist countries, the quantitativerestrictions in western countries on exports from socialistcountries, and the existence of exclusive economie groupingsin Europe, especially the Common Market, which has erectedprotectionist barriers against countries not belonging to thatgrouping.

- 64-

"Pressure by imperialist circles in the Unites States alsoplays a considerable negative role. The policy of discriminationin trade runs counter to the trend towards the development ofall-European co-operation and is objectively in contradictionwith the solution of general European problems".

SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE IN 1969

(Radio Free Europe Research, 15-7-'70)

Summary: This paper gives the first details ofSoviet foreign trade turnover in 1969. The growthof trade with the "socialist" countries was againslower than with the capitalist world, since China,Cuba and Yugoslavia all recorded setbacks, whereasW.Germany, Italy, France, Japan and the US mademajor advances.

The first detailed statistics on foreign trade last year havenow been released in Vneshnyaya Torgovlya (No. 6, 1979).The turnover rose by about 10%, from 18 billion rubles to19. 8 billion. As usual, exports exceeded imports by a sub-stantial margin (10.5 billion rubles compared with 9.3 billion).

As a percentage of total Soviet foreign trade, business donewith the "socialist" countries continued to decrease last year,although in absolute figures it rose substantially from 12.2 billionrubles to 12. 9 billion. It is now down to about 66.7% (l) comparedwith 67.8% in 1967 and 67.4% in 1968. For individual countries,the figures are given below:

Soviet Foreign Trade Volume(millions of rubles)

BulgariaHungaryG DRPolandRumaniaN. VietnamN.KoreaMongoliaChinaCubaYugoslavia

1967

1382106425461633737152196224

96842462

1968

1657121028011873786159264222

86812456

1969

1754127730312091833186295224

51770425

(1) M. Kuzmin, Vheshnyaya Torgovlya, Ho. 6, 1970

- 65 -

Points to note include the expansion of trade with NorthVietnam (although these figures do not cover arms supplies).The whole of the growth was in Soviet exports, since importsfrom Hanoi actually decreased from 16 to 15 million rubles.In the case of North Korea as well, the growth of Soviet exportswas much greater than of imports.

Concerning China, the bulk of the drop was in Soviet exports,which feil from 53 million rubles to 25 million during the year.Imports also decreased from 33 million to 26 million. The out-look for 1970 must now be a little better, if it is eventuallyconfirmed that China has accepted the nomination of V. Stepakovas Soviet ambassador to Peking.

In the case of Mongolia, Soviet trade is still stagnant, as itwas in 1967-68, but with exports running four times as fastas imports.

Cuba is an example of a steadüy decreasing trade exchange,and Cuba now is a less important trade partner than Rumania,for the first time since 1966. Cuba is also a much moreexpensive partner, with Soviet exports to the island now runningat a rate about three times as fast as imports.

Trade with Yugoslavia has been falling for the past two years,but in this case exports and imports are almost in balance, as isusual with all the East European countries.

As regards trade with the major capitalist nations, therehave been some notable developments.

Soviet Trade Turnover (mülions of rubles)

Britain TurnoverSoviet Exports" Imports

F. E., G. TurnoverSoviet Exports" Imports

Italy TurnoverSoviet Exports" Imports

France TurnoverSoviet Exports" Imports

1967450273178

319172146

348209139

299130169

1968576330246

394189205

396209188

388123265

1969600384216

497199298

493208285

417127291

- 66 -1969559321237

Japan TurnoverSoviet Exports" Imports

If these trends continue, Japan is likely to overtake Britainas the USSR's largest trade partner in the free world at sometime during 1970. Moreover, Britain now exports muchless tothe USSR than any of the others in the "big five", but stillimports much more than all the rest.

U. S. trade with the USSR almost doubled in 1969, up from89, 000, 000 rubles in 1968 to 160 million. Most of the improve-ment was due to U. S. exports which rose by 54, 000, 000 rublesto 105, 000, 000. Soviet exports to the U. S. A. went up lessrapidly, from 39 million to 54 million. The evidenee suggeststhat the U. S./Soviet trade expansion will continue in 1970, sinceit consists largely of machine-tools for the Fiat plant atTogliatti, which is not yet completed.

It looks as though the growth of Soviet foreign trade in 1970,at about 10%, was only slightly below the world average, whichhas been estimated by GATT's Secretariat at about 13. 5% (2)in value, of which 2-1/2% is accounted for by greater volume.But the rise in Soviet exports seems to have been considerablybelow the growth rate for exports of the industrialized countries,which averaged some 15%, subject to the same qualificationconcerning prices.

During 1970, Moscow has received a credit of $ 810 millionfrom France for 1970-75, (3) $ 400 million from West Germanyfor 12 years, (4) and about $ 200 million from Italy. (5) More-over, if the Kama truck plant is eventually contracted out toa European consortium (Franco-German?), as now seemsprobable, another $ 300 million or more of long-term creditwould be forthcoming, mainly from West Germany. Withfinancing on this massive scale already available or in prospect,the chances are that Soviet trade with the industrialized nationsof the West and with Japan will continue to grow faster than

(2) Neue Zürcher Zeitung. 15 February 1970

(3) AFP, 13 March 1970

(4) Christian Science Monitor. 31 January 1970

(5) Part of the natural gas deal, see The Times, 11 December 1969

- 67 -

Comecon trade, at least until the end of the 1971-75 plan.

END OF ENTERPRISE COUNCILS

(Radio Free Europe Research, 17-7-'70)

On 16 June 1970, the Bratislava evening paper Vecernikbriefly noted that the federal government had "recently quashedall resolutions concerning enterprise councils and had abolishedwith immediate effect any bodies of this kind which still exist.The ideological substantiation of this radical move was providedby federal Vice-Minister of Planning Nikolaj Zlocha, on July7. In an interview with the Ceteka news agency hè claimed thatthe government resolution on enterprise councils (of June 1968)had been cancelled because it was "a result of gross subjectiveand demagogie pressures" in the framework of a "right-wingand antisocialist strife".

Using much dogmatic verbiage, Zlocha declared the aim ofthe enterprise councils to have been the complete destructionof a unified system of management, deprivation of the Partyof its leading role in the economy , introduction of "groupownership" as opposed to "ownership by the whole'of the people",and the removal of Communists from trade unions. The Vice-Minister emphatically denied that the abolition of enterprisecouncils precluded workers' participation in economie manage-ment. As a substitute for this "revisionist" venture hè suggested— though in general and vague terms only — "a new harmonioussystem" of directing and advisory activities in the context ofwhich the workers' interests would be safeguarded.

The governmental decision and Zloeha's statement mark theofficial end of a shortlived but extremely popular experimentin self-management. The origin of enterprise councils goesback to thé Dubcek era, and they resulted from studies byCzechoslovak economists (headed by Ota Sik) which weredesigned to improve economie management under "socialism"by personally involving all categories of working people, andadding genuine control from below to direction from above. Thepractical implementation of the project was given the green lightIn June 1968, and met with an enthusiastic response in majorenterprises, especially in the Czech Lands. By early March 1969,about 500 enterprise councils had been constituted (see Oldrich

Cernik's statement over Radio Prague, 6 March 1969). Sincethe establishment of new councils was halted in October 1968 asa result of the August 1968 invasion and occupation, it followsthat they had been formed, at least in their preparatory stage,within a period of only four to five months (for a sociologicalstudy of the poptüarity of enterprise councils, see CzechoslovakSR/16, RFER. 17 April 1970, Item 2).

The enterprise councils have met with the same fate as othermajor progressive ventures initiated during the 1968 thaw. Theirdoom actually began in October 1968 when Karel Polacek, thenCzechoslovak trade union chief, declared on return from theSoviet Union that enterprise councils weakened the role of tradeunions. Soon afterwards, the most active enterprise councilin the Republic, that in the Plzen Skoda Engineering Works, wasforced to dissolve (see Czechoslovak SR/98, RFER. 13 November1969, Item 4). Similar moves followed in other major enter-prises.

It remains unclear what kind of workers' "participation" isto replace this foray in "progressive socialism". The theoreticalanswer should be provided in the Law on Socialist Enterprise,which has been repeatedly postponed and is still under discussion.There is little doubt, however, that the legislation, when itcomes, will have to fit into the overall centralistic system ofplanned management. In such a model, control from below haslittle effect, while enterprise autonomy and business initiativeplay at best a secondary role.

RUSSIA GRANTS ICL SPECIAL TRADING STATUS

(The Times, 7-8-'70)

International Computers has been granted "fully accredited"status by the protocol department of the Russian Ministry ofForeign Trade, a spokesman for the company said yesterday.It has thus become the second British group to gain a f ir mfoothold in the Soviet Union.

The first was M. Golodetz, the London import/exportmerchanting business which handles I. C. L. 's trade with otheragencies and established a landmark in Soviet trade relationsfrom the fact of being the first foreign company to win suchstatus.

- 69-

The advantages of fully accredited status are manifold. Theyinclude permission to set up permanent offices with its owntelex facilities; visa-free entry and officially allocated dwellingsfor resident British staff, as well as permission to hire Russianpersonnel. These facilities are available as a rule only todiplomatic and press personnel.

Other ancillary advantages are that staff can shop in Moscow'shard currency stores, register cars and import office furniturewithout having to pay duty.

About 30 foreign firms have the same privilege — they includeRenault and Sifal from France, Fiat, Montecatini-Edison andENI from Italy, the Dutch Stemmler-Imex and a number of otherEuropean and Japanese firms — most of them trading organ-izations.

All other exporters to Russia have to base themselves intemporary quarters, usually hotel accommodation.

In I. C. L. 's case the permission to take up permanentresidence concerns two employees. The company has alreadyhired five Russian nationals: among them a systems analyst,a driver and three secretaries. Soviet nationals are hiredthrough the U. P. D.K., government employment agency, whichfixes salaries and terms of employment.

The British company has yet to find permanent offices andto set up a private telex link, but the fact that it has joined theselect communily of foreign firms "augurs well for the future",said Ralph Lard, manager for the U.S. S.R., especially asI. C. L. is the only Western computer manufacturer in thiscategory.

Russian orders for I. C. L. eqüipment exceed £ 8 m. whilethe valuè of installed computers is over £ 4 m.

THE APPEAL OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS

(Badio Free Europe Research, 10-7-'70)

1 Summary: The work of Western managementconsultant firms received good grades in anevaluation of their results by the Dean of theMosców Institute of National Economics. Itwas clearly indicated that the Soviet industrialsystem could well apply the methodology of

- 70 -

the MC firms as an aid toward rational use ofresources and to assure maximalization of profits.

Ever alert to learn of new innovations and technology fromWestern sources, following the behest of Lenin, the Sovietshave had a hard look at one of the modern developments in thecapitalist business world and found it of "pronounced interest".

Writing in the literary weekly, a leading Soviet source ofnew ideas in fields other than literature, the Dean of the MoscowInstitute of National Economics described the effective contri-bution management cons uiting firms have made to the develop-ment of private and public enterprises and institutions in theWest. (1) The implication was rather clear that the Sovietindustrial system could well use the methodology of the manage-ment consultant firms as an aid toward rational use of resourcesand to assure maximalization of profits. Although an editorialcomment reminds the reader that "the Soviet economy is freeof market fluctuation and competition and functions under thelaws of the planned development of a socialist economy",nonetheless the operational methods of the managementconsultant firms are "of decided interest to us".

The Dean leads off with the query:

When a person becomes sick hè consults a doctor;when a business firm gets "sick" to whom doesit turn? In the Western world, management consultingfirms play the role of the doctor.

The growth of the Management Consultants (M. C.) firmshas been spectacular. In Great Britain during the last decadethey have tripled and their personnel now number about 3,000consultants. In continental Europe the volume of business basedon fees reaches 29 million £ sterling a year, while in the USAit is five times greater. Private industry is the main area ofoperation, but in recent years government agencies have alsobegun to turn to M.C. to maximize resources and administrationalinputs, the Dean maintained.

The services of M. C. firms are usually called in when afirm's business is not progressing satisfactorily, when profitsdecline, the Dean said. The M.C. then examines every aspectof the firm and apart from suggesting remedies in the reallocationof labor, capital and management they often analyze the wants

(1) Literaturnaya gazeta, 24 June 1970, p. 10

- 71 -

of a particular product, the need for product changes, newmarkets, promotion and overall reorganization to maximalizeprofits, according to the Dean. In the Galbraithian analysis,however, a prime motive would be the self-perpetuation ofhigher management, a goal, needies s to say, of Soviet manage-ment, too.

M. C. firms operate internationally and concern themselveswith EEG problems, tariff issues and competitive aspects ofindustries. A knowledge of what competitors are doing is alsoone of the main points in the sales appeal of M. C. s. The Deanmay have been impressed with this aspect, and it is not in-conceivable that some Soviet plant managers may toy with thei dea of getting such assistance, particularly in technologicalinnovations. The Dean described a Japanese shipbuilding firmwhich hired an English M. C. for 40, 000 £ sterling to figureout ways to reduce costs of constructing marine power plants.After two years study of foreign firms the M. C. came up witha new approach to building which saved the company 1.8 million£ sterling a year.

Even profitable firms hire M. C. s, the Dean said. Itprovidesa sound analysis to compare one firm's technique of operationswith another's: the analysis done by an independent professionalgroup of experts who often have a knowledge of the technologyof the competitors.

The personnel of the M. C. s impressed the Dean. In a visitto the American firm, A. D. Little, hè found 700 scientificworkers of a wide array of specialities; almost every professionwas represented. The average man was from 28 to 35 years ofage, with graduate training, one who had spent some time inindustry and was generally a later graduate of a business manage-ment school. The work of the M. C. s is so challenging and re-warding that the M. C. s have no trouble getting the top men in afield; the "birds-eye view of industry is more challenging" thanwork in a line sector of an enterprise.

The work of the M. C. s has won for it a laating place in theeconomy of the capitalist countries, the Dean concluded. InEngland, hè claimed, about one-third of the effective growthin production can be traced to the sound work of the managementconsultant firms.

Apart from the news value, what would prompt the Dean of

- 72 -

the faculty for planning industrial production at the MoscowInstitute of National Economy to report so positively on theeffectiveness of the M. C. s in the capitalist countries? Bycontrast, in the Soviet Union most firms are on "khozraschet".cost accounting, with their own staff of economists-engineers-et al. specialists to analyze operations. Their end productis much the same as in private firms: profits, prices, increasedlabor productivity, capital productivity. Besides, frequentinspections for "control" are carried out by ministries and/crcentral boards (glavki), whose work generally leads to confusionand apathy at plant level. The factories are a part of thehierarchical system of administration. One cannot imagine aplant director protesting against a ministerial order, an orderusually based on infra-structure inspecting committees. Theappeal of the M. C. s, particularly to those plants converted toindependent khozraschet (an important improvement which inpractice means that they are not paid from the budget of theministries but by the plants which those ministries direct),lies in the independent, impartial analysis of outside expertsto improve realistically the profits and weU-being of the plantand the tenure of management.

- 73 -C U L T UB E

FBENCH FILM ON STALINISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED IN YUGOSLAVIA

(Radio Free Europe Research, 16-7-'70)

Summary: The Confession, a film made in Franceby the Greek director Costa Gavras and starringYves Montand and his wife Simone Signoret, wasrecently shown in Zagreb before a selected audience.The film produced extremely friendly responsesbecause of its anti-Stalinist message. After itsshowing a round-table discussion took place inwhich Lise London (the wife of Arthur London whoselife is the subject of the film), Yves Montand,Costa Gavras and script-writer Jorge Semprunexplained why they found it necessary to make afilm which both the extreme Right and extremeLeft call "anti-Communist".

Yves Montand, the famous French leftist film star, statedrecently in Yugoslavia that his friendly attitude toward SovietCommunism changed "on the day Imre Nagy was killed". (1)Montand, his wife Simone Signoret — also a well-known filmpersonality — Costa Gavras, the Greek-born film director,Jorge Semprun, a script-writer, and Lise London, the wifeof Arthur Lqndon (Czechoslovakia's deputy Foreign Ministerin the early Jïfties and one of the defendants in the show trialof Rudolf SlanSjky in 1952) recently visited Zagreb to attend thepremiere of Gavras1 film The Confession. which was taken fromthe book of the same name by Lise and Arthur London and filmedin France.

The film, which describes Stalinist methods in extortingfalse accusations from alleged "lackeys of Tito" and "traitors",

(1) Vjesnik u srijedu, Zagreb, 15 July 1970 (Imre Nagy was theHungarian Prime Minister during the fateful October 1956

,',/ anti-Soviet uprising in Hungary. He was executed by theRussians in 1958).

- 74 -

had been shown only in France prior to its premiere inYugoslavia and has provoked lively debate. The Zagreb screeningwas by invitation only, but afterwards the editorial board ofVjesnik u srijedu staged a public round-table discussion whichwas later published in the weekly.

Soviet Occupation of Czechoslovakia AttackedDuring the discussion the Yugoslavs expressed their

enthusiasm for Gavras' new film — just as they did after seeinghis film_Z_ which is critical of the rightist dictatorship in Greece.The Confession — an obviously anti-Soviet film — has beencalled "anti-Communist" both by the extreme Right and extremeLeft. To these groups Gavras answered: "Communism wasseverely damaged by the Stalinist system, especïally by what isdescribed in my film. By telling the truth about the Stalinistsystem we prove that we have not lost our faith in Communism,a point which is continually emphasized by Arthur London".

As for the claim made by pro-Soviet Communists throughoutthe world that Gavras' film is being misused by the enemies ofCommunism for their anti-Communist propaganda, Gavrasanswered:

Yes, our enemies can misuse it. They can use it fortheir own purposes. However, I consider that therightist groups have benefited much more from the(Soviet) intervention in Czeehoslovakia (in August 1968)and from show trials in the past; I think that thoseactions have been more damaging than our film.He who claims that enemies ean use our film fortheir purposes, presents the problem in a falseway. Obviously this happens to be the only way tohide the real essence of the problem.

Simone Signoret said that the group whieh made the film"is a united team", even though she and her husband, YvesMontand, have never been "registered members of theCommunist Party". Costa Gavras is not a Communist and"Arthur and Lis e London, and Jorge Semprun have beenmembers of the Communist Party for a long time". All thisdoes not prevent their holding personal views on many questions.Said Mme. Signoret:

- 75 -

Look, we have so many things in common, but stillwe are very different; we even belong to differentgenerations, especially as far as Gavras is concerned.He is 12 years younger than Yves and myself. Wehave united our forces in order to present to the worlda true story. The decision to make this film, whichI must emphasize was not ordered by anyone, is ourown decision. We wanted to teil the story of anevent without being advised by anybody from outside,least of all by any political organization.

Mme i Signoret added that she and Montand had in the pastheld certain incorrect views, but that they are not sorry forthem "because they were sincere... We see only now that theseviews were wrong1.'. This was one of the chief reasons why theydecided to appear in The Confession: "You must understand us.Yves and I have feit it our duty to make this film. It was a debtdue to our consciences".

Stalinism Should be Totally DestroyedA Yugoslav participant in the discussion questioned whether

Gavras' film deprives people of hope for the future and under-mines their wish to concern themselves with politics * He wasanwered by Jorge Semprun, the film's script-writer, who said:

I tip not believe that political action is possibleand nëéessary only when direct hope exists, whenpolitica! fighters know or assume that in the nearttftöÊë they will be successful. I consider thatpolitical action, especially Communist politicalaction — but Communist in the correct sense ofthe term — can be taken even if it is assumed thatconservative forces will be successful in preventingus from implementing our ideas. This is why I donot see why the lack of an immediate prospect ofsuccess should inhibit political action.

To support his argument, Semprun mentioned the case ofYagoslavia which in 1948 had no hope whatsoever of successfullyopposing the mighty Soviet Union. "Was not your decision-makingIn those days a gamble, a challenge to the future? Did not all

- 76-

tbis seem utopian?" Semprun continued:However, today, 20 years later, we see that yourpolicies were effective, that they have becomeaccepted practice. We see that you were correctin not capitulating (to Moscow) even though youconducted your Communist policies against thewhole "community" of the then internationalCommunist movement.

Linking The Confession with the Yugoslav struggle againstMoscow's supremacy, Semprun said that "the first conditionfor successful political action is to know all the facts correctly".The film's only task is to present these facts. That is why itcan be called "amateur politics" only by people "who are notcourageous".

Lise London, whose husband could not come to Zagrebbecause of bad health, said that the film should be viewed "asan appeal to all Communists to return to their original thinkingand to fight for true Communism". In her opinion the filmshould help "outmoded, conservative Communists to open theireyes and to finally realize what Stalinism actually was".

Another criticism by a Yugoslav journalist was that the filmdid not explain why certain things which happened to ArthurLondon were done and in whose name they were perpetrated.Semprun admitted that the film had not really anwered allquestions concerning Stalinism. "I personally do not know ofany global, scientific, if I may say, Marxist explanation of thephenomenon called Stalinism, what it was and what it is today",hè said. Not even the Yugoslavs have gone to the logical con-clusion in unmasking Stalinism, Semprun added. "It seems tome that even today you meet this phenomenon in your owncountry and outside it", hè stressed. He concluded:

By the way, one of the bas ie conditions for makinga complete analysis of Stalinism is (the belief) thatabove all, it should be totally destroyed.

For his part, Yves Montand admitted that in the film "notall the horrible things that happened were described Someof the things which are shown in the film are difficult to bear;had we included the torture scènes, the film would be even les sbearable". Lise London then took the floor again and talked about

- 77 -

the motives which made them shoot the film:The first show trials in Moscow were held inthe Thirties, so the problems dealt with inThe Confession were not confined to the Slanskytrial at which my husband was one of the defendants.In all Stalinist show trials such confessions wereextorted. And it is precisely these confessionswhich had such a tremendous impact on the inter-national Communist movement. They led to themystification and bureaucratization of power.The greatest personalities of the internationalCommunist movement confessed to the most horriblecrimes. Of course, one asks now how it was possiblefor them to do this. It is a special merit of London'sbook that the technique by which confessions werefabricated is unmasked.

Yugoslav Example ExtolledThe Belgrade film critic Emilia Bogdanovic thought that

only individuals rather than the masses are presented in thefilm. Does this mean, she asked, that in Gavras' opinionpolitics occurs only in top Party apparats ? She said that in heropinion "the best sections of The Confession are those... inwhich Gavras used cuts from original newsreéls showing theintervention üüf Czechoslovakia" in August 1968.

Gavras adjttïftted that his film is about the Party apparatrather than the popuia r masses. The people as a mass are presentin only a few sequences — for instance, in the scène whereworkers congratulate Lise London "for having sent to thePresident of the Bepublic a letter in which she condemned herhusband as a traitor".

Slobodan Lang, the President of the Zagreb StudentAssociation, posed an "awkward question":

I see in this film, and even more in London1 s book,yet another trial, yet another confession. Weshould not forget that Slansky, the protagonist atthe trial, had — before being arrested — signed

i in the name of Czechoslovakia a Stalinist accusationagainst Yugoslavia. Arthur London was in favor of

-78 -

the death sentence for Laszlo Bajk. When Londonwas arrested by the Stalinist police, they foundin nis pocket diplomatic discount cards. The filmindicates in a way that London and Slansky, at thetime of their arrest, were callous Stalinists. Theybehaved, in their dealings with other people, ashard-core Stalinists. That is why I also see in thisfilm the trial of Arthur London against himself.That is the second trial in this film.

Montand answered: "I can only say that we were all Stalinists,not only Arthur London". Mme. Neda Krmpotic, an editor ofVjesnik u srijedu. said she would like to talk "about the thirdtrial" and about the "third confession" in the film, the confessionabout Yugoslavia. She said that in Yugoslavia the Stalinists hadsucceeded in surviving many years after Stalin's demise andthat Aleksandar Eankovic was removed only in July 1966, atthe well-known Fourth Plenum of the Yugoslav Central Com-mittee at Brioni. The showing of The Confession coincided withthe fourth anniversary of the Brioni Plenum, Mme. Krmpoticsaid, and this statement evoked tremendous applause. Sheadded:

I see the greatness of this film in the fact that itsays that the chief problems, the main difficultiesfor socialism, come not from the outside but ratherfrom within. Not even we in Yugoslavia have yetfound adequate and effective ways and means ofmaking people economically free and of still havingthe (Communist) system functioning rationally.That is why we are motivated by the film to thinkabout the third phase, or about the third trial. In Z,Gavras dealt with the bourgeois society and thepolice. In The Confession (his second film) hèdeals with Stalinism within socialism. However,we have seen that even the fighters against Stalinismcould become Stalinists if they employed Stalinistmethods.

Slobodan Budak, the Zagreb State Attorney, said that Gavras'film is a story that could have happened in any socialist country.Socialism, hè said, must be achieved only by humanistic means

-79 -

rather than through crude force. Ante Eumora, a student fromthe Yugoslav "New Left", said that Stalinists are the pre-dominating groups "in most of the ruling Parties and in thosewhich are struggling to assume power". He wondered howanyone could see a film "presenting the Stalinist psychical andphysical annihilation of human beings and not become sensitiveto the socialist exploitation of the working class". Rumoraadded that if a team decides to deal with problems endangeringa class rather than with those imperiling individuals, then thewhole approach must be more Marxist. Eumora reproached themakers of the film: "Both Z and The Confession are an indirectapology for fascism as a politica l and social evü representedby militant American imperialism".

Angered by such a claim Gavras answered very sharply thatin France there are also young people who, living in comfortableconditions and freedom, speak in the same way but are totallyconfused about reality. "As far as Stalinism is concerned, ifwhat we saw in the film existed here in your country, you wouldnot be able to talk as you do", said Gavras, freneticallyapplauded by the audience.

THE MIND-CHANGEES

What Yves Montand has in common with Dr Nezhad of IranBrian Crozier

'''Stotlnarv: In this article, Brian Crozier commentso4*JBbme recent and spectacular changes of mind:

j v^.lan Iranian Doctor, jwo j>rench film stars, and~% leading member of the French Communist Party.

The case of an Iranian called Parsa Nezhad gives food forthought. Dr Nezhad worked for a communist revolution in Iranfor years, then decided hè was wrong and told his story to theIranian press and on the radio some weeks ago.

To change one's mind in politics takes courage and deservescredit. To change one's loyalties usually invites disapprovalJf not horror. All languages have words like "turncoat" orVtraitor". And yet, what if a man should honestly believe in

•« Bomething, give his loyalty to the powers that represent it, thenJ-flnd out hè was wrong all the time?

-80 -

The history of our times is rich in such cases, for it islargely the history of totalitarian ideologies and regimes. Takethe case of Count von Stauffenberg and the other German Armyofficers who tried to assassinate Hitler by planting a bomb inhis office. Were they traitors, or patriotic Germans who wantedto rid their country of a monstrous tyrant? The answer dependson where you stand: Stauffenberg and his friends were executedfor treason.

That is why the term "defector", though it carries a hint ofopprobrium, is bound to be morally neutral. Strietly speaking,Parsa Nezhad was not a defector when hè confessed his errors.But hè had been a defector before that. His story is interesting.

Siavash Parsa Nezhad graduated from the Medical Schoolin Munich in 1964. He had gone to Munich University for furtherstudy in 1957. The feudal backwardness of his country worriedhim and hè wanted to do something about it. Communism seemedto be the answer and in 1961, while still in Germany, hè joinedthe communist Tudeh ("Masses") party. Through his newpolitical friends, hè was permitted to visit East Germanyseveral times.

By 1964, however, hè had become disillusioned with theIranian Communists, having discovered that the Tudeh Partywas controlled by Moscow. But hè still believed in communismand revolution. At that time, hè told Tehran radio in a lengthyinterview on May 17, 90 per cent of the Iranian Communistsin exile left the Tudeh Party. He was one of those who did, thengot together to form the Iranian "Bevolutionary Organisation".

Now Dr Nezhad was a full-time Marxist-Leninist revolutionary.The Bevolutionary Organisation sent him to Cuba, then to China,to study revolution and revolutionary techniques. Next, hè wassent on a "mission" to Iraq to study the Kurdish revolt. Finally,armed with false identity papers in the name of Mostafa Kavandi,hè re-entered Iran through Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf.

His "studies" in Cuba had confirmed the programme of theBevolutionary Organisation. What Iran needed was land reformand the only way to accomplish it was through a peasantrevolutionary uprising. This was what the great revolutionaryleaders, Mao Tse-tung in China, and Che Guevara of Cuba,had preached, and there was no other way.

Once hè was back at home, however, Dr Parsa Nezhad sayshè saw with his own eyes that land reform was actually being

'•' - 81 -

carried out by the Iranian farm corporations of Darius the Greatand Arya Mehr. It was this realisation that made him changehis mind and appeal for the Shah's pardon as a former memberof the outlawed Tudeh Party.

Simone Signoret's Second ThoughtsDr Parsa Nezhad's case, though interesting, is not unique.

For the past two or three months, Paris had been buzzing withpassionate debates over the case of those two famous film-stars,Simone Signoret and Yves Montand. Husband and wife in privatelife, Miss Signoret and Mr Montand were, for many years bytheir own admission, the most reliable fellow-travellers of theFrench Communist Party, always ready to find excuses forwhatever the rulers of Bussia decided was necessary on historicalgrounds.

Now, there has been a dramatic change of heart. SimoneSignoret and Yves Montand star in a film entitled L'Aveu("The Gonfession"), which is breaking attendance records inFrench cinemas. Based on the memoirs of Artur London, aformer Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakiawho in the 1950s was tortured and for eed to confess to crimeshè had not eommitted, the film was made by the same team thatmade the sensational film "Z", about torture in Greece. Thescreenplay is by the former Spanish Communist Jorge Semprun,and the;<fireötor was Costa Gavras.

Whereas:S!Z" was a fictionalised account, however, "TheConfession" ifi strictly factual.

Naturiüy, the fact that Yves Montand and Simone Signoretshould consent to star in a film denouncing actions which theywere previously on record as defending, has provoked manyquestions. In an extended interview in the Paris news-magazineL'Express for May 11-17, the two stars explained how they hadsupported the Communists for many years, until disillusionmentgradually came after the crushing of the Hungarian revolutionTb 1956. For a long time after that, however, they were so''Oonditioned by years of thinking along certain lines that even'^rhile they were making "The Confession", Simone Signoret,^tör instance, had to battle with herself to buy a book by the•"flistinguished Hungarian writer and former Communist, Arthur**KoestIer. In the end, however, the couple did change their minds

-82 -

and had to explain why in public.

The Crime of CriticismSimone Signoret and Yves Montand were not, in a formal

sense, members of the Communist Party. This perhaps maderetraction les s difficult for them than for their compatriot,Boger Garaudy, whose case is both similar and tantalisinglydifferent, and which also caused a sensation in Paris this year.

For 14 years, Garaudy was a member of the political bureauof the French Communist Party, and for 25 years, hè servedon its Central Committee. During those years, hè had builta reputation as the leading Marxist philosopher in France.Even at the time of Hungary, his public loyalty to the SovietUnion had not wavered. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia,however, was too much for him.

The French Communist Party, indeed, took the unprecedentedstep of condemning the Soviet occupation in 1968. Shortly after-wards, however, the Party started back-pedalling, andattackingCommunists who persisted in criticising the Soviet Union. Oneof those who did was Garaudy who had published his viewsabroad, most notably in Yügoslavia. Soon, hè was the onlymember of the political bureau who was out of step. In May thisyear, the Party at last expelled him.

Garaudy, too, had courage, although unlike the others, hèhas gone on declaring himself to be a Communist. His courageconsisted of standing up to the entire apparatus of the Partyhè had faithfully served all his working life.

I wonder what hè would think of the case of Parsa Nezhad.

THE NEW CONCEPT OF SOCIOLOGY(Radio Free Europe Eesearch, 25-6-'70)

One month after the purge in the Czechoslovak SociologicalSociety (see Czechoslovak SB/20, BFEB. 15 May 1970) anarticle entitled "Sociology from a Critical and a Positive Stand-point" (translated excerpts from this article appear in Czecho-slovak Press Survey No. 2322, BFEB. 26 June 1970) waspublished in Tribuna of 10 June 1970. It appeared to have beenproduced by five sociologists: Docent B. Filipcova, DocentJ. Houska, M. Hulakova, J.Krejci, and Docent M. Soukup,

- 83 -

but in the following number of Tribuna the head of the sociologydepartment of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Dr.Frantisek Charvat, was cited as another co-author. Followingthe purge a new team was installed in the Sociological Society,and this team outlines its program in the article referred to.

Most of the article is polemical, which is hardly surprisingBince this is also true of a major part of the political programOf the present Czechoslovak leadership, whose directives theöew Sociological team carries out and on whose support it relies,'the polemic is directed against so-called right-wing opportunismand liberalism and against those who represent these currentsof political thinking and endeavor. The article attacks sociologyas practised in the 1960s (and especially in 1968) and againstthose scientists who, in articles and discussions at congresses,wanted to renew Czechoslovak sociology's co-operaüon with therest of the world, a collaboration which existed prior to 1948but was forcibly interrupted by the events in February of thatyear.

The article attacks the chief representatives of Czechoslovaknon-Marxist sociology (see the Czechoslovak SB quoted above)as well as Miroslav Jodl, a former fellow of the PhilosophicalInstitute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences; BudolfBattek, a former member of the Sociological Institute and adeputy of the Czech National Council who has been in prisonsince August 1969, when hè joined in a spectacular protestagainst the occupation; and Vladimir Horsky, who is blamedfor having gone "not only beyond the borders of Marxism, butalso beyond the frontiers of our state".

The authors aöklow it was possible for these sociologists,who had been "professional Marxists" for many years, to turnin a direction which was "anti-Marxist". The answer, theybelieve, is easy. These sociologists had been exponents ofdogmatlst Marxism (read, Stalinism) and when the politicalsituation changed they were unable to recognize "genuinehistorical movement" and became "dogmatists in reverse"— who defended the opposite dogma with the same rigidity.But in the view of the authors this opposite dogma was anti-Marxist because their expelled colleagues, "at a time ofdramatic class struggle" (between January and August 1968)denied the justification of that struggle. The authors also claim

- 84 -

that their former colleagues are incompetent as sociologists:they failed to recognize the winds of change in Czechoslovaksociety in 1969 and stuck to the old ways of 1968. A good socio-logist, they say, should be able to recognize a change in time— in other words, hè should always adapt himself quickly tonew political realities.

This last criticism implies the main intention of the newteam's program: to build a new Czechoslovak sociology on thepolitical and ideological foundations established through theoccupation of the CSSR by the Soviet army. The authors of thearticle immediately follow up their criticism by saying thatCzechoslovak sociology "will be open to socialist society and itspolitical needs", a science that "expresses social andhence class tasks and interests".

It is in this spirit that the new team will tackle the tasks whichwere set for Czechoslovak sociology in the recent past, forinstance a survey of religious belief — a task which the oldSociological Institute could not carry out because of its "wrongpolitical orientation".

The new team will undoubtedly be aware of the new trendsand "class responsibilities" of Czechoslovak sociology, andwill complete the proposed survey to the satisfaction of thosewho have entrusted it with the supervision of Czechoslovakia'ssociology.

BEETHOVEN IN THE GDB

(Eadio Free Europe Research, 10-7-'70)

Beethoven's music can be truly appreciated only in the GDR,a front-page editorial of Neues Deutschland maintained (25 June1970). The article, authored by Hans-Jürgen Schaefer, Secretaryof the GDB's League of Composers and Musicians, dealt withthe response of the East German population to Beethoven's musicand with the revolutionary character of the composer himself.The arguments advanced in the article are of such an extremeand dogmatic nature that they are, in the final analysis, thorough-ly untenable and, in a sense, highly entertaining.

Thus, the author maintained that the German working class,"led by its Marxist-Leninist Party", has a particularly closerelationship to Beethoven's work. As proof of this contention,

- 85 -

the writer cited Friedrich Engels, who in 1873 reportedly calledBeethoven's compositions "the culmination of music". It might,of course, be proven historically that Engels was a music lover,but it does seem rather far-fetched to project all his personallikes and dislikes on the whole German working class.

Schaefer further claimed that Beethoven's music gaveexpression to the elan of the French revolution. So far so good.He then went on to say that the great composer wrote nis musicso that "it would become an active and activating part of thellfe of the whole people", which is really nothing but a platitude.What composer does not, after all, desire to reach and movea great number of people with his music?

Beethoven was further described as having seen beyond "thefeudalist and bourgeois limitations of his time", and therefore,Schaefer argued,

.... it can be maintained without exaggeration thatthe revolutionary composer and thinker Beethovenstrove already in his time for a genuine humanismas we have attained it in our community.... Thatis the reason why Beethoven's music can no longerhave any function in the state-monopolistic systemof West German imperialismBeethoven's work. as that of all progressive humanistartists of the past, comes alive only throughintegration into the culture of the socialist community.

If such extreme statements are the result of socialist realisttraining, the East German regime should really find anothermore acceptable form of cultural policy.

BRODYAffl - HOODLUMS A LA USSR

(Badiê%ree Europe Research, 24-7-'70)

, Summary: Once again it is evident that certainsocial phenomena which erop up throughout the

,? world also appear in the Soviet Union. The•('". socialist order is unable to protect society from

alcoholism and drug addiction, nor does it doaway with some forms of juvenile behavior.In addition to the hooligans, shirkers and othermanifestations of less positive youthful behavior,

-86 -

Soviet society — and especially the militia — isnow having to deal with hoodlums, or brodyagias they are called. In certain areas of the SovietUnion they have become something of a plague,especially in the warmer and sunnier climates.High-level legal authorities are engaged in com-batting this problem.

The Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Turkmenian SSR,V. Sokolov, recently reported on the growing number ofbrodyagi in his republic. The picture hè painted, however, isnot objective; it tends to depict any sort of behavior which doesnot conform to the system as the next thing to criminal activity.Sokolov sighs: "This hoodlumism is a great evü". (1) Thehoodlums are, hè says, for the most part healthy people whocould be usefully employed, a fact which is borne out bystatistics and medical examinations. The largest numbers ofthem are supposedly "fleeing fathers", trying to escape alimonypayments. This presumption is certainly just as much a partof Sokolov's slanderous tactics as is the claim that most of themlive off the fruits of thievery and "at least half of them" havecriminal records. The same accusations are repeated over andover; they never worked anywhere, they never finished school,they base their existence on petty thievery.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmenian SSRrecently formulated a resolution on measures to be taken againstshirkers and hoodlums. In the resolution, it becomes apparentjust how large a problem the hoodlum element has become in thisclimatically favorable republic. In the European section of theSoviet Union this sort of behavior has somewhat deeper roots.The daily newspapers have long been publishing reportscomplaining about such behavior and expressing concern thateven young girls are charged with being hoodlums, For example,Elizveta Leoncheva, a graduate of an intermediate school anda milk-maid at a sovkhoz, began her career as a hoodlum whenshe came to Moscow at 19. Ten months later she was arrestedand was unable to give any verifiable explanation of where she

(1) "Turkmenskaya Iskra" of 11 July 1970

- 87 -

had been and how she had lived in the meantime. All attemptsto resocialize her failed and she was sentenced in court. Shewas accused of having supported herself by petty thievery,jsomething to which she did not admit. The militia major I.A.iOvanov, who was temporarily responsible for her, said: "I!<San only guess how Liza lived. I only know one thing for certain,tevery brodyaga is a potential criminal". He showed the lifeëtories of some hoodlums to the press and the editorial board

, Bf Selskaya Zhizn. O. V. Egorov, a healthy 30-year-old has,; • ïor example, been a hoodlum since September 1967 and was

•caught by the militia in Ksyl-Orda Tashkent, Semipalatinsk and'Barnaul. The militia got Mm a job several times, but hè neverremained longer than a few days in each place. When last heardOf, hè had jumped on a train from Tomsk to Moscow. (2)

In other cases as well it was revealed that the hoodlums areconstantly on the move. They do not reveal their real names,ór they use pseudonyms. They are all in good health and differfrom the normal Soviet citizen in but one way: they don't wantto work. The large number of girl hoodlums is striking. MajorIvanov's final judgment of them: "Repulsive people, repulsivefor their attitude toward work, toward people, for theirparasitic attitude".

While there were but few cases of hoodlumism in the SovietUnion in the mid-1960s, the social problem has grownconsiderably since then. It is combatted with brutal methodsin the USSR. Hoodlums are assumed to be criminals and aresent off to rehabilitation camps. The "resocialization" to whichthey are subjected is usually nothing more than being given ajob somewjhere. Educational and social rehabilitation iscomplet|il| lacking.

SOVÜBfÉTSTORIANS PRÉPARÉ FOR INTERNATIONAL

sis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union,-' 70)

Summary; From August 16 to 23, 1970, Moscowplays host to the Thirteenth International Congress

) See, for example, "Sel'skaya Zhizn1" of 19 September 1969

- 88 -

of Historians. Despite assurances that Sovietparticipants will try to preserve "an academiespirit of international collaboration", it is highlylikely that the Kremlin will use the congress asa platform for further attacks on bourgeoisfalsification of history and Western imperialism,if not directly by Soviet historians then by selecteddelegates from the East bloc communist countries.

From August 16 to 23 of this year Moscow is host to theThirteenth International Congress of Historians, an event ofconsiderable political importance for Soviet historians. Some4, 000 participants from all over the world are expected (over2,400 at the previous gathering in Vienna in 1965). It willbe held against the background of an intensified Soviet campaignto combat so-called bourgeois-imperialist ideology and rightistand leftist revisionism.

The Moscow congress offers Soviet historians a convenïentopportunity to parade the "achievements" of their historicalmethod and, because it coincides with the Lenin anniversary year,they will try to use it as a propaganda platform for Leninismand its practical realization in the USSR. The opening ceremonywill be held in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, recently thescène of festivities in honor of the Lenin centenary. Soviethistorians have undertaken extensive preparations for the forth-coming event and, since late 1968, the Institute of WorldHistory of the USSR Academy of Sciences, ordered by the Partyto demonstrate the "strength of Marxist-Leninist methodology",has been compiling monographs and collections of articlesrelevant to the items on the agenda of the congress. Specialconferences on problems to be discussed in Moscow in Augusthave also been held (Voprosy istorii, No. 8, 1969, p. 15;Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, No. 6, 1969, p. 166).

The first Soviet delegation to attend a world gathering — the1928 Sixth International Congress of Historians in Oslo — wasled by the prominent Marxist historian, M.N. Pokrovsky. As mail Soviet delegation, headed by V. P. Volgin, also appearedat the 1933 Seventh International Congress in Warsaw, afterwhich contact with the outside world was severed for many years.During the period of Stalinist dogmatism and political andideological absolutism Moscow sent no representatives to the

-89 -

1938 Eighth Congress in Zurich or the 1950 Ninth Congress inJParis. During the Stalin purges many Soviet historians perishedknd in 1938 the orthodox Marxist historical school founded byI|pokrovsky was abolished and great-power chauvinism and Soviet•toatriotism began to be propagated. 1950 saw the triumph of''iltjgmatisin and the isolation of Soviet historical studies as the(Struggle against "rootless cosmopolitanism" and "WesternInfluences" was stepped up. It became tabu to consider the con-Irlbution of the pre-Marxist, "unscientific" period to the develop-inent of Soviet historical science and Western "bourgeois"feistoriography was dismissed as "pseudo-scientific". The Sovietitpproach to the study of history was proclaimed to be the onlygenuine one and therefore there could be no question ofcollaboration between Soviet historians and their foreign col-leagues.

A change came after Stalin's death and 1954 brought theannouncement of a new course in Kremlin foreign policy in thedirection of peaceful co-existence between states with differentsocial systems. Soviet historians received the appropriateinstructions, which were best expressed in Voprosy istorii(No. 8, 1955, pp. 3-10; No. l, 1956, pp. 3-12). These directivescondemned the former isolation of Soviet historical studies andconceded that international contacts are essential. Voprosyistorii maintained that Marxism-Leninism has a high regard forthe work of outstanding historians of the past and also for that ofcontemporary non-Marxist historians in the capitalist countries,whose valuable'ï$!search should be noted by Soviet historians,

should, ^l^lfore, collaborate with Western historians "toi^èllMï science and promote scientific and culturalIfêtfÖllh their joint efforts" (ibid, No. 8, 1955, p. 9).

The fornaëi?;'nêgative assessment of prë-Marxist historicalstudies and the reference to contemporary Western work astpseudo-scientific" were condemned (ibid, No. l, 1956, p. 8).

Aft part óf the new policy of peaceful co-existence SovietlÉltorians and their colleagues in the satellite countries joined

CO in 1955 and in the same year took part in the Tenthrnational Congress of Historians in Rome, since when Sovietrians have played an increasingly active part in internationalesses and symposia. Soviet scholars also establish bilateralets with fellow historians in various capitalist and develop-

- 90 -

ing countries and actively participate in the work of the numerousSoviet societies for friendship with foreign countries and in suchorganizations as the Soviet Committee for Asian and AfricanSolidarity.

This more open attitude is not primarily motivated by adesire to contribute to the furthering of world historical studiesor science and culture: it is still maintained that the study ofhistory is only a science in the Soviet Union, where it remainsfaithful to Lenin's statement that "materialism included Party-mindedness, which means the obligation to directly and franklyregard every event from the point of view of a specific socialgroup" (Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Works), Vol. l,5th ed., 1958, p. 419. Soviet historical science is an extensionof politics and a "potent ideological weapon" (Voprosy istorii.No. 8, 1969, pp. 4 and 5). These claims are an obstacle topurposeful collaboration between East and West in this field.The instructions which accompanied Soviet historians to theTenth International Congress in Rome read:

In the present situation each Soviet historian isfaced with the question of whether his work willassist the cause of peace and friendship betweennations or whether his work will be exploited bythe enemies of international collaboration to inflamechauvinistic sentiments and racial and nationalhatred for the preparation of a new world war.Every historian who is conscious of his responsibilityto the people and science cannot support a policywhich leads to the unleashing of a war. Concern forthe preservation of peace anf for scientific progresscan and must unite honest historians throughout theworld. (Ibid.. No. 8, 1955, p. 10)

But the Soviet leaders themselves regard internationalcollaboration in this field as part of the struggle against what theycall bourgeois historical studies. This was shown at the 1955Rome and, inparticular, at the 1960 Stockholm InternationalCongress of Historians. Soviet ideologists are fond of quotingthe statement by a Canadian historian that at the latter congress"Marxism took the offensive and its opponents had to defendthemselves" (ibid., No. 3, 1966, p. 6). Soviet historians rejoicethat "in Stockholm bourgeois historical science suffered a clear

-91 -

iefeat" and that this congress" was an undoubted success forarxist historical science" (Kommunist, No. 17, 1960, pp.

and 94). Here, however, the Soviet press was careful notdistinguish between a pseudo- Marxist or simply positivist

.terpretation of history and the subjective and voluntarist;ructures of Soviet Marxism-Leninism.

According to some Western observers, the 1965 Twelfthlinternational Congress of Historians in Vienna was marked by| |,less aggressive Soviet attitude and a degree of reconcüiation

the views of Soviet and Western historians. It also«< |6vealed growing discord among Marxist historians, particular-!; jr behind the scènes in private conversations and at receptions,0tc. (Helmut Neubauer, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas,Vol. 14, Wiesbaden, 1966, No. l, pp. 149-54).

Not all Soviet historians are inflexible dogmatists, of cours e;many entertain private opinions differing from those expressedia public in defense of the official Party line. In the latter years

r«rf Khrushchev's reign and the first years after the present•f'collective leadership" came to power more liberal tendencies,were evident, especially in the reassessment of Marxist-

'.ÜLejnnist dogmas, and disagreements have arisen between SovietJii'storians and their colleagues in the other East bloc countries.

Although Soviet historian M. V. Nechkina stated in her paper'«"delivered to the Vienna Congress and entitled "The Evolution/ of Historical Thought in the Middle of the Twentieth Century"5, that thé study of history should not be turnèd into a vehicle for

pesolving contemporary political disputes, there was little|dence of reconciliation with Western standpoints. Nechkina

pked Western historians for being "colonialist" and forag "reactionary nationalist racial theories" and claimedry for Marxist influences on the study of history in theand the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin

Brica.hè forthrightness of Soviet historians at the Vienna congressrasted with the reticence of their Western counterparts in

debates on such papers as "Nationalism and InternatiOnalism""Decolonization", where the colonial expansion of Imperial

ssia and the Soviet Union was barely touched upon. On therst of these themes an American historian, Hans Cohen,ferred to the revival of prolétarian internationalism as a

i>rm of socialist nationalism. These words, and also various

- 92 -

allusions in the course of debates about the attitudes of nationalminorities in the Soviet Union and the socialist camp were seenby Soviet historians as attempts to dis credit the Soviet Unionand the socialist camp in general, although in the discussion onthe problems of decolonization in Asia and Africa, Soviethistorians found support from some Western colleagues.

At the forthcoming Thirteenth International Congress ofHistorians the Soviet delegates will be expected to present aunited front. To ensure this, the Party propaganda published inconnection with the Lenin centenary has condemned isolatedattempts by Soviet historians to question basic principles ofmethodology (Kommunist, No. 5, 1969, pp. 68-81). There arealso more attacks on "bourgeois writing of history" and its"falsification of history", as can be seen from the relevantParty directives (Voprosy istorii, No. 8, 1969, pp. 3-16;No. 9, 1969, pp. 3-13) and the plans for research during theperiod 1971-75 (Istoriya SSSR, No. 6, 1969, pp. 3-25; Novayai noveishaya istoriya, No. 6, 1969, pp. 164-66). These planscall for a large number of general works, on all epochs ofworld history, which must prove the validity of the Marxist-Leninist approach. Soviet historians will also be required towrite many works devoted especially to criticism of the "bourgeoisconcept" of history and "bourgeois falsification" of the historyof Bussia and the Soviet Union.

It is probable, therefore, that the forthcoming Moscow congrésswill be marked by some ideological skirmishes between Spvietand Western historians. This is suggested by A. A. Guber, chair-man of the National Committee of Historians of the USSR, whichis responsible for organizing the congréss (Voprosy istorii,No. 3, 1970, pp. 3-11). Although there is a promise to steerclear of political arguments, and the fact that Moscow is the hostputs the onus on Soviet historians to preserve an academiespirit of international collaboration, Guber says that "Marxist -Leninist historical science can lead the offensive against hostilepositions and achieve success only if it is professionally armed withknowledge of all contemporary material" (ibid., p. 11).

Soviet historians wïll read a cbmparatively small number ofpapers at the Moscow congréss (11 out of a total of 89)and noreports, but they will be represented in force in the discussionsand debates on all papers. The 14 papers on "major themes"(i. e. on the methodology of history) and the 22 "major papers"on ancient, medieval and modern history will be discussed in the

- 93 -

by those who read them and a panel of experts in therespective fields, who will be nominated by the national com-mittees of the relevant countries.

In his report Guber announced:Our task not only consists in ensuring that the paperspresented by us are of the highest ideological leveland rest on all the dis cover ies of contemporaryscience. It is important that our voices ring out withscientific conviction and assurance from the Ups ofexperts and other participants in the discussionsThe most important task for all our organizations,institutes and groups is to put forward the bestspecialists on the problems treated by the papersto be read at the congréss for participation in thediscussions. (Ibid.)

The Moscow congréss will open with the paper "Lenin andHistory", to be read by Ye. M. Zhukov, academie secretaryof the Department of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences.Judging by the current spate of Leniniana it can be assumedthat Lenin will be presented as the figure who has given thegreatest inspiration to all seekers after historical truth. Thispaper will not be debated, but during the course of the congréssa special symposium on Lenin will be held at which Westernhistorians will be able to comment on Zhukov's opening con-tribution. Therefore, "it is the duty of Soviet historians to pré-paré properly for worthy participation in this symposium"iibid.. p. 10). The congréss will close with a paper by V.N.

izarev entitled "Medieval Russian Art and the West".Allegedly to preserve an "academie spirit of international

ïlaboration", Soviet historians will read no papers on the firstirt of the major theme "The History of the Continents", which

f la devoted to "Nationalism and the Class Struggle in the Processof Modernization in Asia and Africa" (second major theme withdiscussions by experts). On the second part of this theme, which

with Latin America, they will present one paper — "Latinlerica and the World Historical Process in the Ineteenth andrentieth Centuries". There are also no Soviet contributions

|jthe section "Contemporary History". Here Soviet historians*" merely read papers on "The Basic Features of the Cultural

irolution in the USSR" and "Change in the Social Structure of the

- 94 -

Population of the USSR". Soviet contributions are also absentamong the papers to be read on the first major theme of the con-gress ("The Methodology of History", "The Historian and theSocial Sciences"), but there will be many contributions fromhistorians from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany,Bulgaria and Bumania. All this has obviously been carefullyplanned by Soviet ideologists. When the Congress opens inAugust, the Sovi et participants will appear to support the"academie spirit of international collaboration", and adopt amoderate stand, while, at the behest of the Soviet Party CentralCommittee, certain selected historians from some East bloccountries are likely to use the discussions to bring Westernimperialism under fire on the strength of their researches.