Early Warning - Delayed Response?

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Early Warning

Delayed Response?Lessons from IFRC Horn of Africa Appeals 20082010

www.ifrc.org

Saving lives, changing minds.


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Cover photo: IFRC.

www.ifrc.orgSaving lives, changing minds.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societys work is guided by

Strategy 2020 which puts forward three strategic aims:

1. Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disaster and crises.

2. Enable healthy and safe living.

3. Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva, 2011.

Copies of all or part of this study may be made for noncommercial use, providing the source is acknowledged The IFRC would appreciate receiving

details of its use. Requests for commercial reproduction should be directed to the IFRC at [email protected]@ifrc.org.

The opinions and recommendations expressed in this study do not necessarily represent the ofcial policy of the IFRC or of individual National

Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies. The designations and maps used do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the International

Federation or National Societies concerning the legal status of a territory or of its authorities. All photos used in this study are copyright of the IFRC

unless otherwise indicated.

P.O. Box 372

CH-1211 Geneva 19

Switzerland

Telephone: +41 22 730 4222

Telefax: +41 22 733 0395E-mail: [email protected]

Web site: http://www.ifrc.org

Report by:

Nisar Majid

Food Security Specialist

Independent Consultant


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Contents

Foreword 5

Introduction 7

Key ndings 7Early warning delayed response 7

Well organised at point of distribution 8

Capacity and institutional learning 8

Coordination confusion 8

What does the RCRC stand for and do? 9

Strategic clarity 9

Responding to needs and relevance to branch 9

Innovation 10

Emerging issues and recommendations 11Overarching recommendation 11

The role of food aid (or timeliness and scale)? 11

Recommendation 1 11

Large-scale v small-scale appeals? 12

Recommendation 2 12

Vision, Strategy and Organisational Change 12

Recommendation 3 13

Structural issues 13

Recommendation 4 13

Background to the region 14Conditions in 2008 15

Analysis of appeals 16Summary of Intervention 16

Analysis of Appeal 16

Summary of Intervention 17

Analysis of the Assessment and the Appeal 18

Coordination 19

Ethiopia Red Cross 19

The Moyale Intervention 20

Summary of Seed Distribution 21

Analysis of Intervention 21

Summary of Intervention (East Hararghe) 22

Analysis of Appeal 23

Annex 1 List of interviewees 25

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Project reportEarly Warning Delayed Response? Lessons from IFRC Horn of Africa Appeals 20082010


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Between 2008 and 2010, the IFRC launched four international appealsto respond to drought and food insecurity in the Horn of Africa. Theresults were decidedly mixed. In some cases, Red Cross and RedCrescent Societies did manage to use these Appeals to good effect,and relevant and sustainable support was the result. In other cases, the

relief support was slow to mobilise, and was delivered too late to be ofrelevant assistance. For the most part the Appeals themselves failedto generate signicant donor support, and the largest of the Appealswas only 9% funded.

Some of the challenges highlighted in this review are commonly attrib-uted to donor fatigue in the Horn of Africa and the inherent logisticalchallenges of managing relief operations in the region. While acknowl-edging these issues are pertinent, this report attempts to dig deeper inidentifying the causes of success and failure in the IFRC response in theHorn of Africa, and to draw out lessons from the analysis, reasoningand decisions that motivate the IFRC to launch Appeals in the region.

The lessons are important because we will be faced with these samechallenges again. The rst lesson, which is by no means new but under-lies the consequent recommendations, is that droughts are natural andrecurring in the Horn of Africa, and therefore sudden, large scale reliefoperations are often less relevant than addressing the long term chal-lenge of supporting communities to become more resilient to the cyclesof drought. The challenge for Red Cross and Red Crescent Societiesis therefore to focus on the capacity building of Branches and com-munities in risk reduction relative to drought. Secondly, the reviewacknowledges the advances that the wider humanitarian sector (andsome National Societies) have made in the use of early warning sys-

tems and analysing food security trends. The humanitarian response inthe region has become more sophisticated, and so must the Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies, if their interventions are to remain relevant.Which leads to a third lesson, that protecting livelihoods should be acore principle of responding to drought, and food aid is often not thebest option to achieve that end. Therefore more attention needs tobe given to innovating with cash responses, protecting livestock andaddressing health as well as food security threats. A nal challengethat remains prominent for all humanitarian actors operating in theHorn of Africa is to advocate for increased investment in communityresilience work, even when the rainfall is good, as this can provide

opportunities to engage in long term solutions.

Foreword


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Chapter number Foreword

The process of the review itself is worth noting. Although conductedand written by an independent consultant, the review was motivatedand supported by a consortium of implementing and donor Red Cross

and Red Crescent National Societies, who met regularly during thereview and helped guide its progress. Collectively, we are committedto taking its lessons into our responses in the future.

Alexander Matheou

Regional Representative for East Africa


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Introduction

This report is based on a review of four international Appeals of theIFRC in the Horn of Africa, from 2008 to 2010.1 The review took a foodsecurity lens to broadly assess the whole Appeal process, from assess-ment and analysis, project/programme design, resource mobilisation,coordination, implementation and impact. Over fty interviews were

conducted with RCRC staff, in Geneva, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia,as well as by telephone. Branches and beneciary communities werealso visited in Kenya and Ethiopia.

The scope of this review is broad given the number of issues, actors,institutional layers and different contexts within the Movement (dif-ferent branches, NSs, PNSs, IFRC and ICRC). As such, and in order tomaximise the potential readership and impact of the report it has beenkept short and with the purpose of attempting to bring out emergingissues o relevance to the wider Movement. It is structured into 4 sections:Key Findings; Emerging Issues and Recommendations; Background tothe Region; Analysis of Appeals.

Key ndings

Early warning delayed responseIn spite of good early warning signals at the Branch level, the RCRCemergency responses to periods of community stress are typicallydelayed, taking many months (4-6 or more) from rst signals, assess-ments, to the actual response. These delays are not all particular to

the RCRC (many are systemic, reecting the humanitarian system ingeneral and the nature of slow onset crises)2. However, this may meanthat the crisis itself has passed by the time of the response or, if thecrisis has not passed an opportunity to intervene much earlier hasbeen missed. The reasons for these delays vary but include:

1 These were the Ethiopia International Appeal May 2008; the Horn of Africa Appeal December2008; the Kenya Drought Appeal September 2009; the Ethiopia International Appeal February2010.

2 For an interesting analysis of these systemic problems as applicable to the region, see HPGBrieng Note, May 2006, Saving lives through l ivelihoods: critical gaps in the response to thedrought in the Greater Horn of Africa at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdf;
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdfhttp://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdfhttp://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdfhttp://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdf


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1 Introduction

n Limited food security analytical capacity to anticipate the scale,severity and seasonality of a crisis

n Limited contingency funds and institutional options for quick

responses

n A reliance on slow/delayed assessment and appeal processes (eitherinternal or external to the Movement)

n An over-reliance on food aid as the major response

n Inappropriate administrative procedures

Well organised at point of distributionAt the point of distribution, emergency relief (and recovery) activities

are generally effective, well organised and well implemented and usu-ally appreciated by communities on the ground. The Movements roleat the point of distribution is however subject to the inuence of otheractors, e.g. Government or WFP or local community dynamics, whichcan be either positive or negative, depending on the local context, andindicate some limits of NS inuence at the local level.

Capacity and institutional learningAmbitions and motivations of NSs and the IFRC at the senior manage-ment levels to scaling up or doing more, doing better, reaching further,while laudable, are not fully matched with the required institutionalcapacity or the availability of resources to the RCRC in the region. Inthis respect a culture of institutional learning, decentralised decision-making and investment in staff quality and staff retention are impor-tant organisational issues but are problematic within many parts ofthe RCRC. The consultant was hugely impressed by the commitment,quality and desire to do more at the branch level and recognises thehuge and under-utilised potential that exists there. The consultantalso notes a tremendous interest and desire from the majority of staffinterviewed to discuss and debate technical and organisational issues.

Coordination confusionThe period under review was associated with IFRC restructuring and itsnew vision (the 2020 strategy), the development of an unusual regionalAppeal and the creation of an ofce for the coordination of the Horn ofAfrica operation, in Addis Ababa. Time and other pressures to pursuethis vision led to a lack of consultation and buy-in within the move-ment that ultimately led to considerable tension and confusion withinthe IFRC, and in terms of its relations with NSs and PNSs. This waswidely commented upon and is detrimental to the IFRCs potentialrole. While it is recognised that this period of restructuring is largelyover and coordination and relations are already much improved, there

remain concerns over the appropriate technical, logistical, coordination


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and donor relations capacity at the regional level (i.e. Nairobi), and insupport of the Ethiopia Red Cross.

What does the RCRC stand for and do?There is a lack of clarity within the Movement at all levels about thedistinctive identity and role of the RCRC. These include:

n Its emergency and/or development role

n Its understanding of and commitment to food security; how theRCRC movement balances smaller-scale, ongoing work in areas suchas Disaster Risk Reduction with capacity and opportunities associ-ated with larger-scale responses

n What its niche and community-based position means in practice?

Tensions between the attractions of external funding and internalpriorities

n In a highly complex region such as the Horn of Africa where there isa considerable blurring of chronic and acute issues, where crisesare permanent and hunger is seasonal, and where PNSs and NSs areimplementing relief and development programmes, this confusion isproblematic and can serve to undermine a clear strategic direction

Examples of good practiceWhile the review necessarily adopts a critical lens there are several

examples of good practice to draw upon from throughout the region.

Strategic clarityAt the strategic level the Somalia Red Crescent (SRCS) and the Tigraybranch of the Ethiopia Red Cross (ERCS) stand out as having clearstrategic approaches, recognising their own capacity limitations andconcentrating on building their own capacity. This kind of directionobliges PNSs and IFRC support NS or Branch approaches and priorities.Interestingly, neither used food aid as part of their strategies withinthe review period.

Responding to needs and relevance to

branchThe Wolaita, Ethiopia emergency relief and recovery intervention of2008, provided food and water interventions in a critical and excep-tional emergency situation, as well as crucial sweet potato and haricotbean seeds to promote recovery and a successful animal re-stock-ing programme. The branch has capitalised on this intervention tohugely increase its visibility, credibility and membership as a result.


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1 Introduction

Coordination between the ERCS, Austrian and Finnish PNSs and theIFRC was relatively good.

InnovationThe Kenya Red Cross (KRCS) was innovative in identifying the potentialof El Nino rain predictions to implement a timely and highly effectiveseed distribution in Ukambani areas that were severely affected by adrought. It is also currently using predictions of poor La Nina rains tosurvey borehole capacity in advance of a possible drought.

The KRCS and the ICRC have developed a strategic partnership basedaround ICRCs tracking system (identifying different interventions fordifferent phases in the crisis cycle). The IFRC in Nairobi is also pilotingdisaster preparedness activities with Kenya Red Cross with the sup-

port of ECHO. These initiatives are part of the KRCSs evolution fromits strong capacity in logistics and emergency relief towards a morediversied institutional capacity.

The Djibouti Red Crescent implemented a food-for-work programmein peri-urban areas in partnership with WFP and with funds from theHoA Appeal. An innovative recovery programme based on cash loanswas developed between the Djibouti Red Crescent and the British RedCross, in coordination with the IFRC, and was based on a signicantinvestment in relationship building.


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Emerging issues and recommendations

Overarching recommendationThe RCRC (NSs, PNSs and IFRC) in the Horn of Africa should focusits activities around a Community Risk Management Approach basedon integrating its technical support areas. This should be done while

strengthening long-term relationships between the various parts ofthe movement and prioritising branch development where possible.

The role of food aid (or timeliness and scale)?1

While food aid remains an important option, where availability is lim-ited and in times ofextreme food insecurity, unless it can be deliveredin a timely and short duration fashion, there are also considerablerisks identied in its use. It is part of the political and institutionalcontext in the region and is subject to corruption and manipulation.It is a bulky and expensive commodity to source and distribute, which

can contribute to signicant delays in its distribution and thereforein its impact. There is considerable existing capacity alternative tothe RCRC within the region to deliver emergency food relief, withorganisations who have stronger internal systems and who are betterknown to external donors. It is often difcult for communities on theground, as well as agencies, to distinguish the purpose of food aidbetween addressing acute and chronic malnutrition.

Recommendation 1The RCRC in the region should develop regional and country specic

guidance on food security policy and practice (including food aid).This guidance should link to RCRC global food security thinking inGeneva.2 Guidance could include discussion of the advantages anddisadvantages of food aid, criteria for choosing appropriate responses,piloting of other options (e.g. cash), integration with other sectors e.g.nutrition, water and health.

1 See Kenyan Sunday Standard, 3rd October 2010, and KRCSs Press Release in Response, 4 thOctober, 2010, for an example of the complications of food aid. This review takes no positionon this particular issue but merely highlights it as an example of the sensitivities and risksof being involved in food aid in the region.

2 A global food security strategy document is being prepared.


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Recommendation 3The IFRC in the region should develop a discussion document and

training/awareness raising materials to bring out policy and program-matic issues around operating within the chronic and acute contextin the Horn of Africa for the RCRC. Concepts and linkages betweennutrition, food security, livelihoods, health and sanitation, as well asbetween relief and development could be brought out. Exploring a stra-tegic partnership with ICRC in the region and the Kenya Red Cross mayaccelerate this process.

Structural issuesThe ending of the newly created HoA operational coordination ofceand the arrival of new staff in the regional ofce signal the start of thenew structures in the region and new relationships that are forming.There is a clear demand for a strong coordination and technical sup-port role for the IFRC ofce in the region. Nairobi is a key hub for boththe Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions, in terms of logistical,technical, coordination and resource mobilisation issues.

Ethiopia is not directly served by the Nairobi regional ofce yet it isa huge and hugely diverse country with deep poverty and recurringemergencies. Food security related issues are complex and are a fun-damental component of understanding Ethiopia and its policy andprogrammatic environment.3 Ongoing technical support based on long-

term relationship building is an important component of supportingthe Ethiopia Red Cross.

Recommendation 4The RCRC in the region should assess these capacity requirements andcoordination mechanisms, including allocating adequate support tothe Ethiopia Red Cross.

3 See Haan, Majid and Darcy, 2006, for an analysis of Ethiopian food security and livelihoodcomplexity and implications for assessments and food aid interventions, at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/602.pdf;


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Background to the region

The Horn of Africa provides an extremely complex developmentaland humanitarian context with which to engage. Political structuresin the region range enormously from stateless Somalia to the highlycentralised Ethiopian state. Political volatility is high and conict isrecurrent. In terms of livelihoods and food security conditions, the

variability of local conditions is also enormous. There are hundreds ofdifferent livelihood groups each with different combinations of crops,livestock, market opportunities, social systems, access to markets,coping strategies, and so on.1 Extremely high levels of poverty andvulnerability to natural and man-made shocks are evident. Seasonalhunger and seasonal stress occur to varying extents virtually everyyear and many or most large-scale crises have a slow-onset character.

As a result of this extremely volatile and complex environment therehave been large investments in early warning and food security infor-mation systems across the region. The FSNAU2 of Somalia, the ARLMP3of Kenya and the LIU4 of Ethiopia are examples of cutting edge informa-

tion systems. These exist partly to manage the misinformation andpolitics around emergency related gures in the region as well as tohelp prioritise scarce resources.5 There have also been innovative pro-grammes and projects from the large-scale food and cash ProductiveSafety Net Programme in Ethiopia to emergency cash interventions topastoralists in southern Somalia. Underlying these investments is arecognition that crises are recurrent, and emergency (acute) and devel-opmental (chronic) conditions are often blurred and inter-changeable.Most major donors and agencies have invested in signicant regionaltechnical and managerial capacity, in Nairobi, in order to monitor andrespond to these conditions, absorb best practice and maintain insti-

tutional memory.The RCRC is one of hundreds of agencies in the region responding toboth disasters and development needs. It has a relatively low profle andis not known for generating and documenting best practice in a region

1 See livelihood baselines and outputs of the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit ofSomalia, the Livelihoods Integration Unit in Ethiopia and FEWSNET Regional and Countryofces for examples; http://www.dppc.gov.et/Livelihoods/Livelihoods_Integration_Unit.htm;http://www.fsnau.org/products/baseline-reports;http://www.fsnau.org/; http://www.fews.net/Pages/livelihoods.aspx?loc=6&l=en;

2 Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit3 Arid lands Resource Management Project4 Livelihoods Integration Unit5 See Haan, Majid and Darcy 2006 again.
http://www.dppc.gov.et/Livelihoods/Livelihoods_Integration_Unit.htmhttp://www.fsnau.org/products/baseline-reportshttp://www.fsnau.org/http://www.fsnau.org/http://www.fews.net/Pages/livelihoods.aspx?loc=6&l=enhttp://www.fews.net/Pages/livelihoods.aspx?loc=6&l=enhttp://www.fews.net/Pages/livelihoods.aspx?loc=6&l=enhttp://www.fews.net/Pages/livelihoods.aspx?loc=6&l=enhttp://www.fsnau.org/http://www.fsnau.org/products/baseline-reportshttp://www.dppc.gov.et/Livelihoods/Livelihoods_Integration_Unit.htm


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that produces much institutional learning. The ICRC is the exceptionto this general position of the movement in the region.

Conditions in 20082008 onwards arguably provided a more complex environment thanusual with a combination of internal and external factors from inter-national food and fuel price rises (2007-2008; stabilising by mid to late2008), soon followed by the global nancial crisis (September 2008onwards); post-election violence in Kenya (December 2007); electionpreparations in Ethiopia (May 2010) and severe conict and displace-ment around Mogadishu, Somalia (2007 onwards). Disruptions to mar-kets and trade were high in general though there were very differentfactors in different parts of the region.6 Food aid pipeline problems

were also occurring in 2008 and 2009 due to production shortfalls inkey areas e.g. Rift Valley in Kenya. This was compounded by poor rainsand disease outbreaks in many areas. These conditions had followeda severe and widespread regional drought in 2006.7

The four Appeals analysed for the review covered the period 2008-2010. The Ethiopia Food Insecurity Appeal (Wolaita) of May 2008 wasgenerated by the Ethiopia Red Cross and the IFRC in Nairobi. It wasa modest response to a clear crisis. The Horn of Africa Appeal wasparticularly unusual for the region in terms of its scale and the resul-tant processes and structures that were mobilised (i.e. the FACT teamand the HoA8 operational coordination ofce in Addis Ababa). It was

very poorly funded. The HoA Appeal was also signicant for affect-ing country specic resource mobilisation processes. For example, theKenya Red Cross was initially part of the HoA Appeal, then had a largeand poorly funded National Appeal in early 2009, followed by a moremodest International Drought Appeal in September 2009. Finally, therewas an Ethiopia specic Severe Food Shortage International Appeal inFebruary 2010, which was again signicant in scale and poorly funded.The purpose of the review was therefore to try and learn lessons fromthis set of unusual internal and external factors within the region.

6 See Food Security & Complex Livelihoods in the Horn, East and Central Africa, June 2008, atwww.ebpdn.org/download/download.php?table=resources&id=2118;

7 See HPG Brieng Note, May 2006, Saving lives through livelihoods: critical gaps in theresponse to the drought in the Greater Horn of Africa at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdf;

8 Horn of Africa
http://www.ebpdn.org/download/download.php?table=resources&id=2118http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdfhttp://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdfhttp://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdfhttp://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdfhttp://www.ebpdn.org/download/download.php?table=resources&id=2118


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Analysis of appeals

Ethiopia Appeal(May 2008; Euros 1.2m; 35% funded through Appeal, 65% fundedthrough ECHO in-country; increased to Euro 5m, 81% funded, 75,000beneciaries).

Summary of InterventionAn international appeal was launched in May 2008 for the EthiopiaRed Cross to support 40,000 beneciaries for four months in Wolaitazone, Ethiopia. This following an assessment by the ERCS and the IFRCzonal ofce in Nairobi. Funds were raised primarily by the Finnishand Austrian PNSs, as well as from ECHO in-country and through theIFRC. Food relief distributions began in late June. Water rehabilitationand seed distributions were also carried out as well as targeted animalre-stocking in 2009.

Analysis of AppealFirst signals of problems in Wolaita occurred in December 2007 thebranch sent pictures of malnourished children and a letter to the ERCShead ofce in Addis Ababa. Internal ERCS assessments were mobilisedand the zone DM ofce was called upon and arrived in April 2008. Thefood security and nutrition conditions were clearly extremely seriouswith a nutrition survey by GOAL conrming this.1 FEWSNET conrmedthe exceptional situation. The Appeal document itself provided detailedlocal specic explanations of the nature of the problem and justica-tions for a range of responses. The time between the April assessment,the May Appeal and the late June response was good in comparisonto other examples seen (2-3 months; although this was 6 months afterthe branch rst reported the situation). The initial response to theAppeal was limited and the Finnish and Austrian PNSs found addi-tional resources through ECHO funds in addition to their own. Therewas concern within some ECHO quarters of different PNSs requestingresources for the same problem. Coordination through the IFRC wasconsidered relatively good.

1 12.1% GAM, 2.1% SAM, under-5 mortality of 2.24%, in March /April 2008, in Damot Galeworeda.


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The interventions themselves were all appropriate and effectively car-ried out. All interviewees (community beneciaries and woreda of-cials) had extremely positive feedback. People had clearly been deplet-

ing their assets and reducing their consumption for some time. Waterwas also a major problem that was addressed through rehabilitationof water points. Full rations were received with no specic targetingcriteria (reecting the widespread nature of the crisis). Water pointswere still functioning at the time of the visit. The woreda ofcials com-mented that they now knew the Red Cross and that they had learnedfrom the organisation about good distributions.

It is interesting to note that the two woredas targeted are not emer-gency prone areas and do not usually receive either emergency orsafety net support, therefore food aid has not become institution-alised in these areas. They are woredas of high population density,

with likely chronic food insecurity problems but are not drought prone(recurrent emergency prone areas are in the lowlands within the zone2).Supporting this hypothesis is the fact that recovery has been good,with good rains since then and, for example, all beneciaries thathad received sheep still had them and were looking to convert themto milking cows3. The crucial failure of the sweet potato crop wasaddressed through distribution of cuttings and haricot beans were alsodistributed. They appear to have been highly appropriate and valued.The branch has signicantly increased its membership and prole as aresult, now counting approximately 50% of the population of the zoneas members. This proportion is much higher in the districts where thisintervention has taken place.

Discussions at the branch level suggested that if funds i.e. contingencyfunds, were available, they would have been able to respond manymonths earlier and would not have had to wait for the governmentsnational Appeal, suggesting that early, local level responses can takeplace outside of the national level government appeal process.

Horn of Africa Appeal(December 2008; Euro 72.8m; DREF of Euro 86,000; Exceptional advanceof Euro 6.6m from the Federation; 12% funded)45

Summary of InterventionThe large scale of the Appeal was targeted at supporting 2.2m ben-eciaries over 5 years. It signied the activation of the 2020 strategyof senior management in Geneva and their interest to scale up andreach out to more beneciaries. The Appeal was preceded by a large,multi-disciplinary FACT team which was in the region from October

2 A zone in Ethiopia is an administrative area that comprises of several woredas or districts.3 In the authors experience, animals provided in re-stocking projects may often be sold again

to generate income.4 Figure from Operations Update, 19/05/2009.5 A revised and updated appeal was published in June 2009, with an appeal gure of Euros

50m.


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4 Analysis of appeals

to December 2008.6 A special HoA operational structure was created tosupport a potentially large-scale response. DREF funds and an excep-tional advance were released - the majority of which was allocated

to food aid. Funding for the HoA Appeal was limited and priority wasultimately given to Ethiopia. The Moyale emergency relief interventionwas one of the priorities within Ethiopia and interviews were con-ducted in Addis Ababa and Harar to develop this case study.7 140,000people, primarily pastoralists received emergency relief, interventionsto control Acute Water Diarrhroea (AWD)8 and water interventions fromApril to July 2009.

The Kenya Red Cross and Somali Red Crescent received little moneythrough the appeal. The KRCS had already prepared an appeal priorto the Horn of Africa appeal, which was then subsumed within thatAppeal. Djibouti received some funds through the Appeal for a food-

for-work programme with WFP. The HoA assessment and appeal alsocatalysed a bilateral initiative from the British Red Cross, to support acash-loan recovery programme.

Analysis of the Assessment and the AppealThe timing of the assessment and the appeal was considered anythingfrom 6 months to 1 year late in terms of the peak of the problem andthe availability of funds.9 From the middle to the end of 2008, inter-national and regional food prices were stabilising or coming down,particularly as much of the regional harvest was coming in to markets,

although prices were still signicantly higher than long-term averages.The assessment and appeal was therefore out of synch with the globaland regional early warning and resource mobilisation processes thathad already taken place. For example, WFP had launched its appeal forfunds to cover global food price rises in March 2008 and had obtainedits target of $755m two months later.10 The process associated with theHoA Appeal was considered rushed which did not allow crucial timeto generate buy-in within the wider movement. The FACT team itselfdid not comprise of many experts with up-to-date knowledge of theregion. The Appeal document drew largely on existing reports reect-ing known areas of concern but without adding any level of critical

6 Team composition changed during this time, with many members not continuing for the fullperiod.

7 In order to cover as many sites as possible within the timeframe, the consultant and ERCstaff agreed to interview staff in Addis Ababa and Harar that had been involved in theintervention. The long distance (time factor), Ramadan period and uncertainty of ndingbeneciaries contributed to this decision.

8 AWD is used instead of cholera in Ethiopia.9 For example, in mid-2007, FEWSNET was both report ing on the impact of drought, oods,

Rift Valley Fever (RVF) and conict (in Somalia) in 20 05 and 2006, where 10m people werereported to have been affected, and at the same time was already predicting worseninghumanitarian conditions in late 2007/early 2008, as a result of a combination of factors,including rising prices, drought, conict and disease.

10 US$500m of this came from the Saudi government.


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analysis.11 Donors in the region are wary of emergency gures andpotentially exaggerated claims for assistance, including those fromthe United Nations.12 The majority of DREF/Exceptional funds were

used for the purposes of food aid. In retrospect this was problematicas it did not signify a commitment to implementing different typesof interventions for some PNSs and also meant that there was anongoing pressure to obtain funding (for food aid) to repay this loan.Interestingly, the largest contribution to the appeal came through theSwedish Red Cross and was the result of an end of year under-spend,available at short notice, from SIDA.

The assessment and appeal document is generally acknowledged forits attempt to combine short-term, medium term and long-term issues,however it was neither able to do this persuasively nor was the Appealdocument considered the appropriate place for it. For many donors

the Appeal document is there to raise emergency funds as quicklyas possible. The British Red Cross for example, conducted a secondassessment, mobilising several experts, in order to develop a recoveryproposal.

CoordinationCreating a new operational structure in Addis Ababa was viewed prob-lematically by virtually all interviewees. While such a structure mayhave been considered necessary to support a very large-scale interven-tion, lines of communication between Geneva, Addis Ababa, Nairobi

and later Johannesburg were unclear, contributing to less than con-structive relations within the IFRC and poor perceptions by the NSsand PNSs. The Horn of Africa ofce was left in a very difcult posi-tion, trying to reclaim advanced funds as well as credibility, followingthe rushed start through the initial FACT team and the poor resourcemobilisation that resulted.

Ethiopia Red CrossThe ERCS was the largest beneciary of funds through the HoA Appeal.Senior management, the board of the ERCS were apparently interested

to build up capacity to cover up to 10% of emergency needs in-country.In addition, pipeline concerns at the time were affecting WFP (andtherefore the GoE, its main partner). There was a likely interest bythe GoE in looking for alternative sources of food aid to meet needsin a pre-election year. Covering up to 10% of the emergency case-loadequated to over 600,000 beneciaries. It appears therefore that there

11 The author of this report was brought in to the region by a major British NGO in June 2008in order to conduct an analysis of the situation at the time. The problem was identied as acomplex livelihood crisis with many contributory factors and areas of uncertainty, includingdomestic drivers of price ination, regional trade disruptions, food aid supply problems,unreliable gures, unclear timing of acute crisis.

12 See Haan, Majid and Darcy, 2006, for an analysis of Ethiopian food security and livelihoodcomplexity and implications for assessments and food aid interventions,at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/602.pdf;


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was an overlapping interest between the IFRC (Geneva), the ERCS andthe GoE that all contributed towards an interest in scaling up.

The Moyale InterventionMoyale is a politically complicated area of intervention as it sits on theborder of two ethnic groups, the Somali and the Oromiya. It is a droughtprone area, the scene of recurrent emergencies and lies close to theborder of Kenya and Somalia. The ERC had operated there during thesevere regional drought of 2006. The Kenya Red Cross operates on theKenyan side of the border. There is no Moyale branch of the ERC andthe nearest branch is in Negelle, several hours drive away. Moyale wasidentied as a priority area for intervention by the GoE and the FACTteam was keen to intervene in lowland areas due to concerns aboutfunctioning market mechanisms and food supply. The ERCS generallyfollows the GoEs national system for identifying food insecure areaswhich is generally good although ultimately identies relative needsand does not distinguish easily between chronic and acute needs. TheIFRC and ERCS were directed to the Somali side of the border by theGoE, in spite of a reluctance on their side. In terms of the needs at thetime, ofcials reported that while the situation was difcult it was notas severe as in 2006. In addition, one of the major issues in the areais a chronic water problem with a shallow aquifer becoming easilycontaminated, particularly in times of water shortage. At the time ofthe interventions most families had moved to the Kenyan side of theborder, coming back when they heard about the relief distributions. A

subsequent assessment resulted in part of the relief being directed tothe Oromia side as well.

The actual distributions took place during the rainy season. The timeof greatest hardship for pastoralists is usually the end of the dry sea-son and beginning of the wet season. Some trucks were reported tohave become stuck due to muddy roads. These difculties were recog-nised by the community who was reported to have asked ERCS staffwhy cash was not brought in as it is easier to transport. Distributionsthemselves were well organised although ERCS staff generally point outthat targeting and distributing is more difcult in pastoral areas thanagricultural areas due to the strength and salience of the clan system

for managing resource distributions. PHAST and AWD interventionstook place in Moyale urban areas (KRCS frequently requests supportof ERCS in terms of coordination in Moyale, as the town is dividedbetween Kenya and Ethiopia).

The ERCS had to manage very tense and difcult relations with theOromiya side (particularly the woreda administration) as they wereperceived to be biased towards Somalis. Following the relief distribu-tions, water rehabilitation was planned for both communities. In theend this was abandoned as the Somali ofcials claimed that all of theresources were for their area. Communities in both areas were sup-


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portive of the interventions. There was no opportunity to build on theintervention due to the lack of permanent presence in the area.

Kenya International Appeal(September 2009; Euros 5.7m; 25 % funded13)

The Kenya International Appeal followed a preliminary NationalAppeal of CHF 28m in January 2009. This was not well funded. Funding

received through the HoA Appeal for Kenya was also very limited. TheSeptember International Appeal aimed to cover 1.7m beneciaries for6 months, through school feeding, community health care servicesand seed distributions.

Summary of Seed DistributionThe consultant visited the Machakos Branch that supported a seeddistribution in Yatta and other districts. The branch carries out a rangeof activities and had been involved in local fundraising in response tothe emergency conditions prior to the seed distribution.

Analysis of InterventionDrought conditions in the Ukambani areas were very severe in 2008and 2009. Cattle losses were high and a WFP EMOP had started in June2009, following early interventions supported by the British Red Cross.Incomes had been stretched and the seed intervention was developeddue to the expected good El Nino rains. The seed intervention wasa highly effective, pro-active, response to aid recovery in light of an

13 The initial appeal was 6% funded within 2 months. The amount sought appears to have beenrevised downwards with CHF 2,047,020 received by August 2010 and 100% coverage reported this gure is used to provide the 25% estimated coverage.

Box 1. PNSs - Who funds who, what and why?

PNSs have different policies and priorities of their own and as a result of their back

donors, which create a confusing resource mobilisation environment. For example,the German Red Cross has a policy of co-ordinated bilateralism, obtaining funds

from the German Government and the EU and rarely contributes to International

appeals. The Spanish Red Cross are predominantly bilateral and do not have Africa

as a priority area, obtaining funding for the region through some of their own city

municipalities. The Japanese Red Cross only use their own internal funds and have

a policy to support all international appeals based on xed criteria. The Swedish Red

Cross do prioritise Africa and work multilaterally and were able to mobilise funding

opportunistically due to end of year funds available by SIDA at virtually a days

notice. Some PNSs have formed informal groups to share information with regard

to funding decisions. Some PNSs acknowledge these different factors and suggest

that there should be more transparency and co-ordination around fund-raising

issues within the movement to transform a fragmented competitive environment

into a mutually supportive one.


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exceptional rainy season. The hybrid seeds were expensive in the mar-ket and beyond the means of most farmers. Farmers were appreciativeof the seeds but did plant their own traditional varieties as well as thehybrids. Yields of farmers varied greatly in the three sites visited from3 to 10 bags. Lack of draught power meant that land preparation wascompromised which in turn affected productivity. Yields may havebeen better in other districts. Overall maize production in the widerarea was exceptional suggesting that the good rains and the wide-spread seed distributions contributed to good harvests.

However, it is worth recognising that Yatta is a marginal agricultural

area, not best suited to maize, and the Government is correctly tryingto promote drought resistant varieties of crops. This seed interventiontherefore while having an overall positive impact is perhaps best seenas an opportunistic response to exceptional circumstances.

Ethiopia International Appeal(February 2010; $28.7m; 16% funded14)

Summary of Intervention (East Hararghe)The GoE released a Humanitarian Requirements Report in October

2009 several months after its Belg assessment and seven monthsbefore the May 2010 elections. The IFRC regional food security advi-sor was requested by the ERC to support an appeal and arrived inNovember 2009. A FACT team was mobilised in December 2009 andthe International Appeal was released in February 2010. East Hararghewas the priority area identied and interventions (food relief and seeds)were planned to begin in March 2010 arrived in East Hararghe in August2010.

14 Approximately 50% of funding was obtained from ECHO within the region, therefore notdirectly through the Appeal process.

Box 2. The Kenya Red Cross and collaboration

with ICRC

The KRCS has built its reputation around a formidable logistics capacity, torespond to emergencies, and advocacy around emergencies. It has been, until

recently, responsible for 13 districts that WFP covers (recently reduced to 5). These

attributes while important are different from those required to build de-centralised,

institutional capacity to manage more complex projects. Interestingly, the KRCS and

ICRC have recently developed a close relationship involving considerable capacity

building elements. This includes using the ICRCs tracking system for identifying the

types of interventions appropriate to the different phases of a crisis. The IFRC ofce

has also rebuilt its relationship with the KRCS following a tense period in 2008 and

2009. It seems there are now major synergies that could be developed between

the KRCS, ICRC and the IFRC, adopting a community-based approach to Disaster

Management and Disaster Risk Reduction.


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Analysis of AppealThe visit of the regional food security advisor followed GoE/ERC target-

ing procedures to identify Shashamene and Seraro as the priority areas.The ERC branch in Shashemane was keen to know why malnutritionwas appearing when it had not been seen there before. Discussionswith government staff identied that water was the most importantissue and was a chronic problem. People normally have to buy waterwhich accounts for 70% of expenditure. When pushed to discuss thecost-benet of using funds for water or food, government staff quicklyrealised that the greater value was in water interventions. However,the position of food aid in Ethiopia means that it was agreed that 30%of a potential budget should go towards food aid. Water interventionsdiscussed included subsidising water trucking and using food to free upincome for water. Food relief would have been short-term (2-3 months).

Recovery interventions could include water infrastructure expansion.Soft pledges of approximately $3m were already available accordingto the regional food security advisor who felt condent that up to $5mcould be obtained.

Senior management decisions taken in Addis Ababa and Geneva deter-mined that such an appeal was too small. A target of up to 10% ofnational needs was again identied equating to approximately 300,000people. In order to generate a bigger appeal a FACT team was necessary.In light of the experience of the HoA Appeal, there was an understand-able reluctance in Addis Ababa to mobilise another large, expensiveFACT team and a more specic skill set was identied including anutritionist, and experts in food security, early recover and resourcemobilisation.

However, gathering the right combination of people at the right timeproved difcult and a food security expert was not identied. Finallyfour assessment teams were mobilised to Awassa, N Wollo, Tigray andEast Hararghe. Interviewees who were on the FACT assessments raisedconcerns about the appropriate expertise on the team, especially in thearea of food security. They also noted that it was very difcult to turnfour different local assessments, with different technical expertise andwith very different local issues into a consolidated Appeal. There wasalso a perception that the Appeal would be poorly funded based on theHoA Appeal experience. In spite of the varied expertise and inputs foodaid was prioritised. The timing of the Appeal was complicated by theapproaching Christmas and New Year holiday period. The launch of theAppeal in February was preceded by the Haiti earthquake in January.

Distributions have been delayed due to complications around procure-ment. At the time of the visit 200MT (5 trucks) of food relief were stuckon muddy roads. Food was being distributed long after a very goodrain season had begun and early harvests were already available. Fooddistributions themselves were well organised (logistics team there atthe time conrmed this). People appreciated the food as a free resource

distributed during Ramadan but there was little apparent need or


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hunger at the time. The Harare ofce has faced much criticism fromlocal communities and government ofcials, none of its own making,for both failing to deliver on their promises and thereby not allowingalternatives (e.g. resources, organisations) from being approached atthe time.

From the time of the assessment in late 2009 to the time of actualdistribution was approximately 8 months.

Box 3. ECHO food distributions North Shoa

(2009/2010)

ECHO funding for food aid obtained in-country accounts for over 50% of theFebruary 2010 Ethiopia Appeal. ECHO is motivated by its interest in nding

alternative outlets for food aid that are otherwise dominated by WFP and the GoE.

The consultant visited Ankober woreda in N Shoa zone, the site of these food

distributions. Approximately 25,000 people were targeted with full rations. Food

planned for delivery in June and July 2009 became available only in November

2009. Woredas originally planned for distributions were changed due to a changed

situation on the ground by the time food aid was available. Many complaints were

received about the original distribution list drawn up by kebele ofcials and passed

to the woreda. Follow-ups by the ERCS and the woreda administration before

and after the rst distribution addressed some of these complaints. Good storage

facilities were only available in two sites according to woreda ofcials. These were

in the highland areas some distance away from targeted lowland areas within thesame woreda.

The woreda is a mountainous area and beneciaries had to walk up and down these

hills for half to one day to reach either of the two sites. Distributions took place over

three days meaning that people had to stay close to the distributions sites, away

from home, for this time. As well as the physical effort involved in this the costs

incurred were estimated to be a minimum of 20Birr/day, for food during the stay.

The consultant was advised that costs in terms of transport and accommodation

would have been subsidised by friends and neighbours in the towns people would

have begged and borrowed for accommodation and for animals to transport their

goods back home. Beneciaries may have paid for some of this support through

sharing their rations. As well as the physical effort of reaching the distribution site

it is estimated that 10-15% of the value of the ration would have been used to coverthe costs of obtaining it. Distributions themselves were well organised however

there was little relationship to branch strategy or development. This example raises

a number of issues, from delays in the overall process, the dignity of those targeted,

the relative priorities of ECHO, the HoA operational coordination ofce and the ERCS.

Although not strictly part of the HoA Appeal, all parties agreed at the time of the

review that it would be useful to look at for comparative purposes.


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Annex 1 List of interviewees

Geneva

Mohamed OmerMukhier

Head, Disaster Policy and Preparedness Department IFRC

Simon Missiri Head of Resource Mobilisation and Government Relations IFRC

Josse Gillijns Head of Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Repor ting Depar tment IFRC

KiemariamAmdemariam

Senior Ofcer, Food Security IFRC

Robert Fraser Senior Ofcer, WATSAN/EH Unit IFRC

Ina Schonberg Senior Ofcer, Livelihoods, Nutrition & Food Security IFRC

Pierre de Rochefort Senior Ofcer, Training and Information Management IFRC

Geri Lau Head, OD Department IFRC

Kenya

Juhani Alanko Regional Delegate Finnish Red Cross

Christoph Muller Regional Delegate German Red Cross

Nan Buzard Senior Director, International Response and Programs American Red Cross

Ingrid Kristiansen Regional Programmes Ofcer Norwegian RedCross

Karen Peachey East Africa Representative British Red Cross

Nancy Balfour-Smith Head, Disaster Management, Zonal Ofce IFRC

Stephen McDowell Food Security Advisor, Zonal Ofce, IFRC

Brennan Banks Disaster Operations Manager IFRC

Alexander Matheou Head, Regional Ofce, Nairobi IFRC

Piers Simpkin Regional Livestock Specialist ICRC

Christoph Luedi Head of Nairobi Regional Delegation ICRC

Dr. James Kisia Deputy Secretary General Kenya Red Cross

Abdi Shakur Head Disaster Management Kenya Red Cross

Gerald Bumbe Regional Coordinator, Machakos Kenya Red Cross

John Balu Branch Coordinator, Machakos Kenya Red Cross

Martin Kiilu (Hassler) Volunteer and Relief Coordinator, Machakos Kenya Red Cross


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Annex 1 List of interviewees

Raquel Fernandez Community Development Delegate in Kenya Spanish Red Cross

Maki Igarashi Health Delegate Japanese Red Cross

Yuji Matsubara Deputy Director, Development Cooperation Division, InternationalDepartment, Operations Sector Japanese Red Cross

Gideon MyandirichaOyagi,

Kithueni District Administrator,Government of Kenya

Beneciary communities visited in Mamba, Kithueni, Ikombe

Somalia Red CrescentDr Ahmed HassanMohamed

President Somalia RedCrescent

Ahmed Gizo Somalia Country Representative IFRC

Ethiopia

Fasika Kebede Secretary-General Ethiopia Red Cross

Afework Teshome Head Disaster Management Ethiopia Red Cross

Gedlu Bayene Disaster Response Team Leader Ethiopia Red Cross

Kefay Bey Food Security Ofcer Ethiopia Red Cross

Sudi Alemu Acting Branch Secretary, Somali Regional Branch (Project Coordinator,Moyale)

Ethiopia Red Cross

Bayu Tadesse Programme Head, Oromiya Regional Ofce (Field Operation Coordinator,Wolaita)

Ethiopia Red Cross

Beshe Beneburu Branch Secretary, Harar Ofce, East Hararghe Ethiopia Red Cross

Haile Birhane Relief Coordinator, East Hararghe (Health and Sanitation Ofcer, Moyale) Ethiopia Red Cross

Seifu Worku Branch Secretary, Soddo Branch, Wolaita Ethiopia Red Cross

Tadess Fekyibellu, Ankober Woreda Administrator, North Shoa Government ofEthiopia

Niguse Abiye Tefera, Branch Secretary, North Shoa Ethiopia Red Cross

George Gigiberia Ethiopia Country Representation IFRC

Seifu Demeke Dele Project Coordinator Austrian Red Cross

Juergen Herbig Country Delegate German Red Cross

Kai Mikael Kettunen Regional Logistics Delegate, UAE IFRC

Beneciary communities visited in Damot Pulassa, Damot Gale, Fedis and Mehal Meda.


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Telephone InterviewsRoger Bracke Regional

Representative, Indian

Ocean Islands

IFRC

Gorkhmaz Huseynov Head of SupportServices, Africa Zone,Johannesburg, SouthAfrica

IFRC

Amin Wais ProgrammeCoordinator

Djibouti Red Crescent

Nina Paulsen Disaster Responseand Preparedness

Swedish Red Cross

Staffan Wiking Regional ProgrammeCoordination (EastAfrica)

Swedish Red Cross

Johan Kohler Programme Ofcer,Swedish CivilContingenciesAgency

Swedish Red Cross

Mary Atkinson Food Security &Livelihoods Adviser

British Red Cross

Pete Garratt Relief OperationsManager

British Red Cross

Liz Hughes Early RecoveryManager

Ex-British Red Cross


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Humanity /The International Red Cross and Red Crescent

Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without dis-

crimination to the wounded on the battleeld, endeavours,

in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alle-

viate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purposeis to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the hu-

man being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship,

cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

Impartiality / It makes no discrimination as to nation-

ality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It

endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being

guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the

most urgent cases of distress.

Neutrality / In order to enjoy the condence of all, the

Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at

any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or

ideological nature.

Independence /The Movement is independent. The

National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian

services of their governments and subject to the laws

of their respective countries, must always maintain their

autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act inaccordance with the principles of the Movement.

Voluntary service /It is a voluntary relief movement not

prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

Unity /There can be only one Red Cross or Red Cres-

cent Society in any one country. It must be open to all.

It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its ter-

ritory.

Universality / The International Red Cross and Red

Crescent Movement, in which all societies have equal

status and share equal responsibilities and duties in help-

ing each other, is worldwide.

The Fundamental Principles of the International

Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement


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For Further Information:Stephen McDowell

Food Security AdvisorM

arch201

1E0

www.ifrc.org Saving lives, changing minds.

Documents

Early Warning - Delayed Response?