Conference Dossier

“Ten Years after 9/11: Civil Liberties vs. Terrorism”

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Contents

Contents 1The Future of Terrorism “Twenty Years After 9/11” 4Four Scenarios and Implications 4Sources and materials 17

Videos from the conference....................................................................17Texts and Links.......................................................................................17

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Greeting and conclusionsDear participants,

“10 Years after 9/11 – Civil Liberties vs. Terrorism?” In 12 days of an intensive conference programme we have looked into many aspects of the subject. We discussed the direct consequences in military and legal dimensions, we asked for the relationship, contradiction or correlation of freedom and security and we discussed possible developments in the future. It is not easy to conclude with only some few results, because we did not only look at one particular state or society but discussed the situation with focus on the USA, Germany/Europe and Pakistan. Views, focus and perception of the consequences of 9/11 seem to differ here. And also from within the different regions we heard different views. So I would like to share some of my observations without claiming that these are complete and comprehensive or could do justice to the more than 150 contributions our participants made in the conference forum.

From the United States we heard the view that legislation like the “Patriot Act” within the country was necessary and effective to fight terrorism after 9/11. At the same time we

heard US-American voices criticizing the “explosion of surveillance” and its long term effects. From the European perspective we also heard a lot of critical remarks on the EU-US cooperation in fighting terrorism with regards to the rule of law. Cooperation of secret services in detaining and fighting terror suspects was addressed here as well as the transmission of banking or flight passenger data. By Pakistani participants we heard the wish not to be stigmatized solely as supporters of terrorism but to see also

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the victims of terrorism and the ‘war against terror’ on the Pakistani side. However, this was followed by a debate on what should be expected from governments to fight terrorism consequently in their own countries.

Also enlightening were our experts ideas on how terrorist threats could look like in the future and how to develop a rational assessment by using scenario techniques. In the different discussions it became clear that the wide spread assumption among experts and participants is, that we will have to face and live with terrorist threats in the future.

-> Study below

We had an interesting discussion on how liberals should fight terrorism. It became clear that we should not aim for more and more security at the expense of freedom; that we cannot save our freedom when we infringe more and more upon it. However it was nice to see that the debate in our forum went beyond that point: Liberals should also be able to provide answers. Security is also a liberal concern as long as it is not inappropriately limiting freedom. We must not see the relationship of freedom and security as a dichotomy but as a hierarchical relationship where liberals would be the first to opt for freedom when in doubt. The priority of freedom could even be a view shared not solely by liberals. The more important it is to provide liberal answers on how to care for an appropriate and rational security level in accordance with rule of law and liberal principles. But where to draw a line? Which police measures and investigation techniques are acceptable? Probably each society has to find an own answer here. It was very interesting to follow the discussions on this point and we may conclude, that we should continue thinking here in order to provide answers and lobby for the value of freedom successfully.

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Wulf Pabst, Sept. 2011

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The Future of Terrorism“Twenty Years After 9/11”

Four Scenarios and Implications

By Johannes Gabriel

About raumtaktikraumtaktik - office from a better future is a think tank based in Berlin. Its research focuses on urban futures and the dynamics and drivers of the built environment. With a broad urbanistic, architectural and cultural approach to practical implementation, raumtaktik has specialised in helping policy-makers and professionals prepare for the unknown yet configurable future in the cities of tomorrow.

About the AuthorJohannes Gabriel is a social scientist focussing on future studies. He worked with the Society and Technology Research Group (the Daimler AG’s in-house think tank for future studies) and organized international scenario projects, inter alia with the European Commission and the Global Public Policy Institute.Johannes graduated in political science and economics at the University of Trier where he is currently completing his PhD on “(Political) Science and Future”.

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1 | IntroductionHow can we construct possible futures? What are possible futures of terrorism? What strategic implications could be derived from a set of possible futures? These are the guiding question of this study, which follows up a presentation on 15 September 2011, at the International Online Conference “Ten years After 9/11. Terrorism vs. Civil Rights” by Friedrich Naumann Stiftung für die Freiheit. (911.virtuelle-akademie.fnst.org). In this study, future is defined as a time horizon of approximately 10 years. Such a long-term horizon is characterized by uncertainties evolving from structural and dynamical complexities. In order to include uncertainties and complexities in the construction and assessment of possible futures, linear extrapolation of current trends is not seen as an adequate instrument. This study aims to construct four possible and plausible scenarios to embrace the inherent complexities and uncertainties in a systematic manner. Scenarios reject any claim to foresee or forecast the future. Scenarios are foresight (Vorausschau) instruments, not forecast (Vorhersage) instruments. Scenarios are plausible and pictures of the future and colourful stories about possible developments. Therefore scenarios are an instrument to make different future developments imaginable and to derive some broad and vague implications for today’s planning processes – not more but also not less.This short study aims to give an example of a basic scenario construction process and therefore should be seen as an exercise in scenario thinking. All scenarios built and all implications derived have to be treated fairly as outcomes of an exercise in thinking.

2 | Constructing Scenarios for the Future of TerrorismAn Interdisciplinary ApproachScenarios usually are constructed in a process of group communication that is clearly structured. For a scenario workshop you need six to ten experts from different fields of research who are knowledgeable about the main issue being discussed. Concerning the future of terrorism you would probably gain from having experts in regional studies (Middle East and the Americas), international politics and/or international security, science and technology, sociology, political economy, organized crime, military studies, history, (international) law, and psychology. Having the right interdisciplinary team of researchers and/or practitioners is highly valuable not only for scenario construction but also throughout

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the strategic foresight process (scenario construction + derivation of implications for current planning processes). Such an interdisciplinary approach helps you to achieve colourful scenarios, which include the broader environment of terrorism. The environment perspective is important to avoid linear thinking and to create knowledge about influential factors, interdependencies and the resulting dynamics.

Influential FactorsTerrorism and its possible future developments are influenced by a plethora of factors from very different fields. You can find technological, political, economical, and even ecological factors that come into play. Finding, defining and analysing these influential factors are some of the main parts in a scenario construction process. A good point to start from is a primary list consisting 25-50 factors from different fields that directly influence terrorism. For example, global inequality influences terrorism. Indicators for global inequality could be GDP per capita or the global distribution of wealth. Possible states of global inequality in 2021 could be either increased or decreased in comparison to the year 2011. Increased global inequality could lead to more international terrorism because of an intensified perception of injustice. Other examples could include religious radicalization or the prevailing mode of foreign politics (as discussed at the conference).Table 1 presents 17 influential factors with short descriptions or definitions and possible states in 2021. You can also find a column labelled ‘System’ that defines the field affiliation of the respective factor (P: Politics, S: Society, T: Technology, E: Economy, L: Law, IR: International Relations, Eco: Ecology). With this column you can quickly check whether you have found factors from the broad environment of terrorism or just from the field of the economy and politics for example.

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Table 1: Primary List

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Uncertainty-Impact AnalysisStrategic foresight in general and scenario construction in particular deals with complexity and uncertainty. On the other, hand you have to reduce complexity in order to construct clearly distinguished scenarios in a systematic manner that is easy to understand for outsiders who are not part of the scenario workshop. Scenario construction is based on logical reasoning, intersubjectivity and reduction of complexity, which makes it a scientific method. To construct scenarios by temporarily reducing complexity two steps have to be taken: Initially all factors have to be analyzed by their level of uncertainty (the probability distribution of possible future states) and their impact on terrorism. Consequentially, this step is called Uncertainty-Impact (UI) Analysis. In this analysis you have to rate every single factor’s uncertainty and impact in relation to all other factors. Usually you can use a simplistic rating system by measuring uncertainty and impact of every factor with 0, 1 or 2 (see Table 2). Another way is to locate all factors in a UI diagram in relation to each other (see Illustration 1).

Table 2: UI Analysis

No.

Factor Uncertainty

Impact

1 Face of Globalization 1 12 Global Inequality 1 13 National Inequality 1 24 Foreign Politics 2 25 Level of Surveillance 0 17 IT Development 0 18 Religious Radicalization 1 29 Political Radicalization 2 210 Legitimacy of Non-religious Terrorism 1 011 Borders 0 113 (Good) Governance and Steering

Capabilities 2 1

14 Cultural Integration 2 115 Victims of Climate change 1 116 Mass Media 1 117 Democratization 2 2

Please note that factors 6 and 12 are missing in the UI analysis. In rethinking factor 12 (“Corruption”) it turned out that it can not directly influence terrorism but instead “Corruption” could be a good indicator for “(Good) Governance and Steering Capabilities” (factor 13) . Factor 6

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(“Suppression of Civil Rights”) has been integrated in factor 13 and 17 (“Democratization”).After this quantitative rating only 7 factors out of 17 appear to be a bit more interesting (for the construction of scenarios, not more important for the entire process of scenario planning!) than the others. To gain more insights about uncertainty and impact a qualitative UI analysis could be helpful as shown in illustration 1.

Illustration 1: UI Matrix

As a result of the UI analysis you can find 7 important factors (see Table 2) of which 4 appear to be very important (see Illustration 1) because of their respective uncertainty and impact. The outcomes of “Democratization”, “Political Radicalization”, “Foreign Policies”, and “(Good) Governance and Steering Capabilities” heavily influence the future of terrorism while being very uncertain for the coming decade. As mentioned before, scenario construction and planning is a process of communication and the UI analysis is in the same way. The outcome of the UI analysis is an outcome of argumentation, reasoning and bargaining by a distinct group of people. There are no final results, no final truths. Hence, transparency of the UI analysis is a must.

Driver-Driven AnalysisAnother step in a scenario construction process is to gain an understanding of interdependencies among the factors and the resulting

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dynamics. The so called Driver-Driven (DD) Analysis is very helpful to avoid unconscious linear thinking and unintentional extrapolation. With the DD analysis you can find out more about the sensitivity of one factor to other factors’ outcomes and about one factor’s ability to drive other factors’ outcomes.Here is a short example to clarify: The factor “Democratization” has two possible outcomes in 2021: Democratization of authoritarian states in North Africa (e.g. Libya, Syria), Central Asia (e.g. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) and Southeast Asia (e.g. Vietnam) or Non-Democratization, De-Democratization or “Islamization” (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Uzbekistan). If the outcome in 2021 is “De-Democratization and Islamization”, the outcome of the factor “Cultural Integration” would probably be “Decreased”. Factor 17 is driving factor 14. To put it precisely: The outcome of factor 17 influences the outcome of factor 14. You can rate every factor’s ability to influence other factors (0 = no influence; 1 = influence; 2 = strong influence) in a matrix. Then you can sum up all the driving power of one single factor and compare it to the driving power of other factors (see Table 3, column on the right “Driver Index”). You can also measure how a single factor is driven by all other factors (see last line “Driven Index”).

Table 3: Driver-Driven Matrix

You can plot the DD matrix in a two axis diagram to visualize the sensitivity (using driver and driven index as X- and Y-coordinate respectively, see Illustration 2).

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Illustration 2: Driver-Driven Diagram

Completing the UI and DD analysis you can find the critical factors for scenario construction. Critical factors are those which are highly uncertain, highly impacting the future of terrorism, driving other factors’ outcomes and are also driven by other factors’ outcomes (see Table 4). These are the factors that are able to turn future developments upside down.

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Table 4: Critical Factors

Deploying the GBN-MatrixThe Global Business Network (GBN) is a consulting company specialized in strategic foresight and scenario planning. One of its founders, Peter Schwartz, ‘invented’ a scenario construction method that only uses two factors (Schwartz 1991; Schwartz/Ogilvy 1998). If you have two factors with two different future outcomes each, you can cross the two factors and ask for possible combinations of their outcomes. You can visualize this process by plotting a cross diagram with two axis. In every quadrant you can then evaluate the combination of the two factors’ outcomes and construct distinct scenarios (see Illustration 3).

Illustration 3: The GBN Matrix

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The underlying assumption is that these two factors are independent from each other. Otherwise you will unlikely be able to fill all four quadrants with plausible and logical consistent scenarios. To find the right factors – factors that are critical for scenario construction and also independent from each other – you can just try it out. For example, one factor combination that will not fit into the GBN matrix is the combination of “(Good) Governance and Steering Capabilities” (F13) and “Political Radicalization” (F9) because these factors are interdependent: The better the governance and steering capabilities, the less the level of political radicalization because people do not have many reasons to turn to radical activism as long as the government and the state are able to handle socio-political problems in a proper way. The other way round: The higher the level of political radicalization, the lower the chances for effective and good governance.The combination of factors 13 and 17 (“Democratization”) is more promising because there is no interdependence between both factors as you can see in the DD matrix (see Table 3). The crossing of these factors could lead to four distinct and clearly selective scenarios:

3 | Four Scenarios of Terrorism in 2021Illustration 4: Four Scenarios Based on the Cross of F13 and F17

Scenario I (in the upper right quadrant): describes a world (in the year 2021) in which the Arab Spring turned Libya, Syria and Yemen into more

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or less stable democracies with a high level of governance capabilities. Western countries, especially the U.S. and some European countries overcame the financial crisis, integrated their financial and labour markets and strengthened their governance and steering capabilities. Due to these capabilities, the prevailing mode of foreign politics of Western democracies is multilateralism. Overreacted and unilateral actions are history because cooperation between states improved and the United Nations Organizations recovered legitimacy. The global economy stabilized until 2014 after a minor second dip in 2013 and global economic growth is stable and more balanced in 2021 than in 2011. Cultural integration was a big issue in European countries after the Arab Spring in 2011 and effective measures were taken. Between 2014 and 2020 the UN developed a broader approach of international security and included climate change, migration, socio-economic issues. The level of surveillance decreased except in issues like tracking the international trade of dual use technologies. Under these circumstances terrorism declined due to low degrees of political and religious radicalization. Al Qaeda style-terrorism is still the dominant type, pushed by the democratizations in North Africa and at the same time suppressed by the governance capabilities of the new states.

Scenario II (in the upper left quadrant): Despite several democratizations in North Africa and also in Central Asia, the governance capabilities of the new states are on a very low level in 2021. Also in old western democracies such as the U.S., France and Germany, the last 10 years were overshadowed by economic crisis and unstable politics resulting in a low level of steering capabilities in 2021. The common mode of foreign politics turned into unilateralism due to severe and diverse national problems. International organizations legitimacy is still fading in 2021 and global and national inequality increased. The impact of climate change amplified dramatically, migration increased and borders were closed. The picture of terrorism in this world is dark: Religious radicalization emerged due to weak counter capabilities in the new democratic states. Safe havens for Al Qaeda-like terrorists groups multiplied. Due to weak cultural integration in western countries, home-grown terrorism is still a common phenomenon also due to weak surveillance capabilities. The biggest problem of all: In February 2021 Russia and Pakistan announced that they are missing fissile material.

Scenario III (in the lower left quadrant): The Arab Spring resulted in promising democratic states but due to a huge gap in governance capabilities the democratic systems were captured by clans and families

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that are ruling the countries like dictators in 2021. Some states lost governance capabilities entirely in a difficult period between 2013 and 2015 and become fragile or even failed states in 2021. Governance capabilities in Western democracies faded between 2011 and 2021. The first result was de-politization, the final result was political radicalization. The global economy split up and inequality increased.In this world you can find the worst forms of terrorism. Al Qaeda established its political branches and emerged as a kind of shadow government in some failing states. At the same time in Western states religious radicalization emerged due to state failure in providing societal cohesion. Christian fundamentalist tried to participate in the political system but the desperate suppression of basic civil rights in the U.S. promoted radicalization and ended up in national and international Christian terrorism.

Scenario IV (in the lower right quadrant): In 2021, so far the outcomes of the Arab Spring are some semi-democratic or half authoritarian systems with strong governance capabilities. Religious radicalization in these countries emerged due to suppression and because of the fact, that Al Qaeda missed its goal to establish a caliphate. The EU overcame the euro crisis and actively promoted political integration while in the U.S. got over the paradigm of self regulation and increased its steering capabilities. In sum, also Western democracies are equipped with effective instruments to govern. Nonetheless, political radicalization in these countries is emerging due to the fact that higher levels of surveillance and the enduring suppression of civil rights fostered the public perception of the ‘almighty state’. What started as internet activism in 2013 changed into cyber terrorism by 2021. SAP, Halliburton, and the Federal Reserve Bank were already targeted by radical activists. Vattenfall announced that it temporarily lost control of Germany’s electricity grid in July 2018 due to a hacker attack. In 2021, AL Qaeda is, first and foremost, a problem of and for the new states in North Africa and the Middle East.

4 | ImplicationsNo matter of the scenarios’ respective probabilities – all scenarios are possible and plausible. In order to that long-term horizon, strategic policy planning should consider the following implications that can be derived from the fact that all four scenarios could become reality within the next ten years:

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1. Regarding terrorism it could be better to accept semi-democratic or even half authoritarian regimes that have good governance capabilities than to bet on democratic regimes without any ability to govern (from a Western point of view, scenario IV is better than Scenario II for terrorism).

2. The trade-off between security and civil rights can not be undermined. Timing is the key: If surveillance becomes an end in itself and if civil rights and/or even human rights are suppressed for a longer period to ensure security, political radicalization could increase and foster new kinds of terrorism.

3. Religious radicalization and transcendental terrorism is not exclusively owned by one religion.

4. Fragile, failing or failed states as well as closed borders and ineffective governance of climate change and/or impacts of climate change could foster terrorism.

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Literature

Literature on Terrorism/Influential FactorsCetron, Marvin J. et al. (2008): 55 Trends Now Shaping the Future of Terrorism,

in: The Proteus Trends Series Vol.1, No. 2, www.carlisle.army.mil/proteus/docs/55-terror.pdf.

Crone, Manni/ Harrow, Martin (2011): Homegrown Terrorism in the West, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23, No. 4, 521-536.

Jenkins, Michael D./Godges, John P. (Ed.) (2011): The Long Shaddow of 9/11. America‘s Response to Terrorism, RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1107.html.

Koblentz, Gregory D. (2011): Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction? Assessing the Risk of CBRN Terrorism, in: Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23, No. 4, 501-520.

Robison, Kristopher K. (2009): Terror's True Nightmare? Reevaluating the Consequences of Terrorism on Democratic Governance, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, No. 1, 62-86.

Perthes, Volker/Mair, Stefan (2001): Ideen und Macht. Was definiert die relative Gewichtsverteilung in der Welt, in: Internationale Politik, Jahrgang 2011, Mai/Juni, 10-23, http://www.internationalepolitik.de/2011/05/04/ideen-und-macht/ (18.09.2011).

Wilner, Alex S. et al. (2010): Homegrown terrorism and transformative learning: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization, in: Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, 33-51.

SourcesUniversity of Maryland: Global Terrorism Database,

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Terrorism and Counter-

Radicalization, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/topic/?fa=list&id=463

Literature on ScenariosBlass, Eddie (2003): Researching the future: method or madness, in: Futures, Vol.

35, No. 10, 1041-1054Bradfield, Ron et al. (2005): The origins and evolution of scenario techniques in

long range business planning, in: Futures, Vol. 37, No. 8, 795-812.Godet, Michel/Roubelat, Fabrice (1996): Creating the future: The use and misuse

of scenarios, in: Long Range Planning, Vol. 29, No. 2, 164-171.Heijden, Kees van der (o.J.): Scenarios, strategy, and the strategy process, in:

Presearch. Provoking strategic conversation, Vol. 1, No. 1, http://www.gbn.com/consulting/article_details.php?id=31 (29.11.2010).

Mietzner, Dana/Reger, Guido (2005): Advantages and disadvantages of scenario approaches for strategic foresight, in: International Journal of Technology Intelligence and Planning, Vol. 1, No.2, 220-239.

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Schwartz, Peter (1991): The Art of the Long View. Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World, New York.

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Sources and materials

Videos from the conference

Olaf Kellerhoff: „Pakistan pays a high price“

Welcome Videochat with Wulf Pabst and Peter Baumgärtner

BIGS-Conference: Keynote Michael Chertoff, Minister of Homeland Security 2005 - 2009

IGS-Conference: Keynote Suba Chandra

BIGS-Conference: Keynote

BIGS-Conference: PANEL 1 Part 1

BIGS-Conference: PANEL 2

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Texts and Links

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