Dr. Richard de Smet and Sankaras Advaita

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Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies

Volume 16 Article 6

2003

Dr. Richard De Smet and Sankara's Advaita

T.S. Rukmani

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Recommended CitationRukmani, T.S. (2003) "Dr. Richard De Smet and Sankara's Advaita," Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies: Vol. 16, Article 6.Available at: hp://dx.doi.org/10.7825/2164-6279.1295
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Dr. Richard De Smetand Sankara s Advaita

T.S. RukmaniConcordia University

I HAVE had the privilege o meeting Dr.Richard De Smet in Shimla at the IndianInstitute o Advanced Study, when we bothparticipated in a Seminar organized by theInstitute in 1989. We had opportunities ofdiscussing Sankara's Brahman and theChristian concept of God at that timewithout being able to fully understand eachother's position. That has been at the back omy mind all these years, and I was happywhen Bradley Malkovsky asked me to writeon Dr. De Smet's view o Sankara'sBrahman for the Bulletin. I thus got anopportunity to revisit that topic again andhave done so in what follows. Needless tosay that, because o the limitation o space, Ihave not been able to do full justice to thetopic.Before I venture to write something onDr. De Smet's approach to the ontologicalunderstanding o the Brahman-concept inSankara's Advaita Vedanta (hereafterAdvaita), I would like . o state what Iunderstand by comparative work. In order todo a comparative study o two differentreligions o.r theologies, either in a religiousor theological sense, it is not necessary tosomehow fit the ontologyand epistemologyof the two systems being studied to appear

as i they mean the same thing. In such anapproach there is injustice done to both thesystems and one ends up trying to,sometimes, fit round circles into squarepegs. It is wise to acknowledge that religious.and theological schools that rise and grow indifferent cultural milieus can have arationale o their own and the best we cando, as scholars, is to understand andappreciate the dynamics of that growth intheir own setting. There is a historicaldimension to every growth, and we sit onthe shoulders of our predecessors such that acomparative study can only pretend to bean independent, objective approach. Acorollary to that is the question as to whetherthe judgment - of anotherphilosophy/theology/religion will beacceptable to the other, when the approach isgenerally based on the values, concepts,even the vocabulary and language of the onewho studies the other, which the other neednot or does not recognize.In Dr. De Smet's case we know that hewas working through the languages in whichthe original material of the two schools hestudied was available as for instance,Sanskrit for Sankara's Advaita and Englishor any other language for the other

T. S. Rukmani is currently Professor and Chair of Hindu Studies at Concordia University,Montreal, Canada and was previously the first Chair in Hindu Studies and Indian Philosophy atthe University o Durban-Westville, South Africa from 1993-1995. She holds Ph.D. and D.Litt.degrees from the University o Delhi, where her last assignment was as Principal, MirandaHouse, University o Delhi. She is a Sanskritist by training, and her areas of specialization arereligious and theological issues in Hinduism, reform movements in India, women studies,Gandhian studies, Indian philosophy (in particular Advaita Vedanta, Samkhya, and Yoga) and theUpanishads. She is the author o ten books and numerous journal articles: Her latest books areYogasutrabhasyavivarana Vols. I and II (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2001) and YogasutrasofPatanjali with the Commentary of yasa (Chair in Hindu Studies 2001).

Hindu-Christian Studies Bulletin 16 (2003) 12-21

Rukmani: Dr. Richard De Smet and Sankara's Advaita

Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2003


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Assuming his competence in theselanguages, he still had to transcend the arenaof translations and somehow be able tocreatively intuit the meanings of the foreignconcepts that he intended to compare andwhich come with a lot of previous culturaland intellectual baggage.. So there are a number of obstacles toovercome if indeed we cando an honest,comparative work between two schools ofthought, from two very different cultures.Because of the above limitations it is easy toconcur with B.K.Matilal's understanding ofcomparative work (though he was speakingwith reference to comparative philosophy)as the task of explaining and translatingclassical Indian philosophical texts in awestern language . 1 Since Sankara sAdvaita is closer to philosophy than totheology or religion this is relevant for ourpurpose and would come closest to what Iwould count as doing a comparative study.

When we take up the question of DeSmet's comparative study of Christianityand Advaita, all the above thoughts crowdone's mind. As a Christian theologian, itbecame important for De Smet to somehowfind parallels between Advaita, theparamount philosophical/theologiCal schoolin the mind of the Hindus in general, andChristianity, for, in common. with othertheologians, a deeper theological exchangebetween followers of these two spiritualpaths was possible only whenmisconceptions could be cleared away. 2De Smet's primary loyalty to Christiantheology and his love for Sankara's Advaitaexpressed movingly as From Sankara Ilearned to focus on the non-dualistic creativepresence in me - and in all creatures - of theabsolute Brahman as my constant Groundand Cause and thus Supreme Saksin andAtman , goaded him to find parallelsbetween these two systems3, one of which isout and out a theology with belief in apersonal God, who created everything out ofnothing, and the other not a theology in thestrict sense of the term, maybe not aphilosophy as well in the accepted sense of

Dr. Richard De Smet and Sankara's Advaita 3

the term in the west, but perhaps ahermeneutic unraveling of the acosmic(nisprapanca) meanings hidden l l theUpanisads.While in Christianity God is theSupreme; ontological Absolute, Sankara's

Advaita has no room for gods or deity,excepting as a provisional posit. t has noroom for God except in the context of a(metaphysically) ignorant person's inquiryabout the cause of the universe whichunknown to him is only an unrealappearance (and so is not in need of acreator).,,4 Thus we are conscious of thediametrically opposite ways of thinking ofthe Ultimate, Ontological Entity, as well asthe different views ofCreationlManifestation, that such divergentviews entail.In this paper, I try and focus on threepublished papers of De Smet, entitledAdvaitavada and Christianity (1973)(hereafter Advaitavada,,)5, Origin:Creation and Emanation (1978) (hereafterOrigin ),6 and Forward Steps in SankaraResearch (1987) (hereafter ForwardSteps ),7 where he engages in a comparisonof some concepts in Advaita andChristianity, with a view to arriving at aconvergence. I would have liked to havemore of his publications for this study, but,unfortunately, these were the only oneswhich were readily available. So if there areother views and revisions presented in anylater papers, I plead guilty for not consultingthem, for in spite of my best efforts, I didnot succeed in procuring them. But I havehad access to the excellent paper on ThePersonhood of S ankara s Para Brahman(1997) by Malkovskl as well as the volumeof papers published (2000), incommemoration of the passing away of Dr.De Smet in 1997 edited by Malkovsky.9Froin these sources I can surmise that DeSmet did not change or modify his basicstand from his early publications regardinghis understanding of the concepts inAdvaita, based on which he made thecomparative studies.

Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies, Vol. 16 [2003], Art. 6

http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol16/iss1/6DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1295


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14 T.S. Rukmani

If my reading of De Smet is right, thenthe main concern he had was with theNirguna nature of Brahman as pureConsciousness that could not permit theattribution of a creative function to It Sinceonly a person having 'personhood' can havea relation of creativity to the world,Christian theologians in general, and DeSmet in particular, who is our focus, try tofind attribution of personhood to theNirguna Brahman. De Smet services anumber of devices and uses some selectivereadings from Sankara's works to arrive atthe conclusion that it is possible to positpersonhood to Brahman and thus link it withthe manifested world. My task is to see howfar De Smet has succeeded or not in thisenterprise.

As a preamble to this exercise we needto be clear about some points. Firstly there isin place a strong hermeneutic tradition setby the Purvamimamsa school, which isfollowed by Sankara as well, in his approachto the interpretation of the Prasthanatrayi(Brahmasutra, Upanisads andBhagavadgita). These principles, thoughwell known, can suffer repetition as I willtake recourse to them in my explainingSankara, whenever it is relevant. These arethe six hermeneutic principles collectivelyknown as the sadlinga. The first isupakramopasarnharaikya which is important,for it denotes an uniformity of meaningbetween the start and finish of a sentence, asection, < l chapter etc. The second principleis abhyasa or the repetition of the themebeing discussed in the work; the third isapurva or a new conclusion. sought to bebrought about; the fourth is phala or thefruitfulness of such a conclusion; the fifth isarthavada or agreeing or criticizing it in the\york; and the sixth is upapatti or the method

f argumentation. Sankara also uses thereasonings known as upakrama-parakramawhere the initial statements carry moreweight then the later ones, as alsoapaccheda-nyaya, which allows the negationof the previous statement in case thesubsequent one contradicts itlO Sankara

uses these hermeneutic devices to interpretthe Prasthanatrayi in accordance with hisAdvaita stance.Given this importance to the exegeticaltradition of interpretation we cannot affordto ignore Sankara's methodologicalapproach to the understanding of each of thesections (adhikarana) in Badarayana'sBrahmasutras (BS). His commentaries onthe BS as well as the Upanisads (UP) andthe Gita are very often preceded by apreamble to the concerned section, where hestates his thesis and prepares the reader forwhat follows in the subsequent sections ofthe particular chapter. He upholds theprinciple of ekavakyata or the firstexegetical principle of consistency of thmain thesis throughout the entire work andfrequently refers to it in the body of thework and in separate sections. It is alwaysuseful to come back to these initialintroductory portions in Sankara, in order tomake sense of some very difficult points thatare raised in the course of the commentaries.To come back to the paperAdvaitavada mentioned above, De Smettries to set ilp an analogy between theAdvaita Nirguna Brahman and the God ofChristianity, using mainly the passage 4.3.7.from the Brhadaranyaka Up. (Br. Up.) forthe understanding of Brahman. De Smettries to establish an analogical reading of theGod of Christianity including that of Trinityand Sankara's Advaita concept of Brahman.This is one of the pet obsessions of De Smet,for he again comes back to it in his paperOrigin. In the Origin paper he usesAquinas' description of God as 'eminentlyEsse (Be)' and the Taittiriya Up. statementof Brahman being 'satyam, jnanam,anantam' (Truth, Consciousness, Infinite).llHe talks about this again in his ForwardSteps where he tries to argue for theidentical ontological status of the ChristianGod and Advaita Brahman, using a threelevel language for approaching both thesetranscendent realities. Thus in ForwardSteps he believes that Sankara, when heuses the three levels of adhyasa




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(superimposition), apavada (negation) andparamartha-laksana (indication by thesupreme sense), is actually talking about athree level language which can then be takento indicate for both Christian God andBrahman their transcendent nature beyondthe primary meanings of ordinary language(vyavahara), Upanishadic language which ismetaphysical and metempirical languagewhich absolutizes words. 12 This almostsounds like the sphota theory of thegrammarians who absolutize Word assabdabrahman. But this not the case inSankara, and his opposition to the sphotaconcept is well known. De Smet might findthe three levels of adhyasa, apavada andparamarthata a satisfactory tool to explainthe Christian God, but in Sankara that is notthe use to which adhyasa and apavada areput to.Let us now look at Br. Up. 4.3.7 whichSmet uses in Advaitavada for thiscomparison. Sankara in fact has only twocategories to which he applies themethodology of adhyasa and apavada, i.e.Brahman (Atman/Self) and the not-Self. InBr. Up. 4 3 713 Sankara uses the twodevices m i l ~ l y for an epistemic purpose andto extend the scope of adhyasa to explainhow the Self functions at a lower level ofreality. The main point here is the identity ofBrahman with the intellect, the symbol ofconsciousness. Sankara is concerned withthe way tne reflection of consciousnessfunctions and illumines the aggregate ofbody and organs. He has already declared inmany places the distinction between therelational and non-relational view ofReality l4, after stating it as his main thesis inthe Introduction to BS 1.1.1 (thus recallingto mind the second hermeneutic principle ofabhyasa). He has discussed his methodologyof adhyasa and apavada in BSBh 2.3.6 aswell as in the Gitabhasya 13.14 andconsistently maintains his main thesis in hiscommentaries on the Prasthanatrayi. Headds one more level when talking abouterror in the world and dream experiences. STo interpret the three or two levels of


Reality as if they refer to just linguisticcategories is not fair to Sankara's Advaita.Adhyasa is an overriding concept inSankara's Advaita and it cannot be usedselectively to explain some things whileleaving out other things in the system.We also find Sankara talking about twokinds of knowledge, and that can only makesense when the levels they deal with are twolevels of reality 16. Br. Up. Adhyayas(chapters) three and four are together calledthe Yajnavalkyakanda, and they have to beread together as. one unit, along withSankara's commentaries, to understand howSankara presents his two-level reality. Thusin his commentary on Br. Up. 3.4.2 heclearly states his two-level reality which in

tum only reiterates what has already beensaid in 2.4.12, 1.5.3, and in other places.That Brahman and Atman are One and is theHigher Reality, while the world and theselves in it belong to a lower reality, is thecontention of Sankara. De Smet mentions inAdvaitavada based on BSBh II.1.9 andTU. 11 6 1 that we cannot go on repeatingwithout ado that Sankara professes theidentity of the individual soul with theAbsolute,,17. While De Smet uses TU II.6.1which translates as From that Brahman orfrom this Atman was produced Akasa toarrive at his conclusion, it is a positiondifficult to maintain especially whenSankara says in his bhasya on the same TU2.1.1 From That (Brahman) or from thisAtman came into existence Akasah(emphasis mine), i.e. since the word Self(atman) is used with xegard to BrahmanItself, it follows that Brahman is the Self ofthe cogmzmg individual. Sankara'scommentary on TU 2.1.1 which De Smetrefers to, only confirms Sankara'sconviction about the identity of the Self(atman) with Brahman and not otherwise.Repeatedly in that commentary, Sankaraspeaks of this identity. It is a longcommentary, and I give below two of hisstatements there to that effect. Thus he says(1) though the individual Self isintrinsically identical to Brahman ..18 ;




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(2) thus even though Brahman is one's Selfit can remain unattained throughignorance19; from these two combined withthe statement that From That Brahman orfrom this Atman came into existence Akasahit becomes clear that Brahman is identicalwith the individual Self.20 So, in Advaita,there is no distinction between Atman andBrahman and, therefore, it is not possible toacquiesce with Smet in this regard.The rest of Advaitavada dwells uponthe making of man in Christianity and goeson to talk about the attainment of thebeatific vision through the grace of Godand how the individual ceases to conceiveitself as a being separate from God.This .. demands no annihilation of its.dependent existence .. 21. De Smet tries hardto restate Sankara's position as follows:The too little known anthropology whichSankara develops around the notion of thehuman ego as a reflection of the innerWitness opens up towards a conception ofman as a totally dependent and contingentbeing which is yet strongly integrated 22.We can with confidence state that there is aworld of difference not only in the wayhumans/Selves are perceived in Advaita, butalso in the nature of liberation, in the meansto liberation and in the identity repeatedlyproclaimed by Sankara's Advaita betweenBrahman and Selves. All these are points ofdispute and taken together leave us scepticalabout the comparison between the twoUltimates and related issues.

n Origin De Smet also discusses thenotion of Creation, keeping the threelinguistic, levels in the background. Whilethe Christian God creates ex nihilo, inSankara's Advaita the universe/ exists inBrahman before its manifestation. 23Christianity starts with God and thenexplains the universe as created by God.Sankara's philosophical inquiry starts withthe world in order to somehow explain it. Hetherefore resorts to adhyasa to retain theAbsolute, Nirgnuna, intrinsic nature ofBrahman. n his introduction to thisadhil


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depends entirely on the Creator's freedecision and cannot be settled by anydeductive pr6cess ,27. There is again acategory mistake in this argument. All thiscan make sense only in the context ofCreation talk and the notion of the firstinstant of the universe . De Smet also saysthat ontological origination does not itselfimply temporal beginning even if the reverseis true. It is obvious, as already mentioned,that all this can only make sense in aChristian context, where there is a positivetemporal origination of the universe. ForSankara the whole discussion of the originof time or the universe, whether ontologicalor temporal is irrelevant, as it is within thedomain of avidya.De Smet comes back to the Creatornotion of Christianity in a discussion of thenature of the effects of creation. In his paperOrigin he ties the creatures to the idea ofupadhis in Advaita, and one need not quarrelwith that. But it is difficult to agree with hisconclusion of the creatures' totaldependence on their Creator in the contextof Advaita. De Smet brings n the conceptof grace n Advaita (I will touch upon thatbriefly later), combining it with theunsubstantiated theory of creation inAdvaita. When De Smet quotes BS II.l.25and translates it as the SupremeAtman ..creates .. , it is important to recallSankara's introduction of Isvara in the act ofcreation, preservation and destruction in BS1.1.2. Thus, he says It is not possible toimagine any other than this kind of qualifiedIsvara Ifor the creation of this kind ofqualified universe z8. He clearly establishesthat, according to him it is )svara, and notBrahman, that is associated with janma(origin), sthiti (maintenance) and laya(destruction) of the universe. As for 11.1.25which is used by De Smet to undergird hiscreation hypothesis, Sankara has alreadystated as a preamble to this topic before 11.1that the omniscient omnipotent Sarvesvarais the cause of the universe .. and using theprinciples of both upakramopasamharaikya(unity of meaning in the section), abhyasa


(repetition of what has already beenintroduced) and upakrama-parakrama(where . 'initial statements in general carrymore weight than subsequent ones) we haveto understand that here also it is Isvara thatis indicated. The debate is furthered in11.1.27 by stating that Brahman remainsunchanged and beyond phenomenal actions,and all this is imagined through ignorance .Many statements from the BS and theUpanisads that De Smet uses to compareChristianity and the Advaita of Sankara aredifficult to reconcile precisely because ofSankara's own devices of avidya (adhyasa),nirguna/saguna Brahman, maya etc. Thereare statements both in the BS and the UPwhich can be profitably compared toChristianity, but those would be closer toVisistadvaita or Dvaita and not Advaita.Thus, we have to disagree with De Smetwhen he states that we can now with St.Thomas define creation adequately andeminently (paramarthatah) as the intelligentand freely willed emanation of the wholereality or positivity of the universe from thepure Esse 30.In the same paper Origin there ismention of tadatmya, and De Smet'sunderstanding of it, based on BS II.1.14, isas follows. ..the non-difference implied bytadatmya does not eliminate distinction butstresses the ontological character. of thecreature's dependence as well as theCreator's transcendence. 31 BS II. 1. 14 hasbeen explained at length by Sankara. Thesutra in translation reads, 'There isananyatva (non-difference) of those (causeand effect) because of the texts on originetc .. The examples that Sankara brings inhere are spaces within pots and jars beingnon-different from all-pervading akasah, andwater in a mirage being non-different from asandy desert. In his commentary Sankarastresses the elimination of distinctionbetween the Self and Brahman. Sankaraagain brings in Isvara in this context, whoalone can be associated with creation etc.,and reiterates the 'identity or non-differenceof the Selves with Brahman.




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Continuing the discussion on tadatmya,De Smet uses TU 11.6.1 and Sankara'scommentary on it to substantiate his claim.He translates one line of this really longcommentary as names and forms in all theirstates have Brahman alone as their Atman,but Brahman has not its Atman in them (i.e.,tadatmya is not mutual).,,32 There is amisunderstanding of the word tadatmakamhere by De Smet. I translate below the textin question:

Thus it is because of Brahmanalone that nama and rupa have theirbeing in all conditions; but Brahmanis not of their nature [but Brahmandoes not consist of them, accordingto Gambhirananda]; they are said tohave their being in Brahman inessence, because they are no more[cease to exist, according toGambhirananda] when Brahman iseliminated. By these two limitingconditions, Brahman is the agent oall empirical experiences such asknower, knowable and knowledgeetc., and all that it entails.Now the word tadatmakam is acompound (samasa) and an adjective

qualifying Brahman, and the part tat standsfor namarupa and not for Brahman.Atmakam means made up or composed of,of the nature or character of etc. Thereforena tadatmakam cannot be translated asBrahman does not have its Atman in themas De Smet does. It is like the wordrasatmakam in vakyam rasatmakam kavyam(A sentence that has the character of rasa isliterature).34 Tadatmakam indicates thatBrahman is not o the nature of namarupaand not that Brahman has not Atman inthem. Sankara also makes reference to thetopic under discussion by drawing ourattention to the introduction to this wholesection in the TU and indicating that thetopic under discussion is that the Self isimagined to enter the very cavity (of theheart). He thus makes use. o the

hermeneutic principle of ekavakyata andalso reiterates (abhyasa) that the topic l;>eingexamined is the knowledge o Brahma,n.. 5I have spent some time explaining this atlength because it is also quoted byMalkovsky in his paper titled ThePersonhood o Samkara's Para Brahman .36As this paper is concerned mainly with DeSmet's arguments I will not engageMalkovsky's points raised in his paper.So the tadatmya or the unique. identitybetween Brahman and Atrnan is whatSankara repeatedly emphasizes. He uses theexample o the mistaken identity betweenthe rope/snake or shell/silver in order toillustrate this unique relation. The relationbetween the rope and snake is neitherdifference, as we cannot relate two differentterms as snake and rope as This is snake ,nor non-difference since the rope isempirically real while the snake is onlyapparently so; therefore there can be norelation o identity between two levels ofbeing . It is, therefore, a unique relationknown as tadatmya. If, in the above, therope S denied the snake Is not ; but i thesnake is denied (due to realizing one'smistake) the rope Is . Thus, if we apply thesame understanding to TU II.6.1, Brahmanis the same as the rope, and therefore Itunderlies everything; but Brahman asnamarupa does not underlie them, i.e. isnoto their nature, since once namarupa istranscended through knowledge it vanishesand Brahman alone Is . This is anotherexample o adhyasa and also made clear inBr. Up. IV.3.7 and S a n k a r ~ s commentaryon it with which De Smet starts theargument in Advaitavada and mentionedearlier. 7Since the question of grace occurs in allthe three papers under consideration I willbriefly touch upon it here. De Smet uses BS2.3.41 and Sankara's commentary thereonfor support o Sankara's acceptance odivine grace, both in Origin and ForwardSteps,,38 . One has only to read the entirecommentary on 2.3.41 to know that Sankaradoes not support what De Smet believes he




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does. The commentaries on 2.3.41 and2.3.42 have to be read together to makesense. Firstly, it is Isvara, and not Brahman,whose anugraha (grace) is under discussion.Secondly, Sankara continues the same topicin the next sutra and says (Isvara) ishowever dependent on the jiva's efforts, sothat injunctions and prohibitions are notmeaningless and other defects do notarise 39 . In his commentary Sankara clearlystates that Isvara makes the jiva act now inaccordance with its past karma, and Hedirected him earlier in accordance with whathe did earlier, and so on. So, since samsarais without beginning, this is without fault.We can thus see that t is difficult to readdivine grace in Advaita. Grace has to beshowered o n one without any pre-attachedconditions, and that is not the case inSankara 's Advaita.40This brief examination of the abovepapers of Dr.De Smet has shown that he hasnot been able to make a case for either thepersonhood of Sankara's Advaita Brahman,nor for the origin of the seen universe, bothof which differs radically from the ChristianGod and from creation ex nihilo. De Smettried hard to find parallels betweenChristianity and Sankara's Advaita, but hewas dealing with two entirely differentsystems of thought. Just as in theunderstanding of Christianity one has tolook at all the aspects of its theology, soalso, in order to correctly comprehendAdvaita, i( is necessary to read Sankara'scommentaries as a whole in order to arriveat an understanding of Advaita in all itsdimensions. Selective use of a line here orthere cannot help in the long run. This, inno way belittles the sincere efforts of Dr. DeSmet who genuinely sought parallels in thetwo systems. While new interpretations arealways welcome they have to be inconformity with the understanding of thescholar they seek to interpret. Gadamer'sinsightful observations regarding whathermeneutics entails is true of all suchexercises:41


Historical [philosophical]understanding, .. .is the action ofsubjectivity purged of all prejudices,and it is achieved in directproportion to the knower's ability toset aside his own horizons by meansof an effective historical method .. .Isit the case ... hat the knower canleave his immediate situation in thepresent merely by adopting anattitude?Shaped by the past in an infinity ofunexamined ways, the presentsituation is the given in whichunderstanding is rooted, and whichreflection can never entirely hold ata critical distance and objectify.Only a neutralized, prejudice-freeconsciousness guarantees theobjectivity of knowledge.Dr.De Smet was a Christian theologianand though sincere in his approach toSankara and in his efforts to understandSankara's Advaita Vedanta, could not ridhimself of his prejudices . His efforts,therefore, to reinterpret Brahman, tadatmya,adhyasa, and other Sankarian terms and

concepts, in order to bring Sankara'sAdvaita closer to Christian theology, havenot yielded the desired result, in my view.otes

1. Satchidananda Murty,Philosophy in India: Traditions,Teaching and Research (NewDelhi: Indian Council ofPhilosophical Research, 1999reprint), p. 204.2. Cf. Bradley Malkovsky, ThePersonhood of Samkara's ParaBrahman, The Journal oReligion 77 (1997):547.3. Bradley Malkovsky,Introduction: The. Life andWork of Richard V. De Smet,




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SJ., New Perspectives onAdvaita Vedanta: Essays inCommemoration of ProfessorRichard De Smet, S.J., ed.Bradley Malkovsky (Leiden:Brill, 2000), p. 11.4. J. N. Mohanty, AdvaitaVedanta as Philosophy and asReligion, Explorations inPhilosophy: Essays by INMohanty. Volume I: IndianPhilosophy, ed. Bina Gupta,(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress 2002, 2nd ed.), p. 107.5. R.V. De Smet, Advaitavadaand Christianity, The DivineLife 35 (1973):237-239.

6. R.V. De Smet, Origin:Creation and Emanation,Indian Theological Studies 15(1978):266-279.7. R.V. De Smet, Forward StepsIII Sankara Research , PratapSeth Endowment Lecture onSankara Vedanta, DarshanaInternational 26 (1987):33-46.

8. Cf. note 2 above.9. Cf. note 3 above.10. Satchidananda Murty,Revelation and Reason inAdvaita Vedanta (Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass, 1974), pp. 81-87.11. De Smet, Origin, p. 275.12. De Smet, Forward Steps, pp.pp.44-45.13. Br. Up. 4.3.7. in translationreads: Which is the Self? This(purusa) which is identified withthe intellect is in the midst ofthe organs, the (self-effulgent)light within the heart (intellect). .Assuming the likeness (of theintellect) it moves between thetwo worlds; it thinks as it were,and shakes, as it were. Beingidentified with dreams, ittranscends the forms of death(ignorance etc.). (Translation

14.

15.16.

17.18.

19.

by Swami Madhavananda, TheBrhadaranyakopanisad with thecommentary of Sankaracarya,Almora: Advaita Ashrama,1950.) Sankara in hiscommentary on the above talksabout the reflection of the Self(consciousness) in the intellect,mind, sense organs and the bodyby which the entire, insentientcomplex of body-sense organsintellect is illuminated byconsciousness. Sankara alsosays this superimposItIon(adhyasa) is mutual.The Self cannot be takenapart from anything else like astalk of grass from its sheath,and shown in its self-effulgentform. It is for this reason thatthe whole world, to its utterdelusion, superimposes allactivities peculiar to name andform on the Self, and allattributes of this self-effulgentlight on name and form.Translation by R.Balasubramanian, History ofScience, Philosophy andCulture in Indian Civilization.Volume II, Part 2:, AdvaitaVedanta (New Delhi: Centre forStudies in Civilizations, 2000).Commentaries on BS.I.12;Chand Up. 3.14.2; Br. Up.2.3.6; 4.4.15;, Kena Up. 4.4;Taitt. Up. 2.4.1; 2.B.S.Bh. ILl.4; IV.3.14.Commentaries on Mund.Up.Ll.4 and 5; Br. Up. 3.5.l;Chand. Up. 6.2.1.Advaitavada, p. 239.paramarthatobrahmasvarupasyapi satah asya

jivasyaevamavidyaya atmabhutamapibrahma anaptam syat.




11/11

20.

21.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.

29.

30.31.32.33.

tasmadva etasmadatmanah itibrahmanyevaatmasabdaprayo gatvedituratmaiva brahma.A d v a i t ~ l . V a d a , p. 238

Ibid., p. 239B.S.Bh. I 2. 22.Origin, p. 269.B.S.Bh. I 3. 30; II. 1. 10Origin, p. 269.Ibid., pp. 272-73.na ca yathoktavisesanasyajagatoyathoktavisesanamisvarammuktvaanyatah ..sambhavayitumsakyate.avidyakalpitar upabhedabhyupagamt; avidyakalpitena canamarupalaksanena ..tattvanyatvabhyamanirvacaniyenabrahmaparinamadisarvavyavaharaspadatvam pratipadyate;paramarthikena brahmaparinamarthikena ca rupenasarvavyavaharatitamaparinatamavatisthate.Origin , pp. 276-77.Ibid., p. 279.Ibid., p. 279.atah namarupe sarvavasthebrahmanaivatmavati. nabrahma tadatmakam. tetatpratyakhyane na sta evetitadakmake ucyete. tabhyam caupadhibhyamjnatrjneyajnanasabdarthadisarvasamvyavaharabhagbrahma.


34.

35.

36.37.38.39.

40.

41.

Sahitya Darpana 1 cited inV .M.Apte' s The PracticalSanskrit-English Dictionary(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1992), p. 355.kimarthamasthane carca.prakrto hyanyo vivaksito syavak yarthah asti. sa smartavyah- brahmavidapnoti param ..The Personhood ... , p. 559.Cf. note 3 above.Origin, pp. 273-74; ForwardSteps, p. 37.krtaprayatnapeksastuvihitapratisiddhavaiyarthyadibhyah.api ca purvapraytnamapeksyaidanim karayati purvataram caprayatnamapeksyapurvamakarayaditianaditvatsamsarasyetianavadyam.David Linge, Editor'sIntroduction to Hans GeorgGadamer, PhilosophicalHermeneutics, Translated andEdited by David Linge(Berkeley: University oCalifornia Press, 1976),xiv-xvi.


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Dr. Richard de Smet and Sankaras Advaita