Dr. Charles W. Dr. Charles W.

WessnerWessnerDirector, Technology & InnovationDirector, Technology & Innovation

The National Academies of The National Academies of Sciences, USASciences, USA

2

• Advisor, US Congress & Executive Agencies• Adjunct Professor, George Washington University;

University of Nottingham, England; Max Planck

Institute, Germany • Advisor, OECD Committee on Science and

Technology Policy• Advisor, Mexican National Council on Science and

Technology• Advisor, Finland National Technology Agency

(Tekes)• Advisor, Sweden National Technology Agency

(VINNOVA) • Member, Norwegian Technology Forum

3

Fostering Knowledge & InnovationAn Overview of the United States Innovation System

Innovation & Competitiveness Practitioners Workshop

Istanbul, TurkeyApril 19, 2004

Charles W. Wessner, Ph.D.Director, Technology and Innovation

National Research Council

4

The U.S. National Academies

NRC Mission:• The NRC is the Operating Arm of the National Academies; it includes 1300 Staff and a Budget of $160 Million• The NRC Mission is the Advise the Government on Science, Engineering, and Medicine: 270 Reports Each Year

National Academy of Sciences

National Academy of Engineering

Institute of Medicine

National Research Council

5

What is a National Innovation System?

• A network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, develop, modify, and commercialize new technologies– Increasingly, governments around the world

view the development and transformation of such systems as an important way to promote innovation —thus improving the competitiveness of domestic industries and services

– Can be better understood as an Eco-system

6

Why National Innovation “Eco-Systems”?

• “Eco-Systems” Because Innovation Systems Grow and Evolve– They are not constructed by an engineering

team to reach a fixed point

• The Good News: New policies and institutional change can help ecosystem to grow in new ways for new needs– Ecosystem characterized by dynamic

linkages among multiple sub-systems…

7

National Innovation “Eco-Systems”

• Ecosystem strengthened through linkages among a Nation’s – Human Resource base, – Information Infrastructure – Universities and Research Institutes, – A Positive Business Environment – Enabling Government Policies and

Programs• The Policies drive the System

8

U.S. Innovation Ecosystem

Strengths & Weaknesses• Strong Aggregate

Commitments to R&D • Distributed system with

multiple paths of Inquiry and Trial

• Culture of Inquiry & Entrepreneurship

• Entrepreneurship-friendly Business Environment

• Distribution of research portfolio can cause gaps & shortfalls, and can reduce the impact of R&D investments

• Political myths about the primacy of markets inhibit commercialization mechanisms

• Dominance of Military R&D, Capacity Constraints & Waste lowers return on R&D investments

9

Presentation Topics• Trends and Anomalies in US R&D Funding

– Strong Aggregate Commitments– But Linkages to Commercial Realization are less robust

• Myths and Market Realities about the US Innovation System– Myth of Perfect Markets mean that Promising New Ideas

are often not adequately funded– The Path to Commercialization is Complex

• Sustaining Innovation-Led Growth– Fostering an Enabling Business Environment– Government Awards to Spur Growth: The SBIR Model– Innovation Transfer from Universities

• Concluding Points

10

Trends & Anomalies in U.S. R&D Funding

The Good News and theBad News

11

Strong U.S. Commitment to R&D

Shares of Total World R&D, 2001• Total World R&D =

$746.7 billion• U.S. share = $276

billion• EU share = $187

billion

• Source: OECD Main S&T Indicators, 2004; AAAS, 2004

• Calculated using purchasing power parities, Jan 2004

12

Trends in U.S. R&D FundingThere is Good News, but…

Total R&D is Rising (but Federal R&D Spending is flat)

13

U.S. Industry and Federal R&D: 2000

Industry R&D is More Focused on Development than Basic or Applied Research

Source: AAAS

Expenditures in Billions of U.S. Dollars

14

More Good NewsPublic Research has Surged in Health:

A National Decision to Increase our Bet

Source, AAAS, 2003

15

Trends in U.S. R&D Funding

The Bad News: An Uneven Record

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Com

puter scie

nces

Med

ical scie

nces

Oc

eanogra

phy

Oth

er eng

ineerin

g

Biolo

gical scie

nces

Aero

nautic

al eng

ineerin

g

Civil e

ngine

erin

g

Environ

menta

l bio

logy

Social scie

nces

Astro

nautic

al eng

ineerin

g

Atm

osphe

ric sciences

Math

ematics

Agric

ultu

ral sciences

Psy

cholog

y

Metallu

rgy/m

aterials e

ngine

erin

g

Astron

omy

Chem

istry

Physics

Chem

ical e

ngine

erin

g

Geolo

gical scie

nces

Ele

ctr

ical e

ngine

erin

g

Mech

anic

al eng

ineerin

gP

erce

nt c

han

ge

All performers Universities & Colleges

Changes in Federal Research Obligations for All Performers and University/College Performers FY 1993–1999

16

The Really Bad News

-60%

-50%

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10% Chemistry Physics

Chemicalengineering

Geologicalsciences

Electricalengineering

Mechanicalengineering

All performers Universities & Colleges

Random Disinvestment: Real Declines for Research in Physics, Chemistry, & Engineering Risk a Lag Effect

FY 1993–1999; constant 1999 dollars

17

Anomalies in R&D Funding

in U.S. Innovation System• R&D Investments in IT-Related Disciplines Dropped in Real Terms in the 1990s– Yet, IT Innovation is the Main Driver of U.S.

Productivity Surge • Investments in Biomedicine are Up

– But complementary IT investments are needed to capitalize on biomedical progress• Super Computers needed for DNA Analysis• Imaging Technologies and Diagnostics rely on

IT advances• Multi-disciplinary Approaches, e.g.,

Bioinformatics are required

18

Criticisms of the U.S. Innovation System

• Overall R&D Spending is Inadequate– Insufficient R&D investment in the future– 2% in the 1960’s—now 0.8% of GDP

• Too Much Concentration on Military R&D – 52%– Low-utility for civilian economy– Slow or No spin-out for most R&D investments

• Too Much Focus on Health Research at NIH and Not Enough on the Necessary Information Technologies– Surge in Bio-terrorism funding faces capacity

constraints• Inadequate Commercialization Mechanisms

– Ideological/political blockages for effective programs– U.S. myths about perfect markets and role of venture

capital prevent effective policy making– U.S. programs are too few and under-funded

19

Policy Myths & Market Realities

The Myth of Linear Innovation

The Myth of Military Spin-Offs

The Myth of Perfect Markets

The Myth of the Venture Capital Solution

20

• Reality: Innovation is a Complex Process– Major overlap between Basic and Applied Research,

as well as between Development and Commercialization

– Principal Investigators and/or Patents and Processes are Mobile, i.e., not firm-dependent

– Many Unexpected Outcomes– Technological breakthroughs may precede, as well

as stem from, basic research

The Myth of the Linear Model of Innovation

Basic ResearchApplied Research

Development Commercialization

•Myth: Innovation is a Linear Process

21

Basic Research

AppliedResearch

Development

Commercial-ization

Quest for Basic Understanding•New Knowledge•Fundamental Ideas Potential Use

•Application of Knowledge to a Specific Subject•“Prototypicalization”

Development of Products•Goods and Services

Feedback: Market Signals/Technical Challenge• Desired Product Alterations or New Characteristics•Cost/design trade-off

Feedback:Applied Researchneeded to designnew product characteristics

Feedback:• Basic Research needed for discovery •Search for new ideas and solutions to solve longer-term issues

NewUnanticipatedApplications

Non-Linear Model of Innovation

22

The Myth of Military Spin-Offs• Euro Myth: “U.S. Defense

Research/Procurement Directly Funds Civilian Technologies”

• Reality: “Very few technologies proceeded effortlessly from defense conception to commercial application.” – Secrecy, military specs, and long lead times slow

diffusion of new defense technologies• Billions for Stealth Technologies: What civilian market?

– Even efforts to use low-cost civilian technologies for defense use, i.e., “spin-ins,” are often blocked by complicated military procurement system

Beyond Spin-off, John Alic, Lewis Branscomb, et al.

23

The Myth of Military Spin-Offs

• Defense Industry Contracted Sharply in Ten Years after End of Cold War– Major American Contractors dropped from 15 to 5– Industry is detached from mainstream U.S. economy– Dedicated programs with limited spin-off now

compounded by long-term, slow moving contracts • Defense R&D Funds Concentrated on Small Number

of Engineers with Strong Applied Focus– Issue of scale: Intel at $100 Billion value vs. top three

defense groups combined is $50 Billion • Spin-Off of Platform Technologies is Diffused

– Semiconductors and Internet applied widely– Engines and Airframe: Spillovers are substantial

24

The Myth of Perfect Markets

• Strong U.S. Myth: “If it is a good idea, the market will fund it.”

• Reality:– Potential Investors have less than perfect

knowledge, especially about innovative new ideas

– “Asymmetric Information” leads to suboptimal investments• This means that it is hard for small firms to

obtain funding for new ideas

25

Federally Funded Basic

Research Creates New

Ideas

Applied Research

&

Innovation

Capital to Develop Ideas

No Capital

Reality: The Valley of Death Early-Stage Funding Gap

To Innovation

26

The Valley of Death

• A Series of Gaps– Gap in Available Cash Necessary

to develop technology to Proof of Principle, Prototype, and/or Product

– Gaps in Information between Entrepreneur and potential Investor and Partner about• Technology—What is it?• Potential of Technology—What can it do?• Business Opportunity—What size market?

27

The Cash Flow Valley of Death

Technology Creation

Technology Development Early Commercialization

Cash Flow

Federal Agencies, Universities,

States

Entrepreneur & Seed/Angel Investors

IPO

Time

Cash Flow Valley of

Death

Successful

Moderately Successful

Unsuccessful

Unsuccessful

Typical Primary Investors

Venture Capitalists

SBIR & ATP

Adapted from: L.M. Murphy & P. L. Edwards, Bridging the Valley of Death—Transitioning from Public to Private Sector Financing, Golden CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, May 2003

28

The Myth of U.S.Venture Capital Markets

• Myth: “U.S. VC Markets are broad & deep, thus there is no role for government awards”

• Reality: Venture Capitalists have– Limited information on new firms– Prone to herding tendencies– Focus on later stages of technology

development– Most VC investors seek early exit

• Large U.S. Venture Capital Market is Not Focused on Early-Stage Firms

29

Sustaining Science-Based Growth

Firm Creation & Job Growth

30

Basic Research and Small Companies Drive Science-

Based Growth• Basic Research is Key in Supplying a Steady Stream of “Fresh and New” Ideas – Ideas, if Effectively Transferred to the Private

Sector, can become Innovations

• Basic research is Essential, but not Enough– Innovations can become Commercial Products

driving Growth—with the Right Policy Support

• Developing Incentives to spur Innovative Ideas for New Products is a Central Policy Challenge– Small Companies are Key Players

31

Importance of Small Businesses to the U.S.

Economy• Small Businesses are a Key Driver of the U.S. Knowledge-Based Economy– Generating 60% to 80% of Net New Jobs Annually

• 2.5 million of the 3.4 million Total Jobs—1999-2000• Employs 39% of High-Tech Workers—Scientists,

Engineers, Computer Workers– Producing 14 times more Patents per Employee

than Large Patenting Firms• Patents are of High Quality• Twice as Likely to be Cited

32

Small Businesses…

• Grow Jobs• Generate Taxable Wealth• Create Welfare-Enhancing Technologies• Transform the Composition of the

Economy, Developing Products to Ensure our Well-Being and Productivity in the Future

This is Why we Punish Them!

33

Challenges Facing Small Firms in the United States:

Regulation & Finance• SME’s Face High Regulatory Burdens

– Very small firms (less than 20 employees) spend 60% more per employee than large firms to comply with federal regulations

• New Firms Struggle for Adequate Financing– Start-Up funds from “Friends, Family, and

Fools”– Over 80% of small firms in U.S. rely on

credit but banks hesitate to lend

34

VC Markets More Risk Averse

Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers/Venture Economics/National Venture Capital Association Money Tree Survey, 2004

35

Breakdown of U.S. Venture Capital by Stage of Development-2001

1.93%23%18%

57%

Early Stage Expansion

Later Stage Startup/ Seed

Startup/Seed$799 million

Source: PricewaterCoopers, Venture Economics, National Venture Capital Association, 2003

Total= $41.284 billion

36

Breakdown of U.S. Venture Capital by Stage of Development-2003

1.95% 18.27%

54.18%

26.60%

Startup/Seed Early Stage Expansion Later Stage

Startup/Seed$354.3 million

Total = $18.2 billion

37

Why Do Funding Gaps Matter?

• Because Equity-Financed Small Firms are a Leading Source of Growth in Employment in the United States

• Equity-Financed Small Firms are One of the Most Effective Mechanisms for Capitalizing on New Ideas and Bringing Them to the Market– Audretsch and Acs

38

Significance of Pubic Support for

Early-Stage Technology Development

Collapse in Venture Funding Revealed Importance of Other Sources of Early-Stage Finance

39

New Research: U.S. Funding Sources for Early-Stage Technology

Development

Branscomb & Auerswald, Between Invention and Innovation An Analysis of Funding for Early-Stage Technology Development, NIST, 2002

Multiple Actors

*

Multiple Sources of

Finance Focused on

Different Stages

*

Government Role is

Significant

40

Surprising Role of U.S. Government in Early-Stage Technology Development

• Markets for Allocating Risk Capital to Early-Stage Technology Ventures are not Efficient

• Most Early-Stage Funding comes from– Individual “Angel” investors,– Corporations, and– Federal Government – Not Venture Capitalists!

• Federal Technology Development funds Complement Private Funds– More important than we thought

41

U.S. Entrepreneurial EnvironmentA Key to Knowledge-Based Growth

Sources and Limitations

Drive for Ownership: High Rates of Business Formation– High Social Value placed on business success– Low penalties for failure: Gentle Bankruptcy

Laws Low Regulatory barriers for entry

– Ease of company formation– Access to early-stage financing—very important– Pace of activity increases the effective value of

capital

42

U.S. Policy FrameworkStrong but Uneven R&D Commitment

• Spending Helps: Record funding for federal R&D:• FY 2005 R&D=$131.9billion

– DoD R&D up 6.7% to $69.9 Billion• But funding for basic research remains flat

– NIH has doubled over five years to $28.8 Billion– NSF to increase to $5.7 Billion– DOE to increase to $8.9 Billion– DHS rapidly expanding to $1.2 Billion

• Problems with expenditure

• Large increases in R&D funding for weapons development and homeland defense, but flat or declining funding for the rest of the R&D portfolio

• Focus on military development misstates figures and reduces return on R&D portfolio

43

Positive Policy Framework:Microeconomic Incentives

• Positive Incentives for Entrepreneurs– Strong Intellectual Property Regime: Personal

Incentive for Invention– Tax Policy: Potential High Returns are the Best

Incentive for High Risks– Regulatory Policy: Low Regulation for New

Entrants = Lower Cost, Faster to Market– Labor Flexibility: Hire and Fire as Needed

• Firms that Can’t Fire, Will not Hire (or Invest)

• Good Goals do not Guarantee Good Policy

44

Positive Policy Framework:Intermediating Institutions

• Public-Private Partnerships• Innovation Awards —SBIR, ATP• S&T Parks• University-Industry Clusters • Industry Consortia

45

U.S. Policies for Innovation-Led Growth

Government Awards to Spur Innovation-Led Growth:

SBIR

46

Programs to Bridge the Valley of Death

Total AllocatedResources

Uncertainty and Distance to

Market

Prototype

Product development

Commercialisation

Strategic research

Curiosity research

Applied research

Capital Allocation Curve

The Financial “Valley of

Death”The Focus of

SBIR and ATP

Seed: Angel Investors

Expansion

1st Round VC

2nd Round VC

Business development

Investment

Startup: Friends, Families & Fools

Need fo

r Supp

orti v

e

Poli cy

Fram

ew

ork

SBIR Procurement

ATP

Pre 2002

47

U.S. Innovation Curve

Total AllocatedResources

Uncertainty and Distance to

Market

Prototype

Product development

Commercialisation

Curiosity research

Strategic research

Applied research

Capital Allocation Curve

The Financial “Valley of

Death”The Focus of

SBIR and ATP

Seed: Angel Backers

Expansion

1st Round VC

2nd Round VCBusiness

development

Investment

Startup: Friends, Families & Fools

Need fo

r Supp

orti v

e

Poli cy

Fram

ew

ork

SBIR Procurement

and ATP are More Important

Post 2002

48

The SBIR Program• Created in 1982, Renewed in 1992 & 2001• Participation by all federal agencies with an

annual extramural R&D budget of greater than $100 million is mandatory– Agencies must set aside 2.5% of their

extramural R&D budgets for small business awards

• Currently a $2 billion per year program– Largest U.S. Partnership Program

49

SBIR: Critical Source of Predictable Funding for Early-

Stage Finance• SBIR—Main Source of Federal Funding for Early-Stage Technology Development• SBIR over 85% of

Federal Financial Support for Early-Stage Development

• SBIR over 20% of Funding for Early-Stage Development from all sources

*Estimate of Federal Government Funding Flows to Early-Stage Technology Development—Based on total funding for ATP, SBIR & STTR programs by Branscomb and Auerswald 2002

* SBIR

50

SBIR Model

PHASE IFeasibilityResearch

PHASE IIIProduct

Developmentfor Gov’t orCommercial

Market

Private Sector Investment

Tax Revenue

Federal Investment

PHASE IIResearchtowards

Prototype

Socialand

Government Needs

$750K$100K

R&

D

Investm

en

t

51

SBIR: Goals Vary Among Agencies

• Multiple Program Goals– Commercialization and Research

• Multiple Agency Goals– NIH

• Research Tools, Medical Devices, Drug Development, and Audio-Visual Health Materials

– DOD• Special Forces Equipment• Neural Network Processors for remotely piloted

jets• Wireless Communications for Divers• Low-cost, High-performance Drones

52

SBIR Differs Among Agencies

• Multiple Administrative Systems– Each agency typically has its own manner of

choosing awardees and screening applications– Different metrics reflecting unique agency

missions and needs– Different Metrics by industrial sector, e.g.,

software vs. drug development vs. weapon components

• Commendable Flexibility & Diversity• Not Harmonization!

53

SBIR’s Attraction to Policy Makers

• Catalyzes the Development of New Ideas and New Technologies

• Capitalizes on Substantial R&D Investments• No Budget Line —stable program

• Addresses Gaps in Early-Stage Funding for Promising Technologies• Attractive to Small Firms —political support• Certification Effect —government

endorsement of technical quality

54

SBIR’s Attraction to Entrepreneurs

• Features that Make SBIR Grants Attractive include:– No dilution of ownership– No repayment required– Grant recipients retain rights to IP developed

using SBIR funds– No royalties are owed to government– Certification effect for technology/firm

55

Contributions of SBIR to the Nation

• Provides a Bridge between Small Companies and the Agencies, especially for Procurement

• Contributes New Methods and New Technologies to Government Missions

• Provides a Bridge between Universities and the Marketplace

• Encourages Local and Regional Growth, increasingly through the University connection• Creates jobs and justifies R&D investments to the

general public

56

Contributions of SBIR Concept

• Catalyzes the Development of New Ideas and New Technologies

• Capitalizes on Substantial U.S. R&D Investments

• Addresses Gaps in Early-Stage Funding for Promising Technologies

• Certification Effect—Government Endorsement of Technical Quality

57

The Enabling Role of Universities

A Major U.S. Asset

58

University-Industry Cooperation is Key• Cooperative Research

– University research draws ideas from commercial trends more than ever before

– Feedback loops from industry to universities are important

– Major contribution to training for real jobs

• Regional Growth

– Regional economies need their research universities more than ever before

• Firm Formation– University innovation + early government funding have

been key to the growth of many successful technology companies

• Supportive University Culture & Incentives are crucial

59

How Ideas are Commercialized

Transferring University Technology to Firms

RESEARCH $$ INVESTMENT $$

SALES $$

UNIVERSITYCOMMERCIAL

COMPANYNEW PRODUCTS

& PROCESSESINNOVATION

LicenseAgreement or Equity

• Licensing to existing companies – brings royalty $

• New company formation – brings royalties and/or equity

• Other, less direct, contributions to regional economic activity – 5,000 Good New Jobs in Pittsburgh Area

ROYALTIES

or EQUITY PAYOUT

SBIR

Drawn from C. Gabriel, Carnegie Mellon University

60

The Benefits of University-Industry Cooperation: SBIR

Role• SBIR Innovation Awards Directly Cause Researchers to create New Firms– Jobs and Regional Growth– Cooperation creates High-Tech Jobs

• Universities help diversify and grow the job base– Increasingly universities are the largest regional

employer for all types of employment• Cooperation validates Research Funding

– Returns to Society in Health, Wealth, & Taxes– SBIR is a proven mechanism in an uncertain game

61

Changing Role of Universities

Their Role is Important and Changing

• Universities’ Economic Contributions– Idea Creation: Basic & Applied Research

• Effective University Leadership and Supportive Policies Make Universities– Poles for Growth of High-Tech Clusters– Centers for Employment of All Types

62

To Make the University a Nexus of Growth

• Requires Real Changes in– Culture and Values: This requires new

leadership and new incentives– Status of Professors: permissive

environment to encourage innovations, collaboration with industry, and pursuit of innovation awards and wealth

– Institutional Practices: Parallel research institutes with self-select mechanism

63

Incentives and Impacts in the

U.S. University Model• Structure– Multiple sources of funding– Different Types of Institutions

for different needs

– High cost tuition for private schools; State schools $3,500 to $6,000 per year

– Significant Student funding of studies

– Many needs-based scholarships provided

– Licensing obstacles to technology transfer

• Characteristics– Curriculum responsive to

market needs—ie, industry– Adaptable, Differentiated

programs for students– High range of student choice

– High percentage of class attendance & participation

– High percentage of college-age cohort attending

– Globally high returns to R&D investments, but

– Analytically suboptimal returns to public investments in university research

64

Incentives in the European University

Model• Structure– Centrally managed

University budgets

– Faculty are Civil Servants

– Student fees paid by the State

– Centralized State funding

– No University Endowments

• Characteristics– Curriculum not responsive

to market needs nor scientific opportunity

– Faculty job security means little incentive to innovate

– Low levels of Student engagement; don’t seek ‘money’s worth’

– Lack of financial autonomy limits Universities’ flexibility, adaptability & accountability

– Fewer new initiatives

65

Consequences of the U.S. Model

• The US system is more demand driven, and therefore more adaptable– Multiple private participants, not state

controlled• No single model for higher education

– Transfers allows upward mobility across institutions for bright students from different socio-economic backgrounds

• Research is often focused on problem-solving rather than pure theory

• Tax laws encourage cooperation with industry – Donations of building and endowments

66

Characteristics of Successful

University-Industry Partnerships• University-Industry Cooperation involves:

– Complementary Objectives, Mutual Respect– Active, Routine Communication for Cross-pollination

of ideas

• Growing Perception of University as Major Regional Economic Player– SBIR brings Research out to the Market– SBIR links Universities, Small Companies, and Large

Companies

67

Concluding Points

68

Understanding Innovation Ecosystems• National Innovation Systems are Different in

Scale and Flexibility– Flexibility is a differentiator– It is less how much is spent but how well

• All Systems Have Common Challenges– Need to justify R&D expenditures by creating new jobs

& new wealth– Need to reform institutions (or invent new ones)– Need to recognize that project failure does not equal

program failure

• Linkages strengthen Innovation Ecosystems– E.g., SBIR draws together small businesses,

universities, and government agencies

69

Lessons from the US Innovation System

• The US Innovation System is one of the most productive in the world– Its first lesson is its diversity of approaches; there

is no one right answer and no one right model• What we do know is that centrally planned and

funded technology development programs and University systems work less well– Uniformity of approach is not equality of opportunity

• User driven systems are more responsive– Therefore students & industry should be involved

in decisions and share costs in the cooperative efforts of education and innovation

70

Lessons from the US Innovation System

• What does this mean in practice?– Universities should be allowed to

differentiate to meet different market needs in training, education & cooperation with industry

– To do this, universities need financial autonomy, incentives to cooperate with industry, and strong local rewards

– Awards to industry (and universities) should be competitive, limited in size and duration, and be performance based

71

Lessons from the US Innovation System

• Most important, a powerful institutional mechanism, e.g., a Science, Technology, and Innovation Council, is often needed to adjust the innovation system to new needs, and new opportunities, while drawing on best practice and encouraging diversity.

• Mechanisms like SBIR can change behavior in Universities & Labs while addressing the Early Stage Funding Gap

• Close cooperation with strong innovation systems, e.g., the U.S. and European nation states, should be pursued to acquire resources & network advantages

72

THANK YOU

Charles W. Wessner, Ph.D.Board on Science, Technology, & Economic Policy

National Research Council500 Fifth Street NW

Washington, D.C. 20001cwessner@nas.eduTel: 202 334 3801

http://www.nationalacademies.org/step