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EShared Waters: Conflictand CooperationAaron T. WolfDepartment of Geosciences, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon 97331-5506;email: wolfa@geo.oregonststate.edu

Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2007. 32:3.1–3.29

The Annual Review of Environment and Resourcesis online at http://environ.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev.energy.32.041006.101434

Copyright c© 2007 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

1543-5938/07/1121-0001$20.00

Key Words

transboundary water resources, water conflict, water qualitymanagement, water resources development

AbstractThis review examines the state of conflict and cooperation over trans-boundary water resources from an environmental, political, and hu-man development perspective. Although the potential for outrightwar between countries over water is low, cooperation is also oftenmissing in disputes over transboundary resources. This backgroundchapter will

� Provide a brief overview of the nature of conflict and experi-ences of cooperation over transboundary resources.

� Provide a conceptual basis for understanding cooperation andthe costs of noncooperation over water.

� Indicate the possible triggers for conflict over water sharingand the implications on the livelihoods of ordinary commu-nities.

� Offer evidence on the potential costs of noncooperation oreven conflict over water resources.

� Analyze power asymmetries between riparian states and howthey affect the outcomes of negotiations.

� Analyze different examples of cases that countries have usedto manage the competition for water resources.

� Propose general principles and conclusions on conflict andcooperation.

“Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source ofconflict and wars in the future.”

Kofi Annan, March 2001

“But the water problems of our world need not be only a cause oftension; they can also be a catalyst for cooperation . . . If we worktogether, a secure and sustainable water future can be ours.”

Kofi Annan, February 2002

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Contents

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THENATURE OF CONFLICTAND EXPERIENCES OFCOOPERATION OVERTRANSBOUNDARYRESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2Water Conflict and

Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3POLITICAL TENSIONS AND

COSTS OFNONCOOPERATION . . . . . . . . . . 3.7Tensions and Time Lags: Causes

for Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8Overcoming the Costs of

Noncooperation: FromRights to Needs toInterests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9

From Rights and Needs toInterests: Baskets ofBenefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11

VULNERABILITY, RESILIENCE,AND THE IMPACTSOF TENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11

Indicators of HydropoliticalResilience and Vulnerability . . . . 3.12

Intranational Impacts ofInternational Tensions . . . . . . . . . 3.13

Regional Instability: PoliticalDynamics of Loss of IrrigationWater. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.13

WATER AND INSTITUTIONS . . . 3.15Institutional Development—

Contributions from theInternational Community . . . . . . 3.15

Conventions, Declarations, andOrganizational Developments . . 3.16

Legal Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.18Institutional Lessons for the

International Community . . . . . . 3.19WATER CONFLICT AND

COOPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.20GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND

CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.22Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.22Why Might the Future Look

Nothing Like the Past? . . . . . . . . 3.22

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THENATURE OF CONFLICTAND EXPERIENCES OFCOOPERATION OVERTRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES

As human populations and economies grow,the amount of freshwater in the world remainsroughly the same as it has been throughouthistory. The total quantity of water in theworld is immense, but most is either saltwa-ter (97.5%) or locked in ice caps (1.75%).The amount economically available for hu-man use is only 0.007% of the total, orabout 13,500 km3, which is about 2300 m3

per a person—a 37% drop since 1970 (1).This increasing scarcity is made more com-plex because almost half the globe’s land sur-face lies within international watersheds—the

land that contributes to the world’s 263 trans-boundary waterways.

Both water quantity and water quality havebeen neglected to the point of catastrophe (2).

� More than a billion people lack accessto safe water supplies.

� Almost three billion do not have accessto adequate sanitation.

� Five to ten million people die each yearfrom water-related diseases or inade-quate sanitation.

� Twenty percent of the world’s irrigatedlands are salt laden, affecting crop pro-duction.

The pressures on water resources develop-ment leads to intense political pressures, of-ten referred to as water stress, a term coined byFalkenmark (3), or water poverty as suggested

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by Feitelson & Chenoweth (4). Furthermore,water ignores political boundaries, evades in-stitutional classification, and eludes legal gen-eralizations. Water demands are increasing,groundwater levels are dropping, surface-water supplies are increasingly contaminated,and delivery and treatment infrastructure isaging (5). Collectively, these issues providecompelling arguments for considering the se-curity implications of water resources man-agement (6–8).

A huge and growing literature speaks to thehuman and ecological disasters attendant onthe global water crisis—essentially an ongo-ing deployment of a hydrological weapon ofmass destruction [see especially the works ofGleick, e.g., his biennial World’s Water Series(9–13); Postel (5, 14); the UN EnvironmentalProgram (15–18); the UN Educational, Sci-entific and Cultural Organization, which hasproduced dozens of papers under the auspicesof its PCCP Program (http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/), and others].

In conjunction with this crisis, though,come the political stresses that result as thepeople who have built their lives and liveli-hoods on a reliable source of freshwater areseeing the shortage of this vital resource im-pinge on all aspects of the tenuous rela-tions that have developed over the years—between nations, between economic sectors,and between individuals and their environ-ment. This review speaks to how people have,and have not, dealt with hydropolitics andtheir impacts.

Water Conflict and Cooperation

It is quite clear that people affect their envi-ronment, but to what extent is the oppositetrue? Just how deep is the causal relationshipbetween environmental stresses and the struc-ture of human politics? This relationship isat the heart of understanding the processes ofenvironmental conflict prevention and resolu-tion. If, as the large and growing “water wars”literature would have it (see, for example, 19–23), the greatest threat for water conflicts is

that water scarcity can and will lead directlyto warfare between nations; this lends itself todiversion of a potentially huge amount of re-sources in attempts to arrest these processesat the highest levels. If the processes are actu-ally both more subtle and more local in nature(as suggested by, among others References 8,24–27), then so too are the potential solutions.

Throughout thisreview, we will note thatshared water does lead to tensions, threats,and even to some localized violence—and wewill offer strategies for preventing and miti-gating these tensions—but not to war. More-over, these tense “flashpoints” generally in-duce the parties to enter negotiations, oftenresulting in dialogue and, occasionally, to es-pecially creative and resilient working arrang-ments. We note also that shared water pro-vides compelling inducements to dialogue andcooperation, even while hositities rage overother issues.

But let’s look at the evolution of the “waterleads to war” thesis. Although the extreme wa-ter wars literature mostly began to fade in thelate 1990s, a number of articles dating backdecades argue quite persuasively for somedegree of causality between environmentalstress—reaching up against relative resourcelimits—and political decision making. Onecannot discuss water institutions, for example,without invoking Wittfogel (28) and his clas-sic argument that the drive to manage water insemiarid environments led both to the dawnof institutional civilization—described byDelli Priscoli (29) as the “training ground forcivilization”—and to particularly autocratic,despotic forms of government. This latterargument, and the generally enthusiasticreception he received, needs to be under-stood in the Cold War setting from which itsprang and was quite effectively challengedby Toynbee (30), among others. Toynbee’svehemence in his review (he calls Wittfogel’sbook a “menace”) is particularly interestingbecause many of Wittfogel’s theories canbe seen as extensions of a sort of Toynbee’s“challenge-response” thesis (31) in which heargues that the impetus toward civilization

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Environmentalsecurity: thesecuritization orconflict potential ofenvironmental issues

becomes stronger with greater environmentalstress. Toynbee’s objections are primarily withWittfogel’s “tribalistic” lens to history, aimed,as Toynbee charges, at demonizing the SovietUnion. Wittfogel (28) in turn, distinguishinghimself from Toynbee, writes of his own posi-tion, “causality yes, determinism no” (p. 504).However, the premise that there is a criticallink between how society manages waterand its social structure and political cultureremains as an important and valid insight.

This thread of causality between the envi-ronment and politics has been taken up reg-ularly over the years. When Sprout & Sprout(32) describe the environmental factors inher-ent in international politics, it becomes thedirect intellectual precursor to today’s blos-soming “environmental security” literature, asspearheaded by Homer-Dixon (33). Homer-Dixon, like Wittfogel, was initially greetedenthusiastically by the defense establishment,this time in the setting of the post–ColdWar redefinition of relevance, and, again likeWittfogel, has been taken to task for the de-gree of causality in his arguments. (A summaryof Homer-Dixon’s findings, along with a de-bate on the topic is presented in Reference 34.)In his defense, Homer-Dixon’s arguments,along with those of much of the water warscrowd, have become more muted over the lastfew years: In 1994, he wrote, “The renewableresource most likely to stimulate interstateresource war is river water” (35), which he re-peats in his 1996 article (36). He modifies theclaim, elaborated in his 1999 book (37), “In re-ality, wars over river water between upstreamand downstream neighbors are likely only in anarrow set of circumstances . . . [and]. . . thereare, in fact very few river basins around theworld where all these conditions hold now ormight hold in the future.”

In water systems, the dichotomy of causal-ity is manifested as whether water stress lendsitself more readily to conflict or cooperation.Both arguments are powerful and have beensupported by a rich, if mostly anecdotal, his-tory. Postel (5) describes the roots of the prob-lem at the subnational level. Water, unlike

other scarce, consumable resources, is usedto fuel all facets of society, from biologies toeconomies to aesthetics and religious practice.As such, there is no such thing as managingwater for a single purpose—all water manage-ment is multiobjective and is therefore, by def-inition, based on conflicting interests. Withina nation, these interests include domestic use,agriculture, hydropower generation, recre-ation, and environment—any two of which areregularly at odds—and the chances of find-ing mutually acceptable solutions drop pre-cipitously as more actors are involved.

As described conceptually and with casestudies by Trolldalen (38), these conflictinginterests within a nation represent both a mi-crocosm of the international setting and adirect influence upon it. Trolldalen’s work isparticularly useful in that he sidesteps thecommon trap of treating nations as homo-geneous, rational entities and explicitly linksinternal with external interests. Bangladeshis not just the national government ofBangladesh when it negotiates a treaty withIndia over Ganges flow; it is its coastal popu-lation, inundated with saltwater intrusion; itsfarmers are dealing with decreasing quantitiesof water and increasing fluctuations; and itsfishermenare competing for dwindling stocks.

This link between the internal and exter-nal is critical when we look at violent interna-tional conflicts (39). Gleick (6) is widely citedas providing what appears to be a history re-plete with violence over water resources. But aclose read of his article reveals greater subtletyand depth to the argument. Wolf (40) pointsout that what Gleick and others have actuallyprovided is a history rife with tensions, ex-acerbated relations, and conflicting interestsover water, but not State level violence, at leastnot between nations or over water as a scarceresource. It is worth noting Gleick’s carefulcategorization because the violence he de-scribes actually turns out to be water as a tool,target, or victim of warfare—not the cause.Wolf (40) contrasts the results of a system-atic search for interstate violence—one truewater war in history, 4500 years ago—with the

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much richer record of explicit, legal coopera-tion with 3600 water-related treaties. In fact,a scan of the most vociferous enmities aroundthe world reveals that almost all the sets ofnations with the greatest degree of animos-ity between them, whether Arabs and Israelis,Indians and Pakistanis, or Azeris and Armeni-ans, either have a water-related agreement inplace or are in the process of negotiating one.

Nevertheless, water management is, bydefinition, conflict management. Water, un-like other scarce, consumable resources, isused to fuel all facets of society, from bi-ology to economies to aesthetics and spiri-tual practice. Moreover, it fluctuates wildlyin space and time; its management is usuallyfragmented; and it is often subject to vague,arcane, and/or contradictory legal principles.There is no such thing as managing water for asingle purpose; all water management is mul-tiobjective and based on navigating compet-ing interests. Within a nation these interestsinclude domestic users, agriculturalists, hy-dropower generators, recreation enthusiasts,and environmentalists—any two of which areregularly at odds, and the chances of findingmutually acceptable solutions drop exponen-tially as more stakeholders are involved. Addinternational boundaries, and the chances de-crease exponentially yet again.

The Register of International River Basinsof the world (41) defines a river basin as thearea that contributes hydrologically (includ-ing both surface- and groundwater) to a firstorder stream, which, in turn, is defined by itsoutlet to the ocean or to a terminal (closed)lake or inland sea. Thus, river basin is synony-mous with what is referred to in the UnitedStates as a watershed and in the Unite Kingdomas a catchment, and includes lakes and shal-low, unconfined groundwater units (confinedor fossil groundwater is not included). We de-fine such a basin as international if any peren-nial tributary crosses the political boundariesof two or more nations.

Similarly, the 1997 UN Conventionon Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses defines a watercourse as “a sys-

Internationalwatercourse: awatercourse, parts ofwhich are situated indifferent States[nations]

Watercourse: asystem of surface andunderground watersconstituting byvirtue of theirphysical relationshipa unitary whole andflowing into acommon terminus

tem of surface and underground waters con-stituting by virtue of their physical relation-ship a unitary whole and flowing into a com-mon terminus.” An international watercourse isa watercourse with parts situated in differentStates [nations].

Surface and groundwater that cross in-ternational boundaries present increasedchallenges to regional stability because hy-drologic needs can often be overwhelmed bypolitical considerations. Although the poten-tial for paralyzing disputes is especially highin these basins, history shows that water cancatalyze dialogue and cooperation, even be-tween especially contentious riparians. Thereare 263 rivers around the world that crossthe boundaries of two or more nations andan untold number of international groundwa-ter aquifers. The basin areas that contributeto these rivers (Figure 1) comprise approxi-mately 47% of the land surface of the earth, in-clude 40% of the world’s population, and con-tribute almost 60% of freshwater flow (42).

Within each international basin, demandsfrom environmental, domestic, and economicusers increase annually, while the amount offreshwater in the world remains roughly thesame as it has been throughout history. Giventhe scope of the problems and the resourcesavailable to address them, avoiding water con-flict is vital. Conflict is expensive, disruptive,and interferes with efforts to relieve humansuffering, reduce environmental degradation,and achieve economic growth. Developingthe capacity to monitor, predict, and preempttransboundary water conflicts, particularly indeveloping countries, is key to promoting hu-man and environmental security in interna-tional river basins, regardless of the scale atwhich they occur.

A closer look at the world’s internationalbasins gives a greater sense of the magnitudeof the issues: First, the problem is growing.There were 214 international basins listed ina 1978 United Nations study (41), the last timeany official body attempted to delineate them,and there are 263 today (42). The growth islargely the result of the internationalization

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of national basins through political changes,such as the break up of the Soviet Union andthe Balkan states, as well as access to today’sbetter mapping sources and technology.

Even more striking than the total numberof basins is a breakdown of each nation’s landsurface that falls within these watersheds. Atotal of 145 nations include territory withininternational basins. Twenty-one nations liein their entirety within international basins,and a total of 33 countries have greater than95% of their territory within these basins.These nations are not limited to smaller coun-tries, such as Liechtenstein and Andorra butinclude such sizable countries as Hungary,Bangladesh, Belarus, and Zambia (42).

A final way to visualize the dilemmasposed by international water resources is tolook at the number of countries that shareeach international basin. Nineteen basins areshared by five or more riparian countries: onebasin—the Danube—has 17 riparian nations;five basins—the Congo, Niger, Nile, Rhine,and Zambezi—are shared by between 9 and11 countries; and the remaining 13 basins—the Amazon, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna,Lake Chad, Tarim, Aral Sea, Jordan, Kura-Araks, Mekong, Tigris-Euphrates, Volga,La Plata, Neman, and Vistula (Wista)—havebetween 5 and 8 riparian countries (42).

Although lakes and shallow, unconfinedgroundwater are included in these basins, theimportant hydrologic link between ground-water and surface water is recognized but un-derstood only at a reconnaissance level evenin the most studied basins in the world. Theeffects of groundwater use may be containedwithin national boundaries; however, the wa-ter laws of few states or provinces addressgroundwater management owing to the in-visible nature of the resource or the technicalchallenges in predicting spatial and tempo-ral changes in the groundwater system withincreased use. Part of the problem is asso-ciated with recognizing the different typesof aquifers; sand and gravel transmit andstore groundwater differently than ground-water stored in fractured rocks or in karst. Sev-

eral scholars underscore that current interna-tional law does not adequately define ground-water, much less the spatial flow of ground-water (43–46).

Disparities between riparian nations—whether in economic development, infras-tructural capacity, or political orientation—add further complications to water resourcesdevelopment, institutions, and management.As a consequence, development, treaties, andinstitutions are regularly seen as, at best, inef-ficient, often ineffective, and, occasionally, asa new source of tensions themselves.

There is room for optimism, though, no-tably in the global community’s record ofresolving water-related disputes along inter-national waterways. For example, the recordof acute conflict over international water re-sources is overwhelmed by the record ofcooperation. Despite the tensions inherentin the international setting, riparians haveshown tremendous creativity in approachingregional development, often through preven-tive diplomacy, and the creation of “basketsof benefits,” which allow for positive-sum, in-tegrative allocations of joint gains. Moreover,the most vehement enemies around the worldeither have negotiated water sharing agree-ments, or are in the process of doing so asof this writing, and once cooperative waterregimes are established through treaty, theyturn out to be impressively resilient over time,even between otherwise hostile riparians andeven as conflict is waged over other issues.Violence over water does not seem strategi-cally rational, hydrographically effective, oreconomically viable. Shared interests along awaterway seem to consistently outweigh wa-ter’s conflict-inducing characteristics.

POLITICAL TENSIONS ANDCOSTS OF NONCOOPERATION

So if there is little violence between nationsover their shared waters, what is the problem?Is water actually a security concern at all? Infact, there are a number of issues where watercauses or exacerbates tensions, and it is worth

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GAP: Turkishacronym forSoutheast AnatoliaProject

understanding these processes to know bothhow complications arise and how they areeventually resolved. Noncooperation costs re-sult primarily in inefficient water manage-ment, leading to decreasing water quantity,quality, and environmental health. But polit-ical tensions can also be impacted, leading toyears or even decades of efficient, cooperativefutures lost. (See also the section on RegionalInstability in this review for related impacts.)

Tensions and Time Lags: Causesfor Concern

The first complicating factor is the time lagbetween when nations first start to impinge oneach other’s water planning and when agree-ments are finally, arduously reached. A gen-eral pattern has emerged for internationalbasins over time. Riparians of an internationalbasin implement water development projectsunilaterally—first on water within their ownterritory, in attempts to avoid the politicalintricacies of the shared resource. At somepoint, one of the riparians, generally the re-gional power, will implement a project thatimpacts at least one of its neighbors. Thismight be to continue to meet existing uses inthe face of decreasing relative water availabil-ity [as, for example, Egypt’s plans for a highdam on the Nile (47, 48) or Indian diversionsof the Ganges to protect the port of Calcutta(49, 50)] or to meet new needs reflectingnew agricultural policy, such as Turkey’s GAP(Turkish acronym for Southeast AnatoliaProject) project on the Euphrates (51). Inthe absence of relations or institutions con-ducive to conflict resolution, the project canbecome a flashpoint, heightening tensions andregional instability, and requiring years or,more commonly, decades to resolve—the In-dus treaty took 10 years of negotiations, theGanges 30, and the Jordan 40—and, all thewhile, water quality and quantity degrades towhere the health of dependent populationsand ecosystems are damaged or destroyed.

This problem gets worse as the disputegains in intensity; one rarely hears talk about

the ecosystems of the lower Nile, the lowerJordan, or the tributaries of the Aral Sea; theyhave effectively been written off to the va-garies of human intractability. During suchperiods of low-level tensions, threats and dis-putes rage across boundaries with relations asdiverse as those between Indians and Pakista-nis and between Americans and Canadians.Water was the last and most contentious is-sue resolved in negotiations over a 1994 peacetreaty between Israel and Jordan and was rel-egated to “final status” negotiations—alongwith other of the most difficult issues such asJerusalem and refugees—between Israel andthe Palestinians (52, 53).

The timing of water flow is also impor-tant; thus, the operation of dams is also con-tested. For example, upstream users mightrelease water from reservoirs in the winterfor hydropower production, whereas down-stream users might need it for irrigation inthe summer. In addition, water quantity andwater flow patterns are crucial to maintain-ing freshwater ecosystems that depend on sea-sonal flooding. Freshwater ecosystems per-form a variety of ecological and economicalfunctions and often play an important role insustaining livelihoods, especially in develop-ing countries. As awareness of environmentalissues and the economic value of ecosystemsincreases, claims for the environment’s waterrequirements are growing. For example, in theOkavango basin, Botswana’s claims for waterto sustain the Okavango Delta and its lucra-tive ecotourism industry have contributed to adispute with upstream Namibia, which wantsto use the water passing through the CapriviStrip on its way to the delta for irrigation(54, 55).

Water quality problems include excessivelevels of salt, nutrients, or suspended solids.Salt intrusion can be caused by groundwateroveruse or insufficient freshwater flows intoestuaries. For example, dams in the SouthAfrican part of the Incomati River basin re-duced freshwater flows into the Incomati es-tuary in Mozambique and led to increasedsalt levels (56). This altered the estuary’s

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ecosystem and led to the disappearance ofsalt-intolerant flora and fauna important forpeople’s livelihoods (the links between loss oflivelihoods and the threat of conflict are de-scribed below).

Excessive amounts of nutrients or sus-pended solids can result from unsustainableagricultural practices, eventually leading toerosion. Nutrients and suspended solids posea threat to freshwater ecosystems and their useby downstream riparians, as they can cause eu-trophication and siltation, respectively, which,in turn, can lead to loss of fishing grounds orarable land. Suspended solids can also causethe siltation of reservoirs and harbors; for ex-ample, Rotterdam’s harbor had to be dredgedfrequently to remove contaminated sludge de-posited by the Rhine River. The cost was enor-mous and consequently led to conflict overcompensation and responsibility among theriver’s users. Although negotiations led to apeaceful solution in this case, without sucha framework for dispute resolution, siltationproblems can lead to upstream/downstreamdisputes such as those in the Lempa Riverbasin in Central America (57).

Overcoming the Costs ofNoncooperation: From Rightsto Needs to Interests

Most of the international negotiations sur-veyed are hamstrung for so long primarily

because of entrenched and contradictoryopening positions. Generally, parties basetheir initial positions in terms of rights—thesense that a riparian is entitled to a certain al-location based on hydrography or chronologyof use. Upstream riparians often invoke somevariation of the Harmon Doctrine, claimingthat water rights originate where the waterfalls. India claimed absolute sovereignty inthe early phases of negotiations over theIndus Waters Treaty, as did France in the LacLanoux case, and Palestine over the WestBank aquifer. Downstream riparians oftenclaim absolute river integrity, claiming rightsto an undisturbed system or, if on an exoticstream, historic rights on the basis of theirhistory of use. Spain insisted on absolutesovereignty regarding the Lac Lanoux project(58), whereas Egypt claimed historic rightsagainst first Sudan, and later Ethiopia, on theNile (59).

In almost all of the disputes that havebeen resolved, however, particularly on aridor exotic streams, the paradigms used fornegotiations have not been rights based atall—neither on relative hydrography norspecifically on chronology of use, but ratherneeds based. Needs are defined by irrigableland, population, or the requirements of aspecific project. (See Table 1 for examples ofneeds-based criteria.) In agreements betweenEgypt and Sudan signed in 1929 and in 1959,for example, allocations were arrived at on

Table 1 Examples of needs-based criteria

Treaty Criteria for allocationsEgypt/Sudan (1929, 1959, Nile) Acquired rights from existing uses, plus even division of

any additional water resulting from development projectsJohnston Accord (1956, Jordan) Amount of irrigable land within the watershed in each

countryIndia/Pakistan (1960, Indus) Historic and planned use (for Pakistan) plus geographic

allocations (western versus eastern rivers)South Africa (southwestAfrica)/Portugal (Angola) (1969,Kunene)

Allocations for human and animal needs as well as initialirrigation

Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement(1995, shared aquifers)

Population patterns and irrigation needs

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the basis of local needs, primarily those ofagriculture. Egypt argued for a greater shareof the Nile because of its larger populationand extensive irrigation works. In 1959, Sudanand Egypt then divided future water fromdevelopment equally between the two. Cur-rent allocations of 55.5 billion cubic meters(BCM)/year for Egypt and 18.5 BCM/yearfor Sudan reflect these relative needs (59).

Likewise along the Jordan River, the onlywater agreement for that basin ever negoti-ated (although not ratified) until very recently,the Johnston Accord, emphasized the needsrather than the inherent rights of each of theriparians. Johnston’s approach, on the basisof a report performed under the direction ofthe Tennessee Valley Authority, was to esti-mate, without regard to political boundaries,the water needs for all irrigable land withinthe Jordan Valley basin that could be irrigatedby gravity flow (60, 61). National allocationswere then based on these in-basin agricul-tural needs, with the understanding that eachcountry could then use the water as it wished,including to divert it out of basin. This wasnot only an acceptable formula to the partiesat the time, but it also allowed for a break-through in negotiations when a land survey ofJordan concluded that its future water needswere lower than previously thought. Yearslater, Israel and Palestine came back to needsin the Interim Agreement of 1995, wherebyIsrael first recognized Palestinian water rightson the West Bank—a formula for agricul-ture and per capita consumption that deter-mined future Palestinian water needs at 70–80 million cubic meters (MCM)/year, andIsrael agreed to provide 28.6 MCM/year to-ward those needs (62).

Needs are the most prevalent criteria forallocations along arid or exotic streams out-side of the Middle East as well. Allocations ofthe Rio Grande/Rio Bravo and the Coloradobetween Mexico and the United States arebased on Mexican irrigation requirements;Bangladeshi requirements determined theallocations of the Ganges, and Indus negotia-tions deferred to Pakistani projects (although

estimates of needs are still disputed andchanging, particularly in these latter twoexamples) (63).

From the global experience in determiningneeds, it is not apparent that any criterion isnecessarily more effective than any other—ameasure that is determined in dialog betweenriparians by definition generates more buyin than one imposed from outside (althoughneutral third parties have often provided thetechnology to help quantify needs). Moreover,once the needs-based allocations are deter-mined, not only is it not generally requiredthat water actually be applied to those needs,but specific allocations are generally not read-justed, despite the fact that needs change dras-tically over time. For example, the JohnstonAccord determined allocations on the basisof potential gravity-fed irrigated agriculturewithin the Jordan basin. Once the numberswere derived, and Jordan and Israel implic-itly agreed, Israel applied most of its allo-cation to other uses entirely, many of themoutside of the basin. Jordan and Israel ad-here to the Johnston allocations to this day, inspite all of the dramatic changes to all water-related parameters within the basin over thepast 50 years.

One might speculate as to why nego-tiations move from rights-based to needs-based criteria for allocation. The first reasonmay have something to do with the psychol-ogy of negotiations. Rothman (64), amongothers, points out that negotiations ideallymove along three stages: the adversarial stage,where each side defines its positions, or rights;the reflexive stage, where the needs of eachside bringing them to their positions is ad-dressed; and finally, to the integrative stage,where negotiators brainstorm together to ad-dress each side’s underlying interests. The ne-gotiations here seem to follow this patternfrom rights to needs and, occasionally, to in-terests. Although each negotiator may initiallysee him- or herself as Egyptian or Israeli orIndian and the rights of one’s own countryare paramount, over time one must empathizeto some degree and to notice that even one’s

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enemy (be he or she Sudanese, Palestinian, orPakistani) requires the same amount of waterfor the same use with the same methods asoneself.

The second reason for the shift from rightsto needs may simply be that rights are notquantifiable and needs are. We have seen thevague guidance that the 1997 Convention (65)provides for allocations—a series of occasion-ally conflicting parameters—that are to beconsidered as a whole. If two nations insiston their respective rights of upstream versusdown, for example, there is no spectrum alongwhich to bargain; no common frame of refer-ence. One can much more readily determine aneeds-based criterion—irrigable land or pop-ulation, for example—and quantify each na-tion’s needs. Even with differing interpreta-tions, once both sides feel comfortable thattheir minimum quantitative needs are beingmet, talks eventually turn to straightforwardbargaining over numbers along a commonspectrum (66, 67).

From Rights and Needs to Interests:Baskets of Benefits

One productive approach to the developmentof transboundary waters has been to move pastrights and needs entirely and to examine thebenefits in the basin from a regional approach.This has regularly required the ripariansto go beyond looking at water as a com-modity to be divided—a zero-sum, rights-based approach—and to develop an approachthat equitably allocates not the water butthe benefits derived therefrom—a positive-sum, integrative approach. The boundary wa-ters agreement between the United Statesand Canada, for example, allocates water ac-cording to equal benefits, usually defined byhydropower generation. This results in theseemingly odd arrangement that power maybe exported out of basin for gain, but thewater itself may not. In the 1964 treaty onthe Columbia, an arrangement was workedout whereby the United States paid Canadafor the benefits of flood control, and Canada

was granted rights to divert water betweenthe Columbia and Kootenai rivers for hy-dropower. Likewise, the 1975 Mekong accorddefines equality of right not as equal sharesof water but as equal rights to use water onthe basis of each riparian’s economic and so-cial needs. The relative nature of beneficialuses is exhibited in a 1950 agreement on theNiagara, flowing between the United Statesand Canada, which provides a greater flowover the famous falls during “show times”of summer daylight hours, when tourist dol-lars are worth more per cubic meter thanthe alternate use in hydropower generation(68).

In many water-related treaties, water is-sues are dealt with alone, separate from anyother political or resource issues betweencountries—water qua water. By separating thetwo realms of “high” (political) and “low” (re-source economical) politics or by ignoringother resources that might be included in anagreement, some have argued, the process iseither likely to fail, as in the case of the 1956Johnston Accord on the Jordan, or more of-ten to achieve a suboptimum development ar-rangement, as is currently the case on the In-dus agreement, signed in 1960. Increasingly,however, linkages are being made betweenwater and politics as well as between water andother resources. These multiresource linkagesmay offer more opportunities for the genera-tion of creative solutions, allowing for greatereconomic efficiency through a basket ofbenefits (69).

VULNERABILITY, RESILIENCE,AND THE IMPACTSOF TENSIONS

Understanding the indicators of conflict andcooperation is a critical prerequisite both todesigning resilient institutions and to de-veloping monitoring mechanisms to identifyfuture tensions. Vulnerable basins are at par-ticular risk of tensions, but programs of in-stitutional capacity building can help mitigatethe potential impacts of rapid change.

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Hydropoliticalresilience: thecomplex human-environmentalsystem’s abilityto adapt topermutations andchange within thesesystems

Hydropoliticalvulnerability: therisk of politicaldispute over sharedwater systems

RBO: River BasinOrganization

Indicators of HydropoliticalResilience and Vulnerability

In general, concepts of resilience and vulner-ability as related to water resources are oftenassessed within the framework of sustainabil-ity (e.g., 70) and relate to the ability of bio-physical systems to adapt to change (e.g., 71).As the sustainability discourse has broadenedto include human systems in recent years, sotoo has work been increasingly geared towardidentifying indicators of resilience and vul-nerability within this broader context (e.g.,72–74). In parallel, dialog on security hasmigrated from traditional issues of war andpeace to also begin incorporating the human-environment relationship in the relatively newfield of environmental security (see 75, 76).

The term hydropolitics (coined in Reference59) is the result of substantial attention to thepotential for conflict and violence to eruptover international waters and relates to theability of geopolitical institutions to manageshared water resources in a politically sustain-able manner, i.e., without tensions or con-flict between political entities. Hydropoliticalresilience is defined as the complex human-environmental system’s ability to adapt to per-mutations and change within these systems,and hydropolitical vulnerability is defined by therisk of political dispute over shared water sys-tems. Wolf et al. (27), suggested the followingrelationship between change, institutions, andhydropolitical vulnerability, “The likelihoodof conflict rises as the rate of change withinthe basin exceeds the institutional capacity toabsorb that change.”

This suggests that there are two sides tothe dispute setting: the rate of change in thesystem and the institutional capacity. In gen-eral, most of the parameters regularly identi-fied as indicators of water conflict are actuallyonly weakly linked to the dispute. Institutionalcapacity within a basin, however, whether de-fined as water management bodies or treatiesor generally positive international relations, isas important, if not more so, than the phys-ical aspects of a system. It turns out, then,

that very rapid changes, either on the institu-tional side or in the physical system, that out-pace the institutional capacity to absorb thosechanges are at the root of most water conflicts.For example, the rapid institutional change ininternationalized basins, i.e., basins that in-clude the management structures of newlyindependent states, has resulted in disputesin areas formerly under British administra-tion (e.g., the Nile, Jordan, Tigris-Euphrates,Indus, and Ganges-Brahmaputra) as well as inthe former Soviet Union (e.g., the Aral trib-utaries and the Kura-Araks). On the physicalside, rapid change most outpaces institutionalcapacity in basins that include unilateral de-velopment projects and the absence of coop-erative regimes [such as treaties, river basinorganizations (RBOs), or technical workinggroups] or when relations are especially ten-uous over other issues (27).

The general assumption, then, is thatrapid change tends to indicate vulnerability,whereas institutional capacity tends to indi-cate resilience, and the two sides need to beassessed in conjunction with each other for amore accurate gauge of hydropolitical sustain-ability. Building on these relationships, thecharacteristics of a basin that would tend toenhance resilience to change include

� International agreements and institu-tions, such as RBOs

� A history of collaborative projects� Generally positive political relations� Higher levels of economic develop-

ment1

In contrast, facets that would tend towardvulnerability would include

� Rapid environmental change

1Higher levels of economic development enhance re-silience because these countries can afford alternatives aswater becomes relatively more scarce or degraded. In con-trasting developing and developed countries, for example,whereas the former may struggle for a safe, stable supply ofbasic water resources, the latter might utilize greenhouses,expensive drip irrigation systems, bioengineered crops, ordesalination.

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� Rapid population growth or asymmetriceconomic growth

� Major unilateral development projects� The absence of institutional capacity� Generally hostile relations

Intranational Impacts ofInternational Tensions

The subset of security issues of interna-tional tensions occur at the subnational level,with direct impact on ordinary communi-ties (77). Much literature on transbound-ary waters treats political entities as homo-geneous monoliths—“Canada feels . . . ” or“Jordan wants . . . ” Analysts are only recentlyhighlighting the pitfalls of this approach, of-ten by showing how different subsets of ac-tors relate very different meanings to water.Rather than being simply another environ-mental input, water is regularly treated as a se-curity issue, a gift of nature, or a focal point forlocal society. Disputes, therefore, need to beunderstood as more than simply over a quan-tity of a resources, but also over conflicting at-titudes, meanings, and contexts. Throughoutthe world, local water issues revolve aroundcore values, which often date back genera-tions. Irrigators, indigenous populations, andenvironmentalists, for example, can see wateras tied to their very ways of life that are in-creasingly threatened by newer uses for citiesand hydropower (78, 79). Moreover, the localsetting strongly influences international dy-namics and vice versa (39, 77, 80, 81).

If there is a history of water-related vio-lence, and there is, it is a history of incidentsat the subnational level, generally betweentribes, water-use sectors, or states/provinces.In fact, our recent research at Oregon StateUniversity suggests that, as the scale drops,the likelihood and intensity of violence goesup (82). There are many examples of inter-nal water conflicts ranging from interstate vi-olence and death along the Cauvery River inIndia (83, 84); to the United States, whereCalifornia farmers blew up a pipeline meantfor Los Angeles (85); to intertribal bloodshed

between Maasai herdsmen and Kikuyu farm-ers in Kenya (86). The inland desert state ofArizona even commissioned a navy (made upof one ferryboat) and sent its state militia tostop a dam and diversion on the ColoradoRiver in 1934 (87). (See Table 2 for examplesof water-related disputes.)

Another contentious issue is water quality,which is also closely linked to water quantity.Decreasing water quality can make it inap-propriate for some uses, thereby aggravatingits scarcity. In turn, decreasing water quan-tity concentrates pollution, and excessive wa-ter quantity, such as flooding, can lead to con-tamination by sewage. Low water quality canpose serious threats to human and environ-mental health. Water quality degradation isoften a source of dispute between those whocause degradation and the groups affected byit. As pollution increasingly impacts liveli-hoods and the environment, water quality is-sues may lead to public protests.

One of the main reasons for decreasing wa-ter quality is pollution, e.g., through indus-trial and domestic wastewater or agriculturalpesticides. In Tajikistan, for example, whereenvironmental stress has been linked to civilwar (1992–1997), high levels of water pollu-tion have been identified as one of the keyenvironmental issues threatening human de-velopment and security (8). Water pollutionfrom the tanning industry in the Palar basinof the Indian state of Tamil Nadu makes thewater within the basin unfit for irrigation andconsumption. The pollution contributed toan acute drinking water crisis, which led toprotests by the local community and activistorganizations as well as to disputes and courtcases between tanners and farmers (8).

Regional Instability: PoliticalDynamics of Loss of Irrigation Water

As water quality degrades—or quantitydiminishes—over time, its effect on thestability of a region can be unsettling.For example, for 30 years the Gaza Stripwas under Israeli occupation. Water quality

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Table 2 Selected examples of water-related disputesa

Main issueLocation ObservationQuantityCauvery River, South Asia The dispute on India’s Cauvery River sprang from the allocation of water

between the downstream state of Tamil Nadu, which had been using theriver’s water for irrigation, and upstream Karnataka, which wanted toincrease irrigated agriculture. The parties did not accept a tribunal’sadjudication of the water dispute; this led to violence and death along theriver.

Mekong basin, SoutheastAsia

Following construction of Thailand’s Pak Mun Dam, more than 25,000people were affected by drastic reductions in upstream fisheries andother livelihood problems. Affected communities have struggled forreparations since the dam was completed in 1994.

Okavango basin, southernAfrica

In the Okavango River basin, Botswana’s claims for water to sustain thedelta and its lucrative ecotourism industry contribute to a dispute withupstream Namibia, which wants to pipe water passing through theCaprivi Strip to supply its capital city with drinking water.

QualityRhine River, WesternEurope

Rotterdam’s harbor had to be dredged frequently to remove contaminatedsludge deposited by the Rhine River. The cost was enormous andconsequently led to controversy over compensation and responsibilityamong Rhine River users. Although the negotiations led to a peacefulsolution, in areas that lack the Rhine’s dispute resolution framework,siltation problems could lead to upstream/downstream arguments.

Quantity and qualityIncomati River, southernAfrica

Dams in the South African part of the Incomati River basin reducedfreshwater flows and increased salt levels in Mozambique’s Incomatiestuary. This altered the estuary’s ecosystem and led to the disappearanceof salt-intolerant plants and animals that are important for people’slivelihoods.

TimingSyr Dar’ya, Central Asia Relations between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan—all riparians

of the Syr Dar’ya, a major tributary of the disappearing AralSea—exemplify the problems caused by water flow timing. Under theSoviet Union’s central management, spring and summer irrigation indownstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan balanced upstream Kyrgyzstan’suse of hydropower to generate heat in the winter. But the parties arebarely adhering to recent agreements that exchange upstream flows ofalternate heating sources (natural gas, coal, and fuel oil) for downstreamirrigation and sporadically breach the agreements.

aReference 63.

deteriorated steadily, saltwater intrusion de-graded local wells, and water-related diseasestook a rising toll on the people living there.In 1987, the intifada, or Palestinian uprising,broke out in the Gaza Strip and quickly spreadthroughout the West Bank. Was water qual-

ity the cause? It would be simplistic to claimdirect causality. Was it an irritant exacerbat-ing an already tenuous situation? Undoubt-edly (88).

An examination of relations betweenIndia and Bangladesh demonstrate that these

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internal instabilities can be both caused andexacerbated by international water disputes.In the 1960s, India built a barrage at Farakka,diverting a portion of the Ganges flow awayfrom its course into Bangladesh in an effort toflush silt away from Calcutta’s seaport, some100 miles to the south. In Bangladesh, the re-duced flow from upstream resulted in a num-ber of adverse effects: degraded surface andgroundwater, impeded navigation, increasedsalinity, degraded fisheries, and endangeredboth water supplies and public health. Migra-tion from affected areas further compoundedthe problem. Ironically, many of those dis-placed in Bangladesh have found refuge inIndia (89).

Two thirds of the world’s water use is foragriculture, so when access to irrigation wa-ter is threatened, one result can be movementof huge populations of out-of-work, disgrun-tled men from the countryside to the cities—an invariable recipe for political instability.In pioneering work, S. Postel (unpublished)identified those countries that rely heavily onirrigation and whose agricultural water sup-plies are threatened either by a decline inquality or quantity. The list coincides pre-cisely with the world community’s current se-curity concerns: India, China, Pakistan, Iran,Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, and Egypt.

Water management in many countries isalso characterized by overlapping and com-peting responsibilities among governmentbodies. Disaggregated decision making oftenproduces divergent management approachesthat serve contradictory objectives and lead tocompeting claims from different sectors. Andsuch claims are even more likely to contributeto disputes in countries where there is noformal system of water-use permits or whereenforcement and monitoring are inadequate.Controversy also often arises when manage-ment decisions are formulated without suffi-cient participation by local communities andwater users, thus failing to take into accountlocal rights and practices. Protests are espe-cially likely when the public suspects that wa-ter allocations are diverting public resources

for private gain or when water-use rights areassigned in a secretive and possibly corruptmanner, as demonstrated by the violent con-frontations in 2000 following the privatizationof Cochabamba, Bolivia’s water utility.

Finally, there is the human security issue ofwater-related disease. It is estimated that be-tween 5 and 10 million people die each yearfrom water-related diseases or inadequate san-itation. More than half the people in the worldlack adequate sanitation. Eighty percent ofdisease in the developing world is related towater. This is a crisis of epidemic proportions,and the threats to human security are self-evident (2).

WATER AND INSTITUTIONS

The international community has long grap-pled with effective institutional arrangementsfor managing shared water resources. Fromthe international to the local, grappling withthe institutional implications of shared watershas taken many forms, from international dec-larations to guiding principles to treaties andlocal management.

Institutional Development—Contributions from the InternationalCommunity2

Acknowledging the benefits of cooperativewater management, the international com-munity has long advocated institutional de-velopment in the world’s international water-ways and has focused considerable attentionin the twentieth century on developing andrefining principles of shared management. In1911, the Institute of International Law pub-lished the Madrid Declaration on the Inter-national Regulation regarding the Use of In-ternational Watercourses for Purposes otherthan Navigation. The Madrid Declarationoutlined certain basic principles of sharedwater management, recommending thatcoriparian states establish permanent joint

2This section draws from Reference 90.

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UNCED: UNConference onEnvironment andDevelopment

commissions and discouraging unilateralbasin alterations and harmful modificationsof international rivers. Expanding on theseguidelines, the International Law Associationdeveloped the Helsinki Rules of 1966 on theUses of Waters of International Rivers. Sincethen, international freshwater law has ma-tured through the work of these two organiza-tions as well as the United Nations and othergovernmental and nongovernmental bodies(66, 67).

The past decade, however, has witnesseda perhaps unprecedented number of declara-tions as well as organizational and legal devel-opments to further the international commu-nity’s objective of promoting cooperative riverbasin management. The decade began withthe International Conference on Water andthe Environment in the lead-up to the 1992UN Conference on Environment and Devel-opment (UNCED) in Rio. Subsequently, ac-tions taken by the international communityhave included the pronouncement of non-binding conventions and declarations, the cre-ation of global water institutions, and thecodification of international water principles.Although clearly more work is required, theseinitiatives have not only raised awareness ofthe myriad issues related to international wa-ter resource management, but also have led tothe creation of frameworks in which the issuescan be addressed.

Conventions, Declarations, andOrganizational Developments

The 1992 UNCED served as a forum forworld policy makers to discuss problemsof the environment and development. Assuch, management of the world’s water re-sources was only one of several topics ad-dressed. Water was, however, the primary fo-cus of the International Conference on Waterand the Environment (ICWE), a prepara-tory conference held in advance of the RioEarth Summit. The ICWE participants, rep-resenting governmental and nongovernmen-tal organizations, developed a set of policy

recommendations outlined in the Confer-ence’s Dublin Statement on Water and Sus-tainable Development, which the drafters en-trusted to the world leaders gathering in Riofor translation into a plan of action. Althoughcovering a range of water resource manage-ment issues, the Dublin Statement specifi-cally highlights the growing importance of in-ternational transboundary water managementand encourages greater attention to the cre-ation and implementation of integrated wa-ter management institutions endorsed by allaffected basin states. Moreover, the draftersoutlined certain essential functions of inter-national water institutions including “recon-ciling and harmonizing the interests of ripar-ian countries, monitoring water quantity andquality, development of concerted action pro-grammes, exchange of information, and en-forcing agreements” (91).

At the Rio Conference, water resourcemanagement was specifically addressed inChapter 18 of Agenda 21, a nonbinding ac-tion plan for improving the state of the globe’snatural resources in the twenty-first centuryadopted by UNCED participants. The over-all goal of Chapter 18 is to ensure that thesupply and quality of water is sufficient tomeet both human and ecological needs world-wide, and measures to implement this objec-tive are detailed in the Chapter’s ambitiousseven-part action plan. Although transbound-ary water resource management is mentionedin Chapter 18, few specific and substantivereferences are made to water resource issues atthe international scale. The Rio Conferencedid, however, generate a number of activitiesconcerning freshwater management in gen-eral, with implications for international trans-boundary water management (92).

One result of the Rio Conference andAgenda 21 has been an expansion of inter-national freshwater resource institutions andprograms. The World Water Council, a self-described “think tank” for world water re-source issues, for example, was created in1996 in response to recommendations fromthe Rio Conference. Since its inception, the

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World Water Council has hosted three WorldWater Forums—gatherings of government,nongovernment, and private agency repre-sentatives to discuss and collectively deter-mine a vision for the management of waterresources over the next quarter century. Theseforums have led to the creation of the WorldWater Vision, a forward-looking declarationof philosophical and institutional water man-agement needs, as well as the creation of co-ordinating and implementing agencies such asthe World Commission on Water for the 21st

Century and the Global Water Partnership.The Second World Water Forum also servedas the venue for a ministerial conference inwhich the leaders of participating countriessigned a declaration concerning water secu-rity in the twenty-first century. The recentWorld Summit on Sustainable Development(WWSD) has helped to sustain the momen-tum of these recent global water initiatives.In the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustain-able Development, delegates at the WWSDreaffirmed a commitment to the principlescontained in Agenda 21 and called upon theUnited Nations to review, evaluate, and pro-mote further implementation of this globalaction plan (92).

Through these meetings, the internationalcommunity has reinforced its commitment tosatisfy the water quality and quantity require-ments of the global population and its sur-rounding environment and has identified at-tendant tasks and policy measures needed tofulfill its pledge. Although many of strategiesin Agenda 21 and subsequent statements aredirected primarily at national water resources,their relevance extends to international trans-boundary waters. In fact, the Ministerial Dec-laration at the Second World Water Forumincluded “sharing water” (between differentusers and states) as one of its seven ma-jor challenges to achieving water security inthe twenty-first century. Many of the othersix challenges, which include meeting basicneeds, securing the food supply, protectingthe ecosystem, managing risks, valuing water,and governing water wisely, are also applica-

ble to waters in an international setting. Fur-thermore, policy measures prescribed by theinternational community to build greater in-stitutional capacity, such as integrated waterresource management, expanded stakeholderparticipation, and improved monitoring andevaluation schemes, are likewise importantcomponents of international watercoursemanagement.

The large meetings are also spawning cri-tiques, mainly by some donors and selectedinternational nongovernmental organizations(NGOs), as becoming too large and numer-ous (for example, 93, 94). At the same timemany local NGOs, although also criticizingthe meetings, are quick to add that it may bebetter to err on the side of too many thantoo few meetings because they have becomeplaces where local NGOs have been able tointeract with the so-called “world water elite”and visa versa. Indeed, the meetings seem toecho what has been happening within coun-tries. There is increasing awareness that “wa-ter people” alone will not deal with theseproblems and that more and different typesof stakeholders must be involved. In addition,politicians interact more with professionals.Indeed, for many years, the world water meet-ings were mostly run and attended by waterprofessionals. The large meetings have begunto change this to reflect the broader trends oc-curring within countries. The Fourth WorldWater Forum emphasized implementing localactions and spawned a movement to identifyand monitor these actions. It remains to beseen whether the professional water commu-nity can accept this.

Like Agenda 21, however, none ofthese post-Rio statements or declarationsfocuses exclusively on international freshwa-ter sources. Additionally, despite the effortsover the past decade to expand global insti-tutional capacity over freshwater resources,no supranational agency exists to man-age transboundary resources globally. Thus,although many of the principles of nationalwater management apply to internationalwaters, the political, social, and economic

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dynamics associated with waters shared be-tween sovereign states can require specialconsideration.

Legal Principles

There is a vast and growing literature oninternational water law (see, for example,the excellent summaries in References 66,67, 95–97. Wouters and her team (98) at theUniversity of Dundee have created a LegalAssessment Model to help countries developtransboundary institutions. According toCano (99), international water law was notsubstantially formulated until after WorldWar I. Since that time, organs of internationallaw have tried to provide a framework forincreasingly intensive water use, focusingon general guidelines that could be appliedto the world’s watersheds. These generalprinciples of customary law, codified andprogressively developed by advisory bodiesand private organizations, are not intended tobe legally binding in and of themselves, butthey can provide evidence of customary lawand may help crystallize that law. Wouters(P. Wouters, personal communication, 2003)notes that, “Customary law is not ‘soft law,’even though it might be found in codificationefforts of NGOs or even the ILC rules.Customary laws are rules of international lawand considered as sources.” It is tempting tolook to these principles for clear and bindingrules, but it is more accurate to think interms of guidelines for the process of conflictresolution: “(T)he principles (of customarylaw) themselves derive from the process andthe outcomes of the process rather than pre-scribe either the process or its outcome” ( J.Dellapenna, personal communication, 1997).

The UN Convention on the Law ofthe Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses (UN Convention), adopted in1997 by the UN General Assembly, is onepost-Rio accomplishment that specifically fo-cuses on international transboundary waterresources (65). The UN Convention codi-fies many of the principles deemed essential

by the international community for the man-agement of shared water resources, such asequitable and reasonable utilization of waterswith specific attention to vital human needs,protection of the aquatic environment, andthe promotion of cooperative managementmechanisms. The document also incorporatesprovisions concerning data and informationexchange and mechanisms for conflict resolu-tion. Once ratified, the UN Convention willprovide a legally binding framework, at leastupon its signatories, for managing interna-tional watercourses. Even without ratifica-tion, its guidelines are being increasingly in-voked in international forums.

The UN’s approval of the Convention,however, does not entirely resolve many le-gal questions concerning the management ofinternationally shared waters. First, the Con-vention would technically only be binding onthose nations that have ratified or consentedto be bound by the agreement. To date, fiveyears after its adoption by the UN GeneralAssembly, only 14 countries are party to theUN Convention, well below the requisite 35instruments of ratification, acceptance, acces-sion, or approval needed to bring the Con-vention into force (100).

Second, international law only guidesconduct between sovereign nations. Thus,grievances of political units or ethnic groupswithin nations over the domestic manage-ment of international waterways would not beaddressed. Third, although the Conventionoffers general guidance to coriparian states,its vague, and occasionally contradictory, lan-guage can result in varied, and indeed con-flictive, interpretations of the principles con-tained therein. As stated by Biswas (101), the“vague, broad, and general terms” incorpo-rated in the UN Convention “can be de-fined, and in certain cases quantified, in a va-riety of different ways.” Fourth, there is nopractical enforcement mechanism to back upthe Convention’s guidance. The InternationalCourt of Justice (ICJ), for example, hearscases only with the consent of the parties in-volved and only on very specific legal points.

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Moreover, in its 55-year history, the Courthas decided only one case, apart from thoserelated to boundary definitional disputes,pertinent to international waters—that ofthe Gabcıkovo-Nagymaros Project on theDanube between Hungary and Slovakia in1997.3 Finally, the Convention only addressesthose groundwater bodies that are connectedto surface water systems, i.e., unconfinedaquifers, yet several nations are already be-ginning to tap into confined groundwatersystems, many of which are shared acrossinternational boundaries. Nevertheless, anddespite the fact that the process of ratificationis moving extremely slowly, the Convention’scommon acceptance, and the fact that the ICJreferred to it in its decision on the 1997 caseon the Gabcikovo Dam, gives the Conven-tion increasing standing as an instrument ofcustomary law (102).

Institutional Lessons for theInternational Community

A review of international water relations andinstitutional development over the past 50years provides important insights into waterconflict and the role of institutions. The his-torical record of water conflict and coopera-tion suggests that international watercoursescan cause tensions between coriparian states,but acute violence is the exception rather thanthe rule. A much more likely scenario is that agradual decline in water quantity or quality, orboth, affects the internal stability of a nationor region, which may in turn impact the in-ternational arena. Early coordination amongriparian states, however, can serve to amelio-rate these sources of friction.

The centrality of institutions both inpreventive hydrodiplomacy and in effectivetransboundary water management cannot beoveremphasized. Yet, although progress is in-

3The ICJ was established in 1946 with the dissolution of itspredecessor agency, the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice. This earlier body did rule on four internationalwater disputes during its existence from 1922–1946.

deed apparent, the past 50 years of treaty writ-ing suggests that capacity-building opportu-nities still remain. Many international basinsare without any type of cooperative manage-ment framework, and even where institutionsdo exist, the post-Rio treaty record highlightsa number of remaining weaknesses. Thus, incombination with its existing efforts, the in-ternational community might consider focus-ing more attention on the specific institu-tional needs of individual basin communitiesby assisting riparian states in the develop-ment of cooperative management networksthat take into account the following keyfactors:

1. Adaptable management structure.Effective institutional managementstructures incorporate a certain levelof flexibility, allowing for public input,changing basin priorities, and addingnew information and monitoringtechnologies. The adaptability of man-agement structures must also extend tononsignatory riparians, by incorporat-ing provisions addressing their needs,rights, and potential accession.

2. Clear and flexible criteria for water allo-cations and water quality management.Allocations, which are at the heart ofmost water disputes, are a function ofwater quantity and quality, as well aspolitical fiat. Thus, effective institutionsmust identify clear allocation schedulesand water quality standards that simul-taneously provide for extreme hydro-logical events; new understanding ofbasin dynamics, including groundwaterreserves; and changing societal values.Additionally, riparian states may con-sider prioritizing uses throughout thebasin. Establishing catchment-wide wa-ter precedents may not only help toavert interriparian conflicts over wateruse, but also protect the environmentalhealth of the basin as a whole.

3. Equitable distribution of benefits. Dis-tributing water benefits, a concept thatis subtly yet powerfully different than

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pure water allocation, is at the rootof some of the world’s most successfulinstitutions. The idea concerns the dis-tribution of benefits from water use—whether from hydropower, agriculture,economic development, aesthetics, orthe preservation of healthy aquaticecosystems—not the water itself. Dis-tributing benefits allows for positive-sum agreements, occasionally includingeven nonwater-related gains in a basketof benefits, whereas dividing the wateritself only allows for winners and losers.

4. Concrete mechanisms to enforce treatyprovisions. Once a treaty is signed,successful implementation is dependentnot only on the actual terms of theagreement but also on an ability toenforce those terms. Appointing over-sight bodies with decision making andenforcement authority is one impor-tant step toward maintaining coopera-tive management institutions.

5. Detailed conflict resolution mecha-nisms. Many basins continue to experi-ence disputes even after a treaty is nego-tiated and signed. Thus, incorporatingclear mechanisms for resolving conflictsis a prerequisite for effective, long-termbasin management.

WATER CONFLICT ANDCOOPERATION

In order to cut through the prevailing anecdo-tal approach to the history of water conflicts,researchers at Oregon State University un-dertook a three-year research project, whichattempted to compile a dataset of every re-ported interaction between two or more na-tions, whether conflictive or cooperative, thatinvolved water as a scarce and/or consum-able resource or as a quantity to be managed,i.e., where water was the driver of the events,over the past 50 years (27). Excluded wereevents where water is incidental to the dispute,such as those concerning fishing rights, accessto ports, transportation, or river boundaries.

Also excluded were events where water is notthe driver, such as those where water is a tool,target, or victim of armed conflict. (Please seeFigure 2 for instances of conflict and cooper-ation.) The study documented a total of 1831interactions, both conflictive and cooperative,between two or more nations over water dur-ing the past five decades and found the fol-lowing:

First, despite the potential for dispute ininternational basins, the record of acute con-flict over international water resources is his-torically overwhelmed by the record of co-operation. During those 50 years, there wereonly 37 acute disputes (those involving vio-lence); of those, 30 were between Israel andone or another of its neighbors, and the vio-lence ended in 1970. Non-Mideast cases ac-counted for only five acute events, and duringthe same period, 157 treaties were negotiatedand signed. In fact, the only water war be-tween nations on record occurred over 4500years ago between the city-states of Lagashand Umma in the Tigris-Euphrates basin(40, 103).

The total number of water-related eventsbetween nations of any magnitude arelikewise weighted toward cooperation—507conflict-related events, versus 1228 coopera-tive events—implying that violence over wa-ter is neither strategically rational, hydro-graphically effective, nor economically viable.

Second, despite the occasional fieryrhetoric of politicians—perhaps aimed moreoften at their own constituencies than at theenemy—most actions taken over water aremild. Of all the events, some 43% fell betweenmild verbal support and mild verbal hostility.If the next level on either side—official verbalsupport and official verbal hostility—is addedin, the share of verbal events reaches 62% ofthe total. Thus, almost two thirds of all eventswere only verbal, and more than two thirds ofthose had no official sanction (27).

Third, there were more issues of co-operation than of conflict. The distribu-tion of cooperative events covered a broadspectrum, including water quantity, quality,

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Figure 2Number of events by BAR scale.

economic development, hydropower, andjoint management. In contrast, almost 90%of the conflict-laden events related to quan-tity and infrastructure. Furthermore, almostall extensive military acts (the most extremecases of conflict) fell within these twocategories.

Fourth, despite the lack of violence, wateracted as both an irritant and a unifier. As anirritant, water can make good relations badand bad relations worse. Despite the com-plexity, however, international waters can actas a unifier in basins with relatively stronginstitutions.

This historical record suggests that inter-national water disputes do get resolved, evenamong enemies, and even as conflicts eruptover other issues. Some of the world’s most vo-ciferous enemies have negotiated water agree-

ments or are in the process of doing so,and the institutions they have created oftenprove to be resilient, even when relations arestrained.

The Mekong Committee, for example, es-tablished by the governments of Cambodia,Laos, Thailand, and Viet Nam as an in-tergovernmental agency in 1957, exchangeddata and information on water resources de-velopment throughout the Viet Nam War(24, 104). Israel and Jordan have held secret“picnic table” talks on managing the JordanRiver since the unsuccessful Johnston ne-gotiations of 1953–1955, even though theywere technically at war from Israel’s in-dependence in 1948 until the 1994 treaty(105). The Indus River Commission sur-vived two major wars between India andPakistan (106). And all 10 Nile basin riparian

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countries are currently involved in seniorgovernment-level negotiations to develop thebasin cooperatively (107), despite water warsrhetoric between upstream and downstreamstates.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES ANDCONCLUSIONS

The vast experience of the international com-munity and its shared water resources aroundthe world offers lessons for effective, efficient,and equitable water resources managementand strategies for resolving disputes or, bet-ter, in helping to avoid them altogether.

Lessons Learned

The most critical security lessons learnedfrom the global experience in water securityare as follows:

1. Water crossing international bound-aries can cause tensions between nationsthat share the basin. Although the ten-sion is not likely to lead to warfare, earlycoordination between riparians can helpameliorate the issue. Furthermore, wa-ter is a useful inducement to dialog andcollaboration, even in settings of intensepolitical tension.

2. Successful agreements move generallyfrom thinking in terms of rights toneeds and finally to interests, allowingfor an equitable distribution of ben-efits. Whereas focusing on allocatingwater mires negotiators in a zero-sumgame, thinking in terms of benefits al-lows riparians to move beyond the river,(and even beyond water) with new pos-sibilities for the basket of benefits tobe enhanced. Once international insti-tutions are in place, they are tremen-dously resilient over time, even betweenotherwise hostile riparian nations, andeven when there is conflict over otherissues.

3. More likely than violent conflict occur-ring is a gradual decrease in water quan-

tity or quality, or both, which over timecan affect the internal stability of a na-tion or region, and act as an irritant be-tween ethnic groups, water sectors, orstates/provinces. The resulting instabil-ity may have effects in the internationalarena.

4. The greatest threat of the global watercrisis to human security comes from thefact that millions of people lack accessto sufficient quantities of water at suffi-cient quality for their well-being.

Why Might the Future LookNothing Like the Past?

Much of the work presented here is basedpartly on the assumption that we can tellsomething about the future by looking at thepast. It is worth stopping at this point, then,and challenging the very foundation of that as-sumption: Why might the future look nothingat all like the past? What new approaches ortechnologies are on the horizon to change orameliorate the risk to the basins we have iden-tified, or even to change the whole approachto basins at risk?

By definition, a discussion of the future cannot have the same empirical backing as a his-torical study—the data just do not yet exist.Yet there are cutting edge developments andrecent trends, which, if one examined themwithin the context of this study, might sug-gest some possible changes in store for trans-boundary waters in the near future. What fol-lows are four possibly fundamental changes inthe way we approach transboundary waters.

New technologies for negotiation andmanagement. Most analysis of internationalwaters dates from the mid-1960s onward. Insome ways, water management is very sim-ilar now as it was then (or, for that mat-ter, as it was 5000 years ago). But some fun-damental aspects are profoundly different.Although global water stresses are increasing,institutions are getting better and more re-silient, management and understanding are

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improving, and these issues are increasinglyon the “radar screen” of global and lo-cal decision makers. But most importantly,the twenty-first century has access to newtechnology—including remote sensing andmodeling capabilities and technologies as wellas management practices that increase water-use efficiency, which could not be dreamed ofin 1948 and adds substantially to the abilityboth to negotiate and to manage transbound-ary waters more effectively (108). Althoughnew technologies and data cannot replace thepolitical goodwill necessary for creative solu-tions, nor are they widely available outside thedeveloped world, they can if appropriately de-ployed allow for more robust negotiations andgreater flexibility in joint management.

Globalization: private capital, WorldTrade Organization, and circumventedethics. Very little of the recent attention onglobalization and the World Trade Organiza-tion (WTO) has centered on water resources,but there is a definite water component tothese trends. One of the most profound isthe shift of development funds from globaland regional development banks such as theWorld Bank and the Asia Development Bankto private multinationals, such as Bechtel,Vivendi, and Ondeo (formally Lyonnaise desEux) (for example, 109, 110). Developmentbanks have, over the years, been susceptibleto public pressures and ethics and, as such,have developed procedures for evaluatingsocial and environmental impacts of projectsand incorporating them in decision making.On international waters, each developmentbank has guidelines that generally prohibitdevelopment unless all riparians agree to theproject, which in and of itself has promotedsuccessful negotiations in the past. Privateenterprises have no such restrictions, and na-tions eager to develop controversial projectshave been increasingly turning to privatecapital to circumvent public ethics. The mostcontroversial projects of the day—Turkey’sGAP project, India’s Narmada River project,and China’s Three Gorges Dam—are all

WTO: World TradeOrganization

proceeding through the studied avoidance ofdevelopment banks and their mores.

There is a more subtle effect of globaliza-tion, which has to do with the WTO and itsemphasis on privatization and full cost recov-ery of investments. Local and national gov-ernments have traditionally implemented andsubsidized water development systems to keepwater prices down but are under increasingpressure from the forces of globalization todevelop these systems through private com-panies. These large multinational water com-panies manage for profit and, if they use de-velopment capital, both push and are pushedto recover the full cost of their investment.This situation can translate not only into im-mediate and substantial rises in the cost ofwater, disproportionately affecting the poor,but also to greater eradication of local and in-digenous management systems and cultures.If there is to be water-related violence in thefuture, it is much more liable to be like the“water riots” against a Bechtel development inBolivia in 1999 than water wars across nationalboundaries.

As WTO rules are elaborated and negoti-ated, real questions remain as to how muchof this process will be required of nationsin the future, simply to retain membershipin the organization. The commodification ofwater as a result of these forces is a casein point. Over the past 20 years, no globalwater policy meeting has neglected to passa resolution, which, among other issues, de-fined water as an “economic good,” settingthe stage at the 2000 World Water Forum foran unresolved showdown against those whowould define water as a human or ecosystemright. The debate looms large over the futureof water resources: If water is a commodity,and if WTO rules disallow obstacles to thetrade of commodities, will nations be forcedto sell their water? Although far-fetched now(even as a California company is challengingBritish Columbia over precisely such an is-sue under North American Free Trade Agree-ment rules), the globalization debate betweenmarket forces and social forces continues to

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play out in microcosm in the world of waterresources.

The geopolitics of desalination. Twice inthe past 50 years—during the 1960s nuclearenergy fervor and in the late 1980s, withdiscoveries in cold fusion—much of the worldbriefly thought it was on the verge of havingaccess to close-to-free energy supplies. “Toocheap to meter” was the phrase during theAtoms for Peace Conference. Although nei-ther the economics nor the technology finallysupported these claims, it is not far-fetched topicture changes that could profoundly alterthe economics of desalination.

The marginal cost of desalinated water(between US$0.55 and US$0.80/m3) makesit currently cost-effective only in the devel-oped world where (a) the water will be usedfor drinking water; and (b) the population towhom the water will be delivered lives alonga coast and at low elevations; and (c) thereare no alternatives. The only places not sorestricted are where energy costs are espe-cially low, notably the Arabian Peninsula. Afundamental shift either in energy prices or inmembrane technology could bring costs downsubstantially. If either happened to the extentthat the marginal cost allowed for agriculturalirrigation with sea water (around US$.08/m3

on average), a large proportion of the world’swater supplies would shift from rivers andshallow aquifers to the sea (an unlikely, butplausible, scenario).

In addition to the fundamental economicchanges that would result, geopolitical think-ing of water systems would also need to shift.

Currently, there is inherent political power inbeing an upstream riparian, controlling theheadwaters. In the scenario for cheap desali-nation above, that spatial position of powerwould shift from mountains to the valleys andfrom the headwaters to the sea. Many nations,such as Israel, Egypt, and Iraq currently de-pendent on upstream neighbors for their wa-ter supply would, by virtue of their coastlines,suddenly find roles reversed—again unlikely,but plausible.

The changing sources of water and thechanging nature of conflict. Both theworlds of water and of conflict are undergo-ing slow but steady changes that may obviatemuch of the thinking in this report. Lack of ac-cess to a safe, stable supply of water is reachingunprecedented proportions. Furthermore, assurface water supplies and easy groundwatersources are increasingly exploited throughoutthe world, two major changes result: Qual-ity is steadily becoming a more serious issueto many than quantity, and water use is shift-ing to less traditional sources. Many of thesesources—such as deep fossil aquifers, wastew-ater reclamation, and interbasin transfers—are not restricted by the confines of watershedboundaries, our fundamental unit of analysisin this review.

Conflict, too, is becoming less traditional,increasingly being driven by internal or lo-cal pressures, or more subtle issues of povertyand stability. The combination of changes, inwater resources and in conflict, suggest thattomorrow’s water disputes may look very dif-ferent from today’s.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The author is not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity ofthis review.

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