East Coast Main Line - Lessons learned reportorr.gov.uk/.../4704/ecml-lessons-learned-report-200810.pdfEast Coast Main line Lessons Learned Report Contents Executive summary 1 1. Introduction5

EAST COAST MAIN LINE - LESSONS LEARNED REPORT

AUGUST 2010

Published by the Office of Rail Regulation

East Coast Main line Lessons Learned Report

Contents

Executive summary .............................................................................................1

1. Introduction....................................................................................................5

Purpose ...........................................................................................................5

Background .....................................................................................................5

The consultation ..............................................................................................6

Structure of this document...............................................................................7

Next steps........................................................................................................7

2. Findings and recommendations...................................................................9

Introduction......................................................................................................9

Network Rail’s role...........................................................................................9

ORR’s role .....................................................................................................27

Funders’ role..................................................................................................44

Train operators’ role ......................................................................................47

Other issues ..................................................................................................49

Current position .............................................................................................51

Annex A – chronology .......................................................................................53

Annex B – list of consultees/responses ..........................................................61

Annex C – summary of recommendations ......................................................63

OFFICE of RAIL REGULATION • August 2010 Doc # 378117.05

Executive summary

Introduction

1. This document sets out the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR)’s findings and

recommendations from the lessons learned review into the process that led

up to the issue of directions and approvals for the various East Coast Main

Line (ECML) passenger track access applications on 11 February 2010.

2. In February 2010 ORR issued directions on three applications and approved a

fourth granting three passenger train operators - East Coast Main Line

Company Limited, Grand Central Railway Company Limited and Hull Trains

Company Limited - the rights to operate additional and/or amended services

on the ECML. The process leading up to this took two years - full details are

on our website1.

3. Whilst the industry knows that difficulties were encountered at various stages

along the way, it believes that, overall, the process took too long. If the

industry is to learn from this we need to look constructively at the whole

process, including our own areas of responsibility, in order to establish:

(a) what went well;

(b) what went less well;

(c) how the process could be improved in future; and

(d) what the industry could have done differently, with the benefit of

hindsight.

4. It is clear from the information gathered that there are strong feelings within

the industry on how this process was handled. It is important that the industry

takes forward the findings and recommendations in a constructive and

positive way.

1 http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.1993

OFFICE of RAIL REGULATION• August 2010 Doc # 378117.05 1

Summary of findings

5. In summary, the main findings to come out of our discussions with

stakeholders and their representations are:

(a) Network Rail was not proactive enough in managing the access and

timetable development process and failed to take a firm line in refusing

to try and accommodate operators’ and funders’ changing requirements.

Some of the reasons for this were:

(i) the lack of a clear and transparent policy on how it integrates its

strategic planning vision into its timetable development activity and how

it prepares for major forthcoming changes in the timetable;

(ii) it does not give timetabling a high enough priority within the

company, even though the timetable is its main product;

(iii) the lack of rigorous project planning disciplines; and

(iv) the lack of a ‘controlling mind’ to ensure that the timetable is

developed in a way which is consistent with the industry’s strategic

needs;

(b) apparent problems with the resources and skills available within Network

Rail for timetabling – possibly more to do with the mix of skills than the

overall level of resource;

(c) ORR did not provide the industry with a clear enough remit, including

timescales and milestones, at the outset of the process;

(d) ORR did not ensure that clear deadlines were set for the submission of

aspirations and applications, and was not proactive in chasing Network

Rail when things lagged or progress was slow;

(e) ORR should review its policy on the publication of information during

such a process;

(f) the lack of alignment between the access planning and franchising

processes;

2 Doc # 378117.05 August 2010 • OFFICE of RAIL REGULATION

(g) the role of funders, in particular DfT, in writing its own timetable, and the

failure to take a more holistic approach;

(h) the changing requirements of train operators, which introduced

significant delays; and

(i) the lack of a constructive and joined up approach by train operators,

particularly in relation to their dealings with Network Rail.

Our views on these findings are set out in the body of the report.

Summary of recommendations

6. In order to address these findings our report makes a number of

recommendations for the industry and ourselves to take forward. These are

summarised at Annex C and include:

(a) suggestions for improving processes and communication;

(b) ensuring that robust and appropriate project management

arrangements are in place;

(c) ensuring that the necessary resources are in place;

(d) being clear and transparent about what is expected of all stakeholders;

and

(e) seeking to align as far as possible the access planning and franchising

processes.

As the report indicates, many of these recommendations have already been

acted upon. For example, in launching the West Coast Main Line (WCML)

capacity allocation exercise in June, Network Rail and ORR have tried to

ensure that as many of the failures of the ECML process as possible are

taken on board. For our part we have issued Network Rail with a clear remit,

and put in place appropriate project management arrangements with clear

milestones and timescales. Network Rail has similarly put in place suitable

project management arrangements, including the appointment of a project

manager and senior responsible officer. It has also ensured that there are

clear lines of communication across its organisation and that the necessary


resources have been allocated to the project. To date these are working

effectively.

The way forward

7. Neither Network Rail nor ORR are complacent about what remains to be

done, and we will continue to work closely together to ensure that matters

continue to improve, not just in the area of timetable development and

capacity allocation, but across all major projects. I have already met with

Robin Gisby and Paul Plummer of Network Rail to discuss our findings and

am pleased to say that they welcome the recommendations for the industry as

set out in this report. We have also discussed what further steps should be

taken to develop the industry's ‘strategic timetabling’ capability, where we

believe that Network Rail is well placed to play a more proactive role in

working with its customers to identify opportunities for timetable

improvements.

8. But it is not just about Network Rail and ORR. Whilst it is our view that

Network Rail was perhaps rather too flexible in its approach to the ECML – in

particular in trying to meet the various competing and changing demands - it

has to be recognised that it has a difficult task in managing an industry

process on behalf of a range of parties. As our report explains, finding the

right balance is not always easy and funders and train operators must play

their part and work more constructively with the aim of securing the best

whole industry solution – clearly this was not always the case in respect of the

ECML process.

9. There have been positive signs over the last year or so to show that the

industry recognises the need to work together – for example, through the

outputs of the current joint industry review of access planning processes. This

must continue and, as the report indicates, we intend to play our part.

10. We look forward to continuing to work with the industry to ensure that all of

the recommendations are implemented as quickly and efficiently as possible.

John Thomas

Director, Railways Markets and Economics

20 August 2010


1. Introduction

Purpose

1.2 The purpose of this document is to set out the findings of our review into the

process that led up to the issue of directions and approvals for the various

East Coast Main Line (ECML) passenger track access applications on

11 February 2010.

1.3 We have reached these findings following discussions with some of the

interested stakeholders and we are grateful to them for their helpful and

detailed contributions. Through this document we report on the comments

received and set out our findings.

Background

1.4 The process began on 29 February 2008 when we wrote to the industry to

identify all operators’ aspirations for additional track access rights on the

ECML. In this letter we advised that we would consider and decide the future

capacity allocation on this important part of the national network.

1.5 In the letter we referred to our reasons document of 6 April 2006 on the

competing applications from Grand Central Railway Company Limited

(Grand Central), Great North Eastern Railway Limited (GNER) and

Hull Trains Company Limited (Hull Trains) for access rights on the ECML.

In that document we said that, due to the uncertainty about the capacity

available, the approval of rights for further additional inter-city services (over

and above those contemplated by our decision) should await the completion

of the ECML Route Utilisation Strategy (RUS), unless there was compelling

evidence to the contrary. We said that we expected to receive a number of

applications for track access rights following the establishment of the RUS,

either for new services or firm long-term rights in place of those running under

contingent or short-term rights. The RUS was established on 29 April 2008

and in anticipation of any applications, we wanted to ensure that we could

consider the relevant questions of access allocation as quickly as possible in

the full knowledge of all operators’ aspirations. This was the reason for our

request to operators to let us know if they intended to make any applications.


1.6 Subsequently, a number of operators submitted track access applications.

Whilst it was difficult for Network Rail to assess the total available capacity

because of the various service permutations applied for, it was clear at the

outset that there was insufficient capacity to accommodate all the rights

sought by all the operators. We therefore initiated two work streams - a

capacity and performance assessment by Network Rail and our own

economic assessment of the competing applications. Our letters setting out

the process, various reports, stakeholders' comments, and decision

documentation are available from our website2.

1.7 In total the process took some two years and a number of difficulties were

encountered at various stages along the way. A chronology of events is

attached at Annex A. In the light of that it was decided to carry out a lessons

learned review. In order to get the most from such a review we decided at the

outset to look constructively at the whole process, including our own areas of

responsibility, in order to establish:

(a) what went well;

(b) what went less well;

(c) how the process could be improved in future; and

(d) what the industry could have done differently with the benefit of

hindsight.

1.8 We wrote to interested stakeholders, listed at Annex B, on 5 March 2010

informing them of the review and inviting their contributions.

The consultation

1.9 We held meetings with those stakeholders with a direct interest in the ECML,

namely: Network Rail, the ECML passenger operators who had been seeking

rights (East Coast Trains, Grand Central and Hull Trains), the major freight

operators (DB Schenker Rail (UK) Limited (DB Schenker) and Freightliner

Group Limited (Freightliner)), the funders (the Department for Transport (DfT)

and Transport Scotland (TS)), and the passenger representative bodies

(Passenger Focus and London TravelWatch). Alliance Rail Holdings (Alliance

Rail) and Northern Rail Limited also accepted our offer to meet other

2 http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.1993.


recipients of our letter. Four consultees, Alliance Rail, London TravelWatch,

the Rail Freight Group and TS also submitted written responses, and these

have been posted on our website3.

1.10 We are grateful to the industry for its contributions and the detailed and

helpful suggestions received.

1.11 Alliance Rail felt that we should extend the review to examine the process

leading up to the original granting of rights to Grand Central, as many of the

difficulties encountered there manifested themselves again with the more

recent applications. However, we felt that this was not appropriate because

we wanted to focus on learning the lessons from this specific exercise and we

were not convinced that there was any more to be gained from going back to

the original Grand Central decision.

1.12 For ease of reference the term East Coast Trains (ECT) has been used

throughout to represent the ECML long distance franchise operator,

irrespective of whether East Coast, GNER or NXEC Trains Limited (NXEC)

was operating the services.

Structure of this document

1.13 This document represents our final report and conclusions and is structured

as follows:

(a) Chapter 2 sets out our findings and recommendations;

(b) Annex A contains a chronology of events from 28 February 2008 to

12 February 2010, when the parties entered into their contracts/

agreements;

(c) Annex B lists consultees and responses/interviews; and

(d) Annex C summarises the recommendations for ease of reference.

Next steps

1.14 Work is of course already in hand to rectify many of the problems that

occurred during the ECML project. In particular, the industry’s review of

access planning4 is making improvements to the access planning process,


4 For further information see http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.2253.


including the introduction of an ‘overhauled’ Part D of the Network Code, and

the introduction of some guidance to ensure closer alignment between the

access planning and franchising processes. Through our review of access

policy5 we expect to introduce further changes to improve, simplify and

streamline our processes.

1.15 Since starting this review we published a letter on 14 May 2010 seeking to

identify all operators’ aspirations, both passenger and freight, for new or

amended access rights on the West Coast Main Line (WCML) and setting out

the process and timescales involved6. In doing so we have, as far as

possible, picked up many of the concerns the industry had with the ECML

process:

(a) setting out clear timescales and process;

(b) keeping aspirations confidential during the early stages of the process, to

prevent tactical applications;

(c) agreeing not to publish interim capacity allocation and associated

timetabling and performance information until we publish our decision;

and

(d) agreeing a clear remit with Network Rail.

For its part, Network Rail has put in place robust project management

arrangements, including the appointment of a project manager.

1.16 We recognise that some of the recommendations contained in this report will

take longer to implement. Nevertheless, we will work with the industry to

ensure that the necessary changes and improvements are introduced as

quickly as possible.

5 For further information see http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.2254.



2. Findings and recommendations

Introduction

2.1 As explained in Chapter 1, we decided to look at the whole process, from the

point at which Network Rail received multiple requests for access through to

its implementation of our decisions on the various access applications.

This chapter reflects the information we have received from stakeholders

either in writing or through face to face interviews. This is set out by issue,

followed by our findings and, where appropriate, a recommendation.

Network Rail’s role

Overview

2.2 There was considerable criticism of Network Rail from all stakeholders on

many aspects of its performance. There was general agreement that Network

Rail lacked strategic vision and preparedness. This was evidenced by its

failure to plan for forthcoming events such as refranchising, the

commissioning of enhancements and, in the case of ECML, the constraints

on capacity, given its knowledge that operators were seeking increased

access. Stakeholders also felt that throughout the ECML process Network

Rail took too long to respond, that it was reactive rather than proactive, and

that the shortcomings exhibited in the ECML process had also been evident

during the earlier WCML and Midland Main Line timetable developments.

2.3 Many stakeholders put these failings down to Network Rail’s management

structure and the culture within the organisation, which was considered to be

overly bureaucratic, negative and lacking in clear leadership, particularly at a

senior level. The ECML timetable was developed without the benefit of

rigorous project planning and many stakeholders were unhappy with the way

in which they were involved in the process.

2.4 However, there was a general feeling from passenger operators that the work

produced by Network Rail’s timetable planning team was good and that when

they were given clear instructions it had gone well, although, as discussed

below, freight operators felt sidelined. It was also generally agreed that much

better progress was made when Network Rail eventually established

workshops and scheduled bi-lateral meetings with operators. Even though


it may have taken some time to produce the timetable that accompanied

Network Rail’s report, it did actually meet the majority of train operator

requirements.

ORR’s views

2.5 Many of the issues raised by stakeholders are discussed in more detail

below, but in general we agree with many of the criticisms. Overall, it is clear

that Network Rail should have taken a more proactive role in managing the

process and in preventing operators’ and funders’ changing requirements

from extending timescales to the extent they did.

Network Rail’s views

2.6 Network Rail recognises that it can do better in developing new timetables,

but has pointed out that there will always be a difficult balance when

managing an industry process on behalf of a range of parties, all of whom will

have different objectives. It also said that more often than not it had to work to

very tight and fixed deadlines. It also made the valid point that the rest of the

industry must share some of the responsibility and demonstrate a more

joined up and constructive approach. For example, stakeholders must

understand that it is difficult for Network Rail to start developing a detailed

timetable without specifications from all the affected operators. Funders

should also support Network Rail in delivering agreed processes.

Strategic approach

Findings

2.7 The majority of stakeholders expressed strong views that Network Rail:

(a) has a lack of strategic planning and vision in its timetable planning

process, including a lack of preparedness for significant forthcoming

events such as the ECML process;

(b) displays a lack of service planning, instead focusing on the detailed

timetable: and

(c) has no overall process when a major timetable change is envisaged.

2.8 It was felt that Network Rail does not look at the bigger picture. This was

seen by many to be an institutional problem, with timetable planners only

expecting to validate bids when they are told to do so, rather than having the

skills to plan ahead and design efficient and commercially attractive


timetables. For example, Network Rail was aware that operators wanted to

increase their usage of the ECML and that to accommodate them a standard

pattern timetable would be necessary. But it did nothing until prompted by

ORR to do so.

2.9 Operators’ negative attitude and lack of faith in Network Rail is due in part to

Network Rail having shown both a lack of understanding of the available

capacity and how to optimise its allocation. Its previous failure to identify

capacity for ECT’s Leeds half-hourly services and Grand Central’s

Sunderland services was noted. In 2005 there were 124 long distance

franchised services plus 12 Hull Trains services, and Network Rail said there

was capacity for only six more (three each way) – a total of 142 long-distance

services. In May 2011 there will be 189 per day. Had Network Rail

understood the capacity actually available, instead of saying that it could not

offer any further paths in addition to those already in the timetable, Grand

Central could have been running its Bradford services much earlier.

ORR’s views

2.10 There appear to be significant shortcomings in Network Rail’s strategic

planning and its ability to look ahead and become a proactive rather than a

reactive organisation. The proposals currently being developed by the

industry working group (IWG) to establish a calendar of events and project

working groups7 to oversee significant projects such as the ECML process

will help to ensure that:

(a) Network Rail is better placed to take a more proactive approach in

leading the industry, as evidenced by its current approach on the WCML,

and ensuring that it can respond more effectively to the needs of its

customers; and

(b) interested stakeholders are involved at the outset, providing them with a

process that enables them to work with Network Rail to make best use of

capacity.

2.11 In addition to the changes being proposed through the review of access

planning, Network Rail is currently undertaking a major restructuring of its

train planning function which will see this operation centralised by the end of

7 These new arrangements, which are still in the process of being developed, will be

enshrined in Part D in due course.


August 20108. This should deliver a number of benefits and improvements

including a more joined up, consistent service and a more effective way of

planning ahead.

2.12 As already indicated above, ORR has discussed with Network Rail what

further steps should be taken to develop the industry's ‘strategic timetabling’

capability. It was agreed that Network Rail is well placed to play a more

proactive role in working with its customers to identify opportunities for

timetable improvements - seeking to balance the need for improved reliability

with frequency and journey times and to strengthen the link to RUSs.

However, it was recognised that the financial incentives on the organisation

were not balanced, partly because these incentives had been designed to

focus particularly on performance improvement and on the delivery of

infrastructure enhancements. Network Rail considered that it was seeking to

"do the right thing" despite the apparent incentives while discussing with

ORR, Government and its customers how these incentives could be

improved through the Value for Money study and the periodic review. It was

also recognised that the organisation had made significant investments in

capacity, timetable and performance analysis people, systems and

processes, but that further work was needed in conjunction with Network

Rail's customers. It was agreed that Network Rail and ORR should continue

to develop their plans concerning access planning to address these issues.

2.13 Notwithstanding the above, we also believe that it would be helpful to the

industry if Network Rail was to develop and publish a clear and transparent

policy statement on how it will integrate its strategic planning vision with its

timetable development activity and, for significant projects, appoint a

‘controlling mind’ who ensures that the access planning process is carried out

in a way that is consistent with the strategic needs of the industry and its

customers. Any such statement should include the role of stakeholders and

what Network Rail expects of them in terms of pre-planning and information.

2.14 Recommendation - Network Rail should:

(a) develop and publish a clear and transparent policy on how it will

integrate its strategic planning vision with its timetable

8 Although the majority of Network Rail Operations Planning staff will be based in Milton

Keynes from that date, a satellite office will remain in Leeds until 2012.


development activity – this should probably be included in Network

Rail’s network statement; and

(b) appoint a ‘controlling mind’ who ensures that the access planning

process is carried out in a way that is consistent with the strategic

needs of the industry and its customers.

ECML RUS

Findings

2.15 There was a general view, particularly from train operators, that the root

cause of the problems experienced on the ECML actually started much

earlier than two years ago with the development of the ECML RUS, which

many believed had led the industry astray. It was also pointed out that the

idea of a five trains per hour standard pattern timetable was first discussed

with Railtrack by ECT back in 1999, although very little came out of it.

2.16 The former Strategic Rail Authority started work on an ECML RUS in 2002,

and completed it in early 2005, but it was never published. In April 2005

responsibility passed to Network Rail, who restarted the process, but it was

two years in the making and used data which was three years out of date.

It was acknowledged that an already complex RUS was further complicated

by the intense competition for capacity between ECT, Hull Trains and Grand

Central on the one hand, and passenger versus freight services on the other.

It was also felt that Network Rail’s unwillingness to produce an outline

timetable to inform the RUS did not help matters.

2.17 In June 2007 the draft RUS concluded that without infrastructure

enhancements a timetable with six long distance passenger trains plus one

freight train per hour (6 + 1) was not possible without an unacceptable impact

on performance and journey times. The effect of the draft RUS was to put the

industry on a hostile footing and as a consequence it was challenged by ECT

in September 2007. It is argued that the RUS was not fit for purpose, given

that subsequent timetable development work has produced a 6 + 1 timetable

with ‘generally’ improved, rather than worse, journey times and no significant

predicted impact on performance

2.18 Despite having a RUS, at the start of the ECML process Network Rail gave

every indication of not knowing what the capacity of the core route actually

was. Indeed, one stakeholder questioned whether Network Rail understood

what additional capacity will be made available by the CP4 enhancements.


There was also criticism that, even after publication of the RUS, Network Rail

was still unwilling to agree to sell rights for any additional services.

As a result, operators were forced to prepare and submit section 17 or 22A

applications which cost them additional time and money.

ORR’s views

2.19 We agree that there needs to be better alignment and correlation between

RUSs and other industry strategic planning processes, including franchising

and access planning and timetabling. It would clearly be beneficial if RUSs

were established prior to the signing of new franchises and track access

applications, which would mean prioritising them. This did not happen on the

ECML and will not happen on the WCML unless DfT extends the current

West Coast franchise.

2.20 On Network Rail’s willingness or otherwise to sell rights, it is important to note

the interaction between service specification and the consumption of

capacity. Whilst Network Rail may know what capacity is available, this does

not mean it will be in a position to say whether a specific permutation of

services, which comprise a complex mix of stopping patterns,

converging/diverging services and train types/speeds etc., can be

accommodated. This is why our letter of 14 May 2010, in which we sought

aspirations for new services on the WCML, set out very clearly the

information that we felt Network Rail required in order to assess the

aspirations.

2.21 However, work is in hand through the industry’s access planning review not

only to improve access planning processes, but also to consider how the

interaction between the current franchising and access planning processes

could be improved to ensure that users obtain maximum benefit from the

process, including more clarity for franchise bidders. Work is under way to

produce a statement setting out proposed principles for industry engagement

during the period leading up to the Invitation to Tender (ITT) and formalisation

of a franchise specification. If adopted, this should improve the overall

process and outcomes of refranchising. This policy would of course be

subject to the discretion of franchising authorities.

2.22 Work is also in hand, through our review of access policy, to clarify the role of

RUSs. This will consider how we will take them into account when making

access decisions.


2.23 Recommendation:

(a) Network Rail to ensure that there is better alignment between the

access planning and RUS processes;

(b) funders are encouraged to support an approach which gives better

alignment between the access planning and franchising processes;

and

(c) ORR to clarify the relationship between RUSs and decisions on the

allocation of capacity and set these out in its criteria and

procedures document.

Network Rail’s structure & culture

Findings

2.24 The appropriateness of Network Rail’s structure was questioned by a number

of stakeholders. It is seen by some to be a very bureaucratic organisation

operating in silos, with an apparent lack of empowerment at key levels of the

organisation. This is an impediment to it reaching quick decisions.

For example, it was thought that there was very limited communication and

interaction between the commercial, strategic planning and timetable

planning teams, resulting in a lack of continuity between short/medium term

timetabling, long-term timetabling and the contractual arrangements.

Furthermore, the process for achieving internal approval takes too long and

involves too many people e.g. freight operator customer teams may have to

contact numerous people within Network Rail to get matters resolved.

2.25 It was also suggested that Network Rail is incentivised not to want additional

services running on the network as they may impact adversely on the PPM

targets. PPM is now so important that it is seen as an impediment to growth.

As a result, operators are not always willing to work and engage

constructively with Network Rail. Notwithstanding commercial interests, there

is an unwillingness to look at the bigger picture with Network Rail’s letters of

June and October 2009 being cited as evidence. It was also argued that, if it

can be proved that more trains can run without infrastructure enhancement,

some of Network Rail’s investment schemes could be in jeopardy: a further

incentive for Network Rail to refuse additional services.

2.26 Furthermore, the person doing most of the timetable development on the

ECML had a limited idea of the commercial value of individual paths as


Network Rail’s timetable planners tend to work in isolation from the

commercial team. This also meant that the commercial team did not appear

to be fully versed in what the timetable planners were doing, as the timetable

planners were just trying to fit everyone in, and were paying limited attention

to journey times and other revenue-related issues.

2.27 There was a strong view from the interviews that there exists within Network

Rail a ‘can’t do, won’t do’ culture, with everything seen as a battle, and an

approach that appears to focus on demonstrating why new proposals cannot

be accommodated rather than on generating solutions. Network Rail is also

seen as being too negative and too far removed from both its customers and

the passengers and other end users. It will always revert to the easiest

solution, rather than the best, erring on the side of caution. Essentially,

Network Rail is seen as a risk-averse organisation. Some of the criticisms

were qualified by statements that this does not apply to individuals, such as

the timetable planners, but to senior management.

2.28 For its part Network Rail accepted that communication between teams had

been poor, but felt that getting the CRE teams involved in the process was

one of the things that had worked well. In terms of understanding the

commercial values of paths, Network Rail said that its planning team do take

into account the commercial and societal value of the services affected in

making capacity allocation decisions. However, it argued that its view is

limited by the extent of its detailed knowledge on variables such as revenue

or indeed the sensitivity of that revenue to the various possible timetabling

decisions. Network Rail accepts that it does not always get it right. It also

pointed out that given the extent of change to the specification over the

ECML development period, it would seem that those with access to more

detailed information also do not always get it right first time.

ORR’s views

2.29 Whilst we acknowledge some of the criticism levelled at Network Rail, it

appears to us that many of the issues arose from other factors rather than the

organisational structure. For example:

(a) poor communication within the organisation;

(b) the lack of a dedicated project manager; and

(c) the lack of an overall ‘controlling mind’ to look after the project.


2.30 On culture, we are aware that there have been a number of issues and the

impression certainly appears to have been in the past that the default

response was often to explain why things cannot be done – rather than to

investigate how they might be done. It is not unknown for Network Rail to

refuse access, only for a train operator to demonstrate how its needs can be

met. There also appears to be evidence of a disconnect between Network

Rail’s timetabling function and the needs of passengers and freight

customers. It is worth saying that we do not feel that this sort of response was

true of the Network Rail team that undertook the ECML work. Indeed, as

explained elsewhere in this report, we felt that Network Rail was perhaps too

flexible. Having said that, Network Rail recognises that change is required

and that there is a need for it to develop good, long-term working

relationships with its stakeholders and customers that are built upon

openness, fairness and trust, so that it is as easy as possible for people to do

business with it. Network Rail has already introduced changes and an

important element of these is its Stakeholder Relations code of practice9,

which lets people know what they can expect from Network Rail, every time

they deal with the organisation.

2.31 As part of its project management arrangements for significant timetable

developments, Network Rail must ensure that it always appoints a project

manager and designates someone at a senior level as the ‘controlling mind’.

The former will drive the project, keeping it on track, ensuring timescales are

met and ensuring good cross organisational working and communications.

The latter has to be an experienced service planner, with a good

understanding of timetabling, resourcing and commercial requirements.

2.32 Network Rail appears to have taken these points on board and is ensuring

that appropriate project management arrangements are in place, e.g. in

respect of the WCML process. More generally, Network Rail will be reflecting

these lessons in all future workstreams, for example, its preparation for the

expected recommencement of DfT’s refranchising programme later in the

year.

2.33 Network Rail has recognised the need to develop a greater understanding

within the organisation that the timetable is its fundamental offering to its

customers and stakeholders and that all activities should be focused on

9 See Network Rail’s website at http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/1544.aspx for further

information.


delivering it. This heightened recognition of the central importance of the

timetable, together with the adoption of a more systematic project

management approach to major re-casts, should result in a more pro-active,

two-way exchange of information between train planning and other Network

Rail functions.

2.34 Recommendation - Network Rail to:

(a) ensure that internal communications are improved between teams

working on the access planning activity and that it has in place

clear guidelines and processes;

(b) continue with its work on introducing updated guidance on

stakeholder engagement; and

(c) review its project management arrangements for timetable

development to ensure that they are rigorous and include the

appointment of a dedicated project manager and a senior

responsible officer.

Timetabling & resources

Timetabling

Findings

2.35 There was a general feeling from passenger operators that the work

produced by Network Rail’s timetable planning team was good and that,

when they were given clear instructions, it had gone well. However, some

considered the remit for the timetable planners was too restricted, resulting in

Network Rail looking at the timetable specification from a very narrow

viewpoint, without considering the consequences. For example, Network Rail:

(a) developed a timetable option which it thought best met everyone’s needs

but it was not what the funders wanted;

(b) overlooked some of the issues such as the benefits of the Durham Coast

re-signalling; and

(c) concentrated on the Edinburgh – London and Leeds – London routes for

passenger trains and Peterborough – Doncaster for freight services,

ignoring the routes beyond these core routes. Therefore, path matching

for freight services could not be carried out.


2.36 On the latter point, freight operators generally felt sidelined, even though they

confirmed that in parallel workstreams they were fully engaged throughout,

e.g. the development of the ECML RUS and in the Strategic Capacity work

stream. Their main concerns were:

(a) freight services were always being left until last in timetabling terms,

irrespective of the level of rights held by the respective passenger and

freight operators;

(b) that at all stages the information provided by Network Rail on which they

were being asked to comment was incomplete. This made it difficult for

them to comment fully as they were unable to assess the implications for

their current services and for capacity remaining to accommodate future

freight services. As a result they wasted much time and effort attending

meetings; and

(c) the timetabling work did not establish whether the paths identified for

freight services on the ECML were compatible with available paths on

adjacent routes. This meant that the effects on freight services/paths

could not be considered for the through journeys from origin to

destination, with the freight operators unable to ascertain whether what

was being proposed complied with their access rights.

2.37 In its response to our consultation, the Rail Freight Group (RFG) wrote

pointing out that, although the freight operators had provided their

requirements at the beginning of the process, they were not taken into

account in the December 2008 capacity report. By October 2009 when the

draft timetable was issued, although some progress had been made, there

were still significant freight issues outstanding. Given our plan to make an

early decision on specific rights, RFG was surprised that decisions were

about to be taken when the impact on freight was unknown and unresolved.

Whilst accepting that most of the issues were resolved by the time we finally

issued directions, RFG said that it failed to see why it took two years from

freight operators submitting their requirements to reach a position where

pathing of existing freight services and paths for freight growth were resolved.

It concluded that the requirements of freight and other users must be included

at the outset of timetable development, not as an afterthought. Sadly, the

ECML is not the only example of such an approach.

2.38 Stakeholders also acknowledged that Network Rail had to be responsible for

the development of the timetable, though one suggestion was that the service


design could have been contracted out with the detailed timetabling then

undertaken by Network Rail. A couple of stakeholders suggested that rather

than adapting the existing timetable it would have been better to start again,

e.g. by using the Taktfahrplan concept to develop a completely new timetable

using external resources if necessary.

2.39 Grand Central commented that it had not benefited form the standard pattern

timetable; in fact, the opposite applied, with journey times on average longer.

It queried why, if there had to be only one open access service in the hour,

did it have to be at the same time each hour – why not a different path on

alternate hours, slower for Hull Trains, with its additional station stops, faster

for Grand Central, non-stop south of Doncaster or York? Hull Trains too

thought that it would have been better if Network Rail had varied the standard

pattern.

2.40 Alliance Rail expressed the view that Network Rail was not flexible enough in

developing the timetable, instead taking a dogmatic approach and using the

existing timetable as the base, with the Anglo-Scottish service not leaving

King’s Cross at a time to make maximum use of the capacity available.

Furthermore, instead of looking at a standard pattern timetable for the whole

route, Network Rail should have looked at creating standard paths over

separate sections of the route. Also, Network Rail had not made maximum

use of the capacity available - for example, having ECT’s departures from

King’s Cross five minutes apart when the signal headway is only three

minutes.

2.41 We did not ask Network Rail to produce a weekend timetable, because the

priority was to establish that an acceptable weekday timetable could be

delivered containing all the services for which we had said we would grant

approval. Nevertheless, operators felt that Network Rail should have

produced a weekend timetable. Indeed, Grand Central noted that, if Network

Rail had produced an acceptable weekend timetable at the same time as that

for weekdays, it might not have objected to the worsening of its weekday

timetable, given that Grand Central’s best train loadings are on Sundays.

Resources

Findings

2.42 There was general agreement that Network Rail had not devoted sufficient

resources to the development of the timetable. Questions were raised as to


whether Network Rail generally is sufficiently resourced, both in terms of

quality and quantity, to deal with timetable requests, let alone to be proactive

and come to the operators with proposals. Respondents said that Network

Rail does not have enough train planners with the necessary knowledge and

experience who know the route. It is not unknown for it to rely on timetabling

input from the train operators. Whilst the passenger operators were generally

able to engage on this basis, this was not easily achieved by national freight

operators, who have to deal with all the planning offices and have neither the

time nor the staff to help Network Rail in detailed timetable development

work.

2.43 Given that Network Rail sometimes has difficulty in covering its normal

timetable workload, it was suggested that it should use external resources

when something like the ECML process comes up, as it had when the

December 2008 WCML timetable had been developed. It was felt that that

resource should be independent - the use of a resource from one of the

applicants not being acceptable due to lack of impartiality. However, some

stakeholders felt that Network Rail already has sufficient people in its access

planning function (thought to be over 300). The problem is that they work in

three separate functions – strategic (including performance modelling),

permanent and short term timetable planning. When there is a priority in one

area it appears that staff cannot be drafted in from one or both of the other

two functions to help to resolve a major issue quickly.

2.44 There were also differing views on Network Rail’s policy of consolidation of

timetabling in one location (Milton Keynes) rather than it being in separate

offices. Some saw this as beneficial because it would avoid the issue of the

separate planning offices appearing to operate independently, looking only at

their particular area of responsibility rather than the end to end timetable –

this was of particular relevance to long distance freight services. However,

most stakeholders felt that Network Rail’s future timetabling capability is at

risk given the unwillingness of some experienced staff to move to Milton

Keynes. They felt that there is a long learning curve and local knowledge is

important, so centralisation was not a good idea. A few stakeholders noted

that Network Rail has already lost many experienced timetablers and raised

questions over how and when it is going to replace them. It was also pointed

out that Network Rail was relying on one experienced timetable planner to

complete the ECML timetable before he retires this month.


2.45 Although there is a belief that ITPS, when functioning properly, will make

matters easier for Network Rail and the industry, Network Rail will still need

experienced staff to produce complex new timetables, such as those on the

WCML and ECML. The next twelve months will be challenging for Network

Rail.

ORR’s views

2.46 Whilst we acknowledge the work produced by Network Rail’s timetabling

team, we have some sympathy with the general view expressed by

stakeholders that Network Rail gives insufficient priority to timetabling and

therefore does not devote sufficient resources to it. It needs to be much better

resourced in terms of the number of staff as well as their knowledge. Network

Rail’s ethos appears to be to give the job to one person and let him/her get

on with it, meaning he/she has to deal with all the train operators. Whilst

he/she appears to be trying to satisfy the needs of everyone, it sometimes

means that the operator who shouts loudest and most often gets what it

wants. Such an approach also led to a lack of suitable cover when the senior

timetable planner was absent on leave or otherwise out of the office.

Everyone interviewed agreed that the process took too long and the lack of

resource in this area was one of the main contributing factors throughout the

two years.

2.47 On the issues raised by the freight sector (paragraph 2.36 above), again we

have some sympathy with the views expressed and we are certainly

concerned to ensure that the requirements of freight operators are taken into

account and not sidelined, particularly where they hold established access

rights. However, it should be remembered that the purpose of the ECML

exercise was to establish a standard pattern passenger timetable - freight

does not, of course, conform to a standard pattern. Therefore, in our view, the

only way Network Rail could sensibly undertake this work was to first

establish the broad standard passenger pattern and then determine whether

it left sufficient space for the required freight services.

2.48 It was widely recognised across the industry that a standard pattern timetable

was the best way forward in order to create the extra capacity required to

meet as many of the demands for additional paths as possible. It was our

understanding that a standard pattern timetable was necessary to

accommodate all the services that we approved in the decision of February

2009. We did set a number of parameters for Network Rail – namely that the


WCML timetable should not need to be amended and that a major re-write of

the ScotRail timetable was not an option. This fixed Transpennine Express,

CrossCountry, West Coast Trains and some ScotRail services at

Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow and Edinburgh, which limited the room for

change on the ECML. The open access operators had every opportunity

during the process to make their views known.

2.49 Whilst the process for development of a detailed timetable may still work on

those parts of the network where there is a dominant operator (providing that

operator is prepared to work closely with Network Rail), it does not work well

where there are multiple operators, such as on the ECML. The process for

significant long term change to the timetable has been conducted very much

on an ad hoc basis up to now. As a result it can be expensive, lengthy,

possibly lead to sub-optimal use of scarce capacity and can even present a

barrier to entry for new operators. This issue has been addressed by the

recent review of access planning, and the proposals of that review are being

incorporated into the process for considering new access applications for the

WCML.

2.50 We have already mentioned at paragraph 2.11 Network Rail’s plans for

centralising its timetable planning discipline which, when established, is

intended to remove many of the planning and resourcing issues experienced

on the ECML. It is also worth repeating the good work that has been carried

out by the IWG in overhauling Part D of the network code to produce a

process that is clear, transparent and works. The proposal for change is

currently going through the consultation process. The IWG will follow up with

a further proposal for change that will introduce the Calendar of Events and

project working groups, which are first being tested on a specific December

2011 timetable change, and a revised Decision Criteria.

2.51 Recommendation: The timetabling process should be accorded more

priority within Network Rail, properly resourced and conducted in line

with rigorous project planning disciplines. Network Rail should produce

and publish a clear process which would accurately reflect the

requirements of the network code.


Stakeholder engagement

Findings

2.52 The general message we received was that the industry workshops, when

eventually organised, worked well. This was because they created the

opportunity for Network Rail to get an understanding of all stakeholders’

requirements and enabled compromises to be agreed, so that the best overall

solution could be more easily identified. However, some stakeholders felt that

as the process continued the workshops became shorter, with Network Rail

becoming more defensive and not giving enough opportunity for discussion of

what it had produced.

2.53 The point was also made that the Network Rail/ORR/ECT meetings in

December 2009 achieved a lot, with Robin Gisby’s approach at these

meetings removing many of the blockages. Whilst this was welcomed,

respondents asked how the industry got into a position where the May 2011

timetable Priority Date had to be deferred.

2.54 Concern was expressed that after we issued our decision in February 2009,

ECT worked with Network Rail unilaterally on its own aspirations, but that

only one month’s real work was done by Network Rail before the process

became multilateral. It was only with the three days of workshops in

August 2009 that progress began to be made. Stakeholders said that, without

our prompting Network Rail to start talking to the operators and other

stakeholders, the process would have been delayed even further.

2.55 Network Rail acknowledged that whilst some of the one to one meetings had

been productive, others were not, as it tried to respond to changing

requirements put to it during those meetings. With hindsight it recognised that

it should have exerted better control earlier in the process.

2.56 The passenger representative bodies were pleased that we included them in

our consultations, but were concerned that the industry does not always

involve them. In the case of the ECML process, they thought they were not

involved early enough in the process and were not involved in any of the

timetable development meetings. They saw an enhanced role for

stakeholders in the development of timetables, so that they are for the benefit

of passengers. The formal involvement of stakeholders is vital to the outcome

producing the correct balance between the interests of the operators,


funders, infrastructure manager and the end users, both passengers and

freight customers.

2.57 Passenger Focus argued that there needs to be sufficient transparency for

passengers and stakeholders to understand and discuss the issues at two

stages in the process:

(a) an outline specification showing quantum, indicative stopping patterns,

and, where applicable, journey times. The specification should also

provide detail about what individual operators are trying to achieve – e.g.

maximisation of revenues, or better utilisation of rolling stock; and

(b) a detailed timetable, which must be the whole timetable – i.e. including

local services on the route and services feeding into those on the route.

When a timetable is already well developed it is very difficult to change the

principles, which is why passengers need to be asked their views at the

outset. Similarly, the views of local authorities, regional stakeholders and user

groups should be obtained.

2.58 Passenger Focus understood why we only consult the industry and the

passenger representative bodies about track access applications but said

that as we make decisions which affect the service that passengers get,

we needed to involve them as well. Such a consultation would flush out the

downsides, which can be glossed over at present. Passenger Focus believes

it is important to ensure that there is a good understanding of the advantages

and disadvantages of proposals.

2.59 Many consultees were in favour of the proposals to establish stakeholder

working groups, with a clear remit and project plan incorporating a Calendar

of Events for major timetable changes, coming out of the access planning

review, and to be included in Part D of the network code. It was suggested

that we should monitor delivery of the project. Both passenger representative

bodies would like to see a more holistic approach, and believed that creating

a project group, involving them, to oversee any major change in the timetable

of a route - caused by a new franchise, new services, new infrastructure etc.

would be beneficial. It would provide them with an opportunity to take a

strategic view of the timetable and remind operators of the need to sense

check the emerging work against passenger needs.


2.60 However, there were some concerns, in particular that Network Rail would

use such a forum as a means of delay and that it would only work when

operators had been allocated a quantum of paths by ORR – i.e. not in the first

part of the process, when operators do not have any certainty of the paths

they would be granted and Network Rail is trying to work out what could be

accommodated. Concern was also expressed that such a group, with

representatives of each of the main operators, would become a discussion

group for the rehearsed positions of each of the three lobbies – franchised

operators, freight operators and open access operators.

2.61 Whilst the forthcoming WCML timetable development process should be less

complex than the ECML process, as the WCML timetable is likely to be a

variation on what exists now rather than a complete re-write, TS believes that

a project group is necessary and wishes to be involved in such a group. This

is in view of the importance to Scottish Ministers and TS of Anglo-Scottish

services between Glasgow/Edinburgh and the North West/West

Midlands/London. TS also said it would be important that, should franchised

services be in competition for capacity with planned new open access

services, we make clear the value we place on say, Glasgow – London and

Glasgow – West Midlands services, and the methodology we will apply to

evaluate them against the open access services.

ORR’s views

2.62 We agree with the general view of stakeholders that the ECML process

highlighted the need for a structured programme with adequate opportunities

for them to input and that somebody needs to take ownership, with a suitable

forum for discussion. There is a need to establish early on at what point

stakeholders should become involved and who should be involved, e.g. when

funders should be involved and when and whether there needs to be

consultation with passenger representative bodies. We certainly agree that

they should be involved.

2.63 Those interviewed all agreed that the bilateral meetings with individual

operators and the workshops helped to move things along considerably, but

they should have been arranged much earlier in the process. Although the

Network Rail/ORR/ECT meetings may have achieved a lot, this was not the

ideal way to move the process along because of the lack of transparency to

the other interested stakeholders. Again, this is another issue that Network


Rail has already taken on board, for example, on the WCML capacity project

bi-lateral meetings have been programmed from the outset.

2.64 Joint meetings of the affected operators, rather than individual meetings

between the operators and Network Rail, are usually more effective in making

progress, as these create the opportunity to understand everyone’s

requirements and enable compromises to be agreed so that the best overall

solution can be identified more easily.

2.65 As many stakeholders acknowledged, the issue of stakeholder engagement

is already being picked up through the access planning review and the

development of proposals for a Calendar of Events and the establishment of

project working groups for significant timetable workstreams such as the

ECML process. These arrangements will be included in Part D, which itself is

being overhauled to make it clearer and more transparent. Delivery of this

work is being monitored by the Industry Steering Group, of which we are a

member. We do not accept that Network Rail will be able to use the new

arrangements to introduce delay – the whole point behind the new

arrangements is that it would have clear deadlines to meet.

2.66 Recommendation: Network Rail and ORR to continue with the work of

improving stakeholder engagement. The industry generally to ensure

that the passenger representative bodies are included at an appropriate

stage.

ORR’s role

Overview

2.67 It was generally agreed that it was a good idea for ORR to get the process

under way early on with the launch of a letter asking operators to make their

service proposals known, and that we should adopt the same approach for

the expected requests for capacity on the WCML10. Our open and transparent

way of handling the process, including the consultation process, ensuring that

all interested stakeholders had an opportunity to input, was also appreciated.

2.68 There were also many positive comments about the way in which we arrived

at the decision even though not everyone agreed with it. We were not swayed

10 Letter issued to the industry on 14 May 2010, available at http://www.rail

reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.2437.


by pressure from the funders and/or the franchised operator as evidenced by

our decisions to make some of ECT’s rights contingent, and to include

defeasance provisions where necessary in some access contracts. London

TravelWatch (LTW) said that we considered the competing applications fairly

and equitably and came to a decision based on the evidence.

2.69 However, there was criticism about:

(a) the timescales and deadlines;

(b) the clarity of the remit and the way in which it was interpreted by Network

Rail;

(c) ORR’s process, which can be seen as complex and confusing; and

(d) the lack of clarity over whether ORR or Network Rail was leading the

process.

ORR’s views

2.70 We accept many of the criticisms, particularly in relation to timescales, remits

and our role in the process, and these issues are discussed in detail below. In

terms of the clarity of our process, we have over the last two years or so

carried out a programme of work aimed at achieving a more focused and

effective approach towards access regulation, which is consistent with the

Government’s Better Regulation Initiative. We have done this by ensuring

that we are focussing on those issues where we can add most value,

facilitating a public interest outcome, reducing the regulatory burden/cost on

the industry and withdrawing where this makes sense and the industry is in a

position to take more responsibility.

2.71 This has resulted in a number of significant changes, including the adoption

of a more proportionate response to all applications, allowing the industry

more flexibility on the more straightforward and minor service changes

through the wider use of general approvals and ensuring that there is, as far

as possible, better alignment and integration of track access processes with

the industry’s own processes. We also published clearer and more

transparent criteria and procedures last year.

2.72 This work continues. We are working closely with the industry through the

review of access planning to ensure that we:


(a) provide greater transparency and understanding to those funding,

planning and using rail services;

(b) enable Network Rail to respond to all applications in a more consistent,

efficient, reliable and timely way; and

(c) provide more effective processes for operators to work together with

Network Rail in optimising their use of capacity.

2.73 We are also working with the industry to produce a clearer and more

transparent Part D to the Network Code through our involvement in the

industry’s access planning review11 . We will also be reviewing our model

clauses, particularly the ways in which Schedule 5 in the passenger model

contract could be improved, looking to see what scope there is for extending

the use of general approvals and making our application forms easier to

complete.

2.74 Recommendation: ORR will continue to work with the industry to find

ways of improving, simplifying and streamlining industry processes,

including its own.

Timescales

Findings

2.75 Whilst the industry acknowledged that dealing with the various ECML track

access applications had not been an easy task, the key issue for most

stakeholders was the length of time the process took, as evidenced in the

chronology, and the fact that in reality it is still ongoing.

2.76 It was suggested that the real timescale is arguably longer in that it started

with the letting of the ECT franchise and the commitment to deliver Service

Level Commitment 2 (SLC2), in August 2007. There was then a further delay

awaiting the establishment of the RUS at the end of April 2008. Even then,

detailed timetable planning work did not start until March 2009, work on the

Saturday timetable did not start until April 2010, and work on the Sunday

timetable, representing some operators’ busiest day of the week, only started

in June 2010. Effectively the process is likely to take three years and the

delay has caused numerous problems, including creating business

11 See http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.2253 for further information.


uncertainty for all operators. Most importantly, the provision of new improved

passenger services has been delayed.

2.77 There was also general agreement that we should have been more forceful in

our dealings with Network Rail. This applied particularly to the time we

allowed it to undertake specific pieces of work: it was suggested that we

should have forced Network Rail to allocate more resources. We allowed

timescales to slip too easily through a lack of proper project management.

Even when we set deadlines, Network Rail still did not produce a full

timetable - operators quoted the absence of a weekend timetable and fully

validated freight paths from origin to destination.

ORR’s views

2.78 We accept that the process took too long. There are many reasons for this.

As the chronology demonstrates, there were delays throughout the process

and it is fair to say that all stakeholders, including ORR, must share some of

the responsibility. However, we are confident that the changes being made

through the industry’s access planning review will result in a more efficient

and transparent process that involves all interested stakeholders, such as is

now happening on WCML.

2.79 Recommendation: ORR will ensure that rigorous project planning

disciplines are applied to all future projects of a similar nature,

including the setting of clear timescales and milestones.

Setting deadlines for applications

Findings

2.80 There was concern from a number of stakeholders about the submission of

last minute applications from both new aspirants and existing operators trying

to ‘block’ a rival’s bid. We were asked to consider whether we could impose a

deadline on applications for competing capacity, to avoid the problems

created by late applications, and also impose a deadline on major changes to

those applications, to avoid the problems created by changes to ECT’s

requirements. It was suggested that we should use the Part D process, with a

deadline linked to the Priority Date.

2.81 Alliance Rail re-iterated its belief that we had been wrong to accept a late

change in ECT’s destination from Leeds to York, and that these paths should

have been made available for all operators, including Alliance Rail, to apply


for. Alliance Rail could find no reasoning for this change which appeared to it

to be outside the network code, our criteria and procedures, and had no

justification. It also again brought into question the validity of the RUS

process.

2.82 Alliance Rail also noted that the ECML RUS had identified Halifax and

Bradford as destinations for additional services, so Grand Central’s

application of 18 April 2008 was both consistent with the RUS and with its

earlier application which had passed our ‘not primarily abstractive’ test, but

had been rejected because of lack of capacity. In contrast, Hull Trains’

application of 8 May 2008 for services to Harrogate was for a destination not

identified in the RUS, and not mentioned by Hull Trains during the RUS

discussions.

2.83 When we suggested that Hull Trains had not declared its hand for fear of

copycat applications, Alliance Rail said it did not accept that an existing

operator should not reveal its aspirations during the RUS development

process. It was not right that we had treated the two applications as equals.

We should have given higher priority to an application in line with the RUS.

ORR’s views

2.84 This is not a new issue. During our review of our Criteria and Procedures for

the Approval of Track Access Contracts in 2007, we consulted on the

principle of establishing a process for setting deadlines and parameters for

the submission of applications. There was a mixed response, the main

concern being that deadlines could limit a train operator’s flexibility to adapt to

late changes in demand. Some consultees considered that any deadlines

should not restrict late applications in certain extenuating circumstances.

2.85 It was also suggested that deadlines should be appropriate to the type of

application, i.e. more significant applications should require an earlier

deadline. The different types of application could be distinguished by

‘materiality criteria’ and deadlines should not apply to applications arising out

of the timetabling process. However, there was general recognition of the

problems with conflicting applications, particularly those that arrive late in the

process, with operators being required to make known their aspirations

during Network Rail’s consultation process. As a result of concerns at that

time that we may not be able to impose deadlines because under the


Railways Act 1993 (the Act) anyone can submit an application at any time,

the proposal went no further.

2.86 However, we have reviewed the position again in the light of further

experience. Notwithstanding the right under the Act for anyone to make an

application at any time, we believe that there is a strong case for priority to be

given to more significant applications where we have set out clear timescales,

particularly on congested parts of the railway. This is the approach we have

adopted for the WCML, where we said that we would only take account of

aspirations received by a given date for the purposes of that project.

However, it was made clear that, whilst this did not preclude anyone from

submitting an application, which would still be considered in line with our

usual processes, it would not be given the same level of priority unless there

was strong justification.

2.87 This is particularly true where a train operator might seek to ‘block’ another

company’s access application by making a rival application. We will try to

manage this around the Network Rail-led consultation process and, where

appropriate, through the changes to the access planning process which are

being considered as part of the review of access planning workstream12 .

2.88 On Alliance Rail’s first point, although not a matter for this review, it is our

view that this issue was addressed thoroughly in our letter of 25 November

200913 . On its second point, we have some sympathy with Hull Trains in

wishing to keep its aspirations quiet, given that shortly after they were made

public, ECT decided that it too wished to operate services to Harrogate.

In fact, we had been aware of Hull Trains’ aspirations for some time, following

a confidential presentation by Hull Trains.

2.89 Finally, in relation to giving priority to applications consistent with a RUS, as

part of our review of access policy14, we will be looking at how we can/should

make RUSs more useful for access decisions and more generally providing

greater clarity on our approach to them. The industry will be consulted in due

course.


13 http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/ecml-orr-letter-251109.pdf.

14 For further information on our review of access policy, see http://www.rail

reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.2254.


2.90 Recommendation: ORR will develop and introduce arrangements, in

certain specified circumstances, for a cut-off date, and these will be set

out in its criteria and procedures document15 .

Remits

Findings

2.91 There was a general, but not unanimous, view that we should have provided

a clearer and more prescriptive remit and specification for Network Rail,

particularly given that Network Rail does not appear to go beyond what is

specifically asked of it, i.e. it is seen as a reactive rather than a proactive

organisation.

2.92 The minority view was that our remit was possibly too constraining, and that it

should have been more open to Network Rail to develop proposals.

2.93 Network Rail agreed that it needs a clear remit at the start of such a project,

clearly setting out the aspirations of each of the operators, particularly in

terms of service patterns, journey times, calling patterns etc. It should be a

fixed remit with a change control process, and a cut off point for funders

and/or operators seeking changes. Network Rail also made the point that

whilst the initial remit was essentially to prove that it could accommodate

6 + 1 per hour, it also had to work on a 5 + 2 option to satisfy the stated

aspirations of the freight operators.

2.94 Network Rail said it had written to us back in October 2009 saying that further

significant changes had been sought by DfT and that this was creating

difficulties because it required a fixed base to develop the timetable - whilst

this base continued to move, it was unable to complete essential parts of

the process.

ORR’s views

2.95 We accept many of the points raised by stakeholders and that we need to be

more precise in setting remits and be clear about what operators actually

want. However, it is important that in doing so we strike a balance. Network

Rail is the infrastructure manager with responsibility for timetabling and it is

15 “Criteria and procedures for the approval of track access contracts”, Office of Rail

Regulation, London, November 2009, available at http://www.railreg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.2409.


important that any specification should not tie Network Rail down too tightly

it must have the opportunity and scope to develop the best timetable based

on its experience and knowledge of the network and its capabilities.

We clearly need to engage more with Network Rail in agreeing the remit,

but it is also true that Network Rail could and should have been more

proactive in obtaining clear remits from the operators and funders in

developing the timetable.

2.96 In order to carry out our economic assessment of competing applications

where it is known, or indeed merely believed, that there is insufficient

capacity to satisfy them all, we need an outline timetable. One of the

difficulties we faced during the ECML process was the lack of knowledge of

the capacity available and the absence of an outline timetable – hence the

work Network Rail had to undertake in 2008, before we reached our February

2009 decision.

2.97 Our remit, which we published on 30 June 201016, for the WCML capacity

work picks up on the lessons learned from the ECML and will provide the

basis for all future projects going forward.

2.98 Recommendation: ORR to ensure that:

(a) it provides Network Rail with clear and unambiguous

instructions/remits;

(b) strong project management arrangements are in place, both in

Network Rail and within its own organisation; and

(c) interested stakeholders understand how the timetable development

process will work, and their role in it.

ORR’s attendance at industry meetings

Findings

2.99 There was a belief from train operators and Network Rail that it would have

been valuable for us to attend meetings as an observer, particularly the

industry stakeholder ones, so that we would have had a better understanding

of what was actually happening. Indeed, Network Rail argued that it would

16 http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/wcml-capacity-letter-300610.pdf.


have been helpful had we been more proactive when we did attend meetings,

rather than just acting as an observer.

2.100 TS said that it was important for Network Rail’s internal work to be challenged

and that there was no reason why we should not be involved in the process

and attend meetings, believing that would be in line with our section 4 duties

under the Act.

ORR’s views

2.101 We decided at an early stage in the process not to attend industry meetings,

even as an observer, because of possible conflicts with our role in approving

applications and/or acting as the appeal body in the event of any subsequent

timetabling dispute. Accordingly, we had to be very careful about getting too

involved in the detailed discussions on timetabling. We did attend the initial

stakeholder meeting, to explain what was happening and to address any

questions, but not the subsequent ones. However, towards the end of the

process, we did get more involved, attending two meetings with Network Rail

and ECT in December 2009 to help move matters along.

2.102 We believe that the responsibility for managing processes such as this one

lies squarely with Network Rail. It is its responsibility both to undertake an

appraisal of network capacity and to come to conclusions as to how it should

be allocated and timetabled. It is then our role to ensure that the allocation of

that capacity by Network Rail is fair and efficient, and to determine that

allocation if there is any dispute, as happened on the ECML. This is the

approach that both Network Rail and we have taken on the WCML capacity

work, where Network Rail has been remitted to produce a capacity and

performance report, including a recommendation on how capacity should be

allocated. This will include the development of a prototype timetable.

2.103 It is also worth reminding Network Rail and the industry that the former’s

network licence requires it to run an efficient and effective timetabling

process. Notwithstanding the above, and having regard to the need to be

careful not to prejudice our appellant role, we will consider further our role in

similar exercises to see how we could add value by attending meetings

without prejudicing our regulatory position.

2.104 Recommendation - ORR will in future:


(a) attend initial meetings of industry stakeholders to explain its

position and to set out what it hopes to achieve from the project;

and

(b) consider attending other meetings throughout a particular project

as an observer on a case by case basis.

Project management arrangements

Findings

2.105 There were strong views that we should have ensured that suitable project

management arrangements were in place both in Network Rail and within

ORR. Also, it was thought that we should have been more proactive in telling

Network Rail to make swift progress after 29 February 2009. The chronology

suggests that not much happened for some time after that date and that we

therefore did not take a sufficiently tough stance with Network Rail and the

industry. Furthermore, there was an unacceptable delay between the

submission of some applications, e.g. ECT’s track access application in

June 2008, and our decision at the end of February 2009, which meant that

eight of the 18 months available for the then planned December 2009

implementation were used up.

2.106 It was suggested that there were times when it was not clear who in ORR

was dealing with the project. TS indicated that whilst it felt we were clear

about what we were trying to achieve, there was a lack of clarity about what

the ECML timetable would look like. In future there needs to be clarity about

the objective and a clear project plan showing how the industry achieves it.

Whilst our letters to the industry included next steps, they did not go further.

ORR’s views

2.107 We accept the criticism about the lack of robust and appropriate project

management for the ECML work and that we were not proactive enough in

monitoring progress. As a result, unnecessary and significant delays were

introduced into the project timetable.

2.108 However, we do not accept the point that there was no clear point of contact.

It has been standard operating practice within ORR for many years to have a

sole point of contact for each and every project or workstream. This was no

different for the ECML case. The named case officer through whom all


contact should have been made was in contact with all relevant stakeholders.

Indeed, we were not aware that this was ever an issue.

2.109 Recommendation: ORR will ensure that:

(a) both ORR and Network Rail establish suitable project management

arrangements at the outset of any project, including the early

publication of a project plan detailing timescales, milestones and

resources; and

(b) the sole point of contact, together with others involved in a

particular piece of work, is clearly detailed at the outset.

ORR’s timetabling & planning resources

Findings

2.110 Some stakeholders raised the issue of whether ORR should employ external

consultants to provide a timetabling and performance assessment in the

same way that we employ external consultants for an economic assessment

of the applications. The general view was that we should not, as this would

allow Network Rail an excuse if it then had problems in implementing what

our consultants had produced. Instead, ORR should use its powers to ensure

that Network Rail does its job properly. However, some suggested that we

should not rely on Network Rail. As the independent regulator, they

considered that we should have our own timetabling resources to assess

what Network Rail has produced, or at least seek an independent view.

We were reminded that this point had been made in an ORR Board paper

back in 2004.

2.111 A minority view was that timetable planning should not be undertaken by

Network Rail at all. Instead, an independent company should be formed

which is incentivised by us to maximise utilisation of the network. It was

suggested that Network Rail’s culture is one of caution and to take no risks

with reliability. It was seen as perverse that the infrastructure provider is

tasked with overseeing slack timetables which cope with poorly performing

infrastructure. These respondents believed that, as long as Network Rail

controls the process, the industry will continue to see the same problems

occurring.

2.112 A number of stakeholders were critical that we had issued directions for

detailed access rights without any performance modelling having been


undertaken on the then latest iteration of the timetable17 . As a result, train

operators did not, and still do not, know the impact the new timetable is likely

to have on their PPM. One consultee widened the discussion to express

concerns about the limitation of current performance modelling approaches.

In its view Railsys has serious limitations and is not an appropriate tool for

modelling a large part of the network. The only available alternative at

present is to rely on expert judgement, but clearly this is also unsatisfactory.

There is a pressing need for the industry to develop better performance

modelling techniques.

2.113 One operator also said it was concerned that when we change our economic

consultants – as we did for this series of applications - there is a risk of them

taking a different approach, if only in the way that the data is presented,

which creates additional work for the operators, who are expecting to see it

presented in the same way as last time.

ORR’s views

2.114 Network Rail has a clear responsibility to provide capacity, timetabling and

performance services to the rail industry and should be resourced to provide

the necessary assessments to a high professional standard. The industry

should expect Network Rail to conduct analysis of the economic issues and

to demonstrate to us and the wider industry how it reached its views. For this

reason there should be no need for us to employ our own consultants on a

routine basis: this would be a duplication of effort which would increase our,

and therefore industry, costs.

2.115 On the point about economic consultants, as a public body it is necessary for

us to tender for consultancy work, and on this occasion the consultants used

previously had already been appointed by one of the applicants, so could not

be invited to tender for the work. However, the consultants we appointed had

access to all the previous data and documentation, and, of course, we

maintained an overview to ensure consistency.

2.116 Recommendation: No change to ORR’s current position, although ORR

will work with Network Rail to ensure that it has suitable arrangements

in place so that it can provide high quality professional advice and

assessments.

17 Note: some modelling had been undertaken on the timetable which informed our decision

of February 2009.


ORR’s publication policy

Findings

2.117 There was almost unanimous agreement that we should not in future publish

timetables which were still under development because it led to a lot of

additional work managing stakeholders and fielding enquiries, which could

only be answered in an inconclusive way – that is, it was for DfT and the

operators to specify their requirements. It also led to false hopes and

misunderstandings, for both passengers and freight customers, particularly

when the industry is then unable to deliver. This is a particular issue on a

shared route such as the ECML where the overall timetable available to

passengers is spread between multiple train operators and is also dependent

upon DfT specification, Network Rail timetabling and our approval of track

access rights. It would be far better to keep timetable iterations within industry

processes.

2.118 The exception to the general view was Passenger Focus, who argued that if

we had not published the draft timetables no one would have known what

was being proposed, and thus would have been denied the opportunity to

comment on the downsides for those using particular stations. However, the

timetables should have been more clearly caveated as work in progress.

More generally, the passenger representative bodies would like to see more

of the confidential commercial information which accompanies track access

applications made available to them, to inform their responses to

consultations.

2.119 Freightliner also raised a more general question about the extent to which we

should publish operators’ views where there are issues or conflicts. It said

this was not always helpful, can create issues unnecessarily and cause

uncertainty in the minds of freight customers. Ideally, publication should not

take place until a decision has been made.

ORR’s views

2.120 As previously indicated, we have already taken Freightliner’s point on board

in the WCML capacity work, where we have said at the outset that during the

early stages of the process we will not publish any of the responses received.

Rather we will wait until after the completion of the process and publish all

relevant documentation when we publish our decision. However, we believe

that Passenger Focus made a number of legitimate points, and our views on


its involvement are discussed below. The same principle should apply to

consultees’ responses in respect of track access applications.

2.121 Recommendation: ORR will review its policy on the publication of

material and provide further clarifying guidance as necessary in its

criteria and procedures document.

Industry structure

Findings

2.122 The problems experienced have raised the question among some

stakeholders as to the appropriateness of the current industry structure, i.e.

allowing a system that provides for owning groups to compete with each

other to win a tightly specified franchise under which the successful bidder

has to then compete for capacity with open access operators, both passenger

and freight. If there is a limit on capacity then inevitably there will be conflict.

2.123 It has been argued that having such a competitive environment delayed the

introduction of ECT’s Leeds half hourly services by 18 months, and has

delayed introduction of SLC2 by the same timescale. Open access operators

are prevented from making calls which might be in the interest of passengers

because they would fail the ‘not primarily abstractive’ test. As a result there

may be too many trains running non-stop between London and Doncaster or

York in the May 2011 timetable, which would not be an efficient use of limited

capacity.

ORR’s views

2.124 The structure of the industry is not a matter for ORR. However, the

Government has recently announced a review of franchising and is of course

jointly sponsoring with us the rail Value for Money study.

Allocation of capacity between passenger and freight services

Findings

2.125 Freight operators have ongoing concerns about how we allocate capacity

between passenger and freight services and reiterated the fact that freight

trains only run when there are goods to be moved, i.e. in reaction to customer

demand, whereas passenger trains run irrespective, i.e. in anticipation of

customer demand. The reluctance of freight operators to operate empty or


under utilised trains simply to utilise a path often gives the incorrect

impression that there remains sufficient capacity for freight growth.

ORR’s views

2.126 In making access decisions we already take account of the potential for future

growth in freight services, as indeed we did on the ECML. Nevertheless, we

recognise the concerns over how we decide between passenger and freight

services when allocating scarce capacity. This is why, as part of our ongoing

review of access policy18, we looked at the issue and consulted the industry

on some proposals drawing on a separate industry workstream looking at

freight values of time. Our conclusions on this consultation are due to be

published shortly.

ORR’s role in protecting the interests of open access operators

Findings

2.127 It was suggested that ORR tends to favour open access operators - in part it

was felt that this appeared to be the result of a bias in favour of competition

rather than co-ordination and best use of capacity. Some stakeholders said

that we might be expected to favour the largest operator in order to generate

the greatest benefits, but this does not appear to happen.

2.128 On the other hand, it was argued that open access operators, with few

services, were in need of more protection than franchised operators who

obtain the access they want at the expense of those open access operators,

irrespective of the overall passenger benefits. For example, there are no

incentives for Network Rail to deliver good journey times for open access

operators – providing they are within contractual limits. Some respondents

believed that we should have been more positive in our decision letter,

stressing the importance of open access operators having good journey

times.

ORR’s views

2.129 We already ensure that all applications before us are dealt with in a fair,

transparent and balanced way and in accordance with legislative

requirements and published policies. We are content that this happened in

the case of the ECML. We accept that our decision letter might have been



more explicit on the specific issue of journey times; however, we believe that

there is also an onus on stakeholders to look after their own interests. We

also note that the Decision Criteria (in Part D of the Network Code) already

provide an incentive for Network Rail to deliver good journey times, though

the dispute resolution process is not an attractive proposition for an operator

to get what it wants.

2.130 More generally, our ongoing review of access policy is already looking at the

issue of conflicting capacity and competition19 .

2.131 Recommendation: ORR will ensure that journey times are given more

recognition in any similar exercise (this has already been noted as an

issue for the WCML capacity exercise).

Other issues

DB Schenker

2.132 DB Schenker raised ORR’s failure to recognise its section 22A application for

additional rights on the ECML in the decision of 29 February 2009. Had we

done so, it would have been a lot easier for DB Schenker to get the Level 1

rights it was seeking.

ORR’s views

2.133 We accept that this was an oversight on our part, but note that this did not

affect the outcome for DB Schenker. Our decision on DB Schenker’s ECML

application, which was set out in our decision letter, still stands.

Defeasance

2.134 ECT referred to the six weeks it took ORR (and Network Rail) to come up

with a satisfactory (to them – the operators were not consulted) wording for

the defeasance provisions, and contrasted it with the time it took the

timetable development “team” to come up with a solution to the one known

breach of an operator’s existing track access rights (Grand Central’s rights to

an 11:10 -11:40 departure from King’s Cross).

2.135 DfT said it was disappointing that ORR and Network Rail had failed to resolve

this conflict before we made our final decision on access rights, particularly

as a straightforward solution was found soon afterwards. Had this issue been



addressed properly, there would have been no need to make some of ECT’s

rights contingent.

ORR’s views

2.136 We do not agree that it took six weeks to come up with the defeasance

provision – we already had a standard template provision which was made

available to Network Rail when the need became apparent. Although

amendments were made to the provision to ensure compatibility with the

particular circumstances on the ECML, there was no need to consult

operators. It is also worth noting that the availability of the defeasance

provision was not on the critical path for bringing matters to a conclusion.

2.137 We too were disappointed that a timetabling solution was not found in time,

but it was not for us to do so. It was clearly a matter for the industry.

Freightliner

2.138 Freightliner expressed the view that the rights we had granted the passenger

operators were quite generic and it would rather have seen the rights drafted

more tightly, as this would have made it clearer what capacity they would

actually use. Freightliner said this view was perhaps an expression of a lack

of trust in Network Rail managing the timetable properly.

2.139 Freightliner also expressed concern that the passenger operators are

increasingly seeking to run more trains rather than run longer trains, thus

using the remaining capacity inefficiently.

ORR’s views

2.140 Freightliner is alone in its view that the rights we had granted the passenger

operators were quite generic, and we believe that we struck the right balance

between giving Network Rail the necessary flexibility to develop future

timetables and giving the operators sufficient certainty to proceed with

changes and/or additions to their services.

2.141 On the length of trains, whilst this a commercial matter for operators and, of

course, a natural consequence of starting up new services, at least initially,

we do have regard to train lengths as part of our economic analysis of

competing applications.


Funders’ role

Findings

2.142 Train operators expressed a number of concerns about the role of funders

(essentially DfT and TS) in the process, particularly in relation to their

apparent unwillingness to take a holistic view. Some also felt that TS should

have had less input in determining the outputs for English services. DfT, in

particular, is seen by the open access operators as being against competition

and opposed to open access. DfT acknowledged that its role as the funder of

the ECT franchise meant its objectives took into account the interests of both

passengers and taxpayers and therefore are not necessarily fully aligned with

our statutory duties. These include a requirement to have regard to issues

such as competition, benefits to passengers and other users and protecting

the taxpayer (through the funds available to the Secretary of State), which

means that we might attach different weights to those of the funder. DfT also

pointed out that its objectives may conflict with those of others for the route.

This in turn can cause difficult conflicts with EU and UK legislation in relation

to promoting competition.

2.143 A major issue raised by some stakeholders was the granting of a franchise to

ECT, including SLC2, before it had been established with Network Rail that

there was capacity available within the existing infrastructure to

accommodate the additional services and before any timetabling work had

been undertaken to establish whether the journey time improvements

required were achievable. It was also suggested that running services to

Lincoln was not an efficient use of capacity and took up paths that could

otherwise have been used by other operators. It was pointed out that this is

not a new problem, and funders should engage earlier with Network Rail and

the industry to ensure that the SLC is deliverable before entering into the

franchise agreement. This problem is compounded where there are

competing operators also planning to introduce new or additional services.

2.144 A related issue was the relationship between Network Rail and DfT. The view

was expressed that the industry needs to understand at the outset what

Government requirements are but, having established them, funders should

then keep out of the process until the later stages. To support this view, it

was felt that when DfT was not present at industry meetings the debate

between the operators was more constructive and progress was made. For

the future, operators suggested that it would be better if they first reached


agreement, based on the options available, before the franchised operators

approached funders for their consent.

2.145 It was also felt that funders should not be specifying the SLC in detail, rather

they should be selecting from deliverable options. Although it was accepted

by some stakeholders that DfT’s current approach requires it to be closely

involved, the general view was that there was undue interference from DfT,

just as there had been in the earlier WCML process. This position was not

helped by the fact that DfT has its own timetable planners with their own

views. This further contributed to DfT’s interference in the detail, which it

should have left to Network Rail. As already discussed above, DfT, in

particular, kept changing its mind, which not only created extra work for

Network Rail and delayed the process, but also created extra work for other

operators, who found their paths being amended to take account of changes

to ECT and/or other franchisee requirements.

2.146 TS was generally satisfied with the outcome of the process, a significant

improvement in average Edinburgh – London journey times, and with its

involvement in the process. However, there were some bilateral discussions

between DfT/ECT and Network Rail which resulted in timetable iterations

which had unacceptable impacts in Scotland – for ScotRail in timetabling

terms and for TS in funding terms. It was widely accepted by stakeholders

that communications between DfT and TS, and DfT and ECT, were not

always good, e.g. their differing views on journey times and calling patterns.

DfT was criticised for not being sufficiently involved in discussions with some

of the franchised operators regarding the specification of their rights, in

contrast to its ‘over’ involvement in specifying ECT’s rights.

2.147 DfT recognised that towards the end of the period when NXEC was operating

the franchise, Network Rail was getting mixed messages from the operator

and DfT and that there was a need for better interaction between DfT and

Network Rail so that they take a common approach. That apart, DfT felt that it

and the operators generally worked well together.

ORR’s views

2.148 We understand that the objectives and commercial considerations of funders,

operators and other stakeholders will not always be aligned and will in some

cases conflict. Whilst we agree it is important that the industry endeavours to

take a holistic view, it has to be recognised that DfT and TS must be able to


input in order to meet the policies and strategies set down by their respective

Ministers, in line with statutory duties and responsibilities. For example, we

feel that it is legitimate for TS to input to discussions on issues south of the

border in circumstances where they might impact upon ScotRail services.

However, as evidenced by the review of access planning, there is some

appetite across the industry for alignment of the franchising and access

planning processes. In particular consultees agreed that:

(a) there should be earlier engagement by funders with the industry

(particularly with Network Rail) to see if the capacity required is actually

available;

(b) train operators generally want a greater degree of validation of a

prospective timetable both to reduce and understand risk before the

funder issues an ITT20; and

(c) there is a need for clear industry involvement in the ITT/formalisation of

specification processes.

2.149 We hope that the industry, including funders, supports the policy of ensuring

that there is more alignment between the access planning and franchising

processes and to be actively engaged in the establishment of the industry

best practice statement as proposed by the IWG. It is particularly important

that funders align their processes better with train operators and Network Rail

in developing franchise specifications and particularly in managing change to

those specifications accordingly. The level of capacity depends very largely

on the service specification. If that is changed, then the level of capacity can

increase or decrease substantially, which makes it difficult for Network Rail to

plan.

2.150 Also, as mentioned earlier in this document, we consider that timetable

development is Network Rail’s responsibility. It needs to ensure that proper

project management arrangements are in place and that it controls and

manages the process in a fair and balanced way. As part of that, it is

important that funders are involved throughout. We believe that the proposed

new arrangements to establish a Calendar of Events and project working

groups for all future major timetabling projects will help to improve

20 This is particularly important where a franchise introduces services onto the network that

will affect a number of operators and/or impact on other routes. This could in part be resolved by ensuring the early engagement of funders within the Calendar of Events process proposed under workstream 1 of the access planning review.


communications between all stakeholders and ensure that the industry works

together in a constructive and positive way.

2.151 Recommendation: Funders are encouraged to support the policy of

improved alignment between the access planning and franchising

processes, and to be actively engaged in the establishment of an

industry best practice statement.

Train operators’ role

Findings

2.152 Generally, stakeholders acknowledged that they needed to take projects such

as the ECML one more seriously and ensure that that they are fully engaged.

A number of stakeholders acknowledged that they should have also been

more proactive in telling Network Rail what they needed at the outset. Freight

operators agreed they need to work with Network Rail, but said it was more

difficult for them to say with certainty what their future demand would be.

On the other hand, some operators felt that they could not have done

anything more, having attended all the meetings to which they were invited,

and provided Network Rail and ORR with all the information requested.

2.153 Two operators, in acknowledging that the process took a long time, said that

the eventual outcome worked well for them, but only because their people

had a very clear idea of what they wanted, what they could compromise on,

and made sure that they were fully involved. It was said that there is a big

onus on operators to be proactive because Network Rail’s commercial team

and its timetable planners do not communicate as well as they should. As a

result, operators need to have their own internal processes in place and

aligned with those of Network Rail.

2.154 Some non-ECML operators, albeit those who were directly affected by any

decisions, said that they had not been involved until we had decided what

quantum of paths we were prepared to approve, by which time it was too late

to contribute. In some cases this had resulted in negative outcomes in

respect of resourcing over which they had had no say, which earlier

constructive discussions with Network Rail would have probably resolved.

2.155 Network Rail acknowledged that operators such as First Capital Connect,

Northern and ScotRail, with their detailed knowledge of diagram issues, had

a major beneficial input to the process when they discussed the timetable on


a one to one basis. Bringing the operators’ commercial and operational and

timetabling staff together had also brought benefits. Network Rail noted that

this collaborative working had started before the workshops.

2.156 More generally, Network Rail said that the industry needed to show more

trust in it if the industry was to move forward. Of particular concern was the

lack of availability of business cases and other commercially sensitive

information, the provision of which would help it to make more informed

judgements about capacity allocation and timetable development.

Notwithstanding operators’ commercial considerations, it was also felt that

there was scope for them to show more willingness to work co-operatively

both with Network Rail and other operators and to take a more holistic

approach on major issues like the ECML process. Operators sometimes used

tactics aimed at blocking each others’ aspirations.

2.157 As indicated above, there was much criticism of operators changing

requirements throughout the process. This related particularly to DfT and

ECT, which many stakeholders, including those directly involved, believed

had resulted in considerable delays in the process. For example, Network

Rail had devoted considerable time and effort to establishing that it could not

deliver acceptable paths to Bradford and Harrogate via Leeds, only for the

requirements to change overnight when the franchisee changed. The

publication of ECT’s ‘Eureka!’ timetable and subsequent roadshows resulted

in further changes to the timetable requirements and generated more work,

which Network Rail had not planned into the project timescales21 .

ORR’s views

2.158 It is clear from the comments received that there are still problems even

though the industry is trying to work together. We believe that the changes

that the industry itself is proposing to the access planning process will go a

long way to improving matters and negating the conflicts that currently exist.

We agree with Network Rail that stakeholders need to show more trust in its

ability, but it is also true that such trust has to be earned. Again, we believe

that the changes we are recommending in this report that Network Rail

should make, particularly in relation to project management and the

involvement of all interested stakeholders, will help to achieve this.

21 The operator’s plans have of course again changed with the decision to no longer run the

majority of the planned Lincoln services.


2.159 Recommendation: Train operators should:

(a) be clear about their requirements for timetable development and

ensure that these are communicated to Network Rail in a timely and

constructive way; and

(b) maintain adequate processes to ensure that they are able to

respond and contribute as necessary to the access planning

process.

Other issues

Rules of the Plan

Findings

2.160 It was brought to our attention during the interviews that the Rules of the Plan

(ROTP) on the ECML are more generous than on other main routes for

historical reasons. For example, far longer is allowed for trains to turn round

at King’s Cross than at Euston, Paddington or St Pancras. Furthermore, on

much of the ECML, timetable planning headways are four minutes where

signalling headways are only 1.5 minutes, a larger difference than on other

routes and one which has an effect on the available capacity.

ORR’s views

2.161 We are not in a position to confirm this variance, but it is something that

Network Rail needs to assess. However, we believe that in order for Network

Rail to optimise the use of the infrastructure it will have to consider more than

just the ROTP.

2.162 Recommendation: Network Rail to investigate the optimum use of route

capability, including a review of the ROTP and taking into account both

infrastructure and rolling stock, so as to maximise the benefit of

commercial train services whilst delivering a timetable that can be

operated day in and day out on the ECML, and to agree a plan, with

affected train operators, by the end of September 2010, for developing

potential improvements to feed into ECML timetables at the earliest

practical opportunity.


Track access application forms

Findings

2.163 It was noted that track access application forms do not always explain the

expected timetable changes, including any downsides, as a result of changes

in the rights sought. It would be helpful, to those representing the passengers

in particular, if such information was consistently made available.

2.164 Recommendation: ORR will review its application forms to ensure that

the relevant questions are clear, and remind the industry of the need to

give clear and concise information.

MOIRA

Findings

2.165 LTW expressed concern that MOIRA does not properly reflect passenger

demand – this is worrying, as it is used by the industry in the development of

RUSs and by us in our ‘not primarily abstractive’ test.

ORR’s views

2.166 We recognise the limitations of MOIRA, particularly in estimating the demand

for new direct services between locations which currently have a limited, or

no such, service. Whilst we understand that an updated version of MOIRA is

being developed, it is possible that it will have similar limitations. However,

our five stage ‘not primarily abstractive’ test is designed to overcome this

limitation, and in particular it takes MOIRA estimates as a starting point and

then develops an overall assessment taking into account the known

weaknesses in the MOIRA forecasts and benchmarking against experience

from previous new direct services. We have now built up a significant body of

evidence on the impact of new services and believe that the five stage test

remains fit for purpose, although we are considering what improvements can

be made as part of our access policy review.

2.167 Recommendation: ORR is currently reviewing the ‘not primarily

abstractive’ test as part of its review of access policy, and is expecting

to publish conclusions shortly.


Current position

Findings

2.168 Even after the approval of track access rights in February 2010 there were

still concerns about the current position of the timetable work before

implementation, leaving some stakeholders to suggest that there was a

significant risk to a satisfactory delivery of the new timetable in May 2011.

2.169 Whilst the planned introduction of a standard pattern timetable has provided

more clarity on the available capacity for freight services, freight operators

remain concerned that there may not be enough capacity to accommodate

future demand. Also, there is uncertainty about how the standard pattern

timetable will affect freight operators’ existing services, not just on the ECML

but also on the routes leading to and from the ECML.

2.170 More recently, some stakeholders questioned the announcement by ECT that

it no longer planned to operate seven weekday services each way between

Lincoln and London – in our February 2009 decision letter we said we would

approve access rights for them. Instead it wished to operate one service each

way, with a further four services each way operating between Newark and

London. It indicated that it intended to submit a track access application to

amend its rights.

ORR’s views

2.171 We understand that Network Rail has been working closely with all

stakeholders and that it quickly put in place a project plan with clear

milestones and timescales. We are in regular contact with Network Rail

regarding progress and have been reassured that everything is on course to

ensure the introduction of the timetable in May 2011. More recently, we have

been advised that, following an industry meeting on 12 August 2010, there

are no outstanding major issues and that all stakeholders are reasonably

content. However, given the ongoing concerns of a few operators, we

continue to monitor the situation.

2.172 In relation to ECT’s recent proposal to change its Lincoln services, we have

issued a letter to the industry setting out our position22 .

22 This is available on the ORR website at http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/ecml-orr

letter-110810.pdf.



Annex A – chronology

29 February 2008 ECML RUS published

29 February 2008 ORR letter to industry Asking for aspirations

11 March 2008 ORR meeting with Network Rail To discuss process going forward

20 March 2008 Grand Central Sunderland 4th path section 22A submitted to ORR

28 March 2008 Deadline for responses to ORR’s letter of 29 February

16 substantive responses received

4 April 2008 ORR forwarded responses to Network Rail

18 April 2008 Grand Northern Bradford section 17 submitted to ORR

24 April 2008 ORR meeting with Network Rail and DfT

Update on process going forward – Network Rail concentrating on December 2008 timetable

29 April 2008 ECML RUS established

8 May 2008 Hull Trains Harrogate section 17 submitted to ORR

21 May 2008 ORR meeting with Network Rail and DfT

Network Rail presented its view of the 1 February timetable bids for PCD December 2008

5 June 2008 ORR letter to Network Rail and DfT

Network Rail was asked to undertake a capacity study to enable ORR to reach a decision on the track access applications received and expected

10 June 2008 NXEC section 17/22A applications submitted to ORR

25 June 2008 ORR meeting with Network Rail and DfT

Including discussion of remit and arrangements for the capacity and performance analysis

27 June 2008 Letter from DfT to ORR Setting out its detailed specification for the timetabling work

9 July 2008 Letter from ORR to Network Rail Confirming actions arising out of meeting of 25 June, including meeting with timetable planners to be arranged

11 July 2008 Network Rail published its December 2008 timetable options assessment

Concluded that it was unable to offer any paths in addition to those currently running


16 July 2008 ORR letter to stakeholders Setting out a specification for Network Rail to undertake a capacity assessment and report back by 19 September

25 July 2008 ORR meeting with Network Rail To discuss progress

28 July 2008 Network Rail provided ORR with a standard two hourly pattern timetable (option 0)

31 July 2008 ORR commented on the timetable

8 August 2008 ORR letter to stakeholders Advising that ORR proposed to extend some rights which would otherwise expire

11 August 2008 Network Rail responded to ORR’s comments on the timetable

19 August 2008 ORR letter to stakeholders Outlining approach to potentially competing applications

20 August 2008 Industry capacity planning meeting

Meeting of Network Rail, ORR, DfT and operators using the ECML to review the standard pattern timetable and receive comments

27 August 2008 ORR meeting with Freightliner Freightliner wished to ensure that the timetable development fully reflected the freight position

29 August 2008 Network Rail provided ORR with a draft updated standard pattern timetable (option 1)

29 August 2008 ORR provided comments and asked a number of questions

end August 2008 ORR appointed MVA to undertake an economic evaluation of the competing applications

This followed a tendering process

1 September 2008 Network Rail answered ORR questions of 29 August

1 September 2008 ORR meeting with EWS EWS wished to ensure that the timetable development fully reflected the freight position

1 September 2008 Network Rail issued an updated standard pattern timetable to stakeholders (an amended option 1)

3 September 2008 Second industry capacity planning meeting

To discuss latest iteration of timetable – ORR did not attend


5 September 2008 Deadline for responses to ORR’s letter of 19 August

Two responses received

16 September 2008 ORR meetings with NXEC, Hull Trains and Grand Central

To discuss planned economic analysis methodology

17 September 2008 ORR meeting with Network Rail Network Rail provided an initial draft of its capacity report

24 September 2008 ORR provided comments on the draft

25 September 2008 ORR meeting with EWS To discuss the economic appraisal of the applications

26 September 2008 ORR meeting with MVA To discuss progress23

26 September 2008 Network Rail issued its capacity report

Original deadline for receipt of report was 19 September – ORR agreed extension of one week

29 September 2008 ORR circulated Network Rail’s capacity report to stakeholders

30 September 2008 ORR meeting with Alconbury Developments

To discuss Alconbury’s aspirations for paths on the ECML

6 October 2008 Deadline for comments on Network Rail’s capacity report

17 responses received

14 October 2008 ORR meeting with Transport Scotland

To discuss Transport Scotland’s concerns

23 October 2008 ORR letter to stakeholders Advising that ORR will be asking Network Rail to undertake further work

24 October 2008 ORR meeting with Network Rail To discuss and agree the further work required

27 October 2008 ORR meeting with Hull Trains To discuss Hull Trains’ track access applications and problems being created by the delay in reaching a decision

30 October 2008 Letter from ORR to Network Rail Setting out the detailed remit for the further work; reporting back no later than 19 December

5 November 2008 Network Rail provided ORR with a timetable update (option 2)

10 November 2008 ORR meeting with EWS and Network Rail

To discuss EWS’s concerns

11 November 2008 ORR meeting with Network Rail’s performance team

To discuss performance issues

17 November 2008 EWS provided ORR with details of expected new freight flows

Confidential to ORR – used to inform ORR’s decision

Note: other meetings between ORR and MVA are not recorded in this document


23

18 November 2008 ORR comments to Network Rail Comments on latest iteration of timetable

25 November 2008 Industry performance workshop

28 November 2008 ORR meeting with Network Rail To discuss latest iteration of timetable

2 December 2008 ORR letter to stakeholders Reserving dates for possible hearing (subsequently not held)

9 December 2008 Network Rail letter to stakeholders

Setting out performance impact of 6 + 1 timetable

12 December 2008 MVA provided ORR with its draft economic assessment

12 December 2008 Network Rail provided ORR with a draft of its capacity report

18 December 2008 ORR provided Network Rail with some minor comments on its draft report

18 December 2008 Network Rail issued its capacity report to ORR (an amended option 2)

19 December 2008 ORR circulated the capacity report to stakeholders

Asking for comments by 5 January (deadline subsequently extended)

24 December 2008 ORR letter to DfT Seeking comments on DfT’s support for SLC2b and financial effect on the Secretary of State’s budget

24 December 2008 ORR letter to stakeholders Update on progress, including extension of deadline for responses to capacity report

9 January 2009 ORR issued the draft MVA economic assessment to the four applicants

Comments requested by 20 January

12 January 2009 Deadline for responses to Network Rail’s capacity report


13/14/15 January 2009

ORR meetings with the four applicants

To discuss the draft MVA economic assessment

20 January 2009 ORR letter to Network Rail with questions on capacity report

22 January 2009 ORR Directors Group met and agreed the case team’s recommendation

28 January 2009 Network Rail responded to ORR’s questions

Nothing in the response to change the case team’s recommendation

29 January 2009 ORR issued its proposed decision

Representations requested by 13 February


29 January 2009 ORR also issued the final MVA report

4 February 2009 ORR meeting with Hull Trains to discuss its request for extended term

At Hull Trains’ request. Note: Hull Trains subsequently provided further written justification in response to request from ORR

13 February 2009 Deadline for receipt of representations


16 February 2009 DfT response to proposed decision

Included offer to facilitate changes to other operators’ rights

19 February 2009 ORR meeting with CrossCountry At CrossCountry’s request – to discuss its aspirations

24 February 2009 ORR meeting with DfT At ORR’s request - to discuss DfT’s offer to facilitate changes to other operators’ rights

24 February 2009 ORR directors met with the case team to agree the decision

27 February 2009 ORR issued its decision Changed from proposed decision as a result of DfT’s offer to facilitate changes to other operators’ rights

2 March 2009 Network Rail email to all the ECML operators

Advising that Network Rail would be meeting the affected operators 1:1 to agree the process to take things forward

13 March 2009 Network Rail email to all the ECML operators

Advising that it had met them, would continue to develop the options and no further meetings would be held until there was something worth sharing

13 March 2009 ORR meeting with Grand Central

Meeting at Grand Central’s request to discuss aspects of our decision

March 2009 Network Rail holding fortnightly internal Steering Group meetings

Meetings covering operations, property, safety and performance

30 March 2009 NXEC advised Network Rail that it did not wish to implement any part of the SLC2b timetable in December 2009

1 April 2009 NXEC meeting with Network Rail to discuss progress with timetable development

Meeting with timetable planners

1 April 2009 ORR meeting with Network Rail To discuss progress and the way ahead. Agreed to hold stakeholder meetings when core timetable developed


6 May 2009 ORR letter to Network Rail Expressing concern that Network Rail was proposing that the new timetable should be delayed until PCD 2010, rather than SCD 2010

15 May 2009 Network Rail reply Would be two months before Network Rail was in a position to say whether a change in May was deliverable

17 May 2009 Network Rail email to all the ECML operators

Advising that it hoped to share some timings with the operators by 22 May 2009

20 May 2009 ORR reply to Network Rail’s letter of 15 May 2009

Suggesting that Network Rail put out a statement to that effect

26 May 2009 Network Rail issued a further iteration of the timetable to the operators (option 3)

A big improvement on the previous iteration according to NXEC

5 June 2009 ORR meeting with Network Rail in Leeds

To discuss progress with timetable development. ORR subsequently expressed concerns that the current timetable did not reflect some aspects of the February decision

8 June 2009 ORR meeting with Network Rail To discuss track access contract matters

18 June 2009 ORR meeting with Network Rail To discuss timetable development and ORR’s concerns

3 July 2009 Network Rail issued ECML standard pattern timetable options document

Setting out two timetable options, which of the two it recommended and asking for comments by 17 July

3 July 2009 ORR meeting with Grand Central

To update ORR on various issues

24 July 2009 Network Rail letter to stakeholders

Proposing way forward and timescales

6 August 2009 ORR letter to Network Rail Concurring with Network Rail’s proposed way forward and timescales

17/18/19 August 2009

Industry workshops organised by Network Rail

Attended by DfT, Transport Scotland and train operators

26 August 2009 ORR meeting with Grand Central and Network Rail

To discuss contractual issues and current position of ECML timetable development - Grand Central concerned

26 August 2009 Network Rail letter to ORR Updating ORR on progress

27 August 2009 ORR letter to Network Rail Noting that Grand Central felt it was being disadvantaged


11 September 2009 Network Rail issued a further iteration of the timetable

2 October 2009 Network Rail provided ORR with the latest timetable produced that week

16 October 2009 Network Rail issued its ECML SLC2 timetable report

19 October 2009 ORR letter to stakeholders Inviting comments on Network Rail’s report by 2 November

19 October 2009 ORR meeting with DfT To discuss Network Rail report and other known issues

20 October 2009 ORR meeting with Hull Trains To discuss investment provisions

23 October 2009 ORR letter to Network Rail Initial comments on its report

30 October 2009 Network Rail’s reply

2 November 2009 Deadline for comments on Network Rail’s report


11 November 2009 Network Rail issued KX platform analysis

Confirming that all services could be accommodated at KX

12 November 2009 ORR meeting with DfT To discuss SCL2 timetable implementation

20 November 2009 ORR meeting with East Coast At director level

20 November 2009 Network Rail issued an updated timetable to stakeholders

The first of fortnightly updates

25 November 2009 ORR letter to stakeholders Commenting on destination of fifth East Coast path

27 November 2009 ORR meeting with Network Rail and East Coast

High level meeting to agree what detail of access rights Network Rail was able to offer

7 December 2009 Network Rail issued an updated timetable to stakeholders

The second fortnightly update

8 December 2009 ORR meeting with Network Rail and DfT

To discuss what agreements were necessary and the process for getting them in place before the Priority Date

9 December 2009 Grand Central letter to ORR in response

Setting out financial effects of the standard pattern timetable

9 December 2009 ORR meeting with Network Rail and East Coast

High level meeting

15 December 2009 Network Rail provided ORR with the main body and some of the schedules of the Hull Trains’ contract

These documents were revised and the outstanding schedules provided and revised as necessary through to 2 February

16 December 2009 ORR meeting with Network Rail and Grand Central

To discuss track access rights


16 December 2009 ORR meeting with Grand Central

To discuss the economic impact of the standard pattern timetable on Grand Central

16 December 2009 Network Rail wrote to the industry

Proposing that the Priority Date for the May 2011 timetable be put back from 8 January to 12 February

18 December 2009 Network Rail issued its final timetable report

18 December 2009 East Coast provided ORR with the first draft of its proposed supplemental agreement, excluding the new Schedule 5

There was further correspondence and the agreement was amended as necessary through to 4 February

23 December 2009 ORR letter to stakeholders Setting out next steps, assuming the Priority Date was put back

23 December 2009 Network Rail provided ORR with the first draft of the proposed Grand Central Bradford contract

There was further correspondence and the contract was amended as necessary through to 2 February

4 January 2010 East Coast provided ORR with the first draft of its proposed new Schedule 5

There was further correspondence and the schedule was amended as necessary through to 4 February

5 January 2010 Network Rail letter to the industry

Confirming that the Priority Date had been put back

29 January 2010 ORR meeting with Network Rail To discuss defeasance

2 February 2010 ORR issued draft directions in respect of the Grand Central Bradford and Hull Trains applications

4 February 2010 ORR issued draft directions in respect of the East Coast application

11 February 2010 ORR issued directions in respect of three applications and said it would approve the fourth

11 February 2010 ORR issued its reasons letter

12 February 2010 The parties entered into the two contracts and agreement as directed, and the other agreement was approved

Priority Date for SCD May 2011 timetable


Annex B – list of consultees/responses

Alliance Rail Holdings – letter dated 26 March and interview 11 May Colas Rail Limited DB Schenker Rail (UK) Limited – interview 22 April Department for Transport – interview 21 May DP World Direct Rail Services Limited (DRS) East Coast Main Line Company Limited – interview 20 April East Midlands Trains Limited First Capital Connect Limited First/Keolis Transpennine Limited (TPE) First ScotRail Limited Freightliner Group Limited – interview 4 May GB Railfreight Limited Grand Central Railway Company Limited – interview 13 May Hull Trains Company Limited – interview 14 May Hutchison Ports (UK) Limited London Eastern Railway Limited (NXEA) London TravelWatch – letter dated 31 March and interview 19 April MDS Transmodal Limited Network Rail Infrastructure Limited – interview 29 April Northern Rail Limited – interview 30 April Passenger Focus – interview 14 May Rail Freight Group – letter dated 17 March Renaissance Trains South Yorkshire PTE Transport Scotland - letter dated 12 April and interview 30 April Transport for London Tyne & Wear PTE (Nexus) West Coast Railway Company Limited West Coast Trains Limited (Virgin Trains) West Yorkshire PTE XC Trains Limited (CrossCountry)



Annex C – summary of recommendations

Paragraph

number

Issue Recommendation

2.14 Strategic Capacity Network Rail should: (a) develop and publish a clear and transparent policy on how it will integrate its strategic planning vision with its timetable development activity – this should probably be included in Network Rail’s network statement; and (b) appoint a ‘controlling mind’ who ensures that the access planning process is carried out in a way that is consistent with the strategic needs of the industry and its customers.

2.23 ECML RUS (a) Network Rail to ensure that there is better alignment between the access planning and RUS processes; (b) funders are encouraged to support an approach which gives better alignment between the access planning and franchising processes; and (c) ORR to clarify the relationship between RUSs and decisions on the allocation of capacity and set these out in its criteria and procedures document.

2.34 Structure & culture Network Rail to: (a) ensure that internal communications are improved between teams working on the access planning activity and that it has in place clear guidelines and processes; (b) continue with its work on introducing updated guidance on stakeholder engagement; and (c) review its project management arrangements for timetable development to ensure that they are rigorous and include the appointment of a dedicated project manager and a senior responsible officer.

2.51 Timetabling & resources

The timetabling process should be accorded more priority within Network Rail, properly resourced and conducted in line with rigorous project planning disciplines. Network Rail should produce and publish a clear process which would accurately reflect the requirements of the network code.

2.66 Stakeholder engagement

Recommendation: Network Rail and ORR to continue with the work of improving stakeholder engagement. The industry generally to ensure that the passenger representative bodies are included at an appropriate stage.

2.74 ORR’s role ORR will continue to work with the industry to find ways of improving, simplifying and streamlining industry processes, including its own.


2.79 Timescales ORR will ensure that rigorous project planning disciplines are applied to all future projects of a similar nature, including the setting of clear timescales and milestones.

2.90 Setting deadlines ORR will develop and introduce arrangements, in certain specified circumstances, for a cut-off date, and these will be set out in its criteria and procedures document.

2.98 Remits ORR to ensure that: (a) it provides Network Rail with clear and unambiguous instructions/remits; (b) strong project management arrangements are in place, both in Network Rail and within its own organisation; and (c) interested stakeholders understand how the timetable development process will work, and their role in it.

2.104 Attendance at industry meetings

ORR will in future: (a) attend initial meetings of industry stakeholders to explain its position and to set out what it hopes to achieve from the project; and (b) consider attending other meetings throughout a particular project as an observer on a case by case basis.

2.109 Project management arrangements

ORR will ensure that: (a) both ORR and Network Rail establish suitable project management arrangements at the outset of any project, including the early publication of a project plan detailing timescales, milestones and resources; and (b) the sole point of contact, together with others involved in a particular piece of work, is clearly detailed at the outset.

2.116 ORR’s timetabling & resources

No change to ORR’s current position, although ORR will work with Network Rail to ensure that it has suitable arrangements in place so that it can provide high quality professional advice and assessments.

2.121 Publication policy ORR will review its policy on the publication of material and provide further clarifying guidance as necessary in its criteria and procedures document.

2.131 Protecting the interests of open access operators

ORR will ensure that journey times are given more recognition in any similar exercise (this has already been noted as an issue for the WCML capacity exercise).

2.151 Funders’ role Funders are encouraged to support the policy of improved alignment between the access planning and franchising processes, and to be actively engaged in the establishment of an industry best practice statement.


2.159 Train operators’ role

Train operators should: (a) be clear about their requirements for timetable development and ensure that these are communicated to Network Rail in a timely and constructive way; and (b) maintain adequate processes to ensure that they are able to respond and contribute as necessary to the access planning process.

2.162 Rules of the plan Network Rail to investigate the optimum use of route capability, including a review of the ROTP and taking into account both infrastructure and rolling stock, so as to maximise the benefit of commercial train services whilst delivering a timetable that can be operated day in and day out on the ECML and to agree a plan, with affected train operators, by the end of September 2010, for developing potential improvements to feed into ECML timetables at the earliest practical opportunity.

2.164 Application forms ORR will review its application forms to ensure that the relevant questions are clear, and remind the industry of the need to give clear and concise information.

2.167 MOIRA ORR is currently reviewing the ‘not primarily abstractive’ test as part of its review of access policy, and is expecting to publish conclusions shortly.


Documents

East Coast Main Line - Lessons learned reportorr.gov.uk/.../4704/ecml-lessons-learned-report-200810.pdfEast Coast Main line Lessons Learned Report Contents Executive summary 1 1. Introduction5