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[DRAFT PAPER]
The context of participation: challenges and opportunities for civil society in participatory institutions in Brazil
*Valesca Lima Holanda
This study provides a discussion about a type of democratic institution in Brazil, the so-called
"management councils". Participatory institutions, such as rights councils and participatory
budget, are said to enhance popular participation in politics, promote citizen’s quality of
participation and improve democratic levels. Over the past 20 years, civil society has been i
integration in the process of formulation of public policies. From data provided by the
Institute Pólis about popular participation, this paper addresses two main questions: how civil
society was included in those participatory institutions and the challenges and opportunities
posed to social movements after gaining access to those spaces. This paper will discuss the
advances and limitations faced by civil society, focusing especially on challenges posed
ahead to deepening democracy in Brazil.
3.1 Brazil: the country of contradictions
‘’A rich country is a country without poverty’’ is the Dilma Rousseff government’s motto.
Brazil has more than 200 million people1. 21% of its population live below the poverty line2
(with less than 1.25 US$ per day3) despite being the 6th economy in the world4.
Brazilian politicians celebrated in October 2013 ten years of the conditional cash transfer
(CCT) program Bolsa Família. This program has helped lift approximately 11.1 million
families (around 46 million people) out of poverty between 2003 and 2009 by directly
transferring to the head of the families a monthly allowance between $16 and $150. This is a
* Valesca Lima Holanda is a PhD candidate at University College Dublin (UCD) and lectures on Local Government and Latin America Politics. 1 IBGE (2013). Brazil has an estimated population of 201 032 714 inhabitants, according to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The city of São Paulo is the one that has the largest population of the country: 11.8 million. 2UN data (2009). Population below national poverty line. Available at [http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=MDG&f=seriesRowID%3A581#f_4] 3 World bank poverty line definition. 4 The guardian - March 2012 - Brazil's economy overtakes UK to become world's sixth largest
2
means-tested program that reaches a major portion of the country’s low-income groups (1/4 of
the country’s population). Although internationally recognised as one of the biggest and most
successful cash transfer programs in the world5, this social program is closely related with the
current electoral gains obtained by the former president Lula and the current president Dilma
Rousseff. Their electoral campaigns are centred on the beneficiaries of this cash transfer
program and other Bolsa Família initiatives (Power&Zucco 2013).
Another debate regarding this program is related to its narrow focus on extreme poverty,
which inserts the program in the international trend of shifting from universal to target social
policies. According to Mkandawire (2005), target social policies are less efficient, since most
of the citizens have no access to these social benefits. Another fold of this debate is the
consequence of social policies targeting extreme poverty has on citizenship (Dagnino 2005,
Mkandawire 2005, Townsend 2002). The deepening of the neoliberal project and the
consequent reduction of the role of the state, make social policies formulated as emergencial
efforts projected towards very specific sectors of society, whose conditions for existence are
jeopardised. The target public of these social policies are not interpreted as citizens entitled to
rights, but as ‘needy’ human beings to be the targets of public or private charity (Dagnino
2005,2007).
Brazil – the letter B of the BRICS countries - is a place of deep inequalities. Poverty,
violence and corruption have affected the way regular citizens understand and participate in
politics. Brazilian citizens are disappointed and discredited with the model of politics
conducted nowadays. Some authors (Houtzager and Lavalle 2009 2010, Menegullo and
Moises 2013) point to a crisis of trust in the political process. The citizens' distrust on
democratic institutions was recently exposed in several street demonstrations all over the
country during the FIFA Confederations Cup in July 2013.
Civil society claims for political participation in contemporary Brazil seek to destabilize a
long-standing power structured system that excludes the poor. Power relations are based on
authoritarism and clientelism, features that have emerged alongside with classic institutions
of representative democracy. In the next section it will be discussed the process of the return
to democracy and the participation of different social actors in this process.
5 On Oct 15th 2013 Brazil won the Award for Outstanding Achievement in Social Security” from the
International Social Security Association, for the pioneering Bolsa Família poverty-reduction programme.
3
2.1.1 The Brazilian process of democratisation
The Brazilian dictatorship lasted for 21 years (1964-1985). It was characterized as a very
repressive and violent regime. Thousands of reports of torture and kidnapping were made and
media organisations were strongly repressed. The official numbers shows there are no more
than 1000 people killed by the repressive regime – but many cases were labelled as suicide or
disappearance. Also, a number of indigenous populations were killed in conflicts in Amazon
Forest over land sites in their indigenous reservations. If compared to other authoritarian
regimes in Latin America, such as Argentina (30.000 people killed) and Chile (40.000 people
killed), Brazil would not be considered as country with heavy authoritarian regime, but the
consequences of the centralization of power of the regime over citizenship and participatory
rights left profound marks on the modus-operand of social policies and electoral arena.
The 70’s and 80’s saw a period of great expansion of social policies, targeting mainly the
popular sectors, as a political strategy to bring attention away from the constant attacks to
political and civil liberties. Most of the social benefits were directed towards the ‘‘good
citizens’’, meaning those who had a job and did not get involved in political associations.
According to Dagnino (2005) it was a type of restricted or regulated citizenship, which is
always supervised by the state. The clientelistic exchanges also narrowed the political sphere,
since it interfered with the way citizens see themselves as rights holders, making the
development of an autonomous base for self-mobilisation against the autocratic regime very
difficult.
According to Lamounier (1999), it is observed that in those ten last years of the dictatorial
regime three characteristics already suggested the path that the autocratic government was
taking: 1. Elements of self-restrain from the side of the military government; 2. Electoral
practices and rules maintained in an acceptable level of credibility, and 3. An opposition not
willing to violently confront the regime and playing by the rules of the electoral regime6. The
victory of the opposition in 1974 elections made clear the decompression towards an opening
process. In general, the opposition made a good evaluation of the situation and it was able to
explore the internal failures of the regime itself. “Its formidable success in the 1974 elections helped it
(the opposition) to organized themselves under the label of MDB – Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
6 The first 10 years were the most repressive period of the Brazilian dictatorship. The Brazilian military
government commanded Brazil from March 31, 1964 to March 15, 1985. The Institutional Act No. 5, or AI-5, was released in 1968 is known to be the cruelest of Institutional Acts enacted by the military regime, signed by President Arthur Costa e Silva. The AI-5 severely restricted political rights, given to the legal prerogatives that allowed the expansion of the military-police repression.
4
(Brazilian Democratic Movement) establishing bridges among a variety of social movements and associations
then increasing (re)politicization.” (Lamounier 1999, 133). The gradual decrease of coercion combined
with the decompression of the repressive apparatus leaded to the progressive collapse of the
authoritarian legitimacy.
The Brazilian “opening’’7 process under the term of the military president Ernesto Geisel
(1974 to 1979) marked an important moment in the Brazilian (re)democratization process.
That “opening” process distinguishes itself for being operationalized by elections. The
process of return to democracy was slow. The initial years were characterized by a
‘‘restricted’’ representative democracy and fragile linkages between political and civil
societies (Porto 2013). Brazil’s transition to democracy was marked by the preponderance of
the same old elites and patron-client ties and also by a significant continuum in relation to the
former autocratic regime. Thus, the emphasis is not on new political groups. Elites did not
lose power; they just changed sides (Alves 1988, Hagopian 1996). Slowly, the authoritarian
regime was losing legitimisation and the opposition was growing firmly. The last move to the
traditional elites was to move to the side who was winning. Some well-known representatives
of the government, such as the future new president Tancredo Neves, were members of one
of the two authorised parties of the dictatorial regime, the MDB (today PMDB), a centre-right
party. The other party was ARENA - Aliança Renovadora Nacional (National Renewal
Alliance).
Regardless of the end of the dictatorial regime in 1985 there was no open and direct election
immediately. The period just after dictatorship is called ‘‘new republic’’ and was established
by indirect elections. The civil rule is back, at least in legal terms, with the election of
Tancredo Neves. However, he had no opportunity to exercise his term as president: he died a
few days after his election after surgery complications. His death opened space to the
unexpected rise of Jose Sarney, his vice president. Once in office, Sarney started a new
economic plan (including a new currency named Cruzado) in order to confront the massive
problems that came from the dictatorial regime: debt, inflation, recession, unemployment,
poverty – there were also many other challenges to the young Brazilian democracy. He also
legalised communist parties and lifted authoritarian acts, such as the AI-5. In Sarney’s term
as president, the peak of this democratisation process was the call for a constituent assembly
7 “Opening” is the closest translation to the Portuguese word “abertura”, that in this particular context means the
start of a new idea or a process.
5
in 1985 to elaborate a new constitution. The new constitution conceded extra power to
political organisations but kept the social advances in a controlled way.
Especially after the promulgation of the new Constitution of 1988 the process of
democratisation advanced. The new constitution together with the impeachment of the first
directly elected president Collor de Mello helped to enforce the representative system and
strengthened the force of the demands from popular groups (Porto 2013). Despite its various
and complex flaws, the quality of the Brazilian democracy improved by permitting more
citizens to participate in the policy-making process and by providing improvements in
accountability laws and institutional renovation, which helped to create a more stable and
participatory regime. Among those innovations I can cite the new relationship between state
and society that contributed to the creation of institutions more sensitive to demands coming
from popular sectors. The state support for projects of participatory budgeting, local councils
and City Master Plans were highly relevant to the empowerment of social mobilised groups
(Porto 2013, Avritzer 2010).
Although positive, this new relationship between state and civil society was contentious and
involved different political actors. Behind the return to democracy, there was a coalition that
included students, teachers, professors, politicians, industrial workers, etc, that headway
towards the creation of new civil society organisations and new urban movements (Baiocchi
2005). Grassroots movements started to project themselves in national and local levels,
demanding to be heard and more participation and autonomy, seeking to overturn the
centralisation of power in the public administration. After many rounds of negotiations
involving social movements, politicians in office, workers and members of the traditional
elites, and endless sessions in the constituent assembly, the final version of the Constitution
was published on October 5, 1988.8
The new constitution granted more autonomy to local level government institutions, as those
institutions were given more political and financial autonomy. Municipalities became the
main providers of social services, such as housing, education, health etc. The Constitution of
1988 included mechanisms of direct and participatory democracy, being the most influent
among those the creation and implementation of management councils for public policies.
8 The 1988 Brazilian Constitution has over 250 articles and till 2012 have been amended 70.
6
The membership in these councils is shared equally among member of the civil society and
civil servants.9
The introduction of those new participatory mechanisms gave a boost to social organisations
locally. Regular citizens were invited to come close to social policies and take part in the
decision-making process, by proposing and approving public policies and budgets. That was
one of the main demands of social groups that have been requesting more voice and
participation in local governments. The inclusion of the agenda of social movements in the
decision-making process changed the relationship between state and civil society, once the
social demands were recognised by the state. From this new constitution on, citizens’
demands need to be included in councils’ debates, voted and approved (or not) by the
members of the councils.
Another important step towards democratisation was the implementation of the participatory
budget. This experience started in 1988 in the city of Porto Alegre in the southwest of the
country and still been applied today. This is considered, for some authors a very successful
experience of participatory democracy in country dominated by nepotism and inequality in
many ways (Santos 1998, Baiocchi 2005, Avritzer 2009, Wampler 2010).
Once democracy is considered to be well established in the country, there is no more
controversy that Brazil is consolidated democracy (Lamonier 2006, Levine and Molina
2011). As in most countries in Latin America, democracy in Brazil was reborn in the middle
of an economic crisis and resisted serious setbacks. The centre of the debate is not, anymore,
if the country has reached the transitional phase of democracy to a consolidated one. The
scholarship is more focused in the quality of this democracy. The current analysis seeks to
comprehend, in theory and practice, if citizens have access to full social rights, for example
(Levine and Molina 2011).
2.1 - Experiences that informs participation level nowadays: the creation of spaces for participation
9 Some councils, such as the Urban National Council, includes members of the private sector, for example, representants of the building sectors and research agencies. In this case a bylaw will define the number of members for each group involved in the council.
7
This section analyses the creation of the spaces for participation and democratic structures for
participation of civil society during the governments of President Lula.
After nearly 30 years of the return to democracy, one can observe many experiences of
participation in the Brazilian government. The establishment of Community Councils and
People's Councils in the 80s, the Participatory Budget and Management Councils in the 90s,
and the Councils and National Conferences of the Lula government, among other attempts,
demonstrate the democratic vitality and the active role civil society is playing. Several studies
have been produced on the formation and operation of these public spaces; however, there is
little discussion about how it works, who participated on it and how those spaces were
created.
When Sader (1988) published his study about the “new social actors“ from 70’s and 80’s, he
listed three pillars for the social agitation: the Catholic Church, the new unions and left-wing
groups. The role the Catholic Church plays in support anti-militarist social movements is
connected with the “Liberation theology“. It consisted in list of recommendations created at
the II Vatican Council, in the 2nd General Episcopal Conference of South America in 1968,
Medellín (Boff 1986). According to Boff, it was a recommendation based on the idea that the
church needed to change the parish attendees from simple passive people to active
participants in society acting against social injustices. After the release of a document called
“The Medellín resolutions’’ in 1984, Latin-American bishops interpreted it as a invitation to
the church to take part in the transformation taking place in South America. In practice, it
meant to organise the population to claim better life conditions and more government
compromise with social causes. Small groups of debate, reflection and prayers were created;
those groups were called Basic Ecclesial Communities (Comunidades Eclesiais de Base –
CEB).
Those groups proved to be very effective and spread important values for participatory
struggles, social organization in small groups, mostly the poor, and a resistance to
authoritarian institutions. Their conduct code promoted organization's social base: exercised
reflection on the conditions of life, evidenced basic notions of social and human rights, they
discussed collective identities, created solidarity between people and social movements and
encouraged the knowledge acquisition and democratizing practices At some point those
groups were present in more than 80.000 communities and mobilised nearly 2 million people.
(Boff 1986; Carvalho 1998).
8
This impulsion for mobilisation created the base for a direct participation and implanted the
idea of a power coming from the bases, a power coming from the population. The
communities organised by the Catholic Church and leaded by priests and bishops very
connected to the marginalised classes created for the fist time the idea of the organisation
from grassroots. The same members of CEB and its leaders established important
connections with the "new unionism" and leftist groups, influencing and fortifying each other
(PÓLIS 2014).
Simultaneously, in the city of São Paulo, the “new unionism“ started to reconfigure the
capital-work relations. New unionism meant the workers entrance in the political sphere,
especially in the in metallurgical and chemical industries in the south of Brazil. Some authors
called it “authentic unionism“ to differentiate it from previous union practices, defined by
patronizing and clientelism. The Workers Central Union (Central Única dos Trabalhadores
(CUT), created in 1983, influenced and still influence the performance of other unions around
the country. The important change they implemented was to modify the institutions from the
inside, especially on hierarchies inside the existent unions (PÓLIS 2014). Instead of surging
as parallel power, it was organised around internal core values and a horizontal hierarchies.
Lula da Silva assumed the presidency of the union in 1972.
The third social actor mentioned by Sader (1988), along with the Catholic Church and the
trade unions were left-wing groups. Those groups were dispersed due the intense repression
promoted by the military government. Articulating in the shadows and many times supported
by left-wing Catholic priests, those groups tried to reconnect again with masses in an attempt
to promote new ideas and defeat the dictatorship. Inspired by Gramsci and Paulo Freire, daily
social practices were comprehended as important moments to reflections and formulation of
political strategies. By that time, a few NGOs were created with the mission to promote
education and share the knowledge produced by social movements and other civil society
organisations. Paulo Freire and his “pedagogy of the oppressed“ were widely used.
According to Souza (2011) apud Paoli (1995), the organization of the popular sectors,
workers in special, led to the rise of the new unionism and the defence of workers' rights, the
creation of advocacy and neighbourhood associations organizations, the creation of Worker’s
Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) and other parties, as well as the return of parties
closed by the regime. The creation of the Workers’ party in 1982 epitomise the articulation of
the three groups mentioned beforehand, symbolising the end of the bi-party system. The party
9
was composed by union leaders linked to the "new unionism", liberation theology
participants, students, intellectuals, students of the left, and leaders of neighbourhood
associations and other forms of organization. In the party’s statute and in meetings and
conferences documents in the 80’s, it is possible to observe its commitment to democratic
values (Souza 2011). The participation of civil society in decision-making processes,
incorporated in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, has been a central principle in the political
project of the Partido dos Trabalhadores and, since its foundation in 1980, the party has tried
to implement participatory practices in different levels of the administration.
Until this point, the general feeling was that civil society would fight against the state,
identified as the promoted of repressive acts. A tense atmosphere between the good (civil
society) and the bad (state) was a good definition of this period. The relationship with the
state was seen as dichotomous: either maintaining the autonomy denying bureaucratic
structures, or it was understood as a process of co-option and therefore distorted the
collective interests (Souza 2011 apud Abrantes 1989). A new relationship between civil
society and state was the main goal. Gradually, civil society started to pressure the state to
create more spaces of participation and slowly it entered the institutional spaces. Starting with
the sanitation movement, which pressured the state for better health services – it was the first
social movement to have more spaces for participation in the direction of supervision and
control of public health policies. It was realised in 1986 the VIII National Healthcare
Conference and it was the first time in the Brazilian history that the government invited
organised civil society members to debate and elaborate public health policies. Before that,
conference attendance was very low and only attended by government officials. Another
victory for the movement was the formulation and approval of the document that would later
be included in the 88 Constituent as the Brazilian National Health System (Sistema Único de
Saúde – SUS) (CARVALHO 1995).
To create a new outline representing a new relationship between state and civil society was
one of the main demands of civil society in the pre-constitutional period. The gradual
response to the social demands brought new challenges to civil society: to understand their
role and great difficulties to move in this new arena. In this context, the idea of “community
councils“ took place and assumed its space in the civil society political agenda.
According to PÓLIS (2005) that is the context when the idea of management councils first
appear. Social movements and other popular organisations were in situation that allowed
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them pressure the government on creating new spaces for popular discussion. According to
Abrantes (1989), the Committee of the Metropolitan Transport and the Popular Health
Council in special hold the conditions and experience to pressure the government. The
popular pressure on the government forced it to implement local healthy councils. Finally, the
proposals of the public health movement, which since the late 70’s proposed the creation of
spaces not only for civil society to be heard, but a public space where it could really influence
public policy-making, through decentralization of health services, with the effective
participation of the population (PÓLIS apud CEBES, 1980). Those were important references
for demands developed in the Constituent around institutional arrangements that would
permit a minimum participation of society in controlling, monitoring and proposing changes
in policy-making government decisions. (Teixeira 1996).
In the 80’s, especially after end of the dictatorial regime, as observed in the section above, the
Workers’ Party had a relative but stable success in the general elections, and from 1988 it
was heading a good number of cities around the country. The faced at this stage an important
challenge: to transform a set of principles and guidelines on concrete public policies (Rolnik
1990). Many of PT administrations, were inclined to popular participation and created the
Popular plenary and People's Councils (Plenárias Populares e Conselhos Populares) as
spaces for dialogues between civil society and government (PÓLIS 2011 apud Paz and Silva
1990).
Once the Workers’ Party had some state representation this debate about direct democracy
and social movements’ autonomy was intensified (PÓLIS 2011). Initially, those popular
councils emerged as space created for social movements to define their identity as a group
and their social demands. It was also as space of resistance to face the state and a strategy to
intervene in the institutional levels. In this sense, this initiative would be understood as a plan
to face the mistrust placed on the civil society by the state.
If the political context in the late 80’s made possible the inclusion of the notion of
participation and power sharing in the 1988 Constitution, this same context changed in the
90’s, after the election of Collor de Mello, the first president elected by direct vote. Collor
deepened the neoliberal process in the country, an attitude followed even further by his
successor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC). The neoliberalism project brought other idea
of participation to the scene (Dagnino 2014). As an expression of the neoliberal adjustment,
the focus on sharing some of the public burden from the state to civil society was moved
11
away from the original plan. It was reconceptualised - differently from what was included in
the national reform plan, conducted by Bresser Pereira – as a partnership. Social policies
duties were now shared trough partnerships between NGOs and private sectors to develop
and implement specific project in a national council called the “Solidarity Council“
(Conselho da Comunidade Solidária), a agency created by FHC that worked also as a think
tank, producing theoretical and empirical analysis to support the neoliberal project (Silva
2006, Dagnino 2014). It was also a way to justify state efficiency, by sharing the social
responsibilities among state enterprises, individuals and civil society. In this context,
participation is reduced to assume social responsibility individually by voluntary work or
through NGOs, while the real decision power remained under state control (Teixeira 2003).
The NGOs number grew in the period, considering that these entities served as stable and
reliable partners to the neoliberal state. As a consequence, civil society was reduced to those
organisation (NGOs) and social movements were marginalised and often criminalised
(Feltran 2005, Dagnino 2014). Those two radically different ways of understanding
participation are still existing in the Brazilian context nowadays, with all its tensions and
contradictions associated with this neoliberal model of participation.
3.1.1 – Worker’s Party and Lula’s election
After 3 attempts as presidential candidate, Lula da Silva was elected president in 2002, under
Workers’ Party umbrella and supported by a coalition of left-wing to central-left parties.
After his election, in his “letter to the Brazilian people” (Carta aos brasileiros) Lula
promised to keep the contracts with financial markets while the same time to apply an
alternative social project, which would not be applied abruptly, but gradually in the long run
(Dagnino 2014). He also reassured his commitment with the democracy and its institutions.
Some authors say that in his very first statement he left out the core ideas of his party’s
document “Program for a Democratic Revolution“, in which the party emphasizes civil
society participation and direct control over the state institutions (PT 1999). To Baiocchi
(2008), it was the first sign of moderate government.
Expectations on Lula’s government were high, mostly among the poorest citizens. Even if
using a prudent language, leftists groups still inspired by the Workers’ Party initial political
project, and Lula’s coming to power meant to those a change for the better. As we know well,
Lula’s government brought changes in many social policies, but it was not away from the
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neoliberal model of government. In his term, Lula emphasised social policies centred on fight
poverty, promoting economic development and job creation. While his first term was focused
in develop backbone social policies, to remain in power was also a concern. So what happens
next is what Evelina Danigno calls ‘’PT’s power project” (Workers’ Party power project).
This new agenda is different from the original party proposal. We can add to that the
coalition supporting Lula’s election and the difficulty to accommodate different and
conflicting social projects under the same flag among Workers’ Party members. This
heterogeneous coalition brought about a set on different views in the eight years of Lula in
office and it is marked heavily the way civil society was included in policy making.
3.2 – Increasing participation in numbers and the inclusion of new voices
In the last 30 years, government and civil society organisations have taken advantage of a
series of political opportunities made available by the new democratic regime after 1985, in
order to offer new democratic institutions that directly include regular citizens in the process
of policy-making. Local governments in special have committed to those institutional
experiences and they have succeeded in many cases. One of the most apparent
accomplishments has been the increase and reinforcement of participatory institutions, both
in numbers and scope, represented by the great number of councils and popular conferences.
This process started just after Collor de Mello office, but it obtained a great impulse during
Lula’s term. During this period it is great the volume of institutional investments, government
resources and people involved on participatory democracy.
Figure 1 – Year of creation national council
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Source: Inesc-Pólis Institute: Arquitetura da Participação no Brasil: avanços e desafios (2011)
It is possible to observe from the data released from a joined research between Pólis Institute
and Inesc Institute on democratic governance in contemporary Brazil, that at national level,
more than one third of the councils were created in Lula’s term. The second highest peak
happened at just after the new 88’s constitution, in a period that covers three presidencies
(Sarney, Collor and Itamar).
Most of the areas mapped are prior to the administration of president Fernando Henrique
Cardoso. Some of these councils were created in non-democratic periods, which appear to be
a contradiction. Most of the councils were created during the democratization process. In the
year of the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, and in two following years were created
seven councils. But it was in 2003 when the highest number of national councils was created,
with eight new councils in total.
The types of councils are distinguished by their goals and ways of working. A “policy
council” is a council that contribute to the formulation of public policies for a given area,
such as policies for health, education, welfare, urban planning, and rural development, among
others. Out of mapped 40 councils, 29 are policy councils, that is, most of the council are of
this type.
0
5
10
15
20
25
before 1980 1980 to 1988
1989 to 1994
1995 to 1998
1999 to 2002
2003 to 2006
2007 to 2010
14
The rights councils are those that deal with the rights of a particular population, in general
marginalized groups that are supposed to need specific policies. Of course, all the councils
deal directly with the issue of rights, however; in this case the right of the population in
question is the focus of the council. In the Inesc-Pólis research, 11 councils are of this type.
Examples of this kind of council are the National Council for the Rights of the Elderly and
the National Council for Fighting Discrimination and Promote LGBT Rights.
Conferences have been one of the main focuses of the government to improving participatory
democracy. The numbers on national conferences are great: official data provided by the
secretary of the republic office informs that a total of 73 conferences were held between 2003
and 2010, in 40 different themes. Those conferences reunited more than five million people,
who took part in municipal, regional, state and national steps of the conferences.
We looked into those who composed the conferences. We found that 70% of the participants
are members of civil society organisation and the remaining 30% were government officials
from local, state and federal level. In the national councils, 52% of the members are from
civil society and 48% from government. Some conferences established quotes to guarantee
the attendance of women and LGBT activists.
An important manner to decide the effectiveness of those councils regarding their influence
on public policies is to identifying, by checking its decree of creation or regulatory law, if it
is a consultative or deliberative council. If the council is only consultative, decisions made by
the council do not necessarily have impact in public policies. In deliberative councils,
decision becomes resolutions. Once this happens, resolutions need to be complied by the
government (INESC and PÓLIS 2011).
However, those are relative roles. Even if the status of the council is relevant, this
characteristic does not always respect the scope of the board's decisions. Deliberative
councils may decide on specific, operational issues and do not always meet the task of
guiding public policy, while consultative councils can discuss complex issues and relate to
the policy template wanted (INESC and PÓLIS 2011). One should consider that the fact the
council is only consultative does not mean it has no political power. Depending on the
political strength of its members of the council and the theme of centrality for a government
project, consultative boards may be more powerful than a deliberative council.
15
New councils reflected new thematic areas and also the inclusion of new voices. The Food
Security Council was created during Collor de Mello term and closed when FHC took office.
It was reactivated as soon as Lula took office in 2003, as a strategic part of his nationwide
program against extreme poverty, Zero Hunger (Fome Zero). This council brought together a
number of representatives of civil society. It also pervade another correlated topics, such as
family farming, school food programs and the creation of new committees to reunite civil
society and government together to formulate public policies in the area. Space was also
opened for the participation of a variety of social groups – human rights activist, women,
black, indigenous people, food businesses and many other – in a attempt to broad social
participation in this particular set (Dagnino 2014).
A second good example of the expansion of policy themes and the inclusion of was in the
cultural area, which received a great boost with the creation of the National Council of
Cultural Policy. This council came as demand from popular artists and cultural producers
sectors involved in Lula’s electoral campaign. Before that cultural policies where defined by
an unequal and unclear funding distribution (Souza 2008).
Civil society and social movements were not limited to pressure government only in
institutional space. Their mobilisation brought them beyond these spaces. As example of that
we can cite the creation and implementation of the Maria da Penha law10, that increased
punishment for violence against women, a long time demand from NGO’s and groups
fighting for women’s rights. In the same way, groups defending racial equality were included
in participatory processes to formulate policies for the Afro-descendant population, including
quotas in third level institutions and more rigid laws to curb racism.
The important outcome of those processes was the inclusion of social groups that had been
systematically excluded from the sphere of decision-making. Their inclusion did not come as
a gift; this inclusion came as a result of a strong pressure exerted by the popular sectors. The
engagement of those social groups in new policy-making venues helped to broad relevant
themes and extends the right of participation and social control to popular groups.
3.3 The issue of quality and other challenges
10 Explain Maria da Penha law briefly here – only to give some context. (Mention international human rights
courts – Human rights watch)
16
Taking in consideration the increase in the number of participatory institutions in previous
years, it is not difficult to conclude that, quantitatively, the number of council and
conferences created reached an impressive level. In addition to the significant quantitative
increase in new participatory spaces (showed in the previous topic), an important point of
analysis still ahead of us. It is important to consider the quality of this participation and some
of the challenges posed to civil society organisations.
If one achievement was to promote democratisation by extending new participatory spaces to
new thematic areas, including food security, people with disabilities, etc. in order to promote
meaningful changes in public policies; the remaining challenge is to understand how can we
determine that quality of participation and how far it can get. Quality of participation here is
understood as effectiveness of participation. In order words, the way decision power is shared
with civil society organisations.
It is not easy to identify this level of effectiveness, as different contexts with different actors
brings distinct results; too many variables might be at play. Some authors as Wampler (2010)
and Stone (200) helped to developed the concept of “policy communities“, in order to
identify the increasing association between civil society and government in different
administrative levels, by defining which actors and events are responsible for decisions in
public policies.
The idea of participatory democracy was one of main social compromises of the Workers’
Party before it came to power. If one looks at the figures, it is possible to observe that more
participatory spaces were created, more people were mobilised and new public policies and
new voices were included in process of decision-making. However, those newly created
entities did not have the impact they initially proposed to. Instead of spaces for debate and
new policy proposals, in many cases it turned out as a space for dialogue and public demands
hearing. A good example to sustain this claim is that 58% of the councils are only
consultative and not deliberative (INESC and PÓLIS 2011).
Without understanding the meaning of power sharing, governmental agencies and councils
have different concepts of this idea. Contradicting the expectations civil society organisation
had to gain access and influence in public policies, in most of the cases participatory
institutions developed a fragmented relationship with those movements. Many Workers’
Party supporters were invited to join those institutions, fact the brought hash criticism to the
administration. In governmental agencies responsible for an area where social movements
17
have a strong composition and are well organised politically, the government relationship is
close and power sharing is enforced (Dagnino 2014).
The absence of coordination and the non-application of the concept of power sharing – that
eventually became a “space for dialogue” carried as a result the co-existence of different
practices. While some government agencies would consider CSO participation in their
administration, others offered great resistance to the idea of popular participation in public
policies. This new participatory project, promoted by the Worker’s Party, clashed with old
traditional forms of governability that exclude the poor. Quality of participation was
compromised by that, and for this and other reasons11 many activists and Workers’ Party
members left their government official jobs and some even created an “alternative” party
named “Socialism and Freedom Party“ (PSOL – Partido Socialismo e Liberdade), more
faithful to the original political project of popular participation developed by the Workers'
Party.
Advances in the creation of new governmental agencies to promote popular participation
were not aligned with concrete changes in power sharing. New policy areas were included
and attention was brought for new social themes. However, no power sharing actually
happened. The inclusion of civil society in those spaces and the acknowledgment of their
demands by the government were not followed by action to promote change in a substantial
way. Despite Lula’s term has created a great number of changes in participatory institutions
over the years, the notion of participation has changed, but still not attending civil society
desire for effective participation and concrete decision power in public policies.
3.4 - Advances and setbacks: what is ahead for civil society organisations
Considering the period prior to the end of the military regime – and potentially before that -
civil society organisations have achieved great success, especially because of their presence
in stances of decision and also its capability to pressure the governments to put their demands
forwards. CSOs contribution to expand participatory democracy has been significant, but not
without equally important challenges.
11 In 2008, Frei Beto, long term social activist recognized internationally, left the government and the Worker’s
Party claiming disagreement with the Workers’ Party “power project“ and for promote the “Depoliticization of Brazilian society” (Brasil de Fato, 2014). Another important fact is the context of creation the PSOL party. After the election of Lula da Silva in 2002, member of PSOL claimed that Worker’s Party took a sharp turn to the right and began a implementation a neoliberal program. Because of that, a section of the party's more committed to the initial party political positioning (left-wing) exit the party and founded PSOL, in an attempt to create an anti-capitalist alternative to the Workers’ Party.
18
The inclusion of CSOs organisation in participatory institutions offered to the groups
involved a formidable chance to voice their demands and pressure the government from a
different level. Once gained access to those spaces of participation, CSOs members also have
access to specialist knowledge, either from close connection with government official in
charge of formulate and implement a given public policy or by attending specific conferences
on their areas of interest.
This learning process reinforces the ability of CSO members to participate properly, by
collaborating to the improvements of public policies in a more assertive way. Once they can
definitely collaborate and understand the processes that command those structures, they are
capable of influence the outcomes of public policies. The level of influence is related to
government attitude towards civil society participation, and, as discussed here before,
different government sectors are more or less resistant to popular participation.
On the other hand, CSOs obtained relative success. Currently, organisations that are more
active usually receive a repressive attitude from governments, including physical repression.
Obviously one cannot compare the current level of repression with the levels during the
military regime, but what still in place in the current government, specially at state level, is
the brutal mode its is handling public demonstrations, opposition and localised acts of
vandalism. It is true that acts of vandalism occur, but the police have demonstrated an
enormous incapability in dealing with irritated masses. A good example of that was the
extreme police repression committed against street demonstrator in June 2013 before the
World Cup. Using isolated actions of looting and vandalism as motivation, state police
officers took a violent approach to spread the demonstrators.
These demonstrations started as small protest against a hike in bus fares in Sao Paulo capital
and it turned into one of the largest popular demonstrations that the country has seen in the
last 20 years, when people went to streets to claim the impeachment of the former president
Collor de Mello. A single hike in bus fares plus the violent approach of the police against
demonstrators sparked a public outrage and it spread all over the country. Other forms of
popular dissatisfaction (violent police repression, corruption, poverty, inequality) also
collaborated to the general feeling of protesting. The movement had no clear political and
ideological direction but it showed that, although Brazil has a weak and distrusted political
sphere, civil society still is strong and aware of its potential of promoting social justice
(Levine and Molina 2011).
19
The message sent by those demonstration – and others that happened after that around
country – was that people still waiting and demand for participation, more transparency and
less corruption. Despite Dilma officially saying she was listen to the people, her government
has done very little to promote the changes people on streets were claiming. It is unfair to
blame president Dilma Rousseff or the Workers’ Party alone: the conservative sectors of the
Brazilian society have their share in curb the access of popular movements to higher spheres
of power.
CSOs still face other challenges, such as financial dependency, as many of those are financed
by external sources. After the 90’s the relationship between governments and non-profit
entities was changed. While some entities kept social activities, other entities, such as NGOs
which offered social services, moved away from social movements and connected themselves
with the state and assumed the role of partner (with government agencies). Those NGOs were
mostly offering social services in partnership with the state (IPEA 2012).
Also according to the IPEA survey, in 2005 the 338,000 existing NGOs (excluding profit
organizations) represented 5.6% of total public and private entities and employed 5.3% of
Brazilian workers. What has also grown significantly over the recent years has been the
dependence of NGOs of government resources. Data published in 2010 by Abong revealed
that while 16.7% of its slightly more than 200 members had associated 41% to 100% of their
budgets come from federal funds in 2003, in 2007 this percentage increased to 37.4%. (IPEA
2012)
On the other side, entities that have no partnership with governments, struggle to survive and
constantly seek alternative sources of funding. This lack of funding and opportunities are a
menace to entities social projects. Full dependency on external funding may also lead
contributors or sponsor to control the agenda of the CSOs; this control in may affect the
entities political autonomy.
Especially for entities depending on external sources, transparency and accountability
appears as important issues. The Transparency Portal website offers information on the
public resources passed to NGOs every year. In 2011 the activities of NGOs came to
attention in the national media. The central point of the reports were cases of possible
irregularities in transfers of public funds for those entities, which, again, raised the debate
about the blurred of the lines between the public sphere, private companies and state in
Brazil.
20
Civil Society organisations probably face many more challenges than listed here. Those
challenges impacts they way those entities function. Despite some advances over time,
especially in the number of participatory institutions, CSOs still have a great deal of
challenges to overcome regarding the political context they operate.
3.5 Conclusion
As home of both the richest and poorest people in the world, Brazil is in true a country of
contradictions. While there is one of the most social Constitutions in the world, the difference
between the legal country and people actual behaviour is striking. The corruption scandals
that overrun the news everyday brought increasing levels of distrust and dissatisfaction with
democracy, as the public demonstrations showed pretty clearly.
The blatant levels of violence and remaining extreme poverty are challenges to both state and
civil society. Disregarding the law, the power of decision is still in the hands of traditional
elites. The initial euphoria of the first years of Lula’s term has, now, faded. As time passes,
social movements and citizens in general become conscious that despite some concrete social
advances, much work still to be done for a more transparent, accountant and open democratic
regime.
If we consider the size of the country and the deep social, one can observe that most of the
poor Brazilian citizens still excluded from the political processes. The challenge for social
movements now is to keep the channels of popular participation open and try to convert the
social innovation into meaningful state public policies. More than just including more
citizens in the public sphere, the challenge here is to create a more inclusive public sphere by
promoting citizenship, defending accountability and avoid re-clientisation.
The message sent by the demonstration on the streets in June 2013 was clear: people are still
wanting participation, concrete participation. Those participating in social mobilisation
nowadays endure the great challenges ahead, to overcome the obstacles posed by the political
fragmentation and inconsistencies of those participatory process, and tensions and
contradictions that limit the effectiveness of participation, as it was confirmed by events on
the streets.
21
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