DON’T PANIC!Crowd behaviour in

emergencies: evidence and implications

Presentation for the EPC 11/12/2007

Dr Chris CockingLondon Metropolitan University

c.cocking@londonmet.ac.uk

Outline of Presentation

1) Background and aims of research

2) Examples of how behaviour in emergencies support our theories

3) Implications for emergency planners

Context of research

Crowd behaviour theories have developed over time-

a) 19th Century: Le Bon irrationalist approach

b) 1960s - 70s: more rationalist approaches c) 1980s to present: The Social Identity

Approach- not rational or irrational, but transformation from individual to collective

Iroquois fire 1903 ‘most of the dead were trampled or

smothered, though many jumped or fell to the floor of the foyer. In places on the stairways, particularly where a turn caused a jam, bodies were piled 7 or 8 feet deep. Fireman and Police confronted a sickening task in disentangling them.[ ] The heel prints on the dead faces mutely testified to the cruel fact that human animals stricken by terror are as mad and ruthless as stampeding cattle’

(in Latane & Darley 1970) p.53

What is panic?

Is escaping a potentially fatal threat- panic or logical flight behaviour?

Difficult to define ‘extreme and groundless fear’

(Quarantelli 2001) Collective flight based on

hysterical belief (Smelser, 1963)

The ‘Panic’ model

Part of the irrationalist tradition in crowd psychology

a) Threat causes emotion to overwhelm reason

b) Collective identity breaks down c) Selfish behaviours- pushing, trampling d) Contagion- these behaviours spread

uncritically to crowd as a whole

Implications of the panic model Assuming crowd will panic can affect

emergency planning

Implications behind Civil Contingencies Act of potential threat of public gatherings (Drury, 2004)

Counter-terrorism planning in US tends not to trust public to behave sensibly, assuming that they are uncooperative and prone to panic (Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2002)

Over-protective government responses may stunt public’s own natural resilience (Wessely, 2005)

Problems with the panic model Mass panic is rare - noticeable by its

absence in many different emergencies, such as;

a) Atomic bombing of Japan during World War II

b) Kings Cross underground fire (1987) c) WTC evacuation 9/11

‘classic panic action or people behaving in an irrational manner was noted in [just] 1/124 (0.8%) cases’ (Blake et al. 2004)

Panic during WWII? Not simply number of casualties, but

intensity and unpredictability 80,000 killed in London during Blitz, vs.

3000 in Coventry, but more psychological casualties in the latter

Children often found it more upsetting to be separated from parents than air-raid itself

Cf Jones et al (2006), Mawson (2005)

Under-reaction rather than over-reaction

‘When people die in fires, it’s not because of panic, it’s more likely to be the lack of panic’

Neil Townsend, Divisional Officer, London Fire Rescue Service

Social attachment model Developed by Mawson (2005) Uses early psychological theories of

maternal attachment In times of stress, people seek out

attachment figures- known as affiliative behaviour

Social norms rarely break down But these ties can have fatal

consequences- people tend to leave or die as a group

Social attachment model Improves on panic model, and

supported by evidence from disasters (Cornwell, 2001)

But problems remain; a) Implies that panic in a crowd of

strangers is more likely b) Neglects possibility that

strangers may co-operate with each other

The self-categorisation approach Disasters can create a common identity

or sense of ‘we-ness’ This common identity results in orderly,

altruistic behaviour as people escape common threat

Increased threat can enhance common identity

Supported by evidence from sociologists Clarke (2002); Tierney (2002)

Scope of research project Project funded by ESRC from 2004-

7 at University of Sussex Can existing psychological models

of crowd behaviour can be applied to emergencies?

3 different areas of research: interviews, room evacuations, and VR simulations

Interviewing disaster survivors

Sinking of the Jupiter, 1988 & Oceana, 1991 Hillsborough football stadium disaster, 1989

Ghana football stadium ‘stampede’, 2001 Bradford football stadium fire, 1985 Fatboy Slim beach party, 2002 Harrods bomb, 1983 Canary Wharf evacuation, 2001

Results from interviews

Common identity quickly emerges Co-operative rather than selfish

behaviour predominates If selfish behaviour happens, it is

usually isolated and rarely spreads, with others usually intervening

Hillsborough 1989

I don’t think people did lose control of their emotions [ ] they were clearly in control of their own emotions and their own physical insecurity, I mean [] you’re being crushed, you’re beginning to fear for your own personal safety, and yet they were [ ] controlling or tempering their emotions to help try and remedy the situation and help others who were clearly struggling

‘Fat Boy Slim’ Brighton 2002

‘People were helping people up and helping people down it was it was a very different atmosphere from any other gig that I’d ever worked before’

‘It was like a massive rave party where everybody felt they knew each other where they could go up to each other hug total strangers and they were in such close proximity to each other and all you could see was people sticking their arms round each other and grinning and you know it was oh God it’s a bit packed isn’t it that sort of…those conversations were going on but not complaints about it’

Room evacuation studies

Simulated role-plays of room evacuations with smoke and time pressures

Some evidence of common identity emerging in response to shared fate

But study suffered from lack of realism

VR evacuation programme Joint project with computing scientists at

Universities of Nottingham & RMIT (Australia)

Many good simulations of crowd flow, but most don’t consider psychological theories of crowd behaviour

Evidence for link between sense of groupness and helping

Discussions with potential users (e.g. Home Office/SciTech) to market it as a training tool

Research into 7th July, 2005

Press reports and web-logs Web based questionnaire for

eye-witnesses of bombings Interview study of survivors Results support our theories

Chronology of events on the tube on 7/7

Blasts followed by darkness and silence Screaming- people try to work out

what’s going on Smoke & soot clear- attempts to help/

comfort others, & escape- some delay because of fear that tracks are live

Passengers wait approx 30 mins. for rescue, and walk in orderly fashion along tracks when directed

Response to 7/7

Individual fear and distress, but no mass panic

Evacuations characterised by orderly, calm behaviour

Many reports of altruism, co-operation, and collective spirit of Londoners/ UK as a whole

Orderly evacuation

The myth of Panic

Many accounts of ‘panic’ But what actually is panic, and what

is logical flight behaviour? Need to look at what people actually

do, and decide if it is indeed ‘panic’ More than just semantics, as it could

affect emergency evacuation planning

Panic? ‘There was no real panic - just an

overwhelming sense to get out of the station quickly’

‘Almost straight away our packed carriage started to fill with smoke, and people panicked immediately. Thankfully there were some level-headed people on the carriage who managed to calm everyone down’

Unity

‘I felt there was a real sense of unity. We were all trying our best to find a way out of there and reassure each other’

‘One of the things which struck me about this experience is that one minute you are standing around strangers and the next minute they become the closest and most important people in your life. That feeling was quite extraordinary’

Co-operative behaviour

‘Many people kept calm and tried to help one another to see if anyone was injured’

‘I was very aware of people helping each other out and I was being helped myself’

‘Passengers with medical experience were found, I found a tool box and we smashed a window, allowing the medical guys to enter the other train’

Cultural/ national differences?

Do different nationalities/ cultures respond differently in emergencies?

We expected some minor cultural variations at start of project, but the more we looked, the less differences we found

Panic on 9/11?

Asian Tsunami, Thailand 2004

When tsunami hit, divisions between local Thais and Western holidaymakers were forgotten and people co-operated

Reports of fighting between tourists to get ferries from islands afterwards, but collective identity could have diminished by then and less important than desire to get home

Hurricane Katrina, Sept 2005 Initial reports of mass looting, gang-

rapes, and murders in Superdome, New Orleans

But these reports were later seen to be wildly exaggerated- very little evidence to support them: crime rate in period after Katrina actually dropped

Local Police chief resigned when scale of exaggeration became clear

Fear of mob has fatal results?

Hajj pilgrimage, Saudi Arabia Some of largest crowds on earth travel to

Mecca/ Medina for the Hajj each year Some tragic accidents, but overwhelming

majority of pilgrims unaffected Fatalities usually due to physical

pressure of crowd rather than any ‘irrational’ behaviour

Need to overcome some fatalistic cultural beliefs (e.g. ‘it’s God’s will’)

General conclusions

Little evidence for mass panic in emergencies

The ‘panic’ model should not be used in planning emergency responses

Any selfish behaviour is confined to individuals and rarely spreads

Risks associated with crowds are usually due to physical constraints and lack of info rather than their inherent ‘selfishness’

OK, BUT SO WHAT?

Possible applications of the research

More info rather than less Very little evidence that people panic if made

aware of a threat and some shows the opposite (Proulx & Sime 1991)

Use of radio code words (e.g. Mr Sands etc) good for keeping professional composure, but no evidence people stampede if they hear ‘FIRE!’

If info is given in clear ways that people can safely act upon to escape threat, they usually do

Deliberately withholding info could cause problems in any future emergencies, as people may not trust accuracy of messages

Delivery of information is important!

Info needs to be clear, unambiguous, delivered confidently, and come from believable source that crowd identifies with.

Spokesperson should be appointed with sole duty to communicate with public (London Assembly 2006)

This could depend on type of crowd; e.g. commuters, football fans

Crowds can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem

People may delay own evac to help othersAppeal to the crowds’ common humanity- ‘We’re in this together’Don’t address commuters as atomised ‘customers’Influential leader figures may emerge from crowd, who can help rescue effort

Spontaneous leaders on 7/7

Plan emergency response

Take the possibility of emergency seriously- don’t think ‘it won’t happen to us!’

Train staff in knowledge of location, and how to relay information effectively in emergencies

Don’t say ‘don’t panic’, as it can create expectation of panic (Durodié & Wessely, 2005)

Practice can make a real difference; e.g. WTC evac rates- 1993 vs 2001

(99% of those below planes’ impact escaped-USA Today)

Possible problematic behaviours by individuals Delaying exit to safety/ finishing mundane

tasks-’freezing’ or ‘disassociation’ People tend to leave by route they

entered, even if closer exits are available Crowd members can be unaware of

physical pressure that others may suffer People unwilling to leave area, or passers-

by rubber-necking Attempts to breach cordons (worried

parents, single-minded commuters, etc)

Summary

Crowds in emergencies behave in ways that are consistent with their social identities and governed by the social norms of the situation

The ‘panic model’ is largely a myth Evidence gathered from many

different emergencies supports our theories

Thank you for listening

Any questions/ comments?

Full Report available at: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/affiliates/panic/applications.html

References: Blake et al (2004). Proceedings of Third International Symposium on

Human Behaviour in Fire. Clarke L (2002). Contexts. Cornwell B (2001) The Sociological Quarterly, 44, 617-638. Drury J (2004) The Psychologist. Durodié B & Wessely S (2002) The Lancet. Glass T & Schoch-Spana M (2002) Clinical Infectious Diseases Jones et al (2006) Journal of Risk Research Latane & Darley (1970) The Unresponsive bystander. Le Bon G (1968)The crowd: A study of the popular mind London Assembly (2006) Report of the 7th July Review committee. Mawson A (2005) Psychiatry Proulx G & Sime J (1991) Fire Safety Science Quarantelli E (2001) The Sociology of Panic Smelser N (1962). Theory of Collective Behaviour. Tierney K (2002) Strength of a city: A disaster research perspective on the

WTC attack.