Duties and Responsibilities Towards the Poor

Duties and Responsibilities Towards the Poor

Robert Huseby

Published online: 17 April 2008

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Abstract Thomas Pogge has argued that we have strong negative duties to assist

the global poor because we harm them through our contribution to the global eco-

nomic order. I argue that Pogge’s concept of harm is indeterminate. The resources of

any group will typically be affected by at least two economic schemes. Pogge sug-

gests that the responsibility for any affected group’s shortfall from a minimum

standard ought to be shared between the contributing schemes. I argue that shared

responsibility can be interpreted in two different ways. Unfortunately, both inter-

pretations are problematic. Lastly, I suggest a strategy for amending this problem.

Keywords Distributive justice � Global economic schemes � Harm �International justice � Negative duties � Thomas Pogge � Positive duties �Sufficiency

Introduction1

A large proportion of contemporary humans suffer from chronic severe poverty.

Almost half the global population is poor or extremely poor. Meanwhile, the rich

control a stunning amount of the world’s total resources. These facts have in recent

R. Huseby (&)

The Ethics Programme, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo,

P.O. Box 1097, Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway

e-mail: [email protected]

1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Nordic Network in Political Theory in Stockholm,

2004; The Annual Norwegian Conference in Political Science in Hurdalssjøen, 2005; The Brave New

World Conference in Manchester, 2005; and at the Colloquium in Political Theory at the University of

Oslo, 2005. I thank all participants. In particular, I am grateful to Lene Bomann-Larsen, Cornelius

Cappelen, Jakob Elster, Asgeir Eriksen, Eli Feiring, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Raino Malnes, Andras

Miklos, Thomas Pogge, Jonathan Quong, Bjørn-Erik Rasch, Attila Tanyi, Dag Einar Thorsen, Andrew

Williams, Jorgen Odalen, and Gerhard Øverland.

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Res Publica (2008) 14:1–18

DOI 10.1007/s11158-008-9047-1

years sparked the interest of a number of political and moral philosophers. Even

though the field of international distributive justice is relatively new, much

important work has been done.2

In an interesting and innovative account, Thomas Pogge insists that we have

strong negative duties not to harm the poor. He further argues that we continuously

violate this duty because we actually harm the poor through our contribution to the

global institutional (largely economic) order (Pogge 2002). Since the poor have

done nothing to warrant such abuse, this harm is inflicted unduly. Therefore,

contributing to global institutional arrangements is tantamount to a continuous

breach of our negative duties. We thus have further strong duties to provide

compensation, or to work in favour of establishing arrangements that are fairer.

In presenting his argument, Pogge takes exception to one of the main tenets of

theories of international justice. Many writers have argued that assisting the global

poor is mainly a matter of positive duties. One prominent proponent of this approach

is Peter Singer (Singer 1971).3 In a seminal article, Singer argued that two

comparatively weak premises yield the conclusion that people in the rich part of the

world have moral duties to assist the global poor: the first of these premises is that

suffering from poverty is bad; the second is that if we can prevent something bad

from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we

morally ought to do so (Singer 1971, p. 231).4

It should be noted that Pogge does not claim that our positive duties to alleviate

severe suffering have no relevance. His aim is rather to convince even those who deny

that positive duties have any moral clout at all.5 Pogge’s theory is ecumenical (Pogge

2005b, pp. 29–53). He wants to convince ‘adherents of all the main views now alive in

Western political thought’ (Pogge 2005b, p. 36). He thus formulates different

baselines corresponding to different theoretical approaches, and argues that we harm

the poor on all these accounts. In this paper, however, I will focus only on one of these

versions. On this view, the baseline is construed in terms of a Lockean proviso.

The version of Pogge’s theory that is discussed in this paper is a minimalconception. Pogge leaves open the question of whether it must be revised or

expanded. The criticisms put forth here are directed at this particular conception,

and not at the theory in all its possible guises. This does not, however, rule out the

possibility that some of the arguments presented below may be relevant to the more

general structure of his framework.

In the next section, I present Pogge’s view of negative duties, and the Lockean

baseline. In the three subsequent sections, I critically examine this conception. The

problem is that the minimum demand put forth in the theory is ambiguous between at

least two different interpretations. In my view, neither interpretation leads to a

2 Notable contributions include Singer (1971, 2004a, 2004b), Beitz (1979), Pogge (1989), Unger (1996),

Rawls (1999), Miller (2001, 2004).3 Pogge also assigns this view to Rachels (1979), Kagan (1989), and Unger (1996).4 This principle, persuasive as it may be, is in fact quite demanding. Singer therefore proposes a weaker

version of the second premise. The weaker version omits the phrase ‘comparatively’, so that it only

demands that we assist the poor insofar as we do not thereby sacrifice anything of moral importance.5 For further discussions on this point, see Satz (2005), and Pogge (2005a); see also Pogge (2002, nn.

207, 216).

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satisfactory result. I argue that this particular take on international distributive justice

has counterintuitive implications and must be amended. Further, I consider two

possible rebuttals to my critique. In the penultimate section, I present an alternative

view of positive duties, and show that they indeed can be strong enough to be morally

authoritative. I also sketch a theory of telic sufficiency that might explain the strength

of positive duties. The last section provides some concluding remarks.

Pogge on Positive and Negative Duties

The view that there is a distinction between positive and negative duties, and that

the latter are generally stronger than the former, is widely held. Here I will accept

this idea, endorsing with the contention that morality requires us to distinguish in

some way or other between harming and allowing harm, and hence I will not

attempt to defend the distinction against possible objections (see for instance

Scheffler 2004; McCarthy 2000).

Pogge proposes (within the domain of interpersonal responsibilities) to ‘call

negative any duty to ensure that others are not unduly harmed (or wronged) through

one’s own conduct and to call positive the remainder: any duty to benefit persons or

to shield them from other harms’ (Pogge 2002, p. 130).

He goes on to make the important claim that our negative duties towards our

nearest and dearest are on a par with our negative duties towards distant strangers

(Pogge 2002, p. 133).6 Positive duties, on the other hand, weaken with diminishing

bonds of affection and loyalty. This means that harm to the global poor that comes

about ‘through a badly slanted global order in whose continuous shaping and

coercive imposition we are materially involved,’ invokes our negative duties (p.

133). From these duties follow further duties to make up for the harm, through

reform of the institutional scheme, or through protection of its victims.

This proposition may seem controversial. How can it be a matter of negative

duties that we promote reform or protect victims? Promoting and protecting

typically require an agent to do something rather than refrain from doing

something.7 According to Pogge, the duties of compensation that arise from

inflicted harm are positive in the sense that they demand action rather than inaction,

but they are negative in that their strength follows directly from the fact that the

agent has violated a weighty moral duty.8 Pogge therefore proposes that they be

termed ‘intermediate duties’ (Pogge 2005b, p. 34).9

6 Some might find this claim controversial. I nevertheless take it for granted in the present context.7 I am grateful to Bjørn-Erik Rasch for instructive comments on this point.8 Two qualifications: First, sometimes intermediate duties require simultaneous compensation. We

contribute to the institutional orders that would have been unjust had we not simultaneously compensated

through international tax regimes or by donating to NGOs. Second, sometimes intermediate duties can

arise from inflicted harm that does not actually constitute a violation of a negative duty. If I break into

your cabin during a blizzard, and then compensate you later, I have not violated your rights, because I

have acted permissibly. I thank Thomas Pogge for these clarifications.9 The claim that our intermediate duties are especially strong towards those we actually harm (as opposed

to other needy individuals), has recently been challenged. See Øverland (2005).

Duties and Responsibilities Towards the Poor 3

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Pogge takes these reflections to render plausible the claim that we sometimes

have strong intermediate duties to promote reform of unjust institutions, and to

protect its victims from harm. The next question is whether this view is relevant ‘to

the case of unjust economic institutions that are global in scope?’ (Pogge 2002, p.

136). A positive answer to this question is a precondition for conceiving of global

poverty as something that we contribute to, and thus have intermediate duties to

remedy. If this is correct, these duties ‘command a place at the top, rather than the

bottom, of our priority list’ (Pogge 2002, p. 136, my emphases).

But what constitutes harm? In Pogge’s view, harm must be defined relative to

some ‘morality-stipulated baseline’ (Pogge 2002, p. 130). This baseline is vital to

the assessment of his account of negative duties. As mentioned, several baselines

are provided in order to explicate this idea. Here I focus exclusively on the baseline

defined in terms of the Lockean proviso.

The Lockean proviso holds that, in a state of nature, ‘each person’s unilateral

appropriations must leave ‘‘enough and as good’’ for others’ (Pogge 2002, p. 137;

Locke 1988, §27 and §30). In Pogge’s interpretation, this leads to the claim that we

harm ‘others unduly if we impose upon them a social order under which they do not

have access to such a minimal economic position’ (Pogge 2002, p. 138). A minimal

economic position is one that is ‘superior to what persons, at least on average, would

have in a Lockean state of nature’. (Pogge 2002, p. 138). It is not clear what this

entails, but Pogge follows Locke in assuming that people in the state of nature

‘would have access to sufficient food, clean water, clothing and shelter’ (Pogge

2002, p. 138).

This baseline allows us to evaluate whether or not our actions (or participation in

institutions) harm others. Pogge needs this specified baseline in order to show that

reform of unjust institutions and protection of its victims are intermediate duties

which arise from breaches of negative duties. If justice is something weaker than that

which is defined by the Lockean proviso, the extent of our duties may be narrower in

scope, and may even cease to encompass many of the world’s poor. Conversely, on a

stronger conception of justice, our duties will be more extensive. As Pogge points

out, on some accounts we may have to defend a global difference principle.

Indeterminate Harm

According to Pogge, then, economic institutional schemes harm those subjected to

them if they bring their economic position below the baseline set by the Lockean

proviso. To the extent that we contribute to economic global schemes that

disadvantage some of those affected by them, we have (intermediate) duties to

protect the victims, or to reform the scheme(s). On the other hand, those people

whose economic position is below the baseline through no fault of ours (may) have

no claims of compensation or reform (Pogge 2002, p. 133);10 or, more specifically,

10 As mentioned above, Pogge does not deny that we may also have positive duties towards those poor

people who we are not engaged in harming. He tends, however to be somewhat ambiguous on this count,

probably because it is important to him to base his theory on the less controversial negative duties. See for

instance Pogge (2002, pp. 130–131).

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they have no claims that follow from our violation of negative duties. It is, however,

obvious that the global economic order is not the only determinant of a group of

people’s economic position (for related concerns, see Patten 2005). How does this

affect our duties toward the poor?

It seems that Pogge’s notion of harm is indeterminate in certain respects. The

interplay between different determinants of a particular group’s economic position

gives rise to complications that should be addressed. In this section, I will direct

attention to a selection of such complicating features. In particular, I will argue that

this notion of harm is insensitive to the difference between what I will call relativeand absolute responsibility for harm. In what follows, I focus on what duties

contributors to unjust economic orders have to reform or adjust the order, not on

their duty to compensate or protect.11

Harm in this context is different from harm as we ordinarily think of it. We

usually agree that Joe harms Jack if he punches him in the face for no good reason.

Part of the rationale behind this judgment is that Jack (after the punch) is worse off

than he was before Joe’s unwarranted assault. The baseline is the possible state of

affairs that would have obtained had the punch not been thrown (for discussions of

comparative notions of harm, see Kumar 2001; Carter 2001). I assume that Pogge

would accept this standard notion of harm in many contexts. The Lockean baseline,

however, works in a different way. This comparison invokes a fictional rendering of

what things would be like in a state of nature (on average). On this account, the

present state of affairs can be justified ‘only if the changes in holdings and social

rules it involves are ones that all participants could have rationally agreed to’

(Pogge 2005b, p. 39). According to Locke, all persons in a state of nature

would be entitled to a proportional share of the world’s natural resources.

[Locke] thus makes the justice of any institutional order depend on whether

the worst-off under it are at least as well off as people would be in a Lockean

state of nature with a proportional resource share. (Pogge 2005b, pp. 39–40)

On this account, we may harm someone even if we in fact increase their share of

resources. If, for instance, we impose our global economic scheme upon a group of

people that prior to this interaction actually suffered from severe deprivation (due to

natural disasters, plagues or lack of necessary skill and technology), the economic

order would, in one sense, benefit this group if its share of resources increased as a

result, but not to the level of the Lockean baseline.12 This would still count as a

violation of our negative duties because the poor would be denied something that

they had a legitimate claim to. Conversely, an economic scheme may deprive a

group of a portion of its share without harming them if their remaining share is still

above the baseline.

In what follows, I assume that ‘we’ are individuals in the rich part of the world,

and that we contribute to the global economic scheme that affects the economic

position of group A (and others). It is in the power of our governments

11 I do this in order to simplify and focus my presentation. I do not want to imply that compensation is

necessarily a less proper response to one’s breaches of negative duties.12 Pogge refers to this in relation to a more demanding baseline (Pogge 2002, p. 136).


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(cooperatively) to adjust the workings of this scheme. This is not true of the

government of A. Further, it is within our power to influence our governments (in

various ways). The same is not true of A in relation to their government. However, it

is within the power of some group to influence A’s government.13

Imagine a global economic scheme (GE), to which we contribute, and what

Pogge calls ‘homegrown causes’, or the national economic order (NE),14 to which

we do not contribute. GE and NE together determine A’s share of resources (w).15

Assume that we could describe w in terms of a number between 0 and 1, and that w(implausibly) is roughly the same for all individuals within A. Assume also that the

morally stipulated baseline (b) is located at 0.3.

There are, of course, numerous factors that may and do affect a group’s w. For

simplicity, I will assume that GE and NE together determine A’s w. I also assume that

GE and NE have roughly the same influence over A’s w. This serves to underline the

important idea that A’s w will not be determined by GE alone. In reality, the

determining power that GE yields over A’s w may of course be disproportional.

The focus on GE and NE, then, excludes other potential economic (local or

regional) schemes, as well as natural influences (droughts, floods, earthquakes, etc.).

Note also that GE may influence NE in important respects (and perhaps also the

other way around). In addition, the workings of GE and NE may in combination

yield effects (both negative and positive) that are multiplicative rather than additive

in nature (see Pogge 2005b, p. 48; I discuss this a bit further below). I leave all these

issues aside here in order to focus on some basic and principled points.

Now consider the following situation:

(1) A’s w is below b. GE, to which we contribute, affects A’s w.

Are we harming A in this scenario? It seems that, according to Pogge, we have

negative duties to adjust GE in favour of A, since A is affected by GE and A’s

members lead their lives below b. However, it is not obvious how exactly we harm

A. Consider the following, more detailed picture of A’s situation:

(2) Group A is below b. GE affects A’s w to a certain extent. However, NE alsoaffects A’s w to a certain extent.

It seems that (2) represents a fairly correct (although sketchy) picture of the

conditions for many of the world’s poor. Now, let us assume that reform of eitherGE or NE would suffice to raise A above b;16 or, in other words, GE and NE

13 In some cases such a group would be a small elite; in other cases it could be a large majority.14 Homegrown causes could of course include other factors than those belonging naturally to a national

economic order.15 When I say that GE and NE determine A’s w, I do not mean to imply that members of A are passive

bystanders to whom benefits are either extended or not. The members of A are assumed to be normally

hard-working and resourceful persons. It is nevertheless a fact that the workings of the economic schemes

that apply to them have effects on the results of their efforts. I assume, then, that the members of A do

their part, so to speak, but that the economic schemes that apply to them determine the extent to which

they are able to reap the fruits of their labor.16 Assume for instance that a more equitable distribution within the state to which A belongs would allow

A to reach b, even in the absence of any reform of GE, and without thereby pushing any other group

below b.

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together leave A with less than its fair share of resources. What are our duties as

contributors to GE here? Do we harm A? Are we responsible for their shortfall from

the baseline, even though reform of another scheme to which we do not contribute

would bring about the same result?

Pogge’s answer is that both institutional schemes and both groups of contributing

individuals have intermediate duties to bring the deprived above b (Pogge 2002, p.

50).17 But it seems that this does not completely solve the problem. Note that if both

GE and NE are responsible, it is unclear whether each order is (a) responsible only

for a part of the harming,18 or (b) responsible (simultaneously) for the total harm.19

Both interpretations may be seen as problematic.

The second interpretation, in which both GE and NE are seen as simultaneously

responsible, is problematic among other things because it seems to blur the line

between positive and negative duties. The first interpretation is problematic because it

allows adjustments in GE that appear to be unjust. In the following, I will refer to the

first interpretation as the principle of relative responsibility (RR), and to the second as

the principle of absolute responsibility (AR). I discuss them in reverse order.

The Principle of Absolute Responsibility

AR holds that contributors to GE are responsible (along with other contributors to

other economic schemes (Es) that affect A’s w) for any negative discrepancy

between A’s w and b, regardless of the size of A’s share of the surplus. I believe that

RR is more plausible than AR. It is worth considering, however, what would follow

if we rejected the former and went with the latter. One result, it seems, would be that

any adjustment in any institutional schemes that brings A’s w below b invokes our

negative duty to shift back.

Before discussing these implications, however, I will consider briefly whether

AR has any intuitive plausibility, since this principle corresponds to some of the

formulations Pogge offers on the justifiability of the Lockean baseline. Remember

that all persons are entitled to a proportional share of the world’s total resources.

We affluent have no rights to property, however acquired, in the face of the

excluded. Rather, they have a right to what we hold. When we prevent them from

exercising this right – when we deprive them of what is justly theirs – then we

violate this original right of the poor and we harm them. (Pogge 2005b, p. 41)

17 In this passage, Pogge speaks of under-fulfillment of rights, rather than falling below a morality-

stipulated baseline. It is reasonable to assume that this does not make any difference in the present

context. See also Pogge (2005b, pp. 41–42) and Pogge (2005a, p. 63).18 This is the type of responsibility that intuitively seems to fit best with the notion of negative duties. It

is also the type that seems to fit best with the general thrust of Pogge’s argument. See for instance Pogge

(2002, p. 33).19 This way of distributing responsibility would be evident in cases where two parents share the

responsibility of supporting their child with the emotional and material security necessary for her to lead a

fulfilling life. If one parent for some reason is unable to fulfill her responsibilities, this does not reduce the

other parent’s responsibilities by half.


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This might be taken to imply that, if A has less than its proportional share of

resources, then contributors to GE have (intermediate) duties to compensate the

total of A’s shortfall (as do contributors to NE), because even though there are two

schemes affecting A’s w, contributors to both are capable of compensating, and both

may be reformed. If one (NE, say) should fail to live up to this obligation, then

contributors to GE must shoulder the total burden. And why not? A has claims to a

share of the total surplus (Pogge 2005b, pp. 39–40). The total consists of whatever

GE and NE (and, in real life, a range of other Es) produce together. The fact that NE

may be reformed so as to compensate for a part of A’s shortfall does not necessarily

imply that contributors to GE are free to ignore the fact that NE is not thus

reformed, or that its contributors do not compensate in due fashion. After all,

contributors to GE still (presumably) command the lion’s share of the total surplus,

and A’s claim to a part of this total is not restricted to either GE’s or NE’s part of it.

Therefore, A might have a claim against GE on its total proportional share, even if

NE also affects its w and thus contributes to harm.20

Consider the following scenario:

(3) A’s w is 0.4. GE is adjusted coercively, resulting in a decrease of 0.1 in A’s w.

A is now at b.

This adjustment would obviously be acceptable according to AR (and RR). The sole

act of coercively depriving A of a fraction of its w through the workings of an

institutional economic order does not constitute harm. The reduction turns into harm

only when A falls below b.21

Thus,

(4) A’s w is b. GE is adjusted coercively, resulting in a decrease of 0.1 in A’s w.

A’s w is now 0.2, and thus below b. A reform of either GE or NE could bring

A above b.

This adjustment would always be impermissible according to AR. The reason is

obvious: we contribute to GE, GE affects A’s w negatively, leaving A below b. This

holds true regardless of how much of GE’s total surplus is left to A prior to the

adjustment. Contributors to GE thus have responsibility to reverse the adjustment.

(On RR, however, the permissibility would depend on how much of GE’s total

surplus was left to A prior to the adjustment. See below.)

But what if

(5) A’s w is b. NE is adjusted coercively, resulting in a decrease of 0.1 in A’s w.

A’s w is now 0.2, and thus below b. A reform of either GE or NE could bring

A above b.

20 One might here be tempted to contemplate the idea that A is entitled to a decent share of all the surplus

of all the schemes that are imposed upon it. Although it might be possible to defend this conception, it

does not fit into the Lockean baseline framework, since the baseline would then increase with the number

of schemes affecting A.21 This statement, of course, is true only with regards to the minimal Lockean baseline. Pogge, as well as

most others, would claim that justice demands (much) more.

8 R. Huseby

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In this case, NE’s adjustment is as impermissible as GE’s in (4). One might think,

therefore, that NE should now be adjusted negatively in order to pull A’s w back to

b. This is of course true to a certain extent, but note that after the respective

(negative) adjustments, both (4) and (5) are (equally) compatible with (2). In other

words, when the adjustments have taken place, A’s w is below b, and its w is

determined by both GE and NE. It seems that it is true of both (4) and (5) that

contributors to both GE and NE are responsible for increasing A’s w to b.

One might argue that even if AR is not sensitive to how much of A’s share of

resources is related to the workings of GE and NE respectively, it need not be

insensitive to the difference between actually causing a reduction in A’s w, and not

causing such a reduction; but this is implausible. There seems to be a difference

between the following two scenarios:22

(6) A’s w is b. In the absence of NE, A’s w would have been 0.20. In the absence

of GE, A’s w would have been 0.10. GE adjusts coercively, resulting in a

decrease of 0.05 in A’s w, leaving A at 0.25, which is below b.

(7) A’s w is b. In the absence of NE, A’s w would have been 0.05. In the absence

of GE, A’s w would have been 0.25. GE adjusts coercively, resulting in a

decrease of 0.05 in A’s w, leaving A at 0.25, which is below b.

One might ask why history is relevant in these cases. If we suppose that A’s

deprivation started with the breakdown of their institutional order in the wake of

civil war, should not the rules of the global economic order respond to this—for

instance, by placing a ban on arms export to A’s country? Or, conversely, if A’s

poverty is a result of global recession, should not the national economic order be

reformed so as to take care of the unemployed?23

There is really no reason to think that both the global and the national economic

orders should not be adjusted in these cases. However, my question is whether we as

contributors to the global order violate our negative duties if we do not thus respond.

Perhaps this is the case if we fail to place a ban on arms exports. However, arms

may not be the only problem. Lack of the means of subsistence may also follow

civil wars. Another pertinent question is therefore whether we have negative duties,

say, to lower tariffs on imports on goods produced by A, even if the prior tariffs

were permissible before A’s resource level fell as a result (we assume here) of

home-grown problems. I think many would agree that even if we should do this, it

would not be a matter of negative duties.

If AR should be sensitive to which E causes A to actually fall below b, withoutbeing sensitive to how much of A’s w stems from each E prior to the adjustment,

22 The following scenarios admittedly invoke hypothetical judgements that are not easily evaluated. It

seems, however, that unless it makes sense to ask how an economic scheme to which we contribute would

have affected A in the absence of other influencing factors, it is very hard to assess the extent to which we

are in breach of negative duties when contributing to it. To simplify, assume that you impose upon me a

scheme of economic exchange that is mutually beneficial, and that a third person also imposes upon me

scheme that is disastrous to my economic situation. In that case, it is hard to see how you harm me. This is

not meant as an analogue to the situation between the actual global economic scheme and the world’s

poor. It is only to motivate the hypothetical disaggregation of contributing factors.23 I grateful to Thomas Pogge for these objections.


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then (6) and (7) would appear to be on a par. However, they are not. In (6) A’s

resource share stems almost entirely from GE. If this is true, why should GE be

responsible for closing the gap between A’s w and b? What if NE, prior to GE’s

adjustment in 6), was adjusted similarly? Then both schemes have caused the same

reduction, although at slightly different times, and A’s share of resources has at all

times stemmed more from GE than NE. It seems unreasonable that contributors to

GE should bear the responsibility alone for adjusting in a manner that would end

A’s deprivation.

These arguments against the special version of AR that is sensitive to which E

actually causes the reduction that brings A below b has drawn on the same intuitions

that underlie RR. It seems that these arguments have force also against the general

version of AR, which is insensitive both to which scheme causes the reduction that

pulls A below b, and to how much of A’s w is traceable to its interaction with each

E.

According to AR, contributors to GE would have duties to bring A back to bregardless of the way in which NE influences A’s w. These duties, however, would

be shared with the contributors to NE. In other words, both GE and NE would be

responsible for any negative discrepancy between A’s w and b, period; but, if

contributors to NE do not meet their responsibilities, then the total burden falls upon

contributors to GE. However, this seems to correspond poorly with our notion of

negative duties. Consider the following:

(8) A is at b. NE is adjusted coercively, resulting in a decrease of A’s w of 0.1.

Contributors to both GE and NE have responsibilities to close the gap between

A’s w and b. Contributors to NE do not fulfil this responsibility. Contributors

to GE do. A is again at b. NE is adjusted, resulting in a decrease of A’s w ...

etc.

It seems evident that AR is not a plausible principle for determining the negativeduties we have towards the world’s poor in virtue of being contributors to GE.

Unless one accepts RR, it seems that contributors to GE have a responsibility to

adjust in a way that raises A to b regardless of how the shortfall came about in the

first place. If this is the case, then it is more generally the case that when more than

one E affects the w of any A, then the failure of E1 to cooperate in maintaining A’s

w at b places the burden of the total responsibility on the remaining Es.

One solution to this problem may be to modify AR in a way that limits the

burdens that may befall contributors to GE as a result of the contributors to NE’s

violation of their duties. One such way could be to argue that GE is only responsible

for closing half the gap between A’s w and b. However, this seems to cause the same

problems as in (8), if only on a smaller scale.

Another and perhaps more plausible possibility would be to hold that contributors

to GE have no obligation to ensure that A’s resource level is such that it would have

been sufficient to secure b for A in the absence of NE. This might seem to be an

attractive solution. It effectively stops the implausible escalation of duties evident in

(8), but it does not rid AR of the underlying question of why contributors to GE

should take on duties that seem to belong to contributors to NE. The absence of NE

is surely not the same as the refusal on the part of contributors to NE to fulfil their

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duties. It seems that unless responsibilities for total contribution are divided

between the schemes affecting a group’s w, then the contributors to one scheme can

shift their own responsibilities onto the contributors to another scheme. Again,

while this might not be implausible as such, it might still be implausible as a

rendering of negative duties.

The Principle of Relative Responsibility

Is it better, then, to distribute responsibilities according to how much of GE’s and

NE’s surplus (respectively) is left to A? It seems that if we conclude that it is

implausible to hold contributors to GE responsible for the negative discrepancies

between A’s w and b that comes about through the workings of NE, then we really

think that contributors to GE are responsible only for that fraction of b that they can

be expected to ensure, given the number of other determinants (in the present case

only NE). If contributors to GE share with A b/2 (0.15) of the surplus of GE, do

contributors to GE then have any further responsibilities toward A? If the answer is

no, then our negative duties to the global poor would be to share no more and no less

than 0.15 with A.24 Leaving less would be a violation; leaving more would be a

matter of beneficence. But is RR plausible? It seems plausible in the sense that ourresponsibilities connect nicely with our contribution to harm. However, it may seem

implausible in other respects.

In (4) above, according to RR we need more information to answer whether

contributors to GE have responsibilities to reform in a way that brings A’s w back to

b. It would depend crucially on how much contributors to GE share after the

adjustment. If this amounts to b/2 or more to A’s w, even after reducing its

contribution by 0.1, the adjustment is permissible. Assuming still, of course, that GE

and NE together determine A’s w, and that they do so equally.

The following illustrates this:

(9) A’s w is 0.3. In the absence of GE, A’s w would be 0.1. In the absence of NE,

A’s w would be 0.2. GE is adjusted coercively in such a way that A’s w is

reduced by 0.05, leaving A at 0.25.

In that case, the adjustment of GE would, according to RR, permissibly cause A to

fall below the baseline. An even worse case (but still permissible) would be the

following:

(10) A’s w is 0.2. In the absence of GE, A’s w would be 0. GE is adjusted

coercively in such a way that it reduces A’s w by 0.05, leaving A at 0.15.

This would surely pull A even further below b, but contributors to GE could rest

content, knowing that they had done their share. This may strike many as

implausible. Is it really not a violation of our duties to act in such a way that our

24 This number will of course vary with the number of Es as well as with the relative determining power

that the various Es hold over A’s w.


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actions causally reduce the standard of living of some of those affected by our

actions to a level below what justice minimally requires?

It is not clear what Pogge would have to say about this, but his definition of

negative duties does not discriminate between harming relative to b (AR), and

harming relative to b and relative to the number of determinants of b (RR). If AR is

indeed implausible, it seems that we are stuck with RR. Of course, if RR is also

(equally) implausible, the situation seems grim, but I think that it is possible to

argue that AR is less plausible than RR. RR, even though it yields unfortunate

results, seems to stay in tune with the link between what we causally bring about

and our consequent duties, whereas AR does not. AR actually yields a distorted

picture of our negative duties, in the sense that it invokes our negative duties to

remedy someone else’s harm.

Note that the demands we lay on contributors to NE should be limited by how

much NE is able, under optimal conditions, to leave to A on average. If the

workings of an NE under the best of circumstances is unable to contribute b/2 to the

w of its As, it might be argued that GE affects A disproportionally, and that

contributors to GE thus have responsibilities to ensure that A’s w is at b nonetheless.

It seems, however, that most NEs would be able to contribute b/2 (half of what is

needed to ensure food, clothes, shelter) to its As and their members on average.

Objections

There might be a number of ways to respond to the criticisms presented in this

paper. Two seem especially salient: first, it could be objected that the Lockean

baseline is merely one of the baselines that Pogge invokes, and that objecting to one

of them does not damage his overall argument; second, it could be argued that the

above criticism unjustifiably assumes away the combined or multiplicative effects

of the global and domestic (and other) economic schemes.

In relation to the first of these objections, we should note that the Lockean

baseline is quite important in one respect: it is this baseline that would make

Pogge’s theory most widely acceptable. Showing that we harm the poor even on a

libertarian account would surely be an achievement. If not, the theory runs the risk

of being plausible mainly to those who already share the sentiment that the world’s

poor are being treated unjustly. Of course, Pogge’s arguments may still be valuable,

but it seems to be an important aim to him to make his theory widely acceptable.

The Lockean baseline serves an important strategic function in the theory, and

dismissing it should count as a real loss (cf. Patten 2005).

In relation to the second objection, we should note that assuming away possible

multiplicative negative effects of two or more economic schemes was done in order

to clarify the presentation. I do not deny that such effects may occur, but it is

nevertheless true that Pogge’s analysis of how economic schemes work together to

the detriment of the poor is controversial (cf. Patten 2005, pp. 20–21; Risse 2005).

Pogge illustrates the way the global economic order harms the poor with an

example in which two factories are

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releasing effluent into one river. Each factory’s chemicals, by themselves, are

harmless to the downstream population. But mixed together they are highly

toxic and kill many. Given symmetrical placement of the fully informed

factory owners, we must either hold both of them responsible or neither. It

would be evidently absurd to contend that neither is harming the downstream

population and that both may thus continue their releases. (Pogge 2005a, p.

63)

I agree that the factory owners should stop their pollution, but this does not show

that the global economic order on balance harms the poor in a similar way. I do not

have the space here to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the complex

workings of international and national orders; however, there is actual disagreement

about whether or not the global order, in combination with national orders, harms

the poor in ways comparable to the deadly mix of otherwise harmless chemicals.

Yet, Pogge’s theory relies on these uncertainties to a large extent. We only have

negative duties towards the poor insofar as we harm them. Whether or not we

actually do so, however, is contested. In light of this, it seems to me that we should

place a greater emphasis on positive duties.

An Alternative View of Positive Duties

Pogge’s account of international justice appears to be indeterminate. It is not clear

how to interpret its implications. This could of course be easily amended by arguing

in favour of one of the alternative accounts presented above, but this will not do.

Pogge’s purpose is to show why even libertarians should accept that we ought to

assist the global poor. The first account, however, would not pass muster with most

serious libertarians. It relies on a notion of negative duties that is implausible. The

second account is more congenial to libertarians, but it falls short of doing the work

intended for it because it implies that in many cases we only have duties to relieve

the poor of parts of their misery.

There are surely alternative takes on international distributive justice, and it is

quite likely that Pogge could accept theories that relied less heavily on negative

duties (Pogge 2005a, pp. 74–75). If it is true that, even if the rich part of the world

discharged its negative duties towards the poor, millions would still starve to death

or lead their lives in absolute misery, then we must either accept this unfortunate

fact, or else consider whether morality demands even positive assistance on the part

of the wealthy. Many (though few libertarians) would choose the latter strategy.

Keeping within the domain of duties, it could be argued, quite plausibly, that

many positive duties must be at least as strong as many negative duties, even though

the latter is in general stronger than the former (Satz 2005).

The question seems to be how we are to integrate the two seemingly conflicting

intuitions that we find in (among others) Peter Singer’s and Pogge’s works. Singer,

as mentioned above, argues that it is morally wrong not to prevent someone from

grave harm when we can do this at moderate cost to ourselves (Singer 1971, p. 231;

I refer here to the weak version of Singer’s argument). The illustration he famously


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presents concerns a child who is drowning in a shallow pond. A person passing by

could easily save the child merely at the risk of getting his clothes dirty and wet.

According to Singer, this example is analogous to world poverty, in the sense that

we, in the rich part of the world, are so endowed with resources that we could easily

save many—perhaps most—of the people that are threatened by lack of the

necessary means of subsistence.

There are different ways of responding to these omissions. One could simply say

that so long as we fulfil our negative duties, and our positive duties are weak, then

everything is, morally speaking, in order. The fact that some are still poor is

unfortunate, but remedying it is solely a voluntary choice. Alternatively, one could

argue that if some people (whether a few or millions) suffer from severe poverty

even after we have discharged our negative duties, then there is still something

morally wrong about the situation. In the following, I will present an argument of

this kind. The argument attempts to uncover the strengths of positive duties. I will

further attempt to ground this strength in an ideal of telic sufficiency.

Reassessing Positive Duties

In what way are negative duties stronger than positive ones? It is quite common to

agree that stealing is worse than failing to prevent theft, that killing is worse than

failing to save from killing, etc. However, the standard formulation that our negative

duties are stronger than our positive duties surely does not rule out the possibility

that some positive duties are stronger than some negative duties. It is one thing to

say that invoking harm is generally worse than failing to prevent (or avoid) harm; it

is quite another to say that all instances of invoking harm are worse than allinstances of failing to prevent harm (a similar line of argument has been presented

by Satz 2005).

Imagine that we categorize all types of harm. Even though each instance of harm

may in some details differ from all other instances, we are used to thinking and

acting as if it was possible to separate between such categories. One easy illustration

of this is the justice system. Punishment is typically meted out on the basis of

(among other things) what type of crime that has been committed. Allowing for

variations within each category, most of us tend to place different types of harm

along a scale of increasing wrongness. Few people accept a notion of right and

wrong that is absolute. There might perhaps be a distinguishable border between the

two realms, but among the things that are wrong, some are simply more wrong than

others. Many people think that white lies are wrong. Such lies may be well intended,

but they are still wrong. However, no one would deny that killing for fun is much

worse.

Thus, even if we accept a dyadic picture of positive and negative duties for any

type of harm (lying, stealing, cheating, hurting, maiming, killing, etc.), where

breach of the negative duty is worse than breach of the positive duty, we still do not

know what level of wrongness a particular breach is at, compared to anything else

than the counterpart breach for the type of harm in question. In other words, when

presented with a breach of a negative duty not to do X, we know only that this

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breach is worse than a breach of a positive duty to prevent X from occurring. We

have no way of knowing, in advance, whether a breach of a positive duty to prevent

X is more or less wrong than a breach of a positive duty to prevent Y. However,

more interestingly, we have no way of knowing whether a breach of a positive duty

to prevent X is more or less wrong than a breach of a negative duty not to do Y. Of

course, due to the structure of moral duties, we might suspect that the latter is more

wrong, but this need not always be the case.

To illustrate: stealing is worse than failing to prevent theft. Our duty not to steal

is thus stronger than our duty to prevent theft. It is reasonable to assume that the

negative duty not to steal is not only stronger than its positive counterpart, but that it

is also strong enough to be morally significant. I assume here that, at some point

along the line of wrongness, a duty becomes strong enough to be morallyauthoritative. I assume further that our duty not to steal is beyond this point. Thus,

most—if not all—violations of positive duties are wrong, but many of them are

located so close to the border of rightness that such violations are not considered

really bad.

We may say that stealing is a generic label for the act of taking possession of

another person’s rightful property against her will and without due cause. This act

can take many forms, and can be placed at various levels of wrongness: robbing

banks is typically judged more harshly than small-scale shoplifting; stealing the

Mona Lisa is worse than running off with a cheap reproduction in a dentist’s waiting

room; and so on. The pertinent point is that although there are differences, theft is

generally prohibited by negative duties, and although the strength of this negative

duty may vary with the specifics of various cases, the duty in question is still, in

general, strong—at least strong enough to be morally authoritative. This means that

even relatively minor instances of shoplifting are prohibited by a negative moral

duty. The corresponding duty to prevent other people’s shoplifting is, of course,

weaker. This does not rule out, however, the possibility that other positive duties are

as strong as the negative duty not to shoplift.

In my view, the duty to rescue a drowning child from a pond is strong enough to

be morally authoritative. This view is not affected by the fact that the duty is a

positive one. I think that my positive duty to rescue the child is at least as strong as

my negative duty not to steal groceries. In fact, I think the former duty is

substantially stronger than the latter, but it seems that equivalence will be sufficient

to bolster the case. Because the upshot is that the duty to save persons in danger,

even if we ourselves have not contributed to their misery, is at least as strong as at

least one negative duty. If this negative duty—the duty not to steal (including

relatively minor theft)—is strong enough to be morally authoritative, and the

positive duty to save lives with only moderate cost to ourselves is at least as strong,

then, by implication, the latter duty is morally authoritative as well.

This seems to square with our moral intuitions. We believe (a) that negative

duties are stronger than positive duties, and (b) that our positive duty to save lives is

strong enough for us to be bound by it, in spite of the fact that it is not a negative

duty.

I take it that this rendering of positive duties implies a plausible amendment to

Pogge’s theory of negative duties: first, it serves to underline that we have strong


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duties to alleviate suffering even if we have not contributed to its occurrence; and

second, it does so without denying that our duties not to harm may be even stronger;

but since both duties are strong enough to be morally authoritative, both provide us

with moral reasons to help the world’s poor.

Telic Sufficiency

In this subsection I want to consider the idea that the strength of positive duties may

be connected with a principle of telic sufficiency. The ideal of sufficiency has been

developed in different ways (Anderson 1999; Crisp 2003; Frankfurt 1987; see also

Tungodden 2003). On my view, sufficiency is a telic ideal. It assesses distributions

in terms of total weighted negative discrepancies from the sufficiency threshold. In

other words, telic sufficiency holds that it is bad if some individuals are

insufficiently well off, worse the more of these individuals there are, and worse

the further individuals are from the sufficiency threshold. Outcomes are morally

evaluated only in relation to the badness of shortfalls. Telic sufficiency does not

distinguish between distributions in which everyone is sufficiently well off (in

contrast, for instance, to utilitarianism and prioritarianism). It is also readily

distinguishable from egalitarianism because it does not, obviously, demand equal

distribution.

Sufficiency is a modest principle, in the sense that it is indifferent between all

distributions in which all individuals are sufficiently well off. Even though this may

strike defenders of other telic theories as a flaw, in my view it is a virtue, because it

leaves adequate room for deontic morality. In fact, it is a natural corollary to deontic

morality. It gives sense to the idea that we have moral obligations to aid those that

are insufficiently well off, even when we are not responsible for this fact. Many

people share this view, but it is not always explicated as a telic part of morality; and

if it is, it is not always combined with deontic restrictions.25 It is further reasonable

to assume that in many ways it corresponds to positive duties. It also corresponds to

the idea that positive duties are weaker than negative ones, and that some positive

duties are nevertheless morally authoritative.

This correspondence can be explained in the following manner. Negative duties

are duties not to harm. This generally holds at any level of well-being for the

harmed person. One is not allowed to hit a person even if he enjoys a high welfare

level. The opposite is not true of positive duties. We are not obligated to increase the

welfare level of someone whose welfare level is already high. Thus, we have strict

duties not to steal minor goods from superstores, but no duty to share our lottery

prize with our sufficiently well-off neighbour; even though owners of superstores

are often very well off, while our neighbour is (I assume) not; and even though our

minor theft is close to imperceptible to the store-owner, while our potential benefit

to our neighbour would be huge. We should, however, benefit (with or without

25 That said, I claim no originality in explicating this idea. I think, however, that this view merits further

specification.

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lottery prizes) those who are insufficiently well off, in particular those who are the

furthest from the threshold. The world’s poor are prime examples.

Telic sufficiency is also appealing in a further way. It places a limit on our duty to

benefit others (even though in our actual world, with millions and millions living in

absolute poverty, it is still demanding). A similar limit is not inherent in

utilitarianism, prioritarianism or egalitarianism. Sufficiency, then, is plausible to

those who think that we should benefit the poor, but who do not think that morality

demands that we always prioritize the worse-off, or that all outcomes that are

unequal are unjust, or that welfare should be maximized at all times. In short,

sufficiency, in combination with standard deontic morality, is plausible to those who

hold the following two views: (a) It is wrong to harm others; and (b) it is bad if

someone is not sufficiently well off.26

Concluding Remarks

In this paper I have tried to point to some of the complications involved in Pogge’s

notion of harm. My conclusion is that relying solely on our negative duties not to

harm the poor will either be counterintuitive, or insufficient to eradicate world

poverty. In light of this, it seems reasonable to search for other ways of justifying

our duties to help people in severe need.27 One such way would be to examine the

strength of our positive duties (see Satz 2005; Øverland 2005). I have tried to

provide such an account, and further to ground it in an ideal of telic sufficientar-

ianism. This strategy serves to fill out an important gap in Pogge’s account. Pogge’s

main aim is to show that we harm the poor. This contribution is important because

negative duties are commonly seen to be stronger than positive ones. The problem is

that this focus is irrelevant to the millions of poor individuals who cannot be said to

have been harmed by the global economic order. As Pogge points out, however,

conceiving our duties towards the poor as positive undermines the normative

strength that we often think is associated with negative duties.

In order to solve this problem, I have argued that our positive duties can indeed

be stronger than is sometimes assumed. I have further tried to show that this idea

can be defended without weakening the case for negative duties. In this way, a

suitable middle ground is cleared between Pogge’s emphasis on negative duties, and

Singer’s and others’ emphasis on positive duties.

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26 For a fuller account of the principle of telic sufficiency, see my ‘Defending the Principle of

Sufficiency’, work in progress.27 At least to the extent that we feel morally disturbed by world poverty, as I believe relatively many do.


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Documents

Duties and Responsibilities Towards the Poor