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Drug trafficking, violence, corruption and democracy in
Mexico.
Dr. Carlos [email protected]
November, 2009.
Introduction.
In Mexico, drug trafficking is an old issue, however, the high levels ofviolence related to organized crime are the edgier consequence of a deeperproblem, the wide erosion of the state’s institutions.
The actual problem of Mexico is impunity, a politically based issue. In theold regime, the mechanisms of control over organized crime werepreponderantly based on corrupt-extortive practices.
Alternation in power modified the political conditions that warranted thefunctioning of such practices but, instead of collapsing the whole corruptstructure, it just fragmented it.
Any succeeding strategy to coup with organized and crime and violence in Mexico needs not only to implement immediate security measures, but an institutional rebuilding compatible with democracy.
The control of organized crime in the post-revolutionary regime.
Between 1929 and 1946, Mexico consolidated a civil but authoritarian andcentralized political regime that mitigate several structural weakness ofMexican State.
The regime was based on two central figures: the Presidency, who controlledthe federal bureaucracy and nominee governors and congressmen, and thestate party, that controlled corporately the political and social organization.
The regime fostered high levels of corruption because its lack oftransparency and accountability to the citizens, whose vote was not theactual way to achieve power.
Its capacity to control all the relevant political and social actors includedorganized crime, that was fostered by several politicians and high rankingsofficers within security institutions, as a clandestine way for profiting.
The control of organized crime in the post-revolutionary regime.
Organized crime was a dependent subject to political power, with theintermediation of security institutions. The criminal organizations that coulddevelop were those that had the support of members of the state.
The increasing international demand of drugs supposed an unprecedentedopportunity to profit and the already deeply corrupted Mexican securityinstitutions took the protection of drug traffickers to a higher stage.
In the interaction between drug traffickers and public officers, the last onesextortioned-protected the former. This condition depended on thefunctioning of the authoritarian and centralized regime.
Federal security institutions were in charge of combating drug trafficking,and were prevailed over their local counterparts, because of the politicalcorrelation of power between the center and the states.
The control of organized crime in the transition-alternation period.
In the 1994-2000 period, the long liberalizing process finally led to theadoption of effective democratic electoral process in the federal arena.
However, besides electoral reforms, most institutions dragged theirbackground of authoritarianism, lack of transparency and in several cases,corruption. This was particularly true in the security institutions.
Between 1994-2000, in the fight against organized crime, diverse cases ofhigh political corruption related to drugs were uncovered and several ofthem were prosecuted.
In 2000, the alternation in the Presidency raised high expectancies, but evenif different relevant capos were arrested, the fight against the high politicalcorruption that fostered the illicit business stopped suddenly.
The control of organized crime in the transition-alternation period.
Alternation in the Presidency fractured the central executive’s control overthe political structure, the base of their capacity to control-extort thecriminals, and altered the business logistic.
The corruptive structure that protected the traffic did not crumble, but justfragmented, confronting even diverse public officers linked to differentcriminal clients.
Already gigantic criminal organizations suddenly faced a narrowed State’scapacity of control, because of their own divisions.
The criminals are not dependent subjects to politicians or security officersanymore. Often, they are the new patrons of the clientelar relation.
The control of organized crime in the transition-alternation period.
The absence of hegemonies in the political world has also fostered a similarcondition in the criminal arena, and the effect has been the irruption of anunprecedented violence related to drug trafficking.
This violence, is increasingly eroding the governability conditions of severalregions of the country and exerting extreme strain over their populations.
Although its wide political legitimacy, Fox’s administration was reluctant toconfront the roots of such violence and in the middle of 2005 opted todeploy federal police effectives in some or the most affected states.
The current administration’s political limitations determine theshortcomings of its strategy to coup with violence and crime.
The premises of the official discourse about violence and crime in México.
The fight isnew
•Precedent governments did not do anything against the problem and were linked to the crime.
• In the past there were not violence because of corruption.
• It would have been worst not acting at all.
Violence ismagnified
•The media magnify violence.
•Civilian people is not affected by violence.
•Criminals are killing each other.
•Violence is actually lesser than 15 years ago.
•Only three states are affected by violence.
The strategy issucceeding
•Drug traffickers are cornered and therefore they kill each other.
•The strategy is recovering territorial control.
•The government’s actions are preventing drugs to reach youth.
Governance isnot at risk
• State institutions are solid.
•There is not lost of territorial or functional State’s control.
•There are not significative human rights violations.
•High federal functionaries are free of corruption.
The facts contradict the official discourse.
The fight is old
•The attempts to build an integral policy against organized crime, that included the combat to highpolitical corruption and seizing patrimonial profits unexplainably stopped ten years ago.
•Nobody questions the need to act, but is the current policy leading to somewhere?
Violence isreal
•The media are not inventing an inexistent violence. In 2008, national homicide rate increased and several local homicide rates did it dramatically.
•The instrumentalization of paramilitarized organized ‘s violence crime is not directly comparable with common homicides.
The strategy isfailed
• In 2006, Mexico contributed only with 3% of the global cocaine seizures. 90% of the cocaine thatenters the U.S does it through Mexico.
•Violence does not seem to be permanently affected by the massive deployment of security forces.
•There is not social policy as preventive measures against organized crime.
Governance isat risk
• Several State institutions show clear signs of capture by criminal interests. By no ways it could bestated that corruption dissapeared with this administration.
•Different prestigious organizations of Mexico and the world have probed grave violations to humanrights in the fight against drug trafficking.
•All the relevant political parties have shown clear signs of organized crime’s infiltration.
Homicides related to organized crime (executions) in México.Entidad 2006 2007 2008 2009 (Aug. 28) 2009 (Oct- 16)
Aguascalientes 2 27 38 20 25
Baja California 163 154 617 178 208
Baja California Sur 1 1 0 1 1
Campeche 3 2 3 2 2
Coahuila 17 29 53 119 132
Colima 2 0 5 10 10
Chiapas 14 12 30 9 21
Chihuahua 130 147 1652 1268 1616
D.F. 137 145 138 116 144
Durango 64 124 272 430 512
Estado de México 31 111 360 225 271
Guanajuato 25 40 61 113 133
Guerrero 186 253 294 407 524
Hidalgo 16 37 37 27 29
Jalisco 45 92 148 123 154
Michoacán 543 238 233 271 298
Morelos 10 17 28 23 51
Nayarit 1 2 5 20 22
Nuevo León 50 107 79 47 66
Oaxaca 17 33 49 6 6
Puebla 4 2 15 18 20
Querétaro 0 4 7 5 6
Quintana Roo 9 34 18 21 26
San Luis Potosí 1 13 40 5 7
Sinaloa 350 346 686 393 536
Sonora 61 125 137 61 79
Tabasco 19 24 20 41 49
Tamaulipas 181 88 110 29 43
Tlaxcala 0 1 1 2 3
Veracruz 25 48 30 49 54
Yucatán 0 1 17 0 0
Zacatecas 12 13 24 20 23
Total 2119 2270 5207 4059 5071
Total executions in the Calderón’s transcurred period: 12,548. Source: Reforma http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/graficoanimado/nacional/ejecutometro_2009/
Comparison between total homicides and executions in 2007.State Total homicides in 2007 (a) Deaths in legal or war operations
2007 (b)
Executions in 2007 (c)
Aguascalientes 44 0 27
Baja California 369 0 154
Baja California Sur 35 0 1
Campeche 50 0 2
Coahuila 107 0 29
Colima 43 0 0
Chiapas 101 0 12
Chihuahua 518 9 147
D.F. 848 0 145
Durango 178 4 124
Estado de México 1244 0 111
Guanajuato 219 0 40
Guerrero 764 0 253
Hidalgo 74 0 37
Jalisco 450 0 92
Michoacán 556 0 238
Morelos 126 0 17
Nayarit 108 0 2
Nuevo León 279 0 107
Oaxaca 563 0 33
Puebla 274 18 2
Querétaro 56 1 4
Quintana Roo 121 2 34
San Luis Potosí 142 0 13
Sinaloa 397 0 346
Sonora 321 0 125
Tabasco 146 0 24
Tamaulipas 193 0 88
Tlaxcala 36 0 1
Veracruz 380 2 48
Yucatán 49 3 1
Zacatecas 73 8 13
Total 8864* 47 2270* Not include 4 homicides reported as committed abroad. Source: (a) (b) INEGI, Mortality Statistics; (c) Reforma.
States’ homicides rates above the national average.
State 2007 2008
Sinaloa 28 43.7
Chihuahua 18.5 42.1
Guerrero 25.4 30.2
Durango 16.3 27.8
Baja California 17.1 27.7
Oaxaca 26.7 20.6
Sonora 12.5 15.8
Nayarit 11.2 15.2
Quintana Roo 14.4 15.2
Michoacán 13.2 14.2
National homicide rates (per 100,000 habitants).
2007 2008
10.0 12.0
Source: Source. ICESI. “Sixth National Survey on Insecurity. Principal results.” August, 2009. http://www.icesi.org.mx/documentos/encuestas/encuestasNacionales/ENSI-6.pdf
2008 homicides related to organized crime in México.
Executions 2008More than 500
100-500
51-99
26-50
1-25
No executions
Where should be placed the threshold that separates what could be considered violence as usual –if there is any that could be harmless– from instability and fast erosion of governance?
Total executions in the Calderón’stranscurred period: 12,548 (October16, 2009). Source: Reforma.
What should be considered a risky scenario in a specific state, 50 organized crime killings a year? Or the alarm should be turn on when they surpass 100, 500 or 1,000?
Special considerations.
The Mexican increased level of violence can not only be measured inhomicide rates; the violence has also become qualitatively more gruesome.
Beheadings, mutilated bodies, messages of threat, and the use offragmentation grenades even against unarmed civilian people are now apart of the violent environment of several regions.
Such acts suppose an instrumentation of violence that differentiates themfrom less systematic actions of violence, and makes them more concerning.
Some of the criminal groups have transited to paramilitary structures,adopting a territorial expanding pattern that resembles those used bysubversion in other latitudes.
A general assessment of the Mexican State’s strength to fight organizedcrime.
Army 198,697
Navy 50,548
AFI 5,906PFP 24,478
Army desertions
Rank Number of deserters
Colonels 1
Lieutenant Colonels 9
Majors 38
First Captains. 50
Second Captains. 49
Lieutenants 459
Sub Lieutenants 782
First Sergeants 354
Second Sergeants 2,239
Corporals 9,919
Soldiers 109,318
Total 123,218
Military Personnel Desertion during 2001-2006.
Source: SEDENA’s disclosure of information inresponse to public request number 1, ofMarch 13, 2007. In 2006, the total of positionsaccounted for budgeting was 177,198, whichmay reflect the Army’s actual personnel.
Military personnel desertion in the current administration (July 31,2009): 31,202.
Source: Sedena. Answered requests ofinformation, August 3, 2009.http://www.sedena.gob.mx/leytrans/petic/2009/agosto.pdf
Average military personnel deployed in the operations against drugtrafficking every month: 45,000.
Source: Sedena. First inform of executionofNational Development Plan.http://pnd.presidencia.gob.mx/pdf/PrimerInformeEjecucion/1_4.pdf
Federal police recient evolution.
Elements 2006 2007 2008
AFI (PGR) 8127 7992 5906
PFP (SSP) 12907 21761 24478
Facundo Rosas Rosas
Rodrigo Esparza
Cristerna
Víctor Gerardo
Garay Cadena
Edgar Millán
Valenzuela
ArdelioVargas Fosado
Security budget, 2009.
Army, $43,623,321,860
Mexican pesos
• 16.8% to Materials and Supplies and Physical Infrastructure.
• 78.3% to salaries.
Navy,
$16,059,281,110
Mexican pesos
• 23.6% to Materials and Supplies and Physical Infrastructure.
• 70.5% to salaries.
Security budget, 2009.
PGR
$12,309,857,565
Mexican Pesos
$943,284,104
U.S. Dollars
• 77.6% to salaries
SSP
$32,916,838,380
Mexican Pesos
$2,522,363,094
U.S. Dollars
• 49% to salaries
The total budgetary amount of these two dependencies is equivalent to $3,465,647,198 U.S. Dollars.
Concerning issues.
In 2007, the Army warned the Congress that the erosion of Mexican militarypower was so notorious that in the following five years could becomeirreversible.
Military sources express that, in current conditions, they may not able tosuccessfully confront a simultaneous challenge, if social turmoil and politicalunrest arises.
Federal police corporations have been under a tortuous process oftransformation that runs from their uncompleted unification, decreed in thebeginning of the administration, to the constant change of their chiefs.
In the current administration, security institutions, especially SSP and PGRhave become reluctant to transparency and accountability, in contradictionto basic premises of democracy.
Concerning issues.
72% of Mexican people are afraid of becoming victims of kidnapping(México Unido Contra la Delincuencia, June, 2009).
From January of 2007 to June of 2009, there were 591 cases of kidnapping,which lead to the arrest of 374 kidnappers; only 41 were processed and justone was sentenced (México Unido Contra la Delincuencia, June, 2009).
In August, 2009, the Army took control of the 49 custom offices of thecountry. Around 1,100 officers were fired: most of the investigations ondrug trafficking showed their direct involvement.
None of the fired functionaries are facing a penal process and thefunctionaries of superior level have not even been under a widerinvestigation.
Concerning issues.
According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, in 2007, between 545and 707 metric tons of cocaine produced in South America were transportedto the U.S. Around 90 percent of it was transported through México.
In such time, México contributed with the 7% of the world cocaine’ seizures(48 tons), quite far from the 147.8 tons seized by the U.S. in the same year,and even below Panama, that seized 60 tons.
Such amount was mostly the result of only two actions: the seizure of 23tons of cocaine in Colima, plus 12 tons seized in, Tamaulipas, bothsupported by intelligence information provided by the U.S.
In 2006, Mexico contributed with the 3 per cent of world seizures, with 21.3tons of cocaine –even below Spain (49.6 tons) and Portugal (34.4 tons). In2008, the amount reduced again to 19 tons. (World Drugs Reports 08-09).
Concerning issues.
According to CIDAC, in 2008 there were 71,000 processes opened by drug’spossession, but only 14% of them were considered by PGR as possibledistributors.
This practice has raised the number of people incarcerated in federalpreventive prison and those of them that are not yet sentenced increasedfrom 25% to 38% over pressuring the penitentiary system.
The penitentiary system is overpopulated. In the middle of 2008, there were167,281 available places for inmates in the whole country; inmatepopulation reached 218,030.
Correctional facilities show serious irregularities: from Osiel CárdenasGuillén rule over the Gulf’s Cartel, while imprisoned at a high securitypenitenciary, to the rescue of more than 50 Los Zetas allies, from a stateprison, without firing a single bullet.
Conclusions.
Whatever the name we could chose to call the phenomenon, it is clear thatMexican state is increasingly loosing the factual control of several portionsof its territory.
For such condition, it does not matter if there are formal authority there,what matters is that it has not been able to confirm itself as the only forceable to determine the norms of public order and to monopolize violence.
It is compulsory to crumble high political and police corruption that protectsorganized crime and the institutional protections inherited from theauthoritarian regime that spawn impunity.
Because of the lack of political willingness to take more effective measuresto combat organized crime, the armed forces' action will necessarily beinsufficient to solve the problem.
Conclusions.
If additional adverse political an economical conditions are adjoined, thesituation could become more complex as to criminal violence could besummed social and political turmoil.
Sooner or later, Mexico will have to implement harsher measures to coupwith violent criminal organizations. The sooner and faster they areimplemented, the healthier that the social tissue could be preserved.
No endurable conditions of stability could be reached without furtherdemocratic changes within Mexican institutions, to guarantee a functionalpolitical agreement and a more prosperous horizon for Mexican population.
The core question is if Mexican current authorities and institutions areactually willing and capable of confronting such a formidable challenge. Thefacts exposed lead not to be optimistic.
