Domestic support measures in the context of adaptation and mitigation

to climate change

Background paper for The State of Agricultural Commodity

Markets (SOCO) 2018

Domesticsupportmeasuresinthecontextofadaptationandmitigation

toclimatechange

Backgroundpaperfor

TheStateofAgriculturalCommodity

Markets(SOCO)2018

JosephW.Glauber

SeniorResearchFellowInternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute

FormerChiefEconomistUSDepartmentofAgriculture

FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNationsRome,2018

Required citation: Glauber, J. W. 2018. Domestic Support Measures in the Context of Adaptation / Mitigation to Climate Change. The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets (SOCO) 2018: Background Paper. Rome, FAO. 2018. 40 pp.Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by FAO in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. The views expressed in this information product are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of FAO. © FAO, 2018

Some rights reserved. This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 IGO licence (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/igo). Under the terms of this licence, this work may be copied, redistributed and adapted for non-commercial purposes, provided that the work is appropriately cited. In any use of this work, there should be no suggestion that FAO endorses any specific organization, products or services. The use of the FAO logo is not permitted. If the work is adapted, then it must be licensed under the same or equivalent Creative Commons license. If a translation of this work is created, it must include the following disclaimer along with the required citation: “This translation was not created by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). FAO is not responsible for the content or accuracy of this translation. The original English edition shall be the authoritative edition. Any mediation relating to disputes arising under the licence shall be conducted in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) as at present in force. Third-party materials. Users wishing to reuse material from this work that is attributed to a third party, such as tables, figures or images, are responsible for determining whether permission is needed for that reuse and for obtaining permission from the copyright holder. The risk of claims resulting from infringement of any third-party-owned component in the work rests solely with the user. Sales, rights and licensing. FAO information products are available on the FAO website (www.fao.org/publications) and can be purchased through publications-sales@fao.org. Requests for commercial use should be submitted via: www.fao.org/contact-us/licence-request. Queries regarding rights and licensing should be submitted to: copyright@fao.org. Cover photograph: ©FAO/Soliman Ahmed

iii

Contents Acronyms........................................................................................................................................................................ivAbstract.............................................................................................................................................................................v1.Introduction................................................................................................................................................................12.Agriculture’scontributiontoglobalGHGemissions.............................................................................23.Theeffectsofclimatechangeonglobaltrade...........................................................................................34.WTOdisciplinesaffectingdomesticsupportpolicies...........................................................................74.1SupportmeasuresandtheAgreementonAgriculture.......................................................................74.2DefiningGreenBoxsubsidies..........................................................................................................................95.Thepotentialimpactofinternationaltradingrulesonclimatepolicies.......................................95.1TaxingGHGemissions.....................................................................................................................................105.2ProvidingsubsidiestoincreaseGHGefficiencyinproduction....................................................115.3ProvidingsubsidiestoreduceGHGemissionsorsequestercarbon.........................................135.4Measurestoincreaseresiliencetoproducerstotheeffectsofclimatechange...................145.4.1Agriculturalinsuranceanddisasterassistance...............................................................................155.4.2Publicstockholdingprograms.................................................................................................................185.4.3Structuraladjustmentpayments............................................................................................................195.5Regulatorypoliciestoaddressclimatechange....................................................................................206.DesigningWTO-compatibleCSApolicies..................................................................................................217.Conclusions..............................................................................................................................................................23

iv

Acronyms CSA ClimateSmartAgricultureWTO WorldTradeOrganizationCO2 CarbonDioxideAMS AggregateMeasurementofSupportAFOLU Agriculture,ForestryandOtherLandUseAoA AgreementonAgricultureGHG GreenhouseGasR&D Research&DevelopmentIBLI Index–BasedLivestockInsuranceUNCTAD UnitedNationsConferenceonTrade&SupportCRP ConservationReserveProgramACEP AgriculturalConservationEasementProgram

v

AbstractClimateSmartAgriculture(CSA)hasbeenpromotedasakeyapproachinaddressingtheeffectsofclimatechange.Firstlaunchedin2009,CSAreferstoagriculturaltechnologiesthatarewellsuitedtoincreasefarmerlivelihoodsinthefaceofachangingclimateby1)raisingagriculturalproductivity;2)buildingresilienceoflivelihoodsandfarmingsystems;and3)reducingcarbonemissions.Whilegovernmentimplementationofmitigationandadaptationpoliciesmaybeaneffectivemeanstohelpaddressclimatechange,concernsarise,ifCSApoliciesruncountertointernationaltradedisciplines.Inparticular,CSApoliciescouldcomeintodirectconflictwithWTOtraderules,ifthesepoliciesservetoinsulatedomesticproducersfromcompetition.Thus,theycouldpotentiallydistortproductionandtrade.ThispaperexaminesCSApoliciesinthecontextoftheWTOagreements,includingdomesticsupportdisciplinesundertheWTOAgreementonAgriculture.

1

1.IntroductionClimatechangewilllikelyhavesignificantimpactsonagriculturalproduction,particularlyindevelopingcountrieshighlydependentonrainfed-agriculture(McCarthy,LipperandZilberman,2018).FindingsofthefifthassessmentreportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeconcludethat“allaspectsoffoodsecurityarepotentiallyaffectedbyclimatechangeincludingfoodaccess,utilization,andpricestability”(Porteretal.,2014,p.488).Thus,thepotentialimpactsofclimatechangewillfurthercomplicatethegoalofmeetingfoodandnutritiondemandsforagrowingglobalpopulationandgrowingconsumerincomes,aslaidoutintheUnitedNationsSustainableDevelopmentGoals(UN,2015).ClimateSmartAgriculture(CSA)isanapproachdevelopedbytheFoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations(FAO)todevelopthetechnical,policyandinvestmentconditionstoachievesustainableagriculturaldevelopmentforfoodsecurityunderclimatechange(FAO,2013).TheCSAapproachhasthreemainpillars:1)sustainablyincreasingagriculturalproductivityandincomes;2)adaptingandbuildingresiliencetoclimatechange;and3)reducingand/orremovinggreenhousegasemissions,wherepossible.CSAaimstoimprovefoodsecurity,helpcommunitiesadapttoclimatechangeandcontributetoclimatechangemitigationbyadoptingappropriatepractices,developingenablingpoliciesandinstitutionsandmobilizingneededfinances(FAO,2013).Tradecanhelpmitigatetheeffectsofclimatechangeonfoodsecuritybyprovidingabufferagainstshorttermdisruptionsinsupplies,causedbydroughts,floodsorotherextremeweatherevents,eventswhichareprojectedtobemorelikelyasglobaltemperaturesrise(Lantz,BaldosandHertel,2015).Theimportanceoftradehasincreasedinrecentyears,aslargersharesofglobalconsumptionaresuppliedbyimports.Thesetrendsareprojectedtocontinueoverthenexttenyears(OECD-FAO,2017;O’DonoghueandHansen,2017).Overthelongerterm,tradewillbecomeevenmorecritical,aschangingclimatescausefoodproductiontoshiftgeographicallyandmorehighlyvariableweatherincreasespricevolatility.Whilegovernmentimplementationofmitigationandadaptationpoliciesmaybeaneffectivemeanstohelpaddressclimatechange,concernsariseifCSApoliciesruncountertointernationaltradedisciplines.Inparticular,CSApoliciescouldcomeintodirectconflictwithWTOtraderules,ifthosepoliciesdistortproductionandtrade.ThispaperconsidershowCSApoliciesmayaffectproductionandtrade;andassuch,comportwithexistingWTOrules.Section2discussesagriculture’scontributiontoglobalgreenhousegas(GHG)emissions.InSection3,recenttrendsininternationaltradearereviewedandtheimpactsofGHGemissionsoninternationaltradearediscussed,includinghowtradecanpotentiallyhelpachievesustainableagriculturaldevelopmentforfoodsecurityunderclimatechange.WTOdisciplinesaffectingdomesticsupportpoliciesareanalyzedinmoredetailinSection4.Section5focusesonhowCSApoliciesmaypotentially

2

conflictwithWTOtraderules,includingtheAgreementonAgriculture,andtheAgreementonSubsidiesandCountervailingMeasures.Section6offersrecommendationsonhowCSApoliciescanbebestdesignedtoensurecompatibilitywithWTOrulesorhowWTOrulescouldbemodifiedtoaccommodateCSApolicies,withoutcreatinglargetradedistortions.ConcludingcommentsareofferedinSection7.

2.Agriculture’scontributiontoglobalGHGemissionsAgricultureisamajorcontributortoglobalgreenhousegasesthroughcropandlivestockproduction,aswellasthroughlandconversion.Agriculturecontributestoclimatechangedirectlybyemittingmethane(CH4)andnitrousoxide(N2O)incropandlivestockproduction,andindirectlybyaffectingnetCO2emissionsthroughitsimpactonsoil,forestsandotherlanduses.Agriculturecanalsoservetosequesteratmosphericcarbon,throughsoilmanagementpracticesandplantingofperennialcropsandtrees.Agricultureisanemissions-intensivesector,whichtypicallyemitsafargreatershareofGHGgasesthanitproducesineconomicactivity.TheWorldBank(2017)estimates,thatagricultureaccountsforabout3.8percentoftotalGDPin2015,comparedto24percentofglobalGHGemissions.IntheUnitedStates,agricultureaccountsforabout10percentoftotalGHGemissionswhiletheagriculturalsectoraccountsforonly1percentofGDP(USDAandERS,2017).EstimationbySmithetal.(2014)showed,thattotaldirectandindirectGHGcontributionsfromagriculture,forestryandotherlanduses(AFOLU)in2010,wasthesecondlargestsourceofGHGemissions(afterfossilfueluse),accountingfor24percentoftotalglobalanthropogenicemissions.BasedonFAOSTATdata,BlandfordandHassapoyannes(2017)estimated,thatdirectemissionsfromagricultureaccountforabout10–12percentofglobalGHGemissionsin2012–2014.Agricultureisthelargestcontributortonon-CO2GHGemissions,accountingfor56percentofemissions.Livestockareestimatedtoaccountfor80percentofthedirectemissions,largelyintheformofCH4.Ruminantsaccountformorethan80percentoftotallivestock-relatedGHGemissions(Havliketal.,2014).LandusegeneratesCO2emissionsbychangingthecarbonstockinforestland(soilandbiomass),andinthesoilofcropland,grassland,andwetlands(peatlandsandfloodedland).Gibbsetal.(2010)estimate,thatbetween1980and2000,83percentofagriculturallandexpansioninthetropicsoccurred,becauseofdeforestation,muchofwhichwasdonetoincreaselivestockproduction.BlandfordandHassapoyannes(2017)estimated,thatdeforestationaccountedfor59percentofgloballanduseemissionsin2012–2014.Agricultureisalsoanenergyintensivesector,usingfossilfuelsforanumberofproductionactivities,includingfuelfortrucksandmachinery,naturalgasandelectricitytopowerpumps,andprovideheatingandcoolingforlivestockoperations.Agricultureutilizesfertilizersandpesticidesthatareproducedinanenergy-intensivemanner.

3

WhileemissionsfromenergyusearenotaccountedforundertheAFOLUsector,theyaccountforalmostonepercentofglobalGHGemissions(BlandfordandHassapoyannes,2017).Alsoomittedinthosecalculationsareemissionsfromfurtherdownstreamprocessing,forexamplefoodproductionanddistribution. Blancoetal.(2014)estimated,thatbetween1970and2010,GHGemissionsfromAFOLUincreasedby20percent,althoughthenetchangesince1990hasbeenminimal,dueinparttodecreaseinlanduseemissions.BlandfordandHassapoyannes(2017)estimated,thatduringtheperiod1990-2014emissionsfromdeforestationandotherlandusesdroppedbynearly25percent.Yet,whilelanduseemissionshavetrendeddownward,theirdeclinehasbeenoffsetbyincreasesinagriculturalemissions.Overtheperiod1990to2010,agriculture’sdirectemissionsincreasedby15percent,duetoanincreaseintheuseofsyntheticfertilizersandincreasedlivestocknumbers(BlandfordandHassapoyannes,2017).Withfooddemandprojectedtoincreasebyasmuchas60percentbetween2010and2050(FAO,2017),agriculturalGHGemissionsarelikelytoincreaseproportionately,unlesstherearesignificantoffsetseitherthroughdecreasedlanduseemissionsorincreasedemissionefficienciesinagriculturalproduction.

3.TheeffectsofclimatechangeonglobaltradeClimatechangewillpotentiallyhavesignificanteffectsoninternationaltradeinagriculturalproducts,astherelativecomparativeadvantageofcountrieschangeswithshiftsinproduction.Tradecanhelpmitigatetheimpactsofclimatechangebyhelpingtobalanceshiftsinsupplyanddemand.Butaswehaveseeninthepast,marketdistortionscausedbygovernmentpolicies,caninterferewithtradeandexacerbatepricevolatility.Figure1:Growthinworldagriculturalexports2000–2015

Source:WTOStatisticsDatabase2017

0200400600800

100012001400160018002000

20002001

20022003

20042005

20062007

20082009

20102011

20122013

20142015

2016

Billion USD

4

Agriculturaltradehasincreasedmorethan200percentsince2000(Figure1).Higherincomegrowth,increasedpopulationandmoreopenmarketsbroughtoninpartbycompletionoftheUruguayRound,whichbroughtagricultureundermultilateraltraderulesanddisciplinesthathaveallcontributedtoitsgrowthinbothvolumeandvalue.Since2000,importsaccountforalargershareoftotalconsumptionformanycommodities.Forexample,soybeansimportsnowaccountforalmost43percentoftotalglobalconsumptioncomparedtoonly31percentin2000(Figure2a).Wheatimports–asashareoftotalconsumption–haveincreasedfrom17percentto24percentoverthesameperiod.Meatimportshaveincreasedaswell(Figure2b).Figures2a&2b:Importsaspercentofglobalconsumptionof(a)Cropsand(b)Livestockproducts

Source:USDAForeignAgriculturalService

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%

2000/2001

2001/2002

2002/2003

2003/2004

2004/2005

2005/2006

2006/2007

2007/2008

2008/2009

2009/2010

2010/2011

2011/2012

2012/2013

2013/2014

2014/2015

2015/2016

2016/2017

2017/2018

2a. Crops

Wheat Maize Rice Soybeans

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

2000/2001

2001/2002

2002/2003

2003/2004

2004/2005

2005/2006

2006/2007

2007/2008

2008/2009

2009/2010

2010/2011

2011/2012

2012/2013

2013/2014

2014/2015

2015/2016

2016/2017

2017/2018

2b. Livestock products

Swine Beef and veal Chicken Butter Cheese

5

BaselineforecastsbytheUSDepartmentofAgriculture(O’DonoghueandHansen,2017)andOECD-FAO(2017)suggest,thatthesetrendsarelikelytocontinueoverthenexttenyears.Figures3aand3bshowprojectedimportsaspercentoftotalglobalconsumptionformajorgrainsandmeatproducts.Allyears,showmodestincreasesinimportpenetration(definedastheshareofimportsinconsumption).NeithertheUSDAbaselinenorOECD–FAObaselineexplicitlytakeintoaccounttheimpactsofclimatechangeonproduction.Figure3:Projectedimportsaspercentofconsumptionofcropsandmeats

Source:USDAERSInternationalBaselineDataSince2005therehavealsobeensignificantchangesinthecompositionoftrade.Inparticular,wehaveseenthegrowingimportanceofdevelopingcountries,bothintermsoftheirgrowingshareofglobalimportsandtheirgrowingshareofglobalexports(Figure4).Forexample,Brazilhasbecomethenumberonesoybeanexporter,surpassingtheUnitedStatessince2011.Expansionofmaizearea,particularlydoubledcroppedarea,hasboostedBrazil’sshareofmaizeexportsaswell.TheBlackSearegionoftheFormerSovietUnion

18.0%

18.5%

19.0%

19.5%

20.0%

20.5%

21.0%

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

2014

/15

2015

/16

2016

/17

2017

/18

2018

/19

2019

/20

2020

/21

2021

/22

2022

/23

2023

/24

2024

/25

2025

/26

2026

/27

3a.Crops

Wheat Maize Rice Soybeans Imports as percent of consumption

Import(milliontonnes)

as%ofconsumption

8.5%

9.0%

9.5%

10.0%

10.5%

11.0%

0.05.0

10.015.020.025.030.035.040.0

2014

/15

2015

/16

2016

/17

2017

/18

2018

/19

2019

/20

2020

/21

2021

/22

2022

/23

2023

/24

2024

/25

2025

/26

2026

/27

3b.Meats

Beef and veal Swine Poultry Imports as percent of consumption

as%of consumption

Import (milliontonnes)

6

(Kazakhstan,RussiaandUkraine)nowaccountsforalmost30percentofworldwheatexportsandhasbecomeasignificantexporterofmaizeandothercoarsegrains,aswellassoybeans.Figure4:GrowthofSouth-Southtrade

Source:UNCTADStatOntheimportside,abouttwo-thirdsofsoybeanstradedgloballyareimportedbyChina,andthatsharecontinuestogrow.Chinahasbecomeagrowingmarketformaizeandothercoarsegrains,aswellasswineandpoultry(Gale,HansenandJewison,2016).AfricahasbecomealargeandgrowingmarketforriceexporterssuchasIndia,Pakistan,VietnamandThailand(Nigatuetal.,2017).South–Southtrade–asashareoftotalagriculturaltrade–hasgrownfrom13percentin2000toalmost25percentin2014(UNCTAD,2017).Thattranslatestoaboutonequarterofthegrowthoverthepast15years,duetoSouth-Southtrade.Howclimatechangewillaffectfuturetradepatternsislesscertain,althoughitwillalterthecomparativeadvantageofsomeregionsoverothers(Huangetal.,2011).Itisimportanttorecognize,thatacountry’scomparativeadvantageinproducingacropisnotstatic,butchangeswithrelativechangesinregionalyields,costs,andotherfactors(Leamer,1984).WorkbyNelsonetal(2010)suggests,thatwhiletrademaynotbeabletofullyoffsettheimpactsofclimatechange,itcanpartiallymitigateitsimpactbybalancingsupplyanddemandacrossregions.SimilarresultshavebeenconfirmedinmorerecentanalysisbyMartinezetal.(2017),whoconcluded,thatwhileregionalyieldswillbeadverselyaffected,consumptionismoremodestlyaffected,becauseoftrade.Inadditiontopotentiallyalteringregionalcropandlivestockproduction,climatechangewilllikelyresultinmorevariableweather,whichwillexacerbateyieldvolatilityandincreasevulnerabilitytoinsectsandotherpests,someofwhichmaybeexacerbatedbypropagationofinvasivespeciesthroughtrade(FAO2013;Westphaletal.,2008).

0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

DevelopingcountryshareofglobalimportsDevelopingcountryshareofglobalexportsSouth-Southtradeaspercentofglobaltrade

7

Tradehelpsmitigateregionalproductionshortfalls,thoughaswasseeninthefoodpricespikesof2007/08and2010/11,concernsarise,thattrademayexposeexportingcountriestoincreasedpricevolatilityindomesticmarkets.ResearchbyMinot(2014)andCeballoset al.(2017)foundlittleevidence,thatinternationalpricevolatilitywastransmittedtodomesticmarketsexceptinthosecases,whenexportswerelargerelativetodomesticconsumption.However,tradeintegrationinmanydevelopingcountriesislikelylimitedduetohightransportationandothertransactionscosts,whichlimittradeflows(Bouët,CosnardandLaborde,2017).Concernsoverheightenedinternationalpricevolatilityin2007/08and2010/11promptednumerouscountriestoimposeexportrestrictionsorotherinsularpolicies(Demeke,PangrazioandMaetz,2009).Manyofthosepolicies–whilepotentiallydampeningpriceincreasesindomesticmarkets–onlyservedtoincreasepricesandpricevolatilityininternationalmarkets.Moreover,suchbeggar-thy-neighborpoliciesresultedinothercountriesadoptingsimilarpolicies,furtherexacerbatingpricevolatilityandhurtingnetimportingcountries(Anderson,IvanicandMartin,2014).

4.WTOdisciplinesaffectingdomesticsupportpoliciesSincecompletionoftheUruguayRoundin1994andcreationoftheWorldTradeOrganizationthefollowingyear,agriculturehasbeenbroughtintoasystemofmultilateralrulesanddisciplines,includingmarketaccess,exportcompetitionanddisciplinesgoverningagriculturalsupport(Josling,TangermanandWharley,1996).Agriculturalpoliciesdesignedtoaddressclimatechangewouldbesubjecttothoseandmanyotherrules.AsthefocusofthepaperisprimarilyonCSApolicies,abriefdescriptionofthedomesticsupportprovisionsoftheUruguayRoundAgreementonAgriculturefollows.AmoredetailedlegalanalysiscanbefoundinHäberli(2018).14.1SupportmeasuresandtheAgreementonAgricultureDomesticsupportdisciplinesundertheWTOAgreementonAgriculture(AoA)distinguishbetweenprogramsthatareviewedasnon-orminimally-tradedistorting(so-calledGreenBoxsubsidies)andthosethatarenot(AmberBoxsubsidies).GreenBoxsubsidiesarejudgedtohaveno,oratmost,minimaltrade‐distortingeffectsandareexemptfromreductionundertheAoA.TobeincludedintheGreenBox,programsmustnotbetiedtocurrentproductionorcurrentmarketprices,andmustmeetspecificpolicycriteriaspelledoutinAnnex2oftheAoA.AmberBoxsubsidiesarejudgedtohavemorethanminimaltrade‐distortingeffects,andarecappedunderthetermsoftheAoA.AmberBoxsupportincludespaymentsto

1 Border measures are discussed in Blandford (2017).

8

producersthataretiedtocurrentproductionlevels,marketpricesupportprograms,andotherpoliciesthatmakepaymentsbasedoncurrentoutputandcurrentmarketpricessuchascountercyclicalincomesupportprograms.Thesesubsidiesareconvertedintoanaggregatemeasurementofsupport(AMS)usingamethodologysetoutinAnnex3andAnnex4oftheAoA(Effland,2011).UndertheAoA,eachcountrywhichreportednon-exemptdomesticsupportduringthe1986-88baseperiodcommittedtobinditstotalAMSataveragelevelscalculatedoverthebaseperiodandthenreduceitbyaprescribedpercentage(fordevelopedcountries,by20percentover6years;fordevelopingcountries,by13percentover10years).AmberBoxsubsidiesarefurtherclassifiedintotwogroups—product-specificandnon-product-specificsupport—andbothcategoriesaresubjecttodeminimisteststhatexemptsupportbelowaspecificshareofthecurrentvalueofproductionfromthereportedAMS.Fordevelopedcountries,iftheestimatedlevelofsupportislessthan5percentofthevalueofcurrentproduction,supportisconsidereddeminimisandexcludedfromcalculationsofthetotalcurrentAMS.Thedeminimisthresholdfordevelopingcountriesis10percentofthevalueofcurrentproduction.2WTOmemberswhohadlargersubsidiesthanthedeminimislevelsatthebeginningofthepost–UruguayRoundreformperiodwerecommittedtoreducethesesubsidiesinaggregate(by20percentfordevelopedcountriesand10percentfordevelopingcountries).Countrieswithoutdomesticsupportreductioncommitmentsareeffectivelyboundbydeminimislevels.Athirdcategoryoftrade–distortingsupport,calledBlueBoxsupport,isaddressedinArticle6.5oftheAoA.AnysubsidiesandotherformsofincometransfersthatwouldnormallybeincludedintheAmberBoxareplacedintheBlueBoxiftheprogramunderwhichthoseincometransfersoccuralsorequiresfarmerstolimitproductionandbasepaymentsonfixedareaandyieldsormadeon85percentorlessofabaselevelofproduction,or,inthecaseoflivestock,suchpaymentsarebasedonafixednumberofhead.UndertheAoA,BlueBoxexpendituresarenotcappedand,therefore,notsubjecttoanylimitationorreductioncommitments.Therearealsoexemptionsfordevelopingcountries(sometimescalleda“SpecialandDifferential(S&D)Box”),coveredunderprovisionsinArticle6.2oftheAoA.Theseexemptionsincludegovernmentmeasuresofassistancetoencourageagricultureandruraldevelopment,generallyavailableinvestmentsubsidies,andagriculturalinputsubsidiesgenerallyavailabletolow-incomeorresource-poorfarmers.Lastly,asdemonstratedintheUS–UplandCottondispute,non–GreenBoxsupportmeasuresmaybechallengedundertheWTOAgreementonSubsidiesandCountervailingMeasures,ifthosemeasureswereshowntocauseseriousprejudicetoanothermember’sinterest,for

2 As a condition of its accession to the WTO, the de minimis threshold for China is set at 8.5 percent of the value of production.

9

example,bydisplacingexportstothird–countrymarkets,significantpricesuppressioninworldmarketsorincreasedmarketsharebythesubsidizingcountry.4.2DefiningGreenBoxsubsidiesExemptpoliciesundertheGreenBoxmustmeetspecificcriterialaidoutinAnnex2oftheAoA.Toqualify,GreenBoxsubsidiesmustnotdistortproductionortrade,oratmostcauseminimaldistortion(Annex2,Paragraph1).Subsidiesmustbegovernment–funded(notthroughindirectsupportsuchashigherconsumerprices)andmustnotinvolvepricesupport.Inaddition,asreflectedinTable1,Paragraphs2through13ofAnnex2detailspecificcategoriesforgovernmentserviceprograms.Table1:GreenBoxCategories

Paragraph Description2 Provisionofgeneralservicesthatprovidebenefitstoagricultureortheruralcommunity

suchasresearchandextension,pestanddiseasecontrol,inspectionservices,marketingandpromotionservicesandinfrastructuralservices

3 Publicstockholdingprogramsforfoodsecuritypurposes4 Domesticfoodaidprograms6 Decoupledincomesupporttoproducers7 Governmentfinancialparticipationinincomeinsuranceandincomesafety–netprograms8 Payments(madeeitherdirectlyorbywayofgovernmentfinancialparticipationincrop

insuranceschemes)forrelieffromnaturaldisasters9 Structuraladjustmentassistanceprovidedthroughproducerretirementprograms10 Structuraladjustmentassistanceprovidedthroughresourceretirementprograms11 Structuraladjustmentassistanceprovidedthroughinvestmentaids12 Programsforenvironmentalprograms13 Paymentstoproducersindisadvantagedregionsunderregionalinvestmentprograms

In2013,MembersagreedaspartoftheBalipackagetoaddthefollowingactivitiestogeneralservicesprogramstopromoteruraldevelopment,foodsecurityandpovertyalleviation,particularlyindevelopingcountries.Includedwereprogramsrelatingtolandreformandrurallivelihoodsecurity,suchas:landrehabilitation;soilconservationandresourcemanagement;droughtmanagementandfloodcontrol;ruralemploymentprograms;issuanceofpropertytitles;andfarmersettlementprograms.

5.ThepotentialimpactofinternationaltradingrulesonclimatepoliciesUndertheUNClimateAgreementconcludedinParisinNovember2015,countriesagreedtotakeactionstokeeptheriseinglobalaveragetemperaturethiscenturyfrompre-industriallevelstobelow2°C(UNFrameworkConventiononClimateChange,2017).WithAFOLUemissionsaccountingfor24percentoftotalglobalGHGemissions,policymakerswillneedtoaddresstheprojectedgrowthinAFOLUemissions,ifthe

10

objectivesoftheParisAgreementaretobemet.Moreover,reductionsmusttakeplace,whilemeetingSustainableDevelopmentGoalsofeliminatinghungerby2030.TherearebasicallythreepolicyapproachestoreducenetGHGemissions:1)taxingGHGemissionsdirectly;2)subsidizingpracticesthatwouldreduceGHGemissionsorsequesterCO2;and3)reducingGHGemissionsorsequesteringCO2throughregulation.Inaddition,therearepoliciesthataretargetedatmitigatingthefinancialimpactsofclimatechange,suchasagriculturalinsurance.ThissectionexaminessuchpoliciesinthecontextofhowtheymightimpactproductionandpotentiallybeviewedbyWTOagreements,includingtheAoA.5.1TaxingGHGemissionsIneconomics,anexternalityisthecostorbenefitthataffectsaparty,whodidnotchoosetoincurthatcostorbenefit.Unregulatedmarketswithsignificantnegativeexternalitiesareconsideredinefficientinthat,marketpricesdonotreflectthetrue(societal)costofthatgoodorservice.Becausethecostofthenegativeexternalityisnotincluded,producersproducemore(andconsumersconsumemore),thantheywouldhad,hadthecostoftheexternalitybeenreflectedintheprice.Taxingtheproducerforthecostoftheexternalitywould,intheory,“internalize”theexternality,sothatcostsandbenefitswillaffectmainlyparties,whochoosetoincurthem.CarbontaxeshavebeenproposedtoaddressthesocietalexternalitiescausedbyGHGemissionsthroughglobalwarming.Acarbontaxappliedtoagriculturalemissions,wouldhaveanumberofconsequences.Theimmediateeffectwouldbetoraisepricesofagriculturalproducts.Table2showstheeffectsofaUSD20/tonnesCO2epriceoneffectivecarbontaxesforgrains(wheat),rice,beefandchickenforselectedcountries.ThedataonGHGemissionsweredrawnfromrecentworkbyBlandfordandHassapoyannes(2017)thatderivesdirectGHGemissionspertonneofproductproducedforvariouscountries,usingFAOSTATdata.Thetaxeswerethencomparedtoaverageannualcommoditypricesfor2016(WorldBankGroup,2017)todemonstratetheirrelativemagnitudes.Table2—EffectsofaUSD20/tonnescarbontaxonselectedagriculturalpricesforselectedcountriesCountry Wheat Rice Beef Sheepmeat ChickenAustralia 3.0% 3.4% 11.0% 13.4% 0.2%Brazil 2.2% 2.5% 16.5% 16.7% 0.2%China 2.6% 4.0% 12.5% 5.9% 0.6%Ethiopia 1.2% 7.1% 71.5% 25.2% 2.8%EuropeanUnion 2.4% 13.1% 8.2% 10.1% 0.2%India 3.6% 3.5% 54.4% 22.4% 0.5%Indonesia 2.4% 5.6% 22.6% 22.3% 2.9%NewZealand 2.4% --- 8.9% 8.1% 0.2%UnitedStatesofAmerica 2.4% 5.6% 6.0% --- 0.2%

Source:BlandfordandHassapoyannes2017,WorldBankGroup2017

11

BecauseoftherelativeGHG–inefficiencyofextensivelivestockproduction,beefpriceswouldriserelativetograinsandpoultry,likelyshiftingconsumptiontowardsbeefsubstitutes.Note,thatpriceimpactswouldbelesssevereforcountrieswhereagriculturalproductionismoreefficientvis-à-visGHGemissions.Intheexamplehere,theimpactofaUSD20/tonnesCO2ecarbontaxwouldhaveaproportionategreaterpriceimpactongrass-andrange-fedbeefproducers(India,Indonesia,Ethiopia),thanincountrieswhereconfinedfeedingwasmoreprevalent(EUandU.S.).WhileTable2isusefulforillustrativepurposes,inpractice,acarbontaxwouldbemuchmoredifficulttoimplement,sinceGHGemissionsdependonnumerousfactors,includingpractice,cropandregion(Eveetal.,2014).Anyestimatesderivedforacarbontaxwouldbefraughtwithuncertainty,sinceemissionsareoftenfromnon-pointsourcesandthisisthereasonwhytheyaredifficulttomeasure.Amorelikelyapproachwouldbeforcountriestoimposeamoretargetedtaxonaspecificsector,suchasfossilfuelproductionthatwouldthenhaveindirectimpactsinenergy–intensivesectorssuchasagriculture.Alternatively,capandtradeschemescouldbeintroducedthatlimitthetotalamountofemissionsandallowtradingofemissionpermits.Capandtradeschemeswouldpenalizehigheremittingproductsandservices,whileprovidingincentivesforadaptionofmoreefficienttechnologies.Butcapandtradeschemeswouldstillbechallengingforagriculture,duetothehighcostsofmonitoring,necessarytoensuretheintegrityofthetradingscheme.Domestictaxesaretypicallynotcoveredunderinternationalagreementssincetheyarelikelytodepress,ratherthanenhanceoutput.Nonetheless,asBlandford(2013)pointsout,exemptingsectorslikeagriculturefromemissionscaps,couldraisetheissueofimplicitsubsidizationbyallowingexemptsectorstosellemissionscredits.Likeacarbontax,thevalueofcarbonoffsetswouldbesubjecttosimilaruncertaintyinmeasurement,aswellasmonitoringandenforcementissues.Offsetscouldalsopresentfoodsecurityconcerns,forexample,ifcroplandweretakenoutofproductionforcarbonsequestrationpurposes.5.2ProvidingsubsidiestoincreaseGHGefficiencyinproduction UndertheCSAapproach,mitigationmeasuresforclimatechangearepromotedthatareinlinewiththe“foodsecurityfirst”objective.Oneapproachistoimproveefficiencybydecouplingproductiongrowthfromemissionsgrowth.Thisinvolvesreducingemissionsperkilogramoffoodoutput–includedinthiscalculationaretheeffectsofemissionsfromreduceddeforestationperkilogramoffood.Thesecondwayistoincreaseresourceefficiencybyincreasingproductivity.Publiclyfundedresearchisanotherwaygovernmentscanhelpmitigatetheimpactsofclimatechange,throughincreasingtheproductivityandGHG–efficiencyofplantandanimalproduction.Publicfinancingofagriculturalresearchanddevelopmenthasledtolargeandsustainedagriculturalproductivitygains(Alstonetal.,2010;AlstonandPardey,2014).Figure5showsUSagriculturalproductivitysince1948.Whileproductivityhasincreasedover150percentsince1948,inputusehasremainedmoreorlessconstant.

12

Figure5:U.S.TotalFactorProductivity

Source:USDAandEconomicResearchServiceFuglie(2017)argues,thatthepublic–goodsnatureofknowledgecapital,namelythenon-excludabilityoffreeridersinenjoyingthebenefitsofResearchandDevelopment(R&D);andthesmall–holderstructureoffarming,haveimpliedamajorroleofgovernmentininvestinginagriculturalR&D.AndwhileprivateinvestmentinR&Dhasgrown,asrecentlyas2011,publicinstitutionsaccountedforaboutthree–quartersoftotalglobalspendingonagriculturalresearch(Fuglie,2017).ResearchbyBaldosandHertel(2014)pointstotheroleoftotalfactorproductivitygrowthinmitigatingGHGemissionsbyincreasingcarbonefficiency(amountofproductionperGHGemission).WorkbyWiseetal.(2009)shows,thatifproductiontechnologieswerefrozenat2005levels,land–usechangecarbonemissions(assumingnomitigationstrategies)wouldbemorethan70billiontonsCO2ehigheroverthe21stcentury,becausegreateramountsoflandwouldhavebeennecessarytoproducethesameamountoffood.However,duetotheso-calledreboundeffect,someoftheproductivitygainsmaybepartiallyoffsetbyincreasedproduction,atleastatthenationallevel,duetoimprovedprofitability.Atthegloballevel,reboundimpactsarelikelysmaller,sincedemandelasticitiesandmostproductivitygainswillbepassedthroughintermsoflowerprices.PublicexpendituresforCSAResearchandDevelopmentwouldlikelybeconsistentwithParagraph2ofAnnex2oftheAoA.Otherexamplesofgeneralservicespolicieswouldbetechnicalassistanceprogramsaimedathelpingcropandlivestockproducersdevelopandimplementnutrientmanagementplans;andresearchactivities,thatpromotesoilhealthandreduceGHGemissionsfromcroplandandlivestock.Thesepoliciesdonotinvolvedirectpaymentstoproducersorprocessors,noraretheseactivitiesfundedbytransfersfromconsumers.Butiftheydo,thesepolicieswouldbeconsideredamberandsubjecttodiscipline.

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

1948

1951

1954

1957

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

2014

Totaloutput Totalfarminput Totalfactorproductivity(TFP)

1948=1.0

13

InputsubsidiestoencourageadoptionofnewGHGtechnologieswouldgenerallybeconsideredAmberBoxprograms,sincetheyaretiedtoproductionortheinputitself.Theexceptionwouldbeforresourcepoororlowincomefarmersindevelopingcountries,whocouldclaimthesemeasuresunderArticle6.2oftheAoA.

5.3ProvidingsubsidiestoreduceGHGemissionsorsequestercarbonClimatesmartpoliciesthatprovideproducersfinancialincentivestoadoptpolicieswhichreduceGHGemissionsorincreasecarbonsequestration,mustmeetspecificcriteriatobeconsidered“GreenBox”undertheAoAandthisiswhytheyareexemptfromWTOdiscipline.Forexample,consideraclimatesmartpolicythatwouldpaylivestockproducerstoinstallanaerobicdigesterstocaptureGHGemissions.Toqualifyasanenvironmentalprogramconsistentwithparagraph12ofAnnex2oftheAoA,theamountofthepaymentmustbelimitedtothe“extracostsorlossofincomeinvolvedwithcomplyingwiththegovernmentprogramme”(Paragraph12(b)).Totheextentthatsuchpoliciesalsoprovideanincentivecomponenttoencourageadaptation,thismaymakethemineligibleforGreenBoxprotection.Cost-shareprogramsforestablishingconservationpracticesonagriculturallandhavesupportedimplementationoffarmingpracticesandstructuresthatreducelossoffertilitythroughsoilerosion;facilitateimproveddrainage,waterstorage,andmoreefficientirrigation;andprovidemanurestorageandassistancewithmeetingnutrientmanagementregulations(Claassen,DuquetteandHorowitz,2013).IntheUnitedStatesofAmerica,programsliketheEnvironmentalQualityIncentivesProgramandtheConservationStewardshipProgram–thathelpcoverinputcostsandincomeforegoneforenvironmentallyfriendlypractices–mayreduceproductivityortakesomeyearstoachievefullproductioncapacity.Theproductioneffectsofcost–shareprogramsaredifficulttocalculatefortworeasons.First,theadditionalityofsuchprogramsisoftenuncertain,whichmeansthatsomeproducerswouldhaveadoptedsuchpracticeswithoutincentivepaymentsorcost–share(McFarland,2011;Claassen,DuquetteandHorowitz,2013;Mezzatesta,NewburnandWoodward,2013).Shouldsubsidiesbeprovidedforallproducers,whouseapracticeorforjustthose,whonewlyadoptsuchapractice?Intheformercase,the“additionality”gainedbythesubsidymaybesmall,inwhichcase,themarginalcostofadoptionisquitehigh.Ifthesubsidyisrestrictedtojustthose,whonewlyadoptapractice,producerswhohadpreviouslyadoptedthepracticemayhaveincentivesnowtodiscontinuethepractice,iftheybelievetheywillbepaidforre–enrollingintheprogram.Second,althoughtheimpactofsomeofthesepracticesoncropyieldsmaybebeneficialoverthelongrunbyimprovingsoilfertility,plantingconditions,andwateravailability–thatcouldpotentiallyleadtoincreasedproductionandlowerprices–intheshortruntheimpactsarelikelyminorand,forsomepractices,productivitywillremainbelowconventionalpractices.

14

CSApoliciestoencouragecarbonsequestrationincludeputtingcroplandintolongtermsetasides.Forexample,theUnitedStateshasoperatedtheConservationReserveProgram(CRP)since1986.UndertheCRP,producersarepaidayearlyrentalpaymentinexchangeforremovingenvironmentallysensitivelandfromagriculturalproductionandplantingspeciesthatwillimproveenvironmentalquality.CRPcontractsarecompetitivelyawardedonthebasisofenvironmentalbenefitsandtypicallyextendfor10to15years.Sinceitsfirstyearofoperationin1986,theCRPhasidledonaverage12.6millionhectares(ha)annually,butinrecenthigh–priceyears,contractsmaturedandmanyfarmersoptedtobringlandoutofretirement.The2014farmbillrestrictstheenrollmentoflandintheCRPto10.1millionhectares(ha)–equivalentto25millionacres–,andasofSeptember2017,only9.5millionhectares(ha)wereenrolledintheCRP,downfrom13millionhectares(ha)atitspeak.Thereductioninlanduseintensity,providedbytheCRP,canprovidemultipleenvironmentalbenefits,includingsubstantialGHGmitigation,=thatoccursascarbonissequesteredinsoilsorvegetation(USDA,2016).RecenteffortsbytheUSDepartmentofAgriculturetoaugmentbenefitsundertheCRP,haveincludedenrollinglandsintopermanentorlong-termeasementswithintheAgriculturalConservationEasementProgram(ACEP),withStateEasementProgramsundertheConservationReserveEnhancementProgram,andwithprivatepartners.Othereffortsincludetargetingeligiblelandstoenrolladditionalriparianbuffers,wetlands,andotherconservationpracticeswithlargeGHGmitigationbenefitsintoCRPandenrollingorganicsoils–ahighlyconcentratedsourceofGHGemissions–intoCRPorACEP.Twoconcernsarisewithlandsetasideprograms.First,idlingcroplandcouldpotentiallyexacerbatefoodsecurity.Bakeretal.(2010)considertheimpactofacarbonoffsetprogramthatpaysproducerstoconvertcroplandtoforestland.AssumingacarbonpriceofUSD50/tonnesCO2e,theyfoundthatproducerswouldafforestasmuchcroplandas15.8millionhectares(ha).Whilefarmincomeswouldrise,consumerswouldlose.Second,afforestingcroplandmayencourageindirectlanduseeffectselsewhere.Tothedegreethatretiringcroplandreducessupply,theresultingpriceincreasesmayencourageproduction(reboundeffect),particularlyincountrieswherecropproductionmaybelessGHG–efficientorwhereexpansionofproductionoccursthroughdeforestationorpastureconversion.Tothedegreepossible,carbonsequestrationeffortsviaafforestationofcroplandshouldbetargetedtowardscroplandwiththepoorestandleastefficientyieldsfromaGHGperspective.5.4Measurestoincreaseresiliencetoproducerstotheeffectsofclimatechange UndertheAoA,theGreenBoxaccommodatesanumberofmitigationmeasuresthatcanhelpproducersadjusttoincreasedweathervolatilitythatwilllikelyaccompanyclimate

15

change.Agriculturalinsuranceisavailableinover100countries(MahulandStutley,2010).Annex2oftheAoAalsoaccommodatespublicreserveprogramsthatcanhelpbuffertheimpactsofproductionshortfallstomeetfoodsecurityneeds.Forproducers,whoselivelihoodsareadverselyaffectedbyclimatechange,Annex2allowsstructuraladjustmentprograms,suchasproducerretirementprogramstotransitionproducers,tomoreeconomicallyviablelivelihoods.And,throughtheBaliDecision,Annex2wasextendedtoincludeactivitiestopromoteruraldevelopmentandlandreform,suchaslandrehabilitation;soilconservationandresourcemanagement;droughtmanagementandfloodcontrol;ruralemploymentprogrammes;issuanceofpropertytitles;andfarmersettlementprogrammes.5.4.1Agriculturalinsuranceanddisasterassistance Agriculturalinsuranceanddisasterassistanceprogramscanpotentiallymitigatetheeffectsofincreasedclimatevariabilityduetoclimatechange(SkeesandEnkh-Amgala,2002;FAO,2013).Disasterprogramsaretypicallypaymentprogramsthatcompensateproducersforlossesincurredduetoanaturaldisaster.Suchprogramsoftenareinitiatedexpost,whichmeans,thataproducermayhavenoguaranteeofreceivingsuchapaymentattimeofplanting.Insurance,bycontrast,guarantees,exante(typicallypriortoplanting)apaymentcontingentonaqualifiedloss.Inreturn,theproducertypicallypaysapremiumforsuchprotection,thoughthepremiumisoftentimessubsidizedbythegovernment.3IndevelopedeconomiessuchastheUnitedStates,Japan,Canada,andEurope,agriculturalinsuranceisgenerallycharacterizedbyindemnity–basedprogramsthatprovidecropandlivestockcoverageagainstnamedperils,multipleperils,and,morerecently,priceandrevenuerisks.Individual–basedcoverageisexpensive,becauseofthehighcostofadministeringcontractsandadjustinglosses.Moreover,individual–basedpoliciesarepronetomoralhazardandadverseselectionproblems,whichaddtothemonitoringcosts4(Kalra,2013).Becausethesecostsaregenerallyhighrelativetootherriskmanagementstrategies–suchascropdiversification,futuresmarkets,oroff–farmincome–,demandforagriculturalinsuranceproducts,intheabsenceofsubsidies,tendstobelow.Thisexplainswhyprivateunsubsidizedmarketsformultipleperilinsurancehavegenerallyfailed(WrightandHewitt,1994;GoodwinandSmith,1995)andwhythelargerinsuranceprogramsintheUnitedStates,Canada,andJapanaregenerallyhighlysubsidized.Intheircomprehensivereviewofagriculturalinsuranceprograms,MahulandStutley(2010)found,thatalmosttwo-thirdsofthecountriessurveyed,reportedthattheysubsidizedpremiumcosts.Thesecountriesaccountedformorethan90percentoftotalpremiums,atanaveragesubsidyrateof47percent.Forexample,thepubliccostsoftheUSprogram,whichareestimatedataboutone-thirdof2014totalglobalpremiumvolume,areprojected

3 Not all disaster assistance programs are ex post. Some countries offer producers ex ante disaster protection. In such a case they operate effectively like a fully subsidized insurance program (Glauber, 2004). 4 Moral hazard problems arise when insured producers alter their behavior after purchasing insurance to affect their likelihood of collecting an indemnity. Adverse selection problems arise when risks vary across insurance buyers and buyers know more about the risks they face than does the insurer who sets the rates (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992).

16

toexceedUSD8billionannuallyoverthenext10years,anexpenditureofalmost90centsforeveryUSD1premiumwritten(CBO,2017).Withsuchhighprogramcosts,itislittlewonder,thatthelargeragriculturalinsuranceprogramsaregenerallyfoundindevelopedcountries,orincreasingly,inlargeemergingeconomies,likeIndiaandChina.Thehighcostsofcontractingwithlargenumbersofdispersedsmallholders–whentherearefixedcoststocontractingandpoorlydevelopedlegalinstitutionsforenforcingcontracts–haveledmanytoconclude,thatconventional,indemnity–basedinsurancedoesnotworkforsmallholderfarmersindevelopingcountries(Hazell,1992).Toaddresstheseconcerns,index–basedinsuranceproductsbasedonspecificperilsorevents(forexample,regionalyieldloss,drought,orflood)andrecordedataregionallevel(forexample,byregionalweatherstations)havebeenpromoted.Examplesofsuchproductsincludearea–yieldinsurance,wherepremiumsandindemnitiesarebasedontheaverageyieldinaregion,orweather–basedindices,suchasrainfallinsurance,whereproducersreceiveapaymentifrainfallintheregionfallsbelowadesignatedlevel(Skees,Hazell,andMiranda,1999;Carter,2012).Suchcontractstypicallyminimizemoralhazardandadverseselectionissues(Miranda,1991)andcanbeprovidedatlowercosts,becauselossadjustmentandmonitoringcostsaresomuchlower(Skees,BlackandBarnett,1997).Indexinsuranceschemeshavebeenpilotedinanumberofdevelopingcountries,withsomewhatlimitedsuccess(MirandaandFarrin,2012;Carteretal.,2014).Participationinpilotprogramshasbeengenerallylimited(Binswanger-Mkhize,2012).Smith(2016)pointsout,thatsmall–holderfarmersalreadyhavewaysofmitigatingrisk,includinginformalcommunity–basedinitiatives,enterprisediversification,andoff–farmemployment.Anotherdrawbackistheexistenceofbasisrisk;thatis,thedegreetowhichtheregionalyieldorweathervariableiscorrelatedwiththeindividualfarmyield.Producers,whoseyieldsarepoorlycorrelatedwiththeaggregateindexmayfindsuchinsuranceofferstobeinsufficientriskprotection;thus,basisriskcanacttolimitdemand.OneexceptionisIndia’sWeatherBasedCropInsuranceScheme,anindex–basedinsuranceprogramthathasgrownconsiderablysinceitsintroductionin2007toincludemorethan9millionIndianproducersin2010–11,withacombinedcommercialpremiumvolumeofaboutUSD260million(Clarkeetal.,2012;Mahul,Verma,andClarke,2012).However,theprogramisheavilysubsidized,andparticipationismandatory,ifproducersparticipateingovernmentcreditprograms.RecentworkbyBertram-HuemmerandKroehnert(2018)oflivestockindexinsuranceinMongoliaconcludes,thatinsurancemitigatedtheimpactsofdroughtforproducers,whoparticipatedinthepilot.Somebelieve,thatthepotentialmarketforweather–basedinsuranceproductsismorelikelylimitedtoinsuringrelativelylargegroupsoffarmers,eitherdirectlyorindirectlythroughaggregators,suchasinputproviders,creditproviders,orbuyersincontractfarmingsituations(Binswanger-Mkhize,2012;Smith,2016).Anotherpotentialuseofweather–basedcontractswouldbebynationalgovernmentstomitigatewide–spreademergencieslikedroughts(MirandaandFarrin,2012).

17

AgriculturalinsurancehaswitnesseddramaticgrowthsincethelaunchoftheUruguayRound,largelytheresultofsubstantialgovernmentsupportmeasures.Thelevelsofsupportformanyprogramshaveraisedconcerns,thatinadditiontoprovidingriskmitigation,subsidiesmaybedistortingproductionandtrade.Whencropinsuranceisavailableandpriced,sothatthefarmcanacquirecoverage,riskaversefarmsproducemore.Butthepuresubsidyimpactalsomatters.RecentpapersbyBabcock(2015)andDu,FengandHennessy(2017)pointout,thatifproducersareparticipatinginthecropinsuranceprogramprimarilyto“harvest”subsidies,theyarenotactingoptimally.Thismeans,thattheyarenotchoosingoptimallevelsofcoveragetomaximizesubsidies.Theirstudiesconclude,thatfarmers’decisionsabouthowmuchcropinsurancetobuy,arenotgenerallyconsistentwitheitherexpectedprofitorsimplemodelstakingriskaversionintoaccount.Farmersdonotpickcoveragelevelsthatmaximizeexpectedsubsidynordotheydemandfullinsurancecoverage.However,overtime,producershavetendedtosignupforhighercoveragelevels,wheretheperunitsubsidiestendtobehigher.Glauber(2013)shows,thatintheUnitedStatesofAmericatheaveragecoveragelevelsformostrowcropshavegrownsignificantlyandcontinuouslysincethelate1990s,whensubsidieswereincreasedforhighercoveragelevels.MeasurementofimpactsoftheUScropinsuranceprogramhavefocusedonplantedareaandtheeffectsofinsuranceoninputuse.Goodwin,Vandeveer,andDeal(2004)examinedMidwesterncornandsoybeanproducersandwheatandbarleyproducersintheNorthernPlainsandfound,thata30percentdecreaseinpremiumcostswerelikelytoincreasebarleyacreagebyabout1.1percentandcornacreagebylessthan0.5percent.Soybeanandwheatacreageshowednostatisticallysignificantimpact.Ligon(2012)analyzedtheimpactofcropinsuranceonspecialtycropsandconcluded,thattheintroductionofcropinsurancehadalargeandpositiveimpactontreecrops,butanegligibleimpactonnon–treecrops.GoodwinandSmith(2012)havequestioned,whethertheresultsofearlierstudiescontinuetoberelevant,giventhatsubsidylevelsaremuchhighernowthanwhenearlierresearchwasconductedandrevenuepolicieshavelargelyreplacedyieldcoverages.Forexample,theGoodwin,Vandeveer,andDealstudyexaminedtheeffectsofinsurancesubsidiesovertheperiod1986–1993,priortoenactmentofmajorlegislationin1994and2000,thatdramaticallyincreasedsubsidylevels,andpriortotheintroductionofrevenueinsurance(Glauber,2004).Morerecently,Yu,SmithandSumner(2018)found,thatincreasedcropinsurancesubsidyrateshavehadsignificantlypositiveimpactsonproductionofmajorfieldcrops,butthemagnitudeoftheoverallproductionincreaseshavebeensmallasashareoftotalproduction.Theaforementionedstudieshavemostlyindicated,thatcropinsurancesubsidieshavehadsmallimpactsonproductionoverallinareas,whereinsuranceisbroadlyavailableacrosscrops.Cropinsurancelikelyhaslargerimpactsoncropchoicewheninsuredcropscompeteagainstuninsuredcrops,orwhencrops–whererevenueinsuranceisavailable–competeagainstcrops,whereonlyyieldinsuranceisavailable(WuandAdams,2001).Glauber(2017)pointedout,thatmeetingthestrictcriteriainparagraph7(incomeinsurance)orparagraph8(naturaldisasterandcropinsurance)ofAnnex2oftheAoAmay

18

makeitdifficulttoreportinsuranceprogramsintheGreenBox.Forexample,bothParagraphs7and8,limitcoverageto70percentofexpectedincomeoryieldandestablishguaranteesbasedon5yearsorlessofhistoricaldata.Mostarea-basedyieldprogramsorweather-basedderivativeproductstendtoofferhighercoveragelevelsandcoveragelevelstendtobebasedonexpectedyieldorincomeoutcomes,whichmaydifferfromaveragesofpastoutcomes.Moreover,the70percentcoveragelimitisarguablyoverlystringentforindexproducts,sinceindexvolatilityistypicallysubstantiallylessthanvolatilityforindividualyieldorrevenue-basedcoverage.Glauber(2017)noted,thatbecauseofthevariancewithAnnex2criteria,mostcountries–thatnotifyinsuranceprogramstotheWTO–notifythemasAmberBoxprograms.Increasedyieldvariabilityduetoclimatechangewillincreasethecostsofinsuringtheserisks,aspremiumcostswillrise.Thismayreducetheattractivenessofagriculturalinsuranceasamitigationoption,unlessgovernmentscontinuetosubsidizealargeshareofthepremiumcosts.Andinsurancecompaniesmaybelesswillingtounderwriteriskswithoutlargepublicsupportintheformofreinsurance(Glauber,2004).5.4.2Publicstockholdingprograms Liketrade,stocksservetomitigatetheimpactofproductionshortfalls(WilliamsandWright,1991).Privatestockholderstypicallyholdinventorieswhenexpectedspeculativeprofitsarenon–negative.Thishappens,whenexpectedpricesequalorexceedthecostofpurchasingandstoringthecommodity.Whensuppliesareabundantandpricesarelow,stockholderstendtopurchaseandholdmorestocks.Duringperiodsofscarcity,whenpricesarehigh,stockholdersreleasestocksontothemarketandinventorylevelsfall.Stocks,muchliketrade,tendtobuffertheimpactsofsupply.Unliketrade,whichmaybenegative(imports)orpositive(exports),stocksarelimitedinthat,onecanstoreforfutureshortfalls,butcannotborrowfromthefuturetomitigatecurrentshortfalls.Publicstockholdingprogramsdatebackatleasttwothousandyears(Sumner,AlstonandGlauber,2010).Forexample,intheBiblicalstoryJosephtellsthePharaohtostoregrainduringtimesofabundancetoforestallshortagesduringtimesofdrought(Genesis41:53–57).Chen(1974)describedstockholdingschemesinChinainthefirstcenturyBCE.Morerecently,theUnitedStatesofAmericaintroducedgovernmentstockpilingprogramsinthe1930s(GlauberandEffland,2017)andtheEuropeanUnionintroducedpriceinterventionschemesunderitsCommonAgriculturalPolicyinthe1960s(Josling,1974).SubsequentreformsintheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheEuropeanUnionhavegreatlydiminishedtheroleofthosepublicstockholdingprograms,butlargenationalreserveprogramsexistinmanydevelopingcountriessuchasChinaandIndia(G20,2011).Large-scalepublicstockholdingprogramshavebeencriticizedforanumberofreasons(WrightandPrakash,2011).First,theytendtobecostly,bothintermsofcostsofprocurementandthecostsofstorage.Second,stockholdingprogramsoftenoperateonpre–announcedprocurementpricesthatwhensethighrelativetocurrentmarketpricescanleadtolargestockacquisitionsanddistortproductiondecisions.Theexperienceofthe

19

EuropeanUnion,UnitedStatesofAmericaandmorerecently,China,hasbeenthatsuchpoliciescanleadtoburdensomegovernmentstockpilelevels.Thosestockscanfurtherdistortmarketswhengovernmentsdecidetodrawdownpublicstocksbydumpingthemonworldmarkets.Lastly,publicstockholdingprogramsoftenoperateinamannerthatdiscouragesprivatestockpiling,whichreducestheeffectivenessinstabilizingmarketprices.Unlikelargescalebufferstockschemes,smallpublicreservesforpurposesofmeetingshort–termemergencyfoodneedscanhelpmitigateproductionshortfalls,particularlyincountries,wheretransportationcostsmaylimitordelayimportsofneededsupplies.Inaddition,theiroperationislesslikelytodisruptstockholdingbymerchants,andotherprivatesectormarketparticipants.OnesuchexampleistheWorldFoodProgramme’s(WFP)ForwardPurchasingprogramthataimstoachievemorerapidandcost-effectivefooddeliverytobeneficiariesacrosscountriesinvariousregions(WFP,2010).TheAoAallowsforcertainpublicly-fundedgovernmentprogramswithno(oratmostminimal)tradedistortingeffectsoreffectsonproduction,tobeexemptedfromdomesticsupportreductioncommitments,providedtheyalsomeetpolicyspecificcriteriathatarelaidoutinparagraph3ofAnnex2oftheAoA.Ofparticularconcernis,howcountriesprocuregrainorotherfoodstuffsforthereserve.Ifprocurementisbasedonpre-announcedstatutorypricesthatexceedbase-periodreferenceprices,thencountriesmustreportthesemeasuresasAmberBox(andifthesupportforthosecommoditiesexceeddeminimislevels).Theprovisionsinparagraph3havebeencontroversialintheWTOwithsomedevelopingcountriesseekingtorelaxcriteriaintheprovisionstoallowforpublicstockholdingprogramsindevelopingcountries.Thechangeshavebeenstronglyopposedbyanumberofdevelopedcountriesandexportingdevelopingcountries,whichexpressedconcern,thatifadministeredpricesaresethighenough,theywoulddistortproducerproductiondecisions,potentiallyleadingtosurplusesthatcoulddepressglobalmarketprices.5.4.3Structuraladjustmentpayments Climatechangecouldhavesevereadverseimplicationsforproducersinaffectedregions.Incaseswhereclimatechangehasdramaticallyaffectedcropsorlivestockproduction,structuraladjustmentprogramscouldhelpcountriesmitigatethoseimpactsbyprovidingaidtobuildregionalinfrastructuretosupportalternativecrops,orevenbytakinglandoutofcroporlivestockproduction,orinmoreextremecasesbyassistingproducerswholeaveagriculturealtogether.Structuralmeasuresthataredesignedtoassistpermanentlydisadvantagedproducersorregions,arecoveredinAnnex2oftheAoAunderParagraph9(producerretirementprograms),Paragraph10(resourceretirementprograms),Paragraph11(regionalinvestmentaids)andParagraph13(regionaladjustmentprograms).Duetothecostsofsuchprograms,themeasures–coveredunderParagraphs9,10,11and13–havebeen

20

largelyusedbydevelopedmembers,suchastheEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica.Internationalfundingwilllikelybenecessarytoassistpoorercountriesinmakinglargestructuraladjustmentsofthiskind.5.5Regulatorypoliciestoaddressclimatechange Inadditiontosubsidiesandtaxes,climatechangemitigationcanalsobeimposedthroughregulation.RestrictionscouldbeplacedoncertainpracticestoreduceGHGemissions(forexample,regulatinghowmanureismanaged)orbyregulationsthatmandatetheproductionofproductsthataremoreGHGefficient.Biofuelmandateshavebeentoutedasclimatesmartpolicies,thoughtheyremaincontroversial,becauseoftheirpotentialimpactonGHGemissions,whenagriculturalproductionpracticesanddirectandindirectlanduseeffectsareconsidered(USDA,2016).UnitedStatesofAmericabiofuelpolicieshavestimulateddemandforbiofuelsandtheirfeedstocks.From2005to2011,USproductionofcorn-basedethanolincreasedfrom3.9billiongallonsto13.9billiongallons,atanannualgrowthrateofalmost24percentperyear.Cornuseforethanolgrewbyabout3.4billionbushels,accountingformorethan40percentoftotalcornusein2011/12.UnitedStatesofAmericabiodieselproductionrosefromjust90milliongallonsin2005tomorethan1.2billiongallonsby2014.About25percentofsoybeanoilusegoestobiodieselproduction;otherimportantfeedstocksincludeanimalfatsandothervegetableoils.

AsBabcockandFabiosa(2011)pointout,anumberofotherfactorswerecriticalforethanol’sgrowth.First,thephase-outofMethylTertiaryButylEster(MTBE)asagasolineadditivein2004and2005boosteddemandforethanolasitsreplacementinoxygenatedfuelmarkets.Thisgrowthinethanoldemandcombinedwithexistingdemandsubsidiesandalimitedsupplyofethanoltogreatlyincreaseethanolprices,ledtothewideprocessingmarginsin2006and2007.Largemarginsfurtherspurredinvestmentinethanolproductioncapacity.Second,therapidriseinoilpricesbeginningin2006encourageddiscretionaryblendingofethanolasasubstituteforgasoline.Therapidriseincornandothercommoditypricesin2007–2008promptedconcernsabouttheimpactofethanolonfoodpricesbothintheUnitedStatesofAmericaandabroad.Manycritics,likeWright(2014),blamedbiofuelproductionforincreasedpricesandvolatility.Condon,KlemickandWolverton(2015)reviewedawiderangeofstudiesthatconsideredtheimpactofethanolproductiononcornpricesduringtheperiod2007–2010.Theirmeta–analysisconcludesthataboutone-thirdofthepriceincreaseincornpricesovertheperiodwaslikelyduetoincreasedethanolproduction.Since2011,UnitesStatesofAmeriicacornethanolproductionhasremainedrelativelyflatatabout14to15billiongallons,reflectingautomobileperformanceconstraintsthatlimitethanolpenetrationinmotorfueluseat10percent(theso–calledblendwall).Today,theblendertaxcreditsforethanolhavebeeneliminatedashavethehighsupplementalduties

21

onethanolimports.TheRenewableFuelStandard(RFS)mandatesestablishedundertheEnergyIndependenceSecurityActof2007havebeenrelaxedreflectingtheblendwallconstraint.Asaresult,cornuseforethanolremainsatabout5.1billionbushelsperyearandisnotprojectedtogrowmuchoverthenext10years(O’DonoghueandHansen,2017).TheRFS’simpactoncurrentcornpricesislikelysmall.Ethanoliscurrentlypricecompetitiveasanoctaneenhanceringasolineproduction(IrwinandGood,2015).Asaresult,evenwithloweroilprices,ethanolproductionmarginsremaincompetitiveandethanolproductionlevelshaveremainedabovemandatesundertheRFS.Thus,eliminationofthemandateswouldlikelyhavelittleimpactonethanolproductionandhencecornuseandprices,atleastintheshortrun.Overthelongrun,itscompetitivenesswouldlargelybedrivenbytherelativepricedifferencebetweencornandpetroleumabsentconsumptionmandates.Bycontrast,UnitedStatesofAmericabiodieselproductionisheavilydependentonthemandatesandthecurrentUSbiodieseltaxcredit,whichprovidesUSD1/galloncreditforblendersofbiodieselfuel.UndertherecentRFSfor2016,mandatesforbiodieselweresetat1.9billiongallons.Intheabsenceofthemandatesandtaxcreditsitisunlikelythatbiodieselproductionwouldbemorethanone-thirdofcurrentlevels,asanumberofstatesandmunicipalitiesmandatebiodieseluse.Lastly,concernshavebeenraisedabouttheimpactofbiofuelpoliciesonindirectlandusechange(Searchingeretal.,2017).ThemodestGHGemissionsreductionduetofirstgenerationbiofuel(suchasmaize)usemaybelargelyoffsetbytheimpactofhigherpricesonworldproduction,particularlyifproductionexpansionisaresultofdeforestationorpastureconversion.WTOdomesticsupportissuesarepotentiallyraised,whensubsidiesareusedtoencouragebiofuelproductionorconsumption,which,inturn,haspotentialimpactsonfeedstockproduction(forexample,cornforethanolproduction,soybeansforsoybeanoil-basedbiodieselproduction).Assuch,biofuelpoliciesdistortfeedstockproductionandthisisthereasonwhytheyareamberinnature.Forexample,underitsBiomassCropAssistanceProgram(BCAP)theUnitedStatesofAmericaprovidesfinancialassistancetoownersandoperatorsofagriculturalandnon-industrialprivateforestlandwhowishtoestablish,produce,anddeliverbiomassfeedstocks.TheUnitedStatesofAmericahasnotifiedBCAPexpendituresasAmberBox.

6.DesigningWTO-compatibleCSApolicies ClimateSmartAgricultureaimstoachievesustainableagriculturaldevelopmentforfoodsecurityunderclimatechange.Forthemostpart,thosegoalsarecompatiblewiththeWTOgoalsoffreeandopentrade.Indeed,aswasdiscussedinSection3,internationaltradeisitselfamitigatingstrategyinmeetingthefoodsecuritychallengesofclimatechange.An

22

opentradingsystemwillbestservethepotentialneedsofbalancingfuturesupplyanddemandregardlessofhowthosefactorswillbeaffectedbyclimatechange.Tothisend,furtherprogressinloweringtariffsandotherbordermeasuresandeliminatingtrade-distortingdomesticsupportwillhelpfacilitatetimelyandappropriateexportstomeetfoodsecurityconcernsoverthelongrunandmoreimportantly,duringtimesofdistresscausedbyclimate–inducedcropfailures.Inaddition,progressshouldbemadetowardseliminatingtheuseofexportrestrictionsandotherdistortions.Ideally,theexternalitiescausedbyGHGemissionswouldbefullyincorporatedinmarketprices;inpractice,thiswilllikelyneverbethecase.Nonetheless,CSApoliciesaimedatreducingGHGemissions,orsequesteringCO2,ormitigatingtheeffectsofclimatechangeitself,shouldnotbebackdoorwaysofpromotingprotectionismordistortingdomesticproduction.Suchpolicies,whileattractivefromanarrowdomesticperspective,willlikelyhavemoreconsequentialadverseimpactsininternationalmarkets,particularlyfordevelopingcountrieswhowillbelesslikelytoaffordsuchsupportmeasures.Inthissense,CSApoliciesshouldbecompatiblewiththeoverarchingconditionsoftheGreenBoxofprovidingminimaltrade–orproduction–distortingsupport.ThatisnottosaythatreformstotheprovisionsinAnnex2shouldnotbeconsidered.AsGlauber(2017)pointsout,theAnnex2provisiongoverninginsurancearenotwelladaptedtocurrentinsuranceprograms,particularlyindexinsuranceandweatherderivatives,whichareincreasinglybeingusedindevelopingcountries(MirandaandFarrin,2012).Thatsaid,heavilysubsidizedinsuranceprograms,particularlythosethatprovidepriceandrevenueprotection,candistortproductionsincetheyaredirectlycoupledtoactualproduction.Increasingproductivity,particularlyindevelopingcountrieswhereyieldgapsareoftengreatest,shouldbeapriorityofanyCSApolicy.MorepublicR&DshouldbedirectedtowardsclimateresilientvarietiesandtowardsanaimofincreasingGHGefficiency.WhileArticle6.2oftheAoAallowsforsubsidizedinputusetoincreaseproductivityinresourcepoordevelopingcountries,inputsubsidiesfordevelopingcountriesthatpromotelessGHG–efficientproductiontechnologiesshouldbeviewedwithmorecaution.Resourceretirementprogramsmayoffersignificantopportunitiesforcarbonsequestrationthroughafforestation.However,theimpactofsequesteredcarbononGHGemissionsmustbeanalyzedinaglobalcontextintermsofindirectlanduseaswellasfoodsecurityconcerns.Likewise,biofuelmandatesshouldbelimitedtonon–foodandnon–feedfeedstocks,thoughlanduseeffectsofconvertingpotentialcroplandtobiofueluseremainanissueofconcern.

23

7.Conclusions

AddressingclimatechangeinawaythatensuresmeetingtheUNSustainableDevelopmentGoalswillposesignificantchallengesintheyearsahead.Ofbroaderconsiderationiswhethertheexigenciesofclimatechangerequirerethinkingrulesunderlyingtheglobaltradingsystem,particularlythosegoverningdomesticsupport.ShouldmeasuresthatencouragetheadoptionofGHG–efficientpoliciesbeencouraged,eveniftheyincreaseproductionandtrade?Suchpoliciesmaybeefficientfromaglobalperspective,yetcouldleadtoadverseconsequencesforproducersattheregionalorcountrylevel—particularlypenalizingdevelopingcountrieswhoseresourcesmaybeinsufficienttomatchthatofmoredevelopedcountries.ClimateSmartAgricultureisanimportanttooltohelpmitigateagriculture’scontributiontoGHGemissionsaswellashelpproducersandcommunitiesbetteradapttotheconditionsbroughtonbyclimatechange.FreeandopentradeshouldbeseenasanintegralpartofanyCSAstrategy.Effortsatfurtherliberalizationthroughreductionsintariffandnon–tariffbarriers,trade–distortingdomesticsupport,andexportsubsidiesandrestrictionsshouldbevigorouslypursued.

24

ReferencesAhmed,K.,Wang,G.,You,L.,Anyah,R.,Zhang,C.,&Burnicki,A.2017.Projectingregionalclimateandcroplandchangesusingalinkedbiogeophysical–socioeconomicmodelingframework:2.Transientdynamics.JournalofAdvancesinModelingEarthSystems 9(1):377.Alston,J.,M.Andersen,J.James,andP.Pardey.2010.PersistencePays:USAgriculturalProductivityGrowthandtheBenefitsfromPublicR&DSpending.NewYork:Springer.Alston,J.M.,Pardey,P.G.,2014.“AgricultureintheGlobalEconomy”.J.Econ.Persp.28(1):121–146.Anderson,K.,Ivanic,M.&Martin,W.J.2014.Foodpricespikes,priceinsulation,andpoverty.InJ.P.Chavas,D.Hummels&B.D.Wright,eds.TheEconomicsofFoodPriceVolatility,pp.311–339.Chicago,USA,UniversityofChicagoPress.Antle,J.M.2015.Climatechangevulnerabilityandfoodinsecurity.Choices30(2).Babcock,B.2015.UsingCumulativeProspectTheorytoExplainAnomalousCropInsuranceCoverageChoice.AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics97:1317–1384.Babcock,B.&Fabiosa,J.2011.TheImpactofEthanolandEthanolSubsidiesonCornPrices:RevisitingHistory.CARDPolicyBriefs1Ames,IA,US:IowaStateUniversity,CenterforAgriculturalandRuralDevelopment.Baker,J.,McCarl,B.,Murray,B.,Rose,S.,Alig,R.,Adams,D.,Latta,G.,Beach,R.,&Daigneault,A.2010.NetFarmIncomeandLandUseunderaU.S.GreenhouseGasCapandTrade.PolicyIssues.PI7.http://www.choicesmagazine.org/UserFiles/file/PI7.pdfBaldos,U.&Hertel,T.W.2014.Globalfoodsecurityin2050:Theroleofagriculturalproductivityandclimatechange.AustralianJournalofAgriculturalandResourceEconomics58:1–18.(alsoavailableathttps://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8489.12048).Bertram–Huemmer,V.&KraehnertK.2018.DoesIndexInsuranceHelpHouseholdsRecoverfromDisaster?EvidencefromIndex–BasedLivestockInsurance(IBLI)Mongolia.AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics,100(3):145–171.Binswanger–Mkhize,H.2012.IsThereTooMuchHypeaboutIndex–basedAgriculturalInsurance?JournalofDevelopmentStudies48(2):187–200.Blanco,G.,Gerlagh,R.,Suh,S.,Barrett,J.,deConinck,H.C.,DiazMorejon,C.F.,Mathur,R.,Nakicenovic,N.,OfosuAhenkora,A.,Pan,J.,Pathak,H.,Rice,J.,Richels,R.,Smith,S.J.,Stern,D.I.,Toth,F.L.&Zhou,P.2014.Drivers,TrendsandMitigation.InO.Edenhofer,R.Pichs–Madruga,Y.Sokona,E.Farahani,S.Kadner,K.Seyboth,A.Adler,I.

25

Baum,S.Brunner,P.Eickemeier,B.Kriemann,J.Savolainen,S.Schlomer,C.vonStechow,T.Zwickel&J.C.Minx,eds.ClimateChange2014:MitigationofClimateChange,ContributionofWorkingGroupIIItotheFifthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.NewYork,USA,CambridgeUniversityPress.Blandford,D.2013.InternationalTradeDisciplinesandPolicyMeasurestoAddressClimateChangeMitigationandAdaptationinAgriculture.PaperproducedunderE15Initiative.Geneva,InternationalCentreforTradeandSustainableDevelopment(ICTSD)andWorldEconomicForum2014.(alsoavailableat:www.e15initiative.org/).Blandford,D.&Josling,T.2009.GreenhouseGasReductionPoliciesandAgriculture:ImplicationsforProductionIncentivesandInternationalTradeDisciplines.InternationalCentreforTradeandSustainableDevelopment(ICTSD)–InternationalFood&AgriculturalTradePolicyCouncil(IPC)PlatformonClimateChange,AgricultureandTrade,IssueBriefNo.1,ICTSD,Geneva,SwitzerlandandInternationalFood&AgriculturalTradePolicyCouncil,WashingtonDC,USA.Blandford,D.&Hassapoyannes,K.2017.Agriculture'sRoleinGlobalGHGMitigationTowardstheBelow2°CWarmingObjective:Potential,MeansandEconomicImplications.Paris:OECDConsultantReport.COM/TAD/CA/ENV/EPOC(2017)11.Bouët,A.,Cosnard,L.&Laborde,D.2017.MeasuringTradeIntegrationinAfrica.(InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute)IFPRIDiscussionPaper01667.Washington,DC.http://ebrary.ifpri.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll2/id/131365Brown,M.E.,Carr,E.R.,Grace,K.L.,Wiebe,K.,Funk,C.C.,Attavanich,W.,Backlund,P.&BujaL.2017.Domarketsandtradehelporhurttheglobalfoodsystemadapttoclimatechange?FoodPolicy68:154–159.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030691921630481XBurney,J.,Davis,S.&Lobell,D.2010.Greenhousegasmitigationbyagriculturalintensification.ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciences(PNAS)107(26):12052–12057.Campbell,B.,Thornton,P.,Zougmoré,R.,vanAsten,P.&LipperL.2014.Sustainableintensification:Whatisitsroleinclimatesmartagriculture?CurrentOpinioninEnvironmentalSustainability8:39–43.Carter,M.2012.DesignedforDevelopmentImpact:NextGenerationApproachestoIndexInsuranceforSmallholderFarmers.Munich,MunichReMicroinsuranceCompendium2.Carter,M.,deJanvry,A.,Sadoulet,E.&Sarris,A.2014.Index–BasedWeatherInsuranceforDevelopingCountries:AReviewofEvidenceandaSetofPropositionsforUp–scaling.LaFondationpourlesÉtudesetRecherchessurleDéveloppementInternational.http://www.ferdi.fr/sites/www.ferdi.fr/files/evenements/presentations/wp_ferdi_working_paper_on_index_insurance_june_19_kl.pdf

26

Ceballos,F.,Hernandez,M.A.,Minot,N.&Robles,M.2017.GrainpriceandvolatilityTransmissionfromInternationaltoDomesticMarketsinDevelopingCountries,June2017,WorldDevelopment94:305–320.Chen,H.1974.TheEconomicPrinciplesofConfuciusandHisSchool.NewYork,USA,GordonPress.Claassen,R.,Duquette,E.&Horowitz,J.2013.Additionalityinagriculturalconservationpaymentprograms.JournalofSoilandWaterConservation68(3):74A–78A.Clarke,D.,MahulO.,Rao,K.&Verma,N.2012.WeatherBasedCropInsuranceinIndia.PolicyResearchWorkingPaper5985.WorldBank.Washington,DC.Condon,N.,Klemick,H.&Wolverton,A.2015.ImpactsofEthanolPolicyonCornPrices:AReviewandMeta–analysisofRecentEvidence.Washington,DC.FoodPolicy51:63–73.CongressionalBudgetOffice(CBO).2017.BaselineforFarmPrograms.Demeke,M.,Pangrazio,G.&Maetz,M.2009.Countryresponsestothefoodsecuritycrisis:natureandpreliminaryimplicationsofthepoliciespursued.Initiativeonsoaringprices.Rome,FAO.DePinto,A.&Ulimwengu,J.M.,eds.2017.Athrivingagriculturalsectorinachangingclimate:MeetingMalaboDeclarationgoalsthroughclimate–smartagriculture.ReSAKSSAnnualTrendsandOutlookReport2016.Washington,D.C.,InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute(IFPRI).http://dx.doi.org/10.2499/9780896292949Du,X.,H.Feng,andD.Hennessy.2017.RationalityofChoicesinSubsidizedCropInsuranceMarkets.AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics99(3):732–756.Earley,J.2009.U.S.TradePoliciesonBiofuelsandSustainableDevelopment.ProgrammeonAgriculturalTradeandSustainableDevelopment,IssuePaperNo.18.Geneva,Switzerland.InternationalCentreforTradeandSustainableDevelopment.Effland,A.2011.ClassifyingandMeasuringAgriculturalSupport:IdentifyingDifferencesbetweentheWTOandOECDSystems.EconomicInformationBulletinNo.74.EconomicResearchService,USDepartmentofAgriculture.Eve,M.,Pape,D.,Flugge,M.,Steele,R.,Man,D.,Riley–Gilbert,M.&Biggar,S.,eds.2014.QuantifyingGreenhouseGasFluxesinAgricultureandForestry:MethodsforEntity–ScaleInventory.July2014,TechnicalBulletinNumber1939.OfficeoftheChiefEconomist,UnitedStatesDepartmentofAgriculture,Washington,DC.606pp.FAO.2010.ClimateSmartAgriculture:Policies,PracticesandFinancingforFoodSecurity,AdaptationandMitigation.Rome

27

FAO.2013.ClimateSmartAgriculture:Sourcebook.Rome.(alsoavailableathttp://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3325e/i3325e.pdf).Fuglie,K.2017.“R&DCapital,R&DSpillovers,andProductivityGrowthinWorldAgriculture.”AppliedEconomicPerspectivesandPolicy40(3):421–444.Keith,F.2018.R&DCapital,R&DSpillovers,andProductivityGrowthinWorldAgriculture,AppliedEconomicPerspectivesandPolicy40(3),421–444.https://doi.org/10.1093/aepp/ppx045G20.2011.“PriceVolatilityinFoodandAgriculturalMarkets:PolicyResponses”PolicyReportincludingcontributionsbyFAO,IFAD,IMF,OECD,UNCTAD,WFP,theWorldBank,theWTO,IFPRIandtheUNHLTF.http://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-trade/48152638.pdf.Gale,F.,Hansen,J.&Jewison,M.2016.China’sGrowingDemandforAgriculturalImports.EconomicInformationBulletinNo.136,EconomicResearchService,U.S.DepartmentofAgriculture.Gibbs,H.K.,Ruesch,A.S.,Achard,F.,Clayton,M.K.,Holmgren,P.,Ramankutty,N.&Foley,J.A.2010.Tropicalforestsweretheprimarysourcesofnewagriculturallandinthe1980sand1990s.ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciences107(38):16732–6737.Glauber,J.W.2004.CropInsuranceReconsidered.AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics86(5):1179–1195.Glauber,J.W.2013.TheGrowthoftheFederalCropInsuranceProgram,1990–2011.AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics95(2):482–488.Glauber,J.W.2017.AgriculturalinsuranceandtheWTO.InA.Bouët&D.LabordeDebucquet,eds.Agriculture,developmentandtheglobaltradingsystem:2000–2015.Chapter10.325–364.Washington,DC,InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute(IFPRI).https://doi.org/10.2499/9780896292499_10Glauber,J.&Effland,A.2017.U.S.AgriculturalPolicyinHandbookofInternationalFoodandAgriculturalPolicies,Volume1,PoliciesforAgriculturalMarketsandRuralEconomicActivity.InT.Josling,W.Meyers,T.Johnson,eds.WorldScientificPublishing.Godfray,H.C.J.2015.Thedebateoversustainableintensification.FoodSecurity7:199–208.Golub,A.,Henderson,B.,Hertel,T.,Rose,S.&Avetisyan,M.2010.EffectsofGHGMitigationPoliciesonLivestockPolicies.Paperpresentedatthe13thAnnualConferenceonGlobalEconomicAnalysis.Penang,Malaysia.

28

Goodwin,B.&Smith,V.1995.TheEconomicsofCropInsuranceandDisasterRelief.Washington,DC,AEIPress.Goodwin,B.&Smith,V.2012.WhatHarmIsDonebySubsidizingCropInsurance?AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics95(2):489–497.Goodwin,B.,Vandeveer,M.&Deal,J.2004.AnEmpiricalAnalysisofAcreageEffectsofParticipationintheFederalCropInsuranceProgram.AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics86(4):1058–1077.Häberli,Christian.2018.Potentialconflictsbetweenagriculturaltraderulesandclimatechangetreatycommitments.TheStateofAgriculturalCommodityMarkets(SOCO)2018:Backgroundpaper.Rome,FAO,2018.50pages.Haile,B.,Azzarri,C.,Koo,J.&DePinto,A.2017.Trade,climatechange,andclimate–smartagriculture.InA.DePinto&J.M.Ulimwengu,eds.Athrivingagriculturalsectorinachangingclimate:MeetingMalaboDeclarationgoalsthroughclimate-smartagriculture,Chapter5,pp.54–68.Washington,D.C.,InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute(IFPRI).http://dx.doi.org/10.2499/9780896292949_05Havlík,P.,Valin,H.,Herrero,M.,Obersteiner,M.,Schmid,E.,Rufino,M.,Mosnier,A.etal.2014.Climatechangemitigationthroughlivestocksystemtransitions,ProceedingsofNationalAcademyofSciences111(10):3709–3714,Washington,DC.Hazell,P.1992.TheAppropriateRoleofAgriculturalInsuranceinDevelopingCountries.JournalofInternationalDevelopment4:567–581.Hirshleifer,J.&Riley,J.G.1992.TheAnalyticsofUncertaintyandInformation.NewYork,CambridgeUniversityPress.HerreroM.,Henderson,B.,Thornton,P.K.,Conant,R.T.,Smith,P.,Wirsenius,S.,Hristov,A.N.,etal.2016.Greenhousegasmitigationpotentialsinthelivestocksector.NatureClimateChange6:452–461,SpringerNature,London.http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/NCLIMATE2925.Huang,H.,M.vonLampeandF.vonTongeron.2011.“Climatechangeandtradeinagriculture.”FoodPolicy36:S9-S13.Hussein,Z.,Hertel,T.&Golub,A.2013.Climatechangemitigationpoliciesandpovertyindevelopingcountries.EnvironmentalResearchLetters8:035009.http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/8/3/035009/metaIrwin,S.&Good,D.2015.FurtherEvidenceontheCompetitivenessofEthanolinGasolineBlends.farmdocdaily(5):17.DepartmentofAgriculturalandConsumerEconomics,UniversityofIllinoisatUrbana–Champaign,January30.

29

Josling,T.1974.AgriculturalPoliciesinDevelopedCountries:AReview.JournalofAgriculturalEconomics25(3):229–264.Josling,T.,Tangermann,S.&Warley,T.1996.AgricultureintheGATT.London,MacMillanPress.Josling,T.&Blandford,D.2009.BiofuelSubsidiesandtheGreenBox.InR.Melendez–Ortiz,C.Bellman&J.Hepburn,eds.AgriculturalSubsidiesintheWTOGreenBox.pp.530–568.Cambridge,UK,CambridgeUniversityPress.Kalra,A.2013.PartneringforFoodSecurityinEmergingMarkets.Sigma1.Geneva.SwissRe.http://media.swissre.com/documents/sigma1_2013_en.pdf.Lantz,U.,Baldos,C.&Hertel,T.2015.Theroleofinternationaltradeinmanagingfoodsecurityrisksfromclimatechange.FoodSecurity7:275–290.Leamer,E.1984.SourcesofInternationalComparativeAdvantage:TheoryandEvidence.Cambridge,Massachusetts,MITPress.Lendle,A.&Schaus,M.2010.SustainabilityCriteriaintheEURenewableEnergyDirective:ConsistentwithWTORules?InternationalCentreforTradeandSustainableDevelopment(ICTSD),InformationNoteNo.2.Geneva,Switzerland,ICTSD.Ligon,E.2012.“SupplyandEffectsofSpecialtyCropInsurance.”InTheIntendedandUnintendedEffectsofU.S.AgriculturalandBiotechnologyPolicies,editedbyJ.GraffZivinandJ.Perloff,113–142.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Lybbert,T.J.&Sumner,D.A.2012.Agriculturaltechnologiesforclimatechangeindevelopingcountries:Policyoptionsforinnovationandtechnologydiffusion.FoodPolicy37:114–123.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2011.11.001.Mahul,O.&Stutley,C.2010.GovernmentSupporttoAgriculturalInsurance:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforDevelopingCountries.Washington,DC,WorldBank.Mahul,O.,Verma,N.&Clarke,D.2012.ImprovingFarmers’AccesstoAgriculturalInsuranceinIndia.PolicyResearchWorkingPaperNo.5987.Washington,DC,WorldBank.Martinez,P.,Blanco,M.,VanDoorslaer,B.,Ramos,F.&Ceglar,A.2017.WhatrolewillclimatechangeplayinEUagriculturalmarkets?Anintegratedassessmenttakingintoaccountcarbonfertilizationeffects.SpanishJournalofAgriculturalResearch15(3):e0115.McCarthy,N.,Lipper,L.&Zilberman,D.2017.EconomicsofClimateSmartAgriculture:AnOverview.InN.Lipper,N.McCarthy,D.Zilberman,D.Asfaw&S.Branca,eds.ClimateSmartAgriculture.SpringerVerlag.

30

McFarland,B.2011.CarbonReductionProjectsandtheConceptofAdditionality.SustainableDevelopmentLaw&Policy11(2):15–18.Mezzatesta,M.,Newburn,D.&Woodward,R.2013.AdditionalityandtheAdoptionofFarmConservationPractices.LandEconomics89(4):722–742.Minot,N.2014.“Foodpricevolatilityinsub-SaharanAfrica:Hasitreallyincreased?”FoodPolicy45:45-56.Miranda,M.1991.Area–YieldCropInsuranceReconsidered.AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics73:233–242.Miranda,M.&Farrin,K.2012.IndexInsuranceforDevelopingCountries.AppliedEconomicPerspectivesandPolicy34(3):391–427.Nelson,G.C.,Rosegrant,M.W.,Palazzo,A.,Gray,I.,Ingersoll,C.,Robertson,R.D.,Tokgoz,S.,Zhu,T.,Sulser,T.B.,Ringler,C.,Msangi,S.,&You,L.2010.FoodSecurity,Farming,andClimateChangeto2050:Scenarios,Results,PolicyOptions.Washington,DC,InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute.Nigatu,G.,Hansen.J.,Childs,N.&Seeley,R.2017.Sub–SaharanAfricaIsProjectedToBetheLeaderinGlobalRiceImports.AmberWaves.EconomicResearchServiceUSDepartmentofAgriculture.October2.https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber–waves/2017/october/sub-saharan-africa-is-projected-to-be-the-leader-in-global-rice-imports/O’Donogahue,E.&Hansen,J.2017.USDAAgriculturalProjectionsto2026.USDepartmentofAgriculture(USDA),AgriculturalProjectionsNo.(OCE–2017–1)106pp.https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=82538OECD&FAO.2017.OECD–FAOAgriculturalOutlook2017–2026.http://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-19991142.htmPape,D.,Lewandrowski,J.,Steele,R.,Man,D.,Riley–Gilbert,M.,Moffroid,K.&Kolansky,S.2016.ManagingAgriculturalLandforGreenhouseGasMitigationwithintheUnitedStates.ReportpreparedbyICFInternationalunderUSDAContractNo.AG–3144–D–14–0292.July2016.https://www.usda.gov/oce/climate_change/mitigation_technologies/ICFMitgationReportWEB.pdfPorter,J.R.,Xie,L.,Challinor,A.J.,Cochrane,K.,Howden,S.M.,Iqbal,M.M.,Lobell,D.B.&Travasso,M.I.2014:Foodsecurityandfoodproductionsystems.InC.B.Field,V.R.Barros,D.J.Dokken,K.J.Mach,M.D.Mastrandrea,T.E.Bilir,M.Chatterjee,K.L.Ebi,Y.O.Estrada,R.C.Genova,B.Girma,E.S.Kissel,A.N.Levy,S.MacCracken,P.R.Mastrandrea&L.L.White,eds.ClimateChange2014:Impacts,Adaptation,andVulnerabilityPartA:GlobalandSectoralAspects,pp.485–533.ContributionofWorkingGroupIItotheFifthAssessment

31

ReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Cambridge,UK,CambridgeUniversityPressandNewYork,NY,U.S.Searchinger,T.,Edwards,R.,Mulligan,D.,Heimlich,R.&Plevin,R.2017.Dobiofuelpoliciesseektocutemissionsbycuttingfood?Science347(6229):1420–1422.Skees,J.,Hazell,P.&Miranda,M.1999.NewApproachestoCropYieldInsuranceinDevelopingCountries.EnvironmentandProductionTechnologyDivision(EPTD)DiscussionPaper55.Washington,DC,InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute.Skees,J.R.,Black,J.R.&Barnett,B.J.1997.ADesigningandRatinganAreaYieldCropInsuranceContract.AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics79(2):430–438.Skees.J.R.&Enkh–Amgala,A.2002.ExaminingthefeasibilityoflivestockinsuranceinMongolia.PolicyResearchWorkingPaper2886.Washington,DC,WorldBank.Smith,P.,Martino,D.,Cai,Z.,Gwary,D.,Janzen,H.,Kumar,P.,McCarl,B.etal.2007.Policyandtechnologicalconstraintstoimplementationofgreenhousegasmitigationoptionsinagriculture.Agriculture,EcosystemsandEnvironment118:6–28.Elsevier,Amsterdam.SmithP.,Bustamante,M.,Ahammad,H.,Clark,H.,Dong,H.,Elsiddig,E.A.,Haberl,H.,Harper,R.,House,J.,Jafari,M.,Masera,O.,Mbow,C.,Ravindranath,N.H.,Rice,C.W.,RobledoAbad,C.,Romanovskaya,A.,Sperling,F.&TubielloF.2014.Agriculture,ForestryandOtherLandUse(AFOLU).In:O.Edenhofer,R.Pichs–Madruga,Y.Sokona,E.Farahani,S.Kadner,K.Seyboth,A.Adler,I.Baum,S.Brunner,P.Eickemeier,B.Kriemann,J.Savolainen,S.Schlömer,C.vonStechow,T.Zwickel&J.C.Minx,eds.ClimateChange2014:MitigationofClimateChange.ContributionofWorkingGroupIIItotheFifthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,UKandNewYork,NY,U.S.Smith,V.2016.ProducerInsuranceandRiskManagementOptionsforSmallholderFarmers.TheWorldBankResearchObserver31(2):271–289.Sumner,D.,Alston,J.&Glauber,J.2010.EvolutionoftheEconomicsofAgriculturalPolicy.AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics92(2):403–423.Tian,H.,Lu,C.,Ciais,P.,Michalak,A.M.,Canadell,J.G.,Saikawa,E.,Huntzinger,D.N.etal.2016.Theterrestrialbiosphereasanetsourceofgreenhousegasestotheatmosphere.Nature531(7593):225–232,SpringerNature,London.Tubiello,F.,Salvatore,M.,CóndorGolec,R.,Ferrara,A.,Rossi,S.,Biancalani,R.,Federici,S.,Jacobs,H.&Flammini,A.2014.Agriculture,ForestryandOtherLandUseEmissionsbySourcesandRemovalsbySinks:1990–2011Analysis.WorkingPaperESS/14–02,Rome,FAO.

32

UnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD).2017.UNCTADStat.http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange.2017.TheParisAgreement.http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.phpUnitedNationsGlobalCompact.2016.UNGlobalCompactCallsonCompaniestoSetUSD100MinimumInternalPriceonCarbon.22April,2016.https://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/3381-04-22-2016.UnitedNations.2015.UNSustainableDevelopmentGoals.http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/USDepartmentofAgriculture.2016.USDABuildingBlocksforClimateSmartAgricultureandForestry.Washington,DC.[Cited6June2017].https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/building-blocks-implementation-plan-progress-report.pdfUSDepartmentofAgriculture&EconomicResearchService.2017.AgricultureandClimateChange.https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/climate-change/agriculture-and-climate-change/Vermeulen,S.J.,Campbell,B.M.&Ingram,J.S.I.2012.Climatechangeandfoodsystems.AnnualReviewofEnvironmentandResources37:195–222,AnnualReviews,PaloAltoWang,G.,Ahmed,K.F.,You,L.,Yu,M.,Pal,J.&JiZ.2017.Projectingregionalclimateandcroplandchangesusingalinkedbiogeophysical–socioeconomicmodelingframework:1.ModeldescriptionandanequilibriumapplicationoverWestAfrica,JournalofAdvancesinModelingEarthSystems9:354–376,https://doi.org/10.1002/2016MS000712Westphal,M.I.,Browne,M.,MacKinnon,K.&Noble,I.2008.Thelinkbetweeninternationaltradeandtheglobaldistributionofinvasivealienspecies.BiologicalInvasions10:391.Wiebe,K.,Lotze–Campen,H.,Sands,R.,Tabeau,A.,vanderMensbrugghe,D.,Biewald,A.,Bodirsky,B.,Islam,S.,Kavallari,A.,Mason–D’Croz,D.etal.2015.Climatechangeimpactsonagriculturein2050underarangeofplausiblesocioeconomicandemissionsscenarios.EnvironmentalResearchLetters10:85010.https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/10/8/085010Williams,J.C.&Wright,B.D.1991.StorageandCommodityMarkets.NewYork,CambridgeUniversityPress.Wright,B.2014.GlobalBiofuels:KeytothePuzzleofGrainMarketBehavior.JournalofEconomicPerspectives28(1):73–98.

33

Wright,B.&Hewitt,J.1994.All–RiskCropInsurance:LessonsfromTheoryandExperience.InD.L.Hueth&W.H.Furtan,eds.EconomicsofAgriculturalCropInsurance:TheoryandEvidence,pp.73–114.Boston,KluwerAcademicPublishers.Wright,B.&Prakash,A.2011.Thefallacyofpriceinterventions:anoteonpricebandsandmanagedtariffs.InA.Prakash,ed.SafeguardingFoodSecurityinVolatileGlobalMarkets,pp.231–254.WorldBankGroup&ECOFYS.2016.CarbonPricingWatch2016.Washington,DC.https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/24288/CarbonPricingWatch2016.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=yWorldBankGroup.2017.TheWorldBankNationalAccountsdataandOECDNationalAccountsdatafiles.[Cited2November2017].https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS.WorldFoodProgramme(WFP).2010.ReviewoftheWorkingCapitalFinancingFacility.WorldFoodProgramme,Rome.Wu,J.&Adams,R.2001.Productionrisk,acreagedecisionsandimplicationsforrevenueinsuranceprograms.CanadianJournalofAgriculturalEconomics49(1):19–35.Yu,J.,Smith,A.&Sumner,D.A.2018.EffectsofCropInsurancePremiumSubsidiesonCropAcreage.AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics100(1):91-114https://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aax058Zhao,C.,Liu,B.,Piao,S.,Wang,X.,Lobell,D.B.,Huang,Yao,Huang,M.etal.2017.Temperatureincreasereducesglobalyieldsofmajorcropsinfourindependentestimates.ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciences114(35):9326–9331.https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1701762114

CA2332EN/1/11.18

ISBN 978-92-5-131101-1

9 7 8 9 2 5 1 3 1 1 0 1 1

CA2422EN/1/11.18

ISBN 978-92-5-1311117-2

9 7 8 9 2 5 1 3 1 1 1 7 2