Upload
others
View
3
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 1
Topic 8- xFood safety and Food Bio-Security.Evaluation of the Distribution Chaim
Dr Ted Labuza
Dept Food Science and Nutrition
612-624-9701
US News and World Report 12/24/01
What is bioterrorism?
Bioterrorism is an event resulting from anintentionally introduced biological, chemical, ornuclear agent that would be devastating to people,animals, or crops . . .
What is food safety ?
Unintentional or accidental introductionof food pathogens
Causes illness in local or regional area
Due to under-processing, improperholding, cross contamination
If intentional = bioterrorism ?
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 2
Bioterrorism opportunity Bush missedFood safety = terrorism
Precepts of terrorism
Scare people (killing is secondary)
Affect most vulnerable (children)
Create chaos (scared to eat foods)
Create economic disaster (won’t buy foods)
Create farm crisis (no market for commoditiesor death to animals)
Joe Levitt CFSAN Director onbioterrorism
April 22,2002 Consumer Federation of America Meeting
“There is no evidence to suggest food will be a target”
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 3
According to Mike Osterholm,author of “Living Terrors”. . . .
9/11 should not have been a surprise
More terrorist attacks “will come”…not “ if”
Our domestic food supply is very vulnerable
The foods we import are at risk
. . . and we are not readyMinneapolis Star- Tribune
July 2002 NEHA
Obviously the Iraq War raises that threat
Challenges presented byfood bio-terrorism
Large number of available agents
Easily accessible targets
Delivery not all that difficult
Many agents are stable to process technology
Perpetrators could be organized terrorist groups,activists groups or a single individual makingprevention extremely difficult
Lack of public sector awareness to potential threats
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 4
The government and the food industrylikely couldn’t thwart agro-terroristsSept 20, 2002
Scenario planningWhich biological agents
ToxinsRicin
bot toxin
Staph toxin
alflatoxin
Living pathogensE coli O157:H7
Salmonellae
Listeria
spores,anthrax,
C. botulinum
RicinHeat stable plant lectin found in castor beans
(1–5% of total protein)
Easy to purify(over 100 websites describe ricin production processes)
only need blender, acetone and lye
Ingestion of 1µg/kg can kill an adult by blocking protein synthesis
Rapid onset of symptoms (18-24 hrs) and high mortality rates
What is the threat ?
http://www.ansci.cornell.edu/plants/toxicagents/ricin/ricin.html
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 5
Ricin Incidents
US 1993-97 Terrorist History
2001 Thomas Leahy
May 2001 Nevada plot
January 8 2003 UK 7 North Africans
3/4/03 Arkansas man makes ricin threat
3/19/03 3 arrested at Gatwick
3/21/03 France train station locker Gare deLyon Chechan rebels
Bot toxin
Protein from Clostridium botulinum
Lethal dose 1 µg - neuro-toxin
Moderately heat stable
Symptoms - ~ 2-3 days
Double vision
Loss of muscle control
Need respirator
Anti-toxin available (~ 1000 doses)
~ 120 cases / year
Was tested by Japanese Shinryko cult
60,000 fox on ~ 100 farms in Finland
Why anthrax spores ?NFPA recommendations for inactivation
∑∑∑∑ Expose to dry heat at 140∞∞∞∞ C (284∞∞∞∞ F) for 3 hours.
∑∑∑∑ Immerse in water and maintain at 95∞∞∞∞ C (203∞∞∞∞ F) for
25 minutes or at 100∞∞∞∞ C (212∞∞∞∞ F) for 15 minutes.
∑∑∑∑ Autoclave at 120∞∞∞∞ C (248∞∞∞∞ F) for 10 minutes.
∑∑∑∑ Expose to 10% bleach for two hours.
Irradiate > 10 Kg using 40 for letters
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 6
Scenario planning
Which agents ?
Which foods?
Pathogens (any food system)
Bioterror - selected systems
Food vulnerability - highWater - Milwaukee incident
Fresh produce - no kill step (wash step ensures spread)especially imported produce
Pasteurized milk and milk products
(NY incident May 2002)
Dairy Attack ??
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 7
Food vulnerability - very highWater - Milwaukee incident
Fresh produce - no kill step (wash step ensures spread)especially imported produce
Pasteurized milk and milk products (NY incident May2002)
Animal feed ( 2003 60,000 foxes in Finland)
Food vulnerability - low
Minimally processed foods – deli (Listeria)
Any food where post process tampering is possible e.g.finished dry foods (cereals eg Malt O’Meal)
Grain and flour trains
Canned foods- minimal
Scenario planning
Which agents – biological or chemical?
Which foods?
Potential methods for intentional or accidentalintroduction
on farm eg cows shed e. coli)
in plant (lack of kill step or HACCP plans)
en-route in distribution (Schwans)
at retail (poor handling)
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 8
Food Process Chain
Rail ortruck
Distribution
Center Process
Distribution
Center
FARM or
Ingredient
supplier
supermarket
Food Process Distribution Chain
FARM or
Ingredient
supplier
Potential bioterrorism orfood safety vectors
FARM
pesticide applicators
Workers in field (sanitary habits)
Irrigation water
Hydrocooling water
Bulk milk tanks
Fertilizer tanks
silos
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 9
Minnesota Vulnerability to threats
Agriculture industries 18.5% of economy
Dairy $2.7 billion 54,000 jobs
2/01 Foot & Mouth in UK -> slaughter of 6thousand head of sheep and cattle on 10,000farms
Hong Kong - poultry virus (similar in LA area)
Farmer solutionsLock tanks
Add alarms - dogs
Know your visitors (Star Trib article 3/20/03)
Know your suppliers
Use sanitary procedures to minimize
Ron Durst farm Dodge County
According to some . . . .
Imported foods are the biggest threat – only 1%of imported food is inspected (produce isgreatest threat)
40 of 300 entry points into the U.S. of foreignproducts has an FDA inspector today
Current plans will increase this number to 93
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 10
Country of Origin Concern -consumer concern
Imported Food Poisoning
E coli O157:H7 Parsley from Mexico
Cryptosporodium: Raspberries fromCosta Rica - school lunch program
Unknown: Pineapple from Costa Rica -MN. Govenor’s mansion
Cyanide : grapes from Chile
S. aureus toxin: canned mushrooms fromChina
Country of Origin
Federal Security and Rural Investment Actof 2002 HR 2646
Sec 10816 Country of Origin Labeling
Applies to some foods, mostly perishables
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 11
Foods covered by law
Sec 281(2)(A) IN GENERAL- The term `coveredcommodity' means-- (i) muscle cuts of beef, lamb, and pork; (ii) ground beef, ground lamb, and ground pork; (iii) farm-raised fish; (iv) wild fish; (v) a perishable agricultural commodity; and (vi) peanuts.
Labeling requirement
Sec 282(c) METHOD OF NOTIFICATION-
(1) IN GENERAL- The information required by subsection(a) may be provided to consumers by means of a label,stamp, mark, placard, or other clear and visible sign on thecovered commodity or on the package, display, holdingunit, or bin containing the commodity at the final point ofsale to consumers.
Fines
Sec 283(c) FINES- If, on completion of the 30-dayperiod described in subsection (b)(2), theSecretary determines that the retailer has willfullyviolated section 282, after providing notice and anopportunity for a hearing before the Secretary withrespect to the violation, the Secretary may fine theretailer in an amount of not more than $10,000 foreach violation.
Sec 284(b) Regulations by Sept 30, 2004
Sec 285 Action begins Sept. 30, 2002
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 12
FARM or
Ingredient
supplier
Rail ortruck
Food Process Distribution Chain
Potential food safety andbio-terrorism vectors
Truckers identity and history (Belzer)
Verify trucks (Koehler-Schwans)
Truck stops
Loading docks management
Time-temperature management
Vermin management
Note
Logistics Management 3/1/03
Robert Spiegel
Carriers are hesitant to spend heavily onnew security technology unless itimproves safety and efficiency
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 13
Food Process Distribution Chain
Rail ortruck
FARM or
Ingredient
supplier
Distribution
Center
Potential food safety and bio-terrorism vectors
At cross dock
Intrusion
vermin
Distribution
Center
A&P Distribution System
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 14
Food Process Distribution Chain
Rail ortruck
Distribution
Center Process
FARM or
Ingredient
supplier
Potential bio-terrorism vectors
Adulterated ingredients (incoming)
Errors in process (poor GMP and HACCP)vs true bio-terrorism
Process
Potential perpetrators
Employees (Hill Farm ??)
visitors
Competitors
Terrorists ?
In the
plant
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 15
Hill Farm Dairy
Several outbreaks of salmonellae overthree months
Company in major dispute with union
Blame on connectors made no sense
Over 200,000 ill in 3 states
Need was only 10 mL of 10+9 CFU/mL
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
Tim
e m
inu
tes
to in
acti
vati
on
of
105
LD
50
60
70
80
90
10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
temperature °C
y = 1758047922066.436 * 10 -0.145x r2 = 0.984canned corn pH 6.2 Q10 = 28.1
y = 34614163.666 * 10 -0.090x r2 = 0.925phosphate buffer pH 6.8 Q10 = 8
C. bot Type A toxin
milk time
time 2
time
5 sec
23 sec
Relative resistance to processing
Spores - generally heat stable unlesssterilized
Bot toxin - somewhat liable to heat
Ricin - extremely resistant to heat
Bacterial pathogens - easily killed by heat
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 16
FDA Original Approaches
TACCP Report
FDA Security presentation
September 2002
USDA Guidance for Food-Bio-securityGeneral
Create a food security management team andcoordinator for each plant or company.
Conduct food security drills periodically
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 17
USDA Guidance for Food-Bio-securityLogistics
Adopt procedures to trace the source of all rawmaterials
Seal all outgoing food shipments with tamper-proof,numbered seals that are included on the shippingdocuments.
trace the delivery points of all finished products.
Use guards, alarms, cameras or other securityhardware on doors, windows, roof openings,railcars, bulk storage tanks and trailers.
All tanks are sealed
Prepare a daily inventory of hazardouschemicals at the plant and investigate anymissing items immediately.
USDA Guidance for Food-Bio-securityIn plant
Employees and Vendors
Require security background checks on allworkers
Everyone wears identity badges with pictures
Maintain a current list of plant workers with access tothe building.
Control entry to a plant by requiring photo IDs andsign-in procedures.
Illness reporting methods and requirements
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 18
FDA ProcessorBiosecurity Guidance Document
FDA Biosecurity GuidanceDocument 3/21/03
Management
assign person as responsible
prepare strategy
plan emergency operations
have contact list 24/7
Promote awareness
Recall strategy
Evaluate process
FDA Biosecurity GuidanceDocument 3/21/03
Staff
Screen all hires
Have daily work assignments
Identity badges
Restricted access
Train in security procedures
Alertness for staff health
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 19
FDA Biosecurity GuidanceDocument 3/21/03
Visitors
Limit access
Inspect all belongings, vehicles
Have permission for visit
Keep off floor if possible
FDA Biosecurity GuidanceDocument 3/21/03
Facility security
Perimeter
Doors and openings
Bulk unloading area
Tanks and water supply
Monitoring systems
Adequate lighting
Control of parked vehicles
FDA Biosecurity GuidanceDocument 3/21/03
Storage of poisonous/toxic materials
Limit access
Separate out
inventory
Laboratory
Limit access
Inventory of all chemicals
disposal
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 20
FDA Biosecurity GuidanceDocument 3/21/03
Operations - incoming
Know suppliers (check their process)
Check all incoming materials (testing orcontract)
Verify trucker and bills of lading
Supervise off loading
FDA Biosecurity GuidanceDocument 3/21/03
Computer information access
Control systems
Stock
traceability
Storage
Have separate locked area for distressed goods
Track all materials
Label everything
Minimize container reuse
FDA Biosecurity GuidanceDocument 3/21/03
Finished goods
Secure warehousing/DC storage
Do random inspections (HACCP)
Use only locked sealed transport vehicles
Use only scheduled delivery/pickup
Investigate missing/extra stock
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 21
GAO Food Processing SecurityReport 3/18/03
Farmers & industry needs to increasesecurity
Should share details with FDA and USDA
FDAFood Producers Guidance Document
Importers Guidance Document
FSIS Biosecurity web page
Security Guide for Processors
NY Times review of USDA rules 5/30/02
WHO document
FSIS
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 22
Rapid methods to detect biologic agents (pathogensor agents) on incoming ingredients and outgoingproduct
Survival characteristics of biologic agents consideredthreats to food supply
Effectiveness of food processing CCPs to inactivatebiological agents and pathogens in foods
e.g. will normal pasteurization inactivate XXXXXX
Unknown technology-processing factors
Finished Product questions …
How broadly will the product be distributed?
How fast will the product reach consumers?
Will the agent/pathoogen survive x-plant distribution,and in-home prep?
How soon can/will the government react?
How would the public be notified?
What about a recall?
Food Process Distribution Chain
Rail ortruck
Distribution
Center Process
Distribution
Center
FARM or
Ingredient
supplier
supermarket
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 23
Potential bio-terrorism vectors
Docking station
Fresh produce area
Cross contamination in deli
Open barrel dispensers
Disgruntled employee
Terrorist
Tampering
Supermarketor foodservice
Oregon Town Attack 9/9/84Religious sect - Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh
Intent to gain control of town council at Nov. election in The Dalles(pop 10500) because of potential voter threat to their land use
Test for dispersion on salad bars in September using 10 restaurantsbefore election to see impact
751 cases of illness
Informant confessed they did it
They lost vote
Univ Texas Hospital 1994
Disgruntled employee
Injects donuts with shigellae
Sends email to employees that freedonuts in break room
12 made ill
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 24
Disgruntled employee or terrorist
COOK ACCUSED OF TRYING TO POISON DINERSSeptember 16, 2002Standard-Freeholder (Cornwall) 8 NewsJERUSALEM (AP) -- A Justice Ministry spokesman was citedas saying that an east Jerusalem Arab and former cook wasindicted Sunday on suspicion of plotting to poison diners at apopular Jerusalem restaurant.
The story says that Othman Kianiya, 22, a cook at popular CafeRimon, was the third man indicted as part of an alleged plot topoison drinks with a substance that slows the heart rate. Incourt, Kianiya told reporters: "I didn't do anything ... Theydidn't find any substance." Kianiya was to dissolve Digoxintablets -- used to regulate the heartbeat but fatal in largeamounts -- in the drinks of diners, according to an indictmentof the two other men last week.
Business competition (envy)
Chinese incident
Cousin of restaurant owner Chen Zhenping
Wanted to improve own business
Used a rat poison - tetramine (rapid onset) in morningrush hour
49 dead (mostly school children)
300 ill in hospital
Hospitals ran out of space
Similar to Guangxi noodle shop incident in July - ratpoison in soup 57 hospitalized
Competition in food service is fierce - lack of moralityand cut-throat business
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 25
Out-come
China Cooks Assoc.
Each shop must form food safety team
Boss leads the team
Self audit of safety of environment
Ensure food safety management
Must cooperate with local governmentto enforce
Note: Star Tribune 2/14/03
Grand Rapids Michigan man indicted
Put insecticide in 200 lb ground beef atByron Country Fare Supermarket
Sickened 40 people
Trying to get back at them???
Note: Des Moines Register 3/11/03
60 wedding guest went to hospital in Ankeny
Methemoglobinemia - Nitrite poisoning
Found in high concentration in punch
Punch was brought by guest - not caterer
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 26
Food Process Distribution Chain
Rail ortruck
Distribution
Center Process
Distribution
Centersupermarket
FARM or
Ingredient
supplier
home
Scenario planning
Identification of incident as attack orloss of process/distribution controls
or announcement by terrorist
Action at plant, DC or retail
How does consumer respond ?
FDA Retail Guidance Document
Note nothing in document discussesrecalls, containment or remediation
FMI -ISAC
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 27
Recalls vs other means
Current policy - voluntary
Low trace-back or forward
Eg ConAgra
Recall manual FMI
FDA current recalls
Fresh Produce Scenario
E. coli contamination of fresh lettuce
Fresh Produce Industry
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 28
Fresh Fruit & VegetableConsumptionLate 70’s to Late 90’s
Fresh cutproduce . . .has grown froma “zero base in1990 to accountfor almost 20%of selectretailer’sproduce sales in2001”
Source: Major Retailer
Trend in Retail Produce Sales
25
30
35
40
45
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Sources: Food Industry Management Program, Cornell University; United States Dept. of Commerce
$40.9 billion
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 29
Retail Grocery Vegetable/Fruit Sales
Canned 7.8%
Frozen 4.7%
Fresh 87.5%
2001 Sales (in billions of dollars)
*Canned: $3.2 (includes $.9 billion in canned
tomatoes)
*Frozen: $1.9 (excludes frozen french fries)
**Fresh: $40.9*A.C. Nielsen 2001** Food Industry Management Program, Cornell University; United States Department ofCommerce
Lettuce Processing
Harvested and packagedas individual heads oflettuce or sent off toprocessing for baggedsalads
Lettuce Processing
Packed product is movedfrom field to acooling/shipping facility
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 30
Distribution model – highly perishable
E coli could be spread by bad water, poor fieldworker sanitation or applied by a terrorist
Product shipped and distributed based on collecteddata
At retail and in-home based on shared retailer data
Illness occurs, medical treatment, and healthdepartment notification based on conservativeestimates
Lettuce Orders 1/7-11/02
Goes to > 5000stores
Lettuce Distribution example
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 31
Scenario planning
Identification of incident
Announcement by terrorist
Questions
When will field workers who handle lettucebecome ill ?
When will packaging employees show illness ?
Will retail workers become contaminated as loadproduce on shelves ?
Time to Event
# orsymptoms
To DC To Home
To Supermarketor broker
0 2 3 5 10 12 15 2 0
Days
1st symptoms
CDC-FDA Acts
Visit doctor
Hospitalization
99% stopped
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 32
Findings
Good data for distribution to chain DC and/orbroker
Lack of broker data
Need more info on supermarket distribution(mixing)
Lack of data on min-avg-max of onset ofsymptoms
Lack off data on time to hospitalization
When will be time to address crisis
What does a recall do?
What about canned chili ?
Process is high temperature sterilization
Limits agents
But which ones (heat stable)
Final product is secure in can
Canned chili vectors
On the farm - meat and beans
In storage silos - beans like potatoes
Truckers - limits volume contaminated
In the plant - follow FDA/USDA guidance
In transit - not high concern
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 33
Potential logistics solutions
Home Security Adm. policy for healthintervention for farm workers as earlywarning system and health care
ie the CANARY
Potential CANARY solutions
Home Security Adm. policy for healthintervention for farm workers as early warningsystem using mandatory health care
Test kits for agents
Development of rapid tests (eg Charm test forbbbb-lactams in milk ~12 min)
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 34
Potential CANARY solutions
Home Security Adm. policy for healthintervention for farm workers as earlywarning system using mandatory health care
Test kits for agents
100% non-destructive testing
What rapid, real-time methods are available for detectionand monitoring of pathogens and agents ?
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 35
Potential logistics solutions
RFID tags to follow distribution includinginto homes
Tracer Tags
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 36
Traceability andEnvironmental Abuse
RFID for identity
T vs t logging for abuseintegration
Infratab Smart Labels For Perishable Products
Fish, Deli, Coffee, Wine, Dairy, Cut Salad,Organics
Blood, Vaccine,Pharma, DoD MealsReady to Eat, Film
Industrials PaintAdhesives SolderPaste
Smart Labels USA MIT 3/25-27
Marks & Spencer
3.5 million tags
PENI Tag - U Pittsburg
Bioett - TTI tags
Benneton
- 15 MM tags in 5000 stores
Scottish Courage Brewing
- used past 4 years on kegs for quality control
A major retail need:How do you handle contaminated facilities e.g.,distribution centers, trucks, retail outlets ?
Who do you call?
Who is responsible (local or main office,processor)?
Who has the equipment ?
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 37
Questions
What is government policy on recalls orannounce of threats ?
Public Health Security andBioterrorism Preparedness andResponse Act of 2002
Otherwise known as Bioterrorism Bill:Overwhelmingly passed by the House(425-1) and the Senate (98-0) and signedby the President in to law on June 12,2002.
Title III: Protecting Safety and Security ofFood and Drug Supply
FDA New Powers
30 day temporary detention of food if presumedadulterated and threat of serious healthconsequences to humans or animals
Power to inspect and copy all records at plant(need regs in 18 months)
Registration of every manufacturer (US andforeign)
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 38
FDA New Powers
Can debar food importers if repeated violations
Importers must give prior notice of imports
FDA can deputize states or other governmententities
Importers of DS or additives must have completechain of traceability
USA Today 9/20/02
Threat Communications
Sandman web site
Schaefer ppt
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 39
Findings
Osterholm - “NOT IF BUT WHEN”
In-plant Bio-security is not HACCP- it is securityissues
Significant work needs to be done
It is more than planning
Biggest threat is the least controlled
Basic research needs:
How long do select toxins, spores, vegetative cells orviruses remain pathogenic on foods?
What dose is required for desired effect?
Sensing evil
Other Challenges presented bybioterrorism
How would we react . . .
Early identification a significant problem largespread if long incubation time
Limited government resources and lack oflaboratory and hospital infrastructure
Lack of awareness/training of physicians todisease symptoms - need for expert system
Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 40
If these scenarios occurred,what would be the impact on:The public - their reaction to a widespreaddisease outbreak?
The fresh produce industry - are they preparedto respond?
The entire food industry - what would be thefallout?
The retail industry - how do you deal with in-store contamination?
Affected consumers - how do you deal with in-home contamination?
ContactDr. Theodore LabuzaDepartment of Food Science and NutritionUniversity of [email protected] fax 651-483-3302 cell 651-307-2985http://fscn.che.umn.edu/Ted_Labuza/tpl.html